

**PEACEBUILDING FUND  
EMERGENCY WINDOW  
PROJECT/BUDGET REVISION SUBMISSION FORM**

Recipient UN Organization: UNDP	Country: Côte d'Ivoire
Project Title: Support to the Direct Dialogue in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso	Project Number: PBF/EMER/1
Revised Total Project Cost: \$1,000,000	Indirect Cost Percentage: 5% of total budget

**1. Type of Project/Budget Revision requested\***

- Increase in project budget      Amount requested: \$300,000
- Extension of project duration      New end date: \_\_\_\_\_ (if applicable)
- Change of project scope (provide details in a revised project document form)

\* For any change in the budget, provide revised budget

**2. Decision of the Head of the Peacebuilding Support Office**

- Approved
- Approved with modification/condition
- Deferred

**Reason/Comments**

The Special Representative of the Facilitator in Côte d'Ivoire and the Special Representative of the Secretary General of UNOCI in their respective capacity of arbitrator and certifier are heavily involved in supporting Ivorian authorities to achieving (i) the finalization of the contractual arrangements applicable to the electoral process for which a technical operator has been chosen, (ii) the decree for the amendments of the electoral code and (iii) the decree for the modus operandi between the CEI, INS and the technical operator. The facilitation efforts will require support for longer than expected and it is extremely tedious to mobilize and re-mobilize small amounts of funds from several donors to keep the facilitation running without disruption. As a consequence of the above and the need to avoid disruption of the facilitation process due to limited funding, a project extension has been requested to in order to keep the momentum for which results are being achieved for instance as far as the electoral process is concerned. The additional US\$300,000 requested would enable SRSG to ensure a bridging funding capacity so as to enable the sustainability of the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator and the mobilization of funding that are in the pipeline that include pledges from Norway and France.

**Carolyn McAskie**  
Assistant-Secretary General for Peacebuilding Support

[Redacted Signature]

*12.05.08*  
.....  
Date

Signature

**3. Action taken by the Executive Coordinator, MDTF Office, UNDP**

- Project/Budget Revision consistent with provisions of the UN-UNDP and UNDP-Recipient UN Organizations MOUs and the LOA with donors

**Bisrat Akhlu**, \_\_\_\_\_, UNDP

[Redacted Signature]

*14/5/2008*  
.....  
Date

Signature

**SPG COMMENTS ON COTE D'IVOIRE: ADDITIONAL PBF SUPPORTS TO FACILITATION**

Agency/Office	Comments	Endorsed (Y/N)
UNDP	UNDP supports this additional funding for the facilitation of the OPA from the PBF Emergency Window.  Looking forward and in the event that UNOCI is unable to secure additional funding in the medium-term, we should discuss whether there would be other options for such funding within and outside the UN system, including as an additional allocation from the PBF or other. We may also consider what support HQ can provide to country-led resource mobilization in this regard.	Y
DFKO	Conveys support for this request related to direct dialogue in Côte d'Ivoire. As mentioned, additional funds are being sought for the medium-term but this request would address a critical interim gap.	Y
OHCHR		Y
UNDP-MDTF*	<p>We agree with you that the management fee should be "in the range of 5-9%, with an average of approximately 7%", as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between UNDP and the Administrative Agent/MDTF Office (Article II, paragraph 7). Since the management fee charged by UNDP for the "first phase" of the project was 5%, it seems logical to expect a similar fee for any extension, in particular because the complex administrative nature of the project and the role played by UNOPS are not mentioned in the proposal. As far as the MDTF Office is concerned, we have no objection for any fee that falls within the approved range of 5-9%.</p> <p>Regarding the approval process, since the increase requested for PBF-EMER-1 involves the transfer of funds from the PBF account, we recommend using the mechanisms in place for Window III, as per paragraph 3.8 of the TORs, i.e. after the Head of BSO undertakes an <u>expeditious</u> review of the submission in a consultative process at senior level within the UN system. When circulating the proposal, you can set a deadline for comments (2/3 days), after which the Head of PBSO can make a decision on allocating additional resources to the project.</p>	(Y)

\* MDTF is not a member of the SPG but asked to comment to ensure adherence with the TOR of the PBF.

**Preliminary Conclusions:**

- Increase endorsed
- Provisional approval subject to one single management fee of 5% (to UNDP or UNOPS) and discontinuing current practice of double overhead (UNDP – 5%) and UNOPS (13%).



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PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET**

<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b> UNDP	<b>National Ministry or other National Entity</b> (if applicable)
<b>Project Contact:</b> Address: UNDP Côte d'Ivoire Telephone: 22 52 66 00 E-mail: <a href="mailto:martin.banda@undp.org">martin.banda@undp.org</a>	<b>Project Title:</b> Support to the Direct Dialogue in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso
<b>Project Number:</b> To be completed by UNDP MDTF Office	<b>Project Location:</b> Côte d'Ivoire
<b>Project Description:</b> To provide financial support to the Burkinabé facilitation of Direct Dialogue between President Laurent Gbagbo and the armed opposition, the <i>Forces nouvelles</i> , in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, thereby paving the way for the resolution of the conflict, leading to the organisation of free and fair elections in Côte d'Ivoire.	<b>Total Project Cost:</b> \$ 1,000,000 US <b>Peacebuilding Fund:</b> \$ 1,000,000 US <b>Government Input:</b> 0 <b>Other:</b> 0 <b>Total:</b> \$ 1,000,000 US
	<b>Project Duration:</b> <i>Six months</i>
<b>Main Goal and Key Immediate Objectives:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To enable the Facilitator to continue to assure follow-up of the Direct Dialogue;</li> <li>2. To help build confidence between the two ex-belligerents of the Ivorian conflict, leading to lasting peace;</li> <li>3. To contribute to the adoption of a Road Map to implement the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, leading to the organisation of free and fair elections.</li> </ol>	
<b>Outputs and Key Activities:</b> Direct Dialogue entails frequent travel by the Ivorian parties to Ouagadougou, where the Facilitator conducts the negotiations. In addition, the Facilitator also travels to Ivory Coast to lead the Permanent Consultative Framework, the mechanism through which the two ex-belligerents and the two main opposition leaders meet to review progress made in the process and to help expedite delayed activities, such as Disarmament and Dismantling of Militia, DDR, <i>Audiences foraines</i> , Identification, Redeployment of State administration, Civic Service and the Electoral process, the creation and installation of the Integrated Command Centre, the Integration of the two armed forces and Security Sector Reform.	

On behalf of:	Signature	Date	Name/Title
Recipient UN Organization	_____	_____	_____
UN Representative	_____	_____	_____
Head of PBSO	_____	_____	_____

Despite additional progress, since then, notably with the symbolic dismantling and disarmament of militias ceremony in Guiglo on 19 May and the promulgation of two decrees on the restoration of State authority and naming mobile court judges, the implementation of the OPA continues to be impeded by capacity and resource constraints. Finally, the Permanent Consultative Framework (PCF), consisting of the two signatories of the OPA and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, the *Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), former President Henri Konan Bédié, and the *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR), Alassane Dramane Ouattara, presided by President Compaoré parties met on 12 June in Yamoussoukro to address the state of implementation of the agreement. At the end of the meeting, the PCF issued a communiqué addressing the main stumbling blocks, resolving to find appropriate solutions. Hence, on 18 June, Prime Minister Soro launched the redeployment of *Préfets* throughout the northern areas, while the *audiences foraines* are expected to resume soon setting the stage for the start of the identification process, as a prelude to elections. Already the implementation timetable is several months' behind, and the Facilitator's engagement is ever more crucial and necessary. If the international community does not provide financial support, it is difficult to envision how Burkina Faso can continue to pursue its mediation efforts, until the process reaches its logical outcome, the consolidation of peace as demonstrated by free and fair elections acceptable to all parties.

#### COMPONENT 2: Narrative Section: Project justification

The Burkinabé Facilitation - and the personal involvement of President Compaoré, in his capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - has played a crucial role in helping the Ivorian parties reach a comprehensive agreement, paving the way for the return of stability to Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, the Burkinabé Facilitation made significant efforts to restore mutual trust between the parties, widely consult with the international communities and the Ivorian opposition and to offer its good offices to reach important compromises on key issues of the peace process, leading to the adoption of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA). The Ouagadougou process not only led to a framework for moving forward, but, also, critically, served to demonstrate the political will of the Ivorian parties to take ownership of and lead the peace process.

