Climate Vulnerable Forum
Trust Fund
Programme Framework

“Standing indivisible as we are in our determination to act to bring about a resolution to the global menace of climate change.”

Dhaka Ministerial Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum
(November 2011)

“You may represent different countries, but the challenges we face are common – climate change – we have to save this planet, we have to save human lives.”

UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, addressing the Climate Vulnerable Forum
(November 2011)

21 September 2012
1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) is an international platform for cooperation, coordination, advocacy and knowledge-building among developing countries that face significant insecurity due to climate change and are determined to catalyze more effective and broad-based action for tackling the global climate challenge, internationally and nationally. The Climate Vulnerable Forum acts as an ad hoc member-driven entity led by a designated rotating Chair from among its participating member states together with assistance from supporting international institutions including UN Organizations. The Forum is inclusive and its membership is open to any developing country that is climatically vulnerable and is interested to associate with the process and has encompassed a diversity of regional, geographic and socio-economic groups. Industrialized countries and intergovernmental entities have been and are invited to freely take part as Observers. Civil society, research organizations and academia have space for active engagement and involvement in the Forum’s activities as supporters of the CVF activities and goals.

The Forum’s current and incoming Chairs, respectively Bangladesh and Costa Rica, are establishing a transparent Trust Fund in order to ensure adequate, predictable and flexible finance for the Forum’s activities in the medium-term (to end-2015). This document sets out a collaborative programme framework with which the principal activities of the Forum would be realized during the 2012-2015 period, including support behind this work by UN Organizations and other partners in promotion of a resolution to the prevailing climate crisis in fulfillment of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the complementary policy guidance deriving from Rio+ 20.

1.2 The Context

1.2.1 Achieving the Objective of the UNFCCC

One of the most widely subscribed international agreements is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which enjoys near universal membership by 192 parties. The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012, the 20th anniversary of the Earth Summit that saw the birth of this agreement, the advantage of perspective also serves to highlight the dangerous lack of progress achieved by the international community in terms of addressing the fundamentals of this global challenge over a period of two decades, in particular through the effective implementation of this Convention and how to better address the needs and challenges of most vulnerable countries.

The objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. While interpretations vary, the international community’s current reference point for climate stabilization is 2 ° Celsius above pre-industrial levels. At close to 1 °C of temperature increase as of 2012, leading science implies with high confidence that current policies addressing climate change are insufficient to meet the objective of the UNFCCC.
1.2.2 POLITICAL AND POLICY REALITIES

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) consolidated analysis that indicates the mounting difficulty of meeting the UNFCCC objective, indicating that emissions of GHGs causing the rise in temperatures must be between 10 and 17 gigatons lower per year in 2020 than the outcomes of current climate policies agreed under the UNFCCC. That shortfall has been termed the “mitigation gap” (or “ambition gap”). For perspective, current global emissions are between 45 and 50 gigatons per year. Not cutting further back on emissions in accordance with science by 2020 only implies significantly larger-scale cuts would be necessary immediately or at least for every single year past 2020 - cuts that would stretch the practical or even technological limits of action. Furthermore, recent analysis by the International Energy Agency stressed that investment patterns in high-carbon infrastructure, if not altered by 2017, would entail a “lock-in” effect that could become the single factor most likely to cement a pathway towards irreversibly dangerous climate change. Coordinated global policy action to turn these patterns around prior to 2017 is therefore a necessity to safeguard the future of the planet and those populations most at risk.

Already at today’s levels of temperature increase, the costs of climate change for developing countries alone has been estimated at least between 10 billion US dollars per year to well over 100 billion dollars per year with the mean of estimates at about 50 billion dollars a year. In contrast, current commitment of international financial flows supporting adaptation to the harmful effects of climate change in developing countries as provided by Development Partners is well below the bottom end of that scale. Actual flows as much less. As a result, there is an “adaptation gap” which leaves a human toll that the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates in hundreds of thousands of premature deaths each year, since the countries worst affected typically also lack capacity to adequately respond to the new stress of climate change over and above numerous other challenges faced.

Political will and public support for ambitious or even weak climate change policies are insufficient in several of those industrial countries whose participation in a global solution to climate change is a necessity. Some industrialized countries even cast doubt on the actual impact of climate change and are refusing to restrain their carbon-intensive industry and modify energy-intensive consumption patterns. On the other hand, a number of large-scale developing country emitters, such as China, Brazil and Indonesia, now surpass many industrialized countries in terms of overall emissions. But given their development deficit they argue that reduction of poverty is the overriding priority and demand a right to continue traditional energy-intensive development. These countries do not have mandatory obligations to reduce emission of GHG. In parallel, the vulnerable countries continue to suffer from the adverse impacts of climate change. The world faces a rapidly shrinking global carbon budget. And it is clear that the major sovereign powers cannot be solely relied upon for the solution to this crisis when so much is at stake.

Indeed, against the inadequacies of politics and policies, the prospect of more than double the current temperature rise in the near future implies great peril, particularly for countries with limited coping capacities and disproportionate levels of vulnerability to the type of effects that climate change entails. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and many others have been vocal on the extent to
which the impacts of climate change are asymmetric, with the greatest share of harm being caused among countries at lower levels of the socio-economic development spectrum. That harm endangers human development progress, including towards the Millennium Development Goals, which are the international community’s primary development objectives. Climate change also implies territorial and even existential threats for some nations due to the increasing rate of sea-level rise caused by climate change, in addition to meaningful adverse influences on human migration patterns, human rights enjoyment and for cultural and ecological assets.

1.2.3 A NEW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

Hope remains, however, following the initiation of a critical phase for international climate change policy between the major UN climate summits of Copenhagen (COP15) in 2009 through to Durban (COP17) in late 2011. Three fundamental policy tracks now set for completion by the end of 2015 at the latest have created a new window of opportunity for meeting the objective of the UNFCCC. These tracks are:

- **The Climate Change Ambition-Gap** – COP17’s “Durban Platform” of negotiations, including a process to raise the level of ambition, given: “the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges … [and] having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.

- **Post-2020 International Climate Governance** – The Durban Platform is also the negotiating platform for a new legal framework applicable to all parties under the UNFCCC to come into effect and be implemented from 2020.

- **Global Climate Stabilization Target** – COP15’s Copenhagen Accord mandated assessment of a strengthening of the long-term goal for climate stabilization from a maximum temperature increase of 2 °C to one of 1.5 °C. This mandate was made more robust through inclusion as a core element of The Cancun Agreements (article 4) reached at COP16, which, contrary to the Copenhagen Accord, obliges implementation and follow-up by Parties in the context of the UNFCCC.

A wide range of other significant issues across adaptation, financing, technology, forestry, human rights, regulatory loopholes and bunker fuels, among others, also continue to be subject to ongoing debate, negotiation and development across various international fora in and outside the UNFCCC as the fast-paced policy environment of climate change continues to evolve year-on-year. In addition, 2015 is the conclusion point for the Millennium Development Goals, mixed progress towards which can also be attributed in great extent to the adverse impact of climate change.

1.2.4 A ROLE FOR VULNERABLE COUNTRIES

The theoretical basis behind this collaborative programme framework is that some one hundred developing countries with low GHG emissions and medium to low levels of economic and human development represent an untapped source of potential, which if fostered, could make a significant contribution towards overcoming the current impasse in international climate change policy at this most
critical juncture. Indeed, a majority of countries worldwide fall in this category and are home to most of the world’s population, to most of its poverty and most of the negative impacts of climate change – although bearing little of the responsibility for the problem.

Countries disproportionately vulnerable to climate change, which collectively have the most to lose from climate policy that would fail the UNFCCC’s objective, also have the most to gain from policy that would fulfill it. Each country faces similar structural challenges in the context of climate change: from vulnerability to its harmful effects to exposure or fossil fuel inflation risks or health hazards, to difficulties in accessing, attracting or absorbing external financial resources for undertaking mitigation and adaptation actions, whether from public or private sources. International emission transfer schemes moreover, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), have seen only a fractional proportion of activity benefit the majority of developing countries after more than 10 years of operation, with the whole continent of Africa almost completely uninvolved. That said, among vulnerable countries there is great variation in the degree of success they have enjoyed in overcoming such shared structural concerns, but the uptake of successful models is severely limited.

