



**PEACEBUILDING FUND (PBF)  
FINAL PROGRAMME<sup>1</sup> NARRATIVE REPORT  
REPORTING PERIOD: FROM JANUARY 2009 TO DECEMBER 2011**

<p><b>Programme Title &amp; Project Number</b></p> <p>Programme Title: <b>PBF/LBR/E-2 - Support to the Government of Liberia's Peacebuilding Office</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programme Number:</li> <li>• MPTF Office Project Reference Number:<sup>3</sup> 00066681</li> </ul>	<p><b>Country, Locality(s), Priority Area(s) / Strategic Results<sup>2</sup></b></p> <p><i>(if applicable)</i> Country/Region - <b>Monrovia (with extensive in-country travel)</b></p>
<p><b>Participating Organization(s)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizations that have received direct funding from the MPTF Office under this programme</li> </ul> <p><b>UNDP - Liberia</b></p>	<p><b>Priority area/ strategic results- 3:</b> Strengthening state capacity for peace consolidation</p> <p><b>Implementing Partners</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National counterparts (government, private, NGOs &amp; others) and other International Organizations – <b>Ministry of Internal Affairs/Government of Liberia Peacebuilding Office</b></li> </ul>
<p><b>Programme/Project Cost (US\$)</b></p> <p>Total approved budget as per project document: PBF \$ <b>902,759</b>; PBO \$<b>135,000</b> (cost extension: <b>352,000</b>) MPTF /JP Contribution<sup>4</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>by Agency (if applicable)</i> Agency Contribution</li> <li>• <i>by Agency (if applicable)</i></li> </ul> <p>Government Contribution: <b>In-kind (offices, electricity and basic furniture)</b> <i>(if applicable)</i></p> <p>Other Contributions: Two used vehicles, (donors): UNHCR Liberia</p>	<p><b>Programme Duration</b></p> <p>Overall Duration (<i>months</i>): 18 months <b>(with two requests for cost extensions)</b> Start Date<sup>5</sup> <b>1<sup>st</sup> January 2009</b></p> <p>Original End Date<sup>6</sup> :<b>30<sup>th</sup> June 2010</b> Actual End date<sup>7</sup>:<b>31<sup>st</sup> December 2011</b></p> <p>Have agency (ies) operationally closed the Programme in its (their) system? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Expected Financial Closure date<sup>8</sup>: March 15, 2013</p>

<sup>1</sup> The term "programme" is used for programmes, joint programmes and projects.

<sup>2</sup> Strategic Results, as formulated in the Performance Management Plan (PMP) for the PBF, Priority Plan or project document;

<sup>3</sup> The MPTF Office Project Reference Number is the same number as the one on the Notification message. It is also referred to as "Project ID" on the project's factsheet page on the [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#).

<sup>4</sup> The MPTF/JP Contribution is the amount transferred to the Participating UN Organizations – see [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#)

<sup>5</sup> The start date is the date of the first transfer of the funds from the MPTF Office as Administrative Agent. Transfer date is available on the [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#)

<sup>6</sup> As per approval of the original project document by the relevant decision-making body/Steering Committee.

<sup>7</sup> If there has been an extension, then the revised, approved end date should be reflected here. If there has been no extension approved, then the current end date is the same as the original end date. The end date is the same as the operational closure date which is when all activities for which a Participating Organization is responsible under an approved MPTF / JP have been completed. As per the MOU, agencies are to notify the MPTF Office when a programme completes its operational activities. Please see [MPTF Office Closure Guidelines](#).

<sup>8</sup> Financial Closure requires the return of unspent balances and submission of the [Certified Final Financial Statement and Report](#).

*(if applicable)*

**TOTAL:\$1,389759.00**

**Programme Assessment/Review/Mid-Term Eval.**

Evaluation Completed

**Yes**  No Date: 01.04.2010

Evaluation Report - Attached

**Yes**  No Date: 01.04 2010

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 2008, the Liberia Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Joint Steering Committee (JSC) approved a project proposal submitted by the Government of Liberia through the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for the establishment of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO) attached to the MIA. The establishment of the PBO was an attempt to institutionalize Peacebuilding activities within the Government – to mainstream a conflict sensitive framework to the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for Liberia, and to help ensure that the Government policies, strategies and operational programmes would be formulated and implemented considering the conflict context. In the post-conflict reconstruction of Liberia, both the Government of Liberia (GoL) and the United Nations had regarded peacebuilding as pivotal for national development, and to prevent a relapse into violence.

The PBF Liberia had three priority areas: i) Strengthening state capacity for peace consolidation; ii) Fostering national reconciliation and conflict management; and iii) Critical interventions to promote peace and resolve immediate challenges and conflict. This Project was funded under the first priority area mentioned above with a total monetary value for the priority area in the tune of US\$3 million United States Dollars as component of an overall US\$15 million envelop.

