

TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

Conflict Prevention and Mitigation during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Lawrence Robertson
Independent Contractor/Evaluator

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DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP or OHCHR.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction, Background, and Purpose

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Sierra Leone commissioned a Terminal evaluation of the “Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone” Project. The project was designed to contribute to a peaceful and secure environment during the 2018 election process through preventative and mitigating activities with a wide range of government and civil society organisation (CSO) partners.

The project was initially funded by almost USD 3 million from the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to UNDP and United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The project was augmented by USD 400,000 in support from Canada and almost USD 1.9 million from the United Kingdom through UKAid via the Department for International Development (DFID). The project was implemented for 24 months, including a six-month no-cost extension, from 1 June 2017 through 31 May 2019.

The UN has been a key international partner in peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and has had an important, active role in supporting development and governance, including elections, since the end of the civil war in 2002. While the first elections after the civil war were administered by the UN, Sierra Leone had administered subsequent elections in 2007 and 2012 with UN and UNDP support. 2018 was the first election without a UN peacekeeping presence, leading to additional concerns about security and conflict. UNDP thus developed the CPM project to support partners in electoral security and peacebuilding.

The project had two outcomes:

- Outcome one (1): enhanced political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention throughout the electoral cycle; and
- Outcome two (2): promotion of public security, civil protection, human rights and strong national and local capacities for resolving disputes and building peace.

The Project had three phases:

- Phase 1: The induction phase, which focused on establishing the management structure, recruiting staff and consultants, developing and awarding activities to implementing partners, and capacity building, including support for training of trainers and preparing equipment (like re-activating and equipping situation rooms);
- Phase 2: The implementation phase which focused on the full rollout of the project;
- Phase 3: Post-election period which focused on building national cohesion as well as overall learning through the mid-term and terminal evaluations.

March 2018 was to be the country’s second transition of power since the return to multi-party democracy in 1991, as the incumbent president could not run for a third term. The outcome in the first and second rounds of the Presidential Elections were the closest in the history of Sierra Leone. Despite the competitive nature of the elections, divides in society and between the main

political parties, and the close outcomes, the party that lost in practice accepted the results and the extent of electoral violence was generally thought to be less than expected.

Methodology

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess CPM activities and practices to help UNDP, OHCHR, other UN organisations (including the PBF Secretariat), the Government of Sierra Leone, and other organisations working to support peace and development in the country, including international development partners (IDPs) and CSOs learn from the experience. The TOR for the evaluation identified questions in four main categories: relevance and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; and impact, sustainability, and ownership, that have framed the evaluation.

The Terminal evaluation was conducted in Sierra Leone in August and September 2019 shortly after project implementation with the support of the small remaining CPM project team. The independent evaluator used two methods for the evaluation: document review of analytic sources Sierra Leone and materials from the UN, UNDP, OHCHR, the project, and project partners – and 69 interviews with staff, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders that worked with the CPM project. Field visits were made to Bo, Kenema, and Kono districts, in addition to Freetown.

Findings and Conclusions

Relevance and Appropriateness

The CPM project was recognized as relevant to Sierra Leone, and UN support for conflict prevention and mitigation in the electoral cycle seen as appropriate. CPM support was seen as timely because conflict risks are associated with elections. However, interviewees emphasized that CPM project implementation would have been more relevant if further before the elections. Interviewees emphasized the relevance of the CPM project and its activities for their organisations and electoral security, peace, and reconciliation in the country or their district/town, rather than focus on its relevance to the Sustainable Development Goals. The project was responsive to the peacebuilding priorities of the GoSL and key civil society stakeholders, as well as International Development Partners (IDPs). The project focused on gaps in peacebuilding and risks on electoral security; these gaps and risks are ones that the UN and UNDP addressed in previous elections through UN Missions and UNDP electoral cycle projects. The design focused on youth as key electoral security and peacebuilding risks and opportunities and did not engage as much on women's involvement in peace building and social cohesion. The approval of the CPM project by the GoSL and other partners and stakeholders validated the project as appropriate.

Efficiency

The CPM project was not able to achieve all intended results in its proposed timeline; the 2018 mid-term evaluation focused on the many challenges the project faced in implementing specific activities before and during the elections. Staffing, planning and coordination issues within the

project and between the project and other UNDP projects and partners were problematic. The CPM project developed and then delivered a comprehensive set of initiatives post elections to follow up on many of these activities. The project addressed staffing issues and had fewer planning and coordination issues in developed a third set of activities to support peace and social cohesion in 2019. During the tense, tight time period of the elections, the Steering Committee was used extensively to deconflict issues and share information in ways that helped stakeholders and partners. Overall, the CPM project was seen by the UN, UNDP, IDPs, partners, and stakeholders as delivering value for money because the project was able to meet critical needs in electoral security and CPM in the electoral cycle, albeit with notable problems with respect to the efficiency and effectiveness of management in the first two phases of the project.

Effectiveness

The CPM Project was able to successfully achieve its intended outcomes, which made important contributions to electoral security, violence prevention, and peace and national cohesion as intended – although some activities were redesigned and implemented differently than originally planned which led to less immediately relevant outcomes. Perceptions were unanimous that the situation would have been more violent without the initiatives of the CPM project. Project support was recognized as complementing UN and IDP diplomatic engagement, which was seen as critical in such high-stakes elections. The project’s strategy successfully targeted key geographic regions identified as at risk of violence and the right beneficiaries to support electoral security and peacebuilding, particularly the security coordinators (ONS), main security providers (SLP), political party regulator (PPRC), and youth.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

The CPM Project contributed to the broader strategic outcomes of the UN and UNDP in Sierra Leone, and provided timely enough support for electoral security and CPM in the electoral cycle. Expectations within key GoSL institutions, based on the history of UN and UNDP support for electoral security for each election since the end of the civil war in 2002, are that the UN will support each set of elections in the country; sustainability has not been focused on in these conditions. The GoSL, CSO partners, and other stakeholders lack the resources to sustain specific achievements of the project and will continue to seek support going forward – although they can and have sustained and replicated some project-supported approaches to manage local conflicts.

Lessons Learned

Relevance and Appropriateness

Electoral stakeholders in Sierra Leone expect and need continued UN support for electoral security; The UN and UNDP have the institutional capacity to work on electoral security. The UN needs to deploy police advisors and UNDP needs to develop project capacity well in advance to provide for strong implementation of this key support in a timely way.

UNDP can play critical roles for international and national stakeholders by organizing and co-chairing timely steering committees with national counterparts in sensitive political areas like elections.

UNDP should staff up and conduct a comprehensive, participatory conflict analysis as part of project development.

Efficiency

Projects need to staff up early to manage implementation effectively, and have a robust staff to effectively manage projects with many partners and solid prospects for additional donor support. CPM projects need to have strong coordination with complementary UN and other projects to avoid confusion and amplify program impact.

Projects that work in an electoral cycle need to consider the full range of electoral processes. Projects and implementing partners have limited capacity to roll out and use methods that multiply project impact and make project achievements more sustainable in the conditions of Sierra Leone.

Developing a comprehensive project on CPM in the electoral cycle through PBF and UNDP (TRACK) resources provides a valuable framework for national stakeholders and IDPs to coordinate, add resources, and match resources to emerging priorities.

Monitoring and evaluation should be used towards achieving project outcomes as well as broader learning in Sierra Leone and UNDP.

Additional monitoring and evaluation are desired by project partners and stakeholders in Sierra Leone.

Effectiveness

UNDP support to partners that use well-established, tested processes and procedures augments their capacity to provide electoral security in critical ways which helped limit electoral violence in 2018.

Project-level support to the Judiciary to address one component of their work – albeit a key component in managing electoral cases effectively – has limited ability to lead to credible, transparent justice in key electoral cases.

Well-structured technical committees and steering committees provide important benefits to all stakeholders in elections.

Partner approaches that prioritise women supports significantly greater participation of women in peacebuilding activities.

UNDP monitoring and presence is valued by CPM project partners.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

UNDP, through the CPM project, was able to make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and management in the 2018 elections as well as support peace and national cohesion after the elections. Project support towards an OHCHR HRA was able to encourage adherence to international human rights standards in national institutions and project activities but was limited in time and reach.

Civil society and government partners in Sierra Leone have substantial experience developing and implementing activities to support electoral security and prevent as well as manage electoral conflict, but their limited financial resources continue to limit their ability to carry out these activities as well as make these them sustainable.

Successive investments in electoral security through project-based support suggest that the sustainability of results through these modalities remains limited.

Efforts to sustain peace and national cohesion have been limited in Sierra Leone in the wake of the civil war; consequently, these processes have not been completed and are still needed.

Recommendations

Relevance and Appropriateness

1. As relevant to electoral security in Sierra Leone, UNDP should continue to develop projects to support the needs of national stakeholders and partners in electoral security.
2. UNDP should continue to support national stakeholders and partners through support to peace and national cohesion as important challenges in the country and priorities of the government, civil society and key development partners.
3. UNDP and partners need to start designing programming early in the electoral cycle in order to implement substantial CPM programming earlier in the electoral cycle.
4. UNDP and partners should start program design with a participatory analysis and needs assessment.
5. UNDP and the PBPSO should consider developing and funding project support to depoliticise Sierra Leone and reduce the levels of partisanship that are so pervasive and divisive in the country.
6. UNDP should continue develop projects and identify funding for supporting key partners in Sierra Leone in preventing and managing electoral conflict as well as supporting peace and national cohesion

Efficiency

7. UNDP should continue to engage PBSO and develop and implement PBF-funded projects.
8. UNDP projects need to staff up early to manage implementation effectively, and require a robust staff complement to effectively manage projects with many partners and solid prospects for expansion through additional donor support.
9. UNDP should work closely with key partners to develop training-of-trainer approaches that are comprehensively rolled out to prevent electoral violence.
10. CPM projects should maintain a level of flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances, including as additional partners and ideas for piloting CPM activities emerge.
11. UNDP Country Offices should work closely with project teams to ensure that they effectively manage the challenges of supporting LoAs and grants to key partners to work over the end of one financial year and the start of the next financial year to support projects that make critical contributions to time-sensitive processes that span the end of the financial year.

12. UNDP should develop robust staffing for project implementation as part of anticipating the potential for additional donor resources and need for/benefits of flexibility in implementation.
13. UNDP CO teams should review and oversee the preparation, management, and implementation of project teams' work to ensure partners are able to continue implementation in time-sensitive programming from year to year if short-term instruments are used in program implementation.
14. UNDP/Sierra Leone should develop, train in, and institutionalize the use of monitoring processes and procedures for project and Country Office management.
15. To better support CPM in the electoral cycle, UNDP should begin program implementation substantially before the elections themselves – as well as for the full range of electoral events and their aftermath.
16. UNDP and OHCHR should begin project implementation with a robust complement of staff and maintain sufficient staff throughout the implementation of projects.

Effectiveness

17. UNDP should continue to use and co-lead technical committees and steering committees with national partners to share information and address challenges and opportunities in a transparent, inclusive ways.
18. UNDP and IDPs should consider integrating electoral justice into a larger, comprehensive effort to support the development of judicial independence and access to transparent, credible, equitable justice through the judicial system in Sierra Leone.
19. UNDP should develop and use staff capacity in projects to mainstream gender systematically into the development of projects and the activities of project partners based on a clear analysis and understanding of the relevance of gender to project goals and outcomes.
20. UNDP projects should staff up to increase monitoring and presence.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

21. UN and UNDP strategic planning processes should continue to anticipate work in and incorporate electoral security as well as peace and national cohesion in key planning documents for Sierra Leone.
22. While UNDP should continue to build towards sustainability and a larger role for GoSL funding for electoral security, the UN should anticipate continued needs for financial support – particularly from civil society – and prepare well in advance to meet these financial needs.
23. UNDP Sierra Leone should develop and promote a dedicated web site to promote the use of and learning from CPM project experience and products.
24. UNDP project teams should identify key best practices and lessons learned as appropriate from project development and implementation and draft and share brief guidance notes based on these experiences to support replication. UNDP should develop internal processes to vet and verify practices as well as share these experiences across country teams.

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ACRONYMS LIST

ADR	alternative dispute resolution
APC	All People's Congress
APPWA	All Political Parties Women's Association
APPYA	All Political Parties Youth Association
AWP	Annual Work Plan
C4C	Coalition for Change
CGG	Campaign for Good Governance
CoC	Code of Conduct
CHISEC	Chiefdom Security Committee
CO	Country Office
CPD	Country Programme Document
CPM	Conflict Prevention and Mitigation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
CTS	Chief Technical Specialist
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DISEC	District Security Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EOC	Electoral Offenses Court
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EWER	early warning, early response
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HR	Human Rights
HRA	Human Rights Advisor
HRCSL	Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone
IDP	International Development Partner
IGR	Institute for Governance Reform
LAB	Legal Aid Board
LoA	Letter of Agreement
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
LVG	Low Value Grant
MCG	Micro Credit Grant
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MRCG	Media Reform Coordination Group
MPPA	Ministry of Political and Public Affairs
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
NCD	National Commission for Democracy
NCG	National Grand Coalition
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEW	National Election Watch
OHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONS	Office of National Security
OVP	Office of the Vice President

PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
PDA	Peace and Development Advisor
PPRC	Political Parties Registration Committee
ProDoc	Project Document
PROSEC	Provincial Security Committee
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SNEC	Support to the National Electoral Commission
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United National Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNPOL	United Nations Police
USD	United States Dollar
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WF	Women's Forum

1. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Introduction

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Sierra Leone commissioned a Terminal evaluation of the “Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone” Project. The CPM during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone Project was initially funded by the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and was additionally supported by Canada and the United Kingdom through UKAid via the Department for International Development (DFID). UNDP, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and its partners implemented the project in Sierra Leone for 24 months, including a six-month no-cost extension, from 1 June 2017 through 31 May 2019.

In accordance with PBF, UNDP and donor monitoring and evaluation (M&E) policies and procedures, the project was required to undergo a Terminal Evaluation (TE) to assess the PBF-funded project’s achievements in an inclusive way and its overall added value to conflict prevention and mitigation as well as peace and social cohesion during the electoral campaign, the elections themselves, and the post-election period. The evaluation assessed the overall progress of the project against its intended goals and objectives not only help to better understand how the PBF-funded project operated towards its objectives but also help inform future potential contributions of the UN Peacebuilding Fund to Sierra Leone and other countries.

The Terminal evaluation was conducted in August and September 2019 shortly after project implementation. The CPM project team supported the evaluation by facilitating the fieldwork; they were continuing to work using core UNDP resources, Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (TRAC) funds while anticipating the award of a new PBF-funded project.

The TE Report consists of this introduction that explains why the evaluation is being conducted, a background section that briefly describes the context for the Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone Project and an overview of the Project. Section 2 includes the questions to be answered by the evaluation followed by the evaluation methodologies, used to collect valid and reliable data with integrity and address limitations to the evaluation’s methods. Section 3 provides the main findings of the evaluation and draws conclusions to answer the questions posed for the evaluation. Section 4 provides lessons learned and recommendations that follow from these conclusions. The body of the report is followed by four annexes: The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation, a bibliography, the list of interviewees, and the data collection instrument used in the evaluation.

Background

The UN has been a key international partner in peacebuilding in Sierra Leone has had an important, active role in supporting development and governance, including elections. The 2002 elections that ended the civil war were administered by the UN. Since that time, Sierra Leone, with the help of the UN and other bilateral partners, has developed a system of administering elections and managing risks of political violence in elections. This system, with the support of the UN and other partners, was used to successfully manage elections in 2007 and 2012.

The United Nations and its partners have supported elections the reform and development of Sierra Leone's Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) since 2002. Assistance through the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and its successors, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and then the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). An important aspect of this activity has focused on supporting peaceful and transparent, professionally-administered elections in conjunction with UNDP and development partners. Support for Inclusive and Effective Democratic Governance has been a key pillar of UNDP's approach in the country, as notable in the most recent Country Programme Document (UNDP 2014).

In 2005, to support the complete restructuring of the National Electoral Commission, UNDP implemented the first electoral cycle project "Support to Electoral Reform and the National Electoral Commission." The project supported a strategic planning and reform process with the Commissions and helped the NEC prepare for and administer the 2007 elections, the country's second national election since the end of the 11-year civil war in 2002. The successful national elections, local elections in 2008, and by-elections demonstrated that Sierra Leone had made important gains in consolidating its post-conflict democracy and progress towards administering its own elections.

