

I. PRF – PROJECT DOCUMENT

TEMPLATE 3.2



**United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund
(PBF)**

PRF PROJECT DOCUMENT

<p>Project Title: Supporting the Yemen Peace and National Partnership Agreement</p>	<p>Recipient UN Organization(s): UNOPS</p>
<p>Project Contact: Niels Guenther, Senior Programme Officer, Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen Address: 1st Avenue at 46th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA Telephone: +1 646 339 9156 E-mail: guenther@un.org</p>	<p>Implementing Partner(s) – name & type (Government, CSO, etc): All signatories of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement</p>
<p>Project Location: Yemen</p>	
<p>Project Description: Empowerment of all actors to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) and secure the key elements necessary for a lasting peace. This Project will support the design and setup of mechanisms that will monitor the agreement’s implementation and its key milestones including on ceasefires, disengagement and DDR</p>	<p>Peacebuilding Fund: \$796,000 Other source: Complementing 2015 Supplementary Budget OSASGY (from mid-2015) Government Input: Other: Total Project Cost:</p>

(demobilisation, disarmament, and rehabilitation).	Proposed Project Start Date: December 2014 Proposed Project End Date: August 2015 Total duration (in months): ¹ 9
Gender Marker Score ² : <u>1</u> Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective. Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective. Score 1 for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly. Score 0 for projects that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality.	
Priority Plan Outcome to which the project is contributing: Outcome Three: Outcomes of the transition are achieved and sustained through empowered women and men in an increasingly inclusive, transparent and participatory process	
Project Outcomes: <u>Outcome 1</u> : The implementation and monitoring of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement is supported and taking place, including support to political engagement and crisis mediation, and technical advice on areas such as ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR. <u>Outcome 2</u> : Capacity of all sides to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.	
PBF Focus Area³ which best summarizes the focus of the project: 1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)	

¹ PRF project duration must be within the approved dates for the Priority Plan.

² PBSO monitors the inclusion of gender equality and women's empowerment all PBF projects, in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122, and as mandated by the Secretary-General in his Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding.

³ PBF Focus Areas are:

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.1) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

3: Revitalise the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3):

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/PBF Secretariats)

Recipient UN Organization(s)	
Name of Representative: <i>Farouk Hirzika</i> Signature: Name of Agency: <i>UNOPS</i> Date & Seal: <i>22/12/14</i> Email: <i>Faroukh@unops.org</i>	
Co Chairs of Joint Steering Committee	
<i>Mr. Jamal Benomar</i> <i>Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Yemen</i> Signature   Date & Seal	<i>HE Dr. Mohamed Abdul-Wahed al-Maytami</i> <i>Minister of Planning and International Cooperation</i> Signature _____ Date and Seal
<i>Mr. Paolo Lembo</i> <i>United Nations Resident Coordinator</i> Signature _____  Date & Seal	

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(Length: Max. 15 pages)

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II. How this project fits within the approved Priority Plan

Overview

1. In the wake of the Arab Spring movement, Yemen is undergoing a political transition under the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative (GCCCI) and the Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the transition process in Yemen, signed on 23 November 2011 (“Transition Agreement”). The Transition Agreement stipulates that a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) be followed by a constitution drafting process and a constitutional referendum. The transition process will conclude with general elections. United Nations Security Council resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012) and 2140 (2014) reaffirmed the need for the full and timely implementation of the Transition Agreement including an inclusive political process led by the Yemeni people for peaceful change and political, economic and social reforms. The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Yemen has been tasked to facilitate and monitor the political transition and coordinate international assistance in support of the process.

2. The deliberations of the NDC concluded in January 2014. The final report, comprising the outcome of all working groups, presented some 1,850 recommendations that outline the contours of a modern Yemeni federal state and form the basis and common understanding for a new social contract. A number of working groups issued recommendations that relate to security issues and regional grievances, including those of the North. The NDC Outcome Implementation Guarantees Document has been adopted as the new roadmap for the 12 months of extended transition following the closure of the NDC. During this time, in line with the GCC Agreement, the NDC recommendations are the reference for a committee drafting a new constitution to be approved by referendum and followed by national elections.

3. Following the 2011 nationwide uprising against President Saleh, Ansar Allah entrenched their geographic control and political influence to encompass the whole of Saada and parts of neighbouring governorates of Hajjah, Al Jawf, and Amran. Conflict continued in the form of localised fighting between Ansar Allah and tribes and fighters affiliated to the Al Ahmar family, the Islah party, and with troops led by commanders alleged to be loyal to General Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar.

4. In July 2014, Ansar Allah made a major advance capturing Amran city (capital of Amran governorate). In August 2014, Ansar Allah issued a set of demands to the Yemeni government that included calls for action against subsidy reform and corruption, a revision of the national unity government, urgent implementation of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes in relation to Saada and a review of the national body established to monitor delivery of NDC outcomes. To pursue these demands Ansar Allah established a number of protest camps in and around Sana’a during late August 2014.

5. In early September 2014, the conflict grew increasingly violent, culminating in the Ansar Allah take-over of government buildings, Ministries and the Central Bank by September 21. The UN brokered Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), signed by all parties in the eve of September 21, brought an end to the military confrontation in Sana’a and prevented a further escalation of the situation.

6. Engagement with Ansar Allah and other key stakeholders has been a critical element of the UN’s political strategy since 2011. The UN Special Adviser (SASG), in

particular, has made several visits to Saada and his office has been closely involved in efforts to secure ceasefires and humanitarian access in northern areas. After a number of failed domestic initiatives to address the conflict, the SASG brokered the PNPA. Many of the issues raised in the Ansar Allah August 2014 demands have been enshrined in the PNPA. Whilst the genesis of the PNPA relates specifically to the Ansar Allah demands, its implementation is now a nationwide concern.

7. In a press statement on September 23, the UN Security Council welcomed the signature of the PNPA in Yemen as the best means to stabilize the situation and prevent further violence. The members of the Security Council supported the efforts of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, in facilitating the signing and implementation of this agreement.

8. The significance of the PNPA was further underlined by the UN Secretary General in his address of the Friends of Yemen meeting in New York on 24th September 2014, in which he welcomed the Agreement as a step in the right direction. International support for the Agreement was underlined in the Co-Chairs conclusions to the meeting in which was stated:

“Members... urged all groups to uphold a permanent ceasefire, for the legitimate government authorities to have sole and full control over security and public institutions in Sana’a and called for full implementation of all elements of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement based on National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes.”

9. In a conflict marked by a major trust deficit that limits the effectiveness of bilateral peace efforts, the UN occupies a unique position in that it is largely considered a neutral party by all sides. In order to avert further breakdowns of the security and governance situation, it is essential that the UN urgently steps up to its role as outlined in the PNPA and supports the rapid implementation of the agreement including an immediate start to efforts to address grievances, de-escalate tensions, and demobilise non-state combatants and heavy weaponry.

a) Priority Plan Outcome Area supported

10. This project supports Priority Plan (PP) Outcome Area Three:

“Outcomes of the transition are achieved and sustained through empowered women and men in an increasingly inclusive, transparent and participatory process.”

11. PP Outcome Area Three’s target areas include ‘Reparation and Reconciliation and Justice to Redress Violence’, and the provision to non-state actors of ‘...tools to monitor the implementation of the outcomes of the National Dialogue’⁴.

12. The outcomes of the transition are expressed through the NDC outcomes. Implementation of the majority of NDC outcomes requires, as a prerequisite, peace and minimum levels of stability. Actions to implement key NDC outcomes are specified throughout the PNPA, including commitments for an action plan to implement the NDC

⁴ ‘Yemen Peacebuilding Priority Plan’, p.15.

outcomes (Article 2), civil service reform (Article 3), combatting corruption (Article 5), judicial reform (Article 6), electoral reforms (Article 7), national monitoring of NDC outcomes (Article 9), a joint committee to implement outcomes from the NDC Saada Working Group (Article 11), and implement outcomes from the NDC Military and Security Working Group (Article 12).

