

Towards National Reconciliation in Libya
Phase I
Terminal Evaluation

Tunis

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

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1. Executive Summary

Description of the Project

The project under evaluation, “Towards National Reconciliation in Libya”, supported the implementation of a UNSMIL/UNDP framework designed to test methods for local reconciliation and capacity building in Libya. The purpose of the project was to set the stage for further work in this field.

The UNDP signed an agreement to use Peacebuilding Fund resources with USD 2,973,102 authorized in 2016 to be delivered in two tranches. The initial project period was to be for 18 months but it was granted a no-cost extension for six months, resulting in a closing date of field operation on 31 December 2018.

The Reconciliation Project was to be governed by a Project Board headed by the UNDP RR or CD. The Board met one time in December 2017 to approve a six month no cost extension, bringing the project end date to 31 December 2018, which was formally approved/signed in August 2018.

Background to the Project

The Islamic Republic of Libya went through a civil rebellion in 2011. International military intervention resulted in the toppling of the government. The country went through four years of civil strife with thousands killed and many more displaced. Revenge and retribution was a prime motive for much of the violence with those who had benefited during the Gaddafi regime being attacked by those whose livelihoods had been undermined.

The project design was done by UNSMIL, building on a workshop held in August 2016, attended by 70 experts from Libya and globally. UNDP and UNSMIL jointly managed the project with UNSMIL Political Affairs office providing technical guidance and UNDP managing the implementation.

Description of the Project and its Objectives

The Project contributed to the goal of building peace by assisting Libyan national and local authorities, civil society and other partners in their efforts to promote an inclusive vision for national reconciliation. Stakeholders were to be empowered to implement a comprehensive national reconciliation strategy that would adequately contribute to the democratic process in Libya while recognising the specific roles of women and youth. Support was to have been provided to local reconciliation initiatives in order to include them into a nationwide dynamics of peace.

The project document identified two Outcomes for Phase I:

Outcome 1. National reconciliation strategy developed through a consultative and inclusive process, allowing/or the meaningful and effective participation of youth, women, and groups from across the divisions in the Libyan society.

Outcome 2. Bottom-up reconciliation processes strengthened and relevant civil society actors, in particular youth, capacitated.

Phase I was intended to help promote complementarity, synergies, sequencing and linkages between local and national, top-down and bottom-up projects, thereby building more trust and safe spaces for Libyan reconciliation processes to take place in the future.

To accomplish this, a multi-track mediation strategy was to be employed to engage with a wide range of powerful and legitimate actors (including tribal leaders, elders, youth, minorities, women, civil society and municipalities), allowing them to influence the design and implementation of the agreements and making their voices more directly incorporated into the peace process.

Evaluation Methodology

In order to assess performance, results and outcomes, the evaluation sought to use a participatory approach, working in close engagement and consultation with key stakeholders including the funding agency, implementing agencies, and beneficiaries. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with OECD/DAC evaluation criteria.

The following methods were used for gathering information for the evaluation Questions:

- (i) Desk Review of available documents
- (ii) Structured Interviews with UNDP and UNSMIL current and former staff, civil society grantees, and local reconciliation agreement beneficiaries. Structured interviews were carried out within the framework of the evaluation questions using a modified Appreciative Inquiry and Most Significant Outcome methodologies.

The synthesis of data rested primarily upon the evaluator's comparison of intended versus actual results, and an assessment of the incentives and interests that influenced organizational and individual behaviour.

Limitations -- Project management had all left the project well before the evaluation took place. Project documentation had not been well maintained by UNDP. No site visit or interviews were allowed inside Libya and no national evaluation consultant was recruited to support the international evaluator.

Key Findings

Relevance -- The project was highly relevant for the Libyan context. No formal, modern reconciliation tools had been introduced previously. No framework existed that outlined the critical elements of national reconciliation. No quantitative survey data existed to give a clear representation of Libyan perception of the importance of reconciliation. All of these were in place at the end of the project phase 1.

Effectiveness -- The results specified in the prodoc were narrow in scope, some were even event oriented. Nevertheless, the project has served to generate appreciation for and capability of engaging in using modern tools for reconciliation as a peacebuilding tool at the local level and to catalyse follow up action by civil society. The AWP was completed, with a 6 month no cost extension.

Efficiency -- The entire budget was consumed; however, a significant increase was recorded in the use of project funds for Operational and Other Direct Costs, substantially above both the original and revised budgets.

Impact -- It is too soon to objectively assess the impact of this short project. Nevertheless, many pieces of an overall reconciliation framework were put in place by the end of the project that had not existed at its beginning. The Phase II of this project is well prepared to be implemented in a more systematic manner, if the security conditions improve.

Sustainability -- A number of CSOs commented on their enhanced capability to take the tools/training/experience of working with the project and to expand upon this with their own resources.

A drawback is that ALL interviewees mentioned that there appears to be little to no coordination among different projects of UNDP, across the UNCT, and in the wider efforts of the international community. Again, the evaluator was told that the 2018 audit of UNDP operations cited poor level of synergy among its projects.

Lessons Learned

Initial Design—The August 2016 workshop helped to establish the project as one that would be primarily led by Libyan interest and knowledge

Incorporating Women and Youth -- The project acknowledges that it was unable to integrate women to the extent desired. The lesson has been recognised in Phase II with more structured opportunities

Reconciliation Follow up -- Initiating a dialogue to craft a local reconciliation agreement must be seen as only step one. Prior to the start of a dialogue, the facilitators need to have already set actions in motion to mobilise external resources to help in providing substantive opportunities for structured engagements involving the two parties

Creation of a network of facilitators/mediators -- A network was initiated early in the project, but this seems not to have worked as planned. Revision to the selection of mediators was introduced and the network unfolding in Phase II appears to be on a more solid base

Necessity of monitoring – The project appears not to have been able to undertake formal monitoring of field operations due to security considerations. Monitoring of grants consisted of reports from grantees. Monitoring of the media events were reported to have been ad hoc.

Language of operations – The requirement for Libyan CSOs to use English in proposal and report writing reduced the potential for women's and rural groups to participate. This issue remains unresolved.

Conclusions

Relations with UNSMIL – UNSMIL prepared the initial design. UNDP was asked to assist in implementation. There was a lengthy period of tension between the two agencies which had repercussions on the speed and quality of initial implementation.

Relevance - The project was well designed and expertly implemented. Gaps have been noted, but overall it is an example of how an international project should engage with citizens in a country affected by conflict.

Effectiveness - It is worth stating again that the amount of work accomplished is praiseworthy given all the constraints and short time available.

Efficiency - The UNDP reported an extraordinarily high level of expenditure for Operational and Direct Costs. This was far higher than planned, amounting to nearly 30% of the entire project budget, substantially reducing the potential for impact on the ground.

Impact - The project introduced useful new tools and techniques; it helped to establish formal understanding of a modern reconciliation process and left a carefully crafted quantitative assessment of Libyan perceptions of reconciliation for other to build upon. It was designed to be a Phase I of a larger and longer engagement. Impact will be better assessed after the conclusion of Phase II.

Sustainability - Sustainability of project efforts was reduced due to the inability of the UN to fully engage the government due to the increasing level of violence in the country. There was also limited follow up on activities carried out by the CSO grantees as the project was focused on completing tasks within its limited time frame.

Recommendations

Monitoring, Information management and Lessons Learned -- The UNDP should establish a unit in its PSU to guide and support all projects to maintain solid information bases on lessons learned, both positive and negative. These project inputs should be codified and disseminated on a regular basis to partners and donors. More use of spatial information systems and crowd sourcing tools is strongly recommended

Building synergy amongst development partners – The international development community needs to help itself and the Libyan government and citizens by creating a publicly available database on who is doing what and where so that gaps, overlaps, and opportunities for synergy can be more easily identified.

Theory of change and project design --The next phase of this project may be able to move beyond the experimental stage to establish a systematic approach to expanding the Libyan capacity for reconciliation and follow up. A rigorous approach to the use of program theory in project design will be of benefit.

Primary language of operations – Arabic should be the primary language for project operations in the field. Other than internal office communications, English should only be used in translations financed by UNDP

2. Introduction

The Project

The project under evaluation “Towards National Reconciliation in Libya” supports the implementation of a UNSMIL/UNDP framework for testing methods for local reconciliation and capacity building in Libya. The purpose of the project was to set the stage for further work in this field.

The UNDP signed an agreement to use Peacebuilding Fund resources with USD 2,973,102 allocated in 2016 to be delivered in two tranches. The initial project period was to be for 18 months.

The Reconciliation Project is, in some respects, a successor to the Support to Civic Engagement in Libya’s Transition (SCELT) capacity building project. Models for capacity building were taken from this earlier project

The project design was done by UNSMIL, building on a workshop held in August 2016, attended by 70 experts from Libya and globally. UNDP and UNSMIL jointly managed the project with UNSMIL. Initially, Political Affairs office provided technical guidance and UNDP managed the implementation. By the end of the first year, UNDP was driving the project.

The Reconciliation Project was to be governed by a Project Board headed by the UNDP RR or CD. The Board met one time in December 2017 to approve a six month no cost extension, bringing the project end date to 31 December 2018, which was formally approved/signed in August 2018. Although the Minister of Planning from the GNA attended the Board meeting, no government signature was sought for either the original project or its extension due to serious conflict occurring in the country.

The Project was to contribute to the goal of enhancing national reconciliation by assisting Libyan national and local authorities, civil society and other partners in their efforts to promote an inclusive vision for national reconciliation. Stakeholders were to be empowered to implement a comprehensive national reconciliation strategy that would adequately contribute to the democratic process in Libya and recognize the specific roles of women and youth. Support was to have been provided to local reconciliation initiatives in order to include them into a nationwide dynamics of peace.

The project document identified two Outcomes for Phase I:

Outcome 1. National reconciliation strategy developed through a consultative and inclusive process, allowing/or the meaningful and effective participation of youth, women, and groups from across the divisions in the Libyan society.

Outcome 2. Bottom-up reconciliation processes strengthened and relevant civil society actors, in particular youth, capacitated.

Phase I was intended to help promote complementarity, synergies, sequencing and linkages between local and national, top-down and bottom-up projects, thereby building more trust and safe spaces for Libyan reconciliation processes to take place in the future.

To accomplish this, a multi-track mediation strategy was to be employed to engage with a wide range of powerful and legitimate actors (including tribal leaders, elders, youth, minorities, women, civil society and municipalities), allowing them to influence the design and implementation of the agreements and making their voices more directly incorporated into the peace process.

Donor Contributions

There was only one donor for the project. This was the Peacebuilding Fund. The breakdown of the contribution, as documented in the revised project document of August 2018 is detailed in the Efficiency section of the Evidence chapter below.

Country Context

Libya existed under the dictatorial rule of General Muamar Gaddafi from 1969 to 2011. The population comprises Arabs and many Saharan tribes. All but a few are followers of Sunni Islam. The revenues from oil exploitation enabled Libya to achieve the highest Human Development Index in Africa. However, despite this modernization, Libyan society was tightly controlled by General Gaddafi's forces. The regime used its power to benefit some groups it favoured while impoverishing others. Many areas under customary usufruct land management were taken and given to other groups. Acts of this nature served to shore up support for the government in some quarters but led to serious opposition in others.

The wave of uprisings initiated in Tunis that became known as the 'Arab Spring' as it spread, served as the catalyst for a popular revolt in Libya that started in 2011. The USA and allies entered the fight after it was determined that Gen Gaddafi indiscriminately attacked his own citizens. The bombing precipitated a total breakdown in civil order, leading to the death of Gen Gaddafi, the collapse of the government, a rapid rise of multiple armed factions representing tribes, territories, religious ideologies, and other power and/or criminal interests. The country was still in disarray in 2012 when an attack on the American Consulate in Benghazi led to the death of the American Ambassador. Renewed fighting in 2014 further deepened the turmoil. In 2015, a Libyan Peace Agreement (LPA) was brokered by the UN but talks broke down before the final agreements. This resulted in a, thus far permanent, bifurcation of the government into two camps: the GNA based in Tripoli and the HOR based in Tobruk.

Beginning in 2011, many groups that had suffered under Gaddafi initiated reprisals against those who they felt had wrongly benefited. Thousands were killed, maimed, displaced and/or had their properties destroyed and/or confiscated.

The UNDP had already been working in Libya since 1976. On 16 September 2011, the Secretary General created the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The UN, other multi-lateral and bilateral agencies, as well as a plethora of INGOs initiated relief and rehabilitation work. These operations have suffered many setbacks as the civil war has gone through several stages.

Overview of the Evaluation

Conceptual Framework

The review evaluated Phase One of the UNDP implemented Libya Reconciliation project covering the period from January 2017 to December 2018. A Grant of \$2,973,102 was made

available, initially to cover an 18-month period to establish a framework for national reconciliation.

The Reconciliation project has moved on to Phase II. Thus, a prospective evaluation of the contribution of Phase I to the design for Phase II was required. As a result, this External Review carried out an assessment of progress made in Phase I and documented lessons that could be translated into future design and strategy.

