**JOINT PROGRAMME DOCUMENT**

**Country:** Republic of Yemen  
**Programme Title:** Maritime Governance to promote security and safety in Yemen

| Project duration: | 24 months | Total estimated budget: USD $12,721,409  
| Out of which: |  
| 1. Funded budget |  
| 2. Unfunded budget |  
| • Total estimated budget includes both programme costs and indirect support costs |

| Proposed start date: | 1 January 2020  
| Proposed end date: | 31 December 2021 |

| Fund management Option: | Pass through arrangement |
| Administrative Agent: | Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office |

**Total resources funded:**  
UNDPI  
European Union (Pipeline) - $3.3M  
UK (Pipeline) — $2.35M  
US State Department INL (Pipeline)  
Japan (Pipeline)  
Unfunded: 7 M

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| Auke Lootsma, Country Director  
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| UNDP YEMEN | UNODC |
| Date: 9 February 2020 | Date: 26 February 2020 |
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Joint UNDP-UNODC Programme on Maritime Governance to promote security and safety in Yemen (hereinafter “joint programme”) aims at re-establishing the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG), strengthening the criminal justice chain on the investigation, prosecution and trial of maritime crimes, and progressing towards port security, maritime security and regional security.

The YCG capability will be enhanced, in order to achieve the following results:

- to contribute to the enhancement of maritime and port security in Yemen, to prevent further deterioration in stability and to promote the flow of aid and trade;
- to counter maritime crime and protect the freedom of navigation off the coast of Yemen; and
- to assist in avoiding security vacuums post-peace agreement by supporting planning and preparations on maritime law enforcement.

The programme will progressively support YCG capacity in the three zones in which the YCG operates:

**Gulf of Aden zone**: including the Aden Container Terminal, Aden Oil Harbor and Mulla Port

**Arabian Sea zone**: including the Ports of Al Mukalla, Ash Shihr, Nishtun, Ghaydah and the Balhaf Liquid Natural Gas Terminal.

**The Red Sea zone**: including the Ports of Saleef, Ras Issa, Hodeidah and Al-Makha

The sites for action interventions will be prioritised from the zones above, based on the outcomes of programme assessments and subject to the implementation progress of the Stockholm Agreement.

The Yemeni criminal justice system will be supported via the Office of the Attorney General and the Chief Justice to promote the conduct of investigations and trials for maritime crimes are conducted in accordance with applicable international standards.

This programme is in support of SDG 16. It falls under CPF Outcome 1: Yemenis contribute to and benefit from inclusive, accountable and gender responsive governance, at local and central levels; 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan Objective 5 Preserving the capacity of public sector institutions to deliver basic life-saving services, and UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome: Building resilience to shocks and crises.
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2. SITUATION ANALYSIS

2.1. General context

Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the Middle East. It is characterised by its significant strategic location and long coastline at the intersection of the Red Sea, the Bab Al Mandeb strait, the Gulf of Aden and onwards into the Arabian Sea. Adjacent to a major international shipping route, Yemen’s Maritime Security is key to ensuring the continued safe and unhindered passage of trade, and restoring food security.

Yemen remains involved in an armed conflict which is having a devastating impact on the country’s human, social and economic development and affecting regional stability. The conflict has also impacted on the flow of trade, shipping and freedom of navigation.

The conflict has pitted coalition airstrikes against militias operating on the ground, with civilians in the middle facing what international organizations (WFP) call “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” and children bearing the brunt of the consequences. More than 20 million Yemenis, which is two-thirds of the Yemeni population, are suffering because of the lack of food security, with 1.8 million Yemeni children suffering from malnutrition.

About 10 million people – half of Yemen’s population – are currently at risk of food insecurity. The Saudi border blockades designed to weaken the Northern Alliance has significantly restricted civilian access to food, fuel, medicines, and commercial goods, along with limiting the import of humanitarian aid. Yemen ranks last of 149 countries analysed in the World Economic Forum’s gender gap index¹ and last of 160 countries in UNDP’s gender equality index (0.834). According to the Global Gender Gap Report, women’s enrolment rates in primary and secondary education are much lower than those of their male counterparts, and their labour force participation is only a third of that of Yemeni men. For example, in the Ministry of Interior, women represent less than 2.5 per cent of the workforce.²

In grounds for cautious optimism, the Riyadh Agreement was signed on 5 November 2019 between the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. The agreement calls for a power sharing Government based in Aden, and for the integration of STC affiliated forces into national military and security services. This agreement may potentially provide a path for a broader national level political settlement.

Yemen is one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, and weapons trafficking is significant both within Yemen and along maritime routes. In particular, weapons are trafficked into Southern Yemen (around Ghaydah and Nishtun) and trafficked from Yemen to Puntland using dhows and fishing vessels.

Organised crime groups benefit financially from smuggling refugees and economic migrants from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden along maritime routes. Irregular migrants are trafficked onwards from Yemen to Sudan, seeking access to Mediterranean crossing points and Europe.

Heroin and hashish are smuggled from Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan into Yemen, from the Makran Coast of Iran via the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea then onwards to the Mediterranean.

Details of these transnational flows are discussed in Annex III.

¹ The Global Gender Gap Report and Index examines the gap between men and women across four categories: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival and Political Empowerment.
² Yemen Police and Security Assessment, March 2017, UNDP Yemen.
The UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2452 (2019) which mandates the establishment of the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), to support the parties in implementing their commitments in accordance with the Hodeidah Agreement. The UNMHA mandate includes:

- to monitor the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa; and
- to work with the parties so that the security of the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa is assured by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law.

In line with the UN Security Council resolution 2452 the UNMHA, together with OSESGY and UNDP – are working in partnership to coordinate and plan and implement their actions to support the provision of security of Hodeidah city as well as the three ports in accordance with the provisions of the Hodeidah agreement. UNMHA is currently facilitating the negotiations among the parties on the Ceasefire implementation plan, around two phases: i) Phase 1 military forces withdrawal; ii) Phase 2 Local Security Forces redeployment.

In 2019 the parties accepted the detailed plan for phase one of the redeployments in Hodeidah. Yet, its implementation hinges upon an agreement on the details for phase two as well as for the LSF. As divergences between two parties on the LSF are still considerable, there is an opportunity and an urgency to set out a clear, actionable UN vision in this regard that can stimulate the understanding between the parties around phase 2 and enable the Ceasefire implementation plan to begin. Ansar Allah forces have undertaken a unilateral withdrawal from the three ports in Hodeida, in a modified version of the Phase 1 concept of operations which had been agreed between the parties. The Government of Yemen RCC team has objected that AA has handed security over to its own forces, rather than the LSF as it envisaged under the Stockholm Agreement. Positively, there has been an incremental de-escalation of hostilities, with discussions ongoing between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi authorities, and decreasing incidents of heavy and light weapons fire recorded in Hodeidah governorate. As the political process progresses, indications are that space is emerging to institutionalise security at the port, through the Yemeni Coast Guard take-over of the port security in the short-term, and subject to political conditions, progressive improvements in maritime security of the Red Sea in the longer-term.

3. STRATEGIES AND PROPOSED JOINT PROGRAMME

3.1. Background / context

The YCG is national maritime law enforcement agency headquartered in Aden and commanded by the Chairman who reports to the Minister of Interior. Prior to the current conflict, the YCG were beneficiaries of a comprehensive and integrated regeneration package with the UK acting as the project lead. The aim was to establish and further develop a sophisticated and nationally run Coast Guard which would protect the approaches to the Bab Al Mandeb strait. The pre-conflict plan relied on international donations of equipment and other support, as well as significant US funding. The project was around 90% complete and was extremely effective. However, to date most if not all of the infrastructure has been destroyed during the conflict or is beyond economic repair. Consequently, any regeneration initiatives must take into consideration that the YCG will require a complete and full scale rebuild.

The Yemen Coast Guard operates in three zones:

Gulf of Aden zone: including the Aden Container Terminal, Aden Oil Harbor and Mulla Port
Arabian Sea zone: including the Ports of Al Mukalla, Ash Shihr, Nishtun, Ghaydah and the Balhaf Liquid Natural Gas Terminal.

The Red Sea zone: including the Ports of Saleef, Ras Issa, Hodeidah and Al-Makha

The Yemen Coastguard is responsible for:

- Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) related search and rescue responsibilities;
- Port security including include physical security of the port facilities, protection of ships in the port, cargo inspections, and screening of vehicles and personnel entering the port and implementation of International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code;
- Anchorage security including pre-clearance of vessels for port entry;
- Disruption and investigation of maritime crime including piracy, illegal fishing, smuggling goods, drugs and human trafficking; and
- Protection of the marine environment from pollution.

The Coastguard seeks to deter illegal activities, including

- Terrorism;
- Piracy;
- Transnational Organised Crime Flows (Weapons Trafficking, Human Smuggling, Drug Trafficking)

Capabilities and capacity

To meet the above responsibilities, YCG requires the following capabilities:

A. The capability to provide port security to ISPS standards in identified ports in Aden and work in cooperation with the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation;
B. The capability to protect anchorages and internal waters to ensure safety of shipping;
C. The capability to protect Yemeni territorial waters to ensure safety of life at sea (SOLAS) and to disrupt maritime crime (including trafficking of people, drugs and weapons);
D. The capability to protect the Yemeni Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to protect the marine environment and natural resources.