13. The project will support realization of the Yemen Peacebuilding Priority Plan Outcome Three by monitoring and supporting implementation of the PNPA, based on the outcomes of the NDC. The project will also ensure a sequenced and comprehensive international support, ensuring that relevant national, UN, and bilateral support is appropriately linked into the peace plan (see c) below).

b) Rationale for this project

14. Failure to address Yemen's unresolved violent conflicts threatens to undermine significantly a successful conclusion to Yemen's transition. There is a credible process established to secure a sustainable peace under the PNPA, with the personal leadership of the President of Yemen, and the explicit appointment of the SASG as monitoring party.

15. While the responsibility for the implementation of the PNPA rests solely with the signatory parties, the agreement specifically requests that the SASG provide monitoring of the Agreement:

"The Parties commit... to continue negotiations through a joint committee established with the support of the United Nations." (Article 16)

16. Furthermore the PNPA requests substantive technical and advisory support to assist with PNPA implementation, in particular with regard to disarmament:

"The Parties request the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen to continue United Nations support for the implementation of the measures agreed upon in this Agreement. In this regard, the Parties request the Special Adviser to continue to monitor any violations." (Article 17)

"With the technical support of the United Nations, an agreement shall be reached on a mechanism for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference relating to the "disarmament and recovery of State-owned heavy and medium weapons from all parties, groups and individuals that were plundered or seized nationwide, within a specific time frame and simultaneously." (Annex: Article 3)

17. However there are some critical gaps/constraints that have hitherto prevented successful pursuance of a peace plan⁵. These include:

- Severe distrust between groups. Recent conflicts have led to the deaths of hundreds, internal displacement of thousands, and widespread destruction and appropriation of property. This has critically weakened trust on all sides. Confidence will need to be

⁵ Sources: Priority Plan Conflict Assessment and informal assessment by OSASG political officers June 2014.

rebuilt if fundamental proposals pertaining to disarmament and demobilisation are to be successfully tabled and agreed.

- Incentives exist for continued conflict, fuelled by the war economy. War has enriched key actors on all sides. These individuals will have a lot to lose economically and politically from transition away from the norms of war.
- Capacities for mediation and consensus building among key actors are weak. Individuals tasked with negotiating on behalf of their respective groups are not specialised in how to engage and negotiate with political parties and groups in conflict situations. Traditional mechanisms which may have previously helped mediate conflict have been weakened.
- Prevalence of heavy weaponry, and need to disarm non-state actors. The PNPA demands a framework to achieve this, in order to return the monopoly of force to the central government and its security apparatus. However, to secure and maintain buy-in of armed groups this will need to be carefully sequenced with other confidence building measures.
- Weak governance performance, including service delivery, no progress of the NDC outcomes. Slow implementation and lack of visibility of efforts to implement the NDC outcomes has negatively impacted on the confidence of public and key actors. Tangible improvements to citizens' lives will enhance support and public pressure in favour of the PNPA and particularly its annex regarding demobilisation and disarmament.

18. There is therefore a realistic probability that an intervention focused on building the capacity of actors to realise their commitments under the PNPA, coupled with a timely and comprehensive assumption by the UN of its monitoring and technical support role could make the catalytic difference that enables Yemenis to embark on a sustained process that realizes the outcomes of the transition.

c) Coherence with existing projects

19. Owing to its close alignment to the NDC outcomes, the PNPA has relevance to many existing and planned initiatives aimed at strengthening service delivery, governance capacity and national dialogue implementation. Importantly, it also relates to initiatives supporting security sector reform and rule of law. Ongoing programmes may need to be amended in order to become consistent with the PNPA and its timetable, and new follow-on programmes such as for large scale DDR will need to be designed.

20. With the support of the project the OSASG will reach out to UN partners and other international actors and spearhead coordination of complementary activities, through existing mechanisms for coordination – notably the Joint Facility – to ensure alignment with complementary programmatic interventions and where necessary new programming, securing a peace dividend that follows swiftly on the heels of PNPA milestones. Existing fora for cooperation include the Friends of Yemen and its working groups, the G10, and inter-agency UN working groups, in particular PMT for joint UNCT-WBG MAF implementation. .

21. Given the range of complementary humanitarian and early recovery activities that will be required to follow progress with the PNPA such as concerning return of IDPs and humanitarian access there will also be a requirement for regular briefing and operational coordination with the humanitarian group, under close consultation with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator.

22. This project is to be financed under the Priority Plan Outcome Area Three. Relevant programming is already underway through PBF IRF funding and other PP outcome areas. There are also important linkages to programmes funded under non-PBF multi-donor projects. The table below summarises the most significant relevant programming. The Project also interfaces with political work of OSASG funded through the Special Political Mission (SPM) budget. Follow-up activities for some of the Project's outputs (e.g. support to commissions and mechanisms after initial set-up) will be funded through 2015 Supplementary SPM budget, expected to be approved in mid-2015 and with pre-clearance for some staffing from Q2/2015 to ensure a smooth transition between process phases.

Table 1 – Mapping of peacebuilding activities and gaps

Priority Plan Outcome Area Three: Outcomes of the transition are achieved and sustained through empowered women and men in an increasingly inclusive, transparent and participatory process.					
Type	Source of funding (Government/development partner)	Key Projects	Duration of Projects	Budget in \$	Description of major gaps in the Outcome Area, programmatic or financial
PBF IRF (incl. Part PBF / part other source funding)	1) Government of Yemen, YNDCRTF Multi-donor Trust Fund, PBF IRF	1) Technical Assistance to the Constitutional Drafting Process in Yemen (PBF/IRF-89) Yemen Constitution-Making Process (YNDCRTF)	1) Until March 2015	1) \$11.8m (in addition to approx. \$8m from Government to CDC and CDC Secretariat)	Projects support overall process, but do not fund specific follow up on all NDC outcomes.
	2) PBF IRF	2) Addressing Grievances in the South (PBF/IRF-71)	2) until March 2015	2) \$1.1m	There will need to be close cooperation with the IRF project on the South, as the PNPA now unifies efforts to address elements of the northern and southern Yemen conflicts.

	3) PBF IRF	3) Women and Youth engagement in Yemen's political transition (PBF/IRF-73)	3) until Dec 2014	3) \$1m	
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III. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing

23. The **goal** of this project is to empower all actors to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) and secure the key elements necessary for a lasting peace.

This project aims to support two outcomes:

Outcome 1: The implementation and monitoring of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement is supported and taking place, including support to political engagement and crisis mediation, and technical advice on areas such as ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.

Outcome 2: Capacity of all sides to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.

The **theory of change** is: If the capacity of all signatory parties to the PNPA to engage effectively with the peace and political process is increased then the chances of sustained progress towards a lasting political settlement are increased. If the mechanisms for mediation, ceasefire monitoring and for disarmament are established, then trust and confidence of key parties to the PNPA will increase and risks to derailment be reduced.

24. The **scope** of this project is (a) the development of capacities of stakeholders to the PNPA, and (b) the establishment of key components of the PNPA's implementation infrastructure across technical areas.

25. The **geographic focus** will encompass the entirety of Yemen, as the PNPA is a nationwide agreement.

26. **Target groups** include representatives all signatory parties to the PNPA, including Ansar Allah movement, southern movements, Islah and GPC, in addition to a wider array of national stakeholders, including independent women and youth. The project will encourage the implementation of the PNPA to be consistent with all outcomes of the NDC, including with regard to 30% representation of women on all appointed and elected government bodies.