However significant concerns remained in Sierra Leone and in the international community going into the next electoral cycle. The political situation in the country was widely characterized as fragile, based on political polarization and regional and ethnic divisions. The run-up to the presidential, parliamentary and local council elections due in 2012 was widely expected to exacerbate political tensions in ways that might lead to violent conflict. With a weak economy with high levels of unemployment, particularly among youth, fears were that electoral tensions – if not managed through a system to address electoral and campaign disputes – had a high risk of breaking out into open conflict that could spread across Sierra Leone. These concerns led to the develop of a second UNDP electoral cycle project entitled "Support to the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone 2011-2014." The project, in close cooperation with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), operated through March 2015 towards four outcomes:

1. Electoral institutions have the capacity to administer technically sound, credible and sustainable elections (with progressively less international support);
2. Improved public confidence and participation in the electoral process; and
3. Election-related conflict managed for peaceful polls (before, during and after).
4. Strengthening Civil Register to support NEC with a technically sound, credible and sustainable Voter Register.

UNDP continued to engage with EMBs and other stakeholders after the close of the project. A smaller, targeted project was dedicated to supporting boundary delimitation by the NEC for the drawing of new electoral boundaries in 2016. With Presidential and Parliamentary elections due in 2017, the GoSL and NEC again requested support, which the UN found warranted. This led to the development of a third, smaller electoral cycle project, "Support to the National Electoral Commission (SNEC)" from August 2017 through 2018. The project worked towards ensuring that the NEC could deliver inclusive elections in March 2018. The project focused on improving electoral access for people with disabilities and women, helping NEC design and deliver an electoral results management system, and facilitated NEC's processing of civil registration data into the Register of Voters. A key difference from the prior electoral cycle project was that the

SNEC project did not work on conflict prevention in elections or support electoral security. Instead a separate project was developed by the UN Resident Coordinator's office for conflict prevention and mitigation, the CPM project. The CPM project design included elements of election-related programming that were previously implemented within wider UNDP electoral projects in Sierra Leone, specifically support to planning and training for electoral security actors, improving the mediation abilities for political dialogue of national independent commissions, including PPRC, and efforts to establishing early warning systems to prevent electoral violence (including electoral violence against women).

The post-civil war political history of Sierra Leone is substantially a story of political party competition between two main parties, the APC and the SLPP. Political loyalties in post-independence Sierra Leone have been polarised along ethnic and regional lines. The largest ethnic groups, the Mende and Temne, each comprise about 30% of Sierra Leone's population. The Mende and other smaller tribes in the south and east have traditionally supported the SLPP, while the Temne, Limba and other tribes in the north and the Krio community in the west have traditionally supported the APC. Loyalty to political parties in Sierra Leone is sustained by – and in turn sustains – entrenched patronage networks, and corruption.

Elections have been closely contested between the two main political parties and their partisan supporters. Successive post-war presidential and parliamentary elections have been won by different parties. In 2002, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) won the first post-conflict election. In 2007, Ernest Bai Koroma and the All People's Congress (APC) won the election; Koroma and the APC then won re-election in 2012. The two major "swing" districts in the country – areas where the results of voting carried by the two main parties have varied - are Kono in the east and Western Area Rural and Urban (the location of Freetown, the capital). While there are other political parties, these smaller parties have been mostly peripheral in elections. However, in 2007 a split in the SLPP that led to the creation of the People's Movement for Democratic Change proved decisive in leading to victory for the APC (Hitchen 2011). This experience may have contributed to the pressures the leading parties have put on leaders that left the two main parties and formed new or joined existing smaller parties, notably the National Grand Coalition (NCG) and Coalition for Change (C4C) for the 2019 elections. In 2017 and 2018, both of the main political parties had serious internal infighting and disagreement over their leadership, leadership succession processes, and candidates. This was noted as making the electoral context more tense, more unpredictable and more prone to violence.

While there has not been large-scale political violence in Sierra Leone since the civil war, every election has seen notable incidents of violence which have been accompanied by concerns that violence could become widespread. Independent analysts have noted that there is "a popular perception that the use of violence is an acceptable – even legitimate – means of securing power" in the country (Africa Research Institute 2011). All post-civil war election results have been controversial and contested, but have ultimately been grudgingly accepted by the losing parties and presidential candidates. Multiple international observation missions have evaluated all of these elections as credible.

Socio-economic conditions in the country in the years in the run-up to the 2018 elections were difficult. The economy was hit hard by sharp declines in the price of primary export commodities that dominate the formal economy and the Ebola Virus Disease in 2014 and 2015, which overwhelmed the country and limited economic activity - in addition to officially leading to almost

4,000 deaths. These twin crises led to a sharp decline in the economy, accompanied by depreciation of the currency, inflation, and continued difficult times in 2016 and 2017 with a weak recovery in mineral production.

The Project Document (ProDoc). for the CPM in the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone Project provided the program logic. This included explanations for the centrality of women and youth in the country and in the project. Sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls was notorious in the civil war “has continued to worrying degrees” (7). Youth were seen as particularly salient in sustaining peace. One argument around the maintenance of peace in West Africa has been that people remember the devastation of conflict, and do not want to return to those horrific times. With rapid population growth, 75% of the population of the country are said to be under the age of 35, which thus leaves many of them with little to no direct memories of conflict. This may weaken or end this dampening effect of prior violence. The ProDoc succinctly noted that “The civil war and current socio-economic inequality have created a generation of excluded and disadvantaged youth, whose grievances during previous elections, were exploited by unscrupulous political leaders that lured the marginalized youth into political violence against their opponents.” (7) The ProDoc also identified the media as a critical area for engagement, based on the history of political violence incited by hate speech and the spread of false news, which is intensified during elections season. The growth of social media use in the country in the last few years was also noted as a new and growing risk for rumour-mongering and grievances that could incite violence.

However, the Project Document emphasized that observer findings noted that “security sector response to both peaceful protests and riotous conduct has frequently been repressive” and that “incidents of disproportionate use of force by the SLP have been notable in the years since the last election in 2012” (8). The project proposed interventions to address these problems.

The project also developed the need for and potential to support the efforts of state institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) to open spaces for dialogues and promote the peaceful resolution of political differences (7-8).

Purpose

The Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during the electoral cycle in Sierra Leone Project was developed to support the overall objective of building of a peaceful and secure environment during the 2018 electoral process through preventive and mitigating measures. The project developed two outcomes:

Outcome one (1): enhanced political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention throughout the electoral cycle; and

Outcome two (2): promotion of public security, civil protection, human rights and strong national and local capacities for resolving disputes and building peace.

The Project had three phases:

Phase 1: The induction phase, which focused on establishing the management structure, recruiting staff and consultants, developing and awarding activities to implementing partners, and capacity building, including support for training of trainers and preparing equipment (like re-activating and equipping situation rooms);

Phase 2: The implementation phase which focused on the full rollout of the project;

Phase 3: Post-election period which focused on building national cohesion as well as overall learning through the mid-term and terminal evaluations.

The PBF funded the project via USD 2,764,398 to UNDP and USD 255,400 to OHCHR, a total of just under USD 3 million (USD 2,999,798). This funding was later augmented by support from the United Kingdom (USD 1,872,675 from UKAid through DFID for the period September 2017 to June 2018) and Canada (USD 401,517 for January to March 2018). The total budget for the project thus reached USD 5,038,590. As noted above, UNDP also implemented a larger electoral cycle project, Support to the 2018 Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone, funded also substantially by DFID. DFID managed another award to civil society organizations through Search for Common Ground; this also activity included many of the CSOs also funded by CPM.

Support from the project was delivered to support a wide range of government and civil society partners. Government ministries and independent commissions supported included the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), Ministry of Political and Public Affairs (MPPA), Office of the Vice President (OVP), Office of National Security (ONS), Judiciary, Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Political Parties Registration Commission (PRRC), Legal Aid Board (LAB), Human Rights Commission (HRC-SL), and the National Commission for Democracy (NCD). CSOs funded were BBC Media Action, Media Reform Coordination Group (MRCG), Women's Forum, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), Fambul Tok, National Election Watch (NEW), and the Institute for Governance Reform (IGR). Annex 2 lists the awards made to partners in 2017, 2018, and 2019; other project funding was done to support partners via direct execution (such as connecting the ONS to fibreoptic cable to support early warning, early response (EWER) capabilities).

2018 was to be the country's second transition of power since the return to multi-party democracy in 1991, as the incumbent president could not run for a third term. As in 2007, when a party in power lost the presidency, political campaigns were shaped by popular discontent with the government. Resentments were apparent with the incumbent All People's Congress (APC) government, which had almost decade in power. Criticism in the press and by other parties focused on the APC government's handling of the 2014-15 Ebola crisis, 2016 Freetown mudslide and accusations of high-level corruption.

The outcome in the first and second rounds of the Presidential Elections were the closest in the history of Sierra Leone. Despite the competitive nature of the elections and the close outcomes, the party that lost accepted the results. The run-off election proved close between the candidates of the two major parties (to which contested legal proceedings added to the uncertainty about timing). However, the NEC was allowed to hold the run off, which was again held with some violence.

On 4 April 2018, the NEC declared the candidate from the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) Julius Maada Bio the winner with 51.81% of the vote. He was sworn in hours later. Bio won by a narrow margin and his party did not win a majority in Parliament. In an expanded parliament - now with 132 rather than 112 elected seats - the SLPP won 49 seats, up from 42 in 2012. The APC won 68 seats, down from 70. The remaining seats went to other parties: eight to the Coalition for Change (C4C), four to the National Grand Coalition (NGC), and the remaining three to independents.

This result was an unprecedented situation for the country and West Africa: a President governing without a majority in parliament, which was seen as likely to make governing difficult and raising risks of conflict. APC leaders had also vowed to make Sierra Leone ungovernable if they lost (James 2018). The continued challenging socioeconomic conditions in the country and continued practices and perceptions a zero-sum competition in politics between the two main parties were seen as all contributing to the susceptibility of young people to electoral or post-election violence (Mukunto 2019). President Bio appealed for cross-party cooperation and to the APC to drop its legal challenge against the election results. He met with defeated APC candidate Samura Kamara and established a joint commission to investigate the post-electoral violence. However, the potential for conflict in areas represented by the two dominant political parties that they consider to be “their territory” remains (EISA 2017) - and risks of conflict are thought to be especially high in the more contested “swing” regions where victors have come from different parties in different elections (IGR 2018). These risks and problems have been apparent in Parliamentary by-elections since March 2018, which have been tense and sometimes violent.

The CPM project used the second tranche of the PBF-fund towards peace and conflict management post-election, with numerous activities building peace and accord between parties and social forces. The project supported the main national reconciliation efforts of the new government, announced by the President in his initial address to Parliament. The CPM project s through support for the preparation and holding of a National Dialogue on Peace, the May 2019 “Bintumani III” conference - a key part of President Bio’s plans to establish a Peace Commission to address the outstanding issues that continue to threaten the stability and development of the country.

2. METHODOLOGY

The ToR for the Terminal evaluation explained that the purpose of the evaluation was to assess all activities undertaken within the framework of the project - including comparing planned to actual outputs and assessing the actual results to determine their contribution to the attainment of project objectives – and explore the underlying causes and issues that contributed to any outcome or output targets not being achieved. The ToR also sought:

- Documentation of good practices, innovations and lesson learned;
- Concrete and actionable recommendations for future programming; and
- Recommendations on how lessons and recommendations can be incorporated into similar initiatives in the future.

The evaluation may be helpful to UNDP, OHCHR, PBSO, the PBF Secretariat, the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Sierra Leone (including the PBF Secretariat), the Government of Sierra Leone, and other organisations working to support peace and development in the country, including international development partners (IDPs).

The TOR identified four main categories for the evaluation: relevance and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; and impact, sustainability, and ownership. The TOR listed specific questions to be answered under these headings, as well as additional questions about implementation approach, stakeholder participation and benefits accrued, relevance and timeliness, sustainability, replication approach, financial planning, cost effectiveness, and monitoring and evaluation.

The 30-day assignment began in August 2019; fieldwork was conducted in Sierra Leone 7 September through 21 September, including trips to Bo, Kenema, and Kono Districts to meet with partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries outside of Freetown. The evaluation has been conducted through transparent and participatory processes with UNDP staff, UNCT and PBSO staff, OHCHR staff; GoSL, CSs, and development partners; other stakeholders; and project beneficiaries. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards and the UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluations in the UN System.

The evaluation used mixed methods (document review and interviews) as well as general best practices of evaluation to gather qualitative and quantitative data relevant to the purposes of the evaluation and answering all of the evaluation questions. The evaluation has two levels of analysis and validation of information. The evaluator has used written programme documentation and information and independent data collected by the evaluator through fieldwork in Sierra Leone. The purposes of the evaluation and objectives of the project were used to generate evaluation questions in an Evaluation Matrix that developed the methodologies for gathering objective, valid, reliable, precise, and useful data with integrity. The evaluator has triangulated data gathered through these different methodologies as well as data from different categories of informants to validate findings and make conclusions.

Fieldwork focused on gathering data from key institutions, individuals and communities that worked with the project. Interviews focused on how partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries view the project and on verifying and triangulating data on programme results. Data from programme staff, documentation and stakeholder interviews was used to determine plausibility of the programme model, the extent that it was properly implemented, sufficiently developed, and appropriate. Findings were used to examine the contribution of activities to the results of the project, with a particular emphasis on output level results.

Documents reviewed include the Project Document, semi-annual and annual reports to the PBF, planning documents (including Letters of Agreement (LoAs) and Micro-Credit Grant (MCG) and Low-Value Grant (LVA) awards with partners), partner reports, other project-produced and used materials, and independent external analysis of Sierra Leone. Annex 3 is a complete bibliography. Document review was used to understand the objectives of the project, the development of the project, the implementation of activities, and the outputs and outcomes from activities – and to gather data for findings to answer the evaluation questions.

Semi-structured interviews were held with 69 people (17 women, 52 men) listed in Annex 4. Interviews were held with UN personnel, UNDP management and staff, CPM project staff, partner organizations in government and civil society, stakeholders, and beneficiaries as well as with development partners using an interview protocol (Annex 5). The evaluator received informed consent prior to all interviews. Anonymity and non-attribution were granted to all interviewees. Thus, only general identifying information about organizations and geographic locations are used in the report– and only when they preserve anonymity. Interviews were conducted in English, with a few in Krio via an interpreter. Interviews were conducted in person, with a few via phone or Skype when in person interviews were not possible.

Interviews were used to gather qualitative information from key individuals directly relevant to the purposes of the evaluation. The evaluator has followed up on structured questions from the draft interview guide with respondents to learn more from particularly interesting responses and

to dig deeper into their perspectives. Not all informants were asked all questions, as there were too many questions in the SOW for the evaluation for an hour to one-and-a-half-hour interview. Since knowledge and experience with the CPM project varied among respondents, this different knowledge and experience shaped which questions were appropriate to ask informants. For example, UN organisation staff knew more about the design of PBF programming than CSO beneficiaries. Interviews thus paid more attention to design question with UN staff than with informants from CSOs. On the other hand, some interviewees were not asked about components of PBF programming once it was been established that these beneficiaries were not knowledgeable about some aspects of PBF-funded programming (e.g. not asking the MRCG about support for the Office of National Security for electoral security planning). That enabled the evaluator to focus questions on informants' actual experiences with CPM project programming.

Interviews were conducted with UN staff, UNDP CO staff, CPM staff, other UNDP project staff, CPM project partners and beneficiaries. The list of interviews conducted is included as Annex 4. The evaluator has collaborated closely with UNDP and its partners' management and staff in the fieldwork to identify and reach most relevant informants for interviews. After being introduced, the evaluator has excused UN and partner staff and conducted interviews independently to ensure that their presence does not influence interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders.