In a letter to the Secretary-General, on 7 March, the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso requested the assistance of the United Nations in defraying the cost of hosting and facilitating the direct dialogue, which took place from 5 February to 4 March 2007. In addition to the substantive contribution of UNOCI to the direct dialogue, financial support for the first round and the subsequent follow-up talks is important to enable the Facilitator to maintain the momentum. Indeed, it is imperative to ensure that a lack of funding does not undermine the progress already made in securing and implementing the agreement. The Ivorian parties and the Burkinabé facilitation lack the necessary funds to follow-up the implementation of the OPA. The project therefore aims to provide financial support to the Burkinabé facilitation by reimbursing expenditures incurred during the start of the Facilitation process. The facilitation team has functioned mainly with support from the Burkinabé budget and has requested external support since the beginning. The UN had responded positively to the facilitation's request, but earlier attempts to mobilise funds through the Comptroller's office had been unsuccessful. However a new, more comprehensive project proposal to support the Facilitation in a more durable and sustainable manner, and through ECOWAS, is being developed, including to help set up an office of the Facilitation in Côte d'Ivoire. This project will help feed into this larger effort, with immediate support and budgetary relief for the Facilitation. It translates concretely the support of the United Nations to the Burkinabé Facilitation of the Ivorian peace process, as Chair of ECOWAS. Without this financial support, there is a substantial risk that the momentum in monitoring and follow-up of the peace process cannot be sustained due to the lack of resources, particularly in the context of the current difficulties in implementing the OPA.

**COMPONENT 4: AMENDED BUDGET**

Category	Item	Number of Items	Unit Cost	Total Cost
1. Personnel (staff and consultants)	Technical expertise ( <i>Audiences foraines, Identification, DIM/DIR, Security Sector Reform and Redeployment of State Administration</i> )	510	18,000	18990,000
2. Contracts (commercial, grants, professional services)	Pre-negotiation and Negotiation Accommodation and related expenses: More than one month stay in hotel for both delegations, prior to signing the OPA, and several subsequent trips to Ouagadougou to deal with outstanding issues.	4025	10,000	25400,000
3. Training	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4. Transport <sup>1</sup>	Commercial Charter Air (Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Abidjan; Bouaké-Ouagadougou-Bouaké; Ouagadougou-Yamoussoukro-Ouagadougou) and rental vehicles for internal transport in BF	20	15,500	310,000
5. Supplies and commodities	Fuel (Air & Vehicles to and from and within Ouagadougou)	44	15,000	4560,000
6. Equipment	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
7. Travel	See 4.	See 4.	See 4.	See 4.
8. Miscellaneous	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
9. Agency Management Support**	Project Management	1	5% total cost	50,000
<b>Total</b>				<b>1,000,000</b>

\* The Standard Financial Report that has been reviewed with the UNDG Financial Policies Working Group.

\*\* The rate shall be within the range of 5% to 9%, with overall expected average of 7%, as specified in the PBF MOU, of the total of categories 1-8.

<sup>1</sup> Note that the budget lines outlined are derived from a cost estimate submitted to UNOCI on 14 August 2007 by the Government of Burkina Faso and from which UNOCI has adapted this budget to the original request. Please see attached "*Estimation des Dépenses dans le cadre du Dialogue direct inter-ivoiriens*"

## **COMPONENT 5: MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

### **1. Management Structure**

In close collaboration with UNOCI, UNDP will receive and manage the funds. UNOCI leadership and, in particular, the Mission's Political Division, will be responsible for substantive day-to-day follow-up, while, as implementer, UNDP will provide financial reports on the project's expenditures.

### **2. Execution Arrangements**

The project will be directly executed by the UNDP Country Office, according to the Direct Execution (DEX) modality and in full respect of existing rules and regulations.

The Direct execution modality has demonstrated advantages in countries emerging from crises. It provides a flexible and responsive relationship with national entities in managing projects and programs without undermining core capacity-building and national ownership objectives. In this case, the project will reimburse the Facilitation for its expenditures and/or, as requested, reimburse service providers upon the Facilitation's request.

### **3. Project Management Unit**

A joint UNOCI-UNDP team will implement the project's activities. The team will include technical staff that may be required, based on the budget allocated for staff and consultants.

### **4. Steering Committee**

The project, given its nature, will not have a steering committee; however, UNOCI and UNDP will convene periodic meetings to keep all stakeholders informed, as well as to give them the opportunity to contribute to the project's successful implementation.

### **5. Duration of the Project**

The project will be implemented within six months.