For vulnerable countries, socio-economic constraints are paramount. Within a highly complex international development environment, dozens of competing policy agendas sap at the already limited capacities to engage in systematic political organization and coordination, advocacy work and progress-tracking and accountability exercises that are all too familiar and effective as tools employed by major economies. As such, vulnerable countries have been locked out of wielding influence and fulfilling a more prominent role in shaping international policies. And yet policies shaped by this group could yield dividends for all. The marginal costs of reducing emissions in developing countries are significantly lower and technologically less challenging to address than are further domestic actions in developed economies. Effective advocacy on this realization, and supporting research, may be helpful for the developed economies to deliver on their obligations to support developing countries in meeting their own domestic obligations. This further expands the space for collaboration among the developed and the developing world. Additionally, a greater involvement of vulnerable countries, such as through the CDM projects, enhanced mitigation finance and more effective technology diffusion, would drive global economies of scale and facilitate climate action, while reaping a range of human development, health and environmental co-benefits for developing countries. More effective adaptation policy and support for that agenda would save lives and safeguard development progress and the environmental and cultural heritage of affected communities, promoting global prosperity.

For vulnerable countries, better climate policy could offer an opportunity to break out of the structural challenges that make development gains so hard fought. For the world, integrating the same group of countries as a principal actor in the solution to climate change will facilitate the global task of meeting the UNFCCC’s objective. A much wider participation of vulnerable developing countries could not only influence immediate and robust action by all major emitters with both past and present responsibilities, but could also inspire greater mitigation actions in the future. Besides, vulnerable countries can play a crucial role in enhancing the feasible
scale of global climate action - by several additional gigatons of avoided GHGs - during the determinant period of 2012 to 2020.

1.2.5 ENGINEERING CHANGE THROUGH LEADERSHIP

Transformation needs to occur in parallel at both the international level as obligatory actions and domestically within vulnerable countries as voluntary choices. Given the primacy of capacity constraints, more robust international support and partnership frameworks are needed to trigger and sustain the process of change, particularly in the short-term. But policy change - based on proven successes - is also needed inside vulnerable countries so as to prepare the ground for enhanced in-country delivery of climate action. For both these avenues of action, national leadership and collective leadership and collaboration among vulnerable countries will be an essential factor for success.

Realizing the common agenda of vulnerable countries as new partners can make a positive contribution to shifting the global dynamic towards the solutions-oriented footing so desperately needed. Appropriate space and attention are required to help build towards a much broader crystallization of the shared political perspective of vulnerable countries that can pave the way for this process.

Individually, vulnerable countries command little meaningful economic capital or coercive power in a geopolitical context. Collectively, these same countries form one of the world’s largest geopolitical blocs equipped also with a louder voice to demand immediate climate action by the responsible countries and the capacity to exercise greater moral authority than any other international actors in the climate domain.

Empowering representatives of countries interested to act as collective agents for new progress with respect to the international climate change agenda, including through autonomous domestic actions, will therefore constitute an important contribution towards tackling the crisis.

1.3 Background to the Forum

In this context, it was leaders themselves from among those countries most vulnerable to climate change who demonstrated interest and initiative in helping to carve out a different path, striving to work together to this end in a more organized, concerted and targeted fashion, with in mind to make a fuller contribution to improving international and domestic climate change policy landscapes. The Climate Vulnerable Forum is the mechanism that a growing number of countries among them established and developed to support this objective.

1.3.1 2009 GENESIS

The Climate Vulnerable Forum (hereafter: “the Forum”) was launched by the Maldives government in Malé in November 2009 just prior to COP15 at Copenhagen. It is a group of 11 countries represented by their respective government leaders, endeavoring to work united to voice their concerns, attract international attention in view of the catastrophic risks and consequences of climate change, and increase pressure on major powers for more meaningful outcomes via international climate-related policy processes like the UNFCCC.
The Forum was not conceived as yet another technical or expert-level body for climate change negotiations. Instead, it was established as a leadership forum and a communication platform to raise awareness on the dangers of climate change and the imperatives and benefits of collective actions, to voice the concerns of countries vulnerable to climate change, to share experiences in dealing with the challenge, to foster unity among vulnerable developing countries, and to catalyze consensus in international politics.

The Forum was the first international entity to adopt the climate stabilization goal of 1.5 °C, which was subsequently adopted by the Alliance of Small Island States, a UNFCCC negotiating group of more than 40 members, a move which ultimately played a major boundary delineation role to ambition scale discussions at COP15.

1.3.2 2011 DHAKA MINISTERIAL

In November 2011, following the successful holding of the third Ministerial Meeting of the Forum in Dhaka, Bangladesh assumed the Chairmanship. Bangladesh sought to add dynamism to the “CVF” and brought it forward firmly into the public and political domain.

The 2011 Dhaka Ministerial Meeting was jointly organized by the Bangladesh Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Environment and Forests. It was attended by 19 countries representing Asia, Africa, Central America, the Pacific and the Caribbean regions, with notable participation also from the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, HE Sheikh Hasina, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, HE Ban Ki-moon. The expanded Forum endorsed the Dhaka Ministerial Declaration in 14-points (see Annex I), which included a range of follow-up activities to be undertaken during the course of 2011 to 2012. The Declaration was presented to COP17 and distributed at the High-level segment, and subsequently endorsed by Rwanda.

1.3.3 FORUM MODALITIES AND MEMBERSHIP

The Declaration also agreed a reference point for provisional operational modalities of the Forum (see Annex II). The Forum’s process and activities are led by an appointed Chair for a one-year (or, exceptionally, two-year) term. The Forum is characterized as an ad hoc international cooperation entity that is both a flexible and open, inclusive, non-binding and semi-formal platform. Membership is open to developing countries that face a high degree of risks owing to climate change and are also vulnerable due to limitations in coping capacities. Any new member shall be required to endorse the fundamentals of the Forum, in particular any recent outcome documents. Interested parties are to petition the Chair with new members to be confirmed at full meetings of the Forum. The current membership of 20 countries is as follows (with Chair roles):

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh (Incumbent)
- Barbados
- Bhutan
- Costa Rica (Designate)
- Ethiopia
- Ghana
- Kenya
- Kiribati (2010)
- Madagascar
- Maldives (2009)
- Nepal
- Philippines
- Rwanda
- Saint Lucia
The Forum membership is not intended to encompass all countries considered vulnerable to climate change, but rather to embody and catalyze the movement. Therefore, the Forum intends to maintain an appropriate number of members with an upper range of 30-35 in order to ensure critical mass without becoming unmanageable.

1.4 Purpose and Goals

The Forum seeks to empower its members to collectively make a greater contribution towards the creation and implementation of more adequate, appropriate and timely climate change policies at the international and national levels. It aims to be particularly active during the critical global policy juncture during the 2012 to 2015 period. By bringing to bear the potential of a more organized, engaged, communicative, collaborative and informed set of countries who share common challenges in light of shortcomings in the prevailing global policy response to climate change, it attempts to better equip members to generate positive contributions towards necessary change in international and domestic policy agendas. In this context, stronger leadership and greater degrees of collaboration among representatives of countries vulnerable to climate change are understood to form the political backbone of any robust international policy response to climate change, and are also essential to the shaping of effective national actions on the climate front-line.

The aim of this collaborative programme framework and the Forum Trust Fund is to enable the Forum to support a dynamic horizontal partnership for cooperation and leadership among developing countries self-identified as vulnerable to climate change as a means to achieve enhanced policy outcomes for responding to the global climate challenge, internationally and locally. The Trust Fund intends to achieve that aim by facilitating the administration and predictable management of activities and to ensure sustainable resource flows now and in the future.

1.5 Principal Support Areas

The Trust Fund initially aims to support the Forum’s work across four pillars of activity, as follows:

- **South-South Cooperation** – Acting as a sustained intra-group meeting place and network for knowledge-exchange, peer-learning, collaboration and coordination that respond to the evolving demands of climate policy.

- **Advocacy** – Increasing the capacity for articulating the collective voice of numerous and wide-ranging climate vulnerable countries for greater resonance in the global debate on climate change.

- **(Third-Party) International Cooperation** – Engaging relevant international actors and Fora for consultation, dissemination, sensitization and follow-up (including *inter alia* the UNFCCC, UNCSD, Aid Effectiveness Forums, Bretton Woods and multi-lateral institutions, development partners, and other major emitters).
• **Research and Analysis** – Generating, through independent development of relevant evidence-based research, targeted analysis and policy/communication tools.