The evaluation design was based on a **focus** on the most important aspects of the project, **triangulation**, **purposive sampling**, and **comparison**. Focus ensured that the evaluation emphasised the most important parts of the project and its major achievements. Triangulation was used through the triangulation of findings from document and interviews as well as to compare findings from different informants. Triangulation adds confidence to the validity and reliability of the data, findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Purposive sampling was used to select individuals for interviews; selection focused on interviewing the most well-informed people to shed the most light on the activities and achievements of the project. Comparison was used to assess results, based on what was planned, any baseline information, and any performance data on what was achieved – as well as to compare interview findings from different interviews and the work of different implementing partners.

All methodologies have some limitations; the evaluator developed ways to manage these limitations. Limitations to the methodologies, data collection, and analysis for the evaluation were managed. These limitations are common in evaluations, as are the measures to manage these risks to evaluation processes and the validity and reliability of data collection, analysis, and causal inferences.

Limited Resources and Data Collection: The evaluator has limited resources, particularly time, to conduct the evaluation. These limitations constrained the distribution and number of interviews that can be done in the fieldwork. However, there was sufficient resources and time to gather adequate data to address the purposes of the evaluation.

Limited Ability to Make Causal Inferences: While the evaluator will be able to note major external events which might have influenced the course of the project's implementation, the evaluator's ability to draw any conclusions regarding the impacts of those events or influence of other unobserved variables on the project will be limited as the evaluator will not have adequate information to include and/or rule out competing explanation for these impacts.

Recall Bias: Respondents may have limited memories of activities conducted at early stages of the project compared to later ones. The evaluator has inquired specifically about earlier activities with respondents to gather adequate information from this period.

Acquiescence Bias: Partner staff, beneficiaries, and stakeholders may be tempted to tell the evaluator what they think he wants to hear. The evaluator has checked on possible acquiescence bias through questions that ask about the same issue in different ways; no biases were detected.

Attribution: Other UN, UNDP, and IDP-supported interventions also worked with these partners towards conflict prevention and mitigation in the electoral cycle (e.g. the DFID-funded Search for Common Ground implemented project that worked with CSO partners). This and the limited baselines for the CPM project made it hard to attribute developments to UNDP or OHCHR and their partners in the CPM project. Other unobserved effects shape staff, partner, stakeholder, and beneficiary views and experiences. The evaluation has thus assessed the contributions of the project to observed outcomes as we cannot attribute results to the project under those conditions.

Locating informants: Turnover of staff of UN organisations, governmental institutions, and civil society organisations had the potential to make it difficult to find the best informants, as does potential movement of beneficiaries; This limitation was addressed by using project contacts to locate informants and using the telephone or Skype to contact those outside Sierra Leone for interviews.

The limitations above did not prevent the evaluator from gathering and analysing more than adequate amounts of valid and reliable data that are needed to compile solid findings, draw strong conclusions, and make recommendations that target the purposes of the evaluation. A mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and gathering evidence through purposive sampling as well as the triangulation of data from different methods and locations has enabled the evaluator to obtain a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of how the project have been implemented and its achievements in order to be able to respond comprehensively to the purposes of the evaluation.

The Terminal Evaluation Report is a synthesis of the evaluator's analysis of findings drawn from many documents as well as interviews with numerous respondents.

3. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Relevance and Appropriateness

Relevance and timeliness

The CPM project was recognized as relevant to Sierra Leone, and UN support for conflict prevention and mitigation in the electoral cycle seen as appropriate. CPM support was seen as timely because conflict risks are associated with elections. The UNDP electoral cycle project for the period up to and including the 2018 elections, in contrast to earlier UNDP electoral cycle projects, had not included support for electoral security within the project. Security providers had limited other support available that was not seen as sufficient to address their needs. CPM project support was thus seen as particularly relevant for electoral security. However, interviewees

emphasized that to electoral security or peacebuilding more broadly, CPM project implementation would have been more relevant if delivered earlier, further before the elections.

The UN has been heavily engaged in the security sector in Sierra Leone since the end of the civil war.¹ UNDP has supported the electoral cycle in the country for the last three national elections, including on electoral security. Other UNDP investments, particularly through the PBF since its inception, have been important to government, international, and civil society peacebuilding efforts post-conflict in Sierra Leone. The approach in the project was similar to many of the initiatives taken by UNDP to support electoral security for the 2012 elections through the previous electoral cycle project. The Project Document explained the need and rationale for UNDP engagement; the ProDoc included a conflict brief analysis, needs analysis, mapping of current peacebuilding activities, and identified gaps in national capacities. Validation of the relevance of the project came through approval for the development of the project through informal meetings between the UNDP Country Office (CO) and UN Peace and Development Advisor (PDA), government partners, and development partners. Formal validation of the relevance of the project came through approval of the project document by the Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC) in May 2017, including the formal approval by the GoSL for the project, and funding approved by PBSO through the PBF. The relevance was also recognized through additional contributions to the project by DFID and Canada, which identified CPM as a key priority in the context of the elections and specific initiatives of the project to support electoral security through ONS and the SLP as particularly relevant.

Assistance through the CPM project had to fit into a tight time frame for the electoral campaign, the elections and the tense period immediately after elections. To be relevant in these conditions, the project focused on support for electoral security and supporting partner activities around the elections themselves, rather than taking a capacity building approach.

UNDP developed the general principles and practices of the electoral cycle approach as the UN concluded based on extensive experience that elections needed to be seen as a lengthy (and repeated) process rather than a discrete event in order to improve elections. For the CPM project, however implementation came later in the electoral cycle than anticipated in the ProDoc. Organisations supported by the project also noted that a stronger practice is to do research first and then provide policy advice; interviewees noted that under CPM, awards were short duration ones that came too close to the election for them to employ this good practice. Most 2017 activities were only implemented by partners in October to December; then activities in January and February were held just before the March 2018 elections. The project did not appear to anticipate the run-off presidential election for the end of March. This led to additional scrambling by the CPM project and IDPs to successfully fund and implement some activities that were critical for

¹ UN Missions worked with the government reconstitute the central government security institutions - to establish the Office of National Security, reestablish the Sierra Leone Police, and reform the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) – and develop the system of decentralised security committees that is used across agencies across the country – Provincial Security Committees (PROSECs), District Security Committees (DISECs) and Chiefdom Security Committees (CHISEC,) - after the conclusion of the civil war.

key project partners and electoral processes that had not been anticipated, such as providing fuel for SLP transportation for electoral security for the second round of the elections. The project was able to reinforce some of the earlier relatively short-duration, immediate pre-election activities implemented in late 2017 and early 2018 with a second round of support later in 2018. However, these activities were also seen to have lagged in their timing as they were implemented in the fall, rather than immediately following the March 2018 elections when tensions and needs were the most pressing.

UN and UNDP staff recognized that the CPM project was directly relevant to UN's Peacebuilding mandate and UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and SDG 5. Support to national dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention (Outcome 1) and supporting public security, civil protection, human rights promotion, and peaceful response capacities (Outcome 2) were seen as important particularly in the context of the 2018 elections which had risks of promoting conflict rather than peace in the country, producing a divided rather than inclusive society and governance, and degrading rather than building governance capacity. The aim of the CPM project was to provide UNDP and OHCHR support to avoid regressing towards the SDG and to instead make progress towards more peaceful and inclusive Sierra Leone through peaceful, inclusive elections. Partners and stakeholders outside of the UN system did not focus on the relevance of the CPM project for the SDGs; instead they emphasized the relevance of the CPM project and its activities for their organisations and electoral security, peace, and reconciliation in the country or their district/town. Partners and stakeholders in Sierra Leone did not emphasize the SDGs in discussing the relevance of the project and its activities because relevance in their perspective was in relation to the challenges of maintaining the peace and providing electoral security in conditions that they operated in within Sierra Leone. SDG relevance was noted and an emphasis of only of the UNCT and UNDP.

CPM project staff, partners and stakeholders noted that CPM interventions were directly relevant to priority needs of beneficiaries. Interviews, partner reports, and project reports all noted the importance of project-supported activities to CPM.

Project staff and the partners of the project as well as key stakeholders recognized and spoke to the direct relevance of CPM supported activities as key priorities for the beneficiaries of their organisations. Beneficiaries interviewed emphasized the importance of peace and the contributions of project partners towards supporting electoral security, which led to more peaceful and better (fairer) elections, helped prevent conflict in and around the elections, and helped some communities that had been divided by conflict around the elections to reconcile and move forward. The preservation of peace and stability is recognized to be critical in the country in the wake of years of civil war that had led to regression in development. Awareness of the importance of peaceful, credible elections in maintaining peace is widely understood by IDPs, CSOs and government agencies in Sierra Leone. Interviews noted that the past and continued divisions within the country continued to be worrisome, and that these differences were key concerns in elections and their aftermath because conflicts risked again setting development back. Beneficiaries and

partners put peacebuilding support and activities into their contexts, which whether national, regional, or local, emphasized the importance of socio-economic development to meet the needs of the population. Their experience with civil war was asserted to have shown them that development – their goal - was not possible without security and peace. Peace and good governance were now in turn meant to support development priorities at the national, regional, and local level.

The project responded to the peacebuilding priorities of the GoSL and key civil society stakeholders in Sierra Leone. The responsiveness to priorities was validated in the approval of the project by the GoSL and civil society through the LPAC and endorsement of the project. Many of these priorities were the same or similar to those supported by the UN for the 2012 elections with these same partners: ONS management of security, SLP training and deployment for electoral security, civic education to reach women and youth through civil society, voter information to support higher and more informed turnout through independent government commissions (like NCD), support for the judiciary to rule on electoral cases, and political party mediation through the PPRC.

The “theory of change” for the CPM project was recognized as relevant to the project by UN and UNDP staff. However, few project or UNDP staff, partners, stakeholders, or beneficiaries focused on the theory behind the project. Interviewees stressed the relevance of the CPM project based on the problems around security and risks to peace of the elections and need to address gaps in critical frameworks for electoral security, as well as that UNDP was an appropriate provider of support for the immediate, practical challenges of CPM in elections and afterwards. The emphasis on support for national cohesion after the elections was not a component of the theory.

The CPM project was identified as responding to peacebuilding gaps in the country. Some UN staff and partners noted that gap analysis was a component of the ProDoc and considered this analysis validated by partners and stakeholders with the approval of the project. Other UN and UNDP staff felt that this analysis needed to be stronger as well as more widely socialised to build shared understanding of the gaps and how the CPM project would work to address them. The flexibility of the project and the development of the third phase to support peace and national cohesion after the tense elections and change of government was seen as laudable and beneficial. Expectations are high that the new government will focus more on peace and national cohesion as a core plank of President Bio.

While the design of the project helped increase women’s involvement in peace building and social cohesion, the design was not seen by many partners and stakeholders as focused on women; instead the project was recognized as focused on elections and key electoral security and peacebuilding priorities that threatened political and social peace needed for development. Partners and stakeholders thus did not criticize the lack of focus on women in the design; this was seen as appropriate under current conditions. The focus on women in some parts of the project was lauded by partners and stakeholders that focused more on gender.

Contributions to broader strategic outcomes

The CPM Project contributed to the broader strategic outcomes identified in the Sierra Leone UNDAF and UNDP's 2015-2018 Country Programme Document (CPD). The broader strategic plans for the UN and UNDP for Sierra Leone noted the importance of the issues addressed by the CPM project and the merits of working to support the agendas of key government partners in improving governance and conflict prevention. UNDP committed in the CPD to supporting inclusive and effective democratic governance, including through supporting residual activities post UNIPSIL such as work with civil society. In the CPD, UNDP operationally agreed to “institutionalize conflict analysis as part of its regular planning and monitoring processes” (UNDP 2015, 6).

Appropriateness

The approval of the CPM project by the LPAC validated that the GoSL and other partners and stakeholders in Sierra Leone felt the project was appropriate for the country; UNDP willingness to develop and implement the project demonstrated UNDP's recognition that electoral security and CPM in elections were appropriate areas for UNDP to engage given the conditions in Sierra Leone and the capabilities of UNDP to implement the project. PBSO approval of PBF funding validated the appropriateness of the project by the UN. Finally, the additional support to the project from international development partners (DFID and Canada) affirmed that the international community also recognized the appropriateness of UNDP engagement. This appropriateness was based on the analysis of the security and conflict challenges around the elections, the relevance of the project to addressing these challenges and meeting these needs, and the capabilities of UNDP and OHCHR to support Sierra Leone – including based on prior engagement in electoral security, CPM and HR previous electoral cycles – that were part of the project's background and design that was explicitly recognized by all parties.

Efficiency

Implementation approach

The CPM project was not able to achieve all intended results in its proposed timeline; the mid-term evaluation focused on the many challenges the project faced in implementing specific activities before and during the elections. The CPM project developed and then delivered a comprehensive set of initiatives post elections to follow up on many of these activities developed new approaches at the request of the new government to support peace and national cohesion in the wake of the change of government. The project also worked with partners after the elections to address tensions in hotspot communities through these civil society partners. However, the implementation approach was still substantially through grants of only a few months duration that left little time for partners to address community disputes.

The efficiency of CPM project implementation was negatively affected by staffing, planning and coordination issues within the project and between the project and other UNDP projects and partners. These issues contributed to some problems with the timely delivery of project funds and

implementation of activities in a timely manner that were discussed extensively in the mid-term evaluation report. Partners at that time noted that the design and procurement of activities and grants came too soon before the elections, and that the project was often not able to provide funds in a timely manner – which affected their ability to deliver these activities. Project staff noted that partner preparations were slow or late, as some of the reasons for these timeliness problems.

Some activities were redesigned as awards were not made in a timely way that could be delivered as planned. The Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) award for monitoring of political party compliance was signed two days before the second-round of the Presidential election on 31 March 2018. Instead of monitoring in the campaign and election in ways that could have been actively used to prevent and mitigate conflict as originally planned, CGG developed a post-election data collection and monitoring project on election code-of-conduct compliance to learn about the roles of political parties in threats, acts of intimidation and acts of violence that were reported by both MIA and independent election observers, especially toward the end of the campaign. While the final retrospective report yielded useful information on conflicts and tensions, these data were not usable for managing or preventing electoral violence in this election cycle. It is not clear how this information will be used in the future. Office furnishings for the ONS for PROSECs, DISECs, and CHISECs were not distributed by the ONS until months after the elections. In the period close to elections, ONS may have had other priorities; earlier delivery by the project might have been more useful – or delivery through modalities that distributed these furnishings directly to PROSECs, DISECs, and CHISECs.

The implementation approach of the CPM project – the provision of technical and financial support to GoSL partners through LoAs and civil society organizations through MCGs and LVGs – had the potential to be efficient. With the large number and wide distribution of awards plus the need for amendments to meet urgent needs in the tense compressed time period in the run up to the elections, the period between the first and second rounds, and immediate post-election period, the CPM project did not manage to be efficient. The small project with the support of CO staff was challenged to manage activities and relationships with nine implementing partners in 2017 and 14 partners in 2018. UNCT and UNDP managers and project partners from both government and civil society faced issues with the timeliness and comprehensiveness of project resource delivery and support in the high-pressure, limited time of the election period. Adjustments were made – several of which transformed project achievements from those originally intended (e.g. managing the PPRC mediation training after rather than before elections; CGG code monitoring as research after elections rather than CPM in the campaign and election).

Projects to support national cohesion after the elections also came with a substantial lag. Partners reported tensions in communities in the months immediately after the elections; however, second, follow-up CPM awards were done in August 2018, four months after the election process had concluded. The development of the Social Cohesion Road Map that served as the design document for the third phase of the project was not completed until July 2018, and activities went forward from that point.

The project board came to be used intensively— for the CPM project as well as for the SNEC project – as the board was used to manage relationships broadly around the elections. UNDP and the GoSL jointly chaired the Steering Committee. This experience was seen as so successful in the SNEC evaluation that UNDP commissioned an additional lesson learned study to further learning and support the replication of this successful SC experience (UNDP 2019).

The project focused on time-sensitive implementation of activities and prevention and mitigation of conflict in the elections and their aftermath with limited staff; the press of time and limited staff capacity did not provide allow for substantial investment in the collection of data to monitor CPM results. This appears to have contributed to limited use of monitoring data to inform CPM implementation with partners.