27. Activities

- Facilitate the establishment of a mechanism for mediating any disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of the PNPA, including a Joint Committee for Resolution of the Disputes under the PNPA;
- Provide technical expertise and support to the establishment of implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed

groups, mandated to normalise the situation, and to complete the organisation of the administrative, security and military authorities in a manner that achieves the establishment of state authority;

- Provide technical expertise and support to the establishment of a mechanism for disarmament and recovery of state-owned heavy and medium weapons;
- Inform and train political movements/PNPA partners, such as Ansar Allah and other members of the Joint Committee for Resolution of the Disputes, to effectively engage in mediation and peaceful conflict resolution initiatives;
- Implement PNPA monitoring-related targeted communication activities⁶.

28. **Sequencing** will focus on using the Peacebuilding Fund to catalyse early implementation of support whilst additional resources will be sought, including through a Supplementary SPM budget for 2015 (expected for approval in mid-2015).

b) Budget

Table 2: Project Output/Activity Budget

Outcome 1: The implementation and monitoring of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement is supported and taking place, including support to crisis mediation and technical advice on ceasefires/disengagement and DDR.		
Output number	Output names	Output budget
Output 1.1	Support to the establishment of a mechanism for mediating any disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of the PNPA	\$180,000
Output 1.2	Provision of technical expertise and support to the establishment of implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups, mandated to normalise the situation, and to complete the organisation of the administrative, security and military authorities in a manner that achieves the establishment of state authority	\$200,000
Output 1.3	Provision of technical expertise to the establishment of a disarmament mechanism	\$180,000
Outcome 2: Capacity of all sides to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.		

⁶ Including in support of the Government's strategic communication efforts and in coordination with relevant partners supporting the Government, such as UNDP through work with the Office of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Information since 2012.

Output 2.1	Political movements/PNPA partners have increased capacity to engage in mediation and conflict resolution initiatives and increased understanding of political party setup and related framework	\$200,000
Output 2.2	Public understanding of the PNPA implementation increased through targeted outreach and communication activities	\$36,000
TOTAL		\$796,000

Table 3: Project budget by UN categories

CATEGORIES	USD
1. Staff and other personnel	\$354,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$17,625
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$45,000
4. Contractual services	\$8,500
5. Travel	\$273,800
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$0
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	\$45,000
Sub-Total Project Costs	\$743,925
8. Indirect support Costs	\$52,075
Total Project Costs	\$796,000

c) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners

29. The coordinating UN organization will be OSASG. The sole RUNO will be UNOPS. DPKO is not present in Yemen and will not be a RUNO, but it will be the first point of call for all DDR-related expertise.

30. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations, supporting the successful implementation of its partners' peacebuilding, humanitarian and development projects around the world. UNOPS provides project management, procurement and infrastructure services to governments, donors and UN organizations.

31. UNOPS has developed a strong implementing capacity in Sana'a, with backstopping support by the regional hub in nearby Amman, Jordan. UNOPS has been operating in Yemen since 2013. In Yemen, UNOPS programmes have focused on providing support to the process of political transition. This has included providing a wide spectrum of operational support to the National Dialogue Conference and the constitution drafting process, this included vast recruitment services and managing all logistical aspects, including procurement, salary payments, premises rental and venue rentals, technical advice on institutional capacity, and operational support to the Office of

the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSASG). As part of this operational support, UNOPS has developed templates and administrative systems to bring in experts at very short notice. Such capabilities will ensure that the required technical resources are recruited on a timely manner to assist the Special Adviser and the OSASG in implementing the project.

32. UNOPS also worked closely with the Ministry of Planning and the Executive Bureau for the Acceleration of Aid Absorption in supporting the development of Yemen's institutional capacity.

33. UNOPS will follow the standard PBF PRF reporting requirements on the basis of the results logical framework. UNOPS will contribute its input to the OSASG Programme Coordinator who will consolidate the reports from the project's main components as per the PBF PRF requirements and deadlines.

34. For quality assurance purposes UNOPS will monitor all project activities via key performance indicators (KPI) that will look at progress towards achieving the peacebuilding outcomes of the project, and do the necessary alignment if any deviation was identified.

Table 4: Overview of RUNO funding in the country

	RUNO:	Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)	Annual Regular Budget in \$	Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)
Previous calendar year	UNOPS	-Multi-Partner Trust Fund -Peacebuilding – IRF	\$10m	N/A
Current calendar year	UNOPS	-Multi-Partner Trust Fund -Peacebuilding – IRF	\$8m	N/A

35. **OSASG** (not an RUNO): OSASG (DPA) was mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC 2051) (2011), UNSC 2041 (2014)) to support Yemen's political transition. The Special Advisor of the UN Secretary General played a central role in securing agreement from all the parties to sign and implement the GCC initiative and has since continued to support the transition through active, on the ground, facilitation and the provision of good offices on behalf of the UN Secretary General. OSASG experts have supported the Technical Committee in preparation for the National Dialogue. Such assistance has continued since the inception of the National Dialogue, notably through the deployment of a Youth and Civil Society facilitation expert, who has already begun providing engagement advice to the Women and Youth delegates on a range of transitional issues.

36. Based on its mandate and its success, to date, in securing agreement in 2011 and assisting with the completion of the National Dialogue and launch of the Constitution drafting process, OSASG benefits from a widespread support and acceptance on the part of many Yemeni stakeholders as well as from the international community, which has continuously expressed unity of support for, and strong levels of confidence in, the work of the Special Adviser and OSASG. The international community expressed its full support to implementation of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) that was brokered by the SASG in September 2014. The PNPA outlines a significant role of OSASG in the monitoring and facilitation of its implementation.

IV. Management and coordination

a) Project management

37. The Project will be implemented by UNOPS with oversight and technical input from OSASG.

38. UNOPS will provide the day-to-day management of the project. Technical advice will be coordinated by a lead technical adviser, under the supervision of the Special Adviser. Quality oversight will be provided by OSASG, under the strategic leadership of the UN Special Adviser and operational oversight of the OSASG Senior Programme Officer. OSASG will convene regular operational coordination meetings with all the relevant partners.

39. A Project Board, chaired by the SASG (or delegate), and the Head of the President's Office will provide the strategic oversight for the project. The Project Board will receive, review and approve project reports, prepared by the UNOPS and reviewed by the OSASG Senior Programme Officer.

b) Risk management

Table 5 – Risk management matrix

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
The implementation of the PNPA is undermined by political actors, whose interests and agendas do not align with the peace process	M	H	Monitoring and reporting of PNPA by OSASG.
Renewal of all-out war between various armed factions and militias and government	H	H	Close monitoring by OSASG. Connecting the political facilitation to complementary efforts in other forums such as G10+, Friends of Yemen, and UNSC (OSASG)
Insecurity in some areas throughout the Yemen could threaten project implementation and staff safety	H	L	Operations will commence based in Sanaa. Establishing presence in other regions would be ideal, but is not critical to the success of the implementation methodology (UNOPS)
Insecurity in Sanaa/rest of Yemen causes a full withdrawal of UN from Yemen	M	H	Some project operations can continue remotely. workshops and facilitation meetings can be conducted in a 3 rd country in the region (UNOPS)
Collapse of national consensus behind the National Dialogue	L	H	Be prepared to secure a new consensus on principles amongst

outcomes			key government and non-state actors, using the National Dialogue outcomes as a launchpad for discussion (OSASG)
Decrease in attention to Yemen at the UNSC	L	M	Utilise other international forums, such as Friends of Yemen to buttress involvement by the UNSC (OSASG)
Government fails to meet minimum standards of inclusiveness and ND implementation.	L	H	Monitor inclusiveness of the appointed bodies. SASG to raise concerns with the President as and if they arise. Have a clear understanding of minimum standards and plans to withdraw support should these fail to be adhered to and mitigation efforts fail (OSASG)
Economic collapse of the country owing to fiscal deficit and lack of donor funding.	M	H	Emphasising this issue at Friends of Yemen and through other relevant outreach channels

c) Monitoring and evaluation

40. The project will be supervised and coordinated by OSASG. The PNPA implementation team will be an integral part of OSASG and will provide regular briefing and monitoring reports to the SASG. M&E and project reporting will be prepared by UNOPS, in consultation with the PNPA implementation and monitoring team, and quality assured by OSASG prior to submission.

41. A variety of quantitative and qualitative data will be collected to support monitoring of the project, including post-training survey data, occasional formal and informal canvassing of perceptions from public and key stakeholders, and informed judgement by technical specialists employed under the project.

42. Subject to the political judgement of the SASG, a lessons learned exercise may be undertaken towards the end of the project, in order to collect lessons for informing subsequent peacebuilding exercises in Yemen and other contexts.

d) Administrative arrangements (standard wording)

43. The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

44. On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

45. Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

46. Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

47. Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than 15 July;
- Annual and final narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

48. Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

49. The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

Annex A: Project Summary (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)



**PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT SUMMARY**

Project Number & Title:	PBF/xxx Supporting the Yemen Peace and National Partnership Agreement	
Recipient Organization:	UN	UNOPS
Implementing Partner(s):	PNPA Signatories	
Location:	Yemen	
Approved Project Budget:	USD 796,000	
Duration:	Planned Start Date: Dec 2014	Planned Completion: August 2015 (9 months)
Brief project Description:	Empowerment of all actors to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) and secure the key elements necessary for a lasting peace. This Project will support the design and setup of mechanisms that will monitor the agreement's implementation and its key milestones including on ceasefires, disengagement and DDR (demobilisation, disarmament, and rehabilitation).	

Project Outcomes:	<p><u>Outcome 1:</u> The implementation and monitoring of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement is supported and taking place, including support to political engagement and crisis mediation, and technical advice on areas such as ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.</p> <p><u>Outcome 2:</u> Capacity of all sides to realise their commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.</p>
PBF Focus Area:	1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)
Gender marker:	1
Key Project Activities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate the establishment of a mechanism for mediating any disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of the PNPA, including a Joint Committee for Resolution of the Disputes under the PNPA; • Provide technical expertise and support to the establishment of implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups, mandated to normalise the situation, and to complete the organisation of the administrative, security and military authorities in a manner that achieves the establishment of state authority; • Provide technical expertise and support to the establishment of a mechanism for disarmament and recovery of state-owned heavy and medium weapons; • Inform and train political movements/PNPA partners, such as Ansar Allah and other members of the Joint Committee for Resolution of the Disputes, to effectively engage in mediation and peaceful conflict resolution initiatives; • Implement PNPA monitoring-related targeted communication activities.

<p>Target: TOR drafted (Q1, 2015); TOR agreed on (Q1, 2015), Mechanism implemented (Q2, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 1.1.2</p> <p>Regular reporting on implementation, progress and challenges of PNPA, as part of SASG reporting to UNSC (source: OSASG/UNSC) (see note 2).</p> <p>Baseline: 6 reports to UNSC (2014)</p> <p>Target: 1 (Q4, 2014); 4 (2015)</p>		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1</p> <p>Number of technical expert positions identified (TOR), candidates selected and mobilized (source: OSASG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 (2015)</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.2</p> <p>Number of technical briefing papers and position papers prepared by technical team (source: OSASG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p>
<p>Output 1.2</p> <p>Provision of technical expertise to establish implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups and normalization of the local administrative, security and military authorities</p>			

Target: 3 (2015)	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.3</p> <p>Plan in place with timetable to reflect ceasefire aspects of the PNPA (source: OSASG).</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: plan drafted (2015)</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.4</p> <p>Mechanism established with timetable and operational (source: OSASG).</p> <p>Baseline: No mechanism</p> <p>Target: Mechanism terms of reference drafted, mechanism operational (2015)</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.3.1</p> <p>Number of technical expert positions identified (TOR), candidates selected and mobilized (source: OSASG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 (2015)</p>
		<p>Output 1.3</p> <p>Provision of technical expertise to the establishment of a disarmament mechanism</p>	

		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.2</p> <p>Number of technical briefing papers and position papers prepared by technical team (source: OSASG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 (2015)</p>																					
<p>Outcome 2:</p> <p>Capacity of all sides to realise their</p>		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.3</p> <p>Plan in place with timetable to reflect DDR aspects of the PNPA (source: OSASG).</p> <p>Baseline: 0 – no PNPA in place (2014)</p> <p>Target: plan drafted (2015)</p>																					
		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.4</p> <p>Mechanism established with timetable and operational (source: OSASG).</p> <p>Baseline: No mechanism</p> <p>Target: Mechanism terms of reference drafted, mechanism operational (2015)</p>																					
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2</p> <p>Milestones of the PNPA are met or revised</p>																					

<p>commitments under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.</p>		<p>through participatory processes, and implementation represents good practice in peacebuilding (source: OSASG) (see note 3).</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2014)</p> <p>Target: 1 (2015)</p>	
<p>Output 2.1</p> <p>Political movements/PNPA partners, such as the Houthis, have increased capacity to engage in mediation and conflict resolution initiatives and increased understanding of political party setup and related framework</p>		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.1</p> <p>Number of workshops on thematic issues (source: OSASG).</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 (2015)</p>	
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.2</p> <p>Participants in workshops score them as relevant to their needs. (Source: Post-training course questionnaire) (see note 4)</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2014) (no workshops)</p> <p>Target: Average score 3 (2015)</p>	
<p>Output 2.2</p> <p>Public understanding of the PNPA implementation increased through targeted outreach and</p>		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.1</p> <p>Political update on PNPA provided to UNCT and HCT meetings (source: OSASG).</p>	

communication activities								
	Baseline: 0 (2014) Target: 9 (2015)							
	Output Indicator 2.2.2 Briefings/Consultations with local NGOs and other non-state actors on PNPA implementation (source: OSASG). Baseline: 0 (2014) Target: 3 (2015)							
	Output Indicator 2.2.3 Regular briefings by the UN Special Adviser (UNSA) to local and international political forums on PNPA progress, monitoring and implementation (briefings to ambassadors, Friends of Yemen Security Sector Working Group, etc.) (source: OSASG) Baseline: 0 Target: 6 (2015)							
	Output Indicator 2.2.4 PNPA monthly progress and challenges documented on OSASG website Baseline: 0							

			Target: website established (Q4 2014); 9 postings (2015)										
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Notes:

1. For the purposes of this indicator, a good enough support to the PNPA defined as establishment of a UN monitoring mechanism, including establishing a timetable of regular reporting to appropriate forums (government, international, UN), and received a broad ownership by relevant stakeholders. To be assessed by an appointed UN expert (0 = no mechanism in place; 1 = mechanism in place, but not fully implemented; 3 = mechanisms in place and fully implemented).
2. Frequency of required reporting by SASG to UNSC assumed to remain at once every 60 days.
3. Assessment by SASG. Scoring: 0 – no milestones met, any revisions taken without an inclusive process; 1 – some milestones met, any revisions taken with some inclusive processes; 2 – several milestones met, any revisions taken with sufficiently inclusive processes; 3 – all milestones met, any revisions taken with fully inclusive processes.
4. Training questionnaire scores: 1 – no relevance; 2 – some relevance; 3 – relevant; 4 – highly relevant.