Further but as yet unidentified activity areas would be subject to definition and agreement by the Forum at official meetings.

1.6 **Expected Outcomes**

It is expected that the Trust Fund would support the Forum/members to achieve the following outcomes:

• **Unity and Consensus Promotion** – Development of common approaches to policy questions of mutual interest/concern, promoting consensus and increasing opportunities for favourable outcomes in critical international fora or with respect to key actors (multi-lateral and bi-lateral).

• **Awareness Raising** – Enhanced quantitative and qualitative contributions to the public debate on climate change, articulating collective or complementary viewpoints.

• **Increased Accountability** – A greater degree of accountability on major emitters and all countries through improved tracking of progress and heightened visibility, analysis/scrutiny and political attention for headline policy concerns.

• **Knowledge Building** – Enhanced knowledge of best practices through a cross-fertilization of member experiences as well as targeted research and policy analysis that empower the Forum/members.

1.7 **Target Groups and Processes**

The programme aims to enhance key capacities and support political leaders and senior policy-makers in Forum member countries as its primary beneficiaries. Final beneficiaries are communities most vulnerable to the adverse effects of global warming and the carbon economy. The programme ultimately aims to enhance the ability of climate change policy to deliver positive transformative change for these groups.

With these aims, the programme targets and supports engagement of primary beneficiaries with respect to the following additional actors and processes:

• **Multi-lateral Policy Processes** – The UNFCCC Conference of Parties / Conference and Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol; UN Conference on Sustainable Development; Forums on Aid Effectiveness; other relevant international fora.

• **Multi-lateral Institutions** – Bretton Woods institutions, especially the World Bank Group; other United Nations System agencies and programmes; major international actors engaged on environment, development and humanitarian issues.
• **Bi-lateral Actors** – Development Partners and Aid agencies; other industrialized and major emitter governments.

• **General Public** – Especially in major emitter countries, as well as nationally and at a global level.
1.8 Objective Tree

A full log-frame is available at Annex III.

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2 Programme of Work (2012-2015)

2.1 Overview

The Forum’s programme of work over the 2012 to 2015 period as supported by the Trust Fund is designed to provide the means for empowering climate vulnerable countries to act together as decisive agents of change, supporting a major shift in key international and national climate change policies towards a more adequate, timely and effective response to this global challenge at a highly critical juncture.

The programme of work notably includes the sustaining and strengthening of the Forum itself as a meaningful international body for horizontal partnership and leadership among countries facing high degrees of insecurity as a result of climate change that are eager to contribute actively to resolving the crisis. The work programme also foresees an Implementation Mechanism of activities that will enable the Forum’s effective operation and follow-through.

The work programme as outlined in this document figures the core activities foreseen in relation to the Forum and its Implementation Mechanism. However, the full scope and range of Forum-related activities are subject to a degree of ongoing refinement, adjustment and/or expansion following the indications of the Forum and/or its Chair, including in response to key developments in international climate change policy towards which the Forum intends to react with flexibility and responsiveness. The precise timeline of activities beyond 2012 is subject to agreement by the Forum in the course of the year’s activities.

2.2.1 THE FORUM BODY

The Forum is a flexible, open and inclusive, semi-formal and non-binding platform and political-level process of international cooperation and leadership driven by countries disproportionately vulnerable to climate change. As a Forum, it is not an organization but a meeting place or conference that convenes, in particular, senior government representatives of countries sharing significant confluence of interest and circumstances as relates to global climate change. The Forum allows for coordination and exchange among this group aimed at agenda setting and issue highlighting, the sharing of best practices, consensus building and policy convergence.

2.1.2 THE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM

A robust implementation mechanism is necessary to ensure the effective operation of the Forum both as a conference and as a political process aimed at achieving positive advances in the field of climate change policy at international and national levels. In this respect, the scope of the Implementation Mechanism encompasses the preparation and organization of the gathering of the full Forum (at Ministerial or Summit level) in substantive, logistical/administrative and communication terms. It also encompasses the follow-up and implementation of Forum priorities and decisions as well as actions aimed at amplifying the Forum’s impact and tracking the progress of third-party developments and Forum activities. Such actions include
political, technical or working-level meetings, special Task Force activities, the
development, publication and dissemination of analytical tools, and regular or
punctual communication initiatives.

2.2 Meetings, Events and Networking

The Forum’s activities are anchored in a sustained cooperation framework revolving
around a dedicated annual meeting of the full Forum at Ministerial Level, or
exceptionally, at Summit Level. The outcomes of the Forum meetings are prepared
and followed-up through specific tracks of preparatory, interim and caucusing
meetings of quorums of member representatives both in closed sessions and open
settings together with third-party stakeholders.

2.2.1 FULL FORUM

The programme foresees convening a full Forum once per year during the 2012 to
2015 period, either at Ministerial or, exceptionally, Summit Level (as agreed by the
members and Chair). It is expected that full Forum events would build on previous
meetings as described below.

The Ministerial Forum has been convened twice, first at Malé, Maldives, in 2009, and
secondly at Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2011. Furthermore, the second Forum Chair,
Kiribati, also hosted an associated meeting, the Tarawa Climate Change Conference
in 2010, which involved a number of Forum members and was a successor event to
the 2009 Forum in Malé.

The full Forum is convened each time by the Forum’s designated Chair typically in
or close to the host country’s capital city – a means of focusing attention of the
variety of climate challenges faced. With respect to timing, each full Forum event has
been held in early November within the threshold of the regular UN climate
conference itself held in late November/early December each year.

For the purpose of the full Forum, high government representatives and senior
policy specialists are sponsored to travel and participate in the event. The 2009
Forum in Malé was attended by 11 countries including several Heads of State as well
as government ministers and high representatives, while 19 countries participated in
the Ministerial Level meeting convened by Bangladesh in 2011.

Diplomatic representatives of numerous non-Forum countries and international
organizations have also been invited to participate in each full Forum event as
Observers. Senior experts, representatives of civil society, and members of the
information media have also taken active part in the full Forum events.

In terms of format, full Forums comprise:

- Ceremonial openings with formal statements;
- Closed working sessions in roundtable format at the High-Level, preceded by
  similar Senior Officer level meetings;
- Open sessions for joint interaction with Observers and civil society;
- Specialized open working or consultation sessions for different groups;
- Social, cultural and networking gatherings;
• Field visits (on occasion); and,
• Dedicated press briefings for the information media.

In terms of outputs, each Forum has produced a Declaration consolidating the current state of policy views, concerns and convergence areas of the members following detailed deliberations in closed sessions. The Full Forum also issues press releases/communiqués, meeting reports and typically publishes for public distribution both preparatory documentation and presentations and statements delivered in the open sessions of the Forum.

Past full Forum events have generated considerable media attention and public interest, and have provided a crucial space for strategic discussion and broad consensus building immediately in advance of the important UN climate conferences that conclude the global climate change negotiations each year. They enable members to track, reflect and build collective responses in respect of key policy concerns. Forums have also provided opportunity for countries to share successes and failures from country-level experiences in developing and implementing climate change policy that supports peer cross-fertilizing of important lessons learned.

In 2012, the full Forum event has been agreed to take place in Costa Rica. The Costa Rica delegation has provisionally suggested the dates of 7-8 November 2011, which will be subject to agreement by future sessions of Forum members.

2.2.2 PREPARATORY AND INTERIM MEETINGS/BRIEFINGS

In order to ensure progress against the Forum’s objectives and adequate groundwork for core meetings, the programme foresees the organization of an appropriate level of preparatory and interim or follow-up meetings and briefings each year during the period 2012 to 2015.

Full Forum events require advance briefings of diplomatic representatives, which typically involve the Geneva or New York-based Chair’s Ambassador inviting member country homologues to informational meetings for a briefing and exchange on the substantive and organizational aspects of the forthcoming event.

Interim meetings have been held at strategic intervals in the international policy calendar, such as on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly Opening phase in New York each September. This also greatly reduces (particularly travel) costs and increases availability of important senior participants.