The CPM project was seen as effective in communications with stakeholders via the SC. Project communication on results after SC meetings were held less frequently was seen as limited. The CPM project reported to PBSO, DFID, and Canada on a regular basis; reporting was seen as adequate. Reporting was noted as taxing as three different sets of reports were required. Communication with partners and stakeholders however was less extensive and frequent after the elections.

Financial planning

The Results and Resources Framework (RRF) in the ProDoc did not include the resources to be allocated to these activities. Without putting the funding to it, the RRF did not do a comprehensive job in translating the concepts behind the project into a plan for achieving specific results to contribute to country programme outcomes. The Concept Note that developed the phase III peace and national reconciliation activities did not include a RRF or align resources to the priorities for this phase of the project.

The CPM project largely allocated resources per annual work plans; the addition of substantial resources from DFID and Canada led to a revision of the 2018 work plan. The flow of funds from the CPM project through UNDP appears to have been proper. The CPM project was to undergo an audit after the fieldwork for the evaluation to examine the proper adherence to financial regulations in detail. Project and UNDP CO staff appear to have followed the rules and regulations as described in LoAs, MCGs, and LVGs as well as in contracts with service providers. However, these rules and procedures – with a limited number of staff to manage the project, a long list of specific partners – each with different agreements, and limited capacity to implement and report on their awards among these partners - appears to have impeded the timeliness of the delivery of some funding from UNDP to partners. The CPM project – either by design in the ProDoc or to support and improve delivery by partners as issues were noted in implementation - dedicated international consultants to support partner institutions (PPRC, SLP, ONS, MRCG, Judiciary) or seconded staff to them (NCD & ONS) to support delivery, including financial reporting. The project used additional avenues through dedicated UNDP Sierra Leone governance cluster staff focal points – with Access to Justice project staff to oversee and support

implementation of CPM activities with HRCSL and LAB, the UNDP Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs-funded project manager supporting CPM activities with the Judiciary, and Support from the Media Project's staff for the implementation of CPM's award to MRCCG.

CPM project staff and UNDP staff have evidence to support due diligence in the management of funds and financial expenditures. Per normal UNDP procedures, the CPM project has been audited. The project was due to undergo an audit on the management of funds in September 2019 immediately after the fieldwork for this evaluation. Audit results were not available to the consultant at the time of this report.

Cost effectiveness/Value for money

Overall, the CPM project was seen by the UN, UNDP, IDPs, partners, and stakeholders as delivering value for money because the project was able to meet critical needs in electoral security and CPM in the electoral cycle, albeit with notable problems with respect to the efficiency and effectiveness of management in the first two phases of the project. Management in the third phase for peace and national cohesion was seen as stronger by UN, UNDP, and partner interviewees. The project awarded many grants and implemented LoAs with a number of partners for short time periods. The short duration of implementation and breaks in project implementation with partners that had more than one award – which was most partners – was seen as inefficient. The way projects lapsed in CPM over the start the new year with new, short-term agreements was seen as hindering cost-effective implementation of the project, as it produced breaks in project implementation by these partners with the elections only a month or two away. The timing gap between the elections in March and the tense aftermath to the award of follow-on CPM awards to partners in August was also seen as inefficient, as partners lost the mobilization they had earlier as well as were not able to programme when the population was most ripe – shortly after the elections to support peace and national cohesion.

The CPM project shared implementing partners with other projects, particularly DFID's to support the electoral process through an award to CSOs, and worked on areas where the SNEC project focused. Coordination and cooperation however were seen by interviews and the mid-term evaluation as limited. The SC and TCs were used towards avoiding overlaps and addressing problems, more than developing and using potential synergies which could have been done in the development and early stages of these projects. Different interviews noted instances where their project was not linked to the efforts of other CPM partners and stakeholders or could have been connected to more strongly integrate CPM into the electoral cycle.

UNDP used the CPM project catalytically to enlist additional support from IDPs for electoral security and peacebuilding. The additions of DFID and Canadian funding expanded the size of the project substantially. However, the project was seen as limited in its staffing which hindered the ability to make the implementation of these additional inputs effective. Some interviewees noted that having additional resources left the project less effective, as the same small CPM staff

complement had to manage more resources. While the addition of resources increased the value for money in project implementation in the sense that the same staff and partners managed more programming, this was not viewed as efficient. Areas where the project managed with the support of UN staff with strong relationships with partners were seen as more efficient. To strengthen delivery and reporting, the CPM project adjusted under pressure to second staff to NCD and ONS to support delivery, including financial reporting. The CPM project also used UNDP Sierra Leone governance cluster staff focal points from other projects to oversee and support implementation of CPM activities with HRCSL and LAB, the Judiciary, and MRCG. In addition, CPM hired a temporary project associate to support the awards to ONS, NCD and BBC Media Action by expediting financial disbursements and improving reporting.

Achievement of results in proposed timeline

Interviews emphasized that an earlier start to the project and stronger implementation had the potential to have a greater impact on CPM in the electoral cycle. Nevertheless, the activities of the project on the whole were delivered within the tight timeframe of the 18-month project (and then extended by an additional 6 months to support peace and national reconciliation). Many activities however were delayed slightly or substantially by operational issues that partners attributed to CPM staff or UNDP. Problems with timeliness of contracting and implementation led several partners (PPRC and CGG) to deliver different project results in different time frames than originally intended. While these projects were successful in achieving their redesigned goals in the new time frame, the original conception may have been more impactful by engaging during rather than after key electoral events. The lack of anticipation of a second round, and the lack of comprehensive planning by the project and its partners in advance for a second round impeded delivery and demonstrated problems with the proposed timeline of the project.

Additional flexibility in timing may be warranted for some project activities that require an extensive diplomatic effort connected to government reconciliation preparation. Comprehensive national reconciliation activities, such as the Bintumani III conference, need to successfully enlist all key stakeholders to participate. UNDP project may need to have additional project flexibility to match to UN and IDP diplomatic efforts, as it is crucial to take all the time needed to develop and back inclusive government strategies - such as enlisting the past president and the leadership of the former ruling party (the APC) to participate in the peace and national reconciliation efforts as a political party. The divisions between the two main political parties were noted by most interviews as the key split in the country – as well as one that cascaded down to local disputes through national, regional, and local party leaders.

Monitoring and evaluation

Partners and stakeholders valued and appreciated CPM project monitoring – particularly CPM staff attending and monitoring implementation. CPM project partners sought greater engagement by the CPM project staff in their activities because of the ways the presence of CPM staff served as evidence of the importance of their work for the international community to beneficiaries, partners, and stakeholders. Partners also noted that UN presence served to validate the neutrality

of their initiatives in a highly partisan political context in the country, which also supported implementation of the activities.

Effectiveness

Achievement of intended outcomes

Notwithstanding the problems in efficiency noted above (and in the mid-term evaluation in detail) and the limited use of results-based management in the development of the ProDoc (which did not have a full Results and Resources Framework to clearly indicate what the project aimed to accomplish), the CPM Project was able to successfully contribute to the achievement of broad intended outcomes around limiting violence in the elections, which made important contributions to the strategic goals of the UN in Sierra Leone. CPM staff and partners interviewed noted that the activities of the CPM project made important contributions to electoral security, violence prevention, and peace and national cohesion as intended in the design of the project – although some activities were redesigned and implemented differently than originally intended, which led to less immediately relevant outcomes.

The ProDoc developed outcomes and outputs for the project. However, the outputs were framed as processes rather than discrete points or targets set that could be set and measured. The ProDoc developed a section “Modalities of Support/Implementation Approach” rather than a comprehensive Results and Resources Framework (RRF). Project reporting to the PBF emphasized narrative explanations of what the CPM Project had done, rather than how this contributed to and/or led to the broad achievement of project outputs. The project’s annual project progress report to PBSO at the end of 2017 developed some indicators and baselines that were used to measure progress, but these indicators did not measure some outputs and some of the indicators developed at this time were never subsequently measured or reported on. Some indicators do not seem to be clearly related to the outputs, as discussed below. The indicators used below and data are from the CPM projects final PBF Project Progress Report from June 2019.

All of these challenges negatively affected the evaluability of the project in terms of not specifying what the project set as goals or targets for the outcomes and outputs, not making these goals clear and known to project partners, beneficiaries, and stakeholders, not implementing some of the anticipated activities, and not measuring or reporting on some of these measures. These factors make the evaluation’s estimate of the achievement of outcomes and outputs below less than definitive.

Outcome 1: National dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention enhanced

CPM developed three indicators for Outcome 1. For the first, CPM reported on the “number of reported and resolved election related incidents of violence.” The indicator was measured by SLP action - not the political parties or the partners funded under output 1.1 (the PPRC and NCD). CPM reported that 100% (all 59) election related cases reported were resolved by SLP in accordance to standard operating procedures. This measure implies the SLP was effective in

addressing electoral related incidents of violence. However, many reports and interviews expressed dissatisfaction with the SLP responses, with some noting that perceived partisanship in the SLP response inflamed situations further and that the SLP were responsible for key incidents of violence.

The second indicator, “the percentage of people who express confidence in safety and security measures to enable them to participate in the electoral processes” was never measured; surveys were described and anticipated in the December 2017 report to PBSO, but not undertaken by the project or others. Interviews for the evaluation noted appreciation for support to increase citizen safety and security in electoral processes from CSOs and beneficiaries; the ONS and SLP asserted that they had been able to provide better security and increase people’s confidence in participating safely, which they viewed as important achievements for their agencies for the elections thanks to the support of the CPM project. Turnout in the elections was high, suggesting that people were confident enough in their safety and security on election day to vote.

The third indicator was “level of influence by media campaigns towards the inclusion of marginalised and excluded person (women and PWD).” CPM reporting asserted that post-training evaluations by media participants trained by project partners provided evidence that these beneficiaries felt they had “greater understanding of women and persons with disabilities (PWD) in politics and a willingness to vote for them.” This measurement however does not address whether journalists and the media covered PWD and voting in their outlets in ways that conveyed a greater understanding of women and persons with disabilities (PWD) in politics and encouraged a willingness to vote for them among media consumers – which is what should be measured here. Interviews with MCG and reporting from BBC Media Action, the two media awardees under CPM, felt that training had made a difference with journalists, media managers, and their coverage of inclusion in the media which had thus advanced inclusion.

For Output 1.1: Political Parties and Aspirants develop and commit to peaceful and violence-free elections, CPM contributed to having political parties and aspirants committing to dialogue through awards to the PPRC to work with political parties on inter-party dialogue. These results were not measured effectively in the CPM project’s indicators. However, interviews noted that CPM-supported PPRC interventions were useful at the national and regional level in reducing violence in the election campaign, election day, and the aftermath.

The Indicator for Output 1.1 did directly consider political parties. The indicator was “percentage of political parties that are represented in national intra- and inter-party dialogues.” CPM reported the target of 100% was met, but did explain or describe how this measure was achieved in project reporting. CPM also added a second measurement for this indicator, also including the number of electoral related cases solved by ADR as a measurement of progress, reporting 305. The indicator as developed in the baseline however was measured differently, as was the target. The target there was set as the “percentage of election related contentions among political parties addressed through dialogue.” CPM did not report on the indicator in this way or whether the 305 number reported

exceeded the baseline of 80% or met the target of 90%. Nevertheless, PPRC mediation was seen as helpful by central and regional PPRC officials interviewed, who attributed the training and actions by PPRC after being training with reducing tensions between the parties in the electoral cycle.

Another indicator developed for Output 1.1, “percentage of registered political parties that sign onto the CoC” had a 100% target which CPM reporting indicates was met. This indicator however does not measure adherence, only whether parties signed the CoC - an important but not sufficient step to know about the effects of the CoC. PPRC was able to get parties to sign the CoC, and APPWA and APPYA were able to get party women’s wings and youth wings to sign CoCs. These achievements were seen as meaningful by CPM and PPRC.

The findings of the evaluation note that the activities of the CPM project under this output had important contributions to national dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention though having political parties and aspirants develop and commit to peaceful and violence-free elections – although the indicators and their measurements do not provide much solid data on the magnitude of these contributions, whether they met or did not meet project targets, and how these indicators and their measurements might add up to reach the output and contribute to the outcome.

Output 1.2: “Sustained non-violence campaigns conducted and messages on human rights and peaceful elections promoted across Sierra Leone” as written should measure activities, not results. The language suggests the output should be whether CPM supported sustained campaigns on these messages or not. However, for the output, the proposed indicator 1.2.1, “percentage of sampled community members that are aware of the importance of election-related non-violence, human rights, protection of women and girls from SGBV” would measure awareness, not the existence of the campaign itself. However, this indicator was not measured or reported on by CPM as the project did not conduct a survey or use other data that could measure awareness. The CPM project did support campaigns on human rights and peaceful elections through awards to HRCSL and NCD.

A second indicator for this output, 1.2.2 was the “number of women and youth organisations sensitised on election-related non-violence and prevention on GBV.” This indicator does measure whether the CPM project supported campaigns on these messages or not. The project set a target of 75%, despite the indicator being set and phrased as a number not a proportion. CPM reported that “100% (3) targeted youth and women organisations (1 youth & 2 women)” had “benefitted from specific project activities during the electoral cycle.” This target was fulfilled, but is difficult to understand and interpret. The indicator, either as a number or proportion, does not explain the value of the campaigns and their reach to people on these topics.

CPM interviews, interviews with partners, and CPM reporting noted important support to peace advocacy and peaceful communications and convincing stories about how these interventions added valuable information to partner organisations, beneficiary organisations, community

leaders, and community members, including examples of how information led to greater understanding and action to prevent or manage conflict and violence, including conflict and violence that targeted women and girls.

For Output 1.3: Access to justice for rights holders, including women and vulnerable groups who may become victims of election-related offences enhanced, CPM supported access to justice through the OHCHR HRA, support for the SLHRC, funding the LAB, and through providing training, equipment, and funding to operate 11 Electoral Offences High Courts and disseminate information about the Electoral Offences Courts (EOCs) to the public. To measure access to justice, CPM Indicator 1.3.1 was set as the “number of election-related cases adjudicated and completed by the courts handling electoral cases in accordance with agreed process flow.” The end of project target was set at 150. CPM reported 36 based on reports from the courts, explaining that “the successful use of ADR mechanisms significantly reduced the number of cases reaching the courts for adjudication.” The judiciary’s report to CPM accounting for the award that covered May to July 2018 noted also that “Fifty-two petitions were filed against Parliamentary candidates from both the All Peoples Congress (APC) and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) in Bo, Makeni, Kenema and Freetown. These petitions are still pending in the courts.” Problematically, interviews and news reported noted that key electoral cases were not decided in a timely manner and had persisted into mid-2019. A set of key electoral cases were decided in ways that many observers felt were highly partisan as the courts invalidated nine results where APC candidates had been declared victors seating SLPP candidates as MPs instead. These judicial results provided the SLPP with a majority in Parliament. In this way, the justices fundamentally changed what had been the main result of the election - the unprecedented situation of a President from one party needing to work with a majority in parliament from another party - that observers had hoped would force accommodation, compromise, and reduce partisanship between the two main political parties.

Support to LAB however more directly supports access to justice for rights holders from vulnerable groups, as LAB supports only people that are not able to provide for legal defense from their own resources (which could be defined as vulnerable). LAB reports handling more than 1,300 cases through a variety of methods in the electoral cycle, more than the 800 originally envisioned in their award.

Indicator 1.3.2, the number of reported cases on elections-related human rights violations, as written measures a negative action – the violation of rights. This indicator would thus indicate the magnitude of the problem – not what was done by the project to support remedies for these rights violations. The target was set at 40; CPM reported 24 cases were addressed by the Human Rights Commission – a positive result of action that is different than the indicator originally envisioned by the project. CPM did not report how many cases were reported – the data that would meet the indicator as written. CPM reporting explained that this number was based on HRC reporting and was low since the “ADR mechanism proved effective in handling human right violations hence few cases reported to relevant institution.”

Outcome 2: Public security, civil protection, human rights promotion, and peaceful response capacities sustained

The CPM project had two outputs under this outcome for the project's two main security partners, one for the ONS and one for the SLP.

The first was Output 2.1: The national and community-based early warning and response system strengthened. Indicators CPM listed to measure this indicator were “percentage of reported complaints of police response to election-related incidents with excessive use of force” and the “number of reported complaints of police response to incidents with excessive police force.” CPM did not report on these data or collect systematic data on police responses to electoral security incidents. ONS however was grateful for CPM support for the national early warning system and felt that the upgrade and use of this system, with technology and support through CPM, was critical in limiting and responding to violence in the electoral cycle. EU and other observer reports asserted one way or another that the management of security for the elections had improved from the prior electoral cycle. The EU observation report noted the ONS positively, crediting them for “at times [having] prompted the police to act with the probity expected of them (p. 30).”

ONS managers noted the extremely limited provision of budget support from the government, which was far less than planned, which made the resources provided through CPM all the more critical in supporting security management. The ONS noted that because they were able to operate the updated situation room, they were able to head off many incidents before they led to violence or an escalation of violence. One noted example was in Kamalo, the chiefdom where the APC presidential candidate was from, faced violence between supporters of the two main parties. WANEP reported the problems up to DSEC which the fed the information to the national situation room which enabled the ONS to coordinate the SLP to respond effectively in the campaign.

The second output under this outcome was Output 2.2: Capacity of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) for conflict prevention and, peaceful management of violence improved. CPM proposed to use Indicator 2.2, the “percentage of members of public that express confidence with response of police and other security personnel in addressing human rights violations and election-related offences including gender-based violence” to measure progress towards output 2.2. The baseline was asserted: “14% of sampled population confirmed national security agencies are neutral.” No data source was provided for this data. The target was set at 25%. The final report used survey data from p. 18 of an Institute for Governance Reform (IGR) report, *Deepening democracy in Sierra Leone*, to report different data: “69.4% of sampled population confirmed their confidence with the response of police and other security personnel in addressing violations and offences during electoral cycle.” IGR noted that “Given the strained relationship between citizens and the police in the run-up to, and the course of, the elections, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) obtained a surprisingly high approval rating.” ONS and SLP managers valued the “Security Sector of Sierra Leone Training Manual for the Security Sector on Elections Violence and Security for the 2018

General Election and ONS and SLP managers felt that training of trainers had a positive effect on the SLP's ability to deliver electoral security, by emphasising key procedural roles for the SLP in the polls (although the ONS noted that the SLP's ability to deliver training further down to the rest of the police force absent "donor" support through ToT was limited – while the SLP asserted it was effective to communicate these training messages to the rest of the SLP through the regular morning parades). CPM support for the SLP, which was used to fuel the deployment of SLP personnel to polling stations as well as for training of trainers on electoral security, was valued by the SLP which saw this as critical in their successes in electoral security. CPM also recognized this an important success, albeit one achieved with significant tensions because the project had not planned and prepared for SLP deployments for a second-round in the Presidential elections. Other observers, such as the EU, were more skeptical about the neutrality of the SLP. The EU observation report noted that SLP actions in the electoral campaign and elections "disproportionately affected the opposition parties" which "led to the neutrality of the police being questioned despite the many police officers who acted professionally" (p. 30). Reports of SLP actions in bi elections since that time have been critical of SLP performance and seen this as partial, both for overlooking violations by the SLPP and for the use of force against APC supporters.

Project staff interviewed and reports - as well as project partners interviewed and their reports – note implementing their projects and achieving expected results of these specific activities and awards, although sometimes with challenges (particularly in timing of implementation and delivery) that forced them to redesign some activities which thus had different results. The CPM project was thus seen as having achieved outcomes - and was credited with helping reduce the extent of violence and helping prevent violence in the campaign, elections, and aftermath by project staff, project partners, IDPs, and stakeholders. Perceptions were unanimous in interviews that the situation around the elections would have been more violent without the initiatives of the CPM project.

Project support was recognized as complementing UN and IDP diplomatic engagement, which was seen as critical in such high-stakes elections. Project partners also noted that UN support helped provide them with a neutral, respected platform to deliver key messages, like the IGR research, to leaders, including the newly elected President. Project support for a regional and national eminent persons group (EPG) to engage was seen as a key contribution to limiting violence and the change of power in the wake of the election, as was the engagement of other non-project EPGs and intensive engagement by the diplomatic community in the country, including the RC. However, the project-supported EPG was criticized by some interviewees as insufficiently neutral, as key EPG members had personal relationships with key electoral participants. Support to the Judiciary was seen as contributing to faster and better rulings on electoral matters; however judicial processes were not seen as impartial or independent for the most sensitive rulings by observers.

Human rights advisor (HRA) support through the project was able to mainstream HR into some aspects of the project, but not others. Project support funded half of the salary of an HRA.

However, OHCHR was not able to place an HRA consistently in Sierra Leone which limited the consistency and effectiveness of HR advice provided. Project partners that emphasized HR were able to mainstream some HR into their approaches; other project partners like the HRCSL that already emphasized HR. Support to the SLP was asserted to be more effective when a respected UN Police Advisor had been in place long enough to develop strong relationships with the SLP, which supported implementation.

Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued

The project's strategy successfully targeted key geographic regions identified as at risk of violence and the right beneficiaries to support electoral security and peacebuilding, particularly the security coordinators (ONS), main security providers (SLP), political party regulator (PPRC), and youth. This targeted of the right regions and proper beneficiaries contributed to electoral security and CPM in the electoral cycle.

The CPM project complemented other UN and IDP efforts to support credible and peaceful elections; The project was designed to focus on CPM. This left the SNEC project with a single partner, the NEC, and ability to focus support for electoral administration to the NEC, which SNEC staff and partners saw as an effective design. The CPM project had all the main partners and stakeholders in electoral security in the project, other than the NEC. The SC was used to address some of the ways the complementarities within the CPM project and between the project and the SNEC project, as well as with the DFID-funded civil society activities towards the elections, could be used. Interviews found the SC was more used to avoid duplication and confusion rather than build on complementarities.

Partners in the CPM project were involved in the development of the project (see relevance and appropriateness sections above). Implementation continued to engage stakeholders through the SC. Partners interviewed all agreed that they benefitted from the CPM project through the provision of funding and/or equipment per their awards as well as sharing of information coordination of the project, particularly through the SC. Partner reports and interviews for the evaluation also noted the wide range of beneficiaries of the project, including general beneficiaries like Sierra Leonians that had better trained SLP officers outside polling places, to specific participants in CPM-supported activities, like political party leaders trained in the CoC for elections.

Gender mainstreaming and gender responsive peacebuilding

Although the project document argued for work on women for peacebuilding, the CPM Project was less focused on mainstreaming gender and supporting gender-responsive peacebuilding in practice. Interviews noted the focus was much more on youth than women as a key target group for CPM. Some civil society partners organisations with strong, capable women staff or beneficiaries were able to press for women's participation in their activities and in other parts of the project. Some activities in gender were not integrated with other UNDP projects. Both SNEC and CPM developed workshops on gender and elections with the same partners and stakeholders

without enough coordination. Project staff and most partners and stakeholders focused more on youth as potential risks of electoral violence as they assessed that the perpetrators and victims of much of the past electoral violence were youths. Thus they focused on youth in programming as well. These partners sought to bring women and girls into their activities – but remained focused on youth, particularly male youth, based on their problem analysis. The limited attention to women was thus somewhat of a gap in the project, but one that was partly justified by the focus on youth.

Monitoring and reviewing

The project focused on monitoring to support project implementation consistent with UNDP's responsibility for oversight of partners. Aspects of the project where particular UN or UNDP staff had existing relationships with partners appear to have had stronger monitoring and reviewing, which appears to have contributed to stronger implementation (e.g. training in the Judiciary supported by the HRA). However, these relationships and partner practices were and are strained by politics and partisanship that are so prevalent in Sierra Leone. While Judicial training was seen as successful, the limits on judicial independence in turn limited the results of activities such as training of the judiciary. While training was designed to support the Judiciary so that rulings could be made on electoral cases in a rapid, impartial way, interviews found scepticism that key rulings had been made in this fashion – and noted that a backlog of electoral cases from 2018 had still not been ruled upon. Interviews asserted that other parts of the program were not monitored as effectively since the CPM staff were few in number and had limited relationships with some partners.

Reviewing of partner products was cited as a weakness in the mid-term review. Interviews with some UNDP and UN staff for the evaluation also noted that CPM staff and CPM partners frequently or often did not provide project-produced or project partner produced materials to key UN and UNDP staff as was expected. This left these materials (publications, public service announcements, and training manuals without review for content and information sharing. This was seen as not only failing to build on synergies and connections between projects and initiatives but also problematic because materials then had not been reviewed for consistency and accordance with UN standards, UN policy frameworks, and international HR standards. Consequently, standards that were sometimes not met in CPM supported or produced materials; some instances of this problem were identified after production – just before dissemination - with printed materials thus not sent out – which is not efficient. Interviews noted that processes needed to be developed and institutionalized by the project and/or CO to manage careful review of project and partner products and support complementarities in the project and with other UN projects.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

Sustainability

The CPM project focused on the urgent need to provide timely support for electoral security and CPM in the electoral cycle; the design of the project did not focus as much on sustainability under these conditions. Expectations within key GoSL institutions, based on the history of UN and

UNDP support for electoral security for each election since the end of the civil war in 2002, are that the UN will support each set of elections in the country. Arguably a design that does not focus on sustainability is an appropriate sustainability strategy under the conditions prevailing in Sierra Leone.

The design of some activities was not seen as focused on sustainability. While the SLP LoA committed the SLP to prepare the training materials for electoral security and train 1,500 SLP officers through training of trainer (ToT) methods (and reported training 1,643), the commitment that each trained officer would hold one training at each district for 100 officers was not developed or funded. The lack of SLP capacity to use ToT made the goal “SLP officers on the ground during the electioneering period will be fully trained on their roles and responsibilities” not really credible. The SLP does not make opportunities available for area or unit commanders to train their colleagues. Daily meetings and morning parades do not provide settings to transfer knowledge and skills. UNDP could have considered doing more, and doing more earlier, to ensure a comprehensive roll out of ToT training to the SLP on electoral security by working with the SLP to establish plans for dissemination and funding aspects of this comprehensive plan.

UNDP has been able to keep the small remaining capable project staff in place since the closure of the CPM project at the end of May 2019 through TRAC funds. This has supported sustainability by keeping the team and limited funding to others. UNDP has devoted approximately USD 300,000 to partners to provide residual support for peacebuilding in communities and work with the ONS and OVP. Project staff expect to work under a forthcoming PBF funded project to support government efforts, facilitated by the CPM Project, on peace and national reconciliation. Further funding and the planned prioritisation by the government of peace and national reconciliation encourages the sustainability of partner efforts and achievements in communities in peacebuilding.

Replication Approach

The GoSL and other stakeholders are committed to sustaining peace in Sierra Leone as a key precondition for development. Sustaining peace in the challenging period of the electoral campaign, elections themselves, and aftermath of close, winner take-all elections are key results that the CPM project contributed to. The approach of the project focused on addressing immediate threats and supporting short-term opportunities around the elections. However, the GoSL, CSO partners, and other stakeholders lack the resources to sustain specific achievements of the project. Civil society partners replicate some key results by using other grant resources and the capacity built or reinforced by the CPM project to work on conflicts in other new communities. However, these resources are limited which limits the sustainability of these results let alone the ability to extend these approaches to additional communities.

Key government partners are committed to and capable of sustaining some project results. The ONS continues to use the technology and updated EWER system. However even partners as strong and well-funded by the GoSL as the ONS, do not believe they are capable of replicating key activities such as trainings and simulations for the next elections without financial support from

IDPs. Other partners noted that they would need support similar to that provided through the CPM project for future electoral security and to manage and mitigate conflict around elections, as well as for supporting national reconciliation activities. This included the SLP that recognized training would again would be required, as would logistics support for electoral security, for the next elections.

Sierra Leone continues to face issues with electoral security and justice on a regular basis. Interviews found continued concerns that government institutions act in biased ways that favour the ruling party. Concerns are widespread that the judiciary has not ruled on the most politically sensitive cases in an unbiased way; other cases from the 2018 parliamentary election remain unresolved. The SLP is seen as not doing enough for security in current elections. For example, a NEW by-election report notes the SLP needs to be “resolute in enforcing elections laws, policies and regulations without fear or favour” and are “concerned that despite the heavy presence of security personnel and several security checkpoints,” violations of electoral law that are seen as threatening to voters are not addressed by the SLP” (NEW 16 September 2019).

The project has enhanced and contributed to the development of national capacity in GoSL institutions and in civil society. While these efforts to support CPM focused on addressing risks of conflict and current conflicts, this work has strengthened key partners by reinforcing their experiences with successful CPM efforts. These partners similarly did this work for the 2012 electoral cycle. Partners do use this experience to address other conflicts in Sierra Leone. Fambul Tok and WANEP report continuing to use their mediated dialogue techniques – which they already had and used prior to the CPM Project - to address disputes in Sierra Leone. Now however they deploy community leaders from some of the communities that these partners assisted in the CPM project to support their work with other communities that face conflicts.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LESSONS LEARNED

Relevance and timeliness

Electoral stakeholders in Sierra Leone expect and need continued UN support for electoral security; The UNCT, by working with UNPOL, and UNDP have the institutional capacity to work on electoral security. The UNCT should continue to work with UNPOL to deploy police advisors and UNDP needs to develop project capacity well in advance to provide for strong implementation of this key support in a timely way.

UNDP support for electoral security has been an expected component of elections in Sierra Leone since the end of the civil war in 2002. Although the roles of national authorities have grown over successive elections since UNIPSIL ran the 2002 elections, there is still an expectation that the UN will support general elections and key electoral partners, including the key security providers (the ONS and SLP). The UNCT, working through the UN to identify and deploy experienced police advisors, and UNDP, through project support, have this capacity and expertise and have

been able to support elections and electoral security for 2007, 2012, and now the 2018 elections as expected and needed. National and international stakeholders recognize that Sierra Leone lacks the resources to fully administer elections and provide the security required for credible elections under current conditions.

UNDP can play critical roles for international and national stakeholders by organizing and co-chairing timely steering committees with national counterparts in sensitive political areas like elections.

UNDP projects that support key time-sensitive political processes such as elections and conflict prevention and mitigation in elections provide important opportunities for the UN to organize and co-lead key coordinating bodies with host governments. Steering committees that support elections and electoral security with national and international partners that are critical for providing information, addressing issues, and coordinating the activities of the many partners and stakeholders that contribute to credible elections and work to reduce the level of violence in electoral processes.

UNDP should staff up and conduct a comprehensive, participatory conflict analysis through its staff that engages with partners and stakeholders as part of project development in order to comprehensively understand the landscape, risks, and opportunities.

The CPM project did not appear to conduct a comprehensive participatory conflict analysis. This may have contributed to the lack of attention to anticipated electoral events with high risks of violence, like the Presidential run-off election, in the development of the project. Wider participation in the analysis could not only provide this comprehensive assessment, but also build shared understanding with partners and stakeholders in ways that contribute to CPM activities and coordination among activities.

Efficiency

Implementation approach

Projects need to staff up early to manage implementation effectively, and have a robust staff complement to effectively manage projects with many partners and solid prospects for additional donor support.

The CPM project was challenged by staffing needs, particularly in the first two stages of implementation: the in the elections and their immediate aftermath. Hiring a well-qualified CTA or CTS prior to the finalization of projects has the potential to strengthen project development and implementation.

CPM projects need to have strong coordination with complementary UN and other projects to avoid confusion and amplify program impact.

There were many areas where CPM project activities were closely related to other UNDP Projects in electoral assistance (SNEC) and rule of law/human rights (Support to the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone); however, coordination was seen as limited and lacking. Stronger

coordination processes should be developed and used by CO and project teams to support stronger project implementation, results, and sustainability.

Projects that work in an electoral cycle need to consider the full range of electoral processes and the risks of violence/opportunities for prevention, mitigation, and management within the whole framework.

The CPM project did not seem to have analysed electoral laws and forecasts to prepare for second-round, run-off presidential elections. Analysis should assess the past electoral record as well as current institutions and the expectations of all stakeholders to have a comprehensive program that prepares for all likely contingencies.

Projects and implementing partners have limited capacity to roll out and use methods that multiply project impact and make project achievements more sustainable in the conditions of Sierra Leone.