The reality of rebuilding a coastguard capability as badly degraded as that of Yemen is that these capabilities will be delivered sequentially as the capacity and confidence of the YCG grows, as well as neutrality and non-involvement with any party to the ongoing conflict. For example, protection of the Yemeni Exclusive Economic Zone would include surveillance and patrolling of waters up to 200 nautical miles from Yemen, something that will take many years and substantial resources to deliver. It is beyond the scope of this programme to develop such capacities within two years, however this programme will provide a foundation which the Coastguard can progressively build upon in the future to expand their operational range and capacities.

Coastguard in Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea

- The YCG capability is very limited and in some areas all but defunct, however, led by one of the most respected and dynamic leaders in Yemen there is a core to build on and with the correct strategy and international support the organisation can return to its former capacity;
- Since the war the Coast Guard has reduced from 2400 personnel to a core of 121 based in Aden. There has been a similar reduction in staffing levels in the North. The reduction in manpower has resulted in a marked loss of ‘know-how’ and experience. However, the personnel who are present are career Coastguard members (rather than personnel transferred from the military);
35 of the younger Coastguard personnel have been trained in the UK and US;
There are limited functioning Coast Guard organisations outside Aden, although the Coast Guard network still exists;
Most of the Coast Guard’s key equipment has been destroyed, stolen or sold during the period of the war. Whilst regeneration would not be starting from scratch there will be a very significant resourcing bill;
The Coast Guard has made a huge effort to account for and regenerate a limited operational capability through cannibalisation of existing resources, and to a degree they have been successful. This approach demonstrates that with the right resourcing and support they can regenerate a credible capability;
The Vessel Tracking System has been totally destroyed leaving no ground-based tracking system;
Much of the Coast Guard’s equipment was gifted with no maintenance provision. Vessels are a prime example, with craft from the States, Malaysia and France to name but three, presenting a logistic challenge that is often insurmountable. For example, one of the jet boats has not operated for 7 years due to lack of spare parts;
Since the war started minimal training has been conducted and limited to basic weapon training, drill and fitness training and some boarding training in the Seychelles by UNODC;
Training will be critical as part of the regeneration and whilst some can be done by the YCG Officers they will require embedded trainers to assist.

Coast guard in Red Sea zone ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa

The ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa are under the control of Ansar Allah. The Stockholm Peace Agreement for Hodeidah of December 2018 provides that security in the city and the ports would be provided by “local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law.”

Hodeidah’s Coastguard director has reported a Coastguard strength of 900 staff members and 90 civilian personnel. These personnel numbers would need to be verified, and the UNMHA led screening and vetting process will likely also be applied to Coastguard personnel as they are considered part of ‘local security forces’. The Coastguard director reports that the Hodeidah seaport includes camp buildings which could be renovated and become a training centre.

The Coastguard Headquarters in Sanaa was destroyed and with it all records, files, procedures and processes. This means that the remaining personnel are trying to rebuild the Coast Guard based on institutional memory, with reduced personnel, expertise and operational support.

The Hodeidah Coastguard was involved in detaining 3 vessels in November 2019, as they reported the vessels entered Yemeni national waters without authorization and did not respond to Coastguard calls. The vessels were investigated for Saudi affiliation; however, the vessels and crew members were promptly released after they were found to have entered Yemeni waters due to bad weather and pledged not to re-enter Yemeni waters without authorization in the future.

3.2. Proposed joint programme

A joint UNDP – UNODC programme is proposed to take advantage of the comparative expertise of each UN agency. The programme has been designed on a combination of UNDP’s established operational presence in Yemen and complementary activities on rule of law, together with UNODC’s global and regional technical expertise in maritime security. UNDP has an established Country Office in Sana’a, and Sub-offices in Aden and Al-Mukalla (Hadramout).
Since early 2018, UNODC has provided training to the Yemen Coastguard in visit, board, search and seizure operations related to illegal trafficking in the Gulf of Yemen. UNODC is also in the process of delivering radio equipment and arranging strategic level dialogue between Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen on maritime crime flows in the Gulf of Aden. The UNODC Global Maritime Crime Program has trained Yemeni Coastguard personnel in Aden and abroad in the Seychelles, and through this programme, will move to in-country mentoring, following the approach successfully modelled in Somali ports.

The joint UNDP-UNODC programme aims at re-establishing the YCG and progressing towards port security, maritime security and regional security.

The overall goals of the programme are:

- to contribute to the enhancement of maritime and port security in Yemen, to prevent further deterioration in stability and to promote the flow of aid and trade;
- to counter maritime crime and protect the freedom of navigation off the coast of Yemen; and
- to assist in avoiding security vacuums post-peace agreement by supporting planning and preparations on maritime law enforcement.

The programme aims to promote the strengthening of the maritime law enforcement agencies (Coast Guard and Port security agencies) and the criminal justice chain, to enhance the investigation, prosecution and trial of maritime crimes and to enhance maritime and port security in Yemen. This is intended to prevent further deterioration in peace and stability. Additionally, considering the inclusion under the Ceasefire Agreements of the three Hodeidah ports, the programme aims to assist in avoiding security vacuums post-peace agreement by supporting planning and preparations on maritime law enforcement.

Building on the capacity of Yemeni rule of law institutions to play a greater role in providing maritime and port security services, the programme ideally will empower the Yemen Coast Guard and the Yemeni authorities to perform maritime law enforcement, port security under a functional rule of law framework, in a professional, sustainable and reliable manner.

Activities will also focus on the enhancement of YCG capabilities:

- The capability to provide port security to ISPS standards in identified ports.
- The capability to protect anchorages and internal waters to ensure safety of and shipping;
- The capability to protect Yemeni territorial waters to ensure safety of life at sea (SOLAS) and to disrupt maritime crime (including trafficking of people, drugs and weapons);
- Progressive steps towards establishing the capability to protect the Yemeni Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), to protect the marine environment and natural resources.

Activities will also reinforce the roles of rule of law actors in relation to the prosecution and trial of maritime crimes.

The end result is anticipated to be enhancement of capability at all locations, building up successive layers as funding and commitment/ international appetite allows. This ensures that progress is being made towards the regeneration of operational capability rather than the minimal level currently being exercised, moving from deter to disrupt and building a core YCG capability now to prepare for the future.

The programme will collaborate with other UN Agencies as relevant – in particular, IOM in relation to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants by sea.

In accordance with UN policies, the programme will not procure lethal equipment.
Programme Implementation Approach

Programme implementation is scheduled to initially commence in the Southern Governorates, with the schedule of activities to be determined based upon the results of the initial assessments.

The programme aims to progressively support the re-establishment of coastguard capacities. Initial priority will be given to reestablishing the capacity to operate within the port waters, and to maintain security within the ports. Alongside this, emphasis will be placed on progressively establishing Coastguard patrols outside of the ports and along the coastline. These patrols require the restoration of fleet capacity, an effective communications network, and confident personnel.

In addition, the capacities built throughout this programme will lay the groundwork for a successor programme, to focus on expanding open water and multi-day operations. These operations require effective operational capacity, larger boats, highly functioning communications, access to necessary support infrastructure (such as large dry dock facilities for repairs and maintenance, which are not currently operational in Yemen) and well-trained personnel. This two year programme will help prepare for these operations, ascertain the technical requirements and specifications required to procure and maintain fleet and conduct open water operations.

Following the commencement of activities in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea zones, implementation will expand to the Red Sea ports, subject to the progress of implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. Until such time as the current import restrictions are relaxed, it will likely not be feasible to import specialized equipment for the Coastguard in the Red Sea ports, such as boats and communications equipment. The provision of any equipment with potential dual civil – military uses is likely to be especially contentious. Capacity development at these ports may be constrained until such time as operational equipment can be provided. However, preparatory training which does not require specialized equipment, including theoretical training, training of trainers and water confidence may be undertaken. All training courses will adopt human rights-based approaches, including relevant international laws and best practices.

Building upon the expanding capacities of the YCG, the programme will extend to the criminal justice system to ensure a cohesive response to maritime crime under the legal framework. The programme will
provide training to the prosecution and to the YCG to ensure that proper investigations are conducted in accordance with relevant international standards, thus allowing the Office of the Prosecutor to present a valid and efficient file to the Court. Training the judges in how to conduct fair trials on maritime crime is also an important component of the programme ensuring the rule of law is upheld.

### 3.3. Sustainability of results

Sustainability of results will remain a challenge while the conflict continues. The Coastguard has managed to maintain some level of operations under very difficult circumstances, partly by removing parts and equipment from some boats to carry out repairs on others. However, significant investments are required in order to restore fleet capacity.

The programme seeks to operate in a sustainable way – focusing on restoring the operational capacities of staff, embedding mentors to promote the transfer of skills and support the implementation of policies. As an example, the approach to fleet maintenance is for the coastguard personnel to be trained to carry out the repairs and regular maintenance, supported by an embedded marine engineer and by restored workshop facilities. Each part of the package is required to ensure a functional outcome.

Infrastructure rehabilitation will be undertaken in accordance with UN standards, to promote environmental sustainability. Where feasible, green sources of energy (such as solar power for communications equipment) will be preferred.

Activities to develop the maritime expertise of the Prosecution and Judiciary will be undertaken in conjunction with UNDP’s broader programme to support rule of law actors, to avoid duplication and to benefit from this program’s specialized focus.

The programme is designed with an ‘action learning’ approach, to help establish an evidence base and to inform the development of a follow-on programme.

### 3.4. Cross-cutting issues

Regarding rights-based approaches, maritime insecurity leads to various human rights concerns, including matters related to violence and personal security, including gender-based violence, abductions, human trafficking and other forced migration, prostitution, slavery as well as wider issues (e.g. on IUU fishing vessels) related to child labour, forced labour and unsafe working conditions.

With regard to human rights, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is applied in this project in technical cooperation. A background check of units and individuals are conducted to examine whether units and individuals benefitting from UNDP and UNODC support have been involved in serious offences relating to international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law and/or criminal law. If grave violations of human rights are detected, UNDP and UNODC need to include risk mitigation strategies, or, in the most serious cases, consider whether support can be continued.

In addition, in order to ensure compliance of the proposed action with the obligations stipulated in Article 10 (“Human rights”) of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, a clear human rights perspective will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle on the basis of the operational guidance developed by the European Commission. Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights will be monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen.
The possible impact of the project on the respect of human rights, good governance and gender issues will be constantly monitored and corrective measures will be put in place where relevant and necessary.

Within the framework of this project, gender aspects are taken into consideration in the sense that there is nothing in the present proposal preventing the application of equal access to the activities foreseen. In addition, it is felt that both genders should be represented during activities as maritime crime may be conducted by both men and women.

Regarding gender, women and girls are vulnerable to many risks associated with maritime insecurity, both directly – e.g. as victims of human trafficking or organised prostitution – and indirectly – e.g. as socially and economically vulnerable members of communities affected by the impacts of maritime crime. At the same time, women, alongside other components of civil society, are part of the solution: they play important social roles in communities which are vulnerable to the impacts of maritime insecurity and can play a significant part in the family context. More generally, their role in the maritime sector and in environmental policy and governance (decision-making) should be widened.

In this context, this project advises beneficiary countries on their recruitment policies for maritime law enforcement agencies, and on the development of standard operating procedures for those to ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment. UNDP and UNODC are obviously following all UN policies and guidelines regarding the appointment of staff and gender equality (“The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.”).

Gender equality policies will be integrated, and a gender perspective will be considered, including by ensuring, to the maximum extent possible, equal gender representation among participants and resource persons during the project implementation. In areas where the project engages directly with local communities, efforts will be made to ensure that, to the extent possible, these interactions are carried out on a gender equality basis. Activities such as trainings and mentorships will ensure a gender balance, wherever possible.

UNDP and UNODC will therefore take a gender-sensitive approach and strive to:

- Provide equitable access to project resources and opportunities to men and women, both individually and in groups;
- Take measures to ensure women and men’s equitable access to and full participation in power structures and decision-making in the project;
- Contribute to the goal of gender equality in staffing;
- Include gender assessments as part of the situation analysis for training and assessments, where appropriate;
- Generate and disseminate gender-disaggregated data through monitoring and evaluation in the process of the implementation of its logical framework and related targets;
- Define the implementation and monitoring requirements concerning gender in agreements with any potential partner organisations;

Furthermore, in the implementation of this programme, UNDP and UNODC will adhere to the following:
✓ The partners’ policy and operations at the country level: country profile documents, evaluations and analysis as well as other basic documents should contain information on the situation about gender. Gender disaggregated data should be part of standard reporting requirements;

✓ For UNODC only: implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project activities: for each step of the project cycle, a list of key questions will be addressed to ensure gender mainstreaming, e.g. from the guidance note “Gender mainstreaming in the work of UNODC” or the guidance document “Integrating human rights and gender equality in evaluations” from the United Nations Evaluation Group;

4. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

4.1. Joint programme contributions to UN Goals

Sustainable Development Goal 16 is to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Under SDG 16, this programme relates to the following targets:

16.3 – Promote the Rule of Law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.

16.4 – By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.

The programme further supports the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement and Security Council resolution 2452 (2019), by strengthening the capacity of local security forces to operate Red Sea ports.

The programme supports the following Outcomes:

• Country Programme Document (CPD) Outcome 1: Yemenis contribute to and benefit from inclusive, accountable and gender responsive governance, at local and central levels.
• UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) development setting: Building resilience to shocks and crises.
• Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2019 Strategic Objective 5: Preserving the capacity of public sector institutions to deliver basic live-saving services, in particular through the rehabilitation of infrastructure to enable the resumption of coastguard services.

The programme is consistent with UNDP’s Signature Solution 5: Governance for peaceful, just and inclusive societies

Building on capacity of local criminal justice institutions to play a greater role in providing with maritime and port security services, the programme will empower the Yemen Coast Guard and the Yemeni authorities to enforce maritime law and port security regulations in a professional, sustainable and reliable manner.

The programme will focus on the enhancement of Yemen Coast Guard capabilities:

• The capability to provide port security to ISPS standards in identified ports.
• The capability to protect anchorages and internal waters to ensure safety of shipping;
• The capability to protect Yemeni territorial waters to ensure safety of life at sea (SOLAS) and to disrupt maritime crime (including trafficking of people, drugs and weapons) and protect the marine environment and natural resources.
• The conduct of efficient prosecution in coordination with the relevant enforcement authority.

• The trial of maritime crime within a sound rule of law framework

The programme logic is as follows:

**IF**
• the Yemen Coastguard is trained, equipped and capacitated to provide maritime and port security

**AND**
• the required policy and regulatory framework is put in place

**THEN**
• the Yemen Coastguard will be able to uphold the safety of life at sea and disrupt maritime crime

**THUS**
• Preserving the capacity of public sector institutions to deliver basic life saving services, and contributing to a functional justice system using joint UN approaches to rebuilding Rule of Law.

**CONTRIBUTING TO**
• building resilience to shocks and crises

### 4.2. Outputs, activities and actions

The joint programme is built around four outputs:

Output 1: Assessments of Maritime Law enforcement and port security agencies are completed

Output 2: Coast Guard capability to interdict and investigate maritime crime strengthened

Output 3: Operational capacity of the maritime law enforcement agencies is strengthened

Output 4: An enabling environment for maritime safety and security is promoted

The capacities of the YCG and criminal justice actors responsible for maritime security and safety will be enhanced, in order to achieve the following expected results, under each respective output:

**Output 1: Assessments of Maritime Law enforcement and port security agencies completed**

Activity Result 1.1: Coast Guard needs are assessed

Activity Result 1.2: Port security capacities are assessed

While the conflict is ongoing, the programme will support planning and preparations for restoring YCG and capabilities, by assessing the needs of the YCG in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea Districts,
evaluating current YCG Maritime Domaine Awareness (MDA) and Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) capabilities, as well as the Yemeni Ports’ condition, situation and security. Assessments will take place in both the South and the North, building upon the model of the assessment which has already been conducted in Aden and which forms part of the evidence base for this action.

More specifically, the assessments will ascertain the current institutional capacities of the YCG in relation to infrastructure, equipment, staffing levels, and capacity to implement their organisational mandate. The assessments will consider training needs, fleet readiness and communications capacities.

The programme will address urgent infrastructure and basic needs, including the rehabilitation and the refurbishment of the YCG office in Aden and Mukalla, training and port facilities, and the Coast Guard Academy in Aden. Where feasible, green approaches will be taken into consideration for infrastructure works, including potential for rainwater catchment, grey water recycling, and solar powered lighting.

**Output 2: Coast Guard capability to interdict and investigate maritime crime strengthened**

**Activity Result 2.1: Maritime law enforcement skills are built**

**Activity Result 2.2: Full time mentors are embedded**

**Activity result 2.3: Port security capacity is enhanced**

Major responsibilities to guarantee maritime security shall rest with the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). Traditionally, security in the country has been provided through military approaches, and the Law Enforcement agents (Police forces and Yemen Coast Guard) has lacked critical public service interventions and a human rights–based focus.

Output 2 aims at taking the initial steps to restore the YCG capabilities to provide a high degree of integrated and coordinated maritime security, to ensure that illegal activity is adequately deterred and disrupted, and border integrity are maintained. The output focuses on re-establishing essential activities for YCG, improving YCG training capacities, and establishing a maritime law enforcement training syllabus to be followed by every YCG officer.

Under this Output full-time expert mentors will be deployed to transfer expertise to YCG counterparts.

Maritime law enforcement experts will be deployed as mentors, to conduct seamanship and maritime policing courses, support maritime law enforcement units in routine training, and transfer skills in accordance with the embedded mentoring programme.

A marine engineer expert will be embedded as a mentor to provide expertise in the maintenance and repair of the YCG fleet, including on the job training to restore damaged vessels and equipment to operational status where feasible.

Capacity development initiatives will commence in the South of Yemen and expand to the Red Sea ports as political and security conditions allow. This will also be informed by the progress of implementation of the Stockholm agreement. Initial capacity building efforts for the Red Sea ports may focus on theoretical topics until such time as existing equipment can be made operational or new equipment provided.

As a guide, the programme will aim to support incremental operational capacity of the Coastguard. The initial emphasis will be on restoring the capacity to effectively operate within the ports, with all of the associated support functions required – including maintenance, communications, equipment and personnel expertise. Following the demonstrated capacity of the Coastguard to manage operations within the port, the programme will support the Coastguard to progressively increase their operational range – initially by expanding patrols along the coastlines, and later by enhancing their capacity to operate within
the territorial waters of Yemen up to twelve nautical miles from the coastline. The ability to safely patrol and operate further from shore requires a progressive level of expertise and higher standards of equipment (for example, larger boats), which imparts additional training and support obligations (eg access to dry dock facilities for maintenance). The aspiration is for the Coastguard to manage their responsibilities within the Yemeni Exclusive Economic Zone, however progress towards this goal will be incremental.

**Output 3: Operational capacity of the maritime law enforcement agencies is strengthened**

**Activity Result 3.1:** YCG infrastructures and training facilities are rehabilitated

**Activity Result 3.2:** Coast Guard is comprehensively equipped

Based on the existing assessments jointly carried out by UNDP and UNODC in the Port of Aden, as well as the quick assessments of Hodeidah port conducted by UNDP, and the following assessments will be undertaken under the programme, urgently needed equipment (engines, boats, basic communication systems, sea safety kits etc) will be provided. Through the training and mentoring component of Output 2 above, “engineering maintenance and repair training” and focused “on the-job training” will undertake maintenance and repairs of the current fleet, so a provision for replacement parts to be used in the maintenance and repairs is also included.

YCG facilities, Coast Guard Academy and Port security infrastructures will be rehabilitated, to enable YCG and port security agencies to perform their duties, coordinate, plan, design and implement operations, as well as to provide maintenance and management of equipment provided to perform their duties.

The selection of infrastructure for rehabilitation will be guided by the priorities identified through the assessments under Output 1. Based on the initial Aden assessment, the Aden rehabilitations are proposed to focus on the Headquarter (2 main buildings), the control room (currently based in a container), the maintenance workshop and the floating unit anchorages within the Aden Port, belonging to the YCG. The equipment to be provided refers both to activities on land and activities to be carried out on water. The 2 main buildings pertaining to the HQ as well as the control room need to be fully equipped (involving office furniture, computers, duty accommodation). The Floating unit needs equipment to restore 15 new boat skeletons currently parked in the YCG store in Aden – engines, communication system, safety materials; land to sea communication systems, and land transport.

There is also a need to standardize the equipment provided to the YCG – including spare parts available in the local market or to be easily purchased and delivered in country – in order to make the capacity building activities as well as the management and the maintenance processes, financially and humanly sustainable and effective.

In addition, training facilities will be restored, in order to enable capacity building programs to be performed in country, leaving only the highly specialised training courses to be conducted in the GMCP training centres at the Seychelles and in Sri Lanka, due to the costs to establish such training facility and refurbish them in Yemen. Re-establishing training facilities for the use of the Coast Guard will enhance not only the ownership of the above-mentioned activities, but also their sustainability.

We anticipate that some lead time will likely be required to procure and deliver operational equipment, especially for the provision of equipment for the Coastguard at the Red Sea ports which currently remain restricted by embargoes.

This programme will help establish the maintenance regimes and workshop facilities which are required to enable the Coastguard fleet to function effectively. The increased Coastguard capacity will provide an evidence base to support the provision of new boats in the future. The Coastguard do require patrol boats
in the range of 22-26 metres and 30-36 metres to enable it to conduct effective operations within Yemen’s EEZ. However, the provision of such boats is beyond the scope of this programme at this time, as the supporting facilities are not yet in place and the budget requirements exceed currently available donor support.

UNDP and UNODC will collaborate with other international partners who have also expressed an interest in providing equipment to the Coastguard, to ensure that there is no duplication of the support provided. Through collaboration, the UN and other international partners can support the Coastguard according to their mandates and operational rules – for example, the UN may be able to rehabilitate buildings which is difficult for some international partners, while other partners may have access to equipment which would be more expensive or complicated for the UN to procure.

**Output 4: An enabling environment for maritime safety and security is promoted**

**Activity Result 4.1: Port Security Policies and Regulations are enhanced**

**Activity Result 4.2: Promotion of political engagement**

**Activity Result 4.3: Establishment of interagency coordination**

**Activity Result 4.4: Establishment of YCG dialogue with shipping industry**

**Activity Result 4.5: Capacity building of rule of law actors on maritime security and safety issues**

Recognizing the limitations of security provision within Yemeni ports, especially in Aden and Mukalla, a close working relationship exists between Port Authority and YCG officials. Prior to the war, the YCG was the only agency in charge of securing the control of the waters and ports. This arrangement was more effective than the current security arrangement, which has control of the port area divided between the Coalition forces and the YCG, with the Coalition forces controlling internal access of the container and bulk cargo ports.

The Port Authority reported that trade activity at the port reached 4.15 million tonnes of cargo in 2018, surpassing its previous highest level of trading level from 2012. Despite this, the current "war zone insurance premium" continues to deliver a crippling blow to the Yemeni economy by adding an additional insurance cost estimated in an additional 150,000,000 USD paid in 2018. Shipping costs for cargo entering Yemen are further increased by the fact that the Coalition forces require all container cargo entering and departing Yemen to be offloaded and checked at the Saudi port of Jeddah or in Djibouti. Offloading and reloading containers at multiple locations creates additional costs for transhipment and port storage fees at the inter-mEDIATE offloading sites.

To improve the capability of the YCG to restore and ensure port security in the hands of the Government of Yemen, this output will focus on production of Port Security Policies and Regulations.

Additionally, the promotion of political engagement of Yemeni authorities on restoring the Coast Guard duties and role in maritime and port security, will be pursued through dialogue, advocacy and the achievement of results by the Coast Guard. The establishment of an interagency coordination mechanism will support the coordination and the division of labour and roles of each authority respectively involved, in order to comprehensively target the and involve the relevant actors, including the private sector (shipping industry etc.).

The output also foresees the participation, for the YCG staff and the relevant Yemeni stakeholders, in international conferences, seminars and workshops in the fields of maritime security, to coordinate with national, regional and international actors, to share lesson learnt and best practices and to build the YCG
action on international experiences, practices and standards, implemented on the Coast Guard job, at different levels and in different countries and regions abroad.

The programme will undertake training and capacity building of rule of law actors who are involved in maritime security issues, in order to link the Coastguard’s activities with the criminal justice chain. Training will be provided for Judges and prosecutors, to promote effective conduct of cases and coordination between rule of law actors.
### 4.3. Table: Results Framework

**Sustainable Development Goal 16:** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

- **16.3** – Promote the Rule of Law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.
- **16.4** – By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.

**CPD Outcome 1:** Yemenis contribute to and benefit from inclusive, accountable and gender responsive governance, at local and central levels.

**Related Strategic Objective 5 from 2019 HRP:** Preserving the capacity of public sector institutions to deliver basic life-saving services.

Outcome level indicators 3.2.2 National and local systems enabled, and communities empowered to ensure the restoration of justice institutions, redress mechanisms and community security

#### 3.2.2.1 Number of countries with national and local systems restored or adopted following crises:

- **a)** Functional justice systems
- **d)** Using joint UN approaches to rebuild rule of law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP Outputs</th>
<th>Participating UN agency outputs</th>
<th>Participating UN organisation priority</th>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Indicative activities</th>
<th>Resource allocation and time frame</th>
<th>Total ($)USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Assessments of Maritime Law enforcement and port security agencies are completed (including documentation of gender related issues as appropriate)</td>
<td>Technical assistance to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Assessment of infrastructure, machinery and law enforcement capacity</td>
<td>332,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>332,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators: No of thematic assessments completed</td>
<td>Operational support to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome: Building resilience to</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target Year 1: 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
<td>shocks and crises.</td>
<td>Training curricula developed Training and mentoring on maritime law enforcement, seamanship, maintenance</td>
<td>1,446,379</td>
<td>1,574,455</td>
<td>3,020,833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coast Guard capability to interdict and investigate maritime crime strengthened (Including capacity building of any female personnel)</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Technical assistance to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator: No of coastguard personnel benefit from training and mentoring</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Operational support to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2 100 coastguard trained and mentored, disaggregated by gender</td>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome: Building resilience to shocks and crises.</td>
<td></td>
<td>656,000</td>
<td>597,000</td>
<td>1,253,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: No current training or mentoring programmes</td>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome: Building resilience to shocks and crises.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,247,000</td>
<td>1,748,000</td>
<td>3,995,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operational capacity of the Coast Guard is strengthened (including attending to the infrastructure requirements of female personnel, and the needs of women trafficked at sea)</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Operational support to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator: Number of Coastguard sites rehabilitated and equipped</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome: Building resilience to shocks and crises.</th>
<th>Workshops and operational support to activities Training and capacity building for ROL actors Programme coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target year 2: 4 facilities</td>
<td>Operational support to the promotion of maritime safety and security</td>
<td>1,240,336</td>
<td>1,223,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: Rehabilitation underway at one site (Aden CG HQ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,463,442</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator: An enabling environment for maritime safety and security is promoted. (including coordination on trafficking of persons at sea)</th>
<th>UNODC</th>
<th>Technical assistance to the promotion of maritime safety and security</th>
<th>Port security policies and regulations enhanced YCG shipping dialogue Training and capacity building for ROL actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2: 3 events</td>
<td></td>
<td>221,000</td>
<td>385,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: No maritime safety and security stakeholder coordination currently ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>606,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programme cost</td>
<td>Indirect support cost (GMS 7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>4,306,394 (^3)</td>
<td>3,623,940 (^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>301,448</td>
<td>253,676</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNODC</strong></td>
<td>1,999,379</td>
<td>1,959,455</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139,957</td>
<td>137,162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,305,773</td>
<td>5,583,394</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>441,404</td>
<td>390,838</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNODC</strong></td>
<td>3,958,833</td>
<td>3,958,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>277,118</td>
<td>277,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>£6,747,177</td>
<td>£5,974,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£832,242</td>
<td>£832,242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) Includes MPTFO Administrative agent fee of 63,058 for total 2020 budget (inclusive for UNODC budget)

\(^4\) Includes MPTFO Administrative agent fee of 55,834 for total 2020 budget (inclusive for UNODC budget)
5. MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness

The programme introduces the following features to enhance the effectiveness of its development and reform interventions:

- **Inclusive Approach:** Through its stakeholder strategy, the programme benefits from the involvement of national actors, specialized institutions and civil society groups which ensures that interventions are effective, relevant and sustainable in the long term.

- **Dynamic Project Building on Lessons Learned:** The project builds upon and scales up combined experiences of UNDP and the UN sister agencies of what works in the field. Through effective communication and coordination, the project will adjust to new circumstances and lessons learned to maximize impact and reduce costs.

- **Harmonized and Integrated Development Approach:** Project will be implemented within a broader programmatic framework notably encompassing livelihoods, local development and conflict reduction making the human security and livelihood interventions more strategic and effective for the people of Yemen.

The Steering Committee

A Steering Committee will be established and will have oversight of this programme, offering advice and directing the overall implementation of the project. Should there be major changes in the landscape this body will provide the strategic guidance on how to meet such challenges and with what appropriate measures. The Steering Committee will consist of the Resident Representative of UNDP, a senior representative of UNODC and representatives of contributing donors.

Based on the approved AWP, the Steering Committee may review and approve quarterly work plans and authorize any major deviation from these agreed plans. It is the authority that signs off the completion of each quarterly plan as well as authorizes the start of the following plan. This ensures that required resources are committed, arbitrates on any conflicts within the programme, and negotiates a solution to any problems between the programme and external bodies. In addition, it approves any delegation of its quality assurance responsibilities. The Steering Committee will be convened bi-annually. Procedures for interest income and unspent balances are in line with the policies and procedures of donors.

The Steering Committee will:

- Review and approve the annual work plan of the programme and the quarterly work plans if necessary
- Review the progress report and ensures that obstacles to smooth implementation of the programme are addressed.
- Suggest revisions/measures or reallocation of funding if the programme faces obstacles in implementation under any given section.
- Facilitate audits and evaluations, and report back to the Steering Committee;
- Review and approve M&E plan
- Promote synergies across the programme activities and with all cross-cutting themes;
- Coordinate and compile narrative reports received from Participating UN Agencies, and report back to the Steering Committee for review and approval

Programme coordination

UNDP is the Convening Agency and will provide joint coordination support, such as convening steering committee meetings. UNDP will be accountable for the collation of reports. Each agency will remain
individually responsible for implementing the activities assigned to it under the Annual Workplan by the Steering Committee.

Technical coordination will take place between the lead experts of participating UN agencies.

6. FUND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Modality 1:
This UN Joint Programme will follow the pass-through fund management modality according to the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Guidelines on UN Joint Programming. As outlined, the UNDP MPTF Office, serving as the Administrative Agent for the Joint Programme, as set out in the Standard Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Joint Projects using pass-through fund management, will perform the following functions:

The Administrative Agent will:

- Establish a separate ledger account under its financial regulations and rules for the receipt and administration of the funds received from the donor(s) pursuant to the Administrative Arrangement. This Joint Programme Account will be administered by the Administrative Agent in accordance with the regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to it, including those relating to interest;
- Subject to availability of funds, make disbursements to Participating UN Organizations from the Joint Programme Account based on instructions from the Steering Committee, in line with the budget set forth in the Joint Programme Document.

Each participating UN organization receiving funds through the pass-through would have to sign a standardized Memorandum of Understanding with the Administrative Agent. The Participating UN Organizations will:

- Assume full programmatic and financial responsibility and accountability for the funds disbursed by the Administrative Agent and can decide on the execution process with its partners and counterparts following the organization’s own regulations.
- Establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent.

Each UN organization is entitled to deduct their indirect costs on contributions received according to their own regulation and rules. Each UN organization will deduct 7% as overhead costs of the total allocation received for the agency via this mechanism.

Administrative Agent
According to the pass-through modality, the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) will serve as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the Joint Programme. The AA will be accountable for effective and impartial fiduciary management and financial reporting. The AA will be responsible for financial/administrative management that includes: i) receiving donor contributions, ii) disbursing funds to Participating UN Organizations based on the Steering Committee instructions, and iii) consolidating periodic financial reports and the final financial report.

Participating UN Agencies: Participating UN organizations operate in accordance with their own regulations, rules, directives and procedures. They assume full programmatic and financial accountability
for funds disbursed by the Administrative Agent and are responsible for the implementation and delivery of results under each activity result. PUNOs are the Partners which will sign the EU agreement.

PUNOs will have dedicated resources to achieve results, including personnel and consultants (technical assistance) that are directly contributing to project activities, and allocated budgets for associated costs, such as office structure, and operability of field visits for quality assurance.

**Modality 2:**

Where funds are received by UNDP in accordance with a bilateral framework agreement with donors, UNDP will receive a portion of these funds on behalf of UNODC and pass through funding to UNODC in accordance with a UN Agency to UN Agency contribution agreement signed for each contribution. The applicable rates of GMS may vary between 7-8%, in accordance with the conditions of each donor agreement.

**7. MONITORING, EVALUATION AND REPORTING**

Monitoring and evaluation of the Programme aims at improving efficiency and effectiveness of programmatic outcome, outputs and activities by establishing a rigorous assessment process/system to: a) establish continuously assessing the strengths and weaknesses of interventions; b) continually identify policies and institutions that need to be improved or developed to prioritize programme intervention for the poorest and most socially disadvantaged groups; and c) strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of national partners.

An overall and detailed M&E framework will be developed as the first step of the implementation process in line with the principles laid down in the Joint Programme Document. The M&E framework is based on a programmatic logical framework. It consists of programmatic outcomes and outputs, respective indicators, targets, data sources and assumptions etc.

A Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation System (PMES) will be designed to monitor programme implementation and progress. The implementing partners, including beneficiaries, will be fully involved. The participatory monitoring will ensure effective implementation of the programme activities and the production of desired outputs as contained in the Joint Programme Results and Resources Framework. The annual and quarterly work plans will further facilitate monitoring of the programme activities.

**Monitoring of Outputs**

The overall M&E framework refers to the outcomes, and their underlying outputs. Measurable (quantitative and qualitative) indicators facilitate the monitoring of progress. The framework also provides suitable targets and baselines for each indicator. Where baseline data for output indicators could not be obtained during the planning phase it will be identified through assessments to be conducted prior to capacity building and reform activities.

Progress on all output indicators will be regularly measured through quarterly and annual reviews and reports. The periodical reports will be generated and shared with donors and other implementing partners. Each agency is responsible for undertaking the monitoring of activities as agreed under the Joint Programme Monitoring Framework. The programme team is responsible for the overall collation of monitoring data.
### M&E framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Results</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Means of verification</th>
<th>Collection methods</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Risks and assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Output 1:** Assessments of Maritime Law Enforcement and port security agencies completed. | - Indicators: No of thematic assessments completed  
  - **Target Year 1:** 2  
  - Baseline: 0 | Assessment reports | Documentation of assessments | PUNOs to collate. | Access is permitted for assessments to be conducted  
  Some existing ‘assessment fatigue’ with stakeholders |
| **Output 2:** Coast Guard capability to interdict and investigate maritime crime strengthened | - Indicator 1: Training curricula established  
  - **Target Year 1:** Training curricula designed and validated  
  - Baseline: No current training curricula complying with international standards  
  - Indicator 2: No of coastguard personnel benefit from training and mentoring  
  - **Target Year 2:** 100 coastguard trained and mentored, disaggregated by gender  
  - Baseline: No current training or mentoring programmes | Training reports (including attendance lists, and pre / post tests where feasible)  
  - Third party verification of a sample of training activities | Documentation of training and third-party monitoring | PUNOs to analyse training records  
  Third party monitor to monitor a sample. | Security conditions permit training and mentoring activities to take place. |
| **Output 3:** Operational capacity of the maritime law enforcement agencies is strengthened | - Indicator 1: Coastguard personnel have access to emergency safety equipment  
  - **Target Year 1:** Safety equipment supplied and installed at two facilities  
  - Baseline: Safety equipment not currently installed or available | Observation visits to check safety equipment is available and in use by mentors and third-party monitors | Observations, documentation | PUNOs to analyse reports.  
  PUNOs to collate overall observation | Equipment will not be stolen, redeployed or damaged.  
  Equipment will not be used for military purposes. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2: Number of Coastguard sites rehabilitated and equipped&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Target year 2:&lt;/strong&gt; 4 facilities&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Baseline:&lt;/strong&gt; Rehabilitation underway at one site (Aden CG HQ)</th>
<th>Supervising engineer’s assessment report of infrastructure&lt;br&gt;Counterpart signed handover notes for equipment and rehabilitated facilities</th>
<th>reports and documentation of site handover.&lt;br&gt;Counterparts will agree on sites to be rehabilitated and will make the sites available for remedial works.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 4:</strong> Enabling environment for maritime safety and security is promoted</td>
<td><strong>Indicator 1:</strong> No of coordination dialogue events convened with stakeholders&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Target Year 2:** 3 events&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Baseline:** No maritime safety and security stakeholder coordination currently ongoing.</td>
<td>Event / meeting reports&lt;br&gt;Training reports (including attendance lists, and pre / post tests where feasible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2:</strong> No of rule of law actors trained in maritime law enforcement&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Target Year 2:** 60 actors, desegregated by gender&lt;br&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Baseline:** No maritime law enforcement training currently ongoing</td>
<td>Documentation of training and third-party monitoring&lt;br&gt;Third party verification of a sample of training activities.</td>
<td>PUNOs to analyse training records&lt;br&gt;Third party monitor to monitor a sample of activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluation of Outcomes

Outcome and activities of the programme will be measured in accordance with an objective M&E framework. Outcome assessment will consist of mid-term and final review of progress on each outcome indicator towards stipulated targets. In addition to the outcome evaluation, the programme may be evaluated externally by independent evaluation missions.

Reporting

The Convening Agency will consolidate narrative reports provided by the Participating United Nations Organizations.

As per the MoU:

- Annual narrative progress report and the final narrative report, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year.

The MPTF Office will:

- Prepare consolidated narrative and financial annual reports, based on the narrative consolidated report prepared by the Convening Agency and the financial statements/ reports submitted by each of the Participating UN Organizations in accordance with the timetable established in the MoU;
- Provide those consolidated reports to each donor that has contributed to the Joint Programme Account, as well as the Steering Committee, no later than five months (31 May) after the end of the calendar year.

Consolidated reports and related documents will be posted on the website of the Administrative Agent (http://mptf.undp.org).

Commitment of Accountability

UNDP as Convening Agent will 1) report to the Steering Committee and donors in the event of severe challenge(s) that could hamper the project implementation, 2) respond to donors requests for information on the progress of the project, and 3) request the Steering Committee approval in case of significant variations from the project plan or extension of the project period is necessary.

8. VISIBILITY

A detailed communications strategy to provide appropriate donor visibility will be prepared. Indicative options for visibility include the incorporation of donor logos on reports, equipment and infrastructure; donor acknowledgement at events and training courses; promoting dialogue exchanges between Yemeni officials and donor representatives and arranging donor visits for monitoring and ceremonial occasions.

Due to the nature of the Yemen Coastguard’s work, there may be circumstances where full donor visibility is considered inappropriate by donors and / or the Government of Yemen. These situations will be negotiated as part of the communications strategy, under the strategic direction of the programme Steering Committee.
9. LEGAL CONTEXT STANDARD CLAUSES

This Joint Programme document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Yemen and UNDP, signed on 11 April 1977. All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”

UNDP as the Implementing Partner shall comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)

UNDP agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the project funds are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

Consistent with UNDP’s Program and Operations Policies and Procedures, social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (http://www.undp.org/ses) and related Accountability Mechanism (http://www.undp.org/secu-srm).

The Implementing Partner shall: (a) conduct project and program-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or program to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.

All signatories to the Joint Programme Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any program or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
# ANNEX II- RISK AND MITIGATION MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
<th>POTENTIAL IMPACT</th>
<th>MITIGATION MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY RISKS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Serious degradation of the security situation could also have a direct impact on the rehabilitation of buildings since it would hinder or prevent the effective monitoring of progress and quality assurance. The security situation could prevent access to North and Aden region and endanger the delivery of assets</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>A risk analysis will be undertaken with the other agencies and UNODC regarding the likelihood of programme partners (in security sector) committing grave violations of human rights. The analysis will be shared with the broader UNCT and others. Together with the UNODC, the programme manager will determine the scale and nature of the risks facing the programme and these will be logged by the programme (in the risk matrix). On a 12-monthly basis, the programme will review the risk environment and update the analysis. Risk levels (impact and probability) to the programme are highest in North. In South, overall programme risk levels are lower.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL RISKS</strong></td>
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<td>Increase in political tensions leading to further instability, a general lack of political support to the programme by government counterparts in North and South, the committing of serious human rights violations by the local security forces, no budget allocations to justice ministries and courts, relative disregard of the principle of separation of powers, low levels of political will to work and access to civil society work</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Primarily of continuous monitoring of the political situation with the support of sister agencies. In order to mitigate and reduce the risk of any human rights violation by UNDP’s national partners, the programme will undertake sustained advocacy, training and capacity building on protection and human rights awareness and implementation integrated into programme activities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROGRAMME RISKS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The transfer of equipment and asset management and maintenance as well as the rehabilitation of buildings. The security situation could prevent access to North and Aden region and endanger the delivery of assets There is also the risk that procured equipment would not be properly maintained and managed</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Continuous monitoring of delivery of key results, regular joint planning sessions with programme partners, and a flexible programme design that allows for adjustments in programme activities in order to respond to the on-set of risks. The Country Office will also improve its communications and clearly articulate its mandate and progress against strategies to ensure that negative perceptions regarding UNDP’s support to Yemen are avoided, whilst demonstrating how UNDP’s support to government, civil society, Yemeni institutions and communities is enhancing the lives of ordinary people The programme will seek to establish specific arrangements with the Yemeni Police and Coast Guards for delivery and premises protection in Hodeidah, whilst relying on the special protection units to provide such protection in Aden and Mukalla. Regular assessments of the political and security situation will inform all programme decisions and help to determine if additional security.</td>
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<td><strong>OPERATIONAL RISKS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex technical procurement requirements, particularly for high value and complex items such as boats, spare parts and communications equipment. Risk of purchasing inappropriate, obsolete or incompatible items, or paying above-market prices.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td><strong>Moderate</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Obtain specialist technical and procurement expertise to assist in defining procurement specifications and supporting the procurement process.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Follow UN procurement guidelines to ensure competitive procurement processes, including use of long-term agreements where feasible to promote standardization of procured items.</td>
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</table>
ANNEX III- ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN YEMEN TO BE DETERRED BY THE COAST GUARD

The Yemeni Coast Guard as per its mandate, shall provide a high-level degree of integrated and coordinated maritime security, to ensure that illegal activity are adequately deterred and disrupted, and border integrity are maintained.

Under the mandate of the Coastguard, the main illegal activities to be deterred are:

- Terrorism;
- Piracy;
- Transnational Organised Crime Flows (Weapons Trafficking, Human Smuggling, Drug Trafficking)

Yemeni Coast Guard is also subject to conflict Threats in the Maritime Domain and Red Sea Ports, as a direct consequence of the ongoing conflict with the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen and the De Facto authorities ruling in Sana’a and in the North.

Following, an overview of the main threats to maritime security in Yemen.

Terrorism

There are criminal and terrorists’ groups operating in the region, perpetrating attacks to shipping or/and threatening stability and development in coastal areas. Additionally, the presence of terrorist groups in coastal areas means they have the opportunity to gain significant revenue from maritime flows, have exploited sea routes for logistics and in some cases have developed nexuses with organised crime groups (where conditions such as shared clan background promote this). The main terrorists’ groups are Al-Qaida5 in Yemen and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Yemen6.

5 Al-Qaida carried out attacks in Yemen as early as 1992, when the group bombed hotels in Aden used by US military personnel. Osama bin Laden’s father was from Yemen, and Bin Laden identified as a Yemeni rather than with his own Saudi Arabian nationality. Many of the Al-Qaida foot soldiers were originally from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, meaning some cells can use their background in the region to effectively exploit local grievances and concerns, and have been able to openly hold territory. It is also important to note the presence of Al-Qaida cells dedicated to carrying out high profile terrorist attacks. There has been active conflict with Al-Qaida in Yemen since 2001, following the Government crackdown on the group. In January 2009, the Al-Qaida groups based in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged to create Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In February 2010, the AQAP deputy leader called on Al-Shabaab to have a joint operation to block the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to cut off trade to Israel. There were, however, no indications of this being implemented. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab does not hold territory around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and Israel obviously has Mediterranean supply routes. In 2011, AQAP declared an Emirate after taking considerable territory following the Yemen Revolution. Significantly, AQAP took control of the eastern Gulf of Aden port city of Al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt Governorate, from early 2015, using it as their main base until a Coalition operation drove them out in April 2016. In late 2015, AQAP took over the western Gulf of Aden port town of Zinjibar, in Abyan Governorate, and withdrew in May 2016. AQAP currently holds a large area of territory with proximity to the coast of eastern Yemen in the area surrounding Al Mukalla, and extending north towards Saudi Arabia. AQAP holds a smaller area of territory to the east of Zinjibar, and some small pockets to the north of Aden.

AQAP has become known internationally for carrying out high profile terrorist attacks, notably multiple attempts to bomb aircraft. The shooters who carried out the 2015 Paris attack on the magazine Charlie Hebdo claimed they were acting for AQAP. In Yemen, AQAP has carried out large asymmetric attacks (particularly IED attacks against security forces) and runs a form of administration on the territory it holds. The Al-Qaida or AQAP attacks against commercial vessels offshore at the western end of the Gulf of Aden in 2016 (the Spanish-flagged MV Galicia Spirit, an LNG tanker) and 2017 (the Marshall Island-flagged crude oil tanker MV Muskie) involved crewed skiffs, with explosives used during both incidents. There were indications the group sought to carry out severe “spectacular attacks”, but failed because the devices detonated prematurely. Groups Operating In The Region That Pose A Significant Threat To Stability And Development, But Have Not Reportedly Attacked Shipping.

6 ISIL in Yemen has been a named affiliate since 13th November 2014 and currently has presence in the coastal areas of Aden and Hadramawt. The group initially had sub-units in many governorates and provinces. ISIL in Yemen has attacked Sectarian targets, striking both the northern alliance (including mosques notable for having pro-rebels Imams) and Shia civilians. The group has also attacked targets related to the Coalition. In key coastal areas ISIL in Yemen claimed a 2015 car bombing in which the governor of Aden was killed and a large suicide attack against police recruits in Mukalla in 2016. Nevertheless, ISIL in Yemen has been beset by internal divisions, and has not managed to make the local alliances that would enable it to gain traction.

31
The fighting over coastal territory on the Red Sea coast of Yemen between the two parties (including the international Coalition supporting the IRGoY) has severely damaged Yemen’s port infrastructure.

The shipping industry of Saudi Arabia in late 2017 was threatened, and this was followed by attacks on commercial vessels in 2018.

Al-Qaeda operating from Yemen has historically attacked both naval vessels and a civilian tanker.

**Piracy**

Incidents where vessels have been attacked by pirates confirm the re-emergence of a threat of piracy, but also the recent attacking groups’ inability to hijack large, transiting vessels.

The Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) made unsuccessful attempts to board cargo vessels transiting the high-risk area in 2016, 2017 and 2018. Smaller, regional vessels were taken in 2017 by groups that appeared to be pirates;

The Former PAG leaders have become involved in other organised crime areas, notably weapons trafficking and illegal fishing. There is some reporting that former pirate financiers have become involved in human smuggling. Further research is required to understand whether these former leaders are actively seeking to return to piracy or would do so if conditions become favourable (such as a reduction in security measures taken by the shipping industry);

There is an ongoing relationship between a former major pirate leader and the commander of ISIL in the region. Other nexuses between former pirates and terrorist groups exist, particularly concerning weapons trafficking. There are also indications that some current pirate leaders may seek to base themselves in Al-Shabaab areas in order to avoid the threat of arrest.

**Transnational Organised Crime Flows**

There are three major transnational organised crime routes in the region: weapons trafficking, human smuggling and drug trafficking.

*Note: The above map is included for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.*
All organised crime routes drive corruption, potentially undermining security forces, the judicial service and political process. The corrupt environment increases instability and insecurity, hindering opportunities for sustainable development. In addition, corrupt individuals who profit from organised crime routes have little incentive to see stability and law enforcement capacity increase. A further threat is that terrorist groups profit from smuggling and trafficking routes through illicit taxation or benefit through the ability to receive additional weapons.

**Weapons Trafficking**

A large number of weapons are present in Yemen and before the current conflict it was one of the most heavily armed countries in the world in terms of non-military small arms ownership. Since 2015, states involved in the conflict have brought in significant amounts of weaponry with the aim of supporting militias. Furthermore, there is little control leading to the threat that these weapons could be sold to be used for attacks launched from Yemen or transported by trafficking networks. Small arms (such as Kalashnikov pattern rifles) are cheaper in Yemen than in other weapons markets in the region, driving smuggling to other areas. The scale of weapons recently used to attack shipping vessels is notable, particularly missiles. Historically, IEDs have been used in devastating attacks on vessels in the area, highlighting the threat posed by explosives and components. Missile use against international land targets escalate the conflict. Onshore IED use in Puntland, Somalia and Yemen has had severe impacts on the international community, political personnel, security forces and civilians. Not all of these weapons are currently trafficked on transnational routes as Yemen and Somalia have stockpiles which have been raided by groups operating in the countries, but as these deplete weapons smuggling is likely to increase. There is evidence of the extensive use of ATGW, VBIED and UVIED throughout Yemen.

A broad range of weapons have been trafficked on maritime routes to Yemen, but those most of interest in terms of the major threat they pose to escalating the conflict when they are fired across the border are Extended Range Short Range Ballistic Missiles (ER-SRBM), which have likely been smuggled into Yemen since the implementation of the April 2015 arms embargo, according to the UNSC Monitoring Group on Yemen. It is likely that these weapons are broken down and trafficked on maritime routes to south-east Yemen or across land borders from Oman, with the sections then moved onwards via overland trafficking routes to reach northern territory. These overland routes have previously been identified after they were used to move ATGW to the northern alliance. Weapons trafficking is considerable both within Yemen and to Yemen. There is a notable threat of weapons trafficking on maritime routes, as conflicts and insurgencies have raged on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, driving transfers within the region, with Yemen a hub, and creating a market for weapons from outside. Focusing in the trafficking routes to Yemen and to Puntland, weapons have been trafficked on both dhows and skiffs. Weapons have also been transferred from dhows to skiffs. For weapons trafficking on maritime routes to Yemen, the focus is on transfers from outside the region. For Puntland, weapons are trafficked both from outside the region and across the Gulf of Aden.

Other trafficking and transfer routes exist in the region, including leakage from government facilities, state transfers to groups (both proxies and state) involved in the conflict and private security companies moving weapons in violation of the arms embargo (documented methodology includes air cargo).

The possible landing points in southern Yemen are Ghaydah and Nishtun, since the coastline in this area is remote and fragmented, with rocky outcrops broken by wadis running down to the sea. Ghaydah is the capital of al Mahra Governorate, and has a small launching area for fishing boats a few kilometres to the west, with many skiffs pulled up on the beach. Nishtun is 50 kilometres further south-west on the Ras Fartak Peninsula, and has a small port. Imagery suggests the port has been used by dhows as well as small skiffs.

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8 Small Arms Survey
9 https://jamestown.org/program/yemen-dangerous-regional-arms-bazaar/
10 Author interviews with contacts in Yemen and weapons analysts.
11 Notably the USS Cole.
Human Smuggling

Human smuggling groups take both refugees and economic migrants from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Organised crime groups gain significant revenue as these maritime routes have to be made with the assistance of smugglers, as there are no regular travel options such as ferry routes between the countries.

In 2016, the highest ever number of irregular migrants – nearly 120,000 - were recorded as traveling to Yemen. But, after civil war broke out in Yemen in 2015, tens of thousands of people fled to the Horn of Africa. Between March 2015 and April 2016 more than 85,000 people made the crossing, although after the first few months of the conflict the number leaving on maritime routes fell to hundreds per month\(^1\). Boats making the crossing included fishing craft and dhows, some of which may have been organised by NGOs.

An onwards route from Yemen to Sudan has been reported since late 2015\(^2\), indicating it developed as the conflict in Yemen has spread. From Sudan, irregular migrants travel north towards the Mediterranean crossing points, with the goal of reaching Europe\(^3\).

Factors such as lack of rights, violence and general insecurity, economic reasons, lack of social services are pushing people to travel from the Horn of Africa.

These reasons given for leaving juxtapose strongly with conditions on the route, where people travelling to Yemen are threatened by conflict, detention and may be at risk from people trafficking.

A concern is that organised crime groups smuggling people to Yemen are systematically downplaying the threats, claiming that the conflict has created free passage and work opportunities. In reality, conditions in Yemen are extremely dangerous for irregular migrants, with overland routes blocked by fighting and multiple groups carrying out kidnaps. People are forced to abandon their journeys and seek assistance in returning home. UNHCR has reported on the deception, and also noted that irregular migrants may seek to conceal abuses: “Smuggling networks downplay the perils and threats that people moving irregularly face and those who survive the ordeal frequently fail to feed back home the full picture of what they went through”.

Drug Trafficking

There is a major hashish flow from the Makran Coast of Iran and Pakistan to the Ras Fartak Peninsula in eastern Yemen and a bulk heroin route from the Makran Coast that transits the Red Sea, to reach organised crime groups in the Mediterranean.

Hashish has been seized by the CMF Combined Task Force – 150 (CTF-150) on a route between the Makran Coast and eastern Yemen since 2012. The amount has increased significantly this year (see Graph Above: CTF-150 drug seizures).

In the first half of 2018, nearly 35 tonnes of hashish were seized in international waters by the CTF-150.\(^4\) This is likely because of significant work to understand maritime drug routes in international waters\(^5\), so does not confirm a major increase in the scale of the hashish route.

Imagery of seizures shows that small fishing dhows have been intercepted on the route, with holds loaded with hashish. Some dhows land the hashish, while others are met by skiffs close to the coastline.

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\(^1\) http://www.regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Pushed_and_Pulled.pdf
\(^3\) RMMS report, ‘Pushed and Pulled in Two Directions’, May 2016
\(^4\) Data from CMF seizure reports. CTF-150 has a mission to enhance maritime security, by disrupting terrorism funding sources.
\(^5\) Information from CTF-150
Afghan heroin is trafficked from the Makran Coast of Iran and Pakistan, via the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{17} There are also indications that heroin is trafficked into Yemen, and then onwards to Egypt. There is very little information on these routes in open source, indicating that this is an area where further investigation and responses are needed.

A number of large seizures made between 2016 and 2018 indicate that heroin is being moved through the Red Sea in significant quantities. In cases where an end destination has been identified the heroin was intended to be landed in southern Europe.

- In April 2018 more than a tonne of heroin was seized off the coast of Egypt;\textsuperscript{18}
- In December 2017, 200 kg of heroin was seized off Egypt;
- In June 2017, more than a tonne of heroin was seized in the Mediterranean by Turkish naval forces.\textsuperscript{19} The heroin had been trafficked from the Makran Coast, on a route through the Red Sea;
- In December 2016, more than 170kg of heroin was seized from an Iranian-flagged vessel.\textsuperscript{20}

Heroin destined for Turkish organised crime groups is trafficked from the Makran Coast, on routes via the Gulf (where it is transhipped at sea or the vessel re-flagged), before it is trafficked through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The heroin is then transhipped in the Mediterranean off the coast of Egypt, to be landed in countries including Greece.\textsuperscript{21}

An interview with a member of the Yemen coastguard indicated there were concerns that drugs were landed on islands belonging to Yemen, notably small islands off Socotra, and then brought to the mainland.\textsuperscript{22} The majority of the heroin is trafficked onwards to Yemen. This pattern is similar to that identified by a senior member of the Yemen coastguard. The UNSC SEMG has also warned of the threat that fishing vessels with illicit licenses, with fleets that are not effectively monitored, may be involved in other organised crime activities.\textsuperscript{23} Details provided in coverage of a local court case indicate there is heroin trafficking from Yemen to Egypt on Red Sea routes. In at least one case those intercepted on the boat were from Yemen, travelling to meet an Egyptian organised crime group.\textsuperscript{24}

**Conflict Threats in the Maritime Domain and Red Sea Ports**

The cycle of violence between the two parties is noted, due to the severity of the impact on the Red Sea port cities. The Northern alliance advance into coastal territory along the Red Sea and the group’s use of ordnance, as well as the extremely aggressive Coalition response (notably airstrikes) has severely damaged infrastructure in ports as well as many other civilian areas.\textsuperscript{25}

Commercial vessels, small fishing boats, naval and military supply ships have been attacked, with incidents located in clusters in the Southern Red Sea, BaM Strait and Gulf of Aden;

There has been an increase in the frequency of incidents in which large commercial vessels have been targeted. Of particular concern is that three quarters of the reported attacks in early 2018 were against large commercial vessels, with one incident taking place more than 100km off the coast of Yemen;

\textsuperscript{17} There is intelligence on the routes to the Mediterranean. Additional cases viewed by UNODC in local Arabic media indicate that an organized crime group with Yemeni traffickers has been intercepted landing heroin in Egypt, with a trial taking place in January 2018.

\textsuperscript{18} IFC and local news sources

\textsuperscript{19} Details of the seizure were given in a news briefing, which was covered by Turkish media.

\textsuperscript{20} https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/12/19/egypt-navy-busts-170kg-of-heroine-on-iranian-boat


\textsuperscript{22} It is not clear whether this route still operates, given military presence in the area.

\textsuperscript{23} S/2017/924, para 84

\textsuperscript{24} In January 2018 an Egyptian court sentenced eight Egyptians and five Yemenis. There were no further details in the local reporting.

\textsuperscript{25} www.khaleejtimes.com/region/saudi-arabia/saudi-navy-destroys-two-ansar-allah-explosive-boats-near-jizan-port- “The air strikes carried out by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and the indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance by Ansar Allah-Saleh forces throughout much of 2017 continued to affect civilians and the civilian infrastructure disproportionately.”
Small civilian boats have been attacked, resulting in a large loss of life and hindering local and regional maritime economies. Where details are available, they indicate the attacks against small boats were carried out by Military forces which did not fulfil their obligations under the search and rescue regime.

A more immediate threat to shipping is posed by sea mines in Red Sea ports and their environs in an attempt to hinder Coalition access. The sustained closure of Ansarullah controlled ports of entry, in response to a November 2017 long-range missile attack on Saudi Arabia “had the effect of using the threat of starvation as an instrument of war”, stated a January 2018 report from the UNSC Yemen Monitoring Group.\(^{26}\) The Group also noted the Coalition needed to gain “confidence” in the UN inspection process of vessels, to avoid further hampering civilian supply lines and the maritime economy.\(^{27}\)

Aggressive attacks from the Coalition on boats presumed to be operated by or supporting the opponents of the IRGoY, create conditions where there is the potential for other craft to be inadvertently targeted when rigorous identification processes are not followed, particularly at night. Coalition counter measures launched in the Red Sea have had a devastating impact on local boats, and yet with the focus on military operations will not have provided an understanding of organised crime.

Attacks against small civilian vessels in the Southern Red Sea has resulted in significant loss of life. In a spate of cases in 2017 where small civilian vessels, such as fishing boats and a human smuggling dhow, were fired on resulting in more than 60 fatalities, reporting to the UNSC assessed the attacks were carried out by military assets.\(^{28}\) The most significant loss of life occurred in March 2017 during a night-time attack on a small dhow transporting people off the Red Sea coast of Yemen, killing more than 40 Somalis, with dozens of survivors\(^{29}\) who were brought ashore hours later with the assistance of fishermen. The attack almost certainly violated International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in the targeting of civilians, and obligations under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), in the failure to assist survivors. Fishing boats and camps have been frequently targeted, along with at least one small trading vessel. It is difficult to gain clarity of incidents where small, regional boats have been attacked, as there is a lack of reporting, imagery and investigation (with the exception of analysis of weapons usage presented in recent reports by the UNSC Monitoring Group on Yemen). A better monitored and therefore more understood maritime environment, with established communication lines between civilian and military actors would reduce the threat that civilian boats are targeted by military forces.

\(^{26}\)S/2018/68, p3

\(^{27}\)Ibid, introduction

\(^{28}\)From sources including UNSC Monitoring Group reporting, Jane’s Defence Weekly and author analysis of incidents.

\(^{29}\)S/2018/68

\(^{30}\)Local reporting at the time of the incident
## Annex 1

### Budget by Agency by Year

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Staff and other personnel costs</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>1,042,000</td>
<td>1,024,000</td>
<td>63,058</td>
<td>55,834</td>
<td>3,334,892</td>
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<td>2 - Supplies, commodities, materials</td>
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<td>177,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
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<td>380,000</td>
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<td>3 - Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture</td>
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<td>1,088,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<td>4 - Contractual services</td>
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<td>1,080,000</td>
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<td>5 - Travel</td>
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<td>775,379</td>
<td>755,455</td>
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<td>7 - General operating and other direct costs</td>
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<td>366,106</td>
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<td>45,000</td>
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<td>893,242</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3,568,106</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,999,379</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,959,455</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,058</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,834</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Indirect cost (GMS 7%)</strong></td>
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<td>249,767</td>
<td>139,957</td>
<td>137,162</td>
<td>4,414</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>832,242</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,540,370</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,817,873</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,139,335</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,096,616</strong></td>
<td><strong>67,472</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,742</strong></td>
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* the Administrative Agent fee is levied by the MPTFO (1%)