Interim meetings may be open or closed depending on the purpose. Closed meetings allow for the Chair and leading members to update on progress and report on results achieved in the context of recent actions undertaken as well as to consult on the organization of future activities. If open, meetings offer an opportunity to engage, inform and communicate with wide-ranging non-Forum stakeholders.

The following preparatory and interim meetings are foreseen for 2012:
• May - Closed Interim Meeting at the UNFCCC intersessional (Bonn)-held.
• September – Open Interim Meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly Opening (New York).

2.2.3 CAUCISING

The Forum employs caucusing by means of meeting in closed, open or combined formats to share views and coordinate actions in the context of global decision making processes, and to ensure broad communications of Forum views and concerns in such contexts.

The Forum has held open Caucus at UNFCCC/COP, and the programme foresees periodic caucusing at key meetings during the period 2012 to 2015.

In 2012, the Forum is foreseen to Caucus at the following occasions:
• June – UN Conference on Sustainable Development/Rio+20 (Rio de Janeiro)-held.
• November/December – UNFCCC COP18 (Doha).

2.3 Task Forces

Following group meetings and consultations, the Forum Chair articulates group positions and views when engaging with key stakeholders and target processes. On important issues, the Forum can establish smaller committees of leaders as Task Forces in order to ensure political pressure is maintained for increasing the likelihood of positive progress through bilateral engagement of the Task Force with counterparts in target groups.

Task Forces aim to add focus and gravitas in complement to group and Chair actions. The scope of activities undertaken by Task Forces include in particular:

• Missions – Bi-lateral missions to address and consult with target groups in order to raise and sensitize major third-party actors to group viewpoints, to solicit input, and to benchmark progress against any significant policy commitments already made.

• Advocacy – Joint communications either as statements/communiqués, press briefings or other appropriate communication channels.

The programme foresees support behind a Troika Task Force composed of past, present and future/designated Forum Chairs to engage with target groups and processes in follow-up to headline policy areas identified by the Forum. In 2012, the programme foresees support for a ministerial level Troika mission to Washington DC and New York to engage with the US government, Bretton Woods institutions and the UN system.

2.4 Analytical Tools

The constant evolution of climate science, technological advances and developments in climate change politics and international decision-making processes spurs an
ongoing parallel demand for updated and focused analytical support behind the Forum’s policy and communication activities.

The Forum has engaged in a number of analytical solutions to meet this demand and ensure adequate preparation of its activities, including the sound grounding of policy/communication efforts in targeted independent, evidence-based research. The Forum’s mandating of the ongoing *Climate Vulnerability Monitor* research project is an example of such solutions. The Forum has also prepared and disseminated technical inputs, such as briefing documents and consultations with a panel of leading experts.

This programme foresees support behind further analytical solutions for empowering the Forum/members, including through research projects, briefing documents and technical consultations.

### 2.4.1 RESEARCH PROJECTS

The Forum or Chair mandates relevant organizations to undertake independent expert studies into specific areas of particular interest. The international development assistance and humanitarian research organization DARA was for instance commissioned to develop the *Climate Vulnerability Monitor* project. Major Forum research projects like the *Climate Vulnerability Monitor* seek to generate new insights into headline policy concerns shared by Forum members and/or to develop new analytical tools through an evidence-based study approach that assists with the assessment of key issue areas and supports Forum/member communications on such issues.

The Forum provides guidance to researchers on thematic subject areas for investigation and advice on the types and quality of information desired or deemed useful. Country case studies involving Forum members are included in research in order to help match research to policy needs and promote the horizontal cross-fertilization of learning among members. The analytical process however is left to evolve independently so as to ensure political impartiality as to the research process, and higher value for the analytical conclusions of the work undertaken.

The 2011 Forum at Dhaka planned the publication of the 2012 *Climate Vulnerability Monitor* with public release at Rio+20 in June. It also commissioned the development of a new Monitor research project, termed the “Low-Carbon Monitor”, aimed at enhancing understanding of global trends in low-carbon development, analyzing different strategies for maximizing domestic opportunities in the context of low-carbon economic transformation, and exploring and demonstrating ways in which enhanced participation of developing countries in mitigation actions could facilitate global efforts.

In 2012, the programme foresees support behind the development of the new *Low-Carbon Monitor* research project.

### 2.4.2 BRIEFING DOCUMENTS

Background reports, issue papers, technical studies or general briefing documents are commissioned by the Forum or organized by the Chair in order to ensure for the
sound substantive preparation of Forum delegates for key events, interventions and communication initiatives. Briefing documents focus on general political and policy developments or more specific priority issue areas of common concern to the Forum/members.

The programme foresees support to the development of relevant briefing documents at appropriate intervals. In 2012, the programme foresees the preparation of briefing documents as follows:

- Briefing notes on Forum activities and next steps ahead of the Interim Meeting at the May UNFCCC intersessional
- Summarizing Conclusions of the 2012 Climate Vulnerability Monitor for Forum delegates immediately ahead of the June Rio+20 meeting
- Briefing documents for delegates participating in the November full Forum event in Costa Rica

2.4.3 STRATEGIC AND TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS

In addition to but also in combination with research projects and briefing documents, the Forum also organizes consultations with leading experts for discussion and advice of a strategic or technical nature. The Forum benefits from two separate ad-hoc reference groups whose advice is solicited for this purpose, as follows:

- Advisory Panel – A body of senior leaders current or retired with recognized expertise in policy analysis or implementation at the strategic level.
- Peer Review Committee – A body of leading experts comprising a range of specialist expertise on technical aspects at a scientific or policy level of the Forum’s areas of intellectual engagement.

2.5 Communications

Advocacy and communication are central to the work of the Forum as it seeks to engage and generate resonance across the global debate on climate change including by raising the voice of the vulnerable. The Forum therefore aims to ensure pro-active communications and engagement of the information media to ensure steady growth of its reputational capital as an authoritative communicator on climate issues. As such, the programme foresees support for the Forum in establishing and maintaining online channels of communication, particularly a web portal, as well as media outreach and relations activities. A steady growth in outreach capability and online social influence will support increased impact of advocacy actions and promote achievement of the Forum’s objectives.

2.5.1 ONLINE CHANNELS

Web-based communications are central to the Forum in terms of pooling and reaching out to audiences around the world in a cost effective manner. The programme foresees the development, maintenance and steady enrichment of a web portal that will enable the Forum to give access to its activities and messages to wide-ranging stakeholders and to publicly and transparently project its voice and contributions to a global audience. Other web-based channels and online campaign tools are to be drawn upon as appropriate in order to maximize networking quality and reach. In 2012, the programme foresees the establishment of a Forum web portal
for this purpose. Building on this basis, a steady growth in online activity is foreseen during the 2012-2015 period.

2.5.2 MEDIA INITIATIVES/RELATIONS

Outbound and incoming engagement of key informational media is foreseen throughout the programme so as to ensure that advocacy initiatives and core activities of the Forum, particularly those involving senior-most officials of member governments, take full advantage of opportunities to reverberate messages and contribute to the global conversation on climate change. Regular contact, informational flow and initiatives targeting broad-based media channels are to be prioritized for maximum communications impact. Press conferences, communiqués, statements and televised debates among other media engagement options are to be utilized as appropriate.
3 Implementation Framework

3.1 Governance and Institutional Arrangements

The governance of the programme comprises the following institutional arrangements and mechanisms:

- **Forum**: An independent member state driven entity that acts as a consensus generation body and together with its Implementation Mechanism carries out agreed activities with the support of Implementation Partners, including an ad-hoc (Technical) Secretariat, as envisaged in the provisional operational modalities.

- **Trust Fund Steering Committee**: The executive authority of the Trust Fund responsible for decisions on the allocations of funds to activities and the tracking of progress with respect to activities funded.

- **Advisory Panel**: An independent body of high-level policy-makers and experts who act as a sounding board and dedicated source of strategic advice and guidance on Forum activities.

- **Ad-hoc (Technical) Secretariat**: Is responsible for supporting the Forum’s Chairs and Members in coordinating and implementing activities and supporting the governance mechanisms of the Trust Fund including working in close collaboration with the Administrative Agent as appropriate.

- **Peer Review Committee**: An independent body of senior technical experts with targeted expertise on policy areas pertinent to climate change issues who act as a sounding board and dedicated source of technical inputs on relevant Forum activities.

- **Administrative Agent**: The Administrative Agent administers Forum Trust Fund resources in accordance with the financial regulations and rule of the Fund’s Terms of Reference.

- **Implementing Partners**: Participating UN and non-UN Organizations engaged in implementing Forum activities whether or not these are supported by funds received from the Forum Trust Fund.

3.1.1 THE FORUM’S ROLE/GOVERNANCE

The Forum in its current status as an ad hoc international cooperation entity is guided in its activities by reference provisional operational modalities agreed at the 2011 full Forum meeting at Dhaka (see Annex II). The Forum agrees common priorities in group format among its members, which form the basis for any activities subsequently undertaken or policies established, including as a part of the annual work plan and for the eventual allocation of resources of the Trust Fund. Forum Chairs/members take the lead in implementing the resource mobilization strategy with support from the Technical Secretariat and in consultation with the Steering Committee. Forum leadership/members play an active role in all activities and in the
governance of the Trust Fund, including with Forum Chairs also serving as Chair of the Steering Committee.

3.1.2 TRUST FUND STEERING COMMITTEE

The Forum Trust Fund would be governed by a Steering Committee (SC) comprised of a representative group of key stakeholders and implementing partners and chair on a rotational basis by the incumbent Forum chair. The SC is responsible for approving the annual and as appropriate periodic work plans and progress reports. It approves the resource mobilization strategy. Resources will be allocated against work plans in alignment with the programme Framework and Forum priorities. The SC supervises the overall programme implementation, which aims to act on priorities set by the Forum. Decisions on activity approval, resource allocation and institutional partnerships are to be taken by consensus. The SC shall meet at least twice each year and may also hold extraordinary sessions to the regular meetings as necessary. Where in-person meetings cannot possibly take place, appropriate communication channels will be made use of.

The SC may be comprised of the following:

Chairperson:
- Forum Chair Representative, acting as Committee Chairperson with a one-year rotational cycle.

Ordinary members:
- Two more Forum representatives from among Forum Members representing the outgoing or designate Forum Chairs with a one-year rotational cycle or as decided by the Forum;
- Two representatives of donor countries with a two-year rotational cycle and right of renewal;
- One representative from each of the Implementing Partners as permanent members * to ensure transparency, but without decision making role.

Ex Officio members:
- One representative of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office of UNDP as Administrative Agent of the Fund as a permanent member;
- One representative of the Ad-hoc (Technical) Secretariat also serving as SC Secretary as a permanent member

Members of the SC will be represented at the senior, ideally, Executive-level.

3.1.3 ADVISORY PANEL

An Advisory Panel (AP) was formed and has been active since 2010 in providing strategic advice to the Forum activity of the Climate Vulnerability Monitor report project. Members of the AP will be invited to continue their involvement in support of the Forum’s broader activities under the programme. The AP is made up of

*A maximum of three Implementation Partners may hold membership in the SC at any one time. If the number of Implementing Partners for the programme exceeds three members, the SC will nominate which shall be represented on the SC.
senior-most policy experts representing a wide range of stakeholder groups and backgrounds including former heads of state and government, UN agencies as well as senior academics and civil society leaders. Participation in the AP is on a voluntary basis and in personal capacity. The AP is supported by a Peer Review Committee (PRC) engaged on similar terms to the AP and covering a range of appropriate technical scientific and policy expertise. The current composition of the AP and PRC is at Annex IV.

3.1.4 AD-HOC (TECHNICAL) SECRETARIAT

The Ad-hoc (Technical) Secretariat (TS) provides secretariat support to the Forum’s Chairs and Members in the implementation of Forum activities, including those foreseen in this programme. It oversees the day-to-day organization and coordination of work, as well as the preparation of work plans and progress reports for consideration by the board and the consolidation of proposals from Implementing Partners. The TS works in close association as appropriate with the Administrative Agent and in liaison with the Steering Committee – as Secretary – the Advisory Panel, the Peer Review Committee, other Implementation Partners and contracted agents as necessary.

In direct assistance to and in coordination with the incumbent Forum Chair, the TS assumes the following institutional and organizational responsibilities and implements activities under the guidance of the Forum Chair.

**Institutional Tasks:**
- Preparing and consolidating annual and where needed periodic work plans for approval by the SC;
- Guiding and reviewing the submission of proposals for inclusion as activities into work plans to be submitted for approval and allocation of funds by the SC;
- Recommending to the SC for its decision on proposals to be included into work plans for receipt of funds from the Forum Trust Fund;
- Developing for consideration by the SC the resource mobilization strategy, and supporting its implementation;
- Transmitting approved work plans to the Administrative Agent to guide fund disbursement;
- Synthesizing and consolidating progress reports submitted by Implementing Partners each calendar year and also periodically where necessary;
- Supporting the resource mobilization efforts of the Forum’s Chairs and Members for the capitalization and replenishment of the Forum Trust Fund;
- Supporting the coordination of the implementation of activities undertaken by Forum members and Implementation Partners, ensuring that SC approved work plans are effectively implemented and adhered to.

**Programme Tasks:**
- Organizational and logistical support as feasible for the implementation of Forum activities, including for meetings of all kinds, Task Forces, communication initiatives, and in relation to analytical tools;
- Organizing the preparation and development of substantive documentation and communications content of all kinds, including briefing notes, meeting
minutes/reports, correspondence, event programmes, press releases, and analytical tools either through internal or external means, or following proposals from Implementing Partners;
- Organizing the maintenance and regular updating of communication channels, including the public Web Portal.

For the initial phase of work under the programme, the TS function will be fulfilled in an ad hoc capacity by DARA, a principal Implementing Partner. DARA was involved in supporting the Forum following the first meeting in 2009 and brought out the initial Climate Vulnerability Monitor in 2010. It has been agreed as the current (ad-hoc) institutional support partner of the 2011 full Forum meeting at Dhaka. Establishing a permanent arrangement will be subject to further decision by the Forum and SC.

TS costs, as endorsed by the Steering Committee, are considered a direct cost from the Forum Trust Fund.

3.1.5 ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT

The UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office will be invited to fulfill the Administrative Agent (AA) function. The AA is responsible for:

- Signing an Memorandum of Understanding with each Implementing Partner;
- Negotiating and signing Standard Administrative Arrangements with donors that wish to provide contributions to the Trust Fund;
- Receiving, administering and managing contributions from donors;
- Subject to the availability of funds, disburse funds to Implementing Partners, based on SC approved work plans, and for direct costs incurred by the TC or Implementing Partners, including to perform additional tasks as requested by the SC in support of the Forum;
- Consolidating annual and final financial reports pooling information from all relevant participating entities;
- Transmitting annual/final Consolidated Reports to donors through the TS and SC.

The AA levies standardized fees charged as direct costs until such time as a 1% levy fee on each donor contribution is adequate to cover the costs of the above services. The TS may also fulfill some other functions, such as “progress reporting” in order to maximize cost efficiencies.

3.1.7 IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

Implementing Partners (IPs) include all UN and non-UN Organizations that have signed an MOU with the UNDP MPTF Office and are involved in activities in support of the Forum’s work. Where IPs receive funds from the Forum Trust Fund to implement specific activities included in the SC approved work plans, they shall assume full programmatic and financial accountability for funds transferred to them by the UNDP MPTF Office and be responsible for the following activities: the preparation and submission to the TS of proposals in accordance with Forum/SC
priorities and the fulfillment of standard reporting, monitoring and evaluation procedures, including for financial accounting purposes.

Initially, the implementing partners will be the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR); and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO);

In addition, Fundacion DARA Internacional, who is currently acting as interim Ad Hoc TS upon decision of the Forum, will operate as an implementing partner of UNDP. The Forum reserves the right to review participation of the implementing partners and scope of their participation.

Participation as an Implementing Partner is open to the relevant agencies, programmes and funds of the UN System and other intergovernmental agencies as decided by CVF. Entities with related policy interests, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) among others are encouraged to consider involvement in the Forum’s work.

3.2 Resourcing and Replenishment

3.2.1 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

The Trust Fund aims to provide a financing regime for Forum activities that is adequate, predictable, medium-term (through to end 2015) with flexibility enough to react and respond to new developments in international climate politics.

3.2.2 MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS

Forum Chairs will contribute to the financial capitalization of the Trust Fund, and any member may also contribute financially. Bangladesh as incumbent Chair has allocated up to USD 100,000 as an initial contribution to the fund. Costa Rica as Chair designate has allocated USD 50,000 as an initial contribution to the Fund.