The CPM project used ToT methods with some key partners to magnify program impact; but partners like the SLP do not have the processes and procedures to effectively use ToT across the SLP for themselves or other security providers. Manuals developed in the past for training of trainers do not get used in the next elections and are instead developed a new, and technology used to support processes like situation rooms for one General Election is often out of date and/or in poor repair five years later.

Cost effectiveness/Value for money

Developing a comprehensive project on CPM in the electoral cycle through PBF and UNDP (TRACK) resources provides a valuable framework for national stakeholders and IDPs to coordinate, add resources, and match resources to emerging priorities.

UNDP investments via TRACK funds and PBF funding to develop projects in key areas is a cost-effective strategy to enlist other donor support behind key donor and country priorities such as preventing and mitigating electoral violence.

Achievement of results in proposed timeline

Conflict prevention and mitigation in election cycle projects should begin implementation substantially prior to key election processes.

The implementation of the CPM project began late in the electoral cycle; limited time for program implementation before the election campaign and elections themselves had negative effects on the efficiency of project delivery and the results. Activities had the potential to have larger effects, more significant effects, and more sustainable impact with an earlier start. An earlier start also had the potential for activities to be designed to have a longer term of implementation, greater effectiveness, and more sustainability.

Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation should be used towards achieving project outcomes as well as broader learning in Sierra Leone and UNDP.

The CPM project monitored program implementation; however, there is less evidence that this monitoring was used for managing the CPM project itself.

Additional monitoring and evaluation are desired by project partners and stakeholders in Sierra Leone.

CPM partners and stakeholders valued UNDP staff participation and visibility in CPM activities and sought more engagement by UNDP staff in activities. A larger staff for the project could deliver this additional, visible support to initiatives and complement the work of partners in important ways by adding evidence of UN support and a neutral blessing for what can be sensitive political engagements.

Effectiveness

Achievement of intended outcomes

UNDP support to partners that use well-established, tested processes and procedures augments their capacity to provide electoral security in critical ways which helped limit electoral violence in 2018.

ONS and SLP used similar systems and procedures in the 2007 and 2012 General Elections to minimize violence. These organizations however operate with limited government funding that is not sufficient for them to implement their standard operating procedures. While they could provide less security at this government-funded level, UNDP support is critical to provide the resources for these systems and processes to work better than this minimal level (by for example improving training, speeding and systematizing communications, supporting exercises, and providing the fuel and other resources that are needed for transportation and deployment).

Project-level support to the Judiciary to address one component of their work – albeit a key component in managing electoral cases effectively – has limited ability to lead to credible, transparent justice in key electoral cases.

Support to the Judiciary, while appreciated and valued by key counterparts of the project in the sector, does not appear to have changed key ways that the Judiciary has proceeded in sensitive elections-related matters. Interviews, newspaper reports, and analysis demonstrates that the Judiciary has not ruled on electoral complaints, particularly high-level complaints that involve disputes about constituency-level results (the election of MPs) in a transparent or timely way. Scepticism is thus widespread in Sierra Leone about whether rulings are being made justly.

Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued

Well-structured technical committees and steering committees provide important benefits to all stakeholders in elections.

The CPM project and SNEC project shared useful SC; the TC for CPM was also seen as very useful. These structures were seen as best practices of the CO and the projects.

Gender mainstreaming and gender responsive peacebuilding

Partner approaches that prioritise women supports significantly greater participation of women in peacebuilding activities.

Some CPM in the electoral cycle partners developed deployed approaches that emphasized reaching women (Fambul Tok, LAB) while others did not (ONS, SLP). Whether activities were gender-responsive or not varied by partner based on this approach and how it was implemented (e.g. through capable women partner staff and/or approaches that explicitly adjusted to the barriers to the comprehensive participation and leadership of women in Sierra Leone, particularly in aspects of security and conflict).

Monitoring and reviewing

UNDP monitoring and presence is valued by CPM project partners.

Partners in interviews emphasized the value of UNDP presence in activities as adding credibility to their work, and sought additional monitoring by UNDP because it would increase presence and improve their work.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

Contributions to broader strategic outcomes

UNDP, through the CPM in the electoral cycle project, was able to make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and management in the 2018 elections as well as support peace and national cohesion after the elections. Project support towards an OHCHR HRA was able to encourage adherence to international human rights standards in national institutions and project activities but was limited in time and reach.

While problems were noted in design and implementation, the results of the project were seen as contributing to better processes and results in electoral security, human rights, and peace and national cohesion.

Sustainability

Civil society and government partners in Sierra Leone have substantial experience developing and implementing activities to support electoral security and prevent as well as manage electoral conflict, but their limited financial resources continue to limit their ability to carry out these activities as well as make these them sustainable.

The resource limited environment hinders sustainability as partners have focused, with UNDP support, on delivering and supporting particular critical electoral events.

Successive investments in electoral security through project-based support suggest that the sustainability of results through these modalities remains limited.

Project support for time-sensitive electoral events and processes has not proven to carry over to institutional capacity to manage electoral security without additional inputs for the next elections in Sierra Leone. Project provided support for urgent needs for critical electoral events has not translated into institutional changes that are sustained for subsequent elections.

Replication Approach

Efforts to sustain peace and national cohesion have been limited in Sierra Leone in the wake of the civil war; consequently, these processes have not been completed and are still needed. Although the civil war ended in 2002, there has been limited work to address the underlying causes of the conflict and its consequences. These needs were recognized in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Report and the processes for the Constitutional Review Commission; however, little has been implemented from either, which means the problems remain and continue to impede the development of Sierra Leone.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Relevance and timeliness

1. As relevant to electoral security in Sierra Leone, UNDP should continue to develop projects to support the needs of national stakeholders and partners in electoral security.

Sierra Leone has demonstrated that its security providers need support for electoral security for elections in the past; we can anticipate these needs in the future. UNDP has successfully supported these needs in the past and should do so in the future.

2. UNDP should continue to support national stakeholders and partners through support to peace and national cohesion as important challenges in the country and priorities of the government, civil society and key development partners.

Sierra Leone remains post conflict in a number of respects; the tensions and divisions in society were evident and exacerbated in some cases in the election campaign, the elections themselves, and the aftermath. Under these conditions, UNDP should work with key partners to support national cohesion and prevent conflict in the country.

3. UNDP and partners need to start designing programming early in the electoral cycle in order to implement substantial programming earlier in the electoral cycle - as well as continuously throughout the electoral cycle - to support CPM.

To be more timely and relevant, UNDP needs to design programming earlier in order to start CPM program implementation well before electoral events. Design and then implementation need to take into account all electoral events and that tensions and risks rise after elections, which also build needs for peace and national cohesion.

4. The UN, UNDP and partners should start program design with a participatory analysis and needs assessment, and use this analysis and shared understanding to build the project and consensus around its goals, modalities, and implementation.

The UN and UNDP should use programme development processes to build consensus and shared understanding of not only acting early and continuously throughout the electoral cycle on CPM but also working as a more cohesive set or implementing partners under UNDP management towards shared goals.

5. UNDP and the PBPSO should consider developing and funding projects to work towards reducing the levels of partisanship and politicisation is so significant, pervasive and divisive in the country.

The roles of leading political parties and partisanship in conflict, particularly electoral violence, is readily apparent. The main violent conflicts and risks of conflicts seen in the pre-election period, the elections themselves, and after the elections has been between partisan supporters of different political parties. Project approaches in the CPM project often focused on addressing local conflict so that the influence of these local conflicts did not carry over to the electoral campaign at the local level. However, many conflicts at the local level come from party competition and agitation by outsiders. UNDP should consider ways to work with partners to manage and mitigate the central political conflicts between the main political parties directly at the national level – to address them at the top level and prevent these national, political partisan conflicts from spilling-over and exacerbating local issues and conflicts.

Appropriateness

6. Because partners and stakeholders see UNDP engagement as necessary, relevant and appropriate, UNDP should continue develop projects and identify funding for supporting key partners in Sierra Leone in preventing and managing electoral conflict as well as supporting peace and national cohesion.

UNDP support remains needed and expected in Sierra Leone for electoral security as well as peacebuilding; UNDP's experience and capacity to provide this support should be used again for future elections and broader peacebuilding in the country.

Efficiency

Implementation approach

7. UNDP should continue to engage PBSO and develop and implement PBF-funded projects.

Although the civil war in the country ended in 2002 and the country has hosted multiple UN peacekeeping missions since that time, Sierra Leone continues to have important conflict prevention and mitigation needs, as well as opportunities to support peace and national cohesion. In an environment of few IDPs and highly-limited funds from Sierra Leonian sources, PBF funding provides important support key civil society and government partners through UNDP that should continue to be an emphasis for the PBSO.

8. UNDP projects need to staff up early to manage implementation effectively, and require a robust staff complement to effectively manage projects with many partners and solid prospects for expansion through additional donor support.

Based on an analysis of the prospects for funding, UNDP should anticipate and plan for projects to be approved – and staff their development and design accordingly. Based on past funding trends and country needs, UNDP can anticipate PBF and IDP support for electoral security and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and staff up accordingly.

9. UNDP should work closely with key partners to develop training-of-trainer approaches that are comprehensively rolled out to prevent electoral violence.

ToT approaches used in project work to date in some key institutions have been applied only to a limited extent. The limited use of ToT in key partners like the SLP has been restricted by partner capacity limits. These limits can be anticipated – and approaches should be developed to overcome these limits and employ ToT in a more systematic, comprehensive, effective way over a longer period of time.

Financial planning

10. CPM projects should maintain a level of flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances, including as additional partners and ideas for piloting CPM activities emerge.

The CPM project was able to adjust in Phase 3 to take on key priorities of the new government at the highest levels – as well as able to adjust to bring in new, local civil society partners. This flexibility benefitted key national and regional stakeholders and contributed to peace and national cohesion in important ways. Projects should be staffed at a level that allows for capacity to take on additional resources, partners, and areas of activity.

11. UNDP Country Offices should work closely with project teams to ensure that they effectively manage the challenges of supporting LoAs and grants to key partners to work over the end of one financial year and the start of the next financial year to support projects that make critical contributions to time-sensitive processes that span the end of the financial year.

UNDP should work closely with project management teams to ensure that project manage key transitions, such as yearly close out and start up procedures for LoAs and MCG/LVGs. This is particularly the case for projects that target elections scheduled soon after the start of the new annual cycle.

Cost effectiveness/Value for money

12. UNDP should develop robust staffing for project implementation as part of anticipating the potential for additional donor resources and need for/benefits of flexibility in implementation in contexts like Sierra Leone.

UNDP was able to mobilize additional funding from IDPs for CPM project implementation, which addressed gaps and magnify project impact; The project could have done so more effectively with a more robust staff. At the end of Phase 3, UNDP has been able to keep the CPM project team in place through TRACK resources after the close of the award based on anticipating a follow-on PBF grant which provides high value for money.

13. UNDP CO teams should review and oversee the preparation, management, and implementation of project teams' work to ensure partners are able to continue implementation in time-sensitive programming from year to year if short-term instruments are used in program implementation.

UNDP needs to ensure that project teams are able to manage effectively; COs should make sure that project funding and management practices are effective and able to focus on value for money and cost effectiveness in their work with implementing partners, particularly over the end of the financial year.

Achievement of results in proposed timeline

14. To better support CPM in the electoral cycle, UNDP should begin program implementation substantially before the elections themselves – as well as for the full range of electoral events and their aftermath.

UNDP developed and institutionalized the electoral cycle approach in its work with electoral management bodies from the realization that elections are a longer process, not a discrete event. CPM work around elections needs to take this same approach and engage over a substantially longer period of time before, during, and after elections.

15. UNDP and OHCHR should begin project implementation with a robust complement of staff and maintain sufficient staff throughout the implementation of projects.

While UNDP and OHCHR were able to deliver project results, the way the CPM project was staffed – and beginning implementation with limited time before the election campaign and elections themselves – had negative effects on efficiency of project delivery. Staffing limits contributed to challenges with UNDP processes of reaching and signing agreements with partners and transferring funds in a timely manner, which led to postponements in partner activities (such as early January 2018 NCD sensitization activities). Some partners were not able to deliver the planned results in the planned timeframe, which led to changes in their projects that resulted in results somewhat different than those anticipated *ex-ante*. Holding PPRC mediation training after rather than prior to elections, CGG monitoring political party compliance with codes of conduct retrospectively through research rather than during elections reduced the efficacy left these activities unable to prevent or mitigate conflict in this electoral cycle, although they may help in the post-election environment.

Monitoring and evaluation

16. UNDP/Sierra Leone should develop, train in, and institutionalize the use of monitoring processes and procedures for project and Country Office management.

UNDP, PBSO, and the project should also work closely with evaluators, both mid-term and terminal, so that lessons learned and recommendations can be more useful for current projects, successor projects, other PBF-funded projects, and for UNDP and other RUNOs (including for relations with IDPs and fundraising).

Effectiveness

Achievement of intended outcomes

17. UNDP and IDPs should consider integrating electoral justice into a larger, comprehensive effort to support the development of judicial independence and access to transparent, credible, equitable justice through the judicial system in Sierra Leone.

CPM project support to the judiciary had limited ability to support the independence of the judiciary in critical, sensitive electoral matters. Support for the judicial independence and access to transparent, credible, equitable justice is a larger, longer-term challenge that should be developed and implemented with IDP support through a long-term approach that links successive projects in the rule of law with high-level UN and IDP diplomatic efforts.

Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued

18. UNDP should continue to use and co-lead technical committees and steering committees with national partners to share information and address challenges and opportunities in a transparent, inclusive ways.

UNDP should build on the successful use of SCs and TCs under the project for other projects in the country.

Gender mainstreaming and gender responsive peacebuilding

19. UNDP should develop and use staff capacity in projects to mainstream gender systematically into the development of projects and the activities of project partners based on a clear analysis and understanding of the relevance of gender to project goals and outcomes.

The CPM project incorporated youth systematically throughout the project based on the analysis of the conflict challenges in the country and a theory of change that placed youth at the centre of violence prevention and mitigation. Women do not seem to have been incorporated into project planning and implementation in this way, which led to less of a focus on women and differential incorporation of women into project activities based on differences in partner approaches, capacity, and staff.

Monitoring and reviewing

20. UNDP projects should staff up to increase monitoring and presence.

UNDP can boost partner credibility and the impact and potentially sustainability of partner approaches through more staff monitoring and presence at partner activities. UNDP should seize these opportunities to strengthen the work of partners.

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

Contributions to broader strategic outcomes

21. UN and UNDP strategic planning processes should continue to anticipate work in and incorporate electoral security as well as peace and national cohesion in key planning documents for Sierra Leone.

Future UNDAFs and CPDs should expect to include electoral security and peace and national cohesion as important issues in Sierra Leone and areas where the UN and UNDP have past investments and current capabilities to support national priorities.

Sustainability

22. While UNDP should continue to build towards sustainability and a larger role for GoSL funding for electoral security, the UN should anticipate continued needs for financial support – particularly from civil society – and prepare well in advance to meet these financial needs.

The ways that Sierra Leone has managed elections and electoral security over the past elections strongly suggest that the same needs are likely to exist for the next electoral cycle; The UN and UNDP should prepare well in advance to support key partners in meeting these needs.

23. UNDP Sierra Leone should develop and promote a dedicated web site to promote the use of and learning from CPM project experience and products.

The CPM project's partners developed important products for peacebuilding and electoral security and their experiences in implementation – as well as research studies on the elections – that should be used again to inform not only by-elections but the next general elections. These products are not accessible and little-known outside of the partner that produced them. UNDP should make these products accessible on the internet and publicize their availability widely in Sierra Leone.

Replication Approach

24. UNDP project teams should identify key best practices and lessons learned as appropriate from project development and implementation and draft and share brief guidance notes based on these experiences to support replication. UNDP should develop internal processes to vet and verify practices as well as share these experiences across country teams.

Project teams, as the developers and implementers of discrete ideas, should be tasked with knowledge management and learning. Systematic practical learning is needed about what works in peacebuilding – and why. Practices such as the Eminent Persons Group of the CPM project may be a best practice. UNDP should develop and institutionalize regular processes by which project teams write up what they see as best practices, which UNDP should verify and validate and then share across UNDP to support learning.

ANNEX 1: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE



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TERMS OF REFERENCE

for independent **Terminal Evaluation (TE)** for the UNDP Sierra Leone project “Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone”.

Country:	Sierra Leone
Job title:	International Consultant (IC) – Terminal Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) project “Conflict prevention and mitigation during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone”
Reports to:	Deputy Resident Representative (Programmes and Operations)
Type of Contract:	Individual Contract (Consultant)
Language(s) Required:	English
Expected duration:	August / September 2019: Approximate duration of 30 working days comprising of: Initial home-based (5 days) + one field mission to Freetown, Sierra Leone (20 days) + home based (5 days).

1. Background

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Sierra Leone in collaboration with development partners and civil society organizations, supported the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and relevant institutions to conduct elections in 2018. The support was channeled through the “*Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPM) during the electoral cycle*” project. The applicable Project Document (ProDoc) was signed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) in April 2017. The project operationally started June 2017 and ended March 2019.

In accordance with UNDP and donor Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policies and procedures, the project is required to undergo a Terminal Evaluation (TE) upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) set out the expectations for a TE of the project.

UNDP wishes to engage the services of an **International Consultant (IC)** to conduct a Terminal Evaluation of the project. The IC will be required to assess all activities undertaken within the framework of the project including comparing planned to actual outputs and assessing the actual results to determine their contribution to the attainment of the project objectives. The consultant will also attempt to evaluate the efficiency of project management, including the delivery of outputs and activities in terms of quality, quantity, timeliness and cost efficiency as well as features related to the process involved in achieving those outputs and the impacts of the project. The evaluation will also address the underlying causes and issues contribution to targets not adequately achieved.

Project description

The details of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

Terminal Evaluation Report: CPM during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone

Project Summary:			
Project title: Conflict prevention and mitigation during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone.			
PBF project No:	00105794	Donor <i>(at endorsement):</i>	Peace Building Fund (PBF): US\$ 2,764,398 (June 2017 - March 2019)
DFID project No:	203878-106	Co-financing:	<u>Canada:</u> US\$ 401,517 (Jan - Mar.2018); <u>DFID:</u> US\$ 1,872,675 (Sept. 2017 - June 2018) Total Budget: US\$ 5,038,590
Canada Agreement No:	7383741		
UNDP Atlas Award ID:	00077436	Pro Doc signature	01 June 2017
UNDP Atlas Project ID:	00105765	<i>(start date):</i>	
Participating UN Organizations:	UNDP and OHCHR	Closing Date <i>(operational):</i>	<u>Initial:</u> 31 December 2018 <u>Current:</u> 31 March 2019 <i>(including 3 months No Cost Extension)</i>
Lead national counterpart:	Ministry of Internal Affairs		Total duration: 18 Months
Implementation Partners: Office of the Vice President, Ministry of Political and Public Affairs (MPPA), Office of National Security (ONS), Judiciary, Sierra Leone Police (SLP), Political Parties Registration Committee (PRRC), Legal Aid Board (LAB), Human Rights Commission (HRC-SL), National Commission for Democracy (NCD), BBC Media Action, Media Reform Coordination Group (MRCG), Women’s Forum, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), Fambul Tok, National Election Watch (NEW), Institute for Governance Reform (IGR), and Kono District Youth Council (KDYC).			

The Project involves the implementation of a range of interconnected activities across several target institutions, including Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Civil Society Organizations.

The project covered three phases:

Phase 1: The induction phase which focused on establishing the management structure, providing support to the training of trainers, re-activating and equipping the situation rooms and the recruitment of staff and consultants.

Phase 2: The implementation phase which focused on the full rollout of the project.

Phase 3: The concluding stages which focused on post-election activities, mid-term and terminal evaluations, audit and lessons learned.

Project objectives and outcomes

The overall objective of the project was to: support the building of a peaceful and secure environment during the 2018 electoral process through preventive and mitigating measures. The project aimed at

contributing towards realization of two outcomes: *Outcome one (1)*: enhanced political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention throughout the electoral cycle; and *outcome two (2)*: promotion of public security, civil protection, human rights and strong national and local capacities for resolving disputes and building peace.

2. Evaluation scope and objectives

The evaluation presents an excellent opportunity to assess PBF's achievements in an inclusive way and its overall added value to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone in the areas of electoral support, peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and social cohesion. The evaluation will not only help to better understand how the PBF project has progressed against its intended results, but also help inform future potential contributions of the UN Peacebuilding Fund to Sierra Leone.

Three main elements to be evaluated are Delivery, Implementation and Finances. Each component will be evaluated using the criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

(a) Implementation approach

- Review the project efficiency, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money;
- Review the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the various individuals, agencies and institutions and the level of coordination between relevant players. Assess the level to which the AWP and performance indicators were used as project management tools;
- Evaluate any partnership arrangements established for implementation of the project with relevant stakeholders involved in the country /region;
- Describe and assess the efforts of UNDP and other stakeholders in support of the implementation partners, regional and national institutions;
- Make recommendations as to how to improve future project' performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in achieving impact on institutional and capacity development and the targeted concerns.

(b) Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued

- Assess the extent to which the representatives of the country (including MDAs, civil society, local communities etc.) were actively involved in project implementation and comment as to whether the scope of their involvement has been appropriate given the broader goals and objectives of the project;
- Review and evaluate the extent to which project benefits have reached and contributed to successful elections.

(c) Relevance and timeliness

- Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of: addressing the most relevant peacebuilding issues, identifying and undertaking the right interventions during the electoral process, alignment with the priorities of the Government of Sierra Leone, the project's ability in supporting sustaining peace priorities and addressing cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights in Sierra Leone.

(d) Sustainability

- Assess to what extent the PBF Project has made a concrete contribution in terms of building and consolidating peace in Sierra Leone and to the SDGs particularly SDG 16 & 5 and provide clear supporting evidence;

- Assess the likelihood of continuation of project outcomes/benefits after completion of the conflict prevention and mitigation funding; and describe the key factors that will require attention to improve prospects for sustainability of project outcomes. Factors of sustainability that should be considered include: institutional capacity (systems, structures, staff, expertise, etc.) social sustainability, and policy and regulatory frameworks that further the project objectives, financial sustainability.
- Document good practices, innovations and lesson learnt. Provide concrete and actionable recommendations for future programming.

(e) Replication Approach

- Describe main lessons that have emerged in terms of strengthening: ownership; stakeholder participation; capacity building; application of adaptive management strategies; the role of M&E in project implementation. In describing all lessons learned emphasis should be made on those lessons applicable to this project.
- Make recommendations on how the lessons and experience can be incorporated into similar initiatives in the future.

(f) Financial Planning

- Assess the financial control systems, including reporting and planning, that allowed the project management to make informed decisions regarding the budget;
- Assess the extent to which the flow of funds had been proper and timely from UNDP;
- Evaluate the extent of due diligence in the management of funds and financial expenditures.

(g) Cost effectiveness

- Assess the extent to which the project has completed the planned activities and met or exceeded the expected outcomes according to schedule and as cost effectively as initially planned.

(h) Monitoring and Evaluation

- Assess utilization of project's results based-monitoring systems and implementation of monitoring and evaluation plans including any adaptation to changing conditions (adaptive management) – and specifically, assess whether the lessons, insights and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were applied successfully to re-direct the project.

Evaluation approach and method

The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability** criteria. The evaluation will consider the overall performance of the PBF Project's support considering the project's result framework and other strategic priorities spelled out in project document. The broad questions to be answered are based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria and the UN Evaluation Group standards (including those on gender mainstreaming), which have been adapted to the context at hand as follows:

Relevance and Appropriateness:

- Was the project relevant, appropriate and strategic to the main peacebuilding goals and challenges in the country at the time of the PBF Project's implementation?
- Was the project relevant to UN's Peacebuilding mandate and UN SDGs, particularly SDG 16 & 5?
- To what extent are the interventions relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

- How relevant & responsive has the PBF project been to supporting peacebuilding priorities in Sierra Leone?
- What was the relevance of the proposed 'theory of change' for the PBF Project?
- To what extent did the PBF project respond to peacebuilding gaps?
- To what extent did the PBF project help address women's involvement in peace building & promotion of social cohesiveness and decision-making processes to strengthened peace building and social cohesiveness in Sierra Leone.

Efficiency:

- To what extent did PBFs' project support achieve the results in its proposed timeline?
- How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the two implementing agencies and with stakeholders? Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
- How efficient and successful was the project's implementation approach, including procurement and other activities?
- How efficiently did the project use the project board?
- How well did the project collect and use data to monitor results? How well did it communicate with stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress? Did it use data to inform its implementation strategy?
- How well did the project communicate on its implementation and results?
- Overall, did the PBF project provide value for money? Have resources been used efficiently?
- To what extent the PBF (Phase-II) project ensured synergies within different programmes of UN agencies and other implementing organizations and donor with the same portfolio?
- Did the PBF Project make attempts and manage to ensure catalytic results, including unblocking important processes through its interventions and bringing in funding and support from other sources to its activities, areas of support and beneficiaries?

Effectiveness:

- To what extent did the PBF Project achieve its intended outcomes and contribution to strategic vision?
- To what extent did the PBF Project mainstream a gender dimension and support gender-responsive peacebuilding?
- How effective and clear was the PBF Project's targeting strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
- To what extent did the PBF Project complement work with different entities, especially with UNDP and UN WOMEN, and have a strategic coherence of approach?
- How have stakeholders have been involved in the programme's design and implementation?
- How was the program monitored and reviewed?

Impact/Sustainability/Ownership:

- To what extent did the PBF Project contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in the country level strategic plans and policies?
- Did the intervention design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting national/local ownership, use of national capacity etc.) to support positive changes in peacebuilding in Sierra Leone after the end of the project?

- How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially women's participation in decision making processes, supported under PBF Project?
- How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of national capacity in order to ensure suitability of efforts and benefits?

A set of questions fine-tuned to the context should be drafted and submitted with the inception report for input and approval. The evaluator is expected to amend, complete it as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

Methodology:

The evaluation will be summative and will employ a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/ verify the substance of the findings. Proposals submitted by prospective consultants should outline a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information.

Proposals should be clear on the specific role each of the various methodological approaches plays in helping to address each of the evaluation questions. The methodologies for data collection may include but not necessarily be limited to:

- Rigorous desk review of documentation supplied by country PBF team (UNDP & UN WOMEN) including: Project documents, evaluation of PBF (Phase-I), project reports, key intervention reports and policies, minutes of project board meetings and Government Peace Building meetings etc.
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with major stakeholders including country PBF team, officials from key ministries, representatives of Civil Society Organizations, Community Leaders (females & males) etc.
- Survey of key stakeholders, if relevant.

3. Evaluation products (key deliverables)

The evaluator will be accountable for delivery of the following key outputs and products:

- (a) **Evaluation inception report:** This should be prepared before field mission and should detail evaluators' understanding of the evaluation process. The report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designated responsibilities for each task/product. It should also reflect all substantive and logistical issues to be addressed to ensure the success of the evaluation. The consultant will provide the workplan and schedule to be followed throughout the assignment.

(b) **Data Collection:**

- Data collection and field visits as per agreed methodology.
- Presentation of preliminary findings.

- (c) **Draft evaluation report:** The project team, Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) members and key stakeholders should review and provide input to the draft report to ensure that it meets the required quality criteria and standards.
- (d) **Presentation of the findings:** The key findings of the evaluation should be presented to relevant stakeholders in a joint meeting to obtain participatory comments from them. A brief progress report should be submitted during consultancy detailing: activities and tasks completed to date, any challenges faced, any adjustments made in response to challenges, any deviations from timeline and explanations for deviations and any other risks and issues
- (e) **Final evaluation report:** A stand-alone document of approximately **30-40 pages** (excluding any annexes/attachments) that substantiates its recommendations and conclusions. The report will include mainly the following:
 - A detailed record of consultations with stakeholders to be provided as part of the information gathered by the evaluator, as an annex to the main report,
 - If there are any significant discrepancies between the impressions and findings of the evaluation team and stakeholders these should be explained in an Annex to be attached to the final report,
 - A Monitoring Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) with evaluators comments.

The evaluation report must provide **evidence-based information** that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, donor focal points, UNDP Country Office, project team and other key stakeholders including Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and project Implementation Partners (IPs). The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to the provinces in Sierra Leone to meet and interact with beneficiaries and field-based actors.

Management arrangements for the evaluation.

The project' Chief Technical Specialist (CTS) is the evaluation manager who will manage day-to-day responsibilities of the evaluation and play the central role of connecting the other key players. An evaluation reference group will be constituted comprising of key stakeholders and will work closely with the evaluation manager to guide the evaluation process and provide guidance throughout.

4. Required skills and experience

The Consultant must have demonstrated expertise and experience in advanced techniques of conducting evaluation and quantitative & qualitative research. More specifically, the consultants must be an established leader in social research with demonstrated experience in;

- (i) Designing qualitative and quantitative research methods and sampling strategies, especially with respect of gender sensitive approach.
- (ii) Designing and conducting similar evaluations particularly in peace-building, gender equity promotion and youth empowerment promotion initiatives related project with national and international organizations.
- (iii) Statistical analysis with strong proficiency in data analysis packages such as SPSS, excel, or NVivo.

- (iv) Conducting evaluations, social research studies and impact studies, preferably on peace-building, reconciliation, promotion of coexistence and harmony, gender promotion and youth promotion initiatives project.
- (v) Excellent communication and written skills in English

Competencies

- Good listening skills
- Strong drafting skills
- Ability to discuss sensitive topics at any level, from village to provincial to ministerial stakeholders using various public platforms
- Familiarity with current government policy and strategy in terms of reparations
- Ability to work as part of a multi-sectoral, cross-cultural team
- A sound comprehension of conflict and gender sensitivities
- Excellent communication skills (both written and oral), with fluency in English
- Focuses on impact and results for the client and responds positively to feedback

Academic qualifications:

- A Master's degree in Social Sciences, Law, Public Policy, Political Science, Peace Studies or related field. A combination of a Bachelors' degree with an additional 8 years of relevant work experience may be accepted in lieu of the Masters' degree.

Professional Experience:

- Proven record of conducting similar assessments
- At least 8 years' experience in peace building and conflict resolution activities.
- Experience dealing with UN agencies, non-profits or advocacy campaigns
- Demonstrated ability to work independently and adhere to deadlines

In addition to the above criteria, the terminal evaluation international consultant should be aware of and conduct the evaluation in accordance to the UNEG ethical guideline for evaluation to ensure the credibility and integrity of the evaluation process and products.

This is available here: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/download/548>

5. Timeframe for the evaluation process

Below is the recommended duration of the assignment. The detailed schedule will be finalized with the consultant prior to the assignment. The estimated duration of the assignment is a maximum of 30 working days and the tentative schedule is as follows:

Deliverable	Timing	Actual date
Preparation (home-based)	Recommended: 5 days	TBD
Evaluation mission and draft evaluation report (field-based)	Recommended: 20 days	TBD
Final report (home-based)	Recommended: 5 days	TBD
TOTAL	30 days	

6. Payment modalities

Payments **will be lumpsum and** will be made only upon confirmation of Deputy Resident Representative (Operations and Programmes) on delivering on the contract obligations in a satisfactory manner. The review and approval of all payments will be made by the DRR.

7. Submission process

The application should contain:

- i) **Cover letter** explaining why you are the most suitable candidate for the assignment, a description of your understanding of the consultancy assignment, a summary of the comments on the TOR, and a brief methodology on the proposed approach and conduct of the required work,
- ii) **Confirmation of Interest** document (template attached),
- iii) **Updated and signed P-11 along with your CV** to include qualifications/competencies and relevant experience in similar project and contact details of at least 2 professional referees who can certify your competencies, professionalism, quality of writing, presentation and overall suitability to this TOR,
- iv) Individual consultants will be evaluated based on a combination of factors including cover letter, credentials on offer and an interview (optional). and the offer which gives the best value for money for the UNDP.
- v) A duly filled financial proposal attached to the last page of the CV along with all other required documentation above.

Note: Consultants are responsible for ensuring they have any necessary **vaccinations/inoculations** when travelling. Consultants are also required to comply with the UN **security directives** set forth under dss.un.org.

Annex A: List of documents to be provided (not exhaustive)

- Project Document (ProDoc),
- Annual Work Plans (AWPs),
- Results and Resources Framework (RRF),
- Project progress reports,
- Minutes of meeting for the Technical Committee,
- Mid-Term evaluation report,
- UNDP Strategic plan (2018-2021),
- Country Programme Document (CPD) for Sierra Leone (2015-2018/19),
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Sierra Leone (2015-2018/19).

ANNEX B: UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluators/Midterm Review Consultants

Evaluators/Consultants:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

MTE Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Consultant: _____

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): _____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at _____ (Place) on _____ (Date)

Signature: _____

Terminal Evaluation Report: CPM during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone

Prepared by:

Name: Agus Wandu

Designation: Chief Technical Specialist (CTS)

Date: _____

Signature: _____

Reviewed and approved by:

Name: Josephine Scott-Manga

Designation: Governance Team Leader (a.i)

Date: _____

Signature: _____

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PROJECT AWARDS**2017 Agreements - 6 Letter of Agreements (LoA), 2 Micro-Credit Grants (MCG); Nine Partners**

Recipient	Date of Award	Type of Award		Amount (USD)	Duration
Human Rights Commission Sierra Leone (HRCSL)	28 August	LoA	HR in Elections Manual, training, complaints handling, awareness raising, M&E, HR report after election	52,526	4 months (to end of 2017)
Legal Aid Board (LAB)	24 August	LoA	Workshop legal aid and elections, train party members, partners, community advisory bureaus, case targets including ADR	69,072	4 months
Office of National Security (ONS)	3 August	LoA	Electoral security strategy, town halls, district threat assessments, situation room, trainings and simulation	285,000	5 months
Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC)	10 October	LoA	Code of Conduct (CoC) for PPs reviewed, adopted, signed; APPYA/APPWA CoCs, District Code Monitoring Committees reactivated	171,667	3 months
Sierra Leone Police (SLP)	30 August	LoA	Stationary, election security manual and train 1,500 SLP for ToT	22,423	4 months
National Commission for Democracy (NCD)	24 August	LoA	Design/dissemination of jingles/audio-visual messages, town halls, citizen's platform, election monitoring	256,991	
BBC Media Action	11 December	Direct cash transfer	Social media, journalists, electoral administrator/security/monitoring trainings; social media films, weekly radio show, Facebook posts	347,222	6 months
Media Reform Coordination Group (MRCG)	6 December	MCG	Train conflict-sensitive reporting, monitoring and situation room	145,918	6 months
West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)	6 December	MCG	Needs/capacity assessment of decentralized security committees	43,327	2 months
Total				1,394,146	

Terminal Evaluation Report: CPM during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone
2018 Agreements (11 LoA, 6 MCG): 14 Partners

Recipient	Date of Award	Type of Award		Amount (USD)	Duration
HRCSL	2 February	LoA	Training, monitoring, engaging on HR in elections	37,000	4 months
Judiciary	27 February	LoA	Support for Electoral Offences High Courts	106,811	4 months
LAB	18 January	LoA	Election-related offences service delivery	30,000	5 months
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)	8 February	LoA	Monitor CPM project in 16 districts, promote synergies, manage TC	20,000	2 months
NCD	23 Jan.	LoA	Continue	150,000	5 months
NCD	13 March	LoA Addendum	Reimburse for February VE spending	7,400	NA
Office of the Chief Minister	5 October	LoA	National Consultant to generate Green Paper on National Dialogue	16,423	2 months
ONS	13 March	LoA Addendum	Not previously budgeted communications and outreach for situation room	32,409	2 months
ONS	9 April	LoA Addendum	Not previously budgeted contingency fuel costs, staff costs & allowances, vehicle maintain acne, coordination support	38,696	2 months
PPRC	11 April	LoA	APPWA/APPYA facilitated dialogues, meetings/radio discussion, EPG, mediation training	430,441	6 months
Ministry of Finance	7 Sept.	LoA	Support Concessions, Tax & Waver Committee, compendium of laws	48,000	2 months
Centre for Good Governance (CGG)	29 March	MCG	Political party code of conduct monitoring	30,673	2 months
CGG	31 August	MCG	Promoting peace and national cohesion	30,000	2 months
Fambul Tok	31 August	MCG	Support Peace Mothers, town hall and outreach meetings, radio discussions	35,000	3 months
Institute for Governance Reform (IGR)	31 August	MCG	Map national electoral violence and responses; 5 hot spot cases	20,000	3 months
National Election Watch	31 August	MCG	Promote understanding of elections observation in divided communities	20,000	3 months
Women's Forum	22 January	MCG	Train female councilors, parliament candidates; radio discussions	30,000	3 months
Total				1,082,853	

Terminal Evaluation Report: CPM during the Electoral Cycle in Sierra Leone

2019 Agreements - 5 LoA, 4 Low-Value Grants (LVG): Nine Partners

Recipient	Date of Award	Type of Award		Amount (USD)	Duration
Ministry of Politics and Political Affairs (MPPA)	14 May	LoA	Secretariat and planning for & carrying out National Peace and Social Cohesion conference	114,080	2 months
MPPA	May	LoA Addendum	Support engagement of civil society in National Dialogue	60,000	2 months
ONS	20 May	LoA	Establish/reestablish 20 Chiefdom Security Committees	45,000	2 months (or 1 month)
CGG	30 April	LVG	Dialogues and town halls	50,000	2 months
Fambul Tok	30 April	LVG	Follow on 2018 award	50,000	2 months
WANEP	30 April	LVG	Peace and social cohesion for hotspots post-violence	45,000	2 months
Total				422,591	

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ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

UN Organisations

Sunil Saigal, UN Resident Coordinator
Samuel Doe, Country Director, UNDP
Rokya Dieng, Deputy Country Director, UNDP
Agus Wandu, CTS CPM Project, UNDP
Patrick Johnny, Programme Associate, CPM Project, UNDP
Josiah Mutah, M&E Advisor, CPM Project
Simonetta Rossi, UN Peace and Development Adviser
Lousie Aaen, former UN Rule of Law Advisor
Erica Bussey, former Human Rights Advisor, OHCHR
Kate Sullivan, former CTA, SNEC Project
Josephine Scott-Manga, acting Team Leader, Governance UNDP
Annette Nawolga, former Team Leader, Governance UNDP
Patrice Chiwota, Program Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
Gizem Sucuoglu, Program Officer, PBSO

Civil Society Organisations

Andrew Lavali, Executive Director, IGR
Jon Cauker, Executive Director, Fambul Tok
Francis Sowa, Chari/National Coordinator, MRCG
Bernadete French, Programme Officer, CGG
Melvin Comba, Chair, Kono Youth Development Council
Ishmael Jalloh, MRCG Kono
Lilian Morsay, Fambul Tok, Kono
Christiana Baun, National Election Watch (NEW)
Balg Al Dari, Programme Staff, NEW
Maude Peacock, Chair, Women's Forum
Abubakar Tailo, CGG Kenema
National Coordinator, West African Network for Peace (WANEP)
Edison, WANEP Bo

GoSL Institutions

Edward Kwame Yankson, Permanent Secretary, MPPA
Francis Keili, Director of Planning, ONS
Zainab Umu Kamara, Acting Registrar, Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC)
Abubakar Kargbo, Chair, National Commission for Democracy (NCD)
Bai John Conteh, Commissioner, NCD
Benjamin Macfoy, Commissioner, NCD
Momoh Bockarie, Commissioner, NCD

Gibrilla Kargbo, Communications & PR Manager, NCD

Idrissa Din-Gabisi, Research & Project Coordinator, NCD

Sallu Jusu, Director, Legal Aid Board (LAB)

_____, Project Manager, LAB

Frederick Kamara, Director of Education, Communication, and Training, HRC-SL

Francisco Tucker, PPRC Bo

Patrick Lambo, PPRC Bo

Hawa Samai, Consultant, OVP

Sahr Yomba Senesie, Assistant Inspector General, former Deputy Director of Operations, SLP

International Development Partners

Jerusha Kerubo, UK Department for International Development (DFID)

Sarah Karim, DFID

Beneficiaries

Gbense (Kono District)

Town Chief

Mami Queen

Section Chief

Section Chief

Section Chief

Pastor

Imam

Kokquima (Kono District)

Chief

Deputy chief

Former SLPP Ward aspirant

Area Chief

Giema (Kenema District)

Town Chief

Councilor

Youth Leader

Youth Leader

Youth Leader

Pastor

Tikonko (Bo District)

Chair, Youth Council

Youth Leader

Koigu (Kono District)

C4C Youth Wing Chair

SLPP Youth Wing Chair

APC Youth Wing Chair

NCG Youth Wing Chair

SLPP Youth Wing Deputy Chair

ANNEX 5: EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS

DOCUMENT REVIEW PROTOCOL

The evaluator has reviewed project produced and partner produced materials for qualitative and quantitative data directly useful for answering the evaluation questions and fulfilling the purpose of the evaluation. The review focused on evidence to fit the following categories:

Relevance and Appropriateness

- Relevance and timeliness
- Appropriateness

Efficiency

- Implementation approach
- Financial planning
- Cost effectiveness/Value for money
- Achievement of results in proposed timeline
- Monitoring and evaluation

Effectiveness

- Achievement of intended outcomes
- Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued
- Gender mainstreaming and gender responsive peacebuilding
- Monitoring and reviewing

Impact, Sustainability and Ownership

- Contributions to broader strategic outcomes
- Sustainability
- Replication Approach

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

The introduction and consent note introduced the evaluator, the evaluation, and methods to obtain explicit consent from interviewees to participate in the evaluation. The evaluator recited the following to all interviewees and obtained explicit oral consent from all participants.

Introduction and Informed Consent

Thank you for talking with me today.

My name is Lawrence Robertson. I am working independently for the United Nations to conduct an evaluation of the work conducted by UNDP, OHCHR and its partners through the “Conflict prevention and mitigation during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone” project. The goal of the review is to learn about what has been accomplished in the region through the plan, what has worked well, and what has not worked as well. Lessons from this review will be used to help the UN, UNDP, and OHCHR and their partners in future work here and around the world.

The information collected today will only be used for the review. I will not use this information in a way that identifies you as an individual (or your specific community) in the report.

I would also like to clarify that this interview is entirely voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw from interview at any point without consequence.

I hope to learn from you from your knowledge and experience with the plan and its activities. Are you willing to participate in this study? [Ensure that participant(s) verbally agree to participate]

Do you have any questions for me before we begin with a short list of questions to learn about the ways that you or your organisation may have worked with activities from the “Conflict prevention and mitigation during electoral cycle in Sierra Leone” project?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

[NOT ALL QUESTIONS WERE ASKED IN ALL INTERVIEWS; INTERVIEWS FOCUSED ON THE AREAS AND QUESTIONS MOST RELEVANT TO PARTICULAR INFORMANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE CPM DURING THE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT]

Relevance and Timeliness

Do you see it as relevant and timely for the CPM in the electoral cycle project to enhance political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention?

How have CPM in the electoral cycle interventions meet the needs of target groups and beneficiaries in enhance political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention?

Do you see it as relevant and timely for the CPM project to sustain public security, civil protection, human rights promotion, and peaceful response capacities?

How have CPM interventions meet the needs of target groups and beneficiaries for sustain public security, civil protection, human rights promotion, and peaceful response capacities?

Do you see contributions of the CPM project to UN's Peacebuilding mandate and UN SDGs, particularly SDGs 16 & 5? If so, how?

How relevant and responsive has the CPM in the electoral cycle project been towards supporting peacebuilding priorities in Sierra Leone?

Has the project's "theory of change" been relevant to the project? If so, how?

Has the CPM in the electoral cycle project responded to gaps in peacebuilding? If so, how?

How has the CPM in the electoral cycle project helped support women's involvement in peace building & promotion of social cohesiveness and decision-making processes?

Appropriateness

Is it appropriate for the UN to support conflict prevention and mitigation in the electoral cycle in Sierra Leone? If so, why?

Efficiency

Implementation approach

Based on your experience, has the CPM in the electoral cycle project been implemented efficiently? Why or why not?

How did the project manage activities to economically use resources?

Based on your experience, has the CPM in the electoral cycle project been implemented with attention to value for money? Why or why not? [FOLLOW UP TO ASK ABOUT MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS IF NOT IN ANSWER]

Has the project been transparent and clear about the roles and responsibilities of project staff and partners in implementation?

Has the level of coordination between project staff and partners been adequate in implementing the project?

How has the project used the annual work plan and performance indicators to manage the project?

How strong have any partnership arrangements established for implementation of the project been with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region?

What have UNDP and other stakeholders done in support of the regional and national institutions that are implementing partners? Has this been adequate to support implementation?

How efficiently did the project use the project board?

Financial planning

Based on your experience with the CPM in the electoral cycle project, were the financial control systems, including reporting and planning, of the project adequate to allow project management to make informed decisions regarding the budget?

Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?

To what extent has the flow of funds had been proper and timely from UNDP?

How efficient and successful was the project's implementation approach, including procurement and other activities?

How did project and UNDP management conduct due diligence and oversee the management of funds and spending?

How did the project coordinate with other programmes with similar portfolios to ensure that synergies were supported?

Did the project attempt to identify and enlist additional support for its activities and beneficiaries?

Did the project attempt to ensure catalytic results? How? What were the results of this effort?

Was the financial expenditure in the project in accordance with that planned?

Cost effectiveness/Value for money

Would you say the CPM in the electoral cycle project provided value for money? Why or why not?

Achievement of results in proposed timeline

Has the project completed its planned activities? Why or why not?

Have these activities meet or exceeded the expected outcomes of the project – at the planned schedule and cost?

Did the project achieve the expected results in the planned timeline? Why or why not?

Monitoring and evaluation

How effectively did the project collect and use data to monitor project performance and results?

How effectively did the project communicate with stakeholders and beneficiaries on project progress?

Did the project use data to inform its implementation strategy? If so, how?

Did you see evidence the project was using results based-monitoring, including adapting to changing conditions? If so, what evidence did you see?

Did you see evidence that the lessons, insights and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation were applied successfully to re-direct the project? If so, what evidence and changes did you see?

Effectiveness

Achievement of intended outcomes

Did the project achieve its intended outcomes in enhancing political dialogue, peace advocacy and violence prevention enhanced? Why or why not?

Did the project achieve its intended outcomes in sustaining public security, civil protection, human rights promotion, and peaceful response capacities? Why or why not?

Do you think the project's targeting strategies were clear in terms of who the project targeted in terms of their geographic location and other criteria?

Stakeholder participation and benefits accrued

To what extent did the CPM in the electoral cycle Project complement work with different entities -particularly UNDP and UN Women - and have a coherent strategic joint approach?

How were stakeholders involved in the programme's design and implementation?

Gender mainstreaming and gender responsive peacebuilding

To what extend did the Project mainstream gender and support gender-responsive peacebuilding? What evidence exists that supports this gender approach?

Monitoring and reviewing

How has the CPM in the electoral cycle project been monitored and reviewed?

What if anything would you say should be highlighted best practices or lessons learned in the design, implementation, or results of this project?

Impact, Sustainability, and Ownership

Contributions to broader strategic outcomes

How did the project contribute to strategic outcomes in country-level strategic plans?

Sustainability

Did the project design develop adequate plans towards making the activities and results sustainable and continue on beyond the end of the funding? Why or why not.

To what extent did the PBF Project make a concrete contribution in terms of building and consolidating peace in Sierra Leone and to the SDGs particularly SDG 16 & 5? What is the supporting evidence?

Do you think the activities supported by the project will continue to provide lasting benefits after the conclusion of the project? Why or why not?

Replication Approach

Have other partners continued to use practices from the project? What evidence is there for continuing, scaling up or replicating project activities through local ownership?

How have results been incorporated into other donor programmes, GoSL or regional institutions, or CSO activities?

What are the key factors that have supported the sustainability, continuation, or scaling up of project activities through local ownership?

What would you recommend for priority actions to support peacebuilding and the work done under the project going forward?

How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of national capacity in order to ensure suitability of efforts and benefits?

What are the main lessons that have emerged in terms of strengthening: ownership; stakeholder participation; capacity building; application of adaptive management strategies; and the role of M&E in project implementation?