The review is formative in nature with a two-fold focus:

- i. Clarification of the program theory with an emphasis on understanding if, within the particular social and political environment in which the program is implemented, the current design assumptions (implicit and explicit), objectives, and focus were, and remain, valid and, therefore, likely to lead to the desired outcomes; and
- ii. Learning, with an emphasis on understanding:
 - How the delivery approach, including how resources are used, affected progress towards outcomes; and
 - How the results of Phase I can serve as a basis for future programming on reconciliation in Libya.

To assess these adequately, the evaluator needed to consider these within the country context and the achievement of outcomes to date. Together, these provided findings that may be suitable for consideration in the ongoing Phase II and any future stage design.

The review focused on the work of the Reconciliation project team from its initiation in January 2017 to its end date of 31 December 2018. All elements of the program design and delivery were considered.

The review made judgements about the overall performance of the project, assessing against success criteria established in the project document and the evaluation criteria contained in the terms of reference. The priority evaluation criteria for this component of the review are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. These assessments were based entirely on document review and interviews. No field observation was possible given the security situation in Libya. Therefore, impact will be addressed only cursorily due to the small budget, short implementation period of the project, and lack of opportunity to make direct observations of current behaviour of partners and stakeholders in the field.

Recommendations have been made to address future phases regarding Achievements and Implementation and Development Effectiveness defined as ‘the extent to which the project activities have attained its objectives’.

Evaluation Strategies

Prospective Orientation

The Review was conducted considering the future of reconciliation programming in Libya as its primary orientation. The evaluator gathered data on past and current operations with the intent to assess their potential for replication or modification under any future design. It is also our understanding that the evaluation report may be used by the project management to make decisions regarding refinement of Phase II or later phase designs.

Program theory

Clarifying the current reconciliation program theory and potential modifications for future programming is fundamental to this evaluation. The evaluation used a mix of approaches to articulate the program theory:

- Aggregating the mental models of program stakeholders as part of the key informant activities. However, it turned out that the limited number and variety of the interviewees seriously reduced the potential for meaningful synthesis of contrasting mindsets regarding the utility of the project and its interventions.
- Deductive Analysis of project documentation and external literature. Only Libyan relevant inputs formed the basis for evaluation conclusions or recommendations
- Inductive Analysis from the interviews and quantitative data sources to infer how the program actually operated.

Outcomes-based assessment

As the assessment of objectives falls within the review's secondary purpose and focus, the outcomes-based assessment approach used was practical in nature.

- The two project outcomes were detailed in the project document. It is important to note that the evaluator reviewed the results chain based on available documentation and stakeholder interviews alone.
- A selection of the performance indicators noted in the Final Project Report were validated and reported on.

Participatory

The principles of a participatory approach guided the evaluation, for example:

- The evaluation plan was developed following a preliminary review of background material about the program, its operation and stakeholders gained through a series of discussions with key stakeholders
- The evaluator was assisted by the Project Team in the selection of key informants based in Tunis and Libya.
- Methods and techniques were chosen by the evaluator to promote inclusive participation of key stakeholders to the extent possible without actual face-to-face encounters and recognise the value of everyone's contribution.
- To ensure anonymity, and as per point 12 of the Evaluation Code of Conduct, no interview notes were shared with UNDP

Data sources

- Review of available project documents;
- A brief review of relevant contemporary literature on post-conflict reconciliation.
- Key informant interviews using semi-structured interview guides.

Data analysis

Triangulation of inputs is used to facilitate validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources. It was anticipated that triangulation of data would be a critical aspect

of the data analysis. However, the orientation of the interviewees turned out to be too lopsided for this to be done in more than a cursory manner.

Following the Tunis mission, the evaluator undertook an iterative data analysis and synthesis, structured in two ways:

- a) against the key evaluation questions;
- b) according to the project outcomes and outputs

Quantitative financial data was only used to provide a cursory overview of project implementation as the UNDP was unable to provide expenditure breakdowns at output levels.

Limitations to the Evaluation

There were a number of serious limitations to this evaluation. The primary limitation was the inability of UNDP to facilitate entry to Libya for the evaluator due to the ongoing security restrictions. In addition, the UNDP was unable to obtain the services of a national evaluator to be a part of the team. Therefore, the key data inputs for the evaluation consisted of a series of phone conversations with Libyans who had been associated with some aspect of the project and interviews with UNSMIL and UNDP personnel in Tunisia. (UNDP Libya international staff were withdrawn from Tripoli in September 2018.

There has been essentially no involvement of the Libyan government in the project. The original and revised project documents were signed internally by UN officials alone. No one association with the Libyan government was interviewed for this evaluation, nor were any documents obtained that provide government views on the relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency of the project.

All but one interviewee had a financial connection with the project as a UN staff member, consultant, or grantee. One interview was a participant in a local reconciliation agreement, thus the sole representative of project beneficiaries.

In addition, the UNDP proved unable to retrieve many of the critical documents generated by the project. Those missing included both project products as well as records of important process milestones. Some documents were retrieved from various sources during the course of the evaluation.

All management personnel associated with the project during Phase I implementation had left their positions by the time the evaluation was fielded in December 2019.

3. Analysis of the situation

Evaluation Findings

The information contained in this chapter are based on information collected by the evaluator through interviews in Tunis and phone interviews with UNDP and CSOs in Libya and a review of available documents provided by UNDP and various interviewees, as well as a few internet sites. The factual details have been woven together through reasoning applied by the evaluator. Therefore, any views expressed in this or subsequent sections of the report are those of the evaluator alone, unless otherwise referenced.

Relevance

The purpose of assessing the Relevance of a program is to judge the extent to which the program objectives are consistent with beneficiary needs, country requirements, and partner & donor policies

Main Evaluation Question on Relevance:

Did the Project design match the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient, and donor.

Summary

The project fortunately started when there was a window of opportunity in the on-going Libyan civil conflict. At the time, it was perceived that small reconciliation issues could be addressed and resolved. Although there was no formal link to the national level political reconciliation, it was felt that the results and lessons of these local processes could benefit the national dialogue. Tools were introduced to enhance the potential for Libyans to dig more deeply into the root causes of conflict rather than seeking a resolution that merely calmed the situation on the surface.

The project was designed by UNSMIL but implemented by UNDP. The role played by UNSMIL was unclear to many Libyans. Some comments were made that UNSMIL's involvement reduced the credibility of the project in the eyes of some Libyans. There also appears to have been some friction between UNDP and UNSMIL in the early days, but this is not mentioned in the latter period of project implementation.

The government attended the one Project Board meeting and apparently did not express any objection to the project's no-cost extension.

The approach undertaken and the results achieved, were seen as sufficiently relevant and suitable for the American and Italian to commit to financing Phase II.

In all CSO interviews, the evaluator received confirmation that the Reconciliation Project was (and remains) relevant to Libyan national interests and aspirations.

Comments on the views of the donor, the Peace Building Fund, were requested several times, but no response was forthcoming.

Secondary Evaluation Questions of Relevance

1 Did the project respond to the needs of the intended beneficiaries?

This project represented 3% (USD 1.5 million/year) of the total UNDP portfolio (USD 42 million in 2019). The nominal GDP of Libya in 2017 was USD 62 billion with a per capita GDP of USD 7000 (down from USD 12000 before 2011, the highest in Africa). The project purpose was to introduce new ideas and tools. It did not have the inherent ability to meet all needs of beneficiaries.

The proceedings of the pre-project workshop and several project surveys and research all indicated that Libya had a great need for new ideas and tools to facilitate open discourse. The project introduced and tested several new techniques in many parts of the country during its two-year life. The larger problems inherent in the stability of Libya were well discussed in the workshop. There was no expectation that this project should be engaged in relief or reconstruction efforts. The importance of local reconciliation for reducing horizontal inequity was noted and appreciated. The obstacles to working at the local level were also noted, and possible work arounds identified.

2 Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground?

The inputs used for project design, particularly the August 2016 UNSMIL workshop, provided a solid basis for project design. The evaluator encountered nothing in the subsequent research outputs or activity reports that undermined the validity of the basic structure of the project. Despite serious impediments to successful implementation, the project was able to complete nearly all planned activities. When obstacles were identified, strategic thinking was employed to identify suitable solutions.

Differences of opinion existed between UNSMIL and UNDP regarding several aspects of the project. A particular point of disagreement, that appears to exist to date, is the question of the utility of the local reconciliation agreements. UNSMIL appears to have favoured a stronger emphasis on the national strategy, yet the project was designed by UNSMIL mid-level officers. This will be addressed in greater detail later.

3 Were the problems and needs adequately analysed.

The project grew out of a workshop of 70 experts on reconciliation and fragile states, dominated by Libyans in August 2016. The workshop report indicates it was well designed and managed. Detailed proceedings are incorporated into the report illustrating broad participation. This was held in Tripoli in a particularly calm period. Discussed key issues to be addressed for reconciliation. The project was designed on the basis of a large (70 participant) workshop organised by UNSMIL in August 2016. In addition, UNSMIL has access to substantial internal analysis, plus the analysis done by INGOs that took part in the early design (PCI, PEACE, etc) One of the top global experts on state fragility, Seth Kaplan, was an active participant in that workshop. His arguments for greater emphasis on horizontal

inequity¹ spurred the OECD to revise their earlier perspective on leading causes of fragility². The report section, Steps Forward, lists proposed steps, many of which were incorporated into the Reconciliation project document.

In December 2017, a quantitative survey (implemented by Altai) substantiated many of the issues raised in the workshop and prodoc. Throughout the course of the project, a Technical Committee of about 20 Libyan experts deliberated on key issues associated with reconciliation in Libya. The final outcome was a Reconciliation Strategy that did not diverge greatly from the findings of the initial workshop.

A mapping exercise of a large number other project conducted during the project design indicated that no other project was explicitly covering the topic of national reconciliation. The Peace Building Fund supported the project design as meeting a need that had not been adequately covered

4 Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?

Despite the obstacles and the deteriorating situation after October 2017, particularly the evacuation of the UN from Libya in September 2018, the project was able to complete nearly all planned activities and used the allocated funds with only a six-month no-cost extension. The major activity not completed was the end of project perception survey. Comments were made indicating that this was not completed because of lack of funds. Others noted that given the small budget and short time frame of the project, compared to the size of the problems of Libya, the funds had been better used on other activities.

The project was designed in a manner that did not require a large compliment of full-time staff to manage it. Human resources appears to have been used sparingly in this project. For the first 8 months, the project manager was the only project employee. A programme officer was added to the team in August 2017. UNDP operations services were used for recruitment, procurement and financial management.

Only the AWP for Outcome One in year 2018 (approved January 2018) was made available, but the AWP budget of \$2,001,409 was able to be realistic as it was well utilized according to the 2018 Combined Delivery Report (\$1,971,090).

5 Was the Project design logical and coherent in terms of the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders to realistically achieve the planned outcomes?

The designers originally assumed a National Reconciliation Commission would be formed. However, there was a lack of government involvement (no government entity signed the original or revised prodoc) in the project implementation. Fortunately, the project designers assumed that, due to the innovative nature of planned work, a range of stakeholders would emerge as the project progressed: “Because national reconciliation should be entirely nationally owned, the design and implementation of any comprehensive strategy, timeline or

¹ Kaplan, Seth. “What the OECD still doesn’t understand about fragile states”.

<https://www.fragilestates.org/2015/04/17/what-the-oecd-still-does-not-understand-about-fragile-states/>

² OECD, States of Fragility, 2018.

project document to that end should be preceded by inclusive and representative consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, including government officials, parliamentarians, tribal leaders, elders, armed groups, city councils, victims groups, media outlets, civil society organizations, women's groups, youth, minorities, IDPs and refugees." This is indeed what transpired.

The changing security situation precipitated delays, but no major changes in the project were required. Activities were pushed ahead, despite difficulties. In fact, one commenter reflected, as a criticism, that the project management did not stop to engage in political analysis, but 'kept its nose to the ground' to complete the assigned activities.

Comments inserted into the revised project document carefully reflect the situation.

- Technical Committee meetings could not be held in Libya due to political sensitivity: but Technical Committee meetings were held in Malta and Tunis.
- Disbursements of small grants were hindered by lack of cash in Libya: but ways were found to move money to CSOs
- The procurement of the media campaign had been delayed: but the media campaign did take eventually place.
- Women participants were low due to Libyan customary practices: Although efforts were undertaken to increase the role of women in discussion and dialogues, many opinions were expressed that, ultimately, this ended up being a missed opportunity that should be addressed more aggressively in Phase II.

It is possible that the original project time frame could have been achieved if the violence had subsided and the amendments to the LPA had been agreed upon.

6 To what extent were external factors and assumptions identified at the time of design?

Changes in national level of violence and further fractionalisation of government were identified as a possibility. The focus was placed on using local reconciliation as a means to test tools for Libyans to use in resolving their own conflicts, a process that was able to continue despite a serious downturn in stability at the national level.

7 Was the Project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes/needs that could occur during the implementation?

The points made in Question 5 address this issue as well.

Mention was made of only one Project Board meeting, in December 2017. No minutes were provided to the evaluator. A comment indicated the Minister of Planning had attended the meeting, with UNSMIL and UNDP. However, a transmittal letter mentions lack of national government stability and thus the decision to extend the project was taken without government endorsement, just as with the original prodoc in January 2017. Such a decision, although rare, is allowed under the DIM modality, ensuring project implementation flexibility in times of severe constraints on government.