Critical to the achievements of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office were to build and strengthen conflict sensitivity capacities within the Government of Liberia through training of policy makers, civil society organizations and local government administrations in the counties of Liberia. Also, while acting as PBF Secretariat, the PBO performed such functions by organizing meetings and papers, trouble shooting important issues and prepared consolidated quarterly and annual reports for the attention of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), the Peacebuilding Support Office and other related Peacebuilding Architecture of the United Nations. Additionally, monitoring PBF funded projects and sharing results with the concerned project managers for adjustments if needed, and/or taking appropriate corrective actions formed part of the functions of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office. There were several achievements and accomplishments in line with the required duties and responsibilities of PBO as summarized below.

*Staff capacity development* – in order to be adequately prepared as a peacebuilding entity, six staff of the PBO benefited from a number of national and international trainings including mediation, early warning and other related peacebuilding trainings through which knowledge and skills acquired enabled staff of the PBO to train others from wide range of sectors including government, civil society organizations and in-Country United Nations personnel – UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, amongst others.

*Conflict sensitivity capacity development* - in partnership with the United States based CDA Collaborative Learning Project, the PBO made a major effort of providing training in conflict sensitivity to some 332 representatives from Government, the United Nations system and civil society organizations (CSOs) / non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Skills and knowledge acquired is being utilized in the formulation and design of government's policies and programs. For example, the Government's Decentralization Policy formulation process accounted for applying conflict sensitivity approach. Also, the design of government's decentralization policy is a beneficiary of conflict sensitivity approach, as technicians from the Governance Commission, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were amongst pool of personnel from government ministries and agencies that were trained in the application of Conflict sensitivity approach and worked on the development of such policy document.

*Monitoring and evaluation of the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy 2008-2010* – implementation of the PRS benefitted from conflict sensitivity analysis of its implementation and that Government's policy makers were periodically advised on appropriation actions and lapses during implementation process which was a direct results of these analyses. For example, PRS semi- annual review processes relied on experts' advice from the PBO through the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC) at the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

Meanwhile, despite these accomplishments, there were challenges key amongst which was the delay in the transfer of funds from UNDP Headquarters in New York to the Liberia's Office (UNDP Liberia) and then finally to the PBO in as well as notable weak coordination amongst PBF funded agencies, coupled with the lack of adequate human resources within UNDP Liberia on peacebuilding that would have helped to provide efficient and effective technical support to PBO and others on peacebuilding matters.

Regarding lessons learned, there were remarkable success stories which include fostering national ownership and leadership through the establishment of national peacebuilding structure within Government and its effective management capacity driven by national actors. This is unprecedented and is considered as a model for PBF supported countries to draw lessons from.

The JSC received one request of cost extension from June 2010 to December 31, 211. The total value of the Project is up to US\$1, 389759.00 covered the period January 1, 2009 – December 31, 2012.

## **I. Purpose**

The main purpose of the intervention was to establish a Peacebuilding Office within the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Liberia to support Government's conflict sensitivity approach and peacebuilding opportunities throughout the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and to perform PBF Secretariat functions in support of the efficient and effective leadership and management of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for the implementation of the Liberia Peacebuilding Program and other related peacebuilding projects funded by the PBF. The main objectives and expected outcomes were for the personnel of the PBO to have skills and knowledge, as well as it considered all opportunities throughout the implementation of the PRS (2008 – 2011) to mitigate and respond to Liberia's conflict issues. Amongst key outcomes were: **i)** the adoption and application of conflict sensitivity framework to the PRS implementation; **ii)** technical capacity of policy makers and government officials in conflict sensitivity strengthened; **iii)** early warning and response mechanism in place to detect and respond to emerging challenges to peace; **iv)** Personnel of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office and that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding skills and capacity to respond to peacebuilding challenges; and **v)** efficient PBF Secretariat functions adequately delivered. This intervention was funded under the Immediate Recovery Facility (IRF) of the PBF.

## **II. Qualitative Assessment of Results**

### **Outcomes**

*Staff capacity development and the adoption and application of conflict sensitivity framework to the PRS implementation* – technical capacity of six staff over the period of the intervention was built and strengthened in various conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding disciplines including mediation, early warning, conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis. The Government policy document on recovery and development, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) was periodically analyzed and expert advice were provided to policy makers by these staff in relation to the implementation of the PRS. For instance, the PBO analyzed and advised the different Pillar coordinators to ensure that the different activities of the PRS were carried out in a way that does not unintentionally cause, or exacerbate tensions but rather to capitalize on opportunities that contribute to peacebuilding outcomes. Specific projects related to the PRS were evaluated in terms of double-checking their designs and underlying assumptions and assessed these projects as to whether they would maximize on opportunities that would create or reinforce buy-in and ownership of the specific project interventions. The analysis also closely reviewed those government appointees that were occupying key and strategic positions in Government in consideration of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and other identity including nationalities. It further looked at how involved were perceived divided groups or parties at major functions related to government and related programs within the context of conflict sensitivity. Reports of these analyses were submitted annually to the LRDC through the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs for consideration.

Further, a conflict sensitivity training manual based on national context produced in partnership with the United States based CDA Collaborative Learning Project located in Boston, USA was being applied to by certain ministries and agencies staff in the formulation of their policies and design of their programs. With this manual, the PBO trained, exposed and orientated a number of government officials and others in conflict sensitivity involving a total of 332 representatives from the Government, the United Nations system in Liberia and civil society organizations (CSOs) / non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Through executive dialogue sessions held with 7 policy makers from the Legislature and 8 senior policy makers from the Executive Branch of Government, conflict sensitivity capacities were strengthened thereby enabling them to technically review, analyzed and formulated policy documents using conflict sensitivity lens. Additionally 11 government ministries and agencies are currently championing conflict sensitivity in their respective ministries and agencies. It has been reported that these institutions are incredibly making efforts to institutionalize or mainstream conflict sensitivity in their overall practice of governance. Persistent reference has been made by some members of

the Legislature and the Executive Branches of Government to ensure that the development of Concession Contracts benefit from conflict sensitivity approach.

Early warning and early response mechanism has been established and is effectively detecting potential violent conflicts at both local and county levels. Before then, the PBO facilitated capacity building of government officials, UN personnel and national and international civil society organizations leading to the establishment of the early warning mechanism through a national Early Warning Working Groups (EWWG) and four county level EWWGs operating in Montserrado, Bong, Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh Counties. Members of the EWWG consist of representatives from the Justice and Security Sector including the Liberia National Police, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as county attorneys and public defenders. There are 28 members of the Working Group from CSOs including Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW), iLAB, USHIHIDI, LAVO, Peacebuilding Resource Centre (PBRC), West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and, as well as Carter Center, Search for Common Ground and representatives from the United Nations Mission in Liberia including UN Police, Civil Affairs and Human rights. Further, a platform for early warning data collection, analysis and reporting has been established, referred to as the Liberia Early Warning and Response Network (LERN). A total of 1,336 incident reports have been received, analyzed and transmitted on the LERN Platform. The geographic coverage is Northeast, Southeast, Central and Western Liberia. Predominant issues reported on include: Elections related, Murder, Land disputes, accident cases, Violence (riots, targeted attack, cross border and immigration, sexual gender based violence, ethnicity, domestic violence, fighting, and armed robbery amongst others), etc.

Overall, personnel at the Liberia Peacebuilding Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are effectively applying the knowledge and skills to respond to peacebuilding challenges. Additionally, a full secretariat capacity through the PBO is established and is efficiently delivering services in this regard. The PBO intervention from 2009-2011 was funded under the Immediate Recovery Facility (IRF) of the PBF.

Additionally, the Government has continued to emphasize “political will” thereby helped to address the question of capacity to develop, adopt or mainstream peacebuilding into national Government’s programs. Continued demonstrated and relentless efforts from practitioners, and the commitment of the Government with support of the United Nations, peacebuilding and conflict analysis were integrated into major policy documents including the Agenda for Transformation and the Strategic Roadmap on reconciliation.

In sum, the target to have a structure in national government dedicated only for peacebuilding was met by the establishment of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office intended to support Government’s conflict sensitive approach to policymaking and development throughout the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), and to help develop Government’s capacity to manage and resolve conflicts at both local and national levels. The PBO continues to foster coordination and coherence amongst peacebuilding actors and institutions in Liberia, while at the same time strengthening local and traditional mechanisms for peace. A critical outcome at such local level was the establishment of the County Peace Committee (CPC) across Liberia in partnership with UNMIL Civil Affairs that are currently working with district and county administrations to resolve conflicts and promote dialogue on development matters. The CPCs as local mechanisms for peace have been and continued to be useful for conflict resolution, management and prevention related to land and other natural resources; strengthening participatory governance and reconciliation amongst others. The existence of the CPCs and early warning focal points at district and county levels and the utilization of knowledge and skills in peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity and early warning have created enormous opportunities for peace consolidation at the national level. For instance, attempted trans-border armed intrusion from Ivory Coast into Liberia was intervened by CPC members in River Gee County and the national Government was able to bring the situation under control by effecting and arresting of a number of Ivorian rebels during 2010.

*Construction of infrastructure for peace and development planning* – the Government through the Ministry of Internal Affairs engaged the construction of district peace huts for conflict resolution, management and transformation. Apart from the physical space and conflict resolution opportunities provided by the construction of peace huts in 11 districts in Liberia, access of local people to their officials for development planning and inclusive participation has been overwhelmed and remarkable. For example, district commissioners in Bong, Nimba, Gbarpolu and Grand Cape Mount Counties use the peace huts to dialogue and plan with their citizens.

Overall, the PBO Project ensured to facilitate transparent, strategic and catalytic use of PBF programming so as to maximize peacebuilding opportunities throughout the period of implementation and the lifespan of the PRS from 2009-2010.

## Outputs

During the period January 2009 – December 2011, the Project delivered on a number of outputs. These outputs are discussed as follow:

*The creation of Conflict sensitivity framework* – a consolidated and comprehensive conflict sensitivity training manual containing issues of national context was developed, pre-tested and adopted by ministries and agencies of Government. The training manual contains various components including an instructional section, section on the principles of “Do No Harm”, as well as section on monitoring, evaluation and tracking results. A total of 25 copies were disseminated to government officials including superintendents and development superintendents, city mayors, county attorneys and county planners in 5 counties of the 15 counties of Liberia. Prior to the creation of this framework, 7 staff from the PBO were intensively trained at separate times during in-country visits of experts from the CDA Collaborative Learning Project, based in Boston, Massachusetts, USA.

*Development of core conflict sensitivity champions within government ministries and agencies* – 11 key government decision makers were trained as champions to mainstream conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in their respective ministries and agencies. Additionally, a total of 120 government officials including assistant ministers were trained over the years to apply the concept and approach of conflict sensitivity to their work in addition 7 members of the Legislature who participated in executive orientation forum on the same subject. This Executive Consultation was held at the Cape Hotel on February 2, 2010 with participants from Ministries of State for Presidential Affairs, Youth and Sports, Information Culture and Tourism, Lands Mines and Energy, Public Works, and Gender and Development. Agencies and Commissions in attendance were the General Auditing Commission, Governance Commission, Liberia Anti-corruption Commission, Liberia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (LEITI), Forestry Development Authority (FDA), Press Union of Liberia (PUL), and the Senate Standing Committee on Peace and National Security amongst others.

At the end of the consultation, the Government of Liberia through the ministries and agencies agreed to mainstream conflict sensitivity in all its policies, programs, and other activities as prescribed in the PRS. The stakeholders agreed in principle to buy-in on the idea of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in their respective ministries and agencies since the approach would contribute to efforts of preventing potential conflict [violent] during implementation of the PRS.

Related to multiplying the conflict sensitivity training acquired by the core team of champions or focal points within the ministries and agencies, a week-long training was implemented for 125 persons drawn from three counties including Bomi, Bong and Margibi Counties for period 2010-2011. The Project also organized, facilitated and conducted rounds of peacebuilding and gender training for 100 local government officials and CSOs in all fifteen counties in Liberia in the areas of conflict management, analysis, resolution and gender, as well as training to develop skills in mediation, dialogues and negotiation processes. Specifically, project proposal development, management, and monitoring and evaluation were elements incorporated for training that targeted CSOs. Overall, 332 persons were trained, exposed and engaged on the concept of conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding and gender which targeted beneficiaries from different sectors including government, civil society organizations and the UN system in Liberia.

Additionally, in partnership with ACCORD, based in Durban, South Africa, the Project undertook regional peacebuilding training for 35 members of CSOs and women groups working on peace and conflict within the Mano River Basin including peacebuilding practitioners from Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast. The Regional Peacebuilding training was implemented from 26-29 October 2010.

*Construction of Peace huts* - during the period under review the Project delivered the construction of 11 peace huts against planned target of 33 peace huts in Southeast, Northwest and Central Liberia. Assessment, site identification and the mobilization of local materials at some of the sites were carried out in lieu of actual construction process which never happened due to funding challenge and / or reallocation of funds.

*Conflict hotspots assessment and analysis* - report on conflict hotspots was developed during the period under review and was utilized during the development and decision making process for the development of the second

Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Liberia. The hotspot assessment targeted locations that reported of alarming natural resource exploitations such as gold, diamond, and timber. Based on the results of the assessment exercise included highlights of looming conflicts, appropriate interventions were determined by CSOs with funding and advice from the Liberia Peacebuilding Office.

Overall, as conflict is dynamic and often emerging, periodic conflict and hot spots assessment and analysis were indispensable to inform programming and designing of interventions. As a consequence, the Project worked in partnership with a local CSO, the Peacebuilding Resource Center (PBRC) and UNDP to conduct conflict mapping in seven counties – considered as hotspot counties based on set of criteria. The PBO worked with the management of the PBRC and developed the mapping instruments and protocols including questionnaires and provided training for 6 of its field researchers prior to the conflict mapping exercise. A desk review preceded the field intervention which largely focused on conflict factors in Liberia. Report of the desk review was very useful during the fragility assessment exercise of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding specifically related to defining peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs).

*Conflict early warning and response system* - Over the reporting period, the Project worked with several institutions to help set up a conflict early warning system for Liberia in order to inform decisions of relevant policy actors to promptly respond to conflict triggers. A process for setting up the system started with a one day Consultation held with 15 local CSO groups in Monrovia in addition to individual consultations held with ECOWAS through its Liberia's Office, as well as with WANEP, UNMIL and others. The result pointed to the need for a conflict early warning system and coordination and coherence amongst various stakeholders. Different hard core and human security indicators used by ECOWAS to measure progress were identified during this process. For example, ECOWAS mentioned that it was measuring progress towards 96 indicators while WANEP and other CSO groups were dealing with 15 key human security indicators (See WANEP report 2011). In a related development, the establishment of County Security Councils (CSCs) by the Government, articulated by the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) presented the need for building links and forging synergies through strengthening coordination mechanism involving the CSCs, the early warning system and actors and the PBO early warning initiatives. This led to the establishment of 5 Conflict Early Warning Working Groups (EWWGs) across 5 counties as pilot. The conflict early warning system set up considered 5 critical areas - ownership and sustainability; organization and governing structure; Human security verse State Security approach; and finally, maintaining credibility and meeting expectations of the systems and assurance of technical solutions in place to address emerging early warning incidents detected. In order to succeed, the Project worked in partnership with a US based Civil Society Organization referred to as Humanity United. Through this partnership, an Early Warning Consultant was hired initially for one year in 2010 to provide technical support to the Project or the PBO in order to achieve its objectives related to conflict early warning. To date, significant progress has been made including recruitment, training and incentive payments to county and district focal points on conflict early warning and response.

*Coordination and Coherence* – peacebuilding activities and intervention were fragmented in Liberia prior to the establishment of the PBO at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2009. During the reporting period, the Project ensured coordination and coherence amongst peacebuilding actors and institutions by bringing together on a monthly basis CSOs/NGOs in an attempt to help foster coordination and coherence on peacebuilding. An estimated 14 meetings were held during the reporting period that involved different actors and institutions at different levels. Convening these meetings and discussions held created opportunities for boarder understanding of the Liberia conflict context by participating NGOs/CSOs and government officials who helped to identify areas for interventions by CSOs/NGOs in consideration of their technical and institutional capacities to contribute meaningfully to peace consolidation in Liberia. These coordination meetings created further opportunities for CSOs/NGOs to share lessons, best practices and useful framework to measure cumulative impact of various peacebuilding programmes and projects in the future.

Related to forging partnership, the PBO partnered with over 25 peacebuilding related institutions both in and out of Liberia, including WANEP, Liberia Democracy Watch (LDW), USHAHIDI and Trust Africa. Others include International Alert (IA), the Ministry of Gender and Development (MoGD), the Angie Brooks International Centre (ABIC), the Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation (KAICT) and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Transformation (IPCT) at Cuttington University, Interpeace, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the Carter Centre (TCC), as well as the Innovation for Poverty Action and the America Bar Association (ABA), ACCORD, Peace Tree Network based in Nairobi, Kenya, the CDA Collaborative Learning Project, based in Cambridge, MA, USA, and Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University, and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) amongst others.

With regard to overall assessment and conclusion of the Project, its contributions to the outcome related to strengthening state capacity for peace consolidation; there is no doubt that this outcome was tremendously achieved. For example, an Office on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity has been established within Government through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is currently providing expert advice to Government on peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity matters related to policies and programs. Technical peacebuilding capacities in terms of human resources have been developed while fragmented peacebuilding activities have equally been coordinated. While these results were achieved over time, it is important to note that these were done in collaboration the UN Recipient Organization, in this case, UNDP Liberia. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) also played a significant role in the overall process, particularly UNMIL Civil Affairs and the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretariat General of the United Nations. Technical support and advice were received often times from the UN Mission. Also, the role and contributions of both national and international civil society organizations were extremely important. Monthly meetings were held with civil society organizations that are working on peace and conflict issues in Liberia and the sub-region of West Africa. The Project developed catalytic effects towards achieving consolidated peace by the attraction of additional funds from Humanity United to support early warning activities in Liberia, particularly in five counties, as well as from UNICEF to support youth and social cohesion project in 5 counties of Liberia. Creation and functioning of conflict sensitivity framework in government coupled with the establishment of county and district peace networks across the Country, as well as the establishment of coordination mechanisms at national and county levels for peacebuilding and early warning and early response are considered as significant achievements in terms of and outcomes.

Regarding robust secretariat services, the Project acted on behalf of the Joint Steering Committee for the day-to-day management and implementation of the PBF in Liberia. It ensured the holding of regular policy meetings for critical decisions, followed through on actions and decisions of the JSC, as well as organized important papers and brought to the attention of the JSC issues that potentially could affect the PBF from achieving its overall goal and objectives. The Project coordinated with both the implementing partners in Government and the UNCT, at the same time liaised with the PBSO, MPTF-O and others in New York related to the PBF implementation in Liberia in respect of regular updates, critical issues and lessons. The robustness in response to demands constitutes the effectiveness of the Project.

## ii) Indicator Based Performance Assessment:

Using the **Programme Results Framework from the Project Document / AWP**s - provide details of the achievement of indicators at both the output and outcome level in the table below. Where it has not been possible to collect data on indicators, clear explanation should be given explaining why.

	<b>Achieved Indicator Targets (Cumulative over funding period)</b>	<b>Reasons for Variance with Planned Target (if any)</b>	<b>Source of Verification</b>
<p><b>Outcome 1<sup>9</sup>:</b> Policy makers in Government and CSOs have knowledge and skills of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding and formulated conflict sensitivity policies and programs.</p> <p><b>Indicator:</b> 11 government ministries and agencies applying conflict sensitivity to policy formulation and program designed. Those ministries and agencies include: MIA, MoGD, MPEA, MoI, MoL, MoYS, LACC, GC, LEITI, etc.</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 0</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> 21 ministries and agencies</p>	<p>11 ministries and agencies in government applied conflict sensitivity approaches and peacebuilding framework</p> <p>5 advisory services rendered to policy makers including House Standing Committee on Peace and Reconciliation at the Legislature and conflict sensitivity analysis of the implementation of the PRS.</p>	<p>Limited political will on the part of certain ministries and agencies to participate in conflict sensitivity training and peacebuilding workshops coupled with limited available resources to address cost of capacity building workshops and production and distribution of copies of the conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding framework.</p>	<p>Report, minutes, work plan and note-to-file</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Early warning mechanism in place and emerging challenges to peace detected and actions taken</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 1 early warning CSO worked in 3 counties with ECOWAS on data collection</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> 15 counties early warning mechanisms</p>	<p>National and county level early warning coordination mechanisms in place and responsive; measuring progress towards 4 critical early warning indicators developed in consultation with ECOWAS and UNMIL; Government implements major recommendation of one policy brief report on concession holdings produced; Platform for data collection, analysis and transmission established and functioning</p>	<p>Early warning activities have not cut across the 15 counties in Liberia due to limited institutional capacity including limited financial resources</p>	<p>Reports of those 15 CSOs and select number of government and UN agencies working on conflict early warning issues. Those related to government include the LNP, BIN and DEA. From the UN: UNPOL</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3: functional PBF Secretariat:</b> Robust secretariat services and operational capacity to ensure effective coordination and troubleshooting</p>	<p>Trouble shoot, prepared and submitted consolidated report; acted as repository of knowledge of PBF guidelines and procedures</p>	<p>n/a</p>	

<sup>9</sup> Note: Outcomes, outputs, indicators and targets should be as outlines in the Project Document/Priority Plan or PMP specific so that you report on your actual cumulative achievements against planned targets. Add rows as required for Outcome 2, 3 etc.

problems and reporting on PBF projects			
<b>Baseline:</b> 0			
<b>Planned Target:</b> Decentralized PBO based on justice and security regional hubs			
<b>Output 1.1:</b> Key ministries and agencies' heads knowledgeable of conflict sensitivity and conflict sensitivity framework utilized at all relevant levels of government.	Formulation and design process of 3 key government policy documents: Agenda for Transformation, Decentralization and Strategic Roadmap on reconciliation conflict sensitive	Training and education for additional heads of government ministries and agencies is required so as to increase the number of heads of ministries and agencies with knowledge and skills in conflict sensitivity.	Work plan, report and minutes of meetings held with heads/focal points of government ministries and agencies at all levels
<b>Indicator 1.1.1</b> 3 policy documents development account for conflict sensitivity approach			
<b>Baseline:</b> 0			
<b>Planned Target:</b> All government policies and programs design processes at various levels benefit from conflict sensitivity approach			
<b>Indicator 1.1.2</b> 120 government officials utilized conflict sensitivity at all relevant levels of government	120 heads/focal points championed and utilized conflict sensitivity within government ministries and agencies including local government administrations mainstreamed conflict sensitivity in all policies and programs	Inadequate technical and financial capacities especially financial resources to train heads and focal points of additional ministries and agencies for government	Annual activity plan, report
<b>Baseline:</b> 0			
<b>Planned Target:</b> 210 heads/focal points in ministries and agencies of government utilized			
<b>Output 1.2</b> Technical advice provided by PBO to the GoL and civil society organizations in application of conflict sensitivity approach based on framework.	21 government ministries and 10 agencies by PBO technical advice made their policies and program design conflict sensitive	Weak political will coupled with limited technical capacity to respond to all sectors and levels of government	Minutes, note-to-file
<b>Indicator 1.2.1</b> Conflict sensitivity manual/framework adopted by government and civil society organizations at national and local levels			

<p><b>Baseline:</b> 0</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> 31 ministries and agencies utilized conflict sensitivity manual/framework</p>			
<p><b>Output 1.3:</b> Conflict early warning system in place responding to incidences of potential escalation of violence</p> <p><b>Indicators 1.3.1:</b> 5 county and district level conflict early warning focal points and system responsive to early warning indicators at county and district levels</p> <p><b>Baseline</b> WANEP and ECOWAS conflict early warning system in 3 counties</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> 15 counties and districts conflict early warning system in place</p>	<p>Reduction in chances of violence based on 5 conflict early warning indicators detected and responded to in Lofa, Nimba, Bong, Cape Mount and Grand Bassa Counties</p>	<p>Limited Financial resources to accelerate expansion of conflict early warning system to 10 counties in Liberia</p>	<p>Report, field trips, concept notes/proposals</p>
<p><b>Output 1.4:</b> 33 peace huts built in administrative districts across Liberia to promote participatory planning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding</p> <p><b>Indicators 1.4.1:</b> interactions between local government administrations for social cohesion and conflicts prevention strengthened</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 3 peace huts</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> 33</p>	<p>Social interactions between local government officials in 11 counties through dialogue, inclusive planning and conflict resolution increased</p>	<p>Reallocation of budgets coupled with complex procurement process and delay in construction of peace huts by contractors</p>	<p>Trip report, minutes, work plan</p>

<p><b>Output 1.5:</b> Office infrastructure including trained human resources for peacebuilding and PBF secretariat in place responding to peacebuilding and PBF secretariat needs</p> <p><b>Indicator 1.5.1</b> peacebuilding programs including technical capacities and activities in government coordinated and cohered; robust secretariat services performed on behalf of JSC and PBSO</p> <p><b>Baseline:</b> 0</p> <p><b>Planned Target:</b> decentralized activities of office at regional level based on need of the justice and security regional hubs; PBF secretariat services linked to regional justice and security hubs</p>	<p>7 professional human resources at the PBO built technical capacities of government through coordination and coherence of peacebuilding programs and activities</p> <p>Problems identified during implementations of PBF activities in Liberia raised at the level of the JSC and PBSO</p> <p>Reduced fragmentation in peacebuilding programs and activities due to coordination and coherence of peacebuilding initiatives through building synergies and linkage between different peacebuilding interventions</p>		
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### **iii) Evaluation, Best Practices and Lessons Learned**

#### **Evaluation**

The Project as part of a peacebuilding program benefited from a formative evaluation in March 2010. The report highlighted a number of issues and recommendations. For example, the preparation of consolidated report for the JSC as a result of reports submitted by the Recipient UN Agencies. The PBO was behind in consolidating the individual project quarterly progress reports into quarterly programme reports, including financial oversight for the JSC. This made it difficult to systematically monitor the expenditure delivery rate and address operational bottlenecks for the attention of the JSC. Besides, the Formative Evaluation Report mentioned that the Project did not adequately follow through on the JSC's request to Recipient Agencies for submission of M&E reports which needed adequate attention. Subsequently, the Project or PBO made improvement in this direction by having provided timely consolidated Quarterly Progress Reports, including financial analysis to the JSC, brought key issues, including operational bottlenecks on the agenda of the JSC and ensured that all technical issues were addressed before submitting project proposals for JSC consideration to enable the JSC have more time to contend with policy issues.

The Evaluation Report observed that there were so many demands on the PBO, by PBSO, the MDTF, the JSC, the Recipient Agencies, the many missions and visitors and enormous workload. It further stated, although the PBO had capable staff, the team had insufficient capacity for delivering the required services under the challenging circumstances. The responsibilities assigned to the PBO were rather at the level of more robust Project Management Unit (PMU), which was expected to provide the appropriate guidance and expertise in terms of programme and project management. Based on recommendations, the PBO reorganized itself with distinction between the activities related to the JSC and PBF programme management and PBO Project activities informed realignment of staff terms of references. The PBO now has a Project Management Unit (PMU) with PBF specific P4 funded Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist assigned working in cohort with other staff including the Senior Technical Advisor/Program Manager. Through the PMU, a number of different Peacebuilding projects and the strategic roadmap on national peacebuilding, healing and reconciliation are coordinated with direct supervision from the Executive Director.

Monitoring was predominantly done at output level during most part of the implementation period. However, the PBO facilitated meetings with the UN Recipient Agencies that agreed to focus more in monitoring change in certain critical areas of the priority plan, namely: fostering national reconciliation; building trust between groups; and strengthening state capacity through improvement of the conflict sensitivity institutional structures. This trend has ever since been followed through and thus realized positive results.

The Project faced a number of challenges some of which were addressed. For example, actual implementation of the Project started 4 months later which impacted timely delivery of activities and outputs. UNDP was the UN Recipient Agency and was responsible to directly account to the MPTF-O and to the PBF in New York, as well as to the JSC on Project expenditures and achievements. The PBO was the implementing partners. This implementation modality did not create sufficient access to the financial outlay for the Project. As such the JSC could not make informed policy decision related to the Project and other Projects that benefitted from PBO monitoring and evaluation support. Further, complex procurement procedures coupled with delay in transactions for needed project resources or inputs undermined efficiency in project deliveries. There was increased staff turn-out. Of the seven hired staff, three resigned for better opportunities. Those that separated from the Project were the Conflict Sensitivity and Training Office, the National Monitoring and Evaluation Officer as well as the Program Assistant. Unfortunately the Project could not retain these staff that had acquired the relevant and required trainings from national and international institutions that focused on conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding and monitoring and evaluation. The number of ministries and agencies of government targeted for conflict sensitivity capacity development was relatively low as compared to the target. This was so because heads of 50% of the target ministries and agencies were less interested evidenced by the limited number of Training Interest Survey Forms (TISF) returned to the Project. Consequently, implementation of specific projects of the PRS by certain ministries and agencies did not adequately benefit from conflict sensitivity framework and approach.

On the other hand, policy responses to conflict early warning incidents coupled with its institutionalization in government formed part of the numerous challenges. The conflict early warning platform (LERN) collected over 1,300 incident reports; policy brief report on critical conflict issues including land disputes, migration, corruptions associated with Social and County Development Funds in addition to issues of sexual gender based violence and volatiles youth issues were amongst incident reports and alerts which needed timely response by policy actors. However, a number of measures were taken to address or mitigate some of these issues. For example, the Project developed local early warning and response capacities through the establishment of Coordination Mechanism and Early Warning Working Group integrated with senior level government officials that advised or took appropriate steps in response to conflict early warning incident.

### **Best Practices and Lessons Learned**

The establishment of the PBO as a catalytic Project, nationally driven, inclusive of its management and leadership, responsible for coordination and provision of monitoring and evaluation support to UN Recipient Agencies and implementing partners in Government is indeed, best practice that requires replications in other PBF funded Countries. Human resources for peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity available within Government and accessible by the UNCT and other donors in Liberia constitute critical efforts for peace consolidation and conflict prevention in Liberia.

The 18 month duration of the Project was short for such a post war country which had experienced brain-drain and insufficient capacities for peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity, where “learning by doing” is common strategy for PBF program development and implementation. The personnel of the Project were overstretched by numerous tasks. Facilitating the preparation and finalization of the peacebuilding priority plan, making arrangements for programme management, preparing relevant stakeholders and implementing partners, as well as harmonizing expectations, establishing procedures for coordination and clarifying PBF guidelines and reporting templates were amongst some of the tasks undertaken by the PBO Project.

With respect to lessons learned, the project was developed to respond to the local context which has served sufficiently to respond to the conflict driver of weak institutional capacity related to peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity in Government. The PBO in this context and with the PBF Secretariat as its function on behalf of the JSC and others presented incredible lessons to learn, as there was a stronger focus that emerged as a positive result. Also, building peacebuilding monitoring capacity within PBO, the UN Recipient Agencies and implementation partners which focused largely on outputs rather than on outcome, constituted failure of lessons to learn. Additionally, there were so many indicators developed but were not SMART enough and so measurements of results were very challenging. There was however, no clear and standardized methodology that the PBO adapted to determine collective change for the attention of the JSC basically because coordination between agencies, as well as synergies among the different projects monitored by the PBO was weak.

**iv) A Specific Story** (Attachment of supporting documents, including photos with captions, news items etc, is strongly encouraged. The MPTF Office will select stories and photos to feature in the Consolidated Annual Report, the GATEWAY and the MPTF Office Newsletter).

#### **Conflict dynamics being addressed**

Following 14 years civil war Liberia needed to recover and develop with state capacity building at the core of any peacebuilding intervention. Its institutional capacity to respond to pervasive conflict issues at various levels be it at individual or social political level was weak to deal with such institutional problem. Total absence of coordinated approach to ensure government’s interventions do not inadvertently trigger new conflicts while at the same time to ensuring adequate trouble shooting implementation problems related to PBF program funding in Liberia. In recognition of this gap, the Government of Liberia expressed the need to establish the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The PBO was to develop Government’s capacity to respond to emerging threats, mitigate risks, and ensure that implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) promote peace, reconciliation and development. Another significant function of the PBO was to act as a Secretariat for the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).

## **Project Interventions**

The establishment of the PBO within Government to build capacity in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity and its secretariat role played related to the PBF were amongst key incredible activities of the Project. The intended change was anticipated at individual and social political level. The Project set up office infrastructure, hired an International Capacity Development Advisor and six national staff and trained them in peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity. Conflict sensitivity framework was developed, adopted used to train over 300 government officials and CSOs.

Conflict early warning system was designed and platform for data collection, transmission and prediction established with coordination mechanisms also established at national and county levels. These frameworks are being used to detect and respond to emerging conflicts in order to prevent escalation into violence.

Local government officials in 11 counties where construction of peace huts intended for conflict resolution, management and transformation and development planning, relationships between the citizens and government have improved with increased involvement of citizens in decision and dialogue processes. For example, at the peace hut in Gbarma, Gbarpolu County, the President of Liberia attended a development meeting with local government officials and citizens in 2010.

Regarding the PBF secretariat functions, the Project identified problems that arose in relation to PBF funded projects deliveries and managements, and advised the JSC on appropriate actions, and ensured follow up on reporting back on progress or lack of progress. Agencies reports and status updates were reviewed and consolidated and made available to the JSC and other relevant actors both in and outside of Liberia. As Secretariat. The Project acted as the local repository of knowledge regarding the rules and procedures of the PBF and related management arrangements, guidelines and supported information sharing including bulletins and facilitated appropriate trainings as were required. Further, the Project ensured linkages of the PBF projects to national processes, in particular the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and the related supportive efforts of the UN and partners. Promoting PBF awareness amongst the Government, civil society and international partners was carried out by the Project. And finally, the Project documented issues and periodically share 'lessons learned' with the JSC and PBSO for the necessary actions.

## **Results**

The change of the project is incremental. There are signals that the government of Liberia has endorsed the utilization of the concept of conflict sensitivity in their policy formulation and program design, particularly the 11 ministries and agencies that benefited from training in this regard. For example, the development process of the Agenda for Transformation, the Decentralization policy and the Strategic Roadmap on national peacebuilding, healing and reconciliation benefitted from the approach of conflict sensitivity. Additionally, application of conflict early warning and response knowledge and skills by district and county focal points and relevant and civil society institutions have increased with corresponding reduction in chances for escalation of violence. For example, relationships between youth/communities and concession holdings in Grand Bassa and Grand Cape Mount Counties previously characterized by hate or violent speeches due to lack of access to corporate social benefits have improved as potential violent conflicts associated with the latter were detected early enough and appropriate actions taken including a dialogue process.

## **Lessons Learned**

Development and maintenance of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity human resources within government and other national institutions coupled with the establishment of office just for peacebuilding within Government is critical for peace consolidation in post war Liberia. Building links between micro and macro levels peacebuilding processes created opportunities further for peace consolidation efforts. Additionally, building and strengthening coordination mechanisms for peacebuilding, also at county and local level helped to address fragmentation and promoted coordination and coherence, which inherently would lead to measuring cumulative impact for peacebuilding in the years to come.