### **6. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation**


Project oversight, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's procedures and pursuant to the Programming Manual. The project will be regularly monitored and the management team will issue quarterly progress reports, while providing implementation and financial reports to the donor. Stakeholders will be involved in the monitoring process, as much as possible, while the project will be independently evaluated upon completion.

## **COMPONENT 7: ANALYSIS OF RISK AND ASSUMPTIONS**

For the first time, since the beginning of the crisis in September 2002, the Ivorian ex-belligerents engaged in direct dialogue, at their own initiative, with a facilitator of their choice. Furthermore, the parties themselves agreed on a framework for resolving key issues that had hitherto impeded progress in the peace process. However, prior to the Ouagadougou dialogue, the Ivorian parties had already signed five peace agreements since the outbreak of the conflict in 2002, while the United Nations has adopted 20 Resolutions, not mention those of the AU and ECOWAS. Each of those agreements contributed towards resolving some important aspects of the crisis, but failed to lead to free and fair elections, in large part because of a lack of political will among key political actors. Ownership of the peace process imposes a unique responsibility on the Ivorian parties to implement the Ouagadougou agreement in full and in good faith, with the active support of the United Nations. But the political will demonstrated by the parties alone will not sustain the peace process. Recalcitrant elements on both sides could reignite tension in order to obstruct the tasks envisaged in the OPA. In addition, the limitations on the capacity of national institutions, including financial



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	<b>Project Duration:</b> Six months
<b>Main Goal and Key Immediate Objectives:</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To enable the Facilitator to continue to assure follow-up of the Direct Dialogue;</li> <li>To help build confidence between the two ex-belligerents of the Ivorian conflict, leading to lasting peace;</li> <li>To contribute to the adoption of a Road Map to implement the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, leading to the organisation of free and fair elections.</li> </ol>	
<b>Outputs and Key Activities:</b> Direct Dialogue entails frequent travel by the Ivorian parties to Ouagadougou, where the Facilitator conducts the negotiations. In addition, the Facilitator also travels to Ivory Coast to lead the Permanent Consultative Framework, the mechanism through which the two ex-belligerents and the two main opposition leaders meet to review progress made in the process and to help expedite delayed activities, such as Disarmament and Dismantling of Militia, DDR, <i>Audiences foraines</i> , Identification, Redeployment of State administration, Civic Service and the Electoral process, the creation and installation of the Integrated Command Centre, the integration of the two armed forces and Security Sector Reform.	

On behalf of:	Signature	Date	Name/Title
Recipient UN Organization		22/8/07	Anthony E. Shearson, James JIAN
UN Representative		22/8/07	Abou Nassou, Da Oued
Head of PBSO		22 Aug 2007	Ejeviome E. OTOBO OIC, PBSO



**PEACEBUILDING FUND  
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PROJECT DOCUMENT FORMAT**

**COMPONENT 1: Situation Analysis**

On 4 March 2007, President Gbagbo and the Secretary-General of *Forces nouvelles*, Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) to re-launch the peace process under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, the current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The signing of the agreement followed a protracted political stalemate, despite the efforts of former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny to implement the Security Council Resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire, in particular resolution 1721 (2006). To break the deadlock in the peace process, on 19 December 2006, President Gbagbo offered to open direct dialogue with the *Forces nouvelles*. After consultations with its allies, the *Forces nouvelles* accepted President Gbagbo's offer, stressing that the dialogue should seek to accelerate the peace process within the framework of resolution 1721. For their part, Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) expressed their support for the direct dialogue at their thirty-first summit held in Ouagadougou on 19 January. They also entrusted President Compaoré, the incoming Chairman of ECOWAS, to facilitate the proposed dialogue.

Accordingly, representatives of President Gbagbo and *Forces nouvelles* began discussions with the Facilitator, President Compaoré, in Ouagadougou, on 5 February. President Compaoré consulted extensively with the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) during the talks, in particular through the Officer-in-Charge of UNOCI, the High Representative for Elections and UNOCI's Force Commander, who briefed him on the key political, electoral and military issues. In addition, the Secretary-General wrote to President Compaoré on two occasions, welcoming his efforts to help the Ivorian parties to resolve the prolonged impasse in the peace process, assuring him of the continued engagement of the United Nations to help find a lasting solution to the crisis, and informing him of his readiness to assist, as appropriate.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) signed on 4 March by President Gbagbo and *Forces nouvelles* Secretary General Guillaume Soro addresses the key issues that had blocked the identification of the population, the disarmament process, the restructuring of the armed forces, and the restoration of State authority throughout the country and voter registration. Implementation of the OPA started on schedule, with the establishment of an Integrated Command Centre on 16 March, the appointment of Guillaume Soro as Prime Minister for Côte d'Ivoire on 26 March, the formation of a new Government on 7 April and the gradual lifting of the Zone of Confidence, initiated on 16 April. However, partly due to lack of funds, the parties have not been able to subsequent deadlines for implementing the OPA, namely the "audiences foraines", mobile courts operations, the identification of the population, the disarmament and demobilisation of militia, the cantonment of ex-combatants and the restoration of State authority throughout the country. As a result, the voter registration and identification processes and the integration of the two former fighting forces are also delayed.

On 11 May, President Compaoré, as facilitator of the peace process, convened the first meeting of the OPA Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to expedite the completion of the delayed tasks.



Despite additional progress, since then, notably with the symbolic dismantling and disarmament of militias ceremony in Gulglo on 19 May and the promulgation of two decrees on the restoration of State authority and naming mobile court judges, the implementation of the OPA continues to be impeded by capacity and resource constraints. Finally, the Permanent Consultative Framework (PCF), consisting of the two signatories of the OPA and the leaders of the two main opposition parties, the *Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), former President Henri Konan Bédié, and the *Rassemblement des républicains* (RDR), Alassane Dramane Ouattara, presided by President Compaoré parties met on 12 June in Yamoussoukro to address the state of implementation of the agreement. At the end of the meeting, the PCF issued a communiqué addressing the main stumbling blocks, resolving to find appropriate solutions. Hence, on 18 June, Prime Minister Soro launched the redeployment of *Préfets* throughout the northern areas, while the *audiences foraines* are expected to resume soon, setting the stage for the start of the identification process, as a prelude to elections. Already the implementation timetable is several months' behind, and the Facilitator's engagement is ever more crucial and necessary. If the international community does not provide financial support, it is difficult to envision how Burkina Faso can continue to pursue its mediation efforts, until the process reaches its logical outcome, the consolidation of peace as demonstrated by free and fair elections acceptable to all parties.

#### COMPONENT 2: Narrative Section: Project justification

The Burkinabé Facilitation - and the personal involvement of President Compaoré, in his capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - has played a crucial role in helping the Ivorian parties reach a comprehensive agreement, paving the way for the return of stability to Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, the Burkinabé Facilitation made significant efforts to restore mutual trust between the parties, widely consult with the international communities and the Ivorian opposition and to offer its good offices to reach important compromises on key issues of the peace process, leading to the adoption of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA). The Ouagadougou process not only led to a framework for moving forward, but, also, critically, served to demonstrate the political will of the Ivorian parties to take ownership of and lead the peace process.

In a letter to the Secretary-General, on 7 March, the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso requested the assistance of the United Nations in defraying the cost of hosting and facilitating the direct dialogue, which took place from 5 February to 4 March 2007. In addition to the substantive contribution of UNOCI to the direct dialogue, financial support for the first round and the subsequent follow-up talks is important to enable the Facilitator to maintain the momentum. Indeed, it is imperative to ensure that a lack of funding does not undermine the progress already made in securing and implementing the agreement. The Ivorian parties and the Burkinabé facilitation lack the necessary funds to follow-up the implementation of the OPA. The project therefore aims to provide financial support to the Burkinabé facilitation by reimbursing expenditures incurred during the start of the Facilitation process. The facilitation team has functioned mainly with support from the Burkinabé budget and has requested external support since the beginning. The UN had responded positively to the facilitation's request, but earlier attempts to mobilise funds through the Comptroller's office had been unsuccessful. However a new, more comprehensive project proposal to support the Facilitation in a more durable and sustainable manner, and through ECOWAS, is being developed, including to help set up an office of the Facilitation in Côte d'Ivoire. This project will help feed into this larger effort, with immediate support and budgetary relief for the Facilitation. It translates concretely the support of the United Nations to the Burkinabé Facilitation of the Ivorian peace process, as Chair of ECOWAS. Without this financial support, there is a substantial risk that the momentum in monitoring and follow-up of the peace process cannot be sustained due to the lack of resources, particularly in the context of the current difficulties in implementing the OPA.

If financial support is not provided, both to help defray costs already incurred and to meet expected expenses, such as the initial cost of setting up an office in Abidjan, the Burkinabé facilitation will not be able to continue to supervise the implementation of the OPA, particularly since the parties already face a two-month delay in implementing key aspects of the Agreement. Anymore delays in providing financial support, until the ECOWAS project materialises risks further undermining the momentum achieved by the signature of the OPA. The risks include undermining of the peace process by hardliners on both sides and a resumption of hostilities, further straining social cohesion, and delaying the return of Internally Displaced Persons.

### COMPONENT 3: LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

A logical framework is required. If the urgency of the matter does not allow for a log frame to be developed, the narrative section needs to include clearly stated objectives, outputs, activities, indicators and risks. The following log frame format is recommended:

Objectives	Measurable Indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p><b>Development Objective:</b> Support the peace process facilitated by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, leading to free and fair elections and peace consolidation of Côte d'Ivoire, a pillar in the economy of the West African sub-region</p>	<p>Militia are disbanded and demobilised; DDR takes place, with combatants demobilised or integrated into the Ivorian army; Security Sector Reform implemented; Administration redeployed in the former Forces armées (FA) areas; IDPs return to their places of origin; and free and fair elections are held</p>	<p>UNOCI supervises each aspect of the process, as indicated in the OPA, and the UN certifies that the elections are free and fair and should be accepted by all political actors in Côte d'Ivoire</p>	<p>Parties will continue to show good faith and accept the Facilitator's decisions, in addition to allowing UNOCI to exercise its mandate</p>
<p><b>Immediate Objectives:</b> Support Facilitator's activities, in a manner to act in a way that maintains the momentum already achieved in conflict resolution for success. Allowing the parties to continue consultations, without interruption because of lack of funds</p>	<p>Meeting of the parties to the conflict take place regularly with the Facilitator</p>	<p>Constant engagement by the Facilitator, with the support of the international community</p>	<p>That the parties will continue to demonstrate political will and a spirit of compromise</p>
<p><b>OUTPUTS:</b> Confidence towards the process, maintaining focus, as the OPA's components are implemented, as provided therein</p>	<p>CEA and CPC as well as ad hoc meetings expected, in addition to the International Follow-up mechanism outlined in 1765</p>	<p>Parties travel to and from Ouagadougou, where the Facilitator is based, as part of the follow-up mechanism, while the Facilitator is able to travel in Ivory Coast to visit the Permanent Consultative Framework, with the former bailiffs and the leaders of the PDCI and RDR to help find practical solutions in implementing the OPA</p>	<p>Protracted lack of funds because of rapid donor support; Internal problems in Burkina Faso, causing a disruption in the follow-up mechanism described herein; persistent social strife in Côte d'Ivoire, including strikes and violent union violence, as to mention adverse reaction by spoilers on both sides, as occurred on 29 June 2007</p>
<p>Travel to and from as well as accommodation in Ouagadougou, Bamako and Abidjan; meetings of the parties to the OPA to oversee its implementation</p>	<p>Funds to enable the parties and the Facilitator to travel, as indicated and return; recommendations expertise and technical expertise</p>	<p>Mid way and End Phase/End Reports</p>	<p>One or both parties pull out of the process; the Facilitator refuses himself or is asked by the parties to desert; hostilities resume; or the parties decline to continue accepting financial support</p>

**COMPONENT 4: BUDGET<sup>1</sup>**

Category	Item	Number of Items	Unit Cost	Total Cost
1. Personnel (staff and consultants)	Technical expertise (Audiences foraines, Identification, DDM/DDR, Security Sector Reform and Redeployment of State Administration)	5	18,000	90,000
2. Contracts (commercial, grants, professional services)	Pre negotiation and Negotiation Accommodation and related expenses; More than one month stay in Hotels for both delegations, prior to signing the OPA, and several subsequent trips to Ouagadougou to deal with outstanding issues	25	10,000	250,000
3. Training	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4. Transport	Commercial Air (Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Abidjan; Bouaké-Ouagadougou-Bouaké; Ouagadougou-Yamoussoukro-Ouagadougou) and rental vehicles for internal transport in BF	20	15,500	310,000
5. Supplies and commodities	Computer equipment and office supplies	1	15,000	15,000
6. Equipment	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
7. Travel	See 4.	See 4.	See 4.	See 4.
8. Miscellaneous	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
9. Agency Management Support <sup>4*</sup>	Project Management	1	5% total cost	35,000
<b>Total</b>				<b>700,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> The Standard Financial Report that has been reviewed with the UNDG Financial Policies Working Group.

<sup>4\*</sup> The rate shall be within the range of 5% to 9%, with overall expected average of 7%, as specified in the PDP MOU, of the total of categories 1-8.

<sup>1</sup> Note that the budget lines outlined are derived from a cost estimate submitted to UNOCI on 14 August 2007 by the Government of Burkina Faso and from which UNOCI has adapted this budget to the original request. Please see attached "Estimation des Dépenses dans le cadre du Dialogue direct Inter-ivoiriens".

## COMPONENT 5: MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

### **1. Management Structure**

In close collaboration with UNOCI, UNDP will receive and manage the funds. UNOCI leadership and, in particular, the Mission's Political Division, will be responsible for substantive day-to-day follow-up, while, as implementer, UNDP will provide financial reports on the project's expenditures.

### **2. Execution Arrangements**

The project will be directly executed by the UNDP Country Office, according to the Direct Execution (DEX) modality and in full respect of existing rules and regulations.

The Direct execution modality has demonstrated advantages in countries emerging from crises. It provides a flexible and responsive relationship with national entities in managing projects and programs without undermining core capacity-building and national ownership objectives. In this case, the project will reimburse the Facilitation for its expenditures and/or, as requested, reimburse service providers upon the Facilitation's request.

### **3. Project Management Unit**

A joint UNOCI-UNDP team will implement the project's activities. The team will include technical staff that may be required, based on the budget allocated for staff and consultants.

### **4. Steering Committee**

The project, given its nature, will not have a steering committee; however, UNOCI and UNDP will convene periodic meetings to keep all stakeholders informed, as well as to give them the opportunity to contribute to the project's successful implementation.

### **5. Duration of the Project**

The project will be implemented within six months.

### **6. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation**

Project oversight, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's procedures and pursuant to the Programming Manual. The project will be regularly monitored and the management team will issue quarterly progress reports, while providing implementation and financial reports to the donor. Stakeholders will be involved in the monitoring process, as much as possible, while the project will be independently evaluated upon completion.

## COMPONENT 7: ANALYSIS OF RISK AND ASSUMPTIONS

For the first time, since the beginning of the crisis in September 2002, the Ivorian ex-belligerents engaged in direct dialogue, at their own initiative, with a facilitator of their choice. Furthermore, the parties themselves agreed on a framework for resolving key issues that had hitherto impeded progress in the peace process. However, prior to the Ouagadougou dialogue, the Ivorian parties had already signed five peace agreements since the outbreak of the conflict in 2002, while the United Nations had adopted 20 Resolutions, not mention those of the AU and ECOWAS. Each of those agreements contributed towards resolving some important aspects of the crisis, but failed to lead to free and fair elections, in large part because of a lack of political will among key political actors. Ownership of the peace process imposes a unique responsibility on the Ivorian parties to implement the Ouagadougou agreement in full and in good faith, with the active support of the United Nations. But the political will demonstrated by the parties alone will not sustain the peace process. Recalcitrant elements on both sides could reignite tension in order to obstruct the tasks envisaged in the OPA. In addition, the limitations on the capacity of national institutions, including financial

constraints, constitute significant obstacles in implementing the agreement. Monitoring mechanisms set up within the OPA, as well as the continued engagement of the international community (the Security Council, regional organisations and donors), provide important safeguards to sustain the spirit of consensus engendered by the Ouagadougou agreement, help rebuild national cohesion and promote genuine national reconciliation. Finally, the failure of the Ouagadougou process would likely lead to a breakdown of the peace process, with dire consequences, not only for Côte d'Ivoire, but also for the sub-region.

Despite the parties' stated good will, key aspects of the OPA's implementation lag, including Disarmament and Dismantlement of Militia, DDR, Security Sector Reform. In addition, spoilers on both sides, who do not approve of the OPA may signal their dissatisfaction by attempting to resume hostilities or to assassinate one or both of the main protagonists, as occurred on 29 June, when unknown assailants fired on Prime Minister Guillaume Soro's plane as it landed in Bouaké. Hence, it is necessary to maintain the international community's engagement of the parties, particularly in the face of such risks and as Burkina Faso is not able to sustain the financial burden of mediating the resolution of the crisis to its logical conclusion. The need for the PBF's Emergency Window funding is, thus, critical.