3.2.3 OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Other interested parties and development partners will be invited by Forum representatives to join member states in contributing the capitalization of the Trust Fund.

3.2.4 BUDGET FRAMEWORK

Estimated funds required (provisional figures) are as follows:

- Core activities (as per the programme outlined in this document): may require USD 0.8 million per full year
- Flexible activities: facility of USD 0.5 million per full year
- Global 4-year funding need (2012-2015): USD 5 million
Annex I: CVF Members as of 26.09.2012 and Dhaka Ministerial Declaration

**Members**

Afghanistan  
Bangladesh  
Bhutan  
Costa Rica  
Ethiopia  
Ghana  
Kenya  
Kiribati  
Madagascar  
Maldives  
Nepal  
Philippines  
Rwanda  
Saint Lucia  
Tanzania  
Timor-Leste  
Tuvalu  
Vanuatu  
Vietnam
The Dhaka Ministerial Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum  
14 November 2011

We, Ministers and representatives of Governments from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and the Pacific, members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, representing a significant number of countries most vulnerable to climate change and meeting in Dhaka on 14 November 2011,

Recalling the 2009 Male' declaration as the founding document of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, created at the initiative of the Republic of Maldives, and the 2010 Ambo Declaration, agreed under the leadership of the second Forum chair, the Republic of Kiribati,

Mindful of the firmly robust and unequivocal scientific basis of accelerating global climate change, wherein human activities are indisputably the principal and growing cause as well as of the imperative to act with urgency,

Standing indivisible as we are in our determination to act to bring about a resolution to the global menace of climate change which ultimately entails ever greater human suffering, inequity and irreversible damage to the Earth,

Resolve thereby in our commitment to pursuing, autonomously as an independent strategic choice and to the extent possible, national green development pathways, in spite of our limited capacities and negligible present and historical contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are the principal cause of climate change,

Reaffirming herein the objectives and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as the commitments of its parties, to enable its full, effective and sustained implementation through immediate and long-term cooperative action,

Acknowledging that the challenges of climate change are global in nature and call for the most extensive and inclusive cooperation by all countries, on the basis of equity and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities, historical responsibility, and respective capabilities and socio-economic conditions as laid down in the UNFCCC,

Concerned at the findings of the Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2010, an independent study examining the current and near-term socio-economic impacts of climate change that point to a large-scale and growing worldwide crisis,

Noting that many heavily affected developing countries are low-lying, small-islands, isthmus, landlocked, remotely located, arid and semi-arid and least developed; and are faced with rapid on-set and/or slow on-set climate phenomena affecting productive capacities, and often reversing developmental gains,

Noting further that climate change is rendering development projects costlier and compelling diversion of already inadequate funds from development to costly adaptation programmes,

Mindful nonetheless of the possibility that highly effective adaptation responses to climate change could be capable of limiting, in a cost-effective manner, a significant range of adverse socio-economic and environmental consequences, particularly with respect to human health,

Aware that climate change induced displacement of people is a major concern and their relocation
puts enormous pressure on infrastructures and service facilities; and furthermore, large-scale displacement has the potential to transform into security concerns,

**Recognising** that migration is a viable adaptation strategy to ensure that populations are not compelled to reside in high risk and affected areas, and to manage risks during displacement; and furthermore a planned strategy in the long-term to offer displaced populations with enhanced options for a dignified and diversified livelihood,

**Emphasizing** that climate change related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indirect, undermining our government’s ability to ensure the full and effective enjoyment of human rights and that resultant humanitarian crises, if not adequately addressed, may create multifaceted security challenges,

**Seized** in this light of the window of opportunity for preventing irreversible changes nationally regionally, and globally as fast narrowing and that a failure to arrest further anthropogenic factors to climate change indeed implies existential threats for a significant number of the most vulnerable countries,

**Reaffirming also** the continued relevance of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,

**Recalling** the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements including commitments made by industrialized countries to take mitigation actions and developed countries to provide specified quantities of climate finance for the adaptation and mitigation actions of developing countries,

**Recognizing** the inadequacy of essential commitments, in particular of mitigation actions proposed by industrialized countries for containing global temperature rise within the current internationally agreed goal of less than 2 degrees Celsius,

**Expressing deep concern** at the very slow realization of essential commitments, as well as the real possibility of a vacuum in the international, legally-binding framework governing GHG emission reductions at the expiry of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which could seriously endanger political and economic momentum,

**Determined** to seize this challenge of climate change as an opportunity for the manifestation of our resolve to attain sustainable development to help lead the world into a new era of prosperity in fullest harmony with the Earth and in the interest of the younger and future generations,

**Adopt the following Declaration:**

1. We underscore that it is incumbent upon the developed countries, given their historical responsibility to climate change and taking into account their commitments to reduce our vulnerability, to extend all necessary support to our vulnerable countries so as to be able to respond to the challenges posed by climate change.

2. We renew calls for a comprehensive legally-binding global agreement capable of fully attaining the objective of the UNFCCC, in all urgency and into the long-term, and voice the
imperative for a well-calibrated balance in the global focus on adaptation and mitigation with emphasis on development and easy transfer of environmentally sound technology in nationally determined priority areas;

3. We, as vulnerable countries, resolve to demonstrate moral leadership by committing to a low-carbon development path on a voluntary basis within the limitations of our respective capabilities, which are to a large extent externally determined by the availability of appropriate financial and technological support, and call on all other nations to follow this moral leadership.

4. Adaptation
   - We underscore the need of focusing on adaptation in particular in the short term in order to minimize growing and widespread harm, and seek support for initiatives and projects on adaptation with a view to developing and realizing urgent country-driven adaptation activities;
   - We call upon developed countries to support implementation in the developing countries, particularly in the most vulnerable countries, of our national adaptation plans and climate resilient development strategies and low carbon development plans;

5. Mitigation
   - We reiterate our firm resolve to work collectively with the other Parties to the UNFCCC towards limiting foreseeable global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, peaking global GHG emissions by 2015, and thereafter achieving progressively ambitious emission reduction targets every subsequent decade targeting a sharp decline to a global reduction of 85% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels, and long-term atmospheric GHG concentrations to 350 ppm;  
   - We underline the imperative for securing a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol with no gap between first and second commitment periods and the immediate conclusion of a broad-based and inclusive legally binding agreement on GHG emission cuts, enacted by all Parties on the basis of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities;
   - We seek necessary and immediate support for undertaking programmes to uphold mitigation by creating carbon sinks, dissemination of environmentally sound technologies, and establishing a balance in the energy mix by focusing on renewable and/or alternative energy;

6. Finance
   - We demand that climate finance under the authority of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC must be truly new and additional to Official Development Assistance commitments, as well as adequate, predictable, transparent and with comparable reporting, easily and directly accessible, and that may be supplemented through innovative sources of financing;
   - We demand further that decisions taken at Cancun on finance are realized through immediate implementation by ensuring accelerated disbursement of commitments made, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries, easy and direct access for nationally determined priority projects, preferably through public channels. We also demand early establishment of the Green Climate Fund, which itself should achieve operational implementation by 2013 at the latest;
   - We call upon the developed countries to make firm commitments on a progressive increase of funds with a specific and reasonable annual enhancement in the period 2013-2020 leading to USD 100
billion per year (in 2009 dollars) under the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and to realize those commitments;

- We underscore the need for establishing a balanced adaptation window of at least a 50 percent allocation on adaptation for all climate finance within the GCF to address requirements of the most vulnerable countries in relation to the number of people affected, and the extent of the challenge of reducing vulnerability and consequential adverse effects;

- We request that adaptation funds also be made available on an ongoing and predictable basis for the anticipated emergency response to severe weather events, with particular priority for vulnerable countries;

7. Transfer of technology and capacity building

- We declare that the most vulnerable countries need critical support from the international community in the areas of transfer of technology for adaptation in particular, but also for mitigation actions, and for both public and private sector capacity building;

- We call for ensuring fuller and more pragmatic technology development, including appropriate models for generating hydrological scenarios at different scales in the affected regions to enhance water security through the adoption of climate resilient techniques, transfer and research and development to support crucial adaptation and green growth in vulnerable countries;

- We also call for an immediate agreement to begin the progressive release and transfer of all technologies of beneficial effect for the adaptation and green development actions of vulnerable countries commensurate to the challenge of tackling climate change as implied by science, and including patented knowledge where these have resulted from the investment of public monies;

- We request for enhanced international collaboration and greater support on capacity building in order to enable us to respond effectively and comprehensively to minimize our risks to and impact of climate change, including the early, adequate and appropriately prioritized resourcing of the Climate Technology Centre and Network included in the Cancun Agreements;

- We further request for technical assistance for public and private sector capacity building in our countries targeted at the development, registration and scaling-up of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects with high payoffs for adaptation as well as wider socio-economic/environmental co-benefits;

8. General points

- We urge the UN System, International Financial Institutions and other global organizations and forums to focus on building greater convergence on recognizing the nexus among environment, climate change, migration and development, and to work towards an enhanced reflection of the vulnerability of affected countries in the prioritization of projects and programmes under their respective mandated responsibilities.

- We acknowledge the expression of solidarity of the UN Secretary-General and request him to use all means available to his Office to promote our cause and remain engaged with the Climate Vulnerable Forum;
We call for a common framework/criteria for assessing climate vulnerability with respect to the allocation of funds, (giving due consideration, inter alia, to the scale and extent of the present impacts of intensifying natural disasters, likely losses and risks in future, respective capabilities and socio-economic conditions, and people exposed to the impact of climate change country by country);

In particular, we call for the immediate implementation of paragraph 14 (f) of the Cancun Agreements, which recognizes that migration is a viable adaptation strategy to address human displacement induced by climate change, and includes undertaking measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate-induced displacements, migration and planned relocation; and in this respect call for the commencement of an international dialogue for an appropriate framework;

9. We urge the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), 2012 to recognize the very limited progress in achieving the objective of the UNFCCC and endorse the fundamental need to redouble efforts to limit further harm due to climate change;

10. We agree to work together in order to ensure widest possible dissemination of this declaration among all relevant national and international actors;

11. We recognize the important requirement of having enhanced clarity on the operational modalities of the Climate Vulnerable Forum and take note of a non-paper on provisional operational modalities as circulated by the People’s Republic of Bangladesh as a reference document;

12. We agree to that Costa Rica would host the next Forum.

13. We also agree on the following as part of the agreed Forum activities for November 2011-June 2012:

a. Durban UNFCCC COP-17, South Africa: Side Event and delegation briefings to disseminate and support awareness, dialogue and implementation of the Dhaka declaration (November/December 2011).

b. Roll-out CVF web site development (from January 2012).

c. Rio+20 Technical Meeting to fine-tune substantive CVF inputs (April 2012).

d. UNFCCC First Sessional: Feed-in delegate briefing documents updated against outcomes at/since COP-17 and delegate feedback, plus CVF focal point action (May 2012).

e. Launch of second Climate Vulnerability Monitor report (June 2012).

f. Rio+20 Caucusing: High-level coordination and communication (June 2012).

[g. Commence work on a new Low-Carbon Development Monitor]

14. We express our deep appreciation to Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh for hosting the Climate Vulnerable Forum 2011 in Dhaka.

*Adopted at Dhaka, Bangladesh on 14 November 2011*
Annex II: Provisional CVF Operational Modalities

Non-paper

Provisional Operational Modalities for the Climate Vulnerable Forum

Background

The Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) was founded in November 2009 as a group of nation states represented by their respective government leaders who convened in Male from around the world to act together on the concerns each share as a result of human-induced global climate change. Since then the Forum has met at number of times in New York, USA and Tarawa, Kiribati. One of the major objectives of the Ministerial Meeting of the Climate Vulnerable Forum in Dhaka on 13-14 November 2011 is to enhance the ability of the vulnerable countries to address key challenges and seize all opportunities in this domain, through greater coordination and consultation between CVF member countries, as the multiple-paced climate change field of policy continues to evolve through 2011-2012.

The CVF is yet to take firm root and is poised to cross the threshold of exploratory to a consolidation phase. But, the challenges faced by its member countries are real and long-term that call for an institutional framework to respond to the imperative of its sustainability and long-term needs. Hence, there is an imperative to develop convergence of views on its objectives, characteristics, scope, extent and modalities for its engagement and operation.

Objective

Aims of the CVF include, inter alia, (i) agenda setting for highlighting concerns, issues and challenges faced by the climatically vulnerable countries; (ii) sharing of good practices on adaptation, mitigation, sustainable development, green economy; (iii) consensus building and position convergence; (iv) articulation of common concerns, views and position; (v) building trust among all stakeholders and breaking down divides; and (vi) contribute to a truly inclusive and responsible global climate governance regime.

Characteristics of the Forum

The CVF may be identified with the following characteristics:

a. Flexible and open: Countries may choose to join and discontinue its participation. The platform may maintain flexible engagement with observers and non-state-stakeholders, as necessary.
b. Inclusive: As climate change is generally non-discriminatory, the membership may not be limited to any specific region and to countries impacted by a or a group of specified phenomenon.
c. Semiformal platform: The Forum may be in the middle way between a formal and an informal entity. This may be understood in value-neutral terms, whereby participants may not be put in a negotiating position to defend perceived national interests. Semi-formality is to circumvent barriers of cooperation, and to allow non-members to also contribute in the process of collective examination of issues, if so required. This is not to suggest a casual approach and an absence of procedures.
d. Modalities for efficient functioning: The CVF may agree on modalities in respect of membership and on various organisational aspects such as Chairmanship, consultation process, periodicity of meetings and events, coordination and follow-up etc.

e. Non-binding: Member countries are not expected to negotiate binding rules and may not be obliged to implement decisions and recommendations.

f. Focused: It may focus on adverse impacts of climate change, efforts to reduce vulnerability (including enhancing coping capacities and reducing disaster risk reduction), securing external support for effective adaptation, sustainable development without compromising on the primacy of development and poverty reduction, clean energy and technology to contribute to voluntary mitigation, adaptation-mitigation-development nexus, and other agreed priorities.

g. Forum as a process: The CVF may not conduct one-off events only. It may seek to have technical meetings to identify issues and share experiences coupled with political level engagements to create greater convergence, develop ownership and to pronounce views and preferences. Periodicity and level of political level engagement (Ministerial and Summit) may be flexible and may respond to the need of the time. It may employ caucusing to reflect its concerns and views in appropriate and global decision making processes.

h. Networking: It may maintain virtual network through secure websites and assigned nodal points.

Membership

Most vulnerable countries from Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean which attended the CVF meetings in Male', Ambo and Dhaka will form the initial membership of the Forum. Member countries will enjoy the flexibility to discontinue participation. Each member will designate focal point(s) within its national authorities for the purpose of coordination and follow up.

New members may be added from among developing countries that are faced with high degree of risks owing to climate change and are also vulnerable due to inadequate coping capacities. The Forum may seek to maintain an appropriate number of members given the requirement of critical mass and to avoid a situation of being unwieldy. The CVF may revisit the question of its membership at a reasonable periodicity (say every 5 years). Any new member shall be required to endorse the fundamentals of the Forum and in particular endorse recent outcome documents of the Forum. Any new proposal for inclusion and expansion of the Forum may be considered by the CVF Summit.

The CVF may engage observer countries for developing effective partnership. Likewise, it may seek to engage relevant UN agencies, international institutions and other actors. The CVF may also benefit from its engagement with select local and international experts and representatives of leading civil society organizations and private sector.

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1 At present, the membership may remain within a range of 30-35.
Leadership issues
   a. The CVF Chair will lead the process for a defined period (one / two years)
   b. The Chair will articulate group position and views while engaging with other forums and contribute to other discussions. In the absence of the Chair, either the past or the future Chair (if already known) may represent the Forum.
   c. On important issues, the Chair may avail the services of a troika of the past, present and future (if known). Other past Chairs may also be appropriately consulted, if it is so required.
   d. Chair will contact members through designated focal points and normal diplomatic channels.
   e. The Chair may obtain services of an appropriate arrangement and a relevant organisation to conduct studies or preparing background papers on issues of common concerns.

Coordination and follow-up
   The CVF may carefully examine the crucial role generally played by a coordination arrangement in supporting Chairs and following-up on decisions. This may be required for contacting stakeholders, disseminating information, facilitating follow-up of decisions and providing managerial support. Additionally, it may be assigned to conduct studies and prepare background papers. It may maintain a webportal.

   The Chair may maintain a coordination hub that may rotate till the time the Forum decides to have a permanent secretariat, services of an interested, reputed and neutral organisation (such as DARA) may be utilised as an ad-hoc Secretariat.

Structuring of meetings
   The CVF may generally meet at the Ministerial level, with the provision of Summit level interactions. Ministerial meetings may be held once in 2 years, unless there are compelling reasons for additional Ministerial meeting(s) in between. Summit level Forum may be held once in 4-5 years and as agreed by the membership and necessitated by global developments.

   The political engagements may be followed up with a feasible implementation mechanism at the technical level. Expert level/ senior official level meetings and interactions may be organised in between Ministerial meetings as per requirement. Technical event(s) may also be organised.

Financing
   The Chair may mobilise resources for events and programmes of the Forum. Beyond its own contributions, it may generate resources from voluntary contributions made by member countries, financial support from observers and any other contribution received from donor countries and organisations. The Chair may also consult interested donors and external entities to mobilise financial resources and seek to create a trust fund.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Focus Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Select Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Goal**              | - Empower vulnerable countries as “Collective Agents” for realizing enhanced international/national climate change policies | - Quantity/quality of Forum members influence in international fora  
- Effectiveness of Forum members’ national climate policies  
- Convergence of policy outcomes of international fora with Forum positions | - Scale/quality of coverage of member statements/actions at international fora in the media and standard reporting documentation  
- Scale and rate of change of external climate-related finance (public and private) and CDM activity  
- Progress in reducing vulnerabilities evident in headline socio-economic indicators  
- Comparative analysis of outcome documents against official Forum policy/communication documents (i.e. Declarations) and activity reports (i.e. Meeting minutes) | - Country risks may effect political involvement in international fora and national policy development and implementation  
- The global macro-economic situation may affect future levels of climate finance and capacity building support available  
- Political issues may affect the volume of demand through the CDM |
| **Purpose/Objectives**| - Promote Unity and Consensus | - Quality/quantity of convergence policy areas  
- Quantity of countries in agreement on key policy questions | - Official forum policy/communication documents  
- Media reports or standard reporting documentation on key international fora or international policy issues | - Quantity/quality of collective convergence points threatened by stringent positions of other major regional or thematic groups  
- Key Forum |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Raise Awareness</td>
<td>• Quantity/quality of coverage of Forum actions/communications in conventional and new media</td>
<td>• Media monitoring and press clippings</td>
<td>events/initiatives overshadowed by other high-profile international developments</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Trends in the quantity/quality of public debate on core Forum issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Leading international actors fail to prioritize engagements with Forum members</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Media monitoring and press clippings</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Country risks or competing national priorities (i.e. elections) inhibit the quality/quantity of member participation in Forum activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increase Accountability Levels</td>
<td>• Quantity/quality of interactions between Forum agents and international actors</td>
<td>• Forum activity reports • Media monitoring and press clippings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Quantity/quality of public debate in conventional and new media focused on policy issues at the national and international levels</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Knowledge Empowerment</td>
<td>• Quantity of delegates exposed to knowledge tools or learning opportunities</td>
<td>• Meeting participation lists • Document distributions lists (hard and soft copy) • Country statement/policy analysis versus documentation generated</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Quantity of country statements/policies reflecting aspects of knowledge tools or learning provided</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>• Meetings, Events and Networking</td>
<td>• Quantity/quality of participation in Forum meetings</td>
<td>• Meeting participation lists • Forum activity reports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Task Forces</td>
<td>• Quantity/quality of missions and advocacy initiatives held</td>
<td>• Forum activity reports • Media monitoring and press clippings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Analytical Tools</td>
<td>• Quality/quantity of published documents (reports, briefing notes etc.) •</td>
<td>• Hard and soft copies of published documents • Document distributions lists (hard and soft copy) • Forum activity reports</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communications</td>
<td>• Online traffic and mentions/visibility • Quantity/quality of conventional and new media coverage</td>
<td>• Web analytics and social media volume tracking • Media monitoring and press clippings</td>
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</table>
Climate Vulnerability Initiative

ADVISORY PANEL MEMBERS

SEPTEMBER 2012

Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the Panel of the Wise of the African Union; Chief Advisor to the Former President of Ghana; Former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO)

Helen Clark, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

José María Figueres, Former President of Costa Rica; Chairman of the Carbon War Room

Robert Glasser, Secretary General, CARE International, Geneva

Saleemul Huq, Director, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Independent University, Dhaka

Yolanda Kakabadse, International President, WWF

Ashok Khosla, President, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN); Chairman of Development Alternatives, Co-Chair of the UN Resources Panel

Ricardo Lagos, Former President of Chile; Former President of the Club of Madrid

Loren Legarda, Senator of the Philippines; UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Regional Champion for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation for Asia and the Pacific

Michael Marmot, Director, International Institute for Society and Health, University College, London

Simon Maxwell, Executive Chair, Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN)

David Nabarro, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Food Security and Nutrition

Atiq Rahman, Executive Director, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), Dhaka

Teresa Ribera, Former Secretary of State for Climate Change of Spain

Johan Rockström, Executive Director, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and Stockholm Resilience Centre

Jeffrey Sachs, Director, The Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York

Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Founding Director of the Potsdam Institute for
Composition of Advisory Panel & Peer Review Committee (September 2012)
Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Javier Solana, President, ESA DE Center for Global Economy and Politics; Distinguished Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Chairman, Aspen Institute España

Andrew Steer, President, World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C.

Margareta Wahlström, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction

Michael Zammit Cutajar, Former Executive Secretary, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Climate Vulnerability Initiative

PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE MEMBERS

SEPTEMBER 2012

Yasemin Aysan, Former Under Secretary General, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Suruchi Bhadwal, Associate Director, Earth Sciences and Climate Change Division, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi

Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum, Senior Scientist, Public Health and Environment, World Health Organization (WHO)

Manuel Carballo, Executive Director, International Centre for Migration, Health and Development (ICMHD), Geneva

Ian Christoplos, Senior Project Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen

Joshua Cooper, Director, Hawaii Institute for Human Rights Mariane Diop Kane, Head of Forecasting, Agence Nationale de la Météorologie du Sénégal (ANAMS)

Sean Doolan, Climate Change & Environmental Governance Advisor, United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID), Ghana

Pierre Encontre, Chief, Special Programmes, Division for Africa, Least Developed Countries and Special Programmes, UN Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD)

Hans-Martin Füssel, Project Manager for Climate Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation at the European Environment Agency (EEA)

Tim Gore, International Policy Advisor for Climate Change, Oxfam International Advocacy Office, New York

Anne Hammill, Senior Researcher, Climate Change and Energy, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Geneva

Randolph Kent, Director, Humanitarian Futures Programme, King’s College, London

Tord Kjellstrom, Senior Professor, Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine, Umeå University; Visiting Fellow, Honorary Professor, Australia National University, Canberra, and University College, London

Isabel Kreisler, Climate Policy Specialist, Environment and Energy Group, Bureau for Development Policy, Bureau for Development Policy, United
Composition of Advisory Panel & Peer Review Committee (September 2012)
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Juergen Kropp, Head, North-South Research Group, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Allan Lavell, Coordinator, Programme for Disaster Risk Management, Secretary General’s Office, Latin America Social Science Faculty (FLASCO), San José

Marc Levy, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Earth Institute at Columbia University, New York

Filipe Lúcio, Head of the Global Framework for Climate Services, World Meteorological (WMO)

Urs Luterbacher, Chairman, Environmental Studies Unit, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

Andrew Maskrey, Coordinator, Global Assessment Report (GAR), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)

Benito Müller, Director Energy and Environment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

Michele de Nevers, Visiting Senior Associate, Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C.

Martin Parry, Fellow, Grantham Institute for Climate Change, Imperial College, London

James Roop, Climate Change Advisor for Asia and Pacific, Climate Change Branch, AusAID

Ben Ramalingam, Visiting Fellow, Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and Research Associate, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London

Carlo Scaramella, Coordinator, Office for Climate Change, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction, UN World Food Programme (WFP)

Matthias Schmale, Under Secretary General, National Society and Knowledge Development, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Farhana Yamin, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton