

**Libya Electoral Assistance Project
MPTF OFFICE GENERIC FINALPROGRAMME¹ NARRATIVE REPORT
REPORTING PERIOD: FROM 03.2012 TO 12.2012**

<p align="center">Programme Title & Project Number</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme Title: Libya Electoral Assistance Project • Programme Number (if applicable) • MPTF Office Project Reference Number:³ 	<p align="center">Country, Locality(s), Priority Area(s) / Strategic Results²</p> <p><i>Libya</i> <i>Arab States</i></p> <p><i>Priority area: Democratic Governance</i> <i>Strategic results: Elections, civic education and CSO development, women's empowerment and participation</i></p>
<p align="center">Participating Organization(s)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations Development Programme (Libya Electoral Assistance Project) 	<p align="center">Implementing Partners</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • N/A
<p align="center">Programme/Project Cost (US\$)</p> <p>Total approved budget as per project document: \$19,859,075</p> <p>MPTF /JP Contribution⁴:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>by Agency (if applicable)</i> \$4,626,524 • <i>Agency Contribution</i> \$0 • <i>by Agency (if applicable)</i> <p>Government Contribution (if applicable) \$6,000,000</p> <p>Other Contributions (donors) (if applicable) \$6,074,289</p> <p>TOTAL: \$16,700,813</p>	<p align="center">Programme Duration</p> <p>Overall Duration (months) 34</p> <p>Start Date⁵ (dd.mm.yyyy) 14.03.2012</p> <p>Original End Date⁶ (dd.mm.yyyy) 31.12.2013</p> <p>Actual End date⁷ (dd.mm.yyyy) 31.12.2014</p> <p>Have agency(ies) operationally closed the Programme in its(their) system? Yes No <input type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Expected Financial Closure date⁸: TBC</p>
<p align="center">Programme Assessment/Review/Mid-Term Eval.</p> <p>Evaluation Completed <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No Date: dd.mm.yyyy</p> <p>Evaluation Report - Attached <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No Date: dd.mm.yyyy</p>	<p align="center">Report Submitted By</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Name: Melissa Rudderham ○ Title: Reporting & Coordination Officer ○ Participating Organization (Lead): UNDP Libya ○ Email address: melissa.rudderham@undp.org

¹ The term “programme” is used for programmes, joint programmes and projects.
² Strategic Results, as formulated in the Strategic UN Planning Framework (e.g. UNDAF) or project document;
³ The MPTF Office Project Reference Number is the same number as the one on the Notification message. It is also referred to as “Project ID” on the project’s factsheet page on the [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#).
⁴ The MPTF/JP Contribution is the amount transferred to the Participating UN Organizations – see [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#)
⁵ The start date is the date of the first transfer of the funds from the MPTF Office as Administrative Agent. Transfer date is available on the [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#)
⁶ As per approval of the original project document by the relevant decision-making body/Steering Committee.
⁷ If there has been an extension, then the revised, approved end date should be reflected here. If there has been no extension approved, then the current end date is the same as the original end date. The end date is the same as the operational closure date which is when all activities for which a Participating Organization is responsible under an approved MPTF / JP have been completed. As per the MOU, agencies are to notify the MPTF Office when a programme completes its operational activities. Please see [MPTF Office Closure Guidelines](#).
⁸ Financial Closure requires the return of unspent balances and submission of the [Certified Final Financial Statement and Report](#).

FINAL PROGRAMME REPORT FORMAT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The year of 2012 was an extraordinary one in Libya's history. Following the revolution of the previous year, Libyans began to reconstitute their structures of governance. The 7 July 2012 election of Libya's National Congress constituted a critical milestone on the country's path towards democracy, paving the way for a peaceful handover of power between the National Transitional Council and the democratically-chosen General National Congress (GNC). At stake were 200 seats in the new legislative authority that would oversee the creation of the assembly tasked with drafting Libya's constitution. Over 2.8 million Libyan voters registered for the polls, with 1.77 million casting ballots. By 1 August, final results were announced.

The UN provided electoral assistance to the process in accordance with the mandate provided through Security Council Resolution 2040 (2012), which specified that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) should offer strategic and technical advice to electoral process, emphasizing issues such as capacity strengthening, transparency, accountability, empowerment of women and minorities and coordination of international assistance. Under the overall leadership of UNSMIL, the electoral team tasked with implementing this mandate brought together capacities from UNSMIL, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and other international organisations. The principal vehicle through which UNDP supported the integrated effort was the Libya Electoral Assistance Project (UNDP LEAP).

The overarching goal of LEAP was to support Libyan authorities in a coordinated fashion to prepare for and conduct well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represent the will of the Libyan people and meet international best practices. Support in its first year of operations was spread across seven outputs. Much effort focussed on day-to-day strategic and technical advice to Libya's High National Election Commission, delivered by a contingent of international advisors, in areas including civic and voter education, strengthening of media, support to observer liaison, media centre administration, security, graphic design, and tally centre management. Concurrently, long-term institutional capacity development was pursued through a series of training events, sub-regional forums and study trips to countries such as Mexico, Tunisia and Jordan, with the goal of ensuring that a nucleus of leadership and critical staff built background skills and knowledge in areas related to electoral administration. Finally, operational support to the 2012 electoral process formed an important part of overall LEAP efforts, particularly the provision of specialists in areas such as ballot design and the procurement of electoral materials that included 45,000 voter registration books, 3,500 voter registration kits, 1 million laminates, 15,000 ballot boxes, 7,100 polling kits, 20,000 polling booths, 14,200 bottles of indelible ink, and over 8 million ballots.

Though the electoral process was considered successful overall, several key lessons have been articulated and codified by UNEST, both to strengthen the administration of future elections and to ensure subsequent electoral assistance can be as effective as possible. In future planning, additional attention will be directed to identified areas, such as: working towards improved institutional communication; the legal framework; coordination mechanisms between main Libyan actors, and increasing the timing and scope of voter education and information efforts. Going forward, the UN will need to balance the constraints arising from the lack of clarity on the future electoral calendar with meaningful opportunities to take capacity development forward, and put in place tools that can help future operations. To this end three pillars emerged as the basis for continued UN support to the electoral sector in Libya in 2013: 1) operational and technical support to electoral events; 2) consolidation of the electoral administration capacity; and 3) promotion of electoral awareness and knowledge on priority themes.

I. Purpose

UN electoral assistance to the 2012 election of Libya's GNC was implemented pursuant to a mandate delivered through Security Council Resolution 2040 (2012). To accomplish this, an integrated electoral team was fielded - the UN Electoral Support Team (UNEST) - composed of experts and staff from UNSMIL,

UNDP and UNOPS. The team was to offer strategic and technical advice in support of the Libyan electoral process, as well as “assistance that improves institutional capacity, transparency and accountability, promotes the empowerment and political participation of women and minorities and supports the further development of Libyan civil society.” UNDP’s principle vehicle for contributing to the integrated effort was UNDP LEAP, which came into being on 5 March upon the signature of its project document. The overarching goal of UNDP LEAP as part of UNEST is to support Libyan authorities in a coordinated fashion to prepare for and conduct well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represented the will of the Libyan people and met international best practices⁹. This goal was consistent with the first outcome in UNDP’s Country Programme Action Plan for Libya: the facilitation of “active participation of citizens in the democratic transition of their nation.”

II. Assessment of Programme Results

i) Narrative reporting on results:

The overall outcome of the programme was “enhanced national capacity to run inclusive elections”. In 2012, UNDP LEAP contributed to this outcome through delivering technical expertise, as well as operational services to facilitate the conduct of the 2012 election of Libya’s 200-member transitional legislative body, the GNC. Support by UNDP formed part of an integrated effort headed by UNSMIL and executed in tandem with other organizations. The election, led by UNEST’s principal implementing partner, HNEC, was considered highly successful. The process was lauded by actors from across the political spectrum, including political entities, candidates, media, domestic and international observers and voters.

In pursuing the outcome listed above, UNDP LEAP’s work as part of UNEST was organized into seven outputs which focussed largely, though not exclusively, on complementary support (i.e. vulnerable groups, strengthening of media, support to observer liaison, support to political party and candidate liaison, etc.) and long-term institutional capacity development. A brief overview of significant results is provided below:

Output one as articulated in the UNDP LEAP project document was to “strengthen organisational, management, and operational capacities of HNEC to plan, prepare, conduct and manage elections.” The output was designed to enable the conduct of the GNC elections in July 2012 and to lay the foundation for a professional, sustainable administration at the conclusion of the electoral process. A total of 14 international advisors were provided over 2012 (7 UNDP; 7 UNOPs), in training, public outreach, external relations, media centre management, graphic design, logistics, data management, and security. The role of the advisors was to provide guidance to the HNEC Board of Commissioners and its Administration on the steps of the process, the elements required and the timeline that would be needed in order to hold the election in accordance with the constitutionally-mandated timeline. As part of day-to-day technical assistance, UNEST advisors assisted HNEC to troubleshoot unexpected situations. For instance, when the cascade training system that underpinned the training of polling staff was threatened by factors such as a revised polling date and scheduling conflicts between the new training period and the school examination period (as most polling staff were teachers or school administrators), UNEST advisors worked with HNEC’s Training Division and Public Outreach Department to implement mitigating measures such as refresher trainings, simulations and the production of a supplementary training video.

Early in the planning for the GNC election, HNEC determined they would prefer the UN to conduct procurement of electoral materials produced outside of Libya, as they had only been in existence for several weeks and were, understandably, not yet able to reliably conduct international procurement. UNEST procured all electoral materials that were to be acquired internationally, including: voter registration cards, training kits, polling kits, ballot boxes, voter screens, ink and ballots. Procurement was conducted through UNDP’s Procurement Support Office in Copenhagen, which could employ pre-cleared suppliers in order to ensure a quick turnaround. Polling materials were delivered between 17 and 29 May, except for ballots

⁹ United Nations Development Programme, “Project Document: Libya Electoral Assistance Project,” 5 March 2012.

which were printed after the finalisation of the candidate list on 17 June. On 26 and 29 June, over eight million ballots¹⁰ and 5,000 additional voter screens were received in Tripoli.