8 Was the strategy for sustainability of impact clearly defined at the design stage of the Project?

The project was designed with an intent to make reconciliation a more sustainable process. The use of national facilitators, a Technical Committee composed of nationals drafted the final reconciliation strategy, extensive emphasis on capacity building training, and the provision of open-ended CSO grants that provided the opportunity for nationals to identify problems and implement endogenous solutions, and the attempt to create a network of Libyan mediators/facilitators all point to a clear strategy for sustainability of impact.

9 Was the sustainability methodology/approach taken appropriate to the context?

The steps noted under Question 7 have all led to Libyan nationals being more empowered in their search for ways to enhance stability in their country. The evaluator could not identify any project activity that was driven solely by an international ‘best practice’ framework. The final project report notes that the process was as important as the products achieved.

The initial idea to form a network of Libyan mediators/facilitators matched the need for more nationals trained in modern reconciliation tools that could be used independently of any international project. Although the initial attempt at forming such a network did not work well, the lessons learned were used to design a more viable network that continues to be expanded under Phase II.

However, as will be noted below in more detail, the poor security made it impossible for the project management to undertake field monitoring of activities, relying upon grantees reports and third-party comments to gauge utility of the activities. In addition, several grantees commented that the ‘event’ orientation of the grants was less useful to building sustainable capacity than possibly could have been achieved if a longer-term arrangement had been made with fewer grantees. This is a reasonable critique, but the completion of the grants without serious mishap is an achievement to be noted. Also, aside from a desire for deeper involvement, no grantee or participant expressed the view that any project activity had undermined their capacity or hindered the ability to move forward with their own agenda.

10 Is there a Theory of Change that effectively facilitates the integration of individual project interventions around a common frame of reference.

There is a Theory of Change (TOC) noted in the project document. However, it is merely a statement: “The elaboration of a national strategy for reconciliation based on inclusive consultations and outreach, as well as the building of capacities and spaces to engage in reconciliation processes across lines of division, facilitating voices from different groups, are likely to decrease mistrust and strengthen relationships in the short-term, while creating prospects for increased understanding, social cohesion and thus, sustainable peace in the longer term.”

There is no evidence that a formal process was used to generate the TOC nor is there any reference to the objectives framework or AWP as embodying an extension of the TOC into a Theory of Action (LogFrame or Objectives Logic Model). This point will be taken up in the Recommendations.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness measures the extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, considering their relative importance.

Main Evaluation Question on Effectiveness:

To what extent have the project interventions achieved results and has collaborating with Government of Libya enhanced the level of results achieved

Summary

The indicators specified in the prodoc were narrow in scope, many were activity oriented. Nevertheless, the project has served to generate appreciation for and capability of engaging in the use of modern tools for reconciliation as a peacebuilding tool and to catalyse follow up action by civil society.

There is no single government of Libya, a major armed struggle has been going on since shortly after the initiation of the project. This has made engagement with government a tenuous process at best. Therefore, the evaluation question is oddly phrased as the evaluator only detected two instances of interaction between the project and the Government of Libya. These would be when the government provided funds for IDPs' resettlement following project-instigated reconciliation in Kufra and the attendance of the Minister of Planning at the project board meeting. This minimal engagement has been identified as one weak point in project implementation.

That being said, a strategy national reconciliation was completed and an implementation road map was being prepared for submission to GNA when the fighting broke out in April 2019 and the GNA shifted to a survival mode.

The UNDP international staff had to relocate from Libya part way through the project period, in September 2018. Critically, the project was still able to complete the its original outputs and spend its funds within the six-month no-cost extension approved in August 2018.

The concept of local reconciliation does not appear to have been well articulated prior to the start of the Reconciliation Project. Post-conflict theory has suggested that reconciliation is best initiated 3-5 years after the end of conflict. The initial UNSMIL mindset conceptualised reconciliation as bringing the two main national actors to an agreement. The project was able to show that serious work can be accomplished at the local level. In so doing, they sparked interest in both the GNA and the UNSMIL to look more seriously at local reconciliation efforts. However, the deteriorating situation prevented much progress.

It needs to be noted, that if the TOR had called for an evaluability assessment prior to the inception phase of the evaluation, it is possible the Reconciliation Project would have been assessed as not evaluable due to limited documentation, access to project beneficiaries, failure to objectively track progress towards indicators selected, and limited verifiable data on CSO operations.

Secondary evaluation questions on Effectiveness:

1 How effective has the Project been in establishing ownership especially with reference to the three components of the Project.

It is unclear whose ownership was to be established as the project operated essentially independent of government. Nevertheless, the focus of Outcome One was on the production of a National Reconciliation Strategy that was to have been endorsed by government. The Technical Committee comprised of Libyan national experts on many fields relevant to reconciliation stayed involved throughout the project and supported the final version of the National Reconciliation Strategy as being a something that they had produced. However, by the time it was ready, the GNA was fully in preservation mode as the HOR had initiated a major territorial advance.

All indicators are that the individual local reconciliation agreements reached with the assistance of the project were fully owned by the participating groups. IDPs were returned following the Kufra dialogue. The road opened in another agreement has remained open. Tuareg IDPs were allowed to reclaim their government jobs in Ghadames, but the camp in Awal remains their major settlement.

No comment was given by grantees or participants indicating that they felt the project had pursued a strategy focused on implementing international best practice rather than building Libyan ownership and full engagement in all activities.

2. Were management capacities adequate?

Project managers were in place throughout the project. Libyan nationals were heavily involved in the design and implementation of many aspects of the project. As far as the evaluator is aware, all consultants were local, with the exception of one international expert hired by the Altai survey team (see below).

The first manager was an Arabic speaking international consultant from Yemen. After eight months, the UNDP was able to recruit internally. That manager, a Lebanese-American, remained in place through the remainder of project implementation and submission of the final report in August 2019. He initiated Phase II until he was promoted by UNDP and moved to the Regional Bureau for Arab States.

UNDP provided all operational support in HR, finance, and procurement. Difficulties arose due to the displacement of UNDP and project internationals to Tunis, Tunisia from Tripoli, Libya. Nevertheless, the project was able to complete its objectives.

3. Was the project methodology/approach taken appropriate to the context?

The initial August 2016 workshop set an appropriate design for the project, which centred on emphasising Libyan national involvement and ownership. The quantitative survey done by Altai validated many of those choices and did not identify any aspect of the project as not appropriate to the context.

The use of a Technical Committee comprised of national experts matched the Libyan mindset that the conflict problem and its solutions were their own responsibility.

The open approach to CSO grant making matched the limited UN capacity for detailed oversight of ground activities. It also was appropriate for supporting a range of young actors to try out their own ideas, rather than waiting to be guided by the UN.

4. Was the Project able to respond to changes in the political, security and general operating environment?

Despite upsurge in violence, faulty banking systems, inability of international staff to remain in country, still the project was able to complete nearly all activities and expend nearly all funds with only a six-month extension.

5. What were the development results (i.e. against planned outputs and outcomes) of interventions, considering the changes made and support provided to the national partners?

Outcome 1 A National Reconciliation Strategy developed

Indicator 1.1 A strategy was to be produced through a consultative process. This was achieved, but the strategy was not shared with government due to an upsurge in violence. This indicator is duplicated under Output 1.1 and Indicator 1.1.1 illustrating some gaps in standard UNDP project design standards. More details are included under the output.

Indicator 1.2 A final survey was to assess increased levels of confidence and cohesion as compared to a baseline survey. However, no final survey was conducted. No assessment of achievement of this indicator is possible. Many commenters expressed the view that this would not have added significant knowledge as the national problems has increased but in no way due to any fault of the project.

Output 1.1 Produce a National Reconciliation Strategy

Indicator 1.1.1 Roadmap/strategy prepared

This indicator duplicates Indicator 1.1, which is an improper project design feature. The creation and deliberations of the Technical Committee were all subsumed under this output. The final strategy appears to have been weaker, less specific, than anticipated at the beginning of the project. Some commenters felt the project had ‘taken their eye off the ball’ of the strategy, getting excited about achieving a series of local reconciliation agreements. Nevertheless, a number of thematic reports were produced on traditional reconciliations, missing persons, transitional justice, land and property, and arbitrary detention. These were combined with the quantitative survey findings, regional dialogues, reports of local CSO activities, and local reconciliation results. The draft was reviewed and accepted by the Technical Committee, civil society, and government.

Indicator 1.1.2 Strengthened interactions between national and local

In addition to the Technical Committee deliberations, regional dialogues were conducted. These were done in an attempt to develop a geographically coherent approach. Results of these meetings fed into the Technical Committee deliberations, and ultimately into the Strategy. One dialogue, involving 70 participants from the South, produced the Fezzan agreement. The project was able to engage the prime minister and the SRSG in some of these dialogues. The project claims to have tried to build synergies with the Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery project, but this is apparently a huge project with

sluggish oversight. Dialogue in the west was able to generate interest in providing follow up development support for Misrata and Tawragh.

Output 1.2 National outreach and awareness raising

Indicator 1.2.1 Libyan perceptions of reconciliation understood and social cohesion assessed

Activities under this indicator focused on the production of the media campaign and the quantitative survey. The media campaign was produced through a contract with a national NGO based in Libya. The project wanted to use Libyan companies to ensure national ownership and to avoid repercussions with the political leadership given the sensitive context. Ultimately, it was completed in year two, involving a wide range of activities such as sports, art exhibits, radio and television shows aired in cities and remote areas. Comments indicate a good reception of the campaign. The project expressed that the campaign produced an overall good feeling, but no independent assessment of its impact was made available. This necessitated a lengthy search for a suitably competent contractor. All indicators from the interviewee assessments of the campaign outputs are that the search was worth the time.

The quantitative survey was produced under Altai management with a Libyan call centre business. Following a review of the survey Inception Report and the final publication, the evaluator concurs with the interview comments that this was well done. The survey explored Libyan attitudes towards reconciliation and transitional justice. It also probed, and confirmed, the legitimacy of local level reconciliation initiatives to provide possible lessons for national reconciliation. Formal release of the final document did not take place until May 2019. Findings were shared with the project in December 2017 and with the Technical Committee in March 2018. The completion of 2000 interviews, each comprising 41 questions, in a highly sensitive environment is a significant achievement in itself.

Output 1.3 Building capacity for the dialogue process

Indicator 1.3.1 Processes of reconciliation are understood and documented

The project found very weak capabilities for dispute resolution at the start. Four trainings were implemented, process of documenting human rights violations was introduced. Comments from CSOs indicate the training materials were of good quality and still being used or modified based on additional knowledge. The facilitator/mediator network was initiated under this output, but comments indicate the original set up did not work as planned. Also some people were confused when a second network was started in Tunis. Approximately 150 men have been involved in this. No women during Phase 1. The training lasted for a total of 12 days, involving transitional justice, building capacity for training administration, networking and advocacy. Continuous work was needed to build CSO capacity. Nevertheless, it appears that only after-event reports were produced and no long-term follow-up assessments were attempted...or perhaps possible.

Outcome 2 Bottom up reconciliation process strengthened

Indicator 2.1 CSO capacity increased

Seven CSO's received grants to carry out activities associated with trust building and awareness raising for reconciliation. There is no quantitative assessment of capacity, increased or otherwise. However, several CSOs received more than one grant, indicating an operational quality was assessed. All interviewees indicated their ability to carry out awareness raising and networks was better than before the connection with the Reconciliation Project.

Output 2.1 Bottom up reconciliation initiatives supported

The grant calls for proposals did not specify precisely what the CSO should do. This was beneficial in that the CSOs were not constrained by UNDP perception of problems or solutions. Also, it made it easier for CSOs to apply the lessons learned with UNDP to other situations.

The explicit local reconciliation agreement efforts do not appear to have been explicitly specified in the project document. This appears to have been a realisation that this would be possible, and a valuable addition, after the project started. In any case, these agreements did prove to be useful testing grounds of the tools, techniques, trainings and training materials produced. About eight reconciliation agreements of one sort or another were reached during the project period. Comments were made indicating to the evaluator that UNDP and UNSMIL concurred that additional agreements would not add to the project outputs or lessons.

Indicator 2.1.1 CSO show increased capacity for civic engagement

As with Outcome 1.1 , Output 2.1 indicator duplicates the outcome indicator

Indicator 2.1.2 Sensitisation materials for reconciliation produced and disseminated

The evaluator is unclear what exactly was produced linked to this indicator. The final project document notes that one CSO received a grant and implemented the activity but provides no details. No document of 'sensitisation materials' was provided for review.

Output 2.2 Young people are effectively engaged in reconciliation

Indicator 1.2.1 Number of dialog sessions organised

The final project report states that six sessions were conducted to test truth-seeking mechanisms. No corroborating evidence was provided. CSO interviewees were unclear about what was referred to here.

Indicator 1.2.2 Strengthened youth leadership skills

The project recognized that youth were very good at coming up with ideas but did not have a good way of having their ideas accepted by real decision makers. Serious efforts were done to include youth from fighting groups. This is important because many young people get involved in these militant gangs only because a family member has been killed and it is their filial duty to take their place, despite have a good job and education.

6. Which aspects of the project had the greatest achievements? What were the supporting factors?

It will take some time to objectively identify the greatest achievements of the project.

The aspects of the project that were identified most frequently by interviewees as their favourite or most important were those related to the local reconciliation engagements, particularly the activities that supported the engagement of women and youth.

Interestingly, some commenters with a more top-down orientation felt that the focus on the local agreements had detracted from the achievement of the higher objective of obtaining government endorsement of the national reconciliation strategy.

In general, a high level of commitment to the project design and objectives on the part of the project staff appears to have been the most important supporting factor to project success.

7. In which areas does the Project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?

Although it was mentioned as an important attempt, the minimal involvement of women in project activities was seen by many as an area having low achievement. The project expressed the opinion that main constraining factor to women's involvement came from outside the control of the project. This was the deep-seated misogynistic attitudes of Libyan tribal culture. In most cases, the desire to generate a reconciliation achievement meant that processes often went ahead without female involvement.

The project did realise a means to engaging women on their own and organised an apparently successful involving women from the Southern tribes. However, there does not appear to be any other major activities focused on women after that.

Women's enhanced involvement was flagged as a critical point for emphasis during Phase II implementation, and the important of their role is clearly reflected in the writing of the Phase II design document.

8. Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partners' institutions, including NGOs

No documentation of the process of selecting Technical Committee members or senior Libyan consultants was provided. Interviewees remarked that UNSMIL assumed it was their prerogative to pick and choose whomever they wished and it was UNDP's role to simply make the paperwork happen. These demands appear to have been stronger in the early period of the project.

The process was clearer for CSO grantees. A call for proposals was issued. CSOs submitted their proposals together with supporting documentation. Top candidates were awarded small grants. In some cases, multiple grants were awarded to the same CSO after successful completion of initial activities.

Although Arabic is an official UN language, only the first round of grant applicants were allowed to submit their proposal and support documentation in Arabic. It is unclear to the evaluator why this English language requirement was introduced. The two project managers

are Arabic speakers. The head of UNDP operations and many in the procurement team are as well.

9. Did the project receive adequate political, technical, and administrative support from its local and national partners.

Neither the original nor the revised project documents were able to obtain government written endorsement. They were processed under DIM rules in order to provide necessary support to an ongoing crisis. Likewise, the draft National Reconciliation Strategy was unable to be presented to the GNA given a significant upsurge in fighting at that time.

To the extent possible to assess objectively, the local grant implementers worked together with UNDP to facilitate the money transfers. Many of these same people also engaged in local reconciliation agreement design, particularly in identifying participants. Some have continued to remain engaged in the follow-up without additional support from UNDP.

10. How has the role of UNDP added value to the project? If found relevant, how and in what areas should it be improved?

UNDP has had decades of involvement in Libya. Its involvement in the project apparently helped to mitigate some of the animosity Libyans expressed towards UNSMIL. The project would not have been able to access PBF resources without UNDP's involvement. UNDP was also able to overcome some of the more ad hoc decisions of UNSMIL to ensure the project remained on track.

From all indications, the UNDP did not attempt to push the project to modify any of its objectives to match any specific organisational agenda. It provided full administrative backing to accomplish its tasks. This is important to note considering that two-thirds of the work was accomplished in the second year.

UNDP's normal HR, financial and procurement rules were often seen as cumbersome by participants, grantees, and management alike. This is likely true. However, UNDP was operating in insecure situation, the weak governance and rule of law framework, weak banking system, high levels of violence and corruption. It had limited ability to use direct or third-party resources to provide close oversight of activities. A review of a few elements of the new internal monitoring system gives the impression that it has been designed more for reporting upwards to headquarters than for flagging operational difficulties for country office management intervention.

As noted in the limitations to the evaluation above, UNDP's ability to maintain a normal institutional memory of documentation of both process and product on this project appears quite weak. It is unclear if the project management itself was partly to blame as the earlier SCELТ project has a much more robust documentary presence on the publicly accessible web³. The evaluator was told, although no documents were provided, that UNDP Libya had received audit objections in 2018 on the limitations of its document management system.

³ SCELТ, Project Board Meeting, 7 Jan 2016

11. Did the project strengthen or build the capacity of CSOs under micro-capital grants scheme?

It is not possible for the evaluator to objectively answer this question since the capacity of CSO grantees was not able to be assessed. All grantees operate in Libya, where the evaluator was unable to travel. In addition, the project was small in comparison with most others operating in Libya and had a short effective project life.

Nevertheless, all CSOs contacted gave positive reviews of their association with the project. All remarked that the relationship had helped them in terms of facilitating their operations in new areas, providing new training materials, or connecting them to sound technical advice. In addition, all responding CSOs remarked on their continuing engagement with reconciliation and/or youth/women empowerment. No evidence was obtained indicating that the project had not contributed to building CSO capacity.

12. Are the gender issues correctly identified and highlighted?

Gender issues were identified and highlighted in the project document. The issue of women's empowerment and involvement in reconciliation matters was brought up by nearly all interviewees. This is a deep, societal issue. Women are severely marginalised in Libya. Their role is predominantly seen as limited to the domestic spaces. The project appears to have played a role in opening this issue, particularly with regard to dispute resolution and reconciliation. However, one project report argued that the idea that women's involvement in reconciliation goes against Libyan custom is historically incorrect.⁴

In one instance, the project facilitation enabled the male participants to recognize the limitations of engaging in reconciliation without women's involvement. The participants in the Southern dialogue realized that by leaving the women out of the reconciliation discussions, their mindset did not change. They then remained a part of the problem. Although the men were more prepared to move on and implement agreements, the women still focused on revenge and retribution. This opened an opportunity for the project to develop means of engaging the women separately. The project brought women together in Tripoli. When provided a positive, facilitated environment, using modern problem analysis tools, the women were surprised that parties wanted to achieve the same goals.

Gender mainstreaming was taken into consideration from the design phase of the project to an reflect efforts that women would meaningfully participate in all components of the project. This was identified as a key challenge, and modifications of customary practice proved difficult to introduce. The quantitative survey of public perception of reconciliation contained a strong focus on women's engagement. No participation statistics were made available to the evaluation, but project management stated that rather than achieving their projected 30% women participation, it was often difficult to get even 10% involvement.

13. What has been the quality of documentation and dissemination of knowledge within the project?

⁴ Zahra' Langhi, 2018, The Contribution of Women to Local Mediation in Libya, Towards National Reconciliation in Libya project. <https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/north-africa-hope-in-troubled-times/charting-forward-women-mediators-libya/>

The retention of relevant documentation, both process and product, by UNDP Libya is the worst of any project reviewed by this evaluator since his first evaluation in 2002. The TOR was written one month after the final report was submitted. All necessary documentation of activities and processes should have been compiled at that time. It is as yet unclear why the evaluator had to repeatedly ask UNDP to obtain basic documents. In response to the evaluator's requests, former project staff submitted a number of crucial documents for review. The current management acknowledged these demands for document retrieval had been of benefit to them as well.

That being said. Most documents obtained illustrated a consistently high level of quality. Many important analyses were prepared by Libyans or summarised from Libyan inputs. The documentation was most complete in relation to the media campaign. If all aspects of the project were as well documented during implementation, then clearly the documentation problem does not lie with the project management, but rather with the UNDP.

As a caveat, the evaluator does recognise that the UNDP was forced to evacuate its Tripoli office in September 2018. However, as noted above, the documentation available on public websites for the, earlier, SCELТ project is substantially higher than that for the Reconciliation project.

Dissemination of information from the project appears to have reached its peak during the media campaign. This is quite natural as that was its purpose. Many other aspects of the project involved the development of sensitive or confidential documents, such as reconciliation agreements, that of necessity had a limited distribution.

The quantitative survey is an interesting point. For several reasons, the field survey was not initiated until late November 2017. Nevertheless, the contractor provided a rapid response with feedback of the raw data by 25 December. The contractor did a presentation of more processed data for the Technical Committee in March 2018. However, UNDP (seemingly a Headquarter publication unit) did not complete the final publication until May 2019. It is claimed that the survey data has been appreciated and is used by many other organisations. This cannot be verified, but the evaluator did find the final document on the <www.reliefweb.int> website.

14. Were the work plans timely delivered? If delays are identified, was the project able to adapt accordingly?

Only the 2018 AWP was made available and then only the activities associated with Outcome One were included. This was signed as approved by the UNDP Country Director on 5 January 2018, clearly a timely submission.

As noted in the Relevance section, the project faced numerous operational hurdles during 2017. A complete recitation of the rationale for the request for a no-cost extension was included in the revised project document. Many of these points have been noted above in Effectiveness question 5.

Clearly, the project adapted to the initial operational difficulties and nearly all project workplan requirements were completed by December 2018.

15. What corrective actions could be taken to improve performance in Phase II?

This will be addressed in the Recommendations section

Efficiency

Efficiency is a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time) are converted to results.

Main Evaluation Question on Efficiency:

Were project inputs efficiently used to achieve the planned project outputs -- qualitative and quantitative

Summary

It is recognized that conducting dialogs/workshops in Tunis was a necessary, but uneconomic, expedient due to the prevailing conditions of insecurity. However, the budget line for Travel was never fully expended. The b/l that increased the most was that of an undefined Operational and Direct Costs, growing from 5% in the original project document to 27% in the draft final reporting to the donor (30% if accounting depreciation calculations are taken into consideration).

The evaluator found no evidence that the PBF resources were not used in an efficient manner to complete the project activities.

However, the evaluator asked for detailed ATLAS printout of expenditures at output level in his initial phone call with UNDP. This was requested again in the Inception Report. On the last day in country the evaluator was provided with a single-page printout of expenditures at project level. UNDP claimed that output level spending was not tracked, although the AWP presented budgeted costs at the activity level.

Secondary evaluation questions on Efficiency:

1 Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes?

The budget appears to have been balanced across all outputs. Unfortunately, UNDP was unable to provide output level expenditure reports from ATLAS. This is curious as the AWP 2018 clearly shows activity level budget breakdowns.

The small project budget was divided across five outputs. Each was allocated the following budget percentages in the prodoc for Tranche 1 :

Output 1.1	28%
Output 1.2	24%
Output 1.3	15%
Output 2.1	20%
Output 2.2	9%

These percentages are based on the total value of the first Tranche authorized by PBF, as broken down in the project document.

Considering the amount of work accomplished and the hurdles overcome, this appears to be quite a modest budget. (In contrast, the evaluator spent USD 20 million in three years for subnational government capacity building in Afghanistan.)

Budget line allocations (for Tranche 1) are shown as

Personnel costs	11%
Contractual services	33%
Travel	25%
Grants	20%
Direct Support	5%
Indirect Support	6%

The UNDP Interim Financial Report to the Peacebuilding Fund showed total line item expenditure at the end of the project as follows:

Personnel costs	16%
Contract	23%
Travel	10%
Grants	12%
Operating/Direct Costs	27%
Indirect Support	6%

A rough comparison between the first budget and the final expenditures indicates a significant increase in the Operating/direct support costs. No helpful details are available to understand this increase. A comparison of the Combined Delivery Reports for 2017 and 2018 indicates the overhead costs were actually higher as a percentage of annual expenditure for 2017, which spent less and accomplished less than in 2018. In the evaluators experience, it is expensive to manage projects in a conflict environment, these expenses multiply when the office/project is required to be located outside the country of operation. There will no doubt be significant allocations for security services in these costs. Nevertheless, it is important to be able to transparently account for the utilization of the resources provided by the PBF.

All indications are that the project used the funds available to it in a rational and cost-efficient manner when conducting project activities. However, it needs to be noted that although no additional funds were requested for the extension, UNDP requested a change of budget allocation between categories of more than 15%. The project revision specified the following two major changes:

- Transfers and Grants to Counterparts decreased from \$590,000 to \$488,638.37 due to inability to disperse funds to CSOs for the reasons described above under Output 2.1.
- General Operating and other Direct Costs increased from \$156,000 (5.25% of total cost) to \$286,679 (9.64% of total cost) to accommodate the increase in operation and security cost.

The evaluator noted in the Interim Financial Report to the Peacebuilding Fund that the actual Grants expenditure totalled only USD 350,000 while the Operating and Direct Costs increased to USD 805,380, which does not include an additional USD 151,870 recouped by UNDP for 'un-depreciated assets and inventory purchased commitments'.

2 Were project funds and activities delivered in a timely manner?

The project spent two-thirds of its resources during year two after it was able to surmount numerous operational hurdles.

Project activities experienced delays primarily due to unsettled nature of the situation within the country and limited banking facilities

The baseline survey took long to get started. The survey contract was only signed 8 months after the start of a (then) 18-month project, then contractor had difficulties at start up so preliminary data was only available in December 2017. No final survey undertaken, but this does not appear to have reduced the project value

Inputs to the National Reconciliation Strategy were initiated with the pre-project workshop in August 2016. The final draft of project designed strategy was not completed until March 2018. Comments indicate that, while the Arabic version was well received by the Technical Committee and other participants, it took quite some time to put it into a sharable English version. (Again this raises the question of the need for English when Arabic is a UN official language and the national language of Libya.) By that time, Government was unable to focus as it was, and remains, in survival mode. No document that can be called a roadmap appears to have been produced. This is now the focus of the US Government resources allocated to Phase II.

A network of facilitators was initiated in Jan 2017. Another workshop was held in Jan 2018. Other, under Phase 2, have been implemented in 2019. It is unclear why this process has taken so long to come to fruition. Highly trained reconciliation facilitators should have been a high priority. No documentation obtained mentions this delay. Comments indicated that the initial selection of participants was too political, and thus inappropriate for reconciliation efforts. CSOs contacted in Libya talked about their own networks and their expansion of awareness sessions,

3 Were outputs achieved in a cost-efficient manner

The evaluator is unable to answer this question as UNDP could not provide output level expenditure data.

Impact

Assessment of the Impacts of a program tend to focus on positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Main evaluation question on Impact:

What are the positive and negative changes were produced by the project's development interventions, either directly or indirectly?

Summary

Impact is usually assessed well after the completion of a project to determine the intensity of its aftereffects. Unfortunately, the situation in Libya is considerably different (and worse)

than it was at the start of the project, or even at its end. All Libyan respondents commented that the situation has steadily worsened in 2019. The announcement of the arrival of Turkish forces strongly opposed by the HOR opposition camp does not bode well for resolution of the conflict in the near term.

Nevertheless, prior to the initiation of this project, a formal framing of reconciliation as a concept, let alone a strategy and set of tools for putting the concept into action, did not exist as an intervention structure of the international community. Mention was made that only the Peacebuilding Fund was prepared to put money behind such a design with uncertain outcomes and high risk of failure.

Prior to this project, there was no clear articulation of the social issues that people considered to be related to a process of reconciliation. At the end of the project, a concise strategy is available for use to assist the government to articulate its approach to reconciliation.

According to documentation available, the project played a role in advancing the engagement of women in dispute resolution and in enhancing the potential for their role in public discourse generally.

The project initiated a number of dialogues, agreements, capacity enhancements, and expert consultations that have potentially produced valuable lessons learned for Phase II and beyond.

The evaluator must use the term “potentially produced” because he is as yet uncertain of how lessons learned were formulated, analysed, and incorporated into UNDP thought process for the design of Phase II and linkages with other projects.

Secondary evaluation questions on Impact:

1 To what extent is there evidence that the project interventions have impacted target beneficiaries negatively or positively?

This question was asked as a part of the Effectiveness section.

The evaluator did not identify any negative interventions conducted by the project. When asked, respondents pointed to lack of progress on inclusion of women, but this is not a negative impact, more of a lesson learned to spur greater attention in the future.

Other comments reflected a difference of opinion regarding the value of the local reconciliation agreements and the short/event driven nature of most grants. Again, none of the comments indicated a negative impact. It will take much time, and considerably more peace, before one can really begin to assess the utility of the local reconciliation measures.

While the small grants were all of a short-term nature, no CSO indicated they had been negatively impacted by their involvement in those activities. In fact, all appreciated the opportunity and all noted acquiring new skills, knowledge, and contacts through those interactions. Many noted how they were using these in their ongoing work, after the project assistance had ended.

2 Are there potentially negative effects of the interventions?

This is the same as Impact question 1. The evaluator could not identify any negative effects of the project interventions.

3 If the planned action could not be implemented, is this documented and have results framework/ AWP integrated these issues?

The revised prodoc (signed in June 2018) clearly indicated which aspects of each project outcome had faced implementation difficulties and identified what was/would be done to rectify the problem. It appears clear that the intentions of the project management in preparing the project revision were to ensure that all original outputs could be completed.

It is rare to find such an explicit recitation of limitations, coupled with mitigation measures. All indications are that the solutions worked as the project ended with all outputs achieved and all funds expended. This outcome is even rarer in projects implemented in a crisis environment.

Sustainability

Sustainability indicates the potential for refers to the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.

Main evaluation question on Sustainability:

In what ways have the project's interventions focused on building capacity of beneficiaries and government agencies to carry on reconciliation measures without additional external resources?

Summary

All of the CSOs interviewed commented positively on their enhanced capability to take the tools/training/experience of working with the project and to expand upon this with their own resources.

A drawback is that ALL interviewees mentioned that there appears to have been little to no coordination among different projects of UNDP, across the UNCT, and in the wider efforts of the international community. Again, the evaluator was told that the 2018 audit of UNDP operations cited poor level of synergy among its projects.

Thus, for example, the Tuareg of Awal have been unable to move very far along on the implementation of their side of the reconciliation agreement road map (prepared two years ago) because, unlike Ghadames, they have no municipal budget to allocate. Everyone is focused on sustaining basic livelihoods.

One comment was made that the new UNDP RR is looking into this issue of poor coordination, but he was on vacation during the evaluation period.

Secondary evaluation questions on Impact:

1 To what extent have all possible leverages been used to overcome difficulties and ensure impact?

Project was signed and extended without government endorsement because its attention was focused on the ongoing conflict.

Difficulties were identified and noted in the request for no-cost extension. Workarounds were developed, particularly to facilitate passing USD to CSOs inside Libya, to engage the Technical Committee in a safe environment outside Libya, to undertake the media campaign, and to facilitate a greater involvement of women. In addition, UNDP and UNSMIL overcame their initial antipathy. All major outputs of the project were achieved.

2 What contributing factors and impediments have enhanced or could negatively impede the impact of the project on target beneficiaries?

Externally, the increasing level of violence and uncertainty was an ongoing impediment. UNDP was forced to evacuate its internationals from its office in Tripoli. Despite this, nearly all aspects of the project were completed and participants unanimously appreciated their association.

Internally, the UNDP rules and procedures played a role in making procurements and recruitments and fund transfers time consuming. It was reported that the process to procure this evaluation began in July 2018. However, other than the initial baseline survey, there do not appear to be any parts of the project that were unnecessarily delayed by UNDP rules to the detriment of the project. In fact, UNDP efforts to transfer funds to Libyan grantees may have helped in a small way to facilitate open banking channels.

3 What are the main lessons learned from the partnership strategies and what are the possibilities of replication and scaling up? How can the project build or expand on achievements?

The project management recognised that the inclusion of women had not been pursued with sufficient effort.

The initial facilitator network had to be replaced by a second one, presumably due to the high level of political orientation of many of the original facilitators.

The use of English as the primary language of operation inside Libya seemingly ran counter to UN rules and definitely reduced the potential for expansion to youth and women's groups outside the larger cities.

The failure to pre-plan resources to follow up on local reconciliation agreements meant that several did not advance far beyond the initial signed paper.

All of these points are address below in Lessons Learned, Conclusions, and Recommendations.

4 How is sustainability defined in a reconciliation intervention?

Reconciliation means identification of root causes of conflicts, negotiating their mitigation, and putting tools in place to monitor compliance. Sustainability, therefore, means that future conflicts either do not arise, or are able to be resolved without serious disruption.

Some guidance notes suggest not even attempting reconciliation before 4-7 years posts-conflict. Comments were made that the project had to review each conflict individually to assess its potential for reconciliation. Thus, the choice made by the project to begin with small, isolated interventions focused on local conflicts involving horizontal inequalities appears to have been a positive move.

5 Was an exit strategy constructed?

The project was designed as a phase I, so no exit strategy was envisioned and none has been found in any project documentation. It was set up to introduce new tools and techniques to upgrade the quality of reconciliation

The Phase II document also does not mention an exit strategy. Given the increase in conflict levels, this appears to be a reasonable judgment.

6 How is capacity development conceptualised? AND

7 How did the project support partners in relation to capacity development?

There have been several capacity development areas incorporated into the project document.

Reconciliation Facilitation capacity: The project designers recognised that customary tribal conflict resolution tools were inadequate to use in reconciliation. Typically, the customary focus is on getting people to stop fighting. This often does not include digging deeply into the root causes of the conflict, which is left to fester for another generation to resolve.

Media messaging: Since 2011 there has been a significant increase in the propagation of hate speech on radio, television and in print media. The project identified the need to build the capability to strategize, plan, and execute media campaigns to counter this by emphasising civil discourse as a valued principle of social interaction.

Youth and women engagement: Neither youth nor women were seen generally to have the confidence or capability to engage in dialogue with decision makers. A variety of tools and opportunities were introduced to assist both of these groups to build their confidence and their stature with their elders.

Civil Society: The project identified gaps in the capacity of civil society to design, plan and execute activities beyond the event level. The inclusion of a substantial portion of the budget for CSO grants assisted a small number of CSOs to build their proposal and report writing, activity planning, and financial management.

Engagement with authorities at local and national levels: All of the above were used either singly or in combination depending upon the situation to build the capacity of those who are outside the normal decision-making strata to make their voices heard and, increasingly, to effect positive change.

8 How was partner capacity measured and monitored?

There does not appear to have been any measurement or monitoring of capacity. Aside from surveys conducted immediately after trainings, which were not made available. Also, neither respondents nor project personnel mentioned that any follow up or monitoring was undertaken. The primary reason for this is the serious conflict situation. Nevertheless, this is a gap in program implementation that is addressed in the Recommendation section

9 To what extent did the project contribute to the advance on reconciliation and dialogue among the community leaders in Libya

That cannot be objectively answered by this evaluation.

The end of project survey to assess the increase in the confidence of Libyans to engage in reconciliation did not take place. Most respondents remarked that it likely would not have shown any positive difference on a national scale given the increase in violence, the short duration and limited reach of the project.

Individual CSOs and individual have been able to use their new capabilities as they engaged with a wider range of international organisation after this project. Several remarked on how they are building networks of smaller CSOs in isolated locations to carry on some of this work. However, the number of CSOs that were engaged by the project is quite small in number for a country of 6.4 million people, even if civil society has only begun to flourish since 2011.

In addition, most interviewees stated there was no follow up from the project after the funded event was completed. Some got additional grants, but follow up, assessment of change was not done.

The national reconciliation strategy was completed but has not been vetted by the government or tested on the ground.

10 To what extent was sustainability considered in the execution and conduct of the project's activities?

The national reconciliation strategy can be seen as the major attempt at building sustainability into the project's activities. The initiation of the facilitator/mediator network would be considered as another. This was one of the earliest interventions and has been incorporated into phase 2. But there is no documentation to explain why the original network was abandoned. Some comments related to an inability of some in the network to operate in a non-political manner.

Considering the comments above regarding the lack of follow up on project initiatives, it is interesting to note in the Phase II documents that many of the Phase I accomplishments are categorized as 'starting' an intervention. In fact, the Phase II doc using the same phrasing as Phase I to describe reconciliation interventions: "These initiatives so far have remained mostly ad hoc and limited to these constituencies. They often consist of a "light" version of reconciliation, ceasefire agreement with some confidence-building measures" This could be taken to imply that Phase I did not appreciably change the nature of the Libyan approach to reconciliation.

This is included only as an evidentiary input. It would be unfair to include this as a firm conclusion as the evaluation inputs were minimal, and triangulation was incomplete. However, it does raise the issue as to just how sustainable have the project interventions been.

Several interviewees mentioned that it appeared UNDP's (not the project's) primary interest was on spending the allocated money. This is actually highlighted in the Phase II doc where it clarifies that Phase I was conducted "under the lead of the Political Division of UNSMIL and with support of UNDP for implementation"

11 Which specific objectives that should be addressed in future phases regarding Achievements and Implementation and Development Effectiveness defined as "the extent to which the Project activities have attained its objectives"?

- The National Reconciliation Strategy
- The Facilitator/Mediator Network
- Media campaigns to counter hate speech
- CSO ability to engage with local decision makers
- Women's ability to re-claim public space and to voice their views

Specific suggestions are incorporated into the Recommendations section

12 Is there any record of increased organisational stability of CSO partners, incl. improved system for internal and financial control, project and staff management, monitoring and evaluations?

Both UNDP and CSOs remarked that prior to the initiation of grants, CSOs needed to go through an orientation session that enabled many of them to prepare their proposals, particularly budgets

However, it is impossible for this evaluation to separate out the increased organisational 'stability' coming from this project and that received from the many others support activities organised by INGOs, bilaterals, and other UN agencies. Some interviewees had a hard time remembering exactly what they had done with the reconciliation project, some confused it with other UNDP activities. Some commented : "it was more like implementing an event". Others acknowledged the value of the training materials and technical assistance but noted that they had received much more support from others after the Reconciliation project.

The requirement for CSOs to submit proposals, and all supporting documents, in English can be seen as a step that could decrease organisational stability by requiring resource poor organisations to hire English writers, who may, in fact, have little understanding of the content of the proposal.

13 How is the principle of local ownership put into practice? How did the project phase out its control (if not their financial and technical support)?

The project appears to have gone out of its way to ensure local ownership. This is possible for two key reasons. First, well before the Aug 2016 workshop, Libyans had been clearly stating that foreigners have no role in reconciling their disputes. This was emphasized in the Aug 2016 workshop, and confirmed in the quantitative survey. Second, UNDP management were repeatedly evacuated from Libya during the project period. This required considerable level

of ‘remote management’ with CSOs operating largely on their own in distant corners of the country

The project had no control over any of the local reconciliation processes after the agreements were signed. Some did comment that the project depended heavily on Libyan consultants who appeared to have control over the selection of the participants and the agreement process. The project did manage the Technical Committee, and had final say, together with UNSMIL, over the structure of the English language version of the National Reconciliation Strategy.

14 How are the principles of good partnerships applied?

The evaluator uses the principles espoused in the Busan Partnership for Development Cooperation 2011 conference.

The Busan Partnership document specifically highlights a set of common principles for all development actors that are key to making development cooperation effective. These include:

- Ownership of development priorities by developing countries, whereby countries should define the development model that they want to implement.

The issue of ownership has been discussed positively above

- A focus on results: Having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in development policy making

The achievement of local reconciliation agreements is a tangible result. The lack of follow up by the project reduces its impact somewhat.

- Partnerships for development: Development depends on the participation of all actors and recognises the diversity and complementarity of their functions.

The only gap identified by the evaluator in this regard is the lack of government involvement, particularly for follow up, in most instances. The follow up to the Kufra agreement is a clear example of how valuable that can be...when the government can focus on local issues.

- Transparency and shared responsibility: Development cooperation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens

The project objectives and budget were displayed on the UNDP website. UNDP is in the process of enhancing the transparency of its M&E data collection and analyses. However, the lack of any publicly available spatial database of who, what, where -type information on international interventions in Libya clearly undermines any proclamation of transparency.

15 Did the project support partners to build alliances with other actors?

The project capacity building modules apparently included advise on network building. Clearly, nearly all CSO respondents mentioned the work they were doing to engage with smaller organisations in other cities and rural areas.

Fundamentally, reconciliation is precisely a process of building (or rekindling) alliances. The evaluator did not hear of any groups that returned to a state of open animosity after completing a local reconciliation agreement process with the project .

16 Did the project support partners to innovate and modify existing structures and processes?

There are two examples of attempts to modify existing structures. The first is the recognition of the pervasive use of hate speech as a driver of conflict⁵. A study was conducted of hate speech on the media by a CSO grantee, but under separate funding. Nevertheless, the results were incorporated into the draft Strategy by the Technical Committee .

Prior to this project, all indications are that local dispute resolution was a process dominated by customary decision makers using methods that avoided addressing root causes of a conflict. Focusing instead on a superficial ‘papering’ of differences. The idea of a modern facilitated reconciliation process was seemingly not previously known in Libya.

⁵ First Report of Hate Speech on Libyan Television Channels, February 2017, Libyan Centre for Freedom of Press.

4. Analysis of opportunities

Conclusions

Conclusions for each evaluation element are provided, based on the evaluators analysis of the findings in the sections above, plus a subjective rating given by the Evaluator for each element of the evaluation.

General Conclusions

"What makes the desert beautiful," said the little prince, "is that somewhere it hides a well..."


Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

The quote from the Little Prince reflects the overall positive sense that the evaluator got from his interviews, particularly those with Libyan civil society. These CSOs are what the evaluator would characterise as 'wells' in the desert. He was completely unprepared for the articulate, detailed responses he got via Skype, WhatsApp, and Viber. Libyan civil society has clearly come a long way in a few years since the end of the dictatorship. Perhaps the impetus of the conflict has helped them to focus their attention on innovative ways to build their capacity and impact. The emphasis that Libyan civil society places on the need for multi-stakeholder dialogues, on the need to hear all perspectives, makes the evaluator wish such perspectives were more evident among American civil society and universities.

There is ample evidence that the reconciliation project fit an important niche in the overall UN approach to the Libyan situation. It is unfortunate that the overall UN effort is not better coordinated so that more follow up support could have been provided to all the communities that had been supported to reach reconciliation agreement through the project.

The ongoing, and expanding, conflict undermined the effectiveness and efficiency of the project's implementation. The problems experienced by the Reconciliation Project are not greatly different from many other donor-supported initiatives of a similar nature. Most international agencies face difficulties when supporting reconciliation: a reform that sounds so good but is so insidiously difficult to do well. After 2014, there was not a single year without armed conflict in the country and since September 2018 things are steadily getting worse. Nevertheless, this project undertook a substantial amount of work, and, unlike many, achieved most of what it set out to do despite serious constraints of violence, and limited time and money. When asked how it was able to accomplish, the simple reply given was, "We did what was in the AWP."

Despite the focused and competent work undertaken by the project management and all partners, the Libyan conflict remains a serious and deteriorating problem. One that will have to be resolved by Libyans themselves.



Relations with UNSMIL

The project really got off the ground with the arrival of Ghassan Salame as the SRSG. The early months of his assignment were viewed optimistically. However, analysts perceived that tensions began to grow within a few months as the political agreement remained an incomplete document. Nevertheless, the project kept working and supported substantive results⁶.

The project was squeezed between UNDP and UNSMIL and went through an initial rough period of difficult relations. At the outset, UNSMIL thought of UNDP merely as their logistics clerks. Based on the limited set of partner interviews undertaken, the perceived arrogance of UNSMIL political affairs unit is seen as a part of the problem by many interviewees. In general, respondents indicated that the UN not really accepted by Libyans.

⁶ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/one-year-later-the-un-action-plan-for-libya-is-dead/>

When the SRSG's plan to amend the LPA failed to move ahead, the project got pressured to do more local work. The SRSG went to signing of local agreements because it was something tangible. Comments indicate that the small Reconciliation project was the one of the most active part of the UNMIL process, helping to identify people for political conferences. Its initial meeting on missing persons got broad stakeholder involvement. Nevertheless, the project was criticised for focusing too much at the local level and not engaging enough with government agencies. Despite the solid work done by UNDP, UNSMIL took full credit for local reconciliation, issuing press releases that did not mention UNDP involvement.⁷

Relevance

Design of the project

The Reconciliation project document argued that the project should not be too narrowly focused on the contents of the National Reconciliation Strategy, but should work to create an inclusive, participatory framework for identifying issues and challenges that need to be addressed. To the best of the evaluator's understanding, this overall goal was achieved.

Despite comments in the Evidence section on lacunae in the project design, it is possible that the vagueness of prodoc helped it to be able to identify relevant issues as it went along. The team had the opportunity to build an understanding of which conflict might be ripe for reconciliation rather than having a preselected set to work with. "The reality was to seek what you could do in Kufra, then try." However, this intuitive, experimental, approach left no chance for a systematic rollout given the short duration and other operational impediments.

The basic issues raised during the August 2016 workshop give the evaluator a good indication of the level of disruption that happened to the Libyan society since 2011. That workshop proved to be of fundamental value to the project, and, hopefully, to Libya. It is rare that a UN project design in a post-conflict setting is so heavily based on participatory input from nationals. Certainly, Afghanistan could have used more local participation⁸. The Steps Forward section of the workshop report provided a clear roadmap for UNSMIL to follow when designing Phase I of this project.

Nevertheless, there remains a strong antipathy between those who focused on the higher end products and those who felt the advancing local reconciliation agreement process was important. To the evaluator, it seems obvious that this local work substantiated the decision of the SRSG to approach PBF to fund this project proposal when all others felt it was too risky. And, irrespective of its limitations, it is clear that the Reconciliation project achieved more on the ground than any did at the national level.

⁷ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/step-step-un-action-plan-successful-transition-takes-hold-libya>

⁸ afdiplomacy.af/blog/2017/08/30/despite-enormous-support-of-international-community-why-afghanistan-is-still-a-fragile-state-2/?lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apag The author, Shah Mahmood Miakhel, was UNAMA Local Governance Advisor, then USIP Country Director, now Governor of Nangarhar Province.

Complaints were made that the National Reconciliation Strategy could have been more useful if the project had paid closer attention to its drafting. However, feedback from several who were involved in the final workshops indicates that both the Technical Committee and civil society were very pleased with the strategy and gave solid feedback. The focus of the government only differed slightly by requesting more emphasis be placed on land and real estate property compensation. Some of the limitations of the Strategy may possibly be traced to the curious desire to have it translated to English before presenting it to the GNA

The project structure was imperfect, particularly with overlaps of outcome and output indicators. This makes it difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, the project activities were implemented...participants are generally pleased with the assistance, and the project was able to obtain funding for a Phase II

UNDP warned the evaluator that this is “not a very evaluable project, you won't find a lot of features you expect, not all indicators were tracked.” This is true. Outcome indicators must measure what the recipient/beneficiary/partner is capable of achieving with its own capabilities and resources as a result of the project outputs. The overall design was weak, with only the Strategy, Media Campaign, and Survey being clearly distinguishable activities. Output 1.3, 2.1 and 2.2 all seem to meld into each other. Certainly, many interviewees were unable to carefully distinguish precisely in which output their work had been associated. The lack of output-based expenditure reports, something the evaluator assumed was standard for all ATLAS project reporting, also reduced the potential for distinguishing the activities. Also, as noted above in Evidence, several outcome and output indicators duplicated each other, undermining the potential for assessing the impact and sustainability of project activities.

Perhaps a different sort of management team would have focused more on documenting the process for posterity. However, that approach may also have been less effective in generating products that could be used by others in the field and in the UN. That being said, it is possible that much more documentation is available in documentation of both process and product of the Media Campaign. The evaluator may just not have had access to all the documentation generated. Nevertheless, these are minor points in comparison to the amount of work produced in a short period of time and the positive reception expressed by project participants.

Effectiveness

It is worth stating again that the amount of work accomplished is praiseworthy given all the constraints and short time available.

There is one decision made that the evaluator would argue undermined the Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability of the project interventions.

This is the decision to require English language proposals and supporting documentation from the CSO grantees. Apparently the first round was set up to allow Arabic. Afterwards, all proposals had to be in English. This is odd given that the national language of Libya is Arabic. As Arabic is an official UN language, there would appear to be no rationale excuse for such a decision. There should never have been any English requirement. Such a requirement forces a small CSO comprised of Arabic speakers to use its limited resources to

hire/contract an English speaker to prepare/translate their proposals. This can reduce the internal coherence of a proposal written by someone who has limited understanding of the context. This also tends to reduce the potential for rural and women-based CSOs to engage fully.

Both of these decisions delayed implementation and reduced the potential involvement of smaller, more rural CSOs in the project activity. Unfortunately, in the end, the project spent much less on grants than was originally budgeted.

With the exception of a one-day session for civil society to review the Strategy, all analyses were done by experts. Reports are that civil society was comfortable with the Strategy, but many of the experts on the Technical Committee do not live in Libya. A stronger mechanism for facilitating an exchange of ideas between those on the ground and those with credentialed expertise may have benefited the strategy.

International Synergy

While this small project was achieving meaningful success, an audit of UNDP recorded that the organisation as a whole did not focus enough attention on building synergy amongst its projects. In addition, there is apparently no international development data portal established for Libya, eight years after the initiation of UNSMIL. One senior respondent remarked, “You have put your finger on something that is missing. There are too many disparate activities that are not coordinated, or even generally known. The country has become a chequered map of international activities.”

There is no consortium of international organizations. There are constantly changing agency managements, with many different ideas, and replacements who have little incentive to follow what is there.

This has a negative impact on groups that are attempting to follow through on reconciliation agreements. They need resources. As one respondent said, “Despite our ability to deliver on the dialogues, many participants were still hoping for infrastructure, something very close to their hearts.”

People cannot be left with just a piece of paper in their hands. There are many development and humanitarian efforts underway in Libya. UNDP/UNSMIL must ensure that funds are allocated for development activities in ALL areas where they have facilitated the signing of reconciliation agreements.

It should be explained by the UNDP/Libya why the small number of sites involved in this project’s local reconciliation efforts could not be incorporated into the support packages delivered by the much larger Resilience project. Reconciliation project managers only commented that they tried, but were unsuccessful. The converse can also be asked: Why were sites selected for reconciliation efforts that were outside the areas of interest of larger project providing tangible assistance packages? Project managers stated they worked where they saw opportunities. But does reconciliation theory argue that going through a structured process process of negotiation is sufficient to set a fragile community on its way to resilient development and ensure there will be no reversion to hostilities?

Efficiency

A lot was achieved by the project in short period of time and with a small amount of money. Funds used for direct project implementation appear to have been rationally allocated and spent. However, UNDP Direct Costs are high. The project operated in an insecure environment and all international were evacuated from Tripoli. Nevertheless, the evaluator was told that the 2018 audit commented on the need for UNDP to innovate in its operations area to reduce costs. This seems to be a necessity.

Impact

The Reconciliation project was a small, short-time frame effort. It introduced some seemingly useful new tools and techniques. It helped to establish formal understanding of a modern reconciliation process and left a carefully crafted National Reconciliation Strategy and a quantitative assessment of Libyan perceptions of reconciliation for others to build upon. It was designed to be a Phase I of a larger and longer engagement. Impact of this intervention really needs to wait before it can be properly assessed.

Sustainability

The limited engagement with government significantly reduced the potential for sustainability of individual agreements and the overall push to reconciliation. In the view of the evaluator, it is likely that this was not the fault of the project. The UN itself was unable to even get the government to sign off on either the original or the revised project documents.

The lack of monitoring and activity follow up means that very little of the innovative approaches have been fully tested and documented. This is a shortcoming, that could have been addressed through more involvement of civil society as monitoring agents. That would have had its own drawbacks of ensuring quality and consistency. Nevertheless, it would have been a useful effort to try. Recommendations are made below.

The internal, upward reporting monitoring systems mandated by UNDP HQ provided little or nothing to inform a serious assessment of the project.

Lessons Learnt

Lessons Learnt are considered to be general conclusions with a potential for wider application and use.

Initial Design

The August 2016 conference was an important event. The quality of the design, facilitation, and documentation helped considerably in setting the project on a useful path. One that was built on a strong orientation to Libyan ownership.

Incorporation of Women and Youth

Project recognised it needed to pay more attention to women. This is the most important lesson learned. Women need to be a specific focus of attention in all post- and ongoing-conflict projects. Women often perceived of carrying the flag of the conflict, demanding revenge, rather than finding resolution. They don't get out of this mindset unless they are helped, professionally, to work through the problems in a formalised manner.

Many respondents stated that women were not sufficiently integrated into the project activities. This has been well acknowledged by both management and participants. Respondents commented that 'we should have worked with women from the beginning'. This is an interesting point given that the initial project document is replete with 64 references to women. From the interviews conducted for this evaluation, it seems that the social resistance to women's participation was stronger than originally acknowledged. However, the results of the November 2017 women's dialogue involving Qaddadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes clearly showed a way is possible. The evaluator was assisted to speak to only one woman who was a CSO grantee. Were sufficient steps taken to facilitate more women to be engaged with the project? Did the English language requirement serve as a deterrent?

The Phase II design realises the need to work specifically with women and to connect them to the political process. Reference has been made to a women-only network of facilitators-mediators, but no documentation of this was provided.

There appears to have been strong support for youth engagement. However, no quantitative data exist to provide an estimation of the gender-based breakdown of participants. Management asserted that their attempts to reach 30% were never achieved, and most times they struggled to reach 10%.

Reconciliation Follow up

If local reconciliation agreements are going to be achieved, then there needs to be the potential for the provision of follow up support already in place before engaging the participants. The pre-existing, and highly localised, horizontal inequalities will continue to exist after signing the agreement, even though participants may be willing to stop fighting or eliminate barriers to settlement, trade, or employment.

At the outset of Phase I of the Reconciliation project, management did not define how it would address local reconciliation. It determined that this was essentially uncharted territory requiring careful experimentation. One lesson that should have been learned is that resources to support follow up to a local reconciliation agreement need to be identified prior to undertaking the agreement dialogue. The Ghadames/Awal example is the most glaring case brought to the attention of the evaluator. Two years have passed since the agreement, yet the Tuareg of Awal have received no assistance beyond a training and couple of boreholes. The local reconciliation process needs to be conceptualised as a long-term effort. Reaching an

initial paper agreement between the participants should not be considered as the result. It is an important milestone, but one that requires steady follow up.

When this issue was raised with interviewees, the responses varied from of the excuse ‘the (recovery and) resilience project’s board is slow’ to the more blatant “Awal is not a priority”. Seeking resources after the agreement has been signed is already late. If Awal was not a priority then why did the Reconciliation project work there at all?

Creation of the network of facilitators/mediators

The creation of a network of facilitators/mediators was one of the first activities undertaken by the project with a concept note produced in January 2017, although the first list of 78 participants from East, West, and South and a press release found by the evaluator is January 2018⁹. The network is expanding now under Phase II efforts, the value of expanding the array of Libyans with professional conflict resolution skills is seen as important. There are now efforts to create a specific network of women mediators. It would be valuable to produce a lessons learned report on why the first attempt did not reach fruition. A comment was made reflecting that many of the facilitators were too political, but this could not be confirmed.

Necessity of Monitoring

Regular external assessment of program progress is always valuable for any project. Nearly all project managers focus more attention on doing rather than recording. Monitoring seems to have been entirely absent due primarily to security constraints and the need to ‘complete the AWP’. In this case, a more indigenised process should have been put in place as a part of the training and capacity building process. Recommendations are made below.

Language of operations

The use of English as a primary operating language reduced the impact of the project. CSOs without English capabilities were unable to compete for grants or had to use their own resources to obtain such capacity. The Reconciliation Strategy was produced initially in Arabic with strong technical support, plus validating commentary, from national commentators on the Technical Committee, youth and civil society, and government. For some reason, the final document was translated into English for presentation to the Arabic speaking Libyan government. Decisions of this nature can undermine UN credibility in fragile, conflict-affected states.

Recommendations

Recommendations are actionable proposals regarding improvements of policy or management addressed to the client of the evaluation or other intended users. In this case, they are intended to improve the operations of Phase II already underway or provide advice for the design of the next cycle project.

⁹ <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/local-reconciliation-actors-agree-creating-national-network-mediators-libya>

Inclusion of Government Agencies

It is beyond obvious that the government agencies tasked with reconstruction, reconciliations, human rights protections, and others need to be brought into the information loop at some point. However, as the security situation continues to deteriorate, with Turkish ground forces possibly arriving soon in Tripoli, the evaluator has no smart recommendations on how this might be accomplished in the near-term.

Monitoring, Information Management, and Lessons Learned

Sustainability is a major drawback of many international projects in conflict-affected states around the world. There is a strong desire to ‘doing something’ with less focus on documenting what was done, and far less on how to follow up. Now that the ‘experimental’ phase of the Reconciliation project has been completed, the issue of follow up MUST become a focus on UN reconciliation interventions. There are too many examples of programs operating in fragile, conflict-affected countries that do not pay sufficient attention to providing a nuanced assessment of their successes and failures. The UNDP Libya PSU should task a Libyan Lessons Learned unit to prepare and publicly distribute a transparent quarterly publication accessible to all development and humanitarian agencies operating in Libya.

Monitoring of project activities was a gap in management. Reports to PBF stated that monitoring was UpToDate. However, based on the documents made available to the evaluator, this could only be true if the reports submitted by the grantees themselves were considered to be monitoring reports. If local activities are to be continued in Phase II or beyond, then monitoring capabilities must be upgraded. The cost of such an effort would need to be considered in addition to the security risks.

The evaluator recommends that a part of reporting of events, activities, interventions in the time remaining in Phase II must include a listing of all participants together with their Viber contact. (Viber networks are quite common in Libya. Apparently, the Technical Committee was informed that their services would no longer be required via a Viber message. However, the members all still maintain contact via that same group.) Such networks can provide a rapid, location-based, and gender-disaggregated response dataset. The project could then craft a series of questions to be sent to all participants at progressive points after the event. Responses could be synthesised by a third-party contractor into periodic notes. These notes would provide raw information that could be correlated with other information sources, including on-site visits by national staff when security conditions allow. These raw compilations and correlating evidence should be provided to the PSU monthly for its use in compiling a quarterly lessons learned report. The details contained recent release of the Lessons Learned report from the office of the American Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) provides sufficient rationale for ensuring that negative information is not kept from public view.

Participants in Phase II activities who respond to activity-based queries could also be invited to take part in subsequent virtual queries on a wide range of topics. Responses to questions could be used to form policy notes or public ‘op-eds’ that could be fed into print or electronic

media. UNICEF has been spreading its 'U-Report' tool of a similar nature for nearly a decade, although it has not yet reached Libya¹⁰. It is an excellent tool to use in aggregating the views of youth and women in particular. This could have been used as an appropriate mechanism for obtaining broad feedback on the utility of the media campaign.

The use of satellite imagery linked to crowd sourced mapping is a valuable addition to a project/program/agency-based monitoring mechanism¹¹. This should be considered for all next stage UNDP projects. UNOSAT has a well-established suite of tools that can be used in setting up a spatial information system that can be shared by humanitarian, peacekeeping and development agencies.¹² UNOSAT also initiated a Cybermappr application useful for widespread collection of spatial data¹³. The evaluator does not know the extent to which this app has advanced since its 2012 launch, however, the Open Street Maps Humanitarian teams have been operating in many locations for over a decade¹⁴. There has been activity in Libya, but only one example was found during this review¹⁵

A rigorous effort to establish legal land and property, and usufruct rights to resources, especially water, needs to be incorporated into any future local reconciliation agreements. Resource conflicts are all inherently spatially bounded, making them highly suitable for mapping the detailed root causes, and possible solutions, to a conflict. Municipalities would be a useful place to start as their density provides more potential return for the investment. They are often the site of lingering disputes, they are locations for IDPs to seek shelter, they have real estate property management offices. Obviously, this has to be led by the participants, but inclusion of high resolution remotely sensed imagery is now readily available. Although conducted in rural areas, George Clooney's private effort in Darfur illustrates the significant value of the use of repeated satellite coverage to track detailed changes on the ground over time¹⁶. UNOSAT has generated numerous satellite-based maps of Libya in the past, although none more recent than 2016 were found via google.¹⁷

The point of this recommendation is to get UNDP to conceive of monitoring as more than report writing or third-party checking. Monitoring should be a highly participatory process that involves partners, beneficiaries, and 'innocent bystanders' in collecting data that has an impact on their lives. It is obvious that such an effort needs to be organised at a level higher than a project, which leads us to the next recommendation. Such a change can still be incorporated into Phase II operations.

¹⁰ <https://www.unicef.org/innovation/U-Report>

¹¹ UNITAR, Satellite Imagery and the Libyan Conflict: A report prepared for the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, Office of The High Commissioner for Human Rights, February 23, 2012 – Version 2.0

¹² Pisano, Francesco. UNOSAT: Data, Analysis, Information, Application, 2015

¹³ <https://unitar.org/about/news-stories/news/citizens-mission-unosat-reveals-new-cybermappr-crowd-sourcing-application>

¹⁴ <https://www.hotosm.org/> ; <https://www.facebook.com/hotosm>

¹⁵ https://data.humdata.org/dataset/hotosm_lby_railways

¹⁶ <http://www.satsentinel.org/our-story/george-clooney>

¹⁷ <https://unitar.org/maps/countries/60>

Ensuring Special Consideration for Libyan Women in all Future UNDP Projects

The project generated field evidence that Libyan women have an important role to play in reconciliation efforts. However, despite a strong intention in the prodoc to involve women in all aspects of the project, project management acknowledged the results were far from optimal. The situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly since the end of Phase I in December 2018. Nevertheless, it is strongly recommended that Phase II, and all subsequent and other ongoing project of UNDP, must analyse all lessons learned and research findings to formulate a more robust approach to incorporating women into their field operations.

Building Synergy amongst Development Partners

The evaluator has worked in several conflict-affected countries. In every case, it is the humanitarian agencies that take the lead on data collection, management, sharing, and use. One could almost get the impression that the development agencies are just concerned with accomplishing the tasks presented to them, collecting their pay checks, and moving on. Based on the limited inputs obtained through this evaluation, this certainly appears to be the case in Libya. Are development agencies afraid of transparency? Do they fear that detailed open data will reduce their ability to capture funds because it can easily be shown that someone else is already doing what they are asking for funds to carry out on their own? Simple maps that use dots to show where projects exist are woefully inadequate. Some conflict countries have developed highly detailed satellite-based information systems only to see them disappear after a few years because of disuse. Initiating a plan to use satellite imagery for monitoring (as noted above) and follow up on reconciliation agreements could also provide a structured coordinate system that could allow all international development and humanitarian agencies to work off the same platform as the precursor to a national spatial data infrastructure for Libya. Lebanon's IMAS system was an excellent example of this model until it was allowed to die. (A PowerPoint of the original system and a link to the designer can be sent if there is interest.) It was reported to the evaluator that the new UNDP RR is interested in this issue of synergy, but he was on leave at the time. UNSMIL acknowledged the validity of this observation on the inadequate coordination of international efforts inside Libya. Hopefully, improved synergy, at least within UNDP, will begin to move ahead within the year.

Understanding Incentives

The UN in Libya needs to stop using the phrase 'lack of political will' to characterise decisions/actions taken (or not taken) by government that differ from the prevailing view of the UN. UNDP Oslo Governance Centre issued its Institutional and Context Analysis toolkit in 2011¹⁸ arguing that the use of political will deflects critical analysis away from the incentives and interests that drive elite behaviour. In 2018, the Oslo Centre updated this methodology based on a series of country studies and an expert workshop¹⁹. The opening

¹⁸ https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo_governance_centre/Institutional_and_Context_Analysis_Guidance_Note.html

¹⁹ <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/sustainable-development-goals/institutional-and-context-analysis-for-the-sustainable-developm.html>

paragraph of the Executive Summary in the new version summarises the key principles laid out in this important UNDP guidance:

“The implementation of a given policy succeeds when key players have an incentive to make it succeed. When one or more of society’s key actors disagree with or are threatened by a certain policy, they have an incentive to make it fail. Understanding how different actors in society – civil servants, farmers, industrialists, incumbents, opposition parties, religious authorities, groups of men or women, and more – have differing incentives to enable or block interventions is key to successful policy implementation. All actors have distinct histories and – crucially – face constraints, such as institutional limits on their power, a weak resource base, or an inability to act collectively. This means that only some have the ability to act on an incentive. Illuminating this mixture of incentives and constraints is the aim of Institutional and Context Analysis (ICA) at the country level.”

It is too late for the Phase II document to be designed using more sophisticated UNDP tools for political economy analysis, but this recommendation will remain valid for the design phase of whatever projects come next.

[Theory of Change and project design](#)

The August 2016 pre-project workshop document should be made widely available by the UN. The workshop design and facilitation indicate a high level of thought and care was put into this exercise. The views expressed by the participants provide an invaluable baseline reference to perceptions in 2016. Together with the Altai quantitative survey, these should be used as an example of a best practice model for initiating a program of reconciliation in conflict-affected areas.

This workshop, the quantitative survey, the Technical Committee’s thematic briefs, and the series of dialogues across the country provide valuable baseline material for the design of the next project on reconciliation. However, now that the experiment phase has been completed, the next Phase, or new project, needs to be designed based on an explicit program theory or theory of change. The Phase II document incorporates a US Government styled TOC that does nothing to inform the design of the project. It seems that in the span of a few years the incorporation of a theory of change in a project document has already become a pro forma para that is tacked on at the end of the exercise to complete a quality assessment check box.

Theory of change should be viewed as the guiding framework for a project design. The objectives logic model then becomes the ‘theory of action’. There are numerous websites devoted to helping teams develop a high-quality theory of change. However, Purposeful Program Theory is the best text the evaluator has used that is explicitly designed to develop a TOC and convert it into an actionable project.²⁰ The evaluator strongly recommends UNDP obtains and uses this text in the design of the next version of this project, and others.

²⁰ Funnel, Sue and Patricia Rogers. (2011) Purposeful Program Theory: Effective use of the theories of change and logic models. Jossey Bass, San Francisco.

Primary Language of Operations

All documents produced for UNDP work inside Libya should be prepared in Arabic. English translations that are needed for internal use can be prepared at the cost of the UNDP. This shift should certainly become a part of the Phase II operational modality.

Preparation of documents in English to be translated into Arabic has a serious potential for conveying an incorrect message. Requiring Libyan organisations to prepare documents and proposals creates an unnecessary capacity gap between English and non-English capable individuals and organisations. The evaluator has seen this happen already in several developing countries, both conflict-affected and otherwise. Civil society quickly loses its way as the ‘finishing school’ English writers come to control access to the donors. The international agencies get what they need, but their aid steadily erodes, rather than promoting, participation.

5. ANNEXES

A Terms of Reference

Please provide a MS Word version of the TOR. Attempting to convert the pdf into word has caused considerable formatting problems

B Data collection matrix

DAC CRITERIA: RELEVANCE			
Evaluation Questions	Second Level Evaluation Questions	Sub-areas for Investigation	Sources of Information
Did the Project design match the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient, and donor.			
	1. Did the project respond to the needs of the intended beneficiaries?	Issues as defined by The CSO implementers peace agreement participants Technical Committee Members UNMIL	Key Informant Interviews Document Review
	2. Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground?	Were outputs completed? Were the completed outputs of use to beneficiaries? Were beneficiaries or support organizations able to use the results after project funds were finished?	Review project document Key Informant Interviews Review project output documents and reports
	3. Were the problems and needs adequately analysed.	How was the project designed? What methods were used to ensure changes in the situation were incorporated in the project modifications	ProDoc Pre-prodoc analyses Additional analytical outputs
	4. Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?	How many outputs were completed How well did the output results support the achievement of the objectives	Prodoc Annual project reviews Comments from PBF, UNMIL
	5. Was the Project design logical and coherent in terms of the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders to realistically achieve the planned outcomes?	Were the project managers able to follow the project design without difficulty Were many changes required in the project structure to ensure achievement of outcomes	PRODOC Project reports Minutes of Project Board Meetings Comments from PBF Comments from UNMIL
	6. To what extent were external factors and assumptions identified at the time of design?	How complete was the initial analysis regarding the evolving tensions in the city	PRE PROdoc analysis Prodoc KPI
	7. Was the Project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes/needs that could occur during the implementation?	What mechanism was in place to modify project design? Did the project board review project, suggest modifications to improve generation of results?	Pre analysis prodoc
	8. Was the strategy for sustainability of impact clearly defined at the design stage of the Project?	How was sustainability defined? What aspects of the project were specifically incorporated in the design to support sustainability?	Pre analysis prodoc
	9. Was the sustainability methodology/approach taken appropriate to the context?	Were the sustainability aspects of the design designed to take an unstable situation into consideration	Pre analysis prodoc

	10. Is there a Theory of Change that effectively facilitate the integration of individual project interventions around a common frame of reference.	How was the TOC defined? How did it influence the design of the project Was it referred to in project documents?	prodoc
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DAC CRITERIA: EFFECTIVENESS			
Evaluation Questions	Second Level Evaluation Questions	Sub-areas for Investigation	Sources of Information
To what extent have the project interventions achieved results and has collaborating with Government of Libya enhanced the level of results achieved	1 How effective has the Project been in establishing ownership especially with reference to the three components of the Project.	Role of Government in the project design and implementation If not government, whose ownership is envisioned	Output reports Annual report Project Board minutes KPI
	2. Were management capacities adequate?	Were appropriate individuals selected as project managers? Was UNDP capable of provided administrative back up Did UNMIL have adequate understanding of UN rules and procedures required for proper implementation	Prodoc AWP Output reports Annual report Project Board minutes KPI
	3. Was the project methodology/approach taken appropriate to the context?	Did the project managers understand the context in which they were operating	Prodoc Output reports Annual report Project Board minutes KPI
	4. Was the Project able to respond to changes in the political, security and general operating environment?	Explain how the project adjusted to changes in circumstances	Output reports Annual report Project Board minutes KPI
	5. What were the development results (i.e. against planned outputs and outcomes) of interventions, considering the changes made and support provided to the national partners?	Explain the results achieved for each output	Prodoc AWP Output reports Annual report Project Board minutes KPI
	6. Which aspects of the project had the greatest achievements? What were the supporting factors?	Explain the results achieved for each output	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	7. In which areas does the Project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?	Explain the results achieved for each output	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	8. Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partners' institutions, including NGOs	How was the project manager able to vet participants and beneficiaries while living in Tunis	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	9. Did the project receive adequate political, technical, and administrative support from its local and national partners.	How was the relationship with UNMIL, PBF, bilaterals and INGOs	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI

	10. How has the role of UNDP added value to the project? If found relevant, how and in what areas should it be improved?	Was UNDP able to assist in identifying additional donors Were the UNDP rules conducive to effective and efficient use of the resources Was UNDP able to quickly get the project office back in operation after evacuation from Tripoli twice	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	11. Did the project strengthen or build the capacity of CSOs under micro-capital grants scheme?	How were CSOs selected Was their capacity built by the project prior to receiving funds	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	12. Are the gender issues correctly identified and highlighted?	How were women incorporated into the project How were women's issues identified in the trainings How were women's issues identified in reconciliation agreements	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	13. What has been the quality of documentation and dissemination of knowledge within the project?	What documents were retained in the project archives What documents were made available to the evaluator What documents were provided to the Technical Committee What documents were provided to the government What documents were made available to reconciliation agreement participants What training materials were distributed How were media messages disseminated	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI Media program reports
	14. Were the work plans timely delivered? If delays are identified, was the project able to adapt accordingly?	What impact did the evacuations from Tripoli have on project implementation Were all activities completed by the end of the original time frame?	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI
	15. What corrective actions could be taken to improve performance in Phase II?	How was Phase II designed? What was envisioned as continuation from Phase I What was new added to Phase II	Output reports Annual report Project board minutes KPI

DAC Criteria: Efficiency			
Evaluation Questions	Second Level Evaluation Questions	Sub-areas for Investigation	Sources of Information
Were project inputs efficiently used to achieve the planned project outputs -- qualitative and quantitative	1 Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes?	Have budgets expenditures been tracked at output level Were the key objectives pursued steadily throughout the project period What was the budget line breakdown of expenditures Were any B/I used excessively	Prodoc AWP Annual budgets Annual expenditure reports Project Board minutes
	2 Were project funds and activities delivered in a timely manner?	Was the project able to be completed within the originally planned time frame	Prodoc AWP Annual budgets

		Were any activities excessively delayed By the end of the project were all key activities completed	Annual expenditure reports Project Board minutes
	3 Were outputs achieved in a cost efficient manner	Have budgets expenditures been tracked at output level	Prodoc AWP Annual budgets Annual expenditure reports Project Board minutes

DAC CRITERIA: IMPACT

Evaluation Questions	Second Level Evaluation Questions	Sub-areas for Investigation	Sources of Information
What are the positive and negative changes were produced by the project's development interventions, either directly or indirectly?	1 To what extent is there evidence that the project interventions have impacted target beneficiaries negatively or positively?	How have CSOs made use of the project inputs to carry on their work outside the project What negative impacts have befallen project aid recipients	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	2 Are there potentially negative effects of the interventions?	What negative impacts have befallen project aid recipients Has the project undermined any other aspect of UN/INGO activity in Libya	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	3 If the planned action could not be implemented, is this documented and have results framework/ AWP integrated these issues?	Which aspects of the project were not completed? How did the project management deal with aspects that could not be implemented	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports

DAC CRITERIA: SUSTAINABILITY

Evaluation Questions	Second Level Evaluation Questions	Sub-areas for Investigation	Sources of Information
In what ways have the project's interventions focused on building capacity of beneficiaries and government agencies to carry on reconciliation measures without additional external resources?	1 To what extent have all possible leverages been used to overcome difficulties and ensure impact?	How did the project engage with UNMIL and INGOs and bilaterals to ensure project activities were leveraged into the overall international development strategy How did the project engage with government?	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	2 What contributing factors and impediments have enhanced or could negatively impede the impact of the project on target beneficiaries?	Describe the changing security situation in the country during the project period How did this effect the ability of the project to have a positive impact on the beneficiaries	Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	3 What are the main lessons learned from the partnership strategies and what are the possibilities of replication and scaling up? How can the	How were the partnership strategies designed How were they implemented What are the comments from the implementers	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports

	project build or expand on achievements?	What are the comments from the beneficiaries	
4	How is sustainability defined in a reconciliation intervention?	Define reconciliation Define sustainability Place these in the context of Libya	Pre prodoc analysis Prodoc External analyses KPI
5	Was an exit strategy constructed?	Was the project originally designed as just a phase I of a longer project? What has been communicated to the Technical Committee and CSOs	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
6	How is capacity development conceptualised?	What capacity was considered of prime importance to the project design Did this change over time Were any capacity issues neglected	Prodoc Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
7	How did the project support partners in relation to capacity development?	How was capacity built How did beneficiaries make use of their project induced learning later	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
8	How was partner capacity measured and monitored?	What forms of monitoring were used in the project	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
9	To what extent did the project contribute to the advance on reconciliation and dialogue among the community leaders in Libya	Describe a selection of reconciliation agreements	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
10	To what extent was sustainability considered in the execution and conduct of the project's activities?	Was the project focused on completion of events How did the project express its concern for long term impact	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
11	Which specific objectives that should be addressed in future phases regarding Achievements and Implementation and Development Effectiveness defined as "the extent to which the Project activities have attained its objectives".	How was the Phase 2 designed Was Phase 2 considered to be a continuation of Phase I or did it have a separate orientation Did anything change after Phase 2 began implementation	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
12	Is there any record of increased organisational stability of CSO partners, incl. improved system for internal and financial control, project and staff management, monitoring and evaluations?	How was project implementation monitored What tools were used to track the activities of project beneficiaries after activities had been completed	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
13	How is the principle of local ownership put into practice? How did the project phase out its control (if not	How is local ownership defined Did the project continue to stay in contact with beneficiaries after events were completed	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports

	their financial and technical support)?	Did the project provide ongoing financial and technical support to any beneficiaries	
	14 How are the principles of good partnerships applied?	What is a good partnership How were partnerships defined in the project Were any partners engaged more than once?	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	15 Did the project support partners to build alliances with other actors?	What efforts did the project take to initiate alliances among partners	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports
	16 Did the project support partners to innovate and modify existing structures and processes?	Were partners given support on their internal organizational dynamics	Prodoc AWP Output documents KPI Project Board Minutes Annual reports

C Profile of people interviewed

Andrew Cheatham	Project Manager, Phase II
Kora Andrew	Political Affairs Officer in UNSMIL
Kholoud Saidi	Project manager (Jan 2017 - Aug 2017)
Rawhi Afaghani	Project manager (Aug 2017 - Aug 2019)
Hanin Elhamdi	Project officer (Jan 2017 - Aug 2019)
Amal El Obaidi	NR strategy Consultant 2018
Hisham Windi	Facilitator/National Consultant 2017-2018
Ahmed Bibas	Moomken Org (Tripoli)
Mohamed Abu Snina	Dialogue & Debate Association
Najat El Malti	Nana Marin Org (Nafousa Mountain)
Mohamed Hamouda	H2O Org (Tripoli)
Kristofer Carlin	UNSMIL - political affairs
Ossama Abu Amer	180 Youth CSO
Ermira Basha	UNDP Operations Chief
Laurentina Cizza	Altai Survey Manager
Musa Wantiti	Dialogue participant (awal Dialogue)

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