Though a comprehensive programme of capacity development for HNEC staff was not possible prior to the GNC election given the substantial workload and high tempo of operations, UNEST nonetheless supported targeted study trips and professional development activities in order that a nucleus of leadership and critical staff would have background knowledge in electoral systems and processes. These included an induction training for newly-appointed HNEC Commissioners, a review of elections in Tunisia; a study trip to Mexico; and a conference in Egypt. Several professional development events were supported through UNEST for HNEC staff members, including a study tour in Amman, Jordan between 21 and 24 May and an initial workshop for external relations personnel on 19 May.

In the period before the polls, the UN team supported HNEC's public outreach department to conduct comprehensive voter education to, in accordance with **output two**, "ensure that voters are educated about broader principles of democracy and inclusive elections, and informed about their right to vote, as well as where, when and how to vote." A voter education plan developed by HNEC's six-member voter education committee was adopted by the HNEC Board of Commissioners on 20 March. As part of the implementation process, UNEST advisors provided day-to-day advice and support to the development and the execution of the public outreach campaign. In addition, UNEST advisors focussed on direct implementation of voter education activities, producing twenty types of print voter education materials, four video public service announcements and four audio announcements targeted at different groups. Public outreach advisors further provided continuous assistance to HNEC's thirteen district offices through three UNEST offices based in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha. Advisors in field offices helped to support the thirteen HNEC district offices in planning, distribution of voter information/voter education material as all the activities related to civil society organisations in the area of responsibility, including facilitating complementary activities of other international actors where they intersected with voter education

A particular emphasis was laid throughout the process on the involvement of vulnerable groups such as IDPs, women and minorities (**output three**: i. Enhanced access to and participation in electoral process of vulnerable groups, including women, youth, minorities, and other groups, in rural and urban areas alike; ii. enhanced access to and participation of Libyans displaced by conflict inside and outside of Libya; and iii. enhanced understanding of and access to the technical electoral process of civil society groups and political parties including observer accreditation, candidate registration, and gender and minority representation).

Most UNEST day-to-day activities were conducted with an eye to promotion of women's participation. During voter registration and preparations for polling, for instance, international advisors supported HNEC to produce several products that targeted women, including one video spot, three flyers, three posters, two billboards and one fact sheet. Many activities targeting women were conducted with or through civil society, or with other UN entities. Early on, for instance, UNEST supported UNDP's Support to Civic Engagement in Libya's Transition programme in conducting a workshop for female candidates in Sabha on the Libyan electoral system and women's participation in the elections as candidates. UNEST supported a monitoring effort implemented by an international civil society organization (CSO) based in The Hague, Gender Concerns International, which was intended to address women's participation in all aspects of the electoral process. The effort, which was launched on 5 July, enlisted the efforts of twenty-five Libyan women selected from civil society partners and specially trained for the task, as well as several international consultants. Its final report and recommendations were presented to the HNEC Board of Commissioners on 17 October, and released to the general public the following day. Finally, UNEST supported thirty individuals to participate in a sub-regional forum on "Women's Participation in Post-Revolutionary Parliamentary Elections: Comparative Experiences from Egypt, Tunisia and Libya," which took place on 9 and 10 December in Cairo, Egypt. Participants were drawn from four quarters: thirteen candidates from the

¹⁰ Nearly ten million ballots were eventually procured due to emergency order placed following destruction of ballot papers in a warehouse fire in Ajdabiya district (4,276,450+162,5000 majoritarian ballots; 3,927,350 +139,100 proportional representation ballots).

GNC election (including current GNC members); six civil society representatives; six HNEC representatives and guests; five UN advisors.

Rates of women's participation as voters, candidates, observers and media in the 2012 polls were encouraging: women made up forty-five per cent of those who registered and thirty-nine per cent of those who came out to vote on 7 July 2012. A total of 2,501 candidates participated as individuals for the 120 seats in the majoritarian race, including eighty-four women, while 1,207 candidates, including 545 women, contested the eighty seats allocated to the proportional representation race on "zippered" (i.e. alternating men and women candidates) lists submitted by political entities. When Libya's new legislative body was inaugurated on 1 August 2012, thirty-three women found themselves amongst the ranks of the 200 GNC members, thirty-two from candidate lists and one in the majoritarian race. Of the over domestic observers and agents who registered to help observe the polls and guard against irregularities, nearly thirty per cent of them were women.

UNEST advised HNEC on measures for minority groups in the planning and implementation of the elections, even despite the compressed timelines and limited capacity. IDP voter registration training started 6 May in Tripoli, Sirte, Benghazi, Al Khoms and Sabha. Registration of IDPs for absentee voting for persons displaced from Misrata, Tawergha, Khallesh (Al-Asab'a), Mashashiya (Yefren) and Al-Rumiyah started on 9 May in IDP camps and Libyan Humanitarian Relief Agency (LibAid) offices in Tripoli, Benghazi, Khoms, Sabha, Gheryan and Sirte. Over half of IDPs registered to vote cast a ballot, totalling 7,599 voters. UNEST's efforts on minority representation were encompassed in day-to-day advisory support. Weeks prior to the polls, for instance, violence in Ghadames threw up an urgent need for special measures to enable voters displaced by on-going violence to cast a ballot. HNEC with UNEST advice planned two special polling centres that would allow registered voters in Ghadamese to cast a ballot. The measure was estimated to have affected approximately 250 Tuareg families (1,700 people) thought to have fled to Derj, as well as other Ghadamese unable to return to areas where the registered.

A UNEST advisor worked directly with HNEC to assist its accreditation unit in registering observers, as well as media, and agents. The election attracted the attention of 190 international observers (ten organisations including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union and the Carter Center), 317 guests (thirty-five entities and organisations), and 395 international media representatives (116 media outlets) from a total of ninety-four countries. More than 27,000 domestic observers and agents were registered to help observe the polls and guard against irregularities, representing a substantial achievement in a country where civil society and political organisations had until recently been suppressed. To gather feedback from observers, on 28 and 29 November, HNEC / UNEST convened an electoral observers' forum, attended by eighty-two electoral observers and forty-three HNEC and UN experts and support staff. International organisations present included the Arab League, the EU Electoral Assessment Team and the Carter Center. The final report for the event was developed by HNEC for presentation to the GNC in January 2013.

Although HNEC fully funded their Out of Country Voting operation, an agreement between HNEC and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the latter's assistance was not signed until 8 May. The initial assessment and planning phases of the operation were therefore funded by UNEST through an agreement signed with IOM on 9 April valued at USD 150,000. The OCV effort culminated in registration and polling between 3 and 7 July. A total of 8,021 Libyans participated in the OCV component of the GNC election, with the turnout of women ranging from over forty-eight per cent in Canada to less than twenty per cent in Germany – thirty-one per cent in total.

The role of UNEST advisors in **output four** - strengthened capacities of the national media to report on electoral processes throughout Libya in a balanced and responsible manner - centred on ensuring media possessed adequate information from HNEC, notably through day-to-day support of HNEC's policies and decisions related to media relations, press and public statements, and conduct of the media. UNEST personnel were available for assistance to the managers in this area in order to support the establishment of institutional capacity and knowledge. The HNEC media centre, which constituted the main venue for communicating with the media around polling and the announcement of results, was the result of

collaboration between the National Transitional Council, HNEC, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and UNEST. On 12 May, UNEST and IFES advisors presented HNEC with a concept paper on the establishment of the media centre, a list of the possible procurement lots, and the terms of reference for a media centre coordinator (national post, to be appointed by HNEC). By late May, the Tripoli International Convention Centre was identified as the preferred venue for the HNEC media centre, a survey was carried out and technical specifications were drafted addressing the technical needs of the venue. On 2 July, HNEC held a press conference at the media centre to announce the start of OCV, the first of twelve press conferences HNEC would hold at the premises. In the days following polling day, several domestic and international observer missions took advantage of the HNEC's media centre facilities, which were offered free of charge, to deliver their preliminary statements to the press.

Work under **output five** was intended to strengthen the capacity of the Libyan HNEC (or a media commission) to conduct media monitoring. On 9 May, a concept paper on media monitoring, developed with the support of an advisor from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), was submitted to HNEC, outlining a well-tested methodology to analyse airtime for candidates, identifying infractions and highlighting any disparities in coverage and detecting media infractions identified in the HNEC Media Regulation (No.64). The monitoring effort ran from 18 June to 5 July and was implemented jointly by HNEC and the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society with the support of UNEST and IDEA. A training program began on 10 June to train 18 personnel on methodology and best practices regarding media monitoring and electoral campaigns. The unit was fully operational from the start of the official election campaign; however its scope was initially limited to public media. By the end of the electoral process a total of four reports were produced, two reports which covered the campaign period (18 to 24 June and 25 June to 1 July), and two further reports delivered in July (one covering the 48-hour silence period prior to the opening of polls, and a final report). Reports encompassed media coverage on fifteen public media outlets. All reports were conveyed confidentially to the HNEC Board of Commissioners for their consideration.

The resolution of grievances arising from the electoral process depended on the existing Libyan justice system, which was tasked with adjudicating complaints on all aspects of the process. **Output six** aimed to strengthen the capacities of the relevant legal institutions or commission to plan for, develop and deliver an effective electoral dispute resolution (EDR) mechanism and process electoral complaints in a timely and effective manner. The main challenge for HNEC lay in ensuring that the judiciary was armed with adequate knowledge of the process and their obligations, and to ensure strong coordination mechanisms between the two entities so that issues and decisions could be accurately communicated in a timely fashion. To this end, UNEST supported four two-day workshops on general electoral issues and issues of EDR that took place on: 30 April and 1 May; 7 and 8 May; 14 and 15 May; 21 and 22 May. All workshops took place at the Judicial Institute in Tripoli and trained relevant Libyan legal professionals in the complaints and appeals processes. Sessions saw approximately fifty-five participants each. Advisors also provided input on the regulation on EDR for polling and counting for consideration by the HNEC Board of Commissioners and supported training on 1 and 2 July for HNEC district staff handling complaints.

UNDP LEAP's last output, **output seven**, served to strengthen the capacities of HNEC to coordinate electoral security with stakeholders, and to this end concentrated particularly on the national movement plan for electoral materials. As part of the security planning process, members of the Security Committee and HNEC's security focal point were brought together in a number of meetings to discuss plans for polling day, culminating in a shared understanding of security arrangements and reciprocal liaison functions on polling day.

Despite the short timelines involved in the National General Congress election of 2012, UNEST was able to provide significant technical and operational support to the process consistent with the outputs articulated in its guiding project document, including through a contingent of international advisors who offered day-to-day advice and to HNEC staff as part of an integrated team, delivery of operational assistance through procurement of goods and services in support of the electoral process, and support to efforts on civic education, vulnerable groups, media and so forth, which were intended to complement HNEC's work and strengthen the overall electoral process. In general, technical and operational assistance was recognized and

appreciated by its principal partner, HNEC, and was positively reviewed by other electoral stakeholders including for instance, members of Libya's National Transitional Council and domestic and international observers. UN support in the earliest stages of the process was considered especially critical, when technical advice provided by UN advisors contributed to the design by HNEC of a realistic and achievable concept of operations, and procurement of electoral materials needed to mount voter registration and polling was enabled through funding support provided through the Libya Recovery Trust Fund (LRTF) to UNEST.

In some cases, certain activities originally articulated in the UNDP LEAP project document were not implemented or were implemented in partnership with other assistance providers. Decisions not to implement were taken either due to changing needs and priorities or because of limited timeframes and capacities. This included, notably, direct advice and training to both media houses and security authorities. Support to electoral dispute resolution, the media centre and media monitoring were pursued jointly with partners.

The speed with which electoral support was required to be operational left little time for the development of individual donor agreements, and so LRTF provided a useful conduit for those donors who wished to support these historic processes. In addition, donors who are not on the ground in Libya have been able to use LRTF to ensure support is directed to those electoral activities most in need of donor support. For example, Japan made contribution to support transitional processes in Libya and around 700,000\$ were dedicated to support election activities using LEAP as a platform for this support.

ii) Indicator Based Performance Assessment:

	<u>Achieved</u> Indicator Targets	Reasons for Variance with Planned Target (if any)	Source of Verification
<p>Outcome 1¹¹ : Enhanced national capacity to run inclusive elections. Indicator: Not specified. Baseline: Not specified. Planned Target: Not specified.</p>			
<p>Output 1.1: Strengthened capacity of electoral institutions (HNEC) to plan, prepare, conduct and manage elections. Indicator 1.1.1: Capacity of HNEC Baseline: HNEC newly established with no previous institutional track record of holding elections. Planned Target: Voter Registration and polling successfully held on time.</p>	<p>Voter registration held between 1 and 21 May 2012.</p> <p>A total of 1,548 voter registration centres were opened during the voter registration period</p> <p>Voter registration centres were supplied by the following materials procured by UNEST:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,800 training voter registration kits • 3,500 voter registration kits. • 45,000 voter registration books • 1,800 training voter registration books • 6,360,000 laminates <p>Over 2.87 million Libyans registered for the GNC election out of an estimated eligible population of between 3.2 to 3.5 million.</p> <p>A total of in 1,544 polling centres and 6,497 polling stations opened on polling day, with the final 8 polling centres opening in subsequent days</p> <p>Polling centres were supplied by the</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p>	<p>Public record</p> <p>HNEC</p> <p>UNEST</p> <p>HNEC</p> <p>UNEST</p>

¹¹ Note: Outcomes, outputs, indicators and targets should be as outlined in the Project Document so that you report on your actual achievements against planned targets. Add rows as required for Outcome 2, 3 etc.

	<p>following materials procured by UNEST:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15,000 ballot boxes and lids • 197,500 seals • 2,000 extra tamper-evident bags • 14,200 bottles of indelible ink • 10,000 material transfer forms • 7,100 polling kits • 10,000 record of seals • 9,100 supplementary voters lists • 180 training ink bottles • 1,810 training polling kits • 2,238 training material transfer forms • 3,000 training record of seals • 3,000 training supplementary voters list • 20,000 voter screens • 5,901,450 majoritarian ballots • 4,066,450 proportional representation ballots. <p>1.77 million Libyans cast ballots during polling.</p>	<p>Logistics arising from a late conclusion to candidate vetting led to polling being scheduled beyond the constitutionally-mandated polling date of 19 June</p>	<p>HNEC</p>
<p>Output 1.2: Comprehensive Civic and Voter Education conducted Indicator 1.2.1: Civic and Voter Education takes place Baseline: No civic and voter education in place. Planned Target: Complete Civic and Voter Education</p>	<p>A voter education plan was adopted by HNEC on 20 March. In preparation for polling, the following materials were developed with the advice and support of UNEST advisors: 19 fact sheets; 1</p>	<p>N/A N/A</p>	<p>HNEC UNEST</p>

	<p>flipchart; 15 leaflets</p> <p>A website was established (h nec.ly) A social media presence was established through active use of Facebook and Twitter.</p> <p>A programme of roundtable discussions were organized around: special needs (4 July), the role of the media in elections (5 July), the role of observers in elections (6 July).</p> <p>240,000 posters, factsheets, leaflets, flyers reflecting the extension to the voter registration period were printed and distributed.</p> <p>Nine television and radio public service announcements were produced and distributed prior to polling.</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p>	<p>Public record</p> <p>HNEC</p> <p>UNEST</p> <p>UNEST</p>
<p>Output 1.3 Indicator 1.2.1: i) No. of groups access. ii) No. of IDP's access. iii) Understanding grows among CSO and political parties. Baseline: No participation in any meaningful elections in 42 years. Planned Target: Healthy participation of vulnerable groups, women and IDPs in electoral processes. High level of understanding expressed among CSO and political entities.</p>	<p>Special provisions were also put in place for IDPs; over half of IDPs registered to vote cast a ballot, totalling 7,599 voters.</p> <p>OCV took place from 3 to 7 July in six countries, with 8,021 Libyans, including thirty-one per cent women, participating.</p> <p>According to observer reports, CSOs were very active in civic and voter education efforts, implying at least a minimal comprehension of the process.</p> <p>A total of 11,704 domestic observers, 507 international</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p> <p>N/A</p>	<p>HNEC</p> <p>UNEST</p> <p>HNEC European Union Election Assessment Team, "Final Report, General National Congress Election, 7 July 2012" Gender Concerns</p>

	<p>observers and special guests were accredited by polling on 7 July (approximately 30% women).</p> <p>A total of 10,674 candidate/entity agents were accredited by polling on 7 July.</p> <p>Forty-five per cent of registered voters were women Thirty-nine per cent of Libyans who cast ballots were women. Approximately thirty per cent of registered observers, agents and media were women.</p>	<p>Reliable information was not available on the variance in political entities' understanding of the electoral process between March – December 2012. N/A</p>	<p>International, “Gender Election Monitoring Mission, General National Congress Election, Final Report, 7 July 2012.” HNEC</p> <p>HNEC</p>
<p>Output 1.4 Indicator 1.2.1: Quality and quantity of media coverage. Baseline: No previous media engagement in democratic processes. Planned Target: National media provide effective messages to population on electoral processes.</p>	<p>A total of four reports were produced, two reports which covered the campaign period (18-24 June and 25-1 July), and two further reports delivered in July (one covering the silence period and a final report). Reports covered media coverage on 15 public media outlets. Reports indicated media coverage during campaigns was topical, focusing primarily on a small number of prominent issues and candidates.</p>	<p>Though the media sector developed markedly since the previous year, practices such as self-censorship and intimidation of journalists, as well as lack of consistent standards nonetheless impacted the coverage of the polls.</p>	<p>HNEC European Union Election Assessment Team, “Final Report, General National Congress Election, 7 July 2012”</p>
<p>Output 1.5 Indicator 1.2.1: Effect of HNEC media outreach. Baseline: No media campaigns yet undertaken by HNEC. Planned Target: Effective media outreach of HNEC reaches nationwide population, in particular targeted population groups.</p>	<p>Opinions are mixed: Focus groups conducted following the electoral process indicated dissatisfaction with the level of voter information disseminated through the media, however some observer reports indicate that state and private broadcast media were actively promoting participation</p>	<p>Short timelines for implementation impeded wide dissemination of comprehensive voter education. The challenge was compounded by factors such as the complexity of the electoral system.</p>	<p>IFES, “Libya Status of Women Survey, Preliminary Findings,” March 2013. European Union Election Assessment Team, “Final Report, General National Congress Election, 7 July 2012” Gender Concerns</p>

	frequently airing information Twelve nationally-televised press conferences held by HNEC at the media centre between 2 July and 1 August.	N/A	International, “Gender Election Monitoring Mission, General National Congress Election, Final Report, 7 July 2012.” HNEC
Output 1.6 Indicator 1.2.1: Enhanced ability among legal institutions to play a role in the electoral process, as required. Baseline: Lack of clarity and capacity on the role of legal institutions in the electoral process. Planned Target: Legal institutions are able to deal efficiently, fairly and effectively with electoral issues.	The vetting process conducted by the High Commission on Integrity and Patriotism, with appeals to the judiciary, resulted in the removal of 150 candidates from the final candidate lists after appeals to the judiciary. Over one hundred complaints were submitted to HNEC after the polling day and thirty-seven appeals to preliminary results were submitted to the judiciary. By 29 July, all complaints submitted to HNEC were resolved (two days earlier than expected) and word was received from judicial authorities that all complaints and appeals submitted to them had likewise been resolved. Observers indicated that complaints and appeals were dealt with in “an overall impartial, albeit not always systematic, manner.” (EU EAT)	N/A N/A Changes to the legal framework that took place after the start of the electoral process meant that at times voters and courts were not fully aware of their obligations.	HNEC HNEC European Union Election Assessment Team, “Final Report, General National Congress Election, 7 July 2012”
Output 1.7 Indicator 1.2.1: Electoral security satisfactorily organised. Baseline: No electoral security undertaken. Planned Target: Electoral security is well coordinated.	The Libyan Electoral Security Committee was formed by 4 April A clear security plan was coordinated between security forces and HNEC prior to polling	N/A	HNEC
	Security for distribution and	N/A	HNEC

	retrieval of electoral materials was provided in the majority of cases.		
	Presence of liaison officers in HNEC and Ministry of Interior's operations rooms during polling	N/A	HNEC

iii) Evaluation, Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Following the conclusion of the 2012 electoral process, UNEST undertook an extensive self-evaluation process, examining all aspects of its work with HNEC and other Libyan stakeholders during the hectic preceding months. Lessons were articulated at individual and section levels, culminating in a two-day lessons learned event that aimed to situate lessons within the evolving electoral context in Libya and apply them to tentative workplans for 2013.

Factors that challenge national electoral authorities also impact the work of UNEST, and lessons for both intermingle. Briefly, challenges faced by HNEC which also impacted the work of UNEST ranged from shallow capacity at HNEC headquarters and in the field, fragile internal procedures in areas such as communication, a dearth of public awareness, a constantly evolving legal framework, a lack of regular, formal coordination mechanisms between main actors (e.g., legislative bodies, ministries, judiciary, political entities/candidates), an unclear polling date, disruption to training efforts, logistical hurdles and security conditions. These issues were exacerbated by the compressed timeline. Lessons pulled from the process therefore include the need to ensure future processes benefit from improved planning, coordination and a strong electoral administration.

A key finding relevant to both the electoral process and the ongoing work of UNEST lay in the continuing requirement for civic and voter education. Despite the steady release of information and products, such as the dearth of information on electoral processes in Libya that even a concerted effort over months on the part of the government, media, civil society organisations, political entities and the UN, was not able to satisfy the Libyan polity's thirst for information. Voter information and voter education was thus an area that was much cited when noting deficiencies in the process, and an area where HNEC could continue its efforts in the non-operational period through civic education. In particular, advisors suggested measures that include: encouraging HNEC to issue directives to its district offices on how to implement HNEC public outreach strategies in the field; Facilitating the implementation of a system of internal communication whereby district staff and call centre staff can be kept updated on the latest procedures and issues; and encouraging HNEC to establish a focal point or unit within the HNEC public outreach department for coordination for with civil society and other external partners.

Looking inward to UNEST's own management and administration, lessons related primarily to questions regarding accessibility to UN policies and procedures, ownership, and governance. HNEC expressed at times that it did not feel it had adequate information on programme plans and lacked control of programme activities. Efforts were undertaken to increase the regularity of project board meetings and ensure regular reporting and coordination. Further, the need was identified for HNEC and UNEST to synchronize their respective understandings of liability for programme expenditures, as well as their understanding on issues such as the requirement to follow UNDP procedures, the extent of UNEST's responsibility for implementing activities directly and the authority of UNEST to directly implement activities which sought to increase knowledge and awareness of electoral issues amongst external stakeholders.

The newly-established Libyan electoral administration was obliged to become acquainted with UN programme management and administrative procedures through UNEST, a prospect made more challenging by the fact that UN administrative documents were often not available in Arabic and often had to be translated from scratch. This sometimes resulted in misunderstandings between UNEST management and HNEC. For instance, regarding aspects of the cost-sharing agreement signed between HNEC and UNDP that was necessary to receive Libya's contribution of USD 6M, the UNDP accounting system (ATLAS) and financial procedures, and how the expenditures of the programme were reflected and justified. This was later mitigated during a series of meetings, including Project Board meetings in June and September.

Compounding the challenges listed above, programme governance structures as defined in the project

document were not fully adhered to during the busiest operational periods. The first Project Board meeting was held in June, after several months of the programme's operations. Though subsequent efforts were made to ensure the Project Board meetings were held each quarter at a minimum, it was still critical that the nature and frequency of the meetings be reviewed in order to ensure that the programme was being guided and overseen as envisaged. The oversight and advisory body described in the project document, the Project Advisory Committee, was not called in 2012. HNEC and UNEST planned to explore this modality in 2013.

Lessons were also drawn from the programme's experience as part of an integrated electoral team. Integration between UN bodies – UNSMIL, UNDP and UNOPS - worked well due to goodwill and personalities but also due to clear structures and reporting lines, established early on, that leveraged comparative advantage within the UN system. That being said, a lack of clarity in some areas of the organogram sometimes resulted in confusion. Some suggestions for how integration could be further supported were identified during the internal lessons learned process, notably through elaboration of the team organogram and stronger administrative coordination within the UN family. The overall conclusion was that integration within the UN family should continue in the post-electoral period, and that the team should continue to work with other international partners in the spirit of close cooperation. The stronger internal coordination within UN must also address itself to the need to balance the short term mandated interventions against the imperatives of the long term sustainability of domestic electoral capacity. The balance must be attended to through stages of programme design, planning and implementation,

It is important to note that the scope of UNEST's work evolved over the course of 2012, as clarity was achieved on the electoral calendar the 2012 process would follow, as well as the emerging priorities and programmes of other actors. As international assistance providers arrived in Libya over the early months of 2012, distinct spheres of activity – sub-sectors – were defined, with organisational leads identified for each sub-sector. Through this coordination, overlap between the plans of different actors were identified and de-conflicted. The result was that some areas were addressed by other actors, or responsibility was shared. The EU occupied the lead on issues related to media, and therefore several activities in Output 4 related to assessments, training and mentorship for Libyan media were deferred to the EU, with no expectation that such programmes will be pursued in 2013 (Activity 4.1. Conduct assessment of Libyan media capacity and a baseline survey; identify key media ensuring Libya-wide coverage; Activity 4.2. Recruitment of experts and organise placement of experts in the media houses; 4.4. Training of journalists on electoral reporting; and 4.5. organise electoral stakeholders workshops and meetings). In the same vein, responsibility for provision of international assistance to the HNEC's media centre was accordingly shared between UNEST and IFES, with UNEST providing specialist support on technical aspects of the centre's functioning and IFES providing overall programme management (Activity 4.3. Facilitate establishment of a media centre).

In developing plans for 2013, lessons from 2012 were taken into account. Emphasis was placed on measures which would encourage durable electoral institutions and strong practices that could effectively meet the challenges posed by successive future electoral processes. On this basis, three pillars emerged as the basis for UN support to the electoral sector in Libya: 1) operational and technical support to electoral events; 2) consolidation of the electoral capacity (advice on new institutional and legal framework, cultivation of technical expertise, support to professionalizing administrative functions); and 3) electoral awareness and knowledge (promoting awareness among decision/opinion makers on priority themes such as electoral management body models, electoral systems, voter registration, out of country voting and women's participation). Plans seek to balance the constraints arising from the lack of clarity on the timing and sequence of future electoral events with the opportunity presented by the inter-operational period to take capacity development forward. Though the electoral calendar is not clear, more sustained effort is needed toward ensuring that progress made during the programme cycle translates into sustainable capacity for HNEC to engage in regional and international partnerships with institutions for needed transfer of experience and knowledge.

iv) A Specific Story (Optional)

Problem / Challenge faced: Describe the specific problem or challenge faced by the subject of your story (this could be a problem experienced by an individual, community or government).

It is sometimes said that elections are the largest and most complex logistical exercise a country can undertake outside of armed conflict. When the country itself is recovering from a period of conflict, the level of difficulty is, unsurprisingly, even greater. Libya in 2012 was in just such a situation when tragedy struck just two days before the polls, potentially undermining the operation in several constituencies in the volatile eastern region of the country. Distribution of critical electoral materials - ballots, ballot boxes, voter screens and indelible ink - was taking place across the country when a fire at a district warehouse south of Benghazi destroyed the majority of electoral materials for several constituencies in Ajdabiya district. Early reports indicate that between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. an intruder, unnoticed by police guarding the compound, set the fire. By 6:00 a.m. all materials in the warehouse had perished, potentially dashing the dreams of hundreds of thousands of voters anxious to be a part of Libya's first democratic polls since in 1960s.

Programme Interventions: How was the problem or challenged addressed through the Programme interventions?

Before the cinders had cooled, UNEST was called upon to advise on measures that could be taken to replace the destroyed materials – quickly. In close coordination with UNDP's Procurement Support Office in Copenhagen, an emergency order was placed to reprint 162,500 majoritarian ballot and 139,100 proportional representation ballots using the same specialized international supplier that had provided the initial order.

HNEC logistics personnel and their UN advisors determined it was now imperative to keep the materials hidden until the last moment in the face of additional attacks or threats of attacks. The entire labour force at the national warehouse was called into action and contingency stores of ballot boxes, ink, voter screens and other polling materials were swiftly packed, loaded on waiting aircrafts and flown to Benghazi for temporary safekeeping in secrecy. At the same time that ballot papers were being re-printed in outside of Libya, a special international cargo flight was organized to pick up the newly printed ballot papers. The distribution of the materials from Benghazi to the polling centres employed a mix of bold initiatives: some were collected by polling centre managers, some were trucked to the polling centres in non-descript vehicles, and some were brought to the polling centres in fully escorted convoys.

Result (if applicable): Describe the observable *change* that occurred so far as a result of the Programme interventions. For example, how did community lives change or how was the government better able to deal with the initial problem?

The whole exceptional logistical operation eventually enabled polling in the affected constituencies. In areas in Ajdabiya that experienced delivery of materials after the polls were scheduled to open, polling stayed open later in order to accommodate queues of voters. Back in Tripoli, the HNEC Board of Commissioners instructed six polling centres in Ajdabiya that did not open on 7 July to open the following day, assuring voters that they would, indeed, have the opportunity to participate. This feat of procurement, logistics, media relations and sheer will on the part of so many, as well as the incredible dedication of ordinary voters who patiently queued into the evening, can be seen as one of the most exceptional episodes of the entire 2012 electoral process.

Lessons Learned: What did you (and/or other partners) learn from this situation that has helped inform and/or improve Programme (or other) interventions?

The experience highlighted the importance of often less visible but extremely important aspects of electoral administration: thoughtful and detailed planning, robust systems, contingency measures and extensive testing

prior to critical periods. When the credibility of a national electoral process is hanging in the balance, it is imperative that national authorities are able to be seen to be professional, efficient and responsive. It is precisely these areas where UN advisors add particular value, leveraging existing expertise and knowledge of international resources in order to encourage good practices at all stages of a given electoral process. Though each stage of the process was fully led by Libyan authorities, the supporting role of UNEST during this episode was nonetheless significant, ranging from securing replacement ballots through UNEST and UNDP's Procurement Support Office, reliance on logistics templates and plans painstakingly developed together with Libyan administrators, and even the audiovisual systems within the media centre that were used to reassure the public that they would, eventually, be able to exercise their hard-won right to vote.

ACRONYMS

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EDR	Electoral Dispute Resolution
HNEC	High National Election Commission
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LEAP	Libya Electoral Assistance Project
LRTF	Libya Recovery Trust Fund
OCV	Out of County Voting
SCelt	Support to Civic Engagement in Libya's Transition
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEST	United Nations Electoral Support Team
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya