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<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Approach to Security Executive Group</td>
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<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>Inter-governmental Authority on Development</td>
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SSF  Somali Security Forces
SSR  Security Sector Reform
SWALIM Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TDR  Traditional Dispute Resolution
TFG  Transitional Federal Government
TNG  Transitional National Government
TVET  Technical and Vocational Education Training
UN  United Nations
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMPT UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UNSOM UN Mission to Somalia
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
It is with great pleasure that I present the ninth National Development Plan for Somalia. The prior NDP was a landmark document for our nation and this next version has built on its foundations and lessons learned, making NDP-9 a deeper and more optimistic plan.

Somalia has a long history of preparing National Development Plans, beginning in 1962. NDP-8, our most recent plan (2017-2019), carried the theme Towards Recovery, Democracy and Prosperity. I am happy to report that the nation indeed did make progress towards those aspirations, setting us on firmer ground as we launch NDP-9. However, for every two steps forward we have also experienced the occasional step back, as various climate, economic and security challenges have tested our resolve in the last three years. I am proud to report that our nation and its people have risen to these challenges with the help of our partners, deepening our resolve.

The current national development plan has been formulated to be compliant with the requirements for an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper which will allow Somalia, as a participant of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, to apply for debt relief. The overarching objective of NDP-9, unlike prior development plans, is Poverty Reduction, an apt and meaningful objective when linked to debt forgiveness – the burden of carrying debt is a heavy one for our nation, not only today but as a crippling obligation placed on our children’s future.

NDP-9 has built on the solid foundation of prior NDPs and lessons learned. The need for extensive consultations, to ensure the voice of all Somalis is reflected, was taken to heart. As a result the process involved 77 days of consultation with stakeholders – three rounds of discussions and workshops were held in seven regions, with representatives of each government and sector, with the Judiciary and with each Federal Line Ministry. These views on the causes of, and priority solutions to, poverty have shaped the strategy. NDP-9 has been owned and directed by the National Development Council, and was unanimously endorsed by Cabinet in September 2019.

Equally taken to heart was the need for data and quantitative analysis. The poverty analysis relied heavily on the recent Somali High Frequency Surveys, conducted in partnership with World Bank and our government statistics function. The need for a robust poverty analysis, based on sound data, is a key requirement for iPRSP compliance and we are confident NDP-9 offers deep insights.

The results of the extensive consultations and poverty analysis led NDP-9 to establish three national priorities. These three, Inclusive and Accountable Politics; Improved Security and the Rule of Law; and Improved Economic Development, were found to be the pre-requisites to poverty reduction and government’s ability to capacitate itself to provide Social Development, and other government services.
The high-level rationale is straightforward: national unity and trust demands a government capable of providing the services its citizens need for development, participation and thriving. In order to provide these services, all levels of government must increase revenue, which in turn is dependent on economic growth and an established federal system providing for equitable tax revenue, transfers and fair distribution of resources and responsibilities. Each of these developments is dependent on reconciliation and a trusted system of inclusive politics, governed by law, which requires a strengthened judicial system. Finally, all are dependent on improved security – a peaceful nation.

Resilience is a key theme of NDP-9. Climate change and exogenous shocks are beyond the control of government, but not beyond its ability to better anticipate and manage. The poor in particular are the most vulnerable to shocks so if Somalia is to achieve its objective of poverty reduction it must be through its ability to invest in resilience.

The priorities are clear, and our strategies for poverty reduction and increased national resilience have been conclusively agreed. We are confident that investments in political stability, improved security and a stronger economy will deliver the positive impacts we, and the whole nation, are seeking. We have set a bold target for poverty reduction within NDP-9 and our citizens, particularly those living in vulnerability, are depending on steady and implacable progress towards NDP-9 goals.

Our ability to track progress against this plan is dependent on the availability of statistical data. This has been strengthened since NDP-8 but Somalia has still some way to go. NDP-9 offers a roadmap for closing data gaps and the Directorate of National Statistics has ambitious plans for important surveys to be completed. Monitoring progress will be on a much stronger footing in the near-term.

My acknowledgements and thanks are required and extend to a large cadre of partners, stakeholders, donors and team members. The effort put into NDP-9 was impressive and would not have happened without the able leaderships of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”, Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, Deputy Minister of MoPIED, Fahma Ahmed Nur, Permanent Secretary of MoPIED, Abdikadir Adan, and the tireless work of the NDP-9 team under the leadership of the Program Manager, Asad Yusuf Qanyare. Somalia is in your debt.

Gamal M Hassan

Minister of Planning, Investment and Economic Development

Federal Government of Somalia
The development of Somalia’s Ninth National Development Plan has received tremendous support from a wide range of stakeholders, who willingly provided input and feedback, through consultations, workshops and reviews of prior drafts. Across the country, in every region, stakeholders from the Federal Member States, Benadir Regional Administration, Parliaments, and District councils were generous with their time and feedback. As well, many representatives of the private sector and civil society met with us to provide their unique insights and suggestions, as did most of our international partners. This Plan has been made richer for your contributions. The National Development Council provided expert guidance and support at every step of NDP-9’s formation and receives our thanks.

NDP-9 would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of the drafting team members: Abukar Sanei, Abdirashid Warsame, Dr. Mohamud Hussein, Sonkor Geyre, Howard Bell, Doreen Wilson and contributions from Marek Dabrowski, Ahmed Hassan and Selim Jahan. The facilitation of consultations, public outreach and strategic engagement with stakeholders would not have been possible without Director General of Planning & Economic Development Muse Mohamed, Abdiqani Muse, Seid Mohamed, Cabdirashid Nuur, Maher Abdullahi, Libaan Abdullahi Adam Abyan, Suleeqa Rajis and numerous other individuals. The final thanks and acknowledgement must go to the professional and unflagging leadership of the NDP-9 Program Manager, Asad Yusuf.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Federal Government of Somalia presents the ninth National Development Plan (NDP-9), 2020-2024, which provides the nation with a path leading to economic growth and reduction of poverty within the next five years.

Somalia has a long tradition of national planning, stretching back decades. NDP-9 builds on the progress of and lessons learned from the eighth NDP (NPD-8), which is set to expire at the end of this year. Its goal is to reduce poverty and inequality through inclusive economic growth and employment, improved security and rule of law, and strengthened political stability.

Somalia’s recent history of conflict is well-known. Less well-known, perhaps, is the development progress made by the country over the past seven years. In this regard, Somalia has taken important steps towards the establishment of a federal system of government and sound fiscal and monetary systems, which have supported moderate recent economic growth (approximately 3 percent GDP annual growth in 2018). A stronger government has been met with encouraging signs of community reconciliation and an enhanced capacity for local governance in many regions across the nation.

However, while these signs of development are hopeful, many challenges remain. Recent economic growth has not been enough to lift living standards significantly and poverty remains high. As a result, Somalia’s key human development indicators are amongst the lowest in the world. Therefore, NDP-9 outlines an extensive poverty analysis diagnosing many of its root causes, including conflict, political instability, climate-related disaster and a still weak economy. Somalia also carries substantial international debt obligations that threaten to hinder development and burden future generations.

The completion of NDP-9 as a compliant interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (iPRSP) will allow Somalia to seek debt relief as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which in itself will be a significant milestone in the country’s process of poverty reduction. In line with the guiding principles for iPRSPs, NDP-9:

● Has been Somalia-driven and based on broad participation of Somalis through stakeholder consultations across regions;
● Has a medium to long-term perspective in terms of its developmental vision and strategic interventions;
● Is built on a comprehensive multidimensional poverty reduction strategy with sustainable inclusive growth and economic diversification at its heart;
● Is results-focused, with a feasible and clear monitoring and evaluation framework, to ensure that limited resources available are allocated to those interventions with the largest potential impact.

As an interim PRSP, the scope for both development targets and government reform is more conservative in NPD-9 than it would be in a full poverty reduction plan. In this regard, the aims of NDP-9 are to show progress in the right direction in key national priorities. The intent, therefore, is to monitor and adjust the plan, including baselines, targets and interventions, over its implementation and as data becomes available.
Stakeholder consultations

Several rounds of consultations were conducted, with the first, most extensive one in January and February 2019. Workshops were held in five Federal Member States (FMS), the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) and in Mogadishu with representatives of the private sector, non-state/civil society organizations, state governments and members of the Parliament. Stakeholders were asked to identify both the root causes of poverty in their communities and the priority interventions by which they could be addressed. Though regional preferences were evident, particularly when addressing priority interventions, surprising consensus around the causes of poverty was observed among these disparate groups.

Drivers of Poverty

Though the list of poverty drivers was lengthy, over half of the stakeholders mentioned, among the key drivers, four issues, all of which are national and broad in nature: conflict and political stability; natural disaster; insecurity and the weak rule of law; and poor governance.

Interventions for Poverty Reduction

Equally, when it came to priority interventions to reduce poverty, four thematic areas dominated the response: improved security & rule of law; productive sector development, improved transport infrastructure and improvement in water management (infrastructure).

The second round of consultations included the Somali National Development Council (NDC), which took account of stakeholder feedback and evidence from the analysis presented in the first draft of the NDP, and proposed three overarching national priorities: 1) inclusive and accountable politics; 2) improved security and the rule of law; and, 3) inclusive economic and employment growth. A full range of consultations were also held with the Directors General of federal line ministries in order to identify and map, within the framework of the NDP and the Government’s Recovery and Resilience Framework, their five-year priorities, based on recent roadmap agreements with the Office of the Prime Minister.

Second and third round consultations were also held with Development Partners who, working with the Government, will continue to be important actors in meeting poverty reduction goals.
Poverty Analysis

Somalia faces a number of constraints in formulating evidence-based policies and plans, most important among which is scarce household and sectoral data. However, the National Directorate of Statistics (NDS) has made significant strides in the past few years. An innovative series of household surveys were conducted by the World Bank, in collaboration with the Government of Somalia, in 2015/16 and 2017/18. An analysis of the data from these High Frequency Surveys1 (SHFS) formed the basis of the detailed poverty analysis for NDP-9.

The resulting picture of monetary poverty indicated that 69 percent of Somalis live under the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day (in 2011 PPP dollars). Disaggregated data, along with the levels of severity of poverty, indicate that internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the rural population (both agro-pastoralists and nomads) have the highest rates of monetary poverty. An additional 10 percent of the population live within 20 percent of the poverty line, making almost 80 percent of the entire Somali population vulnerable to external shocks such as natural disasters, conflict and economic disruption, however small. Remittances, which form a vital source not only of risk mitigation but also of investments, totalled US$1.4 billion in 2018 and benefited up to 20 percent of the population, accounting for almost 37 percent of their estimated household expenditures.

Alongside monetary poverty, there are other less discernible aspects of deprivation. Poverty is multi-dimensional in nature, as demonstrated by multiple socio-economic outcomes, with health, education and living standard indicators all lagging regional and global averages. Maternal mortality ratios in Somalia are amongst the highest in the world, as are levels of childhood stunting and under-five mortality rates. Primary school enrolment is persistently low, averaging 33 percent nationally, with rural, nomad and female participation being the lowest.

Somalis experience deprivation in two additional dimensions: lack of physical safety and lack of empowerment. The first dimension has roots in both conflict and climate emergencies which have led to large-scale displacement and insecurity. Access to justice and the police present a mixed picture, with rural citizens relying mainly on traditional, clan-based protection and dispute resolution.

Lack of empowerment has led to exclusion, a feature of poverty that impacts three groups disproportionately, particularly when it comes to economic participation: women, IDPs and youth. Although the most current Population Estimate Survey2 (PESS) was completed in 2014, estimates have been prepared for relevant demographic groups. Women represent 56 percent of the population and generate up to 70 percent of household income but are under-represented in the formal labour force. Somalia has a predominantly young population, with over 80 percent estimated to be under the age of 35, enduring an unemployment rate of approximately 70 percent. As of 2017, almost 2.1 million (of an estimated 15 million) Somalis were categorized as internally displaced. For these three groups, poverty rates are high and socio-economic outcomes are substantially low. The result is significant inequality and lost opportunity. Location, cultural norms and clannism are factors that deepen the consequences of exclusion.

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1 World Bank has recently published the Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (SPVA) report using this data and analysis.
2 The government plans to conduct a Census within the lifetime of NDP-9 which will start with developing a census roadmap that will undergo a consultative and inclusive process.
The demographic shifts created by displacement have also changed the face of Somali lifestyles: displacement has predominantly been rural citizens to urban, usually in the aftermath of conflict or natural disaster. From a once predominantly rural population, Somalia is currently projected to be over 50 percent urbanized within the next six years – an issue that poses considerable challenges for public policymaking in the context of weak institutions and limited economic means, and in terms of coping with pressures from infrastructural needs resulting from rapid urbanisation.

The detailed poverty analysis presented in NDP-9 identifies the following groups as the most vulnerable: rural Somalis (including both agro-pastoralists and nomads); women; youth; other excluded groups, including persons with disabilities; and IDPs.

**Strategy Framework**

NDP-9 addresses the root causes of poverty and aims to improve the impacts of poverty experienced by households and individuals.

Analysis indicates that poverty in Somalia is driven by political fragility, conflict, insecurity and lawlessness, and exacerbated by climate emergencies. Political stability, security and the rule of law must improve to create the conditions in which efforts to support and climate proof economic growth can succeed. Social development is needed to fuel and sustain economic growth, through human capital development, social protection and disaster risk management. The poverty strategy for NDP-9 is therefore organized in four pillars: Inclusive and Accountable Politics; Improved Security and the Rule of Law; Inclusive Economic Growth (including increased employment) and Improved Social Development. By focusing interventions in these four pillars, Somalia will be addressing the root causes of poverty. These organizing pillars align with the three national development priorities identified.

Cross-cutting policies (imperatives) are integrated into each pillar, representing an important strategy for both targeting and prioritizing interventions:

- a) Strengthen gender, human rights and other kinds of social equity
- b) Build the resilience of households, communities and the government
- c) Better manage Somalia’s environment and its natural resources
- d) Prioritise durable solutions to long term displacement
- e) Strengthen the interface between humanitarian and development planning
- f) Make governance improvements a priority in each pillar

NDP-9 serves 1) as a roadmap for the FGS for interventions and investments over the next five years, 2) as a source of strategy and alignment for FMS plans, and 3) as a guide for development partners in their planning. The cross-cutting policy imperatives have been outlined not only as explicit features for pillar strategies, but also to inform and shape future programs and projects launched in response to the NDP.

The inter-dependence of pillars and their supporting strategies requires that NDP-9 be viewed as iterative, concurrent and non-linear in nature. Progress in one pillar is not dependent on the completion of a second pillar, but rather should be seen as mutually reinforcing programmes of action. An imperative for Somalia, and NDP-9, is to approach implementation as a multi-dimensional effort. In this way pillar-specific progress can be a spur to other pillar areas, accelerating poverty reduction across the planning period.
Poverty Reduction Strategy

Development and poverty reduction in Somalia are dependent on making progress on four causes of poverty and under-development: political fragility (inclusive politics), conflict (security and rule of law), weak economy (economic growth and employment), and community vulnerability (social development), all requiring a framework of strengthened governance. It must address these within the increasing frequency of climate events and community displacement.

Two factors significantly shape the interim poverty reduction strategy presented in NDP-9. One is the modest level of FGS revenue across the five-year plan, which will constrain government investment. The other is the scope of the challenges and needs in each of the pillar areas. The gap between resources and requirements will not be closed in five years. However NDP-9 outlines a phasing of priorities where early and dependent actions are taken in response to the opportunities available within the pillar. Doing so will produce change quickly and in the right direction and provide a foundation for future action. The interventions have also been chosen to reflect inter-pillar dependencies, so that multiple pillar benefits are realized with a single investment.

Pillar 1: Inclusive and Accountable Politics and Reconciliation

The NDP-9 stakeholder consultations indicated a widespread belief that lasting poverty reduction and economic growth is contingent on continued progress towards the creation of a stable and inclusive political system in Somalia. The NDP-9’s analysis of poverty and of the country’s vital security sector confirm that effective and inclusive politics is a sine qua non for reducing insecurity, strengthening the rule of law, improving governance, and accelerating economic and social development.

Challenges highlighted in this pillar include:

- An incomplete and ambiguous Provisional Constitution.
- A newly established federal system arrangement that is only partly able to provide the legal and institutional frameworks for tax and customs collection, revenue and resource sharing, agreed roles and responsibilities, inter-regional trade, shared security and justice arrangements and fiscal federalism.
- Institutional weakness that hinders effective governance, service delivery and citizen protection.
- Insufficient participation in the political process for some groups including minorities and women.

This pillar’s desired outcome is to make substantial progress towards a stable and peaceful federal Somalia with an effectively decentralized, functional democratic system based on inclusive political processes.

In order to make progress towards this vision, and to address the pillar challenges, the following strategies and interventions have been highlighted in NDP-9:

**Deepening the Federalization Process** – This strategy builds on promising progress and aims to deepen agreements between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and FMS stakeholders over important constitutional arrangements, including tax and customs arrangements, roles and responsibilities, improving inter-governmental relations, and the review and development of relevant laws and policies.
and regulations. Over the period of NDP-9 the goal is to formalize these agreements to such an extent that devolution of roles and responsibilities to FMS and local governments can take place.

**Stabilization and Establishment of Local Governance** – Communities rely on local government for the bulk of their services and support. Strengthening local government is a priority for NDP-9. This requires the drafting and enactment of a Local Government Act, the re-establishment of local/district councils, and the capacitation of its institutions. The most at-risk districts include those that are newly liberated from al-Al-Shabaab. This strategy outlines interventions aimed at providing support to these areas in the form of community recovery projects. In both local government and FGS and FMS, Somali women are seeking greater representation in employment as well as in higher levels of political participation as outlined in the ratified Somali Women’s Charter.

**Finalization, Ratification and Implementation of the Constitution** – The ratification of the Somalia Constitution is a fundamental milestone that is both a prerequisite and dependent on the formalization of a stable and agreed federal system and on the harmonization of laws and regulations. It also requires support and understanding from Somali citizens. Ongoing technical and legal reviews, public dialogues and awareness-raising will take place as early interventions, leading to parliamentary adoption and national constituent assembly ratification.

**Preparation and Conduct of Fair and Credible Elections in 2020/21 and 2024** – Preparation for these elections requires early investments in completing legal frameworks, including election and political party laws, the official registration of political parties (to be completed in at least 9 regions) and the registration of all eligible Somali voters (in all peaceful regions). The participation of women and minority groups is an important objective.

Two important cross-cutting imperatives are also outlined in this pillar:

**Implementing the National Reconciliation Framework/ Process (NRF/NRP)** – Reconciliation is fundamental to development and poverty reduction. Somalia has developed a National Reconciliation Framework and Process aimed at community healing. The NRF/NRP must now be devolved and operationalized at the local level.

**Institutional Capacity Development** – Crucial to community trust and development is the provision of fair and effective governance. It is a requirement that cuts across all pillars. Pillar 1 outlines interventions for the strengthening of government capacity, including the operations of core government, local government, and relevant political institutions (such as the National Independent Election Commission). To support evidence-based policy making, data collection and monitoring will be an early focus.

**Pillar 2: Improved Security and the Rule of Law**

Conflict and injustice significantly contribute to poverty – as was highlighted by stakeholder consultations, research and the poverty analysis. Though a lack of both security and justice is a national issue, the costs of their absence impact vulnerable people disproportionately. A lack of security, or conflict over resources, touches everyday lives and restricts movement and economic opportunity. The rule of law is the framework for the provision of security, but the collapse of central government in 1991 and the subsequent civil war brought about the disintegration of rule of law and Somalia’s justice systems. The provision of security and the strengthening of the country’s systems of justice, therefore, are considered urgent priorities for NDP-9 both for developmental and poverty reduction purposes.
Highlighted constraints in this pillar include:

- Inadequately unified, trained and equipped National Security Forces (although significant progress has been made)
- Ongoing threats of terrorism
- Emerging concerns from climate change (for example, water scarcity), an unprotected coastline and modern-day threats such as cyber-security
- Loss of judicial capacity and infrastructure, including insufficient enforcement capacity, exacerbated by severe underfunding
- Competing and unharmonized justice systems (traditional and formal), creating uneven access to justice and the judiciary system
- Outdated criminal and civil codes, accompanied by inadequate federal arrangements to provide independence of the judiciary
- A weakened system of judicial institutions, including correction and rehabilitation centres and orphanages.

The desired outcome for the Security Sector component of NDP-9 is the foundation of a security sector that serves the expectations of its citizens and the purpose of ensuring security and stability. The desired outcome for the Rule of Law and the Justice Sector reform is progress towards secure and equitable access to affordable justice and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary.

In order to make progress towards this vision, and to address the pillar challenges, the following strategies have been highlighted in NDP-9, with the Security sector covered first:

**Reforming and Strengthening the Security Sector**

The programs and interventions within this sector are guided by the principles and guidelines of the Security Pact agreed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and international partners in May 2017. NDP-9 outlines progress made in the past two years under NDP-8 in terms of structural, operational and managerial transformation in the security sector and sets out proposals that build upon ongoing efforts in security sector reform (SSR).

- Enhancing the ongoing Integration of the Somali National Armed Forces (SNA)
- Implementing the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Plan – including establishment of Ministry of Defence (MoD) legal framework; implementation of registration and payroll reforms; and other milestones outlined in the Plan.
- Implement the Somali Transitional Plan and the National Security Architecture – implement the core activities and phases of the transition plan, including stabilization of major towns
- Strengthen the Capacity of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Armed Forces in line with international conventions on protection of civilians, gender and human rights – institutional strengthening of key security ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS), MoD, and enhancing inter-ministerial cooperation
- Enhancement of Maritime Security through the Establishment and Capacity development of Maritime Police Unit (MPU)
- Developing Cross-Ministerial Responses to Emerging Threats – supporting the formulation and implementation of a Water Management Master Plan; establishment of Coast Guard and Navy; a National Framework for Cyber Threats.
The provision of security is important for all Somalis, but it is especially important for women and IDPs. Somalia’s Women’s Charter outlines the threat of gender-based violence, and measures to counter this. The Durable Solutions Program outlines the threats and challenges faced by IDPs with suggested remedies in areas of security, but also in justice and in employment (covered later).

**Strengthening the Rule of Law**

**Improving the Corrections System** – Priority interventions include reforming the Custodial Corps, Correctional Services and Prisons in compliance with international human rights standards. Proper segregation of prisons and corrections personnel, along with biometric, registration and payroll reforms are also targeted. Included in this strategy is the reform of rehabilitation centres and orphanages, supported by modern regulatory frameworks.

**Reforming the Judicial System** – Completing and implementing the justice and corrections model for Somalia, including drafting, reviewing, amending and translating the key legislations for rebuilding the country and its judicial institutions. Capacity development of the judges, prosecutors and others is also required.

**Reforming the Judiciary** – The Ministry of Justice Strategic plan outlines a number of priorities including working with the relevant stakeholders for swift action on establishing the Judiciary Services Commission; investment in infrastructure, security, enforcement of judgements and fines and establishing a secure budget for the independent operations of this branch of government.

**Strengthening the Security Service Delivery Capacity of the Police Forces** – As outlined in the New Policing Model (NPM), many programs and interventions are ongoing and will be further implemented including the continuation of the security institution reform process, the review of Human Resources, payroll reform and financial procedure for the police force and all other security institutions, as well as the continuation of on-going integration and institutionalization of existing regional police forces.

**Improving Equitable Access to Justice and Protecting the Most Vulnerable** – Securing and improving access to justice and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary through strengthening Legal Aid and modern public intake models to enhance access to justice for the most vulnerable. Alternative resolution approaches, including administrative decisions, will be investigated to expedite the process. Efforts will be made to harmonize the parallel systems of traditional and legal resolution systems by reforming, modernizing and delivering effective Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems as a means to fill the gap until such time that formal systems are in place on all levels of government.

Two important cross-cutting imperatives are also outlined in this pillar:

**Embedding Human Rights** – Somalia recognizes the value and power of operating within a framework of human rights and plans the integration of human rights into the Constitution Review Process, and the review of existing legislation for inclusion of human rights. Citizens will be empowered to demand and understand their rights, while ensuring security agencies understand and operationalize these rights.

**Strengthening Anti-Corruption** – This is a government-wide, indeed nation-wide, imperative. The intention is to strengthen national legislation and improve Somalia’s international standing. But it will also be operationalized within government standards of transparency and probity. Strengthening of
Public Finance Management and oversight by the Office of the Prime Minister, Central Bank and Ministry of Finance are important components.

**Pillar 3: Economic Development**

At the heart of the economic strategy is a desire to transform the economy by improving the resilience of the traditional livestock and crop production industries to better meet the growing challenges from climate change, while at the same time inducing growth elsewhere in the private sector to broaden and sustain the growth and provide greater employment opportunities. Though all pillars, working together, are required to make substantial progress in poverty reduction, it is within the Economic Pillar where the earliest and most promising impacts can be realized.

Somalia has been experiencing modest economic growth, reflecting the resilience of its entrepreneurial spirit, but it has been insufficient to match population growth or to provide sufficient employment for the young, the vulnerable and the poor. Economic growth is needed, but beyond mere economic growth what is required is an equitable, formal and regulated market which provides inclusive employment opportunities. Wealth creation that favours only the advantaged will not suffice.

The main constraints to economic growth include:

- Economic growth has rebounded, but a 3 percent annual GDP growth rate is insufficient to match population growth
- Domestic revenue for the FGS is growing but is still low (US$184 million in 2018) with the major part allocated to salaries (primarily security and administration).
- Tax and other government revenue are dependent on access, presence and control of ports of entry and commercial centres.
- Capital spending is a small fraction (less than 6% in 2018) of the FGS budget, which is insufficient to meet the infrastructures needs in post-conflict Somalia. In addition, there are limited resources to fund necessary spending on newly built infrastructure
- An undiversified economy, reliant on livestock and crops, is disproportionately exposed to climate risk and disaster, with resulting higher poverty and displacement rates for the rural population
- Food insecurity is linked to climate risks and leads to a national reliance on imports, creating a large imbalance between exports and imports and to poor nutritional outcomes for the vulnerable. In 2018 exports totalled US$675 million, of which US$409 million was livestock, while imports totalled almost US$3.5 billion – much of it food.
- Unemployment rates among young adults and women are very high, with a mismatch between jobs and skills
- Conflict and climate disaster have led to substantial population displacement, creating pressures within IDP camps and their host communities, and high rates of IDP unemployment

Many opportunities exist within a range of sectors and industries. Some are traditional (agriculture and livestock); some have emerged in response to new technologies or need (telecommunications, mobile money, financial services), while others offer new promises (petroleum, fishing, light manufacturing, and service industries). The need is great, the opportunities are wide, but Somalia’s resources and capacity are limited, so NDP-9 outlines a feasible five-year economic strategy.
Government to play an increasing role in improving the functioning of market

Government will improve the business environment through effective reforms that positively affect policy, institutional, regulatory, infrastructure and cultural conditions that govern formal and informal business activities.

**Enabling Business Environment** – The vibrant private sector is an opportunity to be leveraged, but that requires government to play its role in establishing an enabling environment. Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR), copyright, trademark and other pieces of supportive legislation, with accompanying enforcement, are needed to encourage investment and innovation. The government will meet the standards laid out in the Doing Business Survey, including streamlining the processes needed to operate a business. On the one hand, it will develop an administrative and legal framework that is more responsive and accountable to the public and limits the influence of special interests that otherwise would use public agencies to advance their interests rather than the public interest. On the other hand, government will support networking and business association through a Chamber of Commerce to build organisational capacity necessary to legitimately influence and shape public policymaking.

**Regulating the Market** – A level and safe playing field is required and one of a government’s primary roles is to establish the legislation, regulations and oversight of industries to ensure they are competitive, fair, safe and monitored.

An early priority for government, therefore, exists within the economic governance agenda.

**Investment in the Traditional Economic Strengths of Somalia to Promote Sustainable Production, Employment and Food Security**

**Traditional Economy** – Livestock and agriculture dominate the economy of Somalia, in terms of export, domestic consumption and employment. However, there are risks in remaining an undiversified economy, especially with the impacts of climate change on these sectors and the unpredictability of livestock and agriculture commodity markets. Investments linked to disease prevention, animal health and nutrition, improved crop productivity through better production methods and climate resilient techniques and the strengthening of value-chains, can deliver improved economic results in a sustainable way.

**Employment** – A focus on these industries provides early advantages: it creates large-scale employment opportunities, especially for four of the more vulnerable groups (rural, youth, women and IDPs) without a commensurate need for education or new skills training. It will also provide incentives for rural farmers and nomads to remain in place and stem and potentially reverse the flow of displacement.

**Food Security** – Malnutrition levels are too high in Somalia, with mothers and young children suffering disproportionately. A significant portion of the household budget is spent on food while millions face the threat of starvation. The balance of payments for Somalia is skewed by the reality of food insecurity. Investments in the traditional sectors, particularly ones directed at new climate realities, will address these economic and household level risks.

**Oversight and Investment in Supporting Utilities**
Power Master Plan – With the collapse of government-provided utilities, including power, private sector providers sprang up to fill the void. The resulting production and supply of utilities in an unregulated market with no or little quality control and safety pose a considerable economic policy challenge. For example, Somalia has the highest electricity charges in the world and, as a result, Somali citizens use charcoal and wood, decimating the forest stock. Somalia has produced and is implementing a Power Master Plan which outlines plans to increase energy production, increase the supply of renewable energy, and for government to establish regulatory authorities and a legislative framework to improve the market efficiency.

Water Master Plan – The scarcity of water impacts at the household and community level, in health outcomes, as well as in the economy. Water is especially important in the traditional livestock and agriculture sectors and is often the source of conflict. An early priority, therefore, is the creation of a Water Management Master Plan. In this regard, stakeholder consultations across the country called for:

- Mobilisation of resource for large-scale investments in watershed management and infrastructure to mitigate the impact of extreme cycles of rainfall, floods and drought will be critical for the resilience of Somali livelihoods dependent on livestock
- Rehabilitation of the pre-war irrigation and flood control infrastructure in southern Somalia to improve supply of surface water availability to agriculture

Diversification of the economy

Reforms and investments to enhance the economic contribution of a number of promising sectors including financial, telecommunication, construction and petroleum, as well as the expansion of international trade, are necessary to broaden growth, alongside the improved resilience and productivity of the traditional sectors.

Industry specific legislation and investment – There are a number of existing sectors (fishing, ICT, financial services) and newly emerging ones (services, manufacturing and petroleum) that require specific legislation and support, in addition to the overall regulatory framework covered above.

Enabling investment – This priority is tightly linked to the strengthening of the macro-economic framework and completion of Public Finance Management. External investors require confidence that they can invest funds in Somalia and realize a return. Equally the financial services industry must be capable of handling transactions while meeting the standards of anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorist-funding legislation. Mobile money, tied to developments in ICT, has provided support to Somali households through remittances, as well as some investment in small businesses.

Skills training – Poor educational outcomes impact on the level of employable skills. Investment in TVET and other vocational training and apprenticeships will be offered, particularly to the disadvantaged, including youth and women. The Somali Women’s Charter outlines their expectations with regards to economic opportunities, and both Somali Women and Somali Youth have recently approved National Strategies which directly impact in this area. There are particular industries that favour female employment, such as fish processing and small retail (especially in the informal sector).

Formalizing the Informal Sector – The extent of both informal businesses and their employment levels are unknown but they probably form the dominant part of the Somali economy. Part of the economic strategy is to formalize these businesses, offering them a framework of certainty through flexible
regulation and tailored business services, offering greater protection from extortion, while benefiting from tax revenue. Linked to the initiatives within the enabling business environment covered above, the Somali government will look to incentivize the formalization of these businesses.

Social and Human Development

Stakeholder consultations and the NDP-9 poverty analysis consistently identified low levels of education and poor access to other basic public services (such as health, water and sanitation) as leading causes of poverty. As such these issues were identified as priorities for future government action and will be carried out within an overall strategy of Human Capital Development. In addition, 27 percent of the priority needs identified by the Government’s Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) concern the restoration and improvement of public services. The sustainable provision by Government of quality public services is central to Somalia’s poverty reduction strategy and for building resilience for Somali citizens to economic, conflict and environmental shocks.

The main challenges in this sector include:

- Social development spending is a small fraction of the FGS government budget ($26 million US in 2018) – the gap between what is available versus what is needed exceeds the current budget by twenty-five to fifty fold
- Current education and health outcomes, especially for women and girls, threaten to limit the human development potential of the next generation, unless investments are made now
- These outcomes include one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world (732 per 100,000 live births), coupled with high fertility rates (6.7 births per woman) and low access to reproductive health
- Young children have high rates of stunting from malnutrition, a life-long impact which reduces their educational and economic thriving
- The current provision of education and health is dominated by private sector providers. This makes access out of reach for the very poor, who either do not receive these services, or do so through unsustainable humanitarian services
- Educational outcomes are low, with an average 33 percent enrolment in primary school, and 64 percent survival rates to Grade 5, and perhaps fewer than 30 percent of teachers have professional qualifications
- Health and school infrastructure is in urgent need of repair, rehabilitation or construction, with insufficient capital and O&M budgets
- Two-thirds of Somali households experienced at least one shock in 2018. The household level of poverty and vulnerability makes them especially susceptible to shocks, making social protection, including food security, particularly urgent.
- Somalia is rapidly urbanizing, due in large part to internal displacement, and may soon transition from a dominantly rural population to a city one. This has put pressure on the delivery of basic services, especially to IDP camps.

A range of priorities will be addressed within Health, Education and Social Protection. Two important principles frame these priorities:

- The government’s ability to fund these sectors is beyond the scope of NDP-9’s timeframe. A large strategic question remains: Will Somalia choose to have these services delivered in future as a universal public service? Or will they choose to regulate the private sector providers while
ensuring access, or will there be a hybrid model? It is premature to answer these questions. Rather, NDP-9 offers a focus on regulating the private sector while looking to engage with development partners to ensure provision to the vulnerable.

- Human Capital Development offers a powerful framework for strategic interventions, and MoPIED has supported a Human Capital Development Strategy focused on investments in education, training and cultural values.

**Improving Health Access and Outcomes**

**Institutional Oversight and Strengthening** – Setting the legal and oversight framework is a priority, linked to strengthening the Health Management Information System, and institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Health, and state and municipal government health bodies and Ministries. Standards will be set and enforced for private sector providers, ensuring safety and hygiene standards are met.

**Focusing on most pressing health challenges** – Maternal and early childhood health outcomes are urgent challenges, including reducing malnutrition and childhood stunting, preventable diseases (including increased immunizations), maternal health (including reproductive health), reduced levels of female genital mutilation (FGM), and greater access to clean water and sanitation (in homes as well as in health clinics).

**Focusing on the most vulnerable** – Rural citizens along with IDPs, and those in newly liberated areas, have the least access to health care. Somalia will coordinate with development partners to ensure coverage. Government will partner with non-state providers to rehabilitate or construct health clinics and will increase distribution of Essential Health Service Packages.

**Improving Education and Training**

Education was identified as the priority social development sector by stakeholders and analysis.

**Institutional Oversight and Strengthening** – Setting the legal and oversight framework is a priority, linked to strengthening the Education Management Information System, and institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Education, and state and municipal government education bodies and Ministries, and school boards. Standards will be set and enforced for private sector providers, ensuring professional and hygiene standards are met.

**Focusing on education initiatives for the most vulnerable** – Low enrolment rates for primary and secondary schools, especially for girls and those in rural locations, must be addressed and improved. Recruitment of female teachers and reaching out to households to pursue them to send girls to schools may improve the baseline. So too will investment in school infrastructure, school water and sanitation facilities, and improvements in security. Somalia will partner with development agencies to ensure provision for those who can’t afford private schooling. Newly liberated areas will be a focus for schooling and health services.

**A national framework of qualifications** – Continuing to roll-out new a standard curriculum, hiring qualified teachers, or training existing unqualified staff, and establishment of the National Qualifications Framework and Authority.

**Targeting a large cohort of youth** – In consultation with employers, labour groups and private sector organizations, vocational training programs, with a particular focus on TVET, will be established to
provide the technical and vocational skills needed for the labour market. In addition to TVET skills and apprenticeships, skill development in entrepreneurship and services will be encouraged.

**Improving Social Protection**

The newly approved Social Protection Policy of Somalia outlines the intentions of government to provide for greater social protection.

Priorities in NDP-9 include:

*Greater access to national identification documents* – The provision of social protection programmes will require registration. Persistently low levels of Somali ownership of national identification requires an early intervention.

*Progress on national policies, strategies and Charters protecting vulnerable groups* – Somalia has made substantial progress in developing polices and plans focused on vulnerable groups and situations. These include the Somali Women’s Charter; the National Youth strategy; Durable Solutions; Human Rights and Children’s Rights; the National Disability Act; the FGM Act; the National Gender Policy; along with the Social Protection Policy. Implementation of these policies and enforcement of the legislation are important aspects of social protection.

*Investigation of Social Protection Schemes* – This is dependent on government revenue being strengthened, but government will begin to investigate the shape of such schemes, which could include public works projects in times of disaster to supplement lost income, particularly for rural citizens. Unconditional cash transfers are no longer supported by the Federal Government of Somalia in the context of development and conditional cash transfers will only be supported after robust national ID-systems are in place.

*Improving Nutrition and Food Security* – This is linked to interventions in the Economy Pillar and to the health challenges outlined above. But nutrition becomes especially critical during crisis events. The government will partner with development agencies to scale-up responses to climate shocks and drought to ensure the most vulnerable received enough quantity and quality food.

The importance of urban planning and providing services to an increasingly urban Somalia is highlighted in this pillar chapter. This is linked to the governance cross-cutting issues below.

Two important cross-cutting issues feature in this pillar:

*Strengthened Disaster Risk Management* – The government has published a National Disaster Policy and will look to strengthen the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. Establishment of early warning systems, integrating with existing systems, is an early priority.

*Strengthened Public Service Delivery* – Inherent in the provision of social and human development is the capacity of government to fund, and deliver, public services. This pillar outlines early strengthening of the service delivery chain of government, with a focus at the local level.

**Macro-Economic and Fiscal Framework**

Though not a pillar, the macro-economic and fiscal framework is fundamental to the NDP-9. Its aim is to promote economic growth in an environment of low inflation, sustainable fiscal position, favourable
current account and healthy foreign exchange reserves. Monetary and fiscal reforms lay the foundation for economic recovery and growth by promoting a sustainable medium-term macroeconomic environment. This in turn promotes infrastructure development, increased investments and exports; and by improving efficiency in labour markets will promote increased employment opportunities.

**Monetary Policies and Financial Sector Reforms**

Monetary policy in Somalia is weak because the economy is dollarized due to the lack of credibility of the Somali Shilling (SOS). The Shilling has not been issued since 1991, so the likelihood that the notes in circulation are counterfeits is high. A key aspect of financial sector reforms is therefore the introduction of a new currency to end counterfeiting of the Shilling. All the required legal and operational measures for the introduction of the new currency have been concluded. Introduction of small denominated currency (Phase I of the reforms) has been held back by lack of funds and delay in putting in place frameworks and structures to support the process. Banknotes with larger denominations will be introduced in Phase II of the currency reforms.

Financial reforms are intended to build capacity of the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) to carry out its mandate by strengthening its operational capabilities to (1) develop and implement independent monetary policy instruments and reserve management guidelines, and (2) regulate and supervise financial institutions within its jurisdiction. Legislation and regulations have been enacted to empower CBS to carry out its functions. The Bank has also been strengthened with the adoption of its new organizational structure in 2018. The FGS plans to recapitalize the CBS so that it can adequately perform its regulatory function. The CBS has made progress in enforcing international obligations on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).

**Fiscal Policy and Management**

The aim of the fiscal reform agenda is to enhance revenue mobilization, expenditure controls, and transparency and accountability in the management of public resources. Implementation of the reforms has improved in recent years and this has led to increased domestic revenues, realistic national budgets, and improved execution of the budget. These results have improved the predictability and credibility of the budgeting processes.

Although the reforms have increased revenue collection, domestic revenues remain very low; and at 4.0 percent of GDP rank among the lowest in the world. Total domestic revenue is projected to cover only 63.2 percent of recurrent expenditure in 2019 leaving the rest of the budget to be financed through donor support. Overreliance on donor finance is a prominent feature of the FGS budget.

On the expenditure side, compensation of employees and purchase of goods and services account for the largest share expenditure. Little resources are allocated to capital spending and transfers to FMS. This expenditure pattern is mirrored at the sector level where administration and defence and security sectors receive the highest budget allocations, while economic and social services get meagre allocations. As domestic revenue increase the FGS will raise budget allocations to economic and social services sectors to enhance service delivery and to finance development projects.

**External Debt Management**
In 2018 Somalia’s outstanding total external debt was estimated at US$4.7 billion, of which US$4.5 billion were in arrears. The largest debt is owed to bilateral creditors, followed by multilateral creditors. Reconciliation of data on external debts has been a challenge since most of the relevant records got lost during the conflict. Progress has been achieved in this area with 100 percent of multilateral and Paris Club debt reconciled, while reconciliation of non-Paris Club debt is at about 95 percent. The government is confident that reconciliation of all external debt will be completed by April 2020.

External debt arrears have made it difficult for Somalia to get financial assistance from international financial institutions. The FGS is therefore seeking debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. After the IMF Executive Board endorsed SMP IV as meeting the Upper Credit Tranche (UTC) standards for debt relief, the process toward reaching Decision Point has commenced. The government is confident that the process will be concluded by early 2020, enabling the debt relief process to start.

**Fiscal Federalism and Intergovernmental Transfers**

The 2012 Provisional Constitution (PC) introduced a federal system of governance, but did not provide clear legal and institutional structures for managing fiscal federalism. It also neither assigned functions to each level of government nor provided an institutional framework for intergovernmental relations. On the distribution of revenues, the PC provided that it would be agreed between the FGS and the FMS, but the subject remains an ongoing process. These issues are being addressed through the FGS/FMS Intergovernmental Fiscal Forum (IGFF) established to harmonize taxes and address related issues, such as harmonization of fiscal, budget and accounting frameworks, and revenue sharing. Under the IGFF, FGS and FMS have agreed on sharing of natural resources and fisheries, and on revenue-sharing. The Government is reviewing models of fiscal federalism that could be adopted for Somalia. The Government will further clarify functional assignments of FGS and FMS, mechanisms for revenue sharing, management of natural resources and borrowing powers for consideration during the ongoing review of the Constitution under the Constitutional Review Process.

**Medium Term Developments (2019-2022)**

The medium term economic and fiscal framework provides five-year estimates of national incomes, prices and public finances. Rising domestic demand, remittances, and donor inflows and consolidation of peace and security are expected to drive growth in the medium-term. Real GDP is projected to grow at 2.9 percent in 2019 and at 3.2 percent in 2020; and at 3.5 percent thereafter to 2024. Over this period, inflation is projected to decline from 3 percent in 2019 to 2.7 percent in 2020 and to stay flat for the rest of the NDP-9 period.

In the medium-term prudent expenditure management will be applied, including implementation of pay reforms and expenditure controls to ensure operations and maintenance costs remain within budget. Non-salary expenditures required to support the security sector will be financed from external aid. Payments for expenditure arrears mostly related to unpaid salaries and allowances totalling US$65.4 million will be given priority. Given a balanced budget policy, expenditures will be reallocated, where possible, in favour of activities important for effective implementation of NDP-9.

Total expenditures are projected to rise from US$340.1 million in 2019 to US$363.6 million in 2020 and US$436.5 million in 2022. The main expenditures will continue to be compensation to employees and purchase of goods and services; with expenditures on capital and transfers remaining at low levels.
In the medium-term, the main sources of domestic revenue will be customs duties, followed by sales tax on Khat and income tax on government wages and salaries. The government will increase tax revenues by reforming tax administration, expansion of the tax base, and customs reforms. In this respect, the Federal Government will issue licenses to businesses to obtain information for assessing tax liabilities of companies. Grants will continue to be a major source of revenue, contributing between 45 and 46 percent of total revenue over the 2019-2022 plan period.

**Budget Allocations by Sector**

Sector budget projections indicate the level of ambition in financing NDP sector priorities. Overall, in the medium-term, domestic revenues and on-budget donor support are not sufficient to scale up reallocation of budgets within sectors towards key NDP9 priorities, such as the social sector and capital spending. Administration, defence and security sectors will continue to receive the largest budget allocations over the 2019-2022 period. However, allocations to projects and the social sectors will rise over time.

**Aligning Donor Resources to NDP9 Priorities**

Since the FGS budget can only finance recurrent expenditure with little funds left for development, alternative sources of funding must be identified for implementation of NDP-9 priorities. In this regard, it is recommended that donors are approached to align their ODA expenditures to NDP-9 priorities. This would require an agreement with the donors on a mechanism for monitoring their financing and implementation of some plan priorities; and a modality for evaluating the impact of the support. The process would have to start with the costing of all the interventions (priorities) of NDP-9.

**Government Investment Plan**

Somalia has significant constraints and strengths, which shape the priorities for investment by the government for NDP-9. Each pillar area outlines the sectoral background and analysis, along with specific pillar challenges, strategies and interventions, prioritized and sequenced across the five-year plan. These national constraints and opportunities have shaped the short-term government investment plan, with the most significant being the very low level of available government resources.

**Opportunities**

Somalia has a number of strengths and opportunities to leverage for an overall national development strategy.

- Remittances have totalled US$1 billion or more over each of the past four years and represent 20 percent of GDP. More importantly, they represent a lifeline to vulnerable and poor households. Poverty is estimated to be five percentage points lower in households receiving remittances, with the major part of the remittance funding household expenditures, particularly food.
- The capacity of the FGS, particularly in core and central agencies, is being strengthened. This includes the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Investment and Economic Development, amongst others. Line ministries have strengthened their strategic planning capacity. And the Directorate of National Statistics has several pipeline surveys either underway or in planning stages, marking important developments in strengthening national statistics. Several important policies and treaties have been ratified, including Rights of the
Child, the Women’s Charter for Somalia, policies on employment, national statistics, youth, and others.

- Ongoing negotiations and agreements are strengthening the federal system in Somalia, arrangements which are critical for national development. Increasing sub-national transfers are an indication of a strengthened federal system.
- Equally, efforts to bring peace across Somalia have been bearing fruit, with conflict-driven displacements trending lower.
- Economic inclusion of women and the youth, both representing majorities in the Somali population, becomes an exciting opportunity. Even modest improvements in labour force participation, health, education and mortality rates will lead to measurable improvements in the GDP growth and the lifting of households out of poverty.
- The final opportunity is perhaps the most strategic one, certainly in the short-term. The resilience of the private sector has been a feature of Somali development across turbulent decades. An entrepreneurial spirit has persisted in the midst of conflict and institutional collapse. The private sector has filled the vacuum and is now a dominant provider of education, health, utilities (such as telecommunications and energy) and transport. However with the private sector largely unregulated, this leaves provision of services, and entrepreneurial opportunities, uneven, with those unable to pay facing the risk of being left behind.

NDP-9 outlines a four-pillar strategy, with a list of interventions in each pillar significantly longer than can be achieved by government means. However they form important planks in the poverty reduction strategy and Somalia will rely on development partners in joint action over the five-year plan.

**Short-term strategy**

In choosing where to target investments, NDP-9 made some choices based on ongoing support from development partners. These include:

- Significant efforts and funding have been directed towards Security Reform and Inclusive Politics. These are both important pre-conditions for successful development, but partnerships and plans are well underway.
- The funding gap between social development needs and currently available resources is enormous and beyond the scope of this plan to close. Those who can afford to buy these services from the private sector are doing so; those who cannot afford these services can, depending on location, find them from alternative providers (Development Partners, CSOs, Community Schemes, etc.).
- Economic development and employment are identified as a primary objective for NDP-9, with early and strategic investment from the government. The intent, however, is not unequal growth, or jobless growth, but rather inclusive employment-generating growth targeting the most excluded and vulnerable where possible.

Though the overall strategy is to leverage opportunities and address challenges, the particular short-term strategy for NDP-9 economic development is three-fold:

- Creating an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote increased growth, increased employment and increased competition
- Building government’s capacity to increasingly play its role, in terms of regulation, enforcement, a fair playing field, regional trade, resiliency and transparent operations, within a sound macro-economic framework
- Ensuring through collaboration between the government and its development partners, that the excluded and vulnerable are empowered participants.

**Budget**

The Government investment plan for the first year of known budget resources that are *unearmarked* are allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Business Environment</td>
<td>Legislation, Regulations, Capacity Development in FGS</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving Macro-Economic framework</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Regulatory Framework</td>
<td>Hiring and training of enforcement personnel; regulatory monitoring systems; investment in judicial services, establishment of Commercial Court</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving oversight of financial services to better facilitate remittances</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Federalization</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Power Master Plan</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water management projects (including river management and irrigation)</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-requisite investments</td>
<td>Statistical Function</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Identification provision</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL for 2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>PENDING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the Government Budget cycle is nearly completed at the time this plan is finalized, full alignment between NDP-9 priorities and Government Budget will be sought starting with fiscal year 2021. The
Monitoring and Evaluation

In order to monitor progress of NDP-9 a number of principles were established, based on lessons learned from NDP-8, to mitigate the risks of the M&E plan:

1. To limit the baseline data, and targets, to metrics explicitly endorsed by government and nationally collected. In this way progress against the plan can be monitored in a sustainable manner.
2. To limit the initial M&E framework to a small number of strategic baselines and targets linked to high level objectives.
3. To present a secondary “pipeline” table as a road-map for development for the statistical function in government. The M&E Framework outlines baseline indicators by pillar area and provides an indication, where possible, on when the baseline data will become available.
4. To make institutional strengthening not only a key component of the M&E plan but of the national development plan itself.
5. To map all indicators, pipeline and current ones, to SDG indicators. The choice to use localized SDG targets allows the NDP-9 to be aligned to a common global framework, making alignment of funding and interventions straight-forward with the added benefit of simplifying reporting.
6. To not establish targets in the first iteration of the M&E Strategic Framework. This is based on two limiting factors: costing of NDP-9 was limited to a one-year time frame, and the budget was limited to the first year. Meaningful targets in most areas were not possible given these constraints. Macro-economic targets have been included, however, based on the agreed three-year projections with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Though targets have not been established for many of the strategic indicators, the intention is to monitor progress against the baselines on a regular basis (minimum every year, but within six months of publication) to track whether progress is going in the right direction. Once trends have been confirmed, and spending increased in priority strategies, meaningful targets can be established by government. NDP-9 has set an aspirational five-year poverty reduction target. The goal is to reduce the number of individuals living under US$1.90 a day by 20 percent within five years.

Next Steps

After receiving the Government Budget for 2020, the government investment plan will be completed. It will also include a mapping exercise of earmarked government expenditure and how it is aligned with NDP-9 priorities.

Donors will be approached to align their ODA expenditures to NDP-9 priorities. This exercise has two objectives: (1) to map existing projects and assess their degree of alignment with NDP-9 priorities and (2) alignment of future ODA expenditures.

Finalisation of costing of all strategic objectives of NDP-9 with a provision that this will be updated annually in conjunction with government budget approval.

The Somaliland Development Plan will be included/merged into NDP-9.
State Strategic Plans will be drafted in alignment with the National Development Plan.
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

1. The National Development Planning Process

Somalia has a long tradition of short- and medium-term development planning. Since 1962, eight National Development Plans have been formulated and implemented. The current and eighth National Development Plan (NDP-8) will expire in December 2019. The intention of Somalia’s ninth National Development Plan (NDP-9), 2020-2024, therefore, is to build on the achievements of NDP-8 and to provide the Government of Somalia with a clear path that will lead to significant poverty reduction among the Somali population.

Underlying its preparation has been the need to ensure that the NDP-9 is compliant with the demands of the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process. Such iPRSP compliance is a key step towards the clearing of national debt arrears and requires that the national development planning process reflects a number of fundamental principles. First and foremost, national development planning must be country-owned and based on a process of broader participation and consensus-building that delivers a comprehensive poverty context analysis sufficient to inform the future government and international partner interventions and so to ensure the desired development results and outcomes. National development planning should also link policy, planning and budgeting; identify national development objectives and priorities; improve the effectiveness of public expenditures leading to efficiency gains in public finance; harmonize development financing; and promote accountability and transparency through strong monitoring and evaluation.

Preparation of NDP-9 has therefore been guided by these requirements and in doing so has opened up space for input by all major stakeholders, including civil society organizations, private sector representatives, women’s groups, and direct and indirect representatives of the most disadvantaged social groups. Special efforts have been made to reach the most vulnerable parts of the population, such as the internally displaced and the persons living with disabilities. Based on the stakeholder input and a thorough review of available documentation and sources of data, an analysis of poverty and vulnerability in Somalia was conducted, which provides the foundation upon which the NDP-9 is constructed.

From the analysis, a poverty reduction strategy was formulated, consisting of three national development priorities – elaborated in respective pillars – and a set of principles and policy imperatives that bind the priorities into a strategic whole. Implementation, monitoring, aid coordination and accountability arrangements were then devised and placed within a framework of macroeconomic and budgetary projections for the planning period, which ground the NDP-9 in Somalia’s expected economic and fiscal realities.

A schematic representation of the process followed during the NDP-9 preparation is shown below in Figure 1.

The diagram encapsulates the methodology taken by the NDP process and is iterative. Each draft has been based on deepening the consultations and analysis, and further refinement of the Theory of Change, with interventions and needed implementation arrangements becoming more clarified.
NDP 9 Methodology

Two principles: 1) Based on lessons learned from NDP 8; 2) iPRSP compliant

Figure 1: Methodology for NDP-9

Along with 192 other UN member states, Somalia has adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and NDP 9 has aligned and mainstreamed the SDGs and reflects the 2030 Agenda Principles.

The three principles include universality, integration and leaving no one behind. Universality means that the Agenda is based on a set of principles, values and standards which are applicable in all contexts. Integrated means development must be coherent especially in the social, environmental and economic perspectives. Leaving no one behind means development which reaches the most vulnerable. The NDP-9 and its priorities reflect each of these principles, particularly as it focuses on multi-dimensional poverty alleviation to the most vulnerable in the nation.

Somalia is a member of the g7+, a collaborative network of twenty fragile and post-conflict member countries. Facing common challenges in implementing the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, the network seeks to share lessons, best practice and resources, based on the following New Deal principles:

1. Inclusive Politics to be fostered to reconcile and resolve conflicts
2. Security to be established for all people
3. Access to Justice
4. Economic Foundations through the generation of sustainable employment
5. Capacity development to generate and deliver Revenue and Services

These principles play an important role for NDP-9 in prioritizing amongst the many urgent needs for Somali development. It is tempting to believe that progress on the 2030 Agenda should be delayed until post-conflict development has taken place but g7+ nations have recognized the power of bringing the SDGs to bear within development plans, even while acknowledging the special challenges they face. As a result of efforts by this group SDG 16 was included in the final 17 SDGs. SDG 16 is squarely focused on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, themes strongly reflected in NDP-9. Priorities, roadmaps and the
M&E framework are mapped against, and integrated with, the SDG framework and each of its development targets.

2. The Somalia Context

2.1. Geography and Demographics

Somalia, on the Horn of Africa, the easternmost country of the continent, extends from just south of the Equator northward to the Gulf of Aden and occupies an important geopolitical position between sub-Saharan Africa and the countries of Arabia and southwestern Asia. The Somali capital, Mogadishu, is located just north of the Equator on the Indian Ocean.

Somalia is a country of geographic extremes. The climate is mainly dry and hot, with landscapes of thorn-bush savanna and semidesert; the inhabitants of Somalia have developed equally demanding economic survival strategies. Apart from a mountainous coastal zone in the north and several pronounced river valleys, most of the country is extremely flat, with few natural barriers to restrict the mobility of the nomads and their livestock. It is estimated that almost half of the Somali people follow a mobile way of life, pursuing nomadic pastoralism or agro-pastoralism.

According to the 2014 Government of Somalia and the UN Population Estimation Survey, Somalia’s population in 2014 was 12.3 million. Like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, that population is predominantly young with 75 percent of it estimated to be under the age of 30, and almost 50 percent under the age of 15. Somalia is also rapidly urbanising and, according to the 2017-2018 Somalia High Frequency Survey, has 40 percent of the population residing in urban areas, including Mogadishu with 10 percent, while nomadic pastoralists make up 26 percent and agro-pastoralist communities 23 percent. In 2014, it was estimated that 9 percent of Somalia’s population had been displaced by conflict and natural disaster and resided in IDP settlements.

Population growth over the past 20 years is estimated to have fallen from 3.4 percent to 2.9 percent, reflecting a decrease in fertility rates in this period from 7.7 births per woman to 6.7. On this basis, the current population is estimated to be around 14.3 million.

As of early 2019, 2.4 million people in Somalia – about 17 percent of the population – are estimated to be displaced primarily due to conflict and climate-related conditions. In addition, some 877,000 Somali refugees live in neighbouring countries, making them one of the largest refugee populations in the world. The return of refugees to Somalia has increased in recent years, in part due to discussions around the future of the Dadaab Refugee Camp in 2016, but the numbers remain relatively low: around 52,000 are thought to have returned since 2014, of which 29,000 returned during the first half of 2017.

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4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 UNHCR estimates 2.4 million in its early 2019 reports
7 UNHCR, 2018
8 UNHCR, 2018
2.2. Recent History

Historically, the Somali people have been governed by a decentralized system with customary and religious laws and informal institutions of the pastoral or agro-pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa. While political and social organizations were kinship-based and governed by an uncodified law of collective liability, the system was later paired with European models of formalized, individual-based law and institutions, with which customary law continued to operate in parallel to some degree. The effects of and variation in colonial rule — originally by the French, the British, or the Italians — continue to influence Somali society even today. In particular, geographical boundaries, and with them nationhood and belonging, were defined by the independence decision in 1960 of the Somali Republic, leaving large minority Somali communities residing in neighbouring states.

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in the early 1990s, the politics of Somalia have been shaped by popular rejection of a centralized state coupled with a lack of consensus on what form the state should take. During this period there was a proliferation of clan and local militia groups organized around personal, family, and sub-clan relationships. As militias evolved, they became self-financing by controlling infrastructure and taxing markets, though without any legal basis. Where local political settlements have been brokered successfully, personal security and socioeconomic stability have prevailed. For example, Puntland, in the northeast, has had its own constitution and political administration since 1998 but is a champion of a federal Somalia of which it is a part. In another example, Somaliland has its own constitution and administration and declared itself a separate state, a declaration not recognized internationally or by Somalia which considers it an autonomous region.

Finding a political settlement that supports a stable central government has been a core challenge for Somalia. In 2000, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was launched but failed to establish legitimate institutions and effective security measures. In 2004, a new interim government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was established under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The TFG was largely sustained by the African Union’s deployment of a peacekeeping mission, the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), in 2007, at a time when Al-Shabaab (AS) was becoming a significant factor. In 2012, after a devastating famine, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) emerged from the Provisional Constitution adopted in 2011.

Since 2012, there has been significant political progress. Federal institutions are being established. State formation has progressed significantly with the emergence of new Federal Member States (FMS) in Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug, in addition to the existing Puntland. Several constitutional bodies necessary for consolidation of the transitional period are now in place. Transparency has increased and accountability for the use of resources has improved significantly.

In February 2017, Parliament elected Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed as President, marking the second peaceful transition of power in Somalia since 2012. The election was followed by appointment of a cabinet and renewal of the partnership with the international community. This New Partnership for Somalia (NPS), agreed at the London Conference in May 2017, redefined the country’s relationship with the international community to respond to the political, security, and economic needs set out in the

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9 Bilateral arrangements between Somaliland and FGS are the subject of dialogues, the last of which was held in 2015. Proposals have been made to restart discussions, as yet unsuccessfully.

2017-2019 National Development Plan (NDP-8). The constructive engagement of the IMF and successful reviews of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) indicate growing confidence in the state institutions emerging under this reform-oriented administration.

2.3. Conflict and Violence

Conflict in Somalia is complex and in the eyes of many observers has tended to define the country’s recent history. Most conflicts revolve around scarce resource availability and access, which are exacerbated by exogenous shocks such as droughts and other climate related shocks.

Al Shabaab (AS), the terrorist group plaguing Somalia for more than a decade now, capitalizes on local conflicts and uses them to inject new energy into its waning campaign against the emerging formal institutions in Somalia. The impact of AS on the security situation in Somalia is substantial, with more than half of all incidents connected to AS. Indeed, the increase in AS related incidents outpaces the overall decline in security incidents seen since 2013\(^1\).

**Box 1: Al Shabaab**

Arising in 2005 as an enforcement group for the Union of Islamic Courts, AS’s power and reach grew with the 2006 fight against the Ethiopian army in parts of the country. At its peak between 2009 and 2011, AS had effective control over most Somalis in major urban areas and over key sources of revenue. In 2011, AS restricted humanitarian access to many areas hit with one of the worst droughts in Somalia’s history, causing the death of almost a quarter million Somalis. After the 2011 AMISOM-supported offensive, AS evolved from a governing, territory-holding force to an insurgency-style terror group waging largescale attacks against government and civilian targets in Somalia and the region as well as international forces and organizations. At present, AS is still capable of conducting attacks on security and political targets, and against both urban and rural civilians, collecting illegal taxes, extorting business people, forcibly conscripting children, and running a parallel system of justice in its rural stronghold areas.

2.4. The Economy

Despite the civil conflict and the devastating impact of the 2016-2017 drought, the Somali economy was estimated to have grown at 2.5 percent in 2017, while in 2018, Somalia’s GDP growth was estimated at 2.8 percent. The economy was propped up in part by remittances after the large-scale emigration of skilled Somalis. Remittances grew from a negligible amount in 1990 to approximately US$1.4 billion or over 25 percent of Somali GDP in 2018\(^2\). However the modest GDP growth is not keeping pace with population growth (2.9 percent\(^3\)) reducing per capita income during the same time period.

Diaspora remittances provide a lifeline for large segments of the population, exceeding both international aid flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). Remittances in 2018 were conservatively

\(^1\) ACLED (2018)
\(^2\) Somalia Economic Update, World Bank (2019)
estimated at US$1.4 billion, keeping pace with the growth of GDP\textsuperscript{14}. Remittances augment household income and create a buffer against shocks. While some are invested (largely in residential construction), most are spent on consumption (often on education and health services).

Somalia’s economy is highly dollarized, leaving the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) with no monetary instruments to regulate national currency. The last official Somali shilling note was printed in the early 1990s and the stock of shillings consists of a mix of official and counterfeit banknotes accumulated over the years. To facilitate the introduction of a new currency, as planned under the current IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP), the CBS is substantially enhancing its governance and capacity to manage the financial sector and monetary policy\textsuperscript{15}.

On the expenditure side, GDP is dominated by private consumption and imports. In 2014 household consumption, financed by remittances, was equivalent to over 100 percent of nominal GDP, with food and beverages accounting for about 60 percent. The ratio of exports to GDP is about 14 percent but imports account for more than 67 percent of GDP, creating a large trade deficit, financed mainly by remittances and international aid\textsuperscript{16}.

Agriculture (including livestock and crop production) as a share of GDP has risen significantly from its pre-war level of about 62 percent to possibly 75 percent. Before the civil war, the crop subsector was the second largest contributor to GDP and exports, after livestock. It remains crucial for food security, but its contribution to the economy is much smaller than it was, as over the past three decades, the volume of cereal production has declined by almost 60 percent from its 1989 peak.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{somalia_cereal_production.png}
\caption{Cereal Production in Metric Tons; WB data.}
\end{figure}

The state-owned food processing industry has disappeared, further contributing to the decline of the subsector. As a result, livestock remains by far the largest agricultural export category, having risen by a factor of almost 10 between the late 1980s and the mid-2010s. Nonetheless, because of the recent drought and a renewed import ban by Saudi Arabia, the volume of livestock exports fell in 2016 and in 2017\textsuperscript{17}. Fishing has a significant potential in the economy but a lack of regulation is leading to

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
\textsuperscript{15} World Bank
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid
unsustainable (and illegal) over-fishing. Efforts to re-establish manufacturing and other private sector businesses are hampered by the lack of regulation, legislation and presence of corruption. Somalia had the lowest ranking of any country in the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey in 2017.

Several economic activities, among them telecommunications, money transfer businesses, livestock exports, and localized electricity services, have been growing. However they are largely unregulated, and dominated by private providers.

International trade has grown steadily over the past six years. Aggregate data from trading partner countries shows that imports reached $3.3 billion in 2013 and are estimated to have been $3.7 billion in 2015. For Somalia, khat, a mild narcotic plant, is the second largest imported product after sugar. The main sources of imports are Ethiopia, Kenya, and China. Exports are estimated to have almost tripled in the six years to 2013, reaching US$779 million in 2013. Livestock continues to dominate exports, followed by charcoal, fish, and hides and skins\textsuperscript{18}. However, more recent trade data suggests that sesame may now be the country’s second largest export, after livestock\textsuperscript{19}.

Traditional livelihoods have been put at risk with the increased cycle of droughts, and loss of livestock and crops. Youth in particular have low rates of labour force participation.

2.5. Macro-Economic Framework

It is evident that following the inauguration of the FGS in 2012 the economy began an upward growth trajectory reaching 3.5 percent in 2015. This positive development was however disrupted by the 2016/17 drought which caused debilitating famine and humanitarian crisis, leaving thousands of households internally displaced. GDP growth slumped to 1.4 percent in 2017, but has since rebounded and is projected to register a real growth rate of 2.9 percent in 2019 and 3.2 percent in 2020 (Figure 3). In the medium-term the performance of the economy will be constrained, however, by the persistent insecurity in most parts of the country, lack of social cohesion and uncertainty associated with the impending elections.

Reflecting the growing economy, inflation began to decline after 2012, reaching 0.3 percent in 2015, but rose to 6.1 percent in 2017 as a result of high food prices before declining to 3.2 percent by the end of 2018 as the impact of 2016/17 drought receded. It is projected that inflation will decline further to 3.0 percent by the end of 2019. The basket of goods and services used to estimate CPI for 2018 are shown in Figure 4. The high prices of clothing and footwear, food and beverages, and restaurants and hotels are moderated by the negative prices of tobacco and narcotics and health. Of note, however, is that Somalia’s average annual inflation has been in single digits since 2012 and this is projected to hold in the medium-term. It should also be noted that inflation rates are derived from CPI data obtained only in Mogadishu and therefore do not fully reflect price dynamics in the whole of Somalia.

\textsuperscript{18} UN Comtrade, 2017
\textsuperscript{19} Rebuilding Resilient and Sustainable Agriculture in Somalia, World Bank and FAO (2018)
Over the medium-term, macroeconomic stability is expected to continue, with most fundamentals projected to improve. Exports are projected to recover with increased agricultural production, while imports are expected to slow down (Figure 5) as the impact of relief food and materials return to pre-drought levels.
The external position indicates trade deficits declining from 2017, confirming faster increase of exports relative to imports. Current account balance has hovered around 8 percent of GDP after 2017 and is financed by grants and remittances (Figure 6). Growth of exports and investments in the medium term will act as the main development accelerators and, together with improved business climate and stable internal and external macroeconomic balances will open up opportunities for higher living standards.

Somalia’s economic growth is driven by private consumption that is mainly financed by remittance inflows from the Diaspora. On the supply side, the main drivers of growth are transport, communication and construction. A good example is the aviation industry, where there are over 20 daily flights to and from Kenya to Mogadishu every day, indicating that trade in travel services is significant in Somalia.
Other major contributors to the economy are agriculture, livestock, and financial and telecommunications services. Although lack of data makes it difficult to estimate the exact contribution of these sectors to Somalia economy, it is generally agreed that services and agriculture/livestock form the largest share of GDP. The country’s mobile money sector is vibrant and if supported by appropriate legal framework could potentially drive economic growth and increase resilience in Somalia.

2.6. Aid Flows and Remittances

Somalia received almost US$2 billion in official development assistance (ODA) annually in 2017 and 2018, nearly doubling previously seen levels (Table 1).21

Table 1: Reported ODA

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<th>Reported ODA, 2017-19</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US$m</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total ODA</strong></td>
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Total ODA for the previous six years (2012-2016) averaged US$1.1 billion a year, with a fairly even split between development and humanitarian spending each year.

The 2017 increase in ODA was driven largely by the surge of drought relief. Donors provided a record US$1.3 billion in humanitarian aid, which made up 64 percent of total ODA delivered that year. The frontloading of humanitarian support in 2017 probably played a significant role in averting famine in Somalia.22

In 2018, the high level of total ODA was maintained by a 20 percent increase in development aid (from US$725 million to US$869 million), while total humanitarian aid fell by 16 percent from US$1.3 billion to US$1.1 billion).

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21 2017 totals have been revised upwards from the 2018 aid flow report, accounting for additional humanitarian aid drawn from the OCHA Financial Tracking Service.

22 Whereas humanitarian aid also surged in response to the 2011 drought, levels of support did not increase until after a famine was declared. In comparison, humanitarian flows as of April 2017 (US$614 million) had already exceeded the previous year’s total (US$563 million), demonstrating a significant frontloading of support that enabled a scale up of famine prevention activities.
Somalia remains highly dependent on aid and remittances. The ODA to GDP ratio in 2018 was 26.6 percent. Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are rising as is domestic revenue collected by the Federal Government; however, relative to GDP, their levels remain low at 5.5 percent and 2.5 percent respectively in 2018. ODA combined with remittances comprised more than 50 percent of GDP in 2017.


24 Only FGS domestic revenue included in this figure. If revenue collected in the Federal Members States were included, the % for domestic revenue would be higher.
3. Achievements and Lessons Learned from the 2017-2019 NDP (NDP-8)

As previously noted, NDP-9 builds in part on the achievements of NDP-8, which itself was the first exercise in national development planning undertaken in Somalia since the collapse of the central government in 1991. Thanks in large part to the 2016 consultation process, and the inclusivity of document drafting, at the time of the NDP-8 launch in early 2017, awareness of the national planning process was high and buy-in from stakeholders and partners was achieved. As a result, NDP-8 has enjoyed a high level of legitimacy and is recognised by all national stakeholders and international partners. At the time of writing, NDP-8 is still very much in play and is serving as the developmental rallying point that it was intended to be.

In December 2018 the FGS through the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED) commissioned a mid-term review (MTR) of NDP-8. Drawing on the MTR, the following summarises the key achievements and lessons that are emerging from the current NDP-8 process.

3.1. Achievements

Considerable progress has been seen under NDP-8 at a number of levels. The transition from the Somali Compact/New Deal to the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) perfectly reflected Somalia’s progress under the Federal Government and the country’s evolving and maturing relationship with the international community. The continued work and effectiveness of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), and the establishment of the Somalia Partnership Forum at its apex, is an achievement realised under NDP-8 that is of lasting importance for the country.

Under its nine technical pillars, progress is being made towards intervention milestones and targets, although this is uneven and, in some cases, quite limited. Of utmost importance in this regard is the coincidence of the first year of NDP-8 implementation with the 2016-2017 drought. The drought impacted the lives of 6 million Somalis, including the displacement of over 900,000, and, according to the Government’s Drought Impact Needs Assessment, generated recovery needs estimated at US$1.7 billion. The fact that famine, which almost resulted from the drought, was prevented is testament to the Government’s leadership at a time of national crisis, the generosity of the Somali Diaspora communities, and the international community that was able to mobilise large-scale resources. Nonetheless, a number of achievements stand out and should be noted.

Under the Social and Human Development Pillar, health services continued to be maintained through the framework of the Somalia Essential Services Package, which since 2016 has lowered mortality and morbidity resulting from cholera, measles and other communicable diseases, and maintained Somalia’s polio-free status. In addition, the burden of malaria has been reduced considerably as a result of a range of government-led interventions.

In the education sector, the Education Sector Strategic Plan has been completed, a new primary school curriculum rolled out across the country, and a national school leavers’ examination put into place. Despite the impact of the drought, progress is being made towards increasing water supply coverage, which now stands at 40 percent of the population (up from 35 percent in 2016).

25 Pg 21, World Bank Country Partnership Framework Document, 2018
Finally, under human development, notable progress is being made towards the NDP-8 targets concerning youth integration, which includes the formation of a National Youth Council and the rolling out of a work plan for the implementation of the national youth policy.

Under the Economic Growth Pillar, progress in the agriculture and livestock sectors was seriously constrained by the 2016-2017 drought. This was reflected in Somalia’s relatively slow economic growth during 2017 (2.3 percent). Nonetheless, with the support from the international community, the Government is leading efforts to accelerate the recovery of the national livestock herd and rainfed agriculture, and to put in place stronger disaster prevention and response planning. Another important milestone was the signing by the FGS and FMSs of agreements for revenue sharing and licensing of the national fishery in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, and for oil and mineral resource sharing.

The Resilience Pillar has seen important contributions made by a number of NGOs and UN consortia, and Government has published a national social protection policy. Most recently, the Government’s Resilience and Recovery Framework (RRF) was launched, which identifies national and state level needs/priorities and accompanying financial and institutional frameworks for its operationalisation.

Under the Building Effective Institutions Pillar, implementation by the FGS of fiscal policy has improved markedly. As a result, domestic revenue mobilization has increased, budgets have become more realistic, and budget execution has improved. Importantly, a new Statistics Law is under review by the national Parliament, and a national statistics strategy has been finalised. At the state level, FMSs have made progress towards establishing the organisational structures, mandates and staffing needed for effective governance. FMSs are also undertaking an annual workplan exercise for the first time since 1991.

Tangible progress has been made under the Inclusive Politics, Security and Rule of Law Pillar. A roadmap for inclusive politics, which outlines priorities and functions of different institutions to achieve targets in federalism, constitutional review and the national electoral process, has been adopted by the FGS. As a result, the constitutional review process was launched, and agreement reached on the electoral model to be used for the national election in late 2020. In February 2019, a validation workshop on the proposed National Reconciliation Framework was held by the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR). Other achievements include the completion and publication of a voter registration feasibility study, and the provisional registration of political parties, pending the enactment of the Political Parties Act.

Finally, through its Comprehensive Approach to Security, the Government, with ongoing support from AMISOM and its international partners, has made important progress towards the establishment of a national security architecture. Important policies and plans have been completed, including Operational Readiness Assessments, while biometric registration has been ongoing and is scheduled for completion by the end of 2019. Coordination across government and with partners has been strengthened, and functional strengthening has taken place, including establishing financial and procurement guidelines.

3.2. Lessons Learned

Against this set of achievements under NDP-8, important lessons have been learned that inform the content of the NDP-9.
Stakeholder and partner participation. A clear lesson to have emerged from NDP-8 relates to the limited nature of stakeholder and partner participation that took place in 2017 during the plan preparation. FMS consultations did take place, and they contributed to raising of awareness of the planning process at the time. But they were short and were carried out in only a limited number of locations, and two years later the MTR found only limited alignment between FMS planning and NDP-8, and low levels of public awareness of the NDP process.

Development partners engaged quite late in the process and in a manner that resulted in inputs being fragmented and projectized and informed more by partner priorities than by any national agenda.

To correct this shortcoming, substantial efforts have been made during the preparation of NDP-9 to engage stakeholders and partners more fully ahead of the formulation and finalisation of plan content. The details of these consultations are covered in the next Chapter.

Scope and ambition of the NDP. There is widespread agreement that NDP-8 is overambitious in its scope, particularly when set within Somalia’s highly fragile context. The number of the NDP-8 pillar components is nine, which is too many to provide a clear statement of strategic intent and exceeds the capacity of federal and state government and their development partners to operationalise, coordinate and measure progress towards milestones and targets. Although much has been achieved, as a result of this over-ambition only modest progress is being made towards many of the targets contained within NDP-8, and the likelihood is that some will not be reached before the end of the plan in December 2019.

The Government concludes that this over-reach was driven by the fragmented and projectized input from stakeholders and partners, which was incorporated into the nine NDP-8 pillars without reference to a clear Government-owned framework that would set out the country’s development goals and strategies by which those goals would be reached.

Informed by this experience, NDP-9 is shaped by a strategy framework. The framework, which itself is derived from a rigorous analysis of poverty and its causes in Somalia, and by inputs from a comprehensive stakeholder consultation process, sets out the NDP’s development goals which are limited to three, and the policies to be implemented by NDP-9 in pursuit of these focused priorities. The content of the NDP-9 pillars – the sector-level objectives and strategies – is then formulated with reference to the framework. These sector-level objectives have been aligned to line ministry priorities and the 2019 roadmaps, which in turn were limited to their top three priorities.

NDP costing. Related to the problem of scope and prioritization, a shortcoming of the NDP-8 was the lack of costing of the planned interventions. This was due in part to the fragmented, projectized nature of input to the plan, but also to the unavailability of appropriate costing standards at the time.

The ability to cost remains a challenge linked to a lack of historical benchmarks, capacity and the modest budget available for government investment. The approach taken by NDP-9 is to allocate the budget available in year one, with the intention to review and complete future budgets as resources become more available and the costing base more sure.

The lesson carried into NDP-9 is that, in addition to the need for costing standards, costing itself must be done at a strategic or programmatic level in a way that allows those standards to be applied and alignment established with government and partner financial projections.
**Government coordination.** The MTR revealed that NDP-8 implementation has been hindered by the challenges of coordination within the Government of Somalia; that is, vertical coordination between FMS/BRA and FGS ministries, and horizontal coordination between FGS ministries, departments and agencies and indeed within individual ministries. Moreover, the MTR found that neither federal ministry nor FMS government plans and budgets were strongly aligned with the NDP-8.

To some degree, the coordination challenge between state and federal government is an expression of the political tensions that inevitably arise between the two during the process of state building and the development of federal institutions. That is, political tensions have sometimes tended to be played out at the technical level. A part of the challenge, therefore, is to delink the technical from the political. This process will be led by the federal and state level ministries of planning, which have already established strong working relationships at the level of Director General. The process will be supported by the National Security Council and National Development Council, which bring together federal and state governments at the ministerial level.

However, contributing to the coordination challenge are frequent changes in senior personnel in both Federal and State Governments, including at the DG level, and the use by both of short-term consultants to fill in staffing-gaps. Such personnel management practice, combined with the Government’s under-developed data management capacities, lead to discontinuities and a lack of institutional memory that constrains effective coordination and collaboration. At the time of writing, efforts are underway to improve horizontal and vertical communication within government.

Intra-government coordination will also be supported and enhanced by the fuller consultation process that has underpinned the preparation of NDP-9, and that will continue throughout its implementation. Such consultation will result in both higher levels of stakeholder awareness and appreciation of the national planning process, and greater recognition of and identification with the goals and priorities it contains. However, it should be noted that consultation processes in Somalia are expensive. During the NDP-9 implementation, less-costly means, including teleconferencing, will be explored.

**Aid coordination architecture.** Aid coordination in Somalia is conducted by and through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), established in 2014 as the architecture of the New Deal-Somali Compact. In early 2017, following the national election and the expiry of the New Deal, the SDRF was carried over and adapted to the needs of the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) and NDP-8.

In many respects, the SDRF continues to perform a vital aid coordination function for Somalia, providing a set of multi-stakeholder forums through which partnership is strengthened, development programming identified and funded, and mutual accountability promoted. However, at the technical/working level – consisting of the nine Pillar Working Groups (PWGs) – it has struggled to perform consistently. According to the MTR, the PWGs are viewed by government representatives to be largely driven by partner priorities and overly focused on project funding from the three SDRF Trust Funds. Perhaps for this reason government participation in the PWGs has been uneven, and the SDRF has not been as effective as it might have been in terms of supporting federal-state coordination.

Going forward with NDP-9, the SDRF and its PWGs will continue to be at the centre of aid coordination in Somalia, but efforts will need to be made to address the shortcomings identified by the MTR. A smaller number of pillars is likely to help in this regard, as will a further clarification of PWG mandate and membership.
Use of country systems. Over the past two years, important strides have been made in Somalia towards the use of country systems (UCS) by the development partners, which itself is a reflection of improvements made by government in its public financial management. The MTR reported that in 2017 nearly 15 percent of development assistance (not including humanitarian aid) was delivered on-treasury, up from 4 percent in 2015.

However, the preliminary analysis of 2018 aid flows shows that the share of aid delivered on-treasury decreased to 10.5 percent in 2018. According to the Federal Ministry of Finance, the decline was due to a decrease in budget support delivered on treasury from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The OECD DAC donors increased their contributions of on-treasury aid channelled through multilateral instruments.

The World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) was the largest channel through which donors provided aid on-treasury in 2018. Through government-implemented projects, the fund disbursed US$38.1 million through the treasury in 2018. From 2014-2018, the MPF has disbursed a total of US$117.6 million on treasury. The MPF donors include the European Union, United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, the World Bank State and Peace-building Fund, Finland, the United States of America and Italy.

The EU signed an agreement with Somalia in October 2018 to provide EUR 100 million (US$114 million) in budget support over a period of 2.5 years. Under the new agreement US$13.3 million in budget support was delivered in 2018.

This increase in on-treasury support is important progress, but the figures nonetheless compare poorly with other countries of similar status. The government therefore intends that NDP-9 will build on these improvements and further increase the use of country systems for development assistance.

Institutional capacity limitations. A final important lesson taken from NDP-8 implementation – which relates to the lessons concerning plan scope and ambition – is that Somalia’s institutional environment remains at an early stage of development and currently lacks the capacities needed to carry forward an ambitious and wide-ranging development agenda. In addition to shortfalls in the number and capability of personnel, the problem of capacity refers to the systems normally used by the government. For example, Somalia has a very weak data and statistics management capacity, which would ordinarily underpin much of the work undertaken in a national development plan. As a result of its weak human resource base and poorly developed systems, the Government of Somalia lacks the institutional memory upon which most organisations depend.

Therefore, in preparing the NDP-9 and in identifying and developing priority interventions, the government has kept the issue of capacity and feasibility very much at the front of its thinking. Institutional capacity building will be an important theme that cuts across the content of NDP-9. However the building of capacities in Somalia will be a process that spans many national development plans and, as such, constrained institutional strength must be considered a limiting factor for NDP-9.

The Government of Somalia is committed to ensure to the extent possible that citizens engage in the preparation of NDP-9 through an iterative process of consultation. Such consultations are an essential part of the planning process and inform the Government’s understanding of both effects and root causes of poverty as well as the formulation of the plan’s poverty reduction strategy.

Consultations for NDP-9 took place across three rounds. The first round (C1), conducted in January and February 2019, focused exclusively on obtaining input from Somali stakeholders on the causes of poverty and appropriate responses to these. Its output is summarized in this chapter, with the full results available in Annex 1. The second round (C2) was conducted in May and June 2019 and was an opportunity for Somali stakeholders to respond to the first draft of NDP-9, and for the development partners to engage with the plan preparation process and to influence the plan content. The output of C2 has further shaped the content of the second draft of NDP-9. The third and final round (C3) allowed senior Government stakeholders (FGS and FMS) to review and endorse the content of the third draft of NDP-9 ahead of its finalisation and presentation to the Cabinet.

1. Background to Round 1 Consultations

The first round of consultations (C1) engaged both national-level and federal member state (FMS) stakeholders. The consultations were conducted first in Mogadishu for national-level stakeholders in January 2019, and subsequently for the five FMSs and Benadir Regional Administration (BRA), as follows:

- Hirshabelle, in Jowhar from 10 to 15 February
- Jubaland, in Kismayo from 14 to 19 February
- Southwest State, in Baidoa from 17 to 22 February
- Galmudug, in Cadado from 22 to 27 February
- Puntland, in Garowe from 26 to 31 March
- BRA, in Mogadishu on 07 March

The purpose of the first round of consultation was to inform the analysis of poverty (see Chapter 3) prepared by the NDP-Secretariat in the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED). As noted, the analysis of poverty is a key element of NDP-9 and will be the base from which the plan’s programme and policy content is derived.

In each location consultation meetings were held with four groups of national stakeholders, namely:

- Civil society
- The private sector
- Federal Government or FMS line ministries
- Representatives of the National Parliament or FMS Assemblies

All four meetings followed a similar format, which consisted of presentations by the MoPIED team of the NDP-9 planning process, and the multi-dimensional description of poverty that MoPIED proposes to use...
in the plan. Through a mix of plenary discussion and group work, meeting participants were asked to consider a number of questions that will be addressed by the NDP-9 poverty analysis:

- What are the main characteristics of poverty in Somalia, and is the proposed description of multi-dimensional poverty useful?
- What are the main causes or drivers of poverty in Somalia?
- What are the outcomes of poverty in Somalia?
- What strategies are used by Somalis to cope with poverty?
- What actions should the Government take to reduce poverty?

The remainder of this section presents summary accounts of the consultations held in Mogadishu and with the five Federal Member States and the Benadir Regional Administration, and a graphical presentation and tabulation of the main issues identified by each of the stakeholder groups.

2. Overview of Consultation Output

The following charts summarize the results of stakeholder consultations, by type of stakeholders and by regions. As discussed above, the results were consistent across most stakeholders, with a consensus around the top four or five drivers of poverty. Interventions showed more variation by stakeholder, and by region, indicating opportunities to tailor interventions to best suit local contexts.

Poverty here consists of 4 dimensions of deprivation: monetary; living standard; education; water and sanitation.
Figure 9: Causes of Poverty (Stakeholder)
Figure 10: Causes of Poverty (Region)
Only four drivers were mentioned by a majority of all stakeholders:

![Bar Chart]

**Figure 11: The four causes of poverty identified by the majority of stakeholders**

It is interesting to note that the tendency of all stakeholders, irrespective of constituent group or location, was to identify large, national themes as causes of poverty, rather than focusing on the traits of households or individuals. The challenge of inclusive development lies in addressing these complex and multi-faceted constraints. As will be noted later in this plan, the challenges are made even more complex because of the entwined nature of these drivers. Natural disaster impacts on governance (made worse by weak governance) which spawns competition and conflict over resources, which in turn impacts on security levels and economic activities, with the repercussions amplifying across these themes.

In addition to the causes of poverty, stakeholders provided input into desirable interventions targeted at reducing poverty. The following charts summarize their responses.
Figure 12: Priority Interventions (Stakeholder)
Figure 13: Priority Interventions (Region)
Though there is obvious consensus, more variations of desired interventions are demonstrated in the intervention charts than in the drivers of poverty discussions. For some the care of IDPs ranks the highest, for others it is job creation, and for some it is investment in infrastructure that is important to their region or city. A consolidation of interventions under themes, or sectors, reveals:

Figure 14: Stakeholder Consultations on Poverty Interventions, by Sector

The dominance of economic interventions partly reflects the range of possible interventions within this sector, with variations shown region by region. Within the governance cluster, the majority of participants cited improving the delivery of public services, including education and judicial services, though overall improvement of governance in terms of institutional effectiveness and transparency was also a dominant response. The lower relative result of improving national security should be interpreted in light of the tendency of participants to raise fewer specific interventions. While economic interventions would elicit a number of specific projects and suggestions, when it came to security the stakeholders tended to offer only one intervention, which was to improve security. Thus a low number of interventions in this area shouldn’t be interpreted as being of low priority to participants. As demonstrated above, improving security was one of the dominant suggestions for action.
These results align with the overall development priorities of regions as identified through the Government’s 2018 Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) – see Figure 15 below – particularly when it comes to prioritizing economic growth potential and infrastructure investments.

![Map of Priority Interventions from RRF](image)

**Figure 15: Map of Priority Interventions from RRF**

Agriculture was accorded the highest priority by 4 of the 5 FMSs. Puntland rated transport - including roads linking local markets - the highest priority. Benaadir and Southwest State gave high priority to urban development and municipal services, including housing for IDPs, jobs and education.

The regional voice in shaping economic interventions is a consultation result worth noting. The population displacement of the past five years has witnessed a shift from rural settings into urban camps. The regions most impacted by displacement have identified urban development as the most pressing response to local poverty, while rural locations highlight agricultural investment and related infrastructure.

The following section presents the consultation inputs in tabular detail, with Annex 1 providing the full compilation of discussions.
### 3. Tabulation of Stakeholder Inputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS (MOGADISHU)</th>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causes of poverty</strong></td>
<td>Environmental vulnerability</td>
<td>Poor transport infrastructure</td>
<td>Conflict and insecurity</td>
<td>Conflict and insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict and political instability</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>Repeated exposure to natural disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insecurity and the absence of the rule of law</td>
<td>Poor education</td>
<td>High unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The national debt</td>
<td>Limited vocational skills</td>
<td>Limited livelihoods opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak governance</td>
<td>Cultural norms and behaviours</td>
<td>Social inequalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political exclusion</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What should be done?</strong></td>
<td>Discussion didn’t include suggested solutions but focused on the causes of poverty</td>
<td>Investing in and promoting Somali-owned business</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Build capacities for disaster risk management and strategy development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regulation of imported goods</td>
<td>Environmental management</td>
<td>Productive sector development (agriculture, livestock, fisheries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthened government revenue base through development of tax collection systems</td>
<td>Disaster preparedness and risk management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Resolution of political tensions between federal and FMS governments</td>
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<td>Strengthening of governance through capacity building for public financial management</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Skills development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Productive sector development (agriculture, livestock, fisheries)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>However, the plan should be affordable and within Somalia’s means – it should not rely on external funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Raise awareness in government of NDP-9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HIRSHABELLE**

**Causes of poverty**
- Frequent flooding of Shabelle river
- Upstream over-use in Ethiopia
- Poor road infrastructure
- Rural insecurity
- Weak governance, corruption

**Degraded transport infrastructure**
- Rural insecurity that increases cost of transport and reduces regional competitiveness
- Outbreaks of animal pest and disease

**Insecurity driven by political instability**
- Weak governance & a lack of essential services
- Recurrent drought
- Repeated flooding caused by poor management of the Shabelle river
- Degraded transport infrastructure
- Limited employment opportunity
- Low levels of education and skills

**Insecurity and the public’s fear of insurgents**
- Poor management of Shabelle river
- Recurrent drought
- Displacement
- Degraded transport infrastructure
- Poor governance and local administration, and the lack of institutional capacity

**What should be done?**
- Management and desilting of Shabelle river
- Repair old water infrastructure
- Improve road infrastructure
- Develop agriculture & fisheries potential
- More effective management of Shabelle river
- Limit import of rice and encourage the local purchase of relief food
- Promote business growth ("industrialisation")
- Strengthen security
- Manage the Shabelle river
- Strengthen transport infrastructure
- Improve access to education
- Strengthen security
- More effective management of Shabelle river
- Strengthen transport infrastructure
- Strengthen local governance &...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen local leadership and institutional capacities</td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td>Improve access to health</td>
<td>institutional capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procure relief supplies locally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JUBALAND**

**Causes of poverty**

- Unemployment
- Drought
- Poor environmental and natural resource management
- Insecurity
- Poor governance and the mismanagement of aid resources
- Insufficient government revenues
- Low levels of education
- Lack of economic activities/production
- Political instability
- Poor infrastructure
- Social inequality
- Displacement (as a result of the above)

**What should be**

- Strengthening peace and
- Employment creation through
- Strengthening security and the
- Strengthening of security

- Natural disaster, including drought
- Dependency on foreign aid
- Injustice
- Unemployment and a lack of vocational skills
- Low levels of education
- Lack of infrastructure
- Poor governance and corruption
- Tribalism
- Loss of assets, including livestock
- Displacement (as a result of the above)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>done?</td>
<td>agricultural development schemes and infrastructure rehabilitation</td>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>Reconstruction of infrastructure, such as roads, highways, ports and airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security</td>
<td>Support and promote investment in small businesses and equality in employment</td>
<td>Improving governance and fighting corruption</td>
<td>Proactive management of natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing justice and rule of law</td>
<td>Strengthen vocational skills</td>
<td>Better management of risks and natural disasters, such as droughts and floods</td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing local economic production</td>
<td>Strengthen the security sector and access to justice</td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td>Improved access to education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in and marketing of national/local commodities (e.g. bananas)</td>
<td>Strengthen governance by tackling corruption, tribalism, favouritism and nepotism</td>
<td>Vocational skills training</td>
<td>Increasing local agricultural, livestock and natural resource productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving access to quality education</td>
<td>Improve access to clean water, housing, healthcare services and education</td>
<td>Investing in local production and markets</td>
<td>Strengthening private sector accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting political stability and national unity</td>
<td>Invest in the energy sector</td>
<td>Building awareness on how to utilize natural resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting good governance and fighting corruption</td>
<td>Invest in agriculture, livestock and fisheries</td>
<td>Improving access to affordable (free) quality education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritizing infrastructure development (roads, ports and airports, agriculture</td>
<td>Kismayo</td>
<td>Improving access to clean water and clean energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and industries)</td>
<td>Water &amp; sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Creating employment opportunities and building vocational skills</td>
<td>Waste management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing natural resources more effectively</td>
<td>Urban infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen national and state planning for poverty reduction</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOUTHWEST STATE**

- Reconstruction of infrastructure, such as roads, highways, ports and airports
- Proactive management of natural disasters
- Employment creation
- Improved access to education
- Increasing local agricultural, livestock and natural resource productivity
- Strengthening private sector accountability
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of poverty</th>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict and insecurity</td>
<td>Weak governance &amp; local administration</td>
<td>Conflict and security</td>
<td>Conflict and insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Problematic political structures</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Frequent natural disasters – floods and droughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enforced displacement resulting from the above</td>
<td>Conflict and insecurity</td>
<td>Weak systems of justice</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid dependency (caused partly by NGOs working only in urban centres)</td>
<td>Weak systems of justice</td>
<td>Weak governance and corruption</td>
<td>Poorly maintained river beds and irrigation canals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degraded traditional water resources</td>
<td>Degraded road infrastructure</td>
<td>Natural disaster (droughts and floods)</td>
<td>Few employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigation canals destroyed or in disrepair</td>
<td>Degraded water supply infrastructure</td>
<td>Poor disaster preparedness and management</td>
<td>“Deskilling” of younger generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor condition of roads</td>
<td>Unemployment (esp. youth)</td>
<td>Aid dependency &amp; role of NGOs</td>
<td>Aid dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weak local agriculture and livestock productivity – made worse by aid handouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should be done?</td>
<td>Improve security</td>
<td>Strengthen security forces and systems of justice</td>
<td>Strengthen security and capacity of armed forces</td>
<td>Strengthen security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resettle and support IDPs to rural areas</td>
<td>Strengthen governance – building the link between government and community</td>
<td>Strengthen capacity of local institutions for good governance</td>
<td>Restore systems of justice</td>
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<td>Ensure justice and equity (social and economic)</td>
<td>Increase and strengthen local agricultural and livestock production</td>
<td>Increase access to affordable essential services</td>
<td>Strengthen governance - re-establish trust in public institutions &amp; leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase access to free, high quality education</td>
<td>Help create markets for local</td>
<td>Support political reconciliation between different communities</td>
<td>Create (youth) employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repair agricultural and water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase access to free or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>infrastructure</td>
<td>produce</td>
<td>Promote the development of technical and vocational skills</td>
<td>affordable education and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support linkages between local and foreign business</td>
<td>Rehabilitation irrigation canals and river channels, and other water resource infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improve road infrastructure</td>
<td>Resettle and support IDPs in homes of origin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improve access to essential services</td>
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<td>Support IDPs to resettle and re-establish agriculture</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger oversight &amp; coordination of NGOs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**GALMUDUG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of poverty</th>
<th>Insecurity</th>
<th>Insecurity and conflict</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Political instability and conflict</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Limited access to justice</td>
<td>Poor roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Climate change &amp; recurrent drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to justice</td>
<td>Poor roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Lack of health and education services</td>
<td>Poor roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Lack of health and education services</td>
<td>Inadequate water resources</td>
<td>Weak governance &amp; disaster preparedness planning</td>
<td>Low levels of education</td>
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<td>Low levels of education and skills</td>
<td>Inadequate water resources</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Weak economy and limited employment opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Weak governance &amp; corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Weak governance &amp; corruption</td>
<td>Absence of development of productive sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Absence of development of productive sectors</td>
<td>Unavailability of Somali Shilling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
<td>Unavailability of Somali Shilling</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should be done?</td>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability and reconciliation</td>
<td>Strengthen security</td>
<td>Institution building – strengthen government capacity needed to enforce the rule of law</td>
<td>Political stability and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen security</td>
<td>Local reconciliation</td>
<td>Increase government revenues for improved public services &amp; disaster preparedness</td>
<td>Productive sector (livestock) development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuild economic infrastructure (roads, ports, airports)</td>
<td>Strengthen rule of law</td>
<td>Rebuild roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Rebuild roads infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>Rebuild economic infrastructure (roads, ports, airports)</td>
<td>Strengthen economic infrastructure (roads, ports, water, airports)</td>
<td>Strengthen governance for improved service delivery (health, education, water supply)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen governance to improve access to services and effective disaster preparedness</td>
<td>Develop water resource infrastructure (tube wells)</td>
<td>Develop water resource infrastructure (tube wells)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invest in small businesses</td>
<td>Affordable electricity/energy</td>
<td>Increase gender/social equity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better management of local currency (Somali Shilling)</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

**PUNTLAND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of poverty</th>
<th>Recurrent drought and disasters</th>
<th>Low levels of skills in the workforce</th>
<th>Insecurity (both on land and in coastal waters)</th>
<th>Recurrent drought</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recurrent drought and disasters</td>
<td>Low levels of skills in the workforce</td>
<td>Insecurity (both on land and in coastal waters)</td>
<td>Recurrent drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor natural resource management, including fisheries</td>
<td>A culture of dependency</td>
<td>Limited opportunity for employment</td>
<td>Conflict in Sool and Sanaag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low productivity of agriculture, livestock and fisheries</td>
<td>People live beyond their means</td>
<td>Unskilled workforce</td>
<td>The consumption of khat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cost of living inflation</td>
<td>Corruption in public sector</td>
<td>Khat consumption</td>
<td>Lack of skills in modern agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak governance, corruption and nepotism, poor leadership</td>
<td>Social and economic inequities</td>
<td>Weak systems of justice</td>
<td>Fisheries resources are unprotected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weak infrastructure</td>
<td>Limited institutional capacity in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should be done?</td>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A weak justice system</td>
<td>Poor governance and corruption</td>
<td>Improve water resource management (rainwater)</td>
<td>Reduce insecurity</td>
<td>Infrastructure rehabilitation and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social inequities – e.g. gender &amp; disability</td>
<td>Poor political leadership</td>
<td>Invest in the energy sector</td>
<td>Strengthen systems of justice</td>
<td>Restocking of livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low government revenues and the impact of this on public services</td>
<td>Recurrent drought and desertification</td>
<td>Strengthen systems of education</td>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td>Training/skills building in modern agricultural techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited employment opportunities</td>
<td>Low levels of literacy</td>
<td>Strengthen domestic production and marketing</td>
<td>Skills development/training</td>
<td>Protect and modernise the fisheries sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of education</td>
<td>Economic (resource) inequity</td>
<td>Increase access to essential services – health, education, water</td>
<td>Increase access to essential services (health, education, housing, water, etc)</td>
<td>Water resources management – and other environmental management measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Better exploitation and management of natural resources (oil and minerals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity and tribal conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resettlement of IDPs to rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CIVIL SOCIETY**

- Strengthen governance – fight corruption, improve leadership and increase government revenues
- Strengthen systems of justice
- Strengthen disaster preparedness and management
- Increase access to essential services – health, education, water
- Strengthen social justice and equity
- Strengthen economic policy and tackle inflation

**PRIVATE SECTOR**

- Improve water resource management (rainwater)
- Invest in the energy sector
- Strengthen systems of education
- Strengthen domestic production and marketing

**GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

- Reduce insecurity
- Strengthen systems of justice
- Employment creation
- Skills development/training
- Increase access to essential services (health, education, housing, water, etc)
- Strengthen governance (all of the above)
- Attract foreign investment to induce economic growth
- Invest in agriculture, livestock and fisheries as a means of

**MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT**

- Weak infrastructure
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invest in small industries and increase access to micro-finance</td>
<td>increasing production and employment</td>
<td>Strengthen infrastructure</td>
<td>areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop ports and roads infrastructure</td>
<td>Environmental management and conservation</td>
<td>Improved disaster management and preparedness</td>
<td>Skills/employment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in renewable energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen governance through increasing civil awareness and demand for policy action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in agriculture, livestock and fisheries production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a strong aid policy and address growing culture of dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make available vocational skills training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve natural resources management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**BENADIR REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of poverty</th>
<th>Recurrent drought and insecurity that drives displacement</th>
<th>Insecurity</th>
<th>Insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weak system of justice</td>
<td>Poor infrastructure</td>
<td>Political instability &amp; conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption &amp; nepotism</td>
<td>Conditions do not support small business</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions do not support small business</td>
<td>Unskilled workforce</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unskilled workforce</td>
<td></td>
<td>Natural disaster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What should be</th>
<th>Comprehensive NDP to address burning issues – poverty,</th>
<th>Address insecurity</th>
<th>Improve security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NDP-9 The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity, displacement, unemployment, underinvestment</td>
<td>Strengthen justice</td>
<td>Strengthen the system of justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve security</td>
<td>Improve governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve IDPs</td>
<td>Improve tax collection and revenue management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate IDPs</td>
<td>Repair urban infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address growing number of IDPs residing in main urban centres</td>
<td>Reduce political instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in local production to nurture small business</td>
<td>Increase production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>IDP relocation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>Employment/skills creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>address growing number of IDPs residing in main urban centres</td>
<td>Employment/skills creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide quality health services</td>
<td>Free education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote investment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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**Initial Actions:**
- Improve governance
- Improve tax collection and revenue management
- Repair urban infrastructure
- Reduce political instability
- Increase production
- IDP relocation
- Employment/skills creation
- Free education
- Promote investment

**Future Actions:**
- Strengthen the system of justice
- Strengthen the system of justice

**Impact:**
- Improve governance
- Improve tax collection and revenue management
- Repair urban infrastructure
- Reduce political instability
- Increase production
- IDP relocation
- Employment/skills creation
- Free education
- Promote investment

**Nations to Lead:**
- Civil Society
- Government Officials
- Members of Parliament

**Implementation:**
- Improve governance
- Improve tax collection and revenue management
- Repair urban infrastructure
- Reduce political instability
- Increase production
- IDP relocation
- Employment/skills creation
- Free education
- Promote investment

**Outcomes:**
- Strengthen the system of justice
4. Round 2 Consultations

The second round of consultations launched on 5 May 2019 with a meeting with the National Development Council. A presentation on the first draft of the plan was followed by a discussion on developing themes, particularly those derived from stakeholder consultations.

The objective of the meeting was to solicit direction from the NDC on the national priorities that should be the focus of NDP-9. One of the lessons from NDP-8 was the need to narrow the breadth of both the strategies and the interventions.

The direction given was to focus on three national priorities:

i. Inclusive and Accountable Politics and Reconciliation
ii. Improved Security and the Rule of Law
iii. Inclusive Economic Growth

This direction was based on solid consensus demonstrated in Round 1 consultations, much of which focused on the need for improved security and improved economic growth. The need for political stability was also a strong consultation theme, and NDC recognized that progress in inclusive politics is an important precondition, or dependency, for progress in other priorities.

Some discussion was held on whether governance should be included or replace one of the three priorities, but ultimately it was concluded that governance was an important horizontal aspect of all the priorities.

A second consultation was held on 19 May 2019 with the DGs of FGS. A presentation of the first draft was followed by a discussion on the identification of priority interventions, aligned to the three national priorities and located within the four pillar chapters.

The methodology was based on an adapted SDG Accelerator and Bottleneck Assessment guide published by UNDP as a support tool for the 2030 Agenda. Participants were taken through the methodology and provided guidance and criteria by which to suggest priority interventions. The results of this exercise informed the interventions outlined later in the NDP.

Other consultations completed in June included workshops with private sector participants (held 23 June 2019) and representatives of CSOs and non-state actors (24 June 2019), and the Budget, Finance and Planning Committee of Parliament (25 June 2019), where the first draft and national priorities were discussed within the context of poverty reduction.

Feedback from the first workshop with private sector participants focused on addressing constraints for economic growth. Their points included:

- Investment in infrastructure development as a priority; infrastructure development as key to job creation; and job creation contributes to improved security.
- Leading role and potential of the private sector in job creation.
- Development/strengthening of cooperatives in the fishery sector (job-creation).
- Development and enactment of investment, insurance and copyright laws.
- Establishment of legal/regulatory framework for controlling business monopolies.
- Development of quality control policies, laws and institution.
• Poverty as the main driver of conflicts.
• Challenges of the private sector: poor governance, lack of infrastructure, costly power/lack of alternative sources of affordable energy, and lack of protection for domestic production from imports.
• Shift in cooperation modalities between Somalia and its development partners through the NDP as the guiding policy framework with which all development interventions must be aligned; and the enhanced coordination role of MoPIED.

Stakeholder participants from CSOs/NSAs raised the following key points:

• Availability and access to safe and clean drinking water for all the people.
• Management of drought and floods including river management (river bursts).
• Vocational skills training and job creation for the youth.
• Establishment of the Constitutional Court.
• Human development to improve lives and wellbeing of the people.
• Economic growth through increased productivity of the productive sector and promotion of small-scale industries which leads to employment generation.
• Infrastructure development.
• Banks that provide loans for the development of small-scale factories.
• Civic education and raising public awareness on federalism.
• Water management through water policies and construction of dams.
• Inclusive politics and good governance.
• Need for policy to guide cash transfer programs.
• Need for a law which governs FGS-FMS relations (the Constitution).

Finally the Parliament Committee members provided the following feedback:

Table 2: Feedback from Parliamentarians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Security and Rule of Law</th>
<th>Economic Growth</th>
<th>Inclusive Politics</th>
<th>Social Development &amp; cross-cutting issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security is the crucial issue</td>
<td>Lack of legal and regulatory frameworks and banking systems</td>
<td>Inability to export local products such as salt and fish to neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Problem of water management is one of the biggest challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of inclusive politics and reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federalism (thorniest political issue)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of public trust/confidence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>Security and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>Inclusive Politics</td>
<td>Social Development &amp; cross-cutting issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security sector – technical know-how, equipment and assets (e.g. bomb/explosives detection devices, etc.)</td>
<td>Livestock export – livestock is backbone of the economy and food security; need for clear government policies for the livestock sector development</td>
<td>Realization of inclusive politics is a prerequisite for security and rule of law, and economic growth</td>
<td>Capacity development for the civil servants of the various FGS ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on security – specific security agenda and action points</td>
<td>Construction of abattoirs and slaughter houses</td>
<td>Census – to facilitate registration of citizens/voters</td>
<td>Health for both people and livestock – necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reform of the justice sector</td>
<td>Promotion of domestic trade</td>
<td>Federalism will be decided by the Somali people through referendum, however, has thus far become a source of division/tension</td>
<td>Government service delivery (basic service provision) – very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security and development nexus</td>
<td>Establishment of Letter of Credit (LC) bank guarantee systems</td>
<td>One national goal and unity of people</td>
<td>IDPs – part of war economy – need interventions to address the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rwandan style local justice/reconciliation process – Gacaca courts (NRF)</td>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>Establishment of local government structures/councils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity development and rationalization of the security forces</td>
<td>Nutrition and food security</td>
<td>Reconciliation and cohesion/cooperation between local governments and people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development and reconstruction of schools</td>
<td>Fundamental human rights (inclusion) vital for the constitutional review process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Development and reconstruction of infrastructure – roads</td>
<td>Resumption of FGS-Somaliland dialogue and resolution of the Somaliland issue – priority for Somali unification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical skills training/education – need for specific agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Further consultations are scheduled to take place with Development Partners and FMS stakeholders based on the second draft of the NDP.

Further consultations were held as follows on the third draft of NDP-9 as follows:

- Jubaland: 24-28 August
- Hirshabelle: 28-31 August
- South West: 28-31 August
- Development Partners: 3 September

Stakeholders provided feedback, comments and suggestions to strengthen the structure and content of the draft.
The following chapter presents a description of poverty in Somalia, an analysis of the underlying causes and drivers of poverty, based on available sources of data, and drawing on the range of experience of the government and its development partners, along with stakeholder consultations. This description and analysis, coupled with the output of comprehensive national consultations, forms the foundation of NDP-9 upon which future poverty reduction policies and related interventions conducted by government and its development partners are formulated to alleviate poverty in its multiple dimensions.

1. Measuring Poverty

1.1. Introduction

Poverty is examined on a multi-dimensional basis. Beginning with measures of monetary poverty, the report goes on to examine multi-dimensional poverty, as measured in four dimensions: monetary; education; health; and living standards (based on quality of housing and access to sanitation and water). In addition to these four dimensions, the chapter examines broader vulnerabilities associated with poor Somali households with additional “missing dimensions” of poverty\(^{28}\). A framework of underlying causes, intermediate causes and impacts of poverty is presented.

The multi-dimensional nature of poverty in Somalia is such that very few households or individuals are not deprived in one or more defined dimensions. They form the basis for the poverty reduction interventions required by NDP-9, as outlined in subsequent pillar chapters. The most evident demonstration of the impacts of multi-dimensional deprivation is located in the internally displaced people (IDPs), one of the most vulnerable groups within the nation. As of early 2019 almost 17 percent\(^{29}\) of the Somali population are displaced. The emergence of another threatened drought this year could swell the numbers.

1.2. Sources of data

Analysis of multidimensional poverty requires reliable data sources, ideally from multiple sources, and appropriate analytical capacity. Unfortunately, available data sources in Somalia are relatively few and the existing ones tend to be either of limited scope or of a short time-frame.

The description of poverty presented below draws heavily on household surveys of living standards conducted by the World Bank in collaboration with the Government of Somalia in 2015/2016 and 2017/2018\(^{30}\). Somalia High Frequency Surveys (SHFS) are the most developed source of poverty-related data available currently, although constraints in geographic access and the limited time duration of these surveys mean they provide only partial “snapshots” rather than a full and continuous picture of poverty and living standards over time. Nonetheless, Wave 1, and in particular Wave 2 of the SHFS contain detailed information on household economic conditions (including asset levels and

\(^{28}\) University of Oxford, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI)

\(^{29}\) UNHCR data 2019

consumption), education, employment, access to services, security, displacement and perceptions that allow an objective assessment of poverty to be made. Other data sources acceptable to the Government of Somalia are used to augment the SHFS data, especially in comparison to previous periods.

Finally, this poverty analysis was also informed by the first round of national and sub-national consultations that took place from January to March 2019, as described in Chapter 2, allowing it to benefit from Somali perceptions on poverty.

1.3. Methodology for measuring poverty

The long practice of measuring poverty through monetary value (income per capita) does not adequately present the full picture of poverty. The Human Development Index (HDI) was created in 1990 to capture three additional dimensions of required development: achievements in health, education and living standards (as measured by the Gross National Income per capita). In 2012, Somalia’s HDI stood at 0.285, which was lower that the SSA average of 0.389, but higher than those of Mozambique, Burundi, Congo and Zimbabwe.

However the methodology of measuring HDI does not allow latitude for Somalia’s context, where there is a paucity of data to accurately measure the HDI. Nevertheless many studies and measures paint a compelling picture of the face of Somali poverty. In this context the poverty analysis examines deprivations within the four dimensions of poverty: Monetary, Education, Health and Living Standards. The approach taken is to enrich the existing data with other studies and stakeholder feedback on the impacts of poverty within these dimensions and to extend the analysis beyond the traditional HDI definitions into a multi-dimensional examination of Somali poverty.

Drawing on the results of the 2017/2018 SHFS, the measurement of monetary poverty in this analysis uses the international poverty line, which was introduced in the 1990 World Development Report, and which currently stands at a daily value of US$1.90 per person (2011 purchasing power parity, or PPP). The underlying assumption is that people need at least a certain level of income to afford basic living standards such as being nourished, having access to health and basic education and so forth. That minimum level of income, which is called the poverty line, can be viewed as the cost of attaining a basic living standard. Given the poverty line, the following measurements of poverty can be determined:

- The incidence of poverty (or headcount index) estimates the proportion of the population (or households) living below the poverty line;
- The poverty gap (how far below the poverty line a person or a household is – also known as depth of poverty) captures the average shortfall in income of the population living below the poverty line;
- Squaring the poverty gap (the severity of poverty) gives an indication of inequality among the population living below the poverty line, in other words a measure of the severity of deprivation of those living in absolute poverty;
- Finally, a food consumption measure of poverty considers the total consumption of each household, relative to the national average expenditure on food items only. A food consumption measure of poverty identifies those households that cannot afford average food consumption, even if they were to allocate all their expenditure to food items only.

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31 Martin Ravallion (2016), The economics of poverty, Oxford University Press
2. Monetary Poverty

2.1. Incidence

Analysis of the 2017-2018 SHFS revealed that 77 percent of Somalis currently live below the international poverty line of US$1.90 per capita, per day (2011 PPP), which is the third highest in the region (see Fig 1). However, if data for Lower Juba region – where enumerators have not been able to access the target households for face-to-face interview and therefore satellite imagery data has been used to estimate poverty – is excluded, the figure falls to 67 percent32. Using the estimate based on the satellite data, Somalia has the third highest poverty incidence in the region, after South Sudan and Burundi, whereas the 67 percent estimate would place Somalia the seventh poorest country after Malawi. As demonstrated in Figure 16, underlying this high poverty rate are low levels of economic activity, reflected in a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of $5353.

Figure 16: Cross Country Comparison

[Graph showing the poverty incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa]

Poverty is widespread across Somalia and is consistently high (averaging 69 percent) among nomadic pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, residents of IDP settlements and residents of Mogadishu. Poverty in urban areas other than Mogadishu is lower in comparison (60 percent). High levels of poverty incidence in Mogadishu, which would normally be expected to reflect the benefit of greater economic opportunity and better access to services found in urban areas, may be attributed to the large number of IDP settlements within the city. This variation is illustrated in Figure 17.

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32 Government has recently agreed a figure of 69%
33 Somalia Economic Update, World Bank (2018). Note that the remainder of the document reports latest per capita GDP figures following a debasing of GDP estimates by World Bank, using estimate of $1.26/day from Wave 2 of the SHFS to compute 2017 consumption, and adjusts this by changes in the annual CPI to compute nominal values for other years.
In terms of regional variation, the data suggests that poverty incidence is highest in the north of the country – Togdheer, Sanaag and Bari regions – and in the southwest – Middle Juba, Gedo and Bay regions.

2.2. Depth and severity

Recent survey data shows that poverty in Somalia is both widespread and deep (as measured by the poverty gap\textsuperscript{34}). Estimates show that the average poverty gap in Somalia is 29 percent (Fig 18), which suggests that the average income level of a poor Somali household is 71 percent of the international poverty line. However, rural households (pastoralist and agro-pastoralist) and IDP households appear to be particularly vulnerable in this regard, with a poverty gap assessed at 34 percent, compared to Mogadishu (27 percent) and other urban areas (24 percent). The poverty severity index reinforces these findings (Fig 18). The average poverty severity index is 15 percent, pointing to inequalities among the poor. These inequalities are worse in rural areas and IDP settlements.

\textsuperscript{34} See earlier definition
2.3. Food consumption and hunger

As noted, food consumption poverty arises when household consumption falls below average expenditure on food items across regions. The national incidence of food consumption poverty (i.e. people reporting to have not been able to buy food in the past week due to lack of financial resources) is 49 percent. This means that one in every two Somalis is unable to meet their food needs. In absolute terms, over 6.2 million people are food poor using the 2014 population estimates. Incidence of food consumption poverty in Mogadishu and nomadic populations is close to the national average. Rural agro-pastoralist and IDP settlements experience a significantly higher incidence of food consumption poverty (close to 60 percent in both cases), while incidence in urban centres other than Mogadishu is considerably lower (40 percent). These findings are presented graphically in Fig 19, below.

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35 Based on a projection of the 2014 Somalia Population Estimation Survey
Perhaps surprisingly, the SPVA showed that the experience of hunger is weakly correlated with whether a household is poor or non-poor, and with whether a household is female-headed or male-headed. This may be due to strong solidarity and kinship relationships among Somalis, which allow the poor to access some social support at a time of severe hardships. Consistent with the incidence of monetary poverty, a stronger correlation of the household experience of hunger was found with location (urban, rural, IDP settlement, etc), displacement, remittances and exposure to drought. These findings are summarised in Figure 20, below.

![Figure 20: Experience of hunger in the past 4 weeks](Source: Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment)

3. The Nearly Poor

The above analysis of monetary poverty demonstrates that 69 percent of people in Somalia live below the international poverty line, and that 49 percent of Somalis are unable to meet average food requirements, even if they spend all their income on food. Moreover, the analysis tells us that poverty in Somalia is deep, with the daily income of an average poor Somali being only 71 percent of the international poverty line of $1.90. Such extreme poverty represents great vulnerability among the majority of Somalis to the shocks – drought, displacement, poor health, loss of income or assets – to which they are repeatedly exposed. Put simply, it takes very little perturbation in the lives of the very poor to get them to a point where they just do not have the means to survive. Meagre livelihoods fail, food consumption drops still lower, malnutrition rates suddenly rise, and resistance to infectious disease falls and disaster ensues.

However, it is also important to point out that a large part of the population is understood to have consumption levels just above the poverty line; they are “nearly poor”, which makes them also vulnerable to recurrent shocks, if not to the extent of the extremely poor. In this regard, the 2017-2018 SHFS found that 10 percent of the non-poor population have total daily consumption expenditure within 20 percent of the poverty line of US$1.90 per day per capita. This measure of vulnerability is more prevalent in urban centres than within pastoralist and IDP groups. Quite obviously, non-poor
populations closer to the poverty line are more likely to fall into poverty when exposed to economic and/or other shocks as result of declining consumption.

The relationship between vulnerability and livelihood systems in Somalia is less clear. Pastoralism is a livelihood system that is adapted to the rigours and vagaries of arid climates and, in general, pastoralist groups have well developed strategies for coping with drought. Similarly, livelihood diversification by agro-pastoralist households increases resilience and the ability to withstand shocks. However, in Somalia in recent years, both pastoralist and agro-pastoralist livelihood systems have been weakened by repeated drought and ongoing conflict. Both have become extremely vulnerable. During the 2016-2017 drought, famine was only narrowly averted in the worst hit areas of the north of the country (predominantly pastoralist) and of the southwest of the country (predominantly agro-pastoralist).

Factors that work against vulnerability and increase resilience in Somalia are relatively few. In this regard, remittances from the Somali diaspora are one vitally important aspect of resilience for many households (Figure 21). For example, it has been assessed that poverty is 5 percentage points lower in houses receiving remittances than in households that do not (62 versus 67 percent). Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between remittances and a range of other measures of poverty, including food consumption poverty. One in five Somali households\(^{36}\) receive remittances and rely on them heavily, with remittances representing 37 percent of household expenditures. This creates poverty risks on two fronts: non-recipient homes are more likely to be poor, while recipient households are at risk of dropping further into poverty should the remittance be reduced or stopped. Analysis\(^{37}\) indicates that recipient households would be unable to significantly replace loss through labour market income. Urban households are more likely to receive remittances, with rural and IDP households much less likely.

![Figure 21: Effect of remittance on poverty](Source: Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment)

4. Limited Economic Opportunity and Economic Exclusion

\(^{36}\) Pg xii, Somali Poverty Profile; World Bank; 2017

\(^{37}\) Ibid, pg xiii
Monetary poverty is tightly linked to lack of household income, whether through unemployment or loss of economic assets. Three groups are most vulnerable to economic exclusion: youth; women; and IDPs. Though not disaggregated in the data, anecdotal information indicates that people with disabilities are also very vulnerable.

Despite the economic growth that Somalia has recently recorded, there are still limited economic opportunities especially for the youth. According to the Population Estimation Survey for Somalia (PESS) carried out between October 2013 to March 2014, 45.6 percent of the Somali population was below the age of 15 and 81 percent was below the age of 35, which reveals a youth bulge. This is an indication that the youth are the largest segment in the Somali population. However, the majority of the young population is unemployed.

The poverty level among the youth is mainly visible in rural areas where access to employment is very limited. When averaged out across all geographical locations youth unemployment is estimated at 68 percent.

Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that 72 percent of the unemployed youth were actively looking for a job, while the other 27 percent reported feeling discouraged. The survey also reports that since the end of al-Shabaab’s occupation of the main urban cities, companies have opened or reopened, and several private actors called this period a “revival.” As the country is recovering from a civil war, the major economic activity that is visible is in the construction sector, especially in urban areas.

Social exclusion challenges and a poor business environment hinder economic opportunities for the youth. Due to lack of an effective system to enforce fairer employment practices, small companies do not advertise jobs but rely on relatives, close friends and clan elders to identify candidates. Lack of education and financial resources are two other factors that limit economic opportunities for the youth.

Women are under-represented in the labour force. They form 56 percent of the population in rural Somalia, the area hardest hit by natural disaster, conflict and displacement. A World Bank study estimated that they might represent 70 percent of household income earners and yet face higher barriers to employment. This includes more adverse health outcomes, exclusion from economic participation and exclusion from access to capital. Land rights, inheritance rights and legislative restrictions are some of the exclusionary barriers. The fertility rate of 6.7 children per female, high mortality rates during childbirth (732 per 100,000 births), and low use of contraception (6 percent) create adverse conditions for economic inclusion, as well as poor outcomes across a host of measures.

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38 As it is documented in the National Youth Policy and reported by the Somali National Development Plan, 2017-2019, the youth is defined the ages between 15-35. However, the age group that experiences poverty incidence that is looked at by the Somali Household Family Survey (SHFS) is the youth aged between 14-24.


41 IOM, 2016, “Youth, Employment and Migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa,”

42 Ibid

43 Ibid


45 Data provided by National Directorate of Statistics
The IDP group is economically marginalized having delinked themselves from clan protection, lost economic assets and facing precarious conditions within (increasingly) urban camps. Lacking access to livelihoods or remittances, they are ranked amongst the poorest in Somalia. Evidence from consultations suggests that, once moved to IDP camps, a displaced household is likely to be trapped in perpetual poverty— the humanitarian support received, often in the form of protracted cash transfers and food assistance, crowds out any incentive for a household to return to their original livelihood even if the conditions that caused the displacement no longer exist. Global Trends in Forced Displacement, a 2015 UNHCR report, indicates that the number of displaced individuals experiencing protracted stays is increasing. The flows of migrants make an average length of time difficult to calculate, but many refugees and IDPs have been displaced for decades.

5. Education

There is a well-documented relationship between poverty, education and literacy. Put simply, the more educated a person is the less likely he or she is to be poor.46 This understanding was borne out by the results of the 2017-2018 SHFS, which found that poor households have a 6 percent smaller proportion of literate members than non-poor households.

As shown in Figure 22 below, nationally, Somalia has a 50 percent adult literacy rate, with higher rates found among young people (62 percent within the 16-19 year age group), and in urban populations (79 percent in Mogadishu and 68 percent in other urban centres). IDPs and agro-pastoral populations have lower literacy rates (57 and 45 percent respectively), while nomadic pastoralists have the lowest literacy rate (16 percent). For all population groups, literacy is higher for men than for women. Counterintuitively perhaps, poor and non-poor households were found to have similar literacy rates, but the portion of literate members is higher in non-poor households (49 percent) than in poor households (43 percent).

In Somalia, primary school enrolment (ages 6-13), an important social development indicator, tends to be low (33 percent), which compares unfavourably with other low-income sub-Saharan countries47. Moreover, many Somali children start primary school late due to the perception by parents that children aged 6-9 years are too young to attend school. Net enrolment figures show that children enrolling in school do so much later than the usual age of six. Enrolment increases during the 10-19 year age range. This seems to be a social phenomenon driven by many Somalis believing that school should more properly start at a later age. Distance from school and safety do not seem to be significant factors.

46 However, the 2017-2018 SHFS also found that the education of the household head is correlated with age, gender and remittance, but not correlated with household poverty.
47 Pg 13, Somali Poverty Profile, WB; 2017
Figure 22: Household head literacy  
(Source: Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment)

The 2017-2018 SHFS also found that primary school enrolment is highest in urban areas and that boys and girls are equally likely to enrol. However, in secondary schools, girls are less likely to enrol than boys, perhaps reflecting the pressure on girls to assume domestic responsibilities at an early age.

Importantly, it was found that school enrolment is correlated with the literacy of household heads – pointing to a “virtuous cycle” leading away from poverty – and with remittances.

6. Standard of Living

The 2017/2018 SHFS revealed a strong correlation between poverty and the quality of housing. Poor households are more likely to have a floor of mud or wood, less likely to have a sheet metal roof, and equally likely to use charcoal or wood cooking stoves. Less than half (43 percent) of Somali households have a floor of mud, wood or other material while the majority have a roof of metal sheets (57 percent). A majority of the households in all urban areas live either in apartments or shared houses while 17 percent of IDPs squat in dwellings owned by others. Poor households (46 percent) are more likely than non-poor households (37 percent) to have a roof of mud, wood or other material.

Similarly, almost 50 percent of Somali households have access to improved sanitation, which is higher than found in other low-income sub-Saharan countries. Again, not surprisingly, poor and nomadic households are less likely to have access to improved sanitation (Figure 23).
Access to improved water supply is the third important poverty correlate, and in this regard the 2017-2018 SHFS found that 77 percent of all Somalis enjoy such access. As for sanitation, the level of 50 percent access compares favourably with other low-income sub-Saharan countries. However, it is strongly skewed by high levels of access in Mogadishu and other urban areas and masks low levels of access by rural and nomadic households. Interestingly, there is little difference in access to clean water between poor and non-poor households, pointing out the strong spatial aspect of this correlation (Figure 24).

Other significant poverty correlates include access to electricity, which like water is concentrated in urban areas, where coverage exceeds 80 percent. Importantly – and unlike access to clean water – access to electricity is strongly correlated with poverty, with only 47 percent of poor households enjoying access, as compared to 61 percent of non-poor households.
Finally, under access to services, the 2017-2018 SHFS found that only 40 percent of the population have access to a health centre or clinic within 30 minutes of their household, while the figure is 34 percent for access to markets. Due to the nature of their livelihoods, pastoralist households are least well served in this regard. Access to health services and functioning markets is not correlated with poverty, suggesting a strong spatial association, as with clean water supply.

7. Health (child mortality, nutrition),

Child mortality and nutrition are important factors in the multidimensional poverty analysis, although difficult to quantify in the absence of national census and demographic health surveys. Using the SHFS data, 50 percent of the population (6.2 million) faced acute food insecurity based on the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) for food insecurity in 2017 with 2.4 million people facing acute malnutrition. About 300,000 children below five were acutely malnourished during the same period. The vulnerable rural, nomadic and IDP populations remain at risk of falling into acute food insecurity given the high prevalence of hunger among themselves. Chapter 7 examines environmental and market shocks linked to the underlying food insecurity.

Access to health facilities is likely to avert loss of lives, especially to pregnant mothers and children below five years. In 2017, rural residents had less access to health facilities, followed by IDPs and urban residents respectively. Almost four in ten IDP women, less than two in ten urban women and seven in ten rural women who gave birth in the last two years did so at home. Therefore, the likelihood of a woman giving birth at home rather than in a maternity clinic, maternal and child health centre, or hospital may be correlated to child mortality.

Births attended by skilled health staff are a key strategy to reduce maternal deaths. This is in addition to a range of interventions before, during and after pregnancy to ensure the health of the mother and the child are good. According to SHFS, the probability of a pregnant IDP woman assisted by a skilled health attendant is less than their urban counterparts but more than the rural residents. A nurse, midwife, or doctor assisted half of IDP women to give birth in the last two years of the survey compared to eight in ten urban women and three in ten rural women. The need for skilled health workers is paramount in the fight against high mortality rates. Somalia is the sixth worst country in the world for maternal mortality rates (732 per 100,000 live births).

8. The Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index

The Somalia National Human Development Report in 2012 estimated the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which captured both the incidence of poverty and the average intensity of deprivation, to be 0.47 with 82 percent of Somalis being poor across the three non-monetary dimensions of education, health and living standards. Multidimensional poverty was concentrated in nomadic areas (0.62) and the rural areas (0.52), where the access to basic needs was limited compared to urban areas (0.30). Six years later, similar and persistent poverty levels are revealed in the SHFS analysis.

Analysis of data from Wave 2 of the SHFS confirms that Somali people experience poverty in multiple dimensions. In this regard it is estimated that 90 percent of households are deprived in at least one of

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48 2016 & 2017
49 MPI measures both the incidence and intensity of the deprivations within the index. The index is based on the same three dimensions of the HDI (health, education, and living standards)
the three dimensions. It is further estimated that, nationally, 77 percent of households are deprived in two or more of the three dimensions. Breaking this figure down, it is revealed that the experience of multidimensional poverty (two or more dimensions) ranges from 49 percent of households in Mogadishu to 100 percent of households among the nomadic pastoralist population. An estimated 92 percent of rural agro-pastoralist households experience multidimensional poverty, while the figure is 85 percent in IDP settlements, and 53 percent in urban areas other than Mogadishu.

Within this analysis, perhaps unsurprisingly, it is found that deprivation in multiple dimensions is consistent with monetary poverty; in other words, the monetary poor are more likely to be deprived in other dimensions. Furthermore:

- Multiple deprivations are correlated with literacy and the gender of the head of household (female headed households tend to be monetarily less poor than male-headed households)
- Male-headed households are more likely to suffer multiple deprivation
- Larger households with more dependents are associated with deprivation in education
- Households headed by a literate member are less likely to be deprived in every dimension

From this analysis it can be concluded that there is a strong relationship between the gender and educational status of household heads and poverty. This relationship highlights fundamental social and economic inequalities that will need to inform poverty reduction efforts carried forward under NDP-9.

9. Broadening the Dimensions of Poverty

Using traditional dimensions within the MPI, the analysis above provides an empirical basis for measuring the nature of household poverty in Somalia and points to a number of household and individual impacts of poverty. The data from the Wave-2 SHFS indicates that poor households in Somalia suffer from:

- A lack of sufficient revenue/income, linked to high unemployment
- A lack of access to education, health, and other basic living necessities

The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), the group responsible for developing the MPI and publishing worldwide results working with UNDP each year, has proposed an additional five “missing dimensions” of poverty measurement. These include Quality of Work; Empowerment; Safety; Social Connectedness and Psychological Well-being. Research is underway on how these dimensions could feature in national and regional household surveys or censuses.

The data from the Wave-2 SHFS does not provide data on these missing dimensions, but nonetheless they are important considerations for reducing the impacts of poverty on vulnerable Somali households.

In this spirit the NDP has broadened discussion about the nature of poverty in Somalia to include two further deprivations. Stakeholder consultations, research studies and additional sources of data point to these two vulnerabilities, which must also be considered in this analysis of multi-dimensional poverty. The majority of poor Somali households suffer from:

50 Website OPHI: www.ophi.org.uk
● A lack of physical safety
● A lack of empowerment

These are examined in turn, both in terms of impacts on households and individuals (immediate causes of poverty) and in terms of the immediate and underlying causes of poverty. A lack of physical safety is examined in terms of violence (both large-scale conflict and inter-personal violence and crime) as well as food insecurity; while empowerment is examined on two fronts: lack of justice and social and gender inequalities.

9.1. A secure environment

Lack of physical safety for Somali communities comes primarily from two root causes: conflict and natural disaster, in the form of drought (and associated famine) and floods. Many of Somalia’s poor have been impacted by both disturbances, exacerbating the impacts of poverty.

Data from UNHCR-PRMN provides a breakdown for the primary reasons for displacement amongst IDPs. Four years ago fear or consequences of conflict dominated displacement patterns, while drought and, to a lesser extent, floods have been predominant since 2017. The IDP population is now estimated at over 2.4 million, while 2019 has threatened further drought displacement as well as an increase in conflict displacement in the early months. The migration has predominantly been from rural to urban locations, creating urban slums with a host of poverty and development challenges.

Figure 25: Reasons for Displacement, and Cumulative Total, UNHCR-PRMN
Another cost of conflict and drought is borne by the economy. The economic and human impact of conflict and drought is reflected in the productive sector output and the graph below provides the trend in production of cereal crops as an illustrative example.
The loss of productivity coincides with both conflict and natural disaster, and speaks to the underlying community suffering, food insecurity and subsequent displacement. Virtually all major economic activities were disrupted by the civil war, which led to the collapse of agriculture, manufacturing and related activities. This particularly impacted poor people, since almost two-thirds of employment opportunities originated from these and related sectors.

Conflict, together with the systematic onset of recurring disasters (e.g. floods and droughts), which perpetuate competition over resources and conflict dynamics, has led to a complex protracted crisis in Somalia which has created widespread displacement, poverty and vulnerability. The conflict has also had a detrimental impact on economic growth in Somalia by limiting revenues and public investment in human and economic capital. In addition, the risk of disasters and conflict has undermined private investment in agriculture, resulting in a poor business environment and high levels of unemployment51.

Large-scale conflict is not the only source of violence facing Somali citizens. Rates of violence and crime have increased at the community and inter-personal level, particularly impacting IDP communities and women. Over 14,000 gender-based violence reports were filed by Somalis between January 2015 and June 2016, with the majority being female IDPs (as many as 78 percent of surviving victims).52 Over 20 percent of these cases involved children under the age of 17. One study indicates that 36 percent of women experience inter-partner violence. These numbers reflect an under-reporting – those outside IDP camps have fewer opportunities to report violence, probably doubting their ability to receive justice from collapsed institutions, including police and judicial services. Given the large increase in IDP numbers, the rate of violent crime is also probably rising.

9.2. Empowerment

Empowerment is the characteristic of a society where members have the voice and the agency to pursue goals they value. A lack of empowerment is evident when one has no voice to change things, and when significant barriers exist to prevent access to necessities of life. One such mark of lack of empowerment is uneven access to justice.

The absence of strong institutions to deliver justice and the rule of law is a key underlying driver of poverty and vulnerability in Somalia. There have been periods in the last twenty years when Somalis have been relatively safe compared to others; in turn, there are regions where crime and violence are much lower than others. However, recreating the institutions, including criminal justice structures to ensure the rule of law, will take time as well as resources.

Disputes are resolved by a variety of means and the application of justice is contingent on an individual’s socio-economic status. In seeking to resolve contests over land and property ownership, access to natural resources, family or contractual disputes, Somalis are more likely to choose informal institutions using customary law, known as xeer, rather than public institutions. Some US$10.5 million is spent on formal provision of justice services each year in a sector that is lacking in a strategic approach to linking customary and formal laws and institutions. Unclear ‘federal’ relations and functions are also an issue.

51 Somalia: an overview of poverty, vulnerability and financing, Development Initiatives (DI), 2016

52 “73-78 percent of survivors of GBV were female IDPs” – Pg 20, World Bank Country Partnership Framework, 2019-2022
Security actors are governed by weak institutions, reflective of a fragile state, in which the delegation of power to a central ‘public authority’ is fundamental to the political contest. Such little ‘public’ capacity is compounded by international partners that can be disjointed and tend to focus on immediate operational priorities, as opposed to a longer-term strategy for the sector. At the level of the FGS, civilian ministries and legislature have little capacity to engage; there is thus little accountability of public spending throughout the budgetary cycle. Security and the rule of law are therefore key considerations for Somalia’s national development.

The lack of access to justice is not the only evidence of a lack of empowerment in Somalia. As discussed earlier in the plan, social and gender disparities are evident in all of the measures of poverty. Women’s health, mortality, employment and crime outcomes are worse than men’s in almost every dimension. Youth unemployment is comparatively high. IDPs, removed from clan safety nets, are measurably more disadvantaged.

Stakeholders in Chapter 2 align with the view that insecurity and lack of access to justice represent key drivers for poverty. The top four identified drivers of poverty included Conflict and Political Instability (78 percent of participants); Natural Disaster (75 percent); Insecurity and Lack of Rule of Law (71 percent) and Weak Governance (68 percent).

10. Underlying and Immediate Causes of Poverty

According to the World Bank, key manifestations of conflict-induced poverty that contribute to worsening poverty rates and insecurity typically include: (i) weakness of the state and its inability to meet the needs of the poor; (ii) destroyed infrastructure and decreased production, affecting livelihoods; (iii) a climate of insecurity deterring investors and the delivery of public goods; (iv) exacerbated regional disparities and urban-rural divisions; (v) deteriorated education and health services; (vi) increased overlap of ethnic (clan) and economic divisions; and (vii) increased numbers of vulnerable people, including orphans, widows, handicapped, IDPs, and refugees.

Poverty diagnostics in the conflict-affected environment of Somalia typically identify more or less all of the above factors or key manifestations. Layered on top of these key manifestations is climate-change-fuelled environmental degradation leading to large-scale famine, displacement and death.

Somalia’s prolonged violent conflict directly and indirectly affects the four dimensions of poverty used in the foregoing analysis and initial NDP-9 stakeholder consultations: monetary poverty (the international poverty line US$1.90/person/day); living standards (in terms of housing and access to electricity and fuel for cooking); level of education; and access to water, sanitation and health services. However, unlike the other three dimensions, it is difficult to establish a direct correlation or causal relationship between conflict and monetary poverty in Somalia without reliable quantitative data.

The destruction of employment opportunities and property has pushed many families into destitution. The generally insecure and risk-laden environment has discouraged business investment and economic growth. The gradual dismembering of government institutions has led to the disappearance of public and private services and opportunities to engage with society. The emergence of predatory groups

54 NDP-9 C1 consultation guideline 10 December 2018
expropriating financial and productive assets has precipitated a major collapse of the economy. The
direct threat to life has pushed many people to flee Somalia or become IDPs.

The costs of this civil war are immeasurable in terms of lives lost and displaced, as well as the
destruction of public and private infrastructure and property. According to Necrometrics, around
500,000 people are estimated to have been killed in Somalia since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991.
The IOM, in a 2014 study, estimated that since 1991, over a million Somalis were forcibly displaced
internationally and another 1.1 million displaced internally. As cited above, the number of internally
displaced now exceeds 2.4 million.

The prolonged conflict and political instability of almost three decades largely destroyed the country’s
physical and socio-economic infrastructure, the government apparatus as well as the security
institutions. The enduring nature of the conflict has generated extreme poverty, vulnerability and a
complex set of political and social grievances that remain a threat to the country’s stability.

The collapse of the state institutions rendered basic social services such as healthcare and education
almost non-existent\textsuperscript{55}, along with the collapse of judicial institutions, creating a vacuum of community
policing, recourse to justice and leading to a large increase in violence.

In the absence of local reconciliation, disputes among political entities over borders, territory and
natural resources as well as clan tensions over control of nascent administrations persist. These divisions
have resulted in some of the country’s deadliest armed conflicts. These include the conflict in and
around Gaalkacyo between Galmudug and Puntland administrations that displaced around 70,000
people in 2016, and the long-running conflict in the Sool and Sanaag regions involving self-declared
“Somaliland”, Puntland and the self-declared Khatumo State. Such conflicts have the potential to
endanger the viability of the broader federal state project.

Al-Shabaab (AS) remains undefeated and capable of destabilizing Somalia. Recourse to political
assassinations and asymmetric complex terror attacks against both hard and soft targets has increased
since 2013 and is a major source of insecurity in Mogadishu and across Somalia. In 2016, over half of all
civilian casualties reported were attributed to AS. The group exploits local clan grievances and takes
advantage of government corruption and failure to provide rule of law and basic services to Somalis. In
the last year and a half, offshoots aligned ideologically, if not practically, with ISIL have emerged, further
complicating the security situation. AS is also known to recruit, abduct and use children and youth,
posing a challenge for Somali and international forces combating the group\textsuperscript{56}.

A tabulated summary of the impacts and costs of the conflict in Somalia is provided in Annex 2. An
estimated US$1.5 billion per year is spent by international partners on peacekeeping, counterinsurgency
and support to the Somali security sector. This figure is much larger if one accounts for international
maritime anti-piracy measures. With regard to domestic resourcing, in 2014 and 2015 the FGS spent
US$67.5 million and US$44 million respectively on security (representing 45 percent and 33 percent of
the national budget). Numerous other informal armed groups and militias also raise millions of dollars in
predatory ‘taxes’ on Somalis each year to pay for themselves. The amount of money spent on

\textsuperscript{55} Africa Development Bank Group, Somalia Country Brief 2013-2015, OREB Department, March 2013

\textsuperscript{56} UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020
peacekeeping and international maritime anti-piracy measures could go a long way in developing the country if security was restored.57

11. An Integrated Look at Poverty – its causes and impacts

As demonstrated above, multi-dimensional poverty in Somalia impacts the majority of poor individuals and households with the following attributes:

- Monetary poverty, linked to lack of income and livelihoods
- Violence
- Lack of education
- Lack of health
- Low living standards
- Injustice
- Food insecurity
- High vulnerability, low resilience

As indicated earlier, most of the poor in Somalia suffer from multiple deprivations and these deprivations are not independent. Monetary poverty exacerbates lack of health and education, particularly in a country where state institutions collapsed and the provision of services comes at a price. Low living standards lead to poor health outcomes, which jeopardize employment.

The purpose of the NDP-9 is to address the most pressing issues of poverty and target interventions that address multiple causes of poverty. The constraints of both government capacity and resources require a plan that is strategically targeted at the most vulnerable, and at the most catalytic level.

The immediate manifestations of poverty are driven by intermediate and underlying root causes. Application of a cause and effect analysis, supplemented by stakeholder views, creates a flow-chart of drivers of poverty, shown in Figure 28.

In this diagram the impacts of poverty identified in our analysis are gathered on the right, as manifestations of poverty at the individual or household level. Intermediate drivers causing these impacts are identified in a cascading set of drivers, leading to four underlying root causes.

The schematic, however, belies the complexity of poverty and the multi-faceted range of challenges facing Somali households. The relationships are not linear but rather multi-faceted and reinforcing, as well as unique to location. The challenges of Puntland are not the challenges of Mogadishu, and the challenges of an IDP household are not the same as those of the nomad family. Figure 29, below, from the 2018 Recovery and Resilience Framework, demonstrates the variation in priority interventions desired by regional stakeholders.

57 Security and Justice Public Expenditure Review for Somalia, UNSOM and World Bank (2017)
Figure 28: Drivers of poverty, vulnerability and low resilience in Somalia

DRIVERS OF POVERTY, VULNERABILITY AND LOW RESILIENCE IN SOMALIA

Figure 29: Priority Interventions by Region, DINA 2018

Agriculture was accorded the highest priority by 4 of the 5 FMSs

Puntland rated transport - including roads linking local markets - the highest priority

Benaadir and Southwest State gave high priority to urban development and municipal services, including housing for IDPs, jobs and education
12. The Most Vulnerable Groups

With an overall monetary poverty rate of about 70 percent, and with over 90 percent of households in Somalia being deprived in at least one dimension of poverty, it is challenging to identify those in need of most help.

However within the data it becomes apparent that the following groups are consistently the most vulnerable:

- IDPs (primarily focused within urban settings)
- Women
- Youth
- Rural poor (including nomadic and agro-pastoralists)
- Persons with disabilities

Inclusive development and a pro-poor development strategy must have answers focused on these groups.

13. Conclusion

The complexity of poverty, and its causes, in Somalia are at the heart of NDP-9. Many strides have been made in the last decade in poverty alleviation through recognition that multi-dimensional poverty requires a multitude of actors and interventions to “surround” the community. Interventions in justice work hand-in-hand with interventions in education, employment, transportation and safety. The most strategic interventions will serve multiple purposes – for instance water management infrastructure will provide economic benefits alongside environmental sustainability, conflict reduction, strengthened governance and reduced exclusion.

The challenge for the NDP-9 is three-fold: 1) identify the key priorities to be addressed at a national level; 2) tailor interventions to local priorities and 3) deliver services and interventions through the multiple layers of government.

The aim of the NDP is to provide a framework of poverty reduction with which state and local governments can align their local plans.

Having identified the drivers of poverty, through data analysis and stakeholder consultations, Chapter 4 outlines the poverty reduction strategy and targeted interventions.

A forward-looking National Development Plan must formulate a coherent anti-poverty strategy aiming to go beyond the alleviation of current poverty to prevent or reduce future poverty. Such strategy requires going beyond a simple cataloguing of who is currently poor and who is not, to an ex-ante assessment of households’ vulnerability to poverty and considering future possible shocks. In the absence of sufficient assets or external support to draw upon to smooth consumption, such shocks may lead to irreversible losses, such as distress sale of productive assets (e.g. land and livestock), reduced nutrient intake, or interruption of education. That risks permanent reduction in human capital and locking of the affected households in perpetual poverty. In this regard, the focus on vulnerability to poverty serves to highlight the distinction between ex-ante poverty prevention interventions and ex-post poverty alleviation interventions. The challenge of NDP-9 therefore includes not only the elimination of persistent and endemic deprivation, but also the removal of vulnerability to sudden and
severe destitution among a large proportion of the Somali population. This requires developing a framework to understand pathways through the impacts of natural disasters on Somali household livelihood and then identifying appropriate policy levers to address shocks from disasters.

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CHAPTER 4: STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

This section of NDP-9 sets out the principles and strategies that shape NDP-9’s policy and programme content. It is formulated in light of (a) the analysis of poverty in Somalia and underlying causes, set out in Chapter 3, and (b) the stakeholder inputs obtained during consultations conducted by the Federal Government of Somalia – described in Chapter 2 – that ensure NDP-9’s content is grounded in and informed by the experience and aspirations of the Somali people.

The stakeholder consultations and poverty analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 point towards need for a multi-dimensional approach to lifting Somali citizens from poverty, transitioning the country from aid dependence to sustainable social and economic development, and delivering much needed improvements in security and the rule of law. In other words, no single intervention, nor “one-size fit all” approach, will be successful in improving living standards for all Somalis. Rather, a sustained, multi-dimensional effort will be needed that addresses key aspects and causes of deprivation through strategies and interventions tailored to the specific needs and desires of all communities and constituent groups.

2. Principles

In formulating Somalia’s poverty reduction strategy, a number of “constants” – or principles – have been agreed. Principles are the underlying characteristics of NDP-9 and are demonstrated by all its constituent processes and elements: analysis, consultation, policies and programmes, financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. They are what defines NDP-9, and are summarised as follows:

**National ownership:** NDP-9 reflects the priorities of Somali citizens and, notwithstanding external assistance received during its preparation, is primarily a product of Somali institutions.

**Stakeholder inclusion:** the content of NDP-9 represents the voice and aspirations of all stakeholders, as understood through a comprehensive process of consultation. Stakeholders here include Somali civil society and interest groups, Somali media, Somali religious leadership, Somali academia, Somalia’s commercial sector, district, State and Federal Government institutions, and Somalia’s international partners.

**Transparency and Accountability:** all the processes of the development and implementation of NDP-9 will be transparent and all those responsible are accountable to stakeholders.

**Sustainability:** NDP-9 is based on meeting the needs of today without risking the needs of the future. Implementation of the NDP-9 poverty reduction strategy will have lasting positive impact in the lives of Somali citizens.

**Feasibility:** NDP-9 recognizes constraints and leverages strengths; its goals can be realised with available resources.
**Technical excellence:** in formulating and implementing its poverty reduction strategy, NDP-9 will draw on and be informed by national and international good practices and shall employ methods and approaches that have been shown to deliver results.

3. **Somalia’s Development Goals**

In addition to being multi-dimensional, any effective poverty reduction strategy must be feasible. In this regard, within NDP-9’s five-year time frame and likely resource availability it is certain that poverty in Somalia will not be eradicated. But it can be reduced significantly if the growth strategy is pro-poor and limited resources are targeted carefully in areas that are most likely to yield impact. Choices will therefore need to be made as to which of the many possible interventions should be prioritised within Somalia’s poverty reduction strategy.

With this in mind, the Government’s National Development Council (NDC)\(^5^9\) considered the likely effect on the causes of poverty and their associated impacts of the wide range of interventions (policies and programmes) proposed during the first round of stakeholder consultations. These interventions are summarised against the main causes and impacts of poverty and vulnerability identified in Chapter 3, in Table 2 below.

**Table 3: Priority interventions mapped against causes and impacts of poverty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of Poverty</th>
<th>Interventions prioritised by stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Reduce insecurity across Somalia and strengthen citizens’ access to an equitable and affordable system of justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak rule of law</td>
<td>Improve access by Somali citizens to health, education and other essential services, including social protection systems in times of extreme need by strengthening institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak governance impacting on access to basic services</td>
<td>Making policies gender-sensitive and undertaking strategies for women’s empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and social exclusion</td>
<td>Strengthen the effectiveness of political processes in Somalia, thereby increasing inclusiveness and reducing violent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political inclusion</td>
<td>Strengthen Somali institutions’ commitment and capacity for effective political and environmental governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought and climate change</td>
<td>All four objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>To accelerate job-creating economic growth and build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mismanagement and corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population displacement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5^9\) The National Development Council has the responsibility of bolstering economic growth and job creation, is chaired by the President (alternate is the PM) with Ministry of Finance, Planning, the Central Bank Governor, Federal Member states as additional members of this Council. There will be five Somali and international economists who will advise the government in the council.
Causes of Poverty | Interventions prioritised by stakeholders
--- | ---
Economic exclusion | economic inclusion, with particular emphasis on creating opportunities for young people
Pertaining to all drivers: poor institutional health and lack of domestic revenue, with dependence on unsustainable foreign aid | To strengthen Somali institutions’ capacity for effective governance

The process, which is described in more detail in Chapter 2, allowed the NDC to propose three overarching national priorities: political stability, improved security, and economic growth. The proposed national priorities were validated during a second round of stakeholder consultation and articulated as three national development goals for the period 2020 to 2024, as follows:

1. To increase political stability
2. To reduce insecurity and strengthen the rule of law
3. To foster economic growth

NDP-9 will be evaluated in terms of its progress made towards these three development goals, as described in Chapter 13, M&E Framework.

4. The NDP-9 Pillars

Analysis indicates that poverty in Somalia is driven by political fragility, conflict, insecurity and lawlessness, and exacerbated by climate emergencies. Political stability, security and the rule of law must improve to create the conditions in which efforts to support and climate proof economic growth can succeed. Social development is needed to fuel and sustain economic growth, through human capital development, social protection and disaster risk management. The poverty strategy for NDP-9 is therefore organized in four pillars: Inclusive and Accountable Politics; Improved Security and the Rule of Law; Inclusive Economic Growth (including increased employment) and Improved Social Development. By focusing interventions in these four pillars, Somalia will be addressing the most significant root causes of poverty. These organizing pillars align with the three national priorities identified.

- **Pillar 1: Inclusive politics** – strategies and interventions that strengthen the effectiveness of political processes in Somalia, thereby increasing inclusiveness and reducing violent conflict
- **Pillar 2: Security and the rule of law** – strategies and interventions that reduce insecurity across Somalia and to strengthen citizens’ access to an equitable and affordable systems of justice
- **Pillar 3: Economic development** – strategies and interventions that accelerate inclusive growth across the sectors of the economy, with particular emphasis on creating opportunities for women and young people
- **Pillar 4: Social development** – strategies and interventions that improve access by Somali citizens to health, education and other essential services, including social protection systems
in times of extreme need (drivers include information from HDI data on health, living standards and education)

In this way, each pillar of NDP-9 contains a set of strategies, to be conducted nationally and at the FMS-level, that will contribute towards the attainment of the three national development goals. Under the four pillar chapters the interventions are described in some detail and costed out within the fiscal parameters of the macro-economic and fiscal framework, presented in Chapter 10. Note that the strengthening of governance and institutional capacities is treated as an integral part of each pillar, rather than something to be treated separately (see cross-cutting imperatives, below).

The national priorities, as the term suggests, have national relevance and their implementation is expected to benefit the whole of Somalia, at all levels. However, it is also understood that their pursuit, with limited available resources and lack of capacities, will inevitably leave some priorities expressed at the FMS level during the consultation process either unaddressed or only partly addressed. Therefore, a vital companion to NDP-9 will be a set of FMS strategic plans that reflect both the rolling out of national priorities at the state level, and the pursuit of other urgent FMS development needs not addressed through the national priorities and pillar strategies.

The majority of FMSs already have in place such strategic plans and, during the implementation of NDP-9, these will be updated to align with the pillar strategies as well as those identified at the state level.

5. Cross-cutting imperatives

Clear as the national development priorities are, there is an opportunity to make the NDP-9 whole greater than the sum of its four constituent pillars. The principles described above make an essential and important contribution in this regard, but more is needed. Therefore, NDP-9 also identifies a number of “imperatives” that will both inform and bind together the four pillars. These are often called “cross-cutting issues”, but the Government of Somalia is aware of the tokenism that can sometimes become associated with such a label and, because of this, chooses a more assertive term that demands attention and accountability. Imperatives are not options or choices: in this case they are the essential warp onto which the programming responses to NDP-9 goals are woven.

Six such imperatives shall inform and shape all interventions undertaken by government and its development partners under the rubric of NDP-9.

a. **Strengthen gender and other kinds of social equity** – Interventions and programme objectives will focus on reaching the most disadvantaged and vulnerable social groups. Particular attention will be paid in this regard to women and girls’ equity and empowerment. To this end, all programme and policy data shall be gender-disaggregated, and all NDP-9 interventions will include a gender analysis as well as targets and indicators that are appropriately gendered.

b. **Build the resilience of households, communities and government** – Risk identification and management form a core aspect of all interventions. It is for this reason that poverty was not limited to a monetary definition but was broadened to include other dimensions that impact on households, communities and government. Supporting plans, such as the RRF, outline how Somali resilience can be developed across the dimensions of poverty, ensuring that households, communities and governments do not lose the gains made and can withstand future shocks.
c. **Better manage Somalia’s environment and natural resources** – An equilibrium between economic and environmental development and choices between present and future generations must be struck, with environmental degradation as one of the most dominant drivers identified in the poverty analysis. Somalis recognize that their future prosperity and development is tightly linked to today’s effective resource management.

d. **Prioritise durable solutions to long term displacement** – Somalia’s IDPs are the group most deeply impacted by drivers of poverty; no part of their lives is untouched. Progress towards poverty reduction will require the targeting of this most vulnerable group. It follows that an important overall metric for the success of this plan will be the return, resettlement or integration of IDPs.

e. **Strengthen the interface between humanitarian and development planning** – NDP 9 outlines a transition or continuum plan, from almost total dependence on external humanitarian and peacekeeping services to a future where Somali governments and stakeholders are fully capable of meeting their own needs. During this transition and continuum it is critical that government works in partnership with the planning efforts of international donors, aid organizations and others. The mapping and mainstreaming of SDGs provide a basis for this interface and partnership. The goal of the NDP is One Vision, One Plan, where all partners can locate themselves within the national vision.

f. **Governance** – NDP-9 strategies and interventions will include activities that strengthen Somali institutions’ capacity for effective governance.

6. **The Strategy Framework**

The foregoing – the NDP-9 principles, the development goals and FMS level strategic plans, the four pillars and their constituent interventions, and the cross-cutting imperatives – form the strategy framework at the heart of the NDP-9 poverty reduction strategy. The framework can be summarised in the tabular presentation shown in Figure 30, below.
Note that other state level interventions required by FMS strategic plans are not detailed out and costed in NDP-9.

7. Theory of Change

While the overall strategy framework shows how the component parts of the NDP-9 poverty reduction strategy relate to one another, the theory of change summarises the conceptual argument by which the proposed interventions will deliver Somalia’s three development goals and significant poverty reduction.

In words, the theory of change says the following: the overriding development challenge facing Somalia is widespread and extreme poverty, which stems from a number of underlying and intermediate causes, and which impacts people’s lives in a number of ways. Within the five-year time frame of NDP-9, and within available resources, analysis suggests that the problem of poverty can be most effectively addressed through a range of policy and programme interventions. These interventions are identified by using the “accelerator and bottleneck” methodology, informed by the six cross-cutting imperatives, and organised under four sectoral pillars. Given a number of assumptions concerning variables and externalities with probable impacts bearing on Somalia, a range of intermediate outcomes will result from the pillar interventions, which taken together will deliver Somalia’s three development goals. Realisation of the three development goals will result in the desired impact of NDP-9, which is a significant reduction in poverty and strengthened resilience of vulnerable households, communities and institutions.

Schematically, the theory of change can be represented as shown in Figure 31.

The remainder of the NDP-9 document elaborates this Theory of Change, along with the required Implementation, Fiscal Framework, Aid Coordination and Monitoring and Evaluation needed to ensure execution. However, some important linkages to global development are outlined next.

60 https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/SDGs/English/SDG_Accelerator_and_Bottleneck_Assessment_Tool.pdf
### Figure 31: Theory of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Problem</th>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Intermediate Outcomes</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Multi-dimensional poverty, driven by numerous underlying and intermediate causes, and impacting on the lives of the poor in different ways (See Figure 28 in Chapter 3) | **Pillar 1: Inclusive politics**
- Deepen federalism; Extend local level stabilization and governance;
- Complete constitutional reform;
- Conduct free & fair national electoral processes; Build national reconciliation; Strengthen institutions | • Respectful and mutually beneficial federal-sub-federal relations
• Reduced inter-regional and clan-based conflict
• Greater political inclusion and community reconciliation
• Effective decentralization
• Effective institutions supporting political processes | National Development Priorities
- Increased political stability
- Reduced insecurity
- Stronger rule of law
- Increased economic growth | Significantly reduced poverty
- Strengthened resilience of vulnerable households, communities and institutions |
|                                                                            | **Pillar 2: Security & the rule of law**
- Reform of Security Forces, including police; Reform Judiciary, including police; Embedding of Human Rights and provision of equitable access to justice to the most vulnerable. | • Professional, representative and trusted Security Forces
• Professional, representative and trusted judiciary, and judicial institutions
• Protection of human rights
• Most vulnerable have equal access to justice
• Greater government transparency |                                                                            |                                                                            |
|                                                                            | **Pillar 3: Economic development**
- Rehabilitate and expand infrastructure; improve resilience of food production systems; diversify the economy; strengthen natural resource management; create an enabling environment for economic growth and promote international trade. | • More resilient food production
• Improved economic infrastructure
• Lower levels of unemployment
• Higher levels of FDI
• Higher numbers of SME start ups
• Improved regulation of private sector for fair, safe and transparent marketplace
• Sustainable development of marine and offshore NRs |                                                                            |                                                                            |
|                                                                            | **Pillar 4: Social development**
- Improve access to health, education, clean water & sanitation; Strengthen social protection & food security safety nets; Strengthen institutional capacities for DRM and public service delivery | • More equitable access to quality basic services
• Reduced levels of displacement
• More effective and accountable public service delivery and oversight institutions
• Improved human capital development
• Strengthened government ability to predict, prevent and respond to humanitarian need |                                                                            |                                                                            |
|                                                                            | **Macro-economic & Fiscal Framework**
- Strengthen monetary and fiscal policies and financial services oversight | • Improved fiscal & monetary management
• Strengthened fiscal framework
• Improved confidence in government
• Effective institutions supporting the economy |                                                                            |                                                                            |
8. Linkages to Development Frameworks

8.1 Sustainable development dimensions

Table 4, below, maps the content of Table 3 from the beginning of the Chapter to the five organising pillars of NDP-9 and to the four Sustainable Development Dimensions.

Table 4: Strategic Linkages for Causes of Poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of Poverty</th>
<th>What must be done</th>
<th>Organizing Pillars</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Reduce insecurity across Somalia and to strengthen citizens’ access to an equitable and affordable system of justice</td>
<td>Security and the Rule of Law</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak rule of law</td>
<td></td>
<td>Security and the Rule of Law</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak governance impacting on equitable access to quality basic services</td>
<td>To improve access by all Somali citizens to health, education and other essential services, including social protection systems in times of extreme need</td>
<td>Social Development</td>
<td>Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and social exclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political inclusion</td>
<td>To strengthen the effectiveness of political processes in Somalia, thereby increasing inclusiveness and reducing violent conflict</td>
<td>Inclusive Politics</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent drought and climate change</td>
<td>To strengthen Somali institutions’ capacity for effective environmental governance</td>
<td>Governance (Disaster Management)</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Degradation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governance (Disaster Management)</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Displacement</td>
<td>All four objectives</td>
<td>Social Development (and others)</td>
<td>Social Development (and others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Employment</td>
<td>To accelerate pro-poor and job-creating economic growth and build economic inclusion, with particular emphasis on creating opportunities for young people</td>
<td>Inclusive Economic Development</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Exclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of Poverty</td>
<td>What must be done</td>
<td>Organizing Pillars</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pertaining to all drivers: poor institutional health and lack of government revenue, with dependence on unsustainable foreign aid</td>
<td>To strengthen Somali institutions’ capacity for effective governance</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table is clearly linear and two dimensional. The figure below better demonstrates inter-linkages and overlaps among dimensions of sustainable development and the four pillars. For example, weak governance leading to poor basic services is not only a social dimension of poverty, but a governance one as well. Similarly, a lack of security and social exclusion at a broader level contributes to inaccessibility of basic services.

Thus the strategy, reflecting the inter-linkages and overlaps of mutually reinforcing sustainable development dimensions and the four pillars, requires an organizing framework, as outlined below. The framework is a complex circular arrangement where each pillar impacts the other. The overlapping nature of Figure 32, Multi Dimensional Sustainable Development, outlines the reinforcing and overlapping aspects of development sought by NDP-9.

8.2 The humanitarian-development-peacebuilding nexus

As evidenced by g7+ discussions and networking, development in fragile nations is distinctive from development requirements in middle and high-income countries. In fragile nations, a lot of attention is focused on the humanitarian-development-peacebuilding (HDP) nexus. During conflict and in its aftermath, humanitarian and peace interventions, often delivered by international partners, dominate. But this must transition to building national capacity if sustainable development is to be a reality. NDP 9 outlines development interventions to be undertaken by the Somali governments and the Somali people, but recognizes the contributions made by outside aid groups and peacekeepers. One guiding principle in this regard is not to lose the gains already made and to ensure that a partnership is
established between all actors, leading to a successful transition where Somalis are responsible for all functions of government: peace; rule of law; security; social protection; environmental stewardship and a prosperous economy.

The Nexus

Figure 33: Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding Nexus

8.3 Growth pathways to poverty reduction

Whilst the above strategic framework and theory of change were used to map out the links between strategic interventions and poverty reduction and to ensure that interventions are coherently designed across the pillars, NDP 9 has identified inclusive economic growth as the most powerful instrument for reducing poverty and improving the quality of life in Somalia.

Research that compared the experiences of a number of developing countries found consistently strong evidence that rapid and sustained growth is the single most important way to reduce poverty. A typical estimate from these cross-country studies is that a 10 per cent increase in a country’s average income will reduce the poverty rate by between 20 and 30 per cent. Thus, economic growth is critical to making faster progress towards an array of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – and not just the goal of lifting Somali people’s living conditions above the poverty line in monetary terms.

There are three known pathways through which economic growth can benefit the poor:


(1) **Direct pathway**, which impacts the poor directly (such as programs for basic health, sanitation, education, social protection and rural roads);

(2) **Market pathway** (or “trickle down”), where growth helps the poor via economic linkages (such as inter-sectoral and inter-regional labour migration, increased demand for goods and services, reinvestment through formal, informal and internal finance);

(3) **Policy pathway**, which supplements the market path and guides the development process toward greater equality (through subsidies, fiscal transfer, public investment, job creation and proper design of trade, investment and financial policies, social protection and so on).

Illustration of ways in which effective development strategy can help reduce poverty through these three pathways is provided in Figure 34.

---

**Figure 34: Growth pathways**

Economic growth, undertaken within a framework of thoughtful policies, generates job opportunities and hence stronger demand for labour, the main and often the sole asset of the poor. In turn, increasing employment has been crucial in delivering higher growth.

Public programmes for improving delivery of education, health, water, sanitation and hygiene services and social protection can both have a direct impact on poverty through improved access to services and increase the productivity of labour due to better skills and health. Better infrastructure, especially in rural areas, can also impact positively both on productivity and access to these services. Finally, properly designed and executed macroeconomic and fiscal policies can directly impact on the incomes of poor households through direct subsidies and transfer payments, and particularly through central bank regulation and oversight of financial markets that ensures low transaction costs and inclusive financial services (see Chapter 7, Section 11.13). The placement of inclusive economic growth as the primary desired outcome in NDP-9 must be seen in the context of the enabling pillars of change, as shown in Figure 35, below:
8.4 Mapping to the 2030 Agenda

Sustainable development is recognized as the key to poverty reduction: it ensures that development does not lead to inequality where the vulnerable are excluded from opportunities, and it protects gains made and ensures the vulnerable don’t slip back into deprivation.

Somalia has made a commitment to making progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and their principles (Figure 36). Efforts have been made to align and embed the SDGs into the pillar plans, as well as within the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. Leveraging the 2030 Agenda and its tools is a direct investment into poverty reduction.
Annex 3 provides a complete mapping of interventions, baselines, indicators and targets to SDGs. The diagram below maps relevant SDGs to the pillars.

![Mapping to SDGs](image)

**Figure 36: Mapping Pillars to SDGs**

### 8.5 Approach for aligning strategies and interventions

One of the temptations of development plans in fragile nations is to identify a long list of worthy strategies and interventions. The Mid-Term Review of NDP-8 indicated that the prior plan was overly ambitious and its scope hindered implementation as strategies became projectized.

Another risk for implementation is the existence of, and competition from, other development and ministry plans which overlap with the NDP. The national level budget of Somalia is very modest, so the available funds need to be focused on a limited number of key priorities. Equally, development partners, whose efforts and funding will continue to dominate the early years of NDP-9, need a plan providing clear direction on where programs and funding will result in the highest benefit.

NDP-9 focuses on presenting intervention priorities linked to strategies which aligned with the consultation feedback, poverty analysis, and with key development documents such as the FGS roadmaps, ministerial workplans, the Strategic Investment Plan and the RRF. The aim of the mapping exercise was to identify common themes and purposes in order to align with existing budgets, teams, and progress.
The NDP approach used a tailored methodology to identify both pillar strategies and relevant interventions. The strategies identified in each pillar chapter are based on identifying the key pillar constraints/challenges for each stakeholder consultation and data analysis. These challenges provide a basis for constructing the limited number of strategies which directly address each constraint.

The FGS roadmaps, outline a significant number of interventions, assigned as multi-year ministerial workplans, under four pillars with which NDP-9 aligns (Inclusive Politics; Improved Security and the Rule of Law; Economic Development and Social Development). The director generals of line ministries within the FGS, as part of Round 2 consultations, were presented with the strategic framework of the NDP and asked to provide their ministerial intervention priorities, based on the roadmaps. This exercise produced an extensive list of interventions.

An analytical approach was taken to these interventions by applying a number of filters which had been identified as important to the success of the NDP. These filters included:

- Is the intervention pro-poor?
- Will the intervention generate domestic revenue?
- Was the intervention supportive of the cross-cutting policy imperatives?
- Was the intervention supported by pillar analysis in the NDP?
- Will the intervention be supportive of progress in more than one pillar?
- Was the intervention supported by stakeholder consultations for poverty reduction?

A more concise list of interventions was generated by this exercise and mapped against interventions from the RRF, Strategic Investment Plan, and earlier drafts of the NDP. The most useful of filters proved to be the last two: supportive of more than one pillar and a desired stakeholder intervention to reduce poverty.

By “stress-testing” the interventions in each pillar, NDP-9 is more confident that catalytic interventions have been identified, which will generate benefits outside their sectoral boundaries.

The analysis also identified the location of the responsible ministries, the type of intervention, the pillar distribution of interventions, and the cross-cutting policy imperatives distribution. This was used as a cross-check that the distribution of the plan was not skewed, and to amend where it was.

Each pillar chapter contains a limited number of key strategies, aligned to relevant interventions. It is important to note, however, that the strategies will provide the most utility for development partners and FMS strategic plans. It is at this level where various interventions and projects will align to offer progress against national goals and priorities.

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63 The SDG Accelerator and Bottleneck Assessment Tool; UNDP; 2017
Preamble:
The 9th National Development Plan (NDP-9) stakeholder consultations indicated a widespread belief that real and lasting poverty reduction and economic growth is contingent on continued progress towards the creation of a stable and inclusive political system in Somalia. NDP-9’s analysis of poverty, and of the country’s vital security sector, confirm that effective and inclusive politics is a sine qua non for reducing insecurity, strengthening the rule of law, improving governance, and accelerating economic and social development. To continue the progress already made since 2013 under the Somali Compact-New Deal and NDP-8, and to enable the achievement of its development goals, NDP-9 identifies a range of interventions under Pillar 1 that will further strengthen Somalia’s federalization, establish the new national constitution and deliver universal elections in 2020 and 2024. In doing so, Pillar 1 will support Somalia’s progress towards SDGs 1, 5, 10 and 16.

1. Introduction

Somalia is a complex political, security and development environment, and much of its recent past has been marked by poverty, famine and recurring violence. Somalis have been divided politically and until recently have not had a clear path to reconciliation and political unity. The enduring nature and impact of the conflict has generated a complex set of political and social grievances that remain a threat to the country’s stability. However, in 2012, with the establishment of permanent political and executive institutions, the adoption of the federal Provisional Constitution (PC) as well as important military offensives and security gains, Somalia entered into a new period where longer-term peace seemed feasible. After decades of conflict and instability, a federal government was established through national dialogue and consensus.

The peaceful elections and transition of presidential power and establishment of a bicameral federal parliament, in early 2017 and late 2016, provided new momentum and the opportunity to progress Somalia’s peace-building and state-building priorities.

The main political mandate of the current Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which concludes in February 2021, is to complete the unfinished tasks inherited from preceding transitional and post-transitional governments. Primarily, these include completing federalism, finalizing the Constitutional Review Process (CRP), and preparing and conducting democratic elections in 2020/2021 and 2024 that go beyond the existing clan-based power-sharing political system.

Therefore, the Inclusive Politics Pillar of the National Development Plan (NDP-9) will focus on the three core components of the pillar namely, Federalism, the Constitutional Review Process (CRP) and Elections. In addition to that, the pillar plan will also integrate reconciliation and institutional capacity development as crosscutting priority strategies.

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65 UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020
It goes without saying that inclusive politics is essential for sustainable economic and human development. Development – both economic and human – cannot be sustainable if people remain at the receiving end of development as mere beneficiaries, but not as active agents who influence the processes that shape their lives. Inclusive politics gives voice and autonomy to people and allows them to express their desires and priorities. It provides a platform where people from different walks of life can have a discussion on their vision, their wants and their objectives.

Furthermore, inclusive politics also ensures representation of society’s various groups in the running of a country. It also provides a system of transparency and accountability for public administration and government activity. It is a mechanism whereby representatives and public servants can be held accountable. Through inclusive politics, the poor people are also part of the public voice and are able to express their priorities and hold duty bearers accountable.

Inclusive politics therefore has important and positive implications for poverty reduction.

2. Situation Analysis

2.1. Current status of core inclusive politics pillar components

a) Federalism

The most significant change in Somalia’s context in the last five years has been the emergence of four Federal Member States (FMS) – Jubaland (2013), Southwest (2014), Galmudug (2015) and Hirshabelle (2016) – a development that follows a pattern set by Puntland in 1998.

The FGS is solidly committed to the system of federalism as the guiding principle to shape the future of Somalia. A three-tier federal structure has been envisioned and adopted – federal, state and district levels. Although over the past few years, the establishment of the new FMS has almost been completed, significant work remains to be done at the district level and, importantly, on the precise distribution of roles and responsibilities between the different levels of government.

The process of deepening federalism is directly related to the finalization of the PC. A number of the political agreements (e.g. the structure of the state, the distribution of powers, etc.) will be enshrined in the constitution. Therefore, close coordination between the federalization process and the CRP will need to be ensured.

Critical constitutional issues that determine the federal system are a priority for on-going political negotiations. These include: resource and revenue sharing, allocation of competencies and functions, fiscal matters, and the status of the capital – Mogadishu – within the federation.

The February and June 2018 meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) delivered concrete results in these areas in terms of overall agreements on resource sharing in fisheries, minerals and oil. Particularly, in its June 2018 Baidoa meeting, through the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee (FNTC), the NSC negotiated and agreed on the Somali resource-sharing model. The NSC

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68 NDP-8 (2017-2019), December 2018
meeting also reached almost (80%) concurrence on the power-sharing and justice models.\textsuperscript{69} It is equally important that these agreements are acted upon, translated into appropriate legislation by parliament within the timeframe set out in the Political Roadmap.\textsuperscript{70}

In follow-up to and based on the above NSC resource-sharing agreement, on 18 May 2019, the House of the People of the Federal Parliament of Somalia (FPS) passed the Petroleum Law of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS) which establishes the regulatory and legal frameworks to manage and govern its hydrocarbon resources.

Government priorities for 2019 include negotiating and resolving the following crucial issues for the finalization of the federalization process:

- Revenue-sharing and fiscal federalism
- Allocation of powers
- Intergovernmental Relations
- Somali governance structure
- Formalization of the FMS status – graduation of the existing interim regional administrations into fully-fledged FMS – through parliamentary resolutions
- Status of Mogadishu in the federation

Graduation of the FMS is essential due to the fact that most of the interim regional administrations were established before the legal and institutional framework for the implementation of federalism in Somalia was put in place by the FPS. These include the establishment of the Boundaries and Federation Commission (BFC) and relevant laws.

\textit{b) Constitution review process (CRP)}

The endorsement of the 2012 PC of the FRS was a ground-breaking achievement. It put in place an overarching, nationally endorsed legal framework to guide Somalia’s efforts to rebuild the nation in accordance with the rule of law. Review of the PC is a process central to solidifying the political settlement and the success of the transition of Somalia from decades of war and conflict into a stable and peaceful country.

In accordance with the PC, a Parliamentary Constitutional Implementation and Oversight Committee (OC) and Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) were established in 2014 to advance the review process. Besides, a new ministry responsible for constitutional affairs was also established as part of the FGS ministries from 2015.

The review process started in 2014, but progress has been slow, due to a range of political and security factors. However, some important work has been undertaken by OC and ICRIC. These mandated institutions have reviewed chapters of the PC and put forward their recommendations, identifying a number of issues that require further debate. The Ministry of Constitutional Affairs (MOCA), OC and ICRIC bring together stakeholders across and at all levels of government, and the community, to build

\textsuperscript{69} Democratization and Election Office, Office of the President (OoP), February 2019
\textsuperscript{70} The Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Subcommittee for Inclusive Politics, Political Road Map 2020
consensus around the outstanding issues. The intention was to have a new constitution developed and endorsed by all concerned parties before the end of 2019.\footnote{Federal Government of Somalia, National Development Plan 2017-2019 (NDP-8), December 2016}

The CRP goes through two types of review: political and technical. The political review focuses on the contentious issues of the PC. The contested political issues in the PC that have to be negotiated among FGS and FMS stakeholders are: i) distribution of powers and responsibilities between national and subnational authorities; ii) resource and revenue sharing; iii) the powers of the president and the prime minister; iv) the powers and representation of the two chambers of the parliament; v) the status of Mogadishu; vi) citizenship questions; and vii) the design of the judiciary system.

The highest body for political review is the NSC which brings together the executive leadership of FGS and FMS. However, the actual deliberations of these contentious political issues are conducted by the FNTC which submits policy options or proposals to the NSC. In addition, MOCA in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR) provides the platform where political review is undertaken. On the other hand, technical review is undertaken by OC and ICRIC and focuses on issues such as typing errors, gaps, adjustment of articles, etc.

The main components of the CRP include: (i) a national convention; (ii) technical review; (iii) political negotiation; (iv) civic education and public outreach; (v) a validation conference; (vi) parliamentary adoption; and (vii) a national referendum.

The government successfully held the convention to launch the CRP on 15 May 2018 in Mogadishu. However, the on-going work conducted within the framework of the CRP needs to be accelerated and items requiring amendments to be prioritized.\footnote{The Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Subcommittee for Inclusive Politics, Political Road Map 2020}

c) Electoral system

The present system of political representation is based on an interim solution intended to kick start the democratic process and reasonably ensure that different parties in society, based on clan affiliation, are represented in the political structures. The intention remains to move towards a system of one-person one-vote in a multi-party democracy by 2020.\footnote{NDP-8 (2017-2019), December 2016}

According to Articles 60 and 91 of the PC, the current term of the Federal Parliament (FPS) and President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS) will end in September 2020 and February 2021 respectively.\footnote{The Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, Adopted August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia}

The holding of elections in 2020 is clearly articulated in the PC of the FRS, as well as Somali NDP-8. The FGS is committed to implement inclusive, democratic, transparent and credible elections by 2020. Based on those principles, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) leading constitutionally mandated institutions developed an Inclusive Politics Roadmap, which was endorsed by the Council of Ministers (CoM) on the 18th of January 2018 in order to create an environment that enables the government to
fully implement free and fair elections in 2020. The Inclusive Politics Roadmap emphasizes that democratization is an essential component in building a viable state.\(^75\)

The electoral laws have been prepared and agreed by the Election Working Group that brings together the Office of the President, OPM and 17 other institutions. Concerning the next elections, at the June 2018 meeting of the NSC, the FGS and FMS agreed that the electoral model for the country shall be proportional representation (PR), closed-list, single-constituency (the whole country). The proposed electoral law was then discussed, endorsed and submitted to the Federal Parliament of Somalia (FPS) for consideration and passage by the FGS Council of Ministers (CoM) in April 2019. Subsequently, the House of the People (HoP) of the Federal Parliament appointed a parliamentary ad-hoc committee for the review of the proposed electoral law.

The following considerations informed the selection of the proposed electoral model\(^76\): i) Lack of national population census; ii) Displacement of large number of people from original areas of residence; iii) Prevailing unfavourable context for the establishment of electoral districts; iv) Difficulty in the apportionment of federal parliamentary seats to FMS and BRA; v) The persistence of the 4.5 clan-based political system used in earlier electoral processes; vi) Insecurity stemming from the threat of terrorism; vii) Absence of genuine reconciliation efforts throughout the country; viii) Disputes over existing district boundaries; ix) Inability to register all eligible voters due insecurity; x) Low levels of security in some areas of the country; and xi) Lack of national unity due to the outstanding resolution of the Somaliland issue.

In light of the above, among the three main electoral models in the world – Majority/Plurality, PR and Mixed System – the proposed model was found to be the most applicable with the least challenges in relation to Somalia’s current context. No census or border demarcation and allocation of parliamentary seats will be required, voting will take place in all peaceful urban and rural areas with at least 400 eligible voters, while IDPs will be able to vote in their respective camps and, thus, those who vote will represent the whole country. This model is also considered to be strengthening national unity.\(^77\)

Moreover, the PR closed-list system best ensures inclusive representation, and will produce the most representative results in terms of political parties (as well as being inclusive in terms of clans). Parties will win seats in proportion to the votes cast, and all votes will count. Besides, the PR system promotes the building of political party alliances and more inclusive results, as opposed to a winner-takes-all majority system.\(^78\)

The decision is supported by an end-line survey conducted for AMISOM and UNSOM in August-September 2017, which found strong backing among Somalis for a universal suffrage election in 2020.

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\(^75\) The Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Subcommittee on Inclusive Politics, Political Road Map 2020

\(^76\) Ministry of Internal, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, Minister’s Report on Types of Electoral Models/Constituencies, Cabinet Subcommittee on Inclusive Politics, OPM, April 2019

\(^77\) Meeting with the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) top management, 25 August 2019

\(^78\) African Union and United Nations Information Support Team (AU/UN IST), Policy Brief on the End-Line Survey of Citizens’ Perceptions of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia, February-March 2018
and declining support for the 4.5 clan-based, power-sharing formula.\textsuperscript{79} This is corroborated by the feedback, received from the nationwide consultations that were conducted by the NIEC of Somalia.

In order to conduct universal suffrage multi-party elections in 2020/21 and 2024, a number of milestones must be met. These include the enactment of an Electoral Law with a clear definition of the electoral model most suitable for Somalia by the end of 2020 and 2024; voter registration and registration of political parties; enhanced understanding among stakeholders and the public of the electoral processes and operations; and capacity building and institutional development for the NIEC at the national and regional levels.

Regarding preparations for the 2020/2021 elections, the NIEC has registered remarkable progress. By the end of August 2019 it implemented a number of crucial activities:\textsuperscript{80}

- Completed the drafting of the necessary regulations, codes of conduct and procedures.
- Met with the parliamentary ad-hoc committee and proposed changes to the electoral law.
- Implemented capacity building activities, including study tours for the commissioners and the secretariat to gain greater understanding of electoral management and develop networks with well-established electoral management bodies.
- Formulated a voter education (VE) curriculum and supporting materials.
- Developed VE messages in close consultation with partners and stakeholders.
- NIEC staff development on gender mainstreaming, creating opportunities for women, people with disabilities (PWD) and marginalized communities to ensure inclusive political participation.
- Facilitated a televised open forum with political parties, MPs, CSOs, women, PWDs, youth, etc.
- Provisionally registered 54 political parties.
- Facilitated the formulation of the National Election Security Strategy in partnership with the AU.
- NIEC aims to ensure that voter registration (VR) will take place between March-June 2020. The following activities are envisaged for VR during 2020:
  - Registration of voters (March – June 2020)
  - A de-duplication exercise (July-Aug 2020)
  - Display of the provisional list (Aug-Sept 2020)
  - The distribution of voter registration cards (Sept-Oct 2020)
  - Polling target date is October 2020 if there are no delays in planned activities

- To meet this timeline NIEC has completed the identification and verification of potential VR sites in SWS, Hirshabelle, Galmadug and Banadir and will submit these lists to the security forces for security vetting as a next step. If the electoral security task force is not yet set up, NIEC will rely on FMS level security entities to vet these sites.
- NIEC is currently refining the VR budget which now includes more accurate costs of temporary staff to be hired to assist with VR operations. The VR budget prepared by NIEC is designed to inform the financial contribution expected from the government in support of VR. The NIEC budget will be submitted to the government in the next few weeks.

\textsuperscript{79} AMISOM/UNSOM, Citizens’ Perception of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia, End-Line Survey Report, September 2017
\textsuperscript{80} NIEC Chairperson Briefing to the Electoral Information Sharing Network Meeting, August 2019
Despite the progress, challenges associated with delayed passage of the Electoral Law and formation of the Security Taskforce may delay the implementation of crucial activities within the 2020 election timeline.

The fact remains that both the PR system and universal suffrage election models require viable political parties that transcend clan loyalties. In light of the above, genuine political parties with convincing party programs and an active followership that extends beyond a few politicians based in the capital could prove to be valuable vehicles in attempts to transcend the subnational purview of political entities, overcome age-old clan-based disputes, and provide viable platforms for national dialogue. Ultimately, a democratic trajectory for Somalia will be hard to achieve in the absence of both a unified national constituency and effective political parties.81

\[d)\] Reconciliation and restoration of public confidence

During the state formation processes, there has been lack of separate, effective political dialogue and reconciliation effort among the communities in the various regions in Somalia to bridge their differences.82 In view of the complex recent history of Somalia, the political debate therefore needs to be complemented by a conscious effort to reconcile the people within the state-building process.83

Previous national reconciliation processes since 1991 focused more on state-building and less on nation-building and reconciliation.84 These were mainly directed at addressing the constitutional and institutional issues as opposed to the psychological and perceptual aspects of the conflict, hence the need for a comprehensive Somali-owned reconciliation process. In addition, priority was not given to addressing issues of justice, rule of law and human rights, which manifest key concerns and are part of the root causes of the conflict to date.

As a step in that direction, a National Reconciliation Consultative Conference was organized and convened in June 2017 by the Federal Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR). In February 2019, MOIFAR launched a validation workshop on the proposed National Reconciliation Framework (NRF). The NRF was subsequently validated and approved by the CoM. Additionally, FGS priorities for 2019/2020 include the establishment of the law and formation of the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC).

The mandate of the NTRC is to foster national healing, reconciliation and unity, and to ensure that matters relating to impunity, revenge and other triggers of violence are addressed through legal and state directed process.85

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84 Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, National Reconciliation Framework, Version 8, March 7, 2019
85 The Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia
2.2. National policies, strategies, legal instruments and institutional frameworks and gaps for the development of the sector

a) National policies and strategies

Important inclusive politics pillar policies and strategies are summarised in Table 5, below.

**Table 5: Relevant Policies and Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>Gaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FGS National Development Plan (NDP-8) 2017-2019</td>
<td>Election dispute resolution mechanism framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) Strategic Plan 2017-2021</td>
<td>Development of national framework for devolving services and functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS Political Roadmap for 2018-2020</td>
<td>Procedures and mechanisms to ensure that women, youth and minority, disadvantaged groups enjoy sufficient participation in the 2020 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Civic Education Strategy Plan in Support for the CRP 2018-2020, MOCA</td>
<td>Voter registration and public outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconciliation Framework (NRF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Stabilization Strategy (NSS)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Somali National Development Plan (NDP-8)**

The NDP-8 agenda for achieving inclusive politics focused on the following priority areas:

- Democratization; Election and civic engagement
- Finalizing the Constitution
- Decentralization – implementing the federation process

**NIEC Strategic Plan 2017-2021**

This Strategic Plan was prepared in line with the spirit of the PC which articulates the general principles of an electoral system that addresses the aspirations of the Somali people to have free, fair and credible elections. Secondly, this Strategic Plan is developed within the context of the Somali National Development Plan (NDP) 2017-2019. The plan provides a direction and a program of intervention by the Commission as it contains its strategies over next five years.\(^\text{86}\)

**Comprehensive Civic Education (CE) Strategy Plan for CRP 2018-2020**

The plan covers preliminary and substantive Civic Education (CE) campaign in two phases. Preliminary CE is designed to prepare the public to participate in the review process, while substantive CE is designed to inform the people on key political issues in the review process and options available for their resolutions. The primary target audiences are: Somali citizens inside and outside the country, interest groups (women, youth, and elders, religious leaders, people with disabilities, IDPs and school children),

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\(^{86}\)National Independent Electoral Commission, Strategic Plan 2017-2021
media organizations, FGS and FMS civil servants, the Somali Police Force (SPF) and the Custodian Corps (prisons).  

The objectives of the CE strategy are to:

- Raise awareness on the importance of the CRP nationally, regionally and within targeted audiences.
- Provide each target audience with the necessary information from MOCA in order to prepare them for the review process.
- Encourage civic participation, to render the CRP fully inclusive of the views and desires all Somali nationals and that it meets their needs.

To achieve these objectives, a comprehensive CE campaign will be rolled out to create two-way public engagement for both sensitization and soliciting feedback to be incorporated into the constitution.

**National Reconciliation Framework (NRF)**

The NRF goal is to contribute to a sense of sustained peace and stability by laying the ground for genuine, comprehensive national reconciliation for the Somali people by restoring trust among themselves and increasing confidence in all levels of government institutions, resulting in peaceful coexistence, renewed relationships, and social and economic recovery.

The NRF consists of five interlinked pillars, 14 milestones and 85 activities to be implemented at national, FMS & BRA, district and village levels. The five pillars address three types of reconciliation: political, social and religious. **Political reconciliation** issues include power-sharing, representation, the relationship between FGS and FMS, federalism, devolution, resource-sharing and constitutional review issues, etc. **Social reconciliation** issues include historical grievances, disputed areas/lands, addressing the past, mistrust, suspicion, clan rivalry, active conflicts, displacement, destruction of traditional mechanisms, poor clan leadership, and the relationship between clan and state. **Religious reconciliation** issues include sectarianism, violent extremism, the relationship between religion and the state, the status of religion and the judiciary.

The guiding principles of the NRF are:

- Somali-led, driven and owned processes
- Focus on voluntarism, local engagement and funding
- Inclusive and accountable participation in recognizing regional and community diversities
- Mainstreaming transparency and accountability
- Non-political and non-partisan
- A bottom-up approach to reconciliation, which is community informed and reflects lessons learned
- Building consensus, forming collaborative partnerships and fostering trust

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88 Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, National Reconciliation Framework, Version 8, March 7, 2019
Building on these key principles, the NRF implementation will be based on inclusivity, consultation, and impartiality, leaving no one excluded.

**FGS Political Roadmap for 2018-2020**

As mentioned above, the OPM developed an Inclusive Politics Roadmap, which was endorsed by the CoM on 18 January 2018. The roadmap emphasizes that democratization is an essential component in building a viable state\(^89\). It focuses on: federalism and reconciliation, CRP, elections and related activities, as well as strengthening international relations.

**National Stabilization Strategy (NSS)**

The overall goal of NSS will be to improve stability in Somalia by delivering tangible results that strengthen cohesion within communities and between communities and their government. The purpose of the strategy is to support a combination of peace and state-building interventions and prevent violence through the following efforts:

- Engage communities in dialogue to address their legitimate grievances and develop confidence building measures.
- Expand socio-economic opportunities to build resilient communities and reduce poverty.
- Promote transparency and inclusivity to increase government legitimacy.
- Provide justice and security services to all groups to extend legitimate state authority.\(^90\)

The NSS focus areas are: community recovery, social reconciliation, local governance, and rule of law. In addition to the four focus areas, the strategy will also link with crosscutting issues supported by other government strategies and policies e.g. Preventing/Combating Violent Extremism strategy.

\(b\text{)} \text{Legal instruments}\)

Important legal instruments for the inclusive politics pillar are summarised in Table 6, overleaf.

**Provisional Constitution (PC)**

Chapters 4 and 5 of the PC contain the legal tenets that frame the electoral system (Article 47) and the devolution of powers of state/federalism in the FRS (Articles 48 to 54). Similarly, Chapter 10 provides the legal basis for the establishment of the Independent Commissions, including the Boundaries and Federation Commission (BFC), NIEC and Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in articles 111E, 111G and 111I, respectively. In addition, article 121 of Chapter 12 of the PC underscores the harmonization of the constitution of the FRS and those of the FMS.\(^91\)

\(^{89}\) The Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Subcommittee on Inclusive Politics, Political Road Map 2020

Table 6: Relevant Legal Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>Gaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Provisional Constitution (PC) of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS)</td>
<td>Political Parties Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law establishing the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) of FRS</td>
<td>Electoral Law (developed and submitted to parliament for enactment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Law of the FRS (resource-sharing of hydrocarbon resources)</td>
<td>Local Government Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law of the National Truth &amp; Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship law</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of Intergovernmental Relations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formalization of existing interim regional administrations according to article 49 (1) of the PC or (by way of a resolution of the Parliament)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmonisation of regional states’ constitutions with the federal constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translation of resource-sharing agreements (fishery, marine) into laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral regulations, codes of conduct, procedures and protocols necessary for 2020 elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determination of Mogadishu status as the capital city of Somalia and its status within the federation (Article 9 of the PC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review of Structure of the State Organs (Article 48 of the PC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review of Governance System (Article 89 of the PC) – election of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocation of Powers (Article 54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) Law

This law complies with articles 47, 110, 111G and 112 of the PC on the electoral system, general principles of independent commissions, the NIEC, and the appointment of independent commissions at the federal level. The law also defines the powers and responsibilities of election and referendum monitoring commissions at district, regional and national levels. In addition to that, the law enshrines the independence of NIEC from the executive organ and political parties in the execution of its responsibilities, in accordance with the Federal Constitution.92

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92 The Law Establishing the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), 2015
Proposed National Electoral Law

The proposed electoral law was endorsed by the Council of Ministers (CoM) in April 2019 and sent to the Federal Parliament for review for revision and/or enactment. However, the proposed law differs with the Provisional Constitution (PC) in the provisions governing the election of the President. According to Article 89 (1) of the PC the (two) houses of the Federal Parliament shall elect the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS) in a joint session, presided over by the Speaker of the House of the People of the Federal Parliament. Conversely, according to Article 12 of the proposed electoral law, the presidential candidate of the party which wins the majority of the votes or seats in the parliament becomes the President of the FRS, while ensuring that changes to the provisions governing the election and powers of the President will be addressed in the Constitutional Review Process (CRP).

So far, the electoral law has not been agreed by all the regions, politicians or parliament and remains a proposal. It is for this reason that the House of the People (HoP) of the Federal Parliament appointed a parliamentary ad-hoc committee for the review of the proposed electoral law.

The objective of the proposed law is to manage the elections of legislative bodies and the President of the Republic, specify the duties and responsibilities of NIEC and affiliated electoral offices, and define the electoral model for Somalia. According to Article 11 of the proposed law, the electoral model will be ‘Proportional Representation (PR) Closed-List, Single-Constituency’. The lists of each party must not be more than double (550) and less than the total number of parliamentary seats contested (275).

Petroleum Law

In compliance with Articles 7 (1) and 44 of the PC, the House of the People of the Federal Parliament passed the Petroleum Law on 18 May 2019. However, its passage through the Upper Chamber or Senate of the Federal Parliament remains pending, as does presidential assent.

According to Article 4 of the law, petroleum revenues will be shared between the FGS and FMS in a manner beneficial for the whole country and in congruence with the PC. The main objective of the law is to ensure Somalia’s sovereign rights over the exploration, development, discovery, utilization and management of its on-shore and off-shore petroleum resources.

c) Studies, reviews and option papers

Technical studies, reviews and option papers on critical inclusive politics issues are summarised in Table 7, below.

a) Institutional frameworks

The lead institutions and ministries for inclusive politics are MIOFAR, MOCA, and the OPM, which is responsible for coordination. There are also 13 other institutions, including ministries, involved in the Inclusive Politics Pillar (IPP) processes.

93 Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia
Table 7: Relevant reviews and options papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Gaps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completion and publication of a voter registration feasibility study</td>
<td>Review of Article 9 of the PC on the status of the capital city of the FRS Mogadishu in the federation</td>
<td>Resolving contested areas such as Galkayo, Sool &amp; Sanaag, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Article 48 of the PC on structure of the state organs on the two levels of government (FG &amp; FMS)</td>
<td>The Somaliland dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Article 89 of the PC on the governance system and election of the President of the FRS</td>
<td>Feasibility study toward one-person one-vote in Somalia possible options / scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey on state of affairs on federalism in Somalia to assess the implementation powers of the government to provide public services</td>
<td>Federal justice model</td>
<td>Agreement on fiscal federalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to implement an inclusive political process, the IPP Cabinet Subcommittee (CSC) will provide strategic leadership, coordinate, facilitate, integrate and monitor the various activities in the Inclusive Politics Roadmap. The CSC is tasked with ensuring that all roadmap milestones are expedited by the rest of the Cabinet, the Parliament and other key stakeholders before the 2020 elections.

The FNTC was established by prime ministerial decree to facilitate negotiations between FGS and FMS. It consists of 11 members – five members from FMS, two from the OPM, and one each from the Office of the President (OoP), MOIFAR, BRA, and Somaliland. It is a virtual body that meets periodically in the capital and FMS capitals. FNTC proposals go through the NSC then to the CoM and the MOCA/OC, and finally are submitted to Parliament for ratification and/or enactment. FNTC activities are milestones and benchmarks of the line ministries.

The resolutions of the National Security Council (NSC) on contentious issues are collected by MOCA which passes them over to ICRIC to translate them into legal language and/or policies, which are reviewed by the OC to ensure parliamentary buy-in. The OC also conducts civic education and public outreach for both sensitization and soliciting feedback to be incorporated into the Constitution by ICRIC. The NSC also doubles as the intergovernmental relations forum to reach political, security and economic decisions.

Of late, the FNTC has not been fully operational due to the changes in FMS leaderships, coupled with delayed and irregular NSC meetings. Both old and new FMS leaders either suspended or replaced their respective FNTC representatives without appointing replacements. Moreover, since June 2018 the NSC has met only once, in May 2019 in Garowe, when it did not reach any significant agreement.
2.3. Gaps for the development of the sector

The development of the above-discussed institutions and legal and policy instruments represent improvements in the inclusive politics sector of Somalia. However, some very important policies and legal and institutional frameworks relating to the inclusive politics pillar agenda are yet to be established and finalized. These include: the election dispute resolution mechanism, voter registration and public outreach policy, and mechanisms for ensuring the full participation of women and minority and marginalized groups in the next elections.

Similarly, there are gaps in the legal framework for the inclusive politics pillar including: political parties and electoral laws, citizenship law, and federalization legal frameworks. In the absence of political parties and electoral laws, the NIEC is unable to start its work and operate effectively.

In other words, existing policy and legal instruments do not adequately meet the needs of Somalia’s political process. This is so because most of the instruments lack clarity in defining the roles and responsibilities, as well as properly guiding the actions of the various institutional actors and stakeholders involved in the consolidation of inclusive political processes.

For instance, the PC, which is the most important legal instrument, is incomplete, unclear and contradictory. This lack of clarity is epitomized by the articles of the constitution regarding roles in state formation (Articles 49(1) and 49(6)), the allocation of natural resources (Article 44), and Articles 90 and
100 on the powers of the President and the PM. In addition, Article 49(6) does not clearly explain how subnational states, which may merge to form a FMS, are to be established themselves in the first place. This makes the review and finalization of the PC through an inclusive process a strategic imperative for long-term peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia.

There are other critical political issues stipulated in the FGS 2018-2020 Inclusive Politics Roadmap in Somalia, the resolution of which is still pending. These include the Somaliland dialogue, and the resolution of contested areas such as Sool & Sanaag.

Progress is not helped by the fact that many of the institutions that are critically important for dealing with inclusive political issues in Somalia are absent in the current institutional framework. These include: local councils; the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC); the Federal Constitutional Court; the Anti-corruption Commission; and the Human Rights Commission.

In addition to these gaps, existing institutional actors lack the capacity to carry out their mandated core state functions. Assessing the inclusive politics institutional actors against the implementation of FGS priorities for 2017-2019 and 2018-2020 stipulated in Somali NDP-8 and the FGS Inclusive Politics Roadmap respectively, demonstrates the institutional capacity shortfall. Two years down the line, and spilling over to the third and final year of NDP-8, most of the inclusive politics targeted priorities dealing with elections, CRP and decentralization have not been fully achieved.

Some of the achievements include agreements on resource-sharing and the electoral model coupled with cabinet endorsement of the electoral law and enactment of the petroleum law. In addition, the NIEC commenced political party registration bringing the total to 39 parties awarded with temporary certification to date. The lack of significant progress in the implementation of the inclusive politics priorities and milestones for 2017-2019 is partially due to the weakness of national institutions.96

3. Major Challenges, Opportunities and Lessons Learned

3.1. Major challenges

While modest progress is being made, the continuous standoff and tension between FGS, FMS and crises resulting from competition for power and resources, complicated by the weakness of national institutions, ambiguities in the constitution and teething problems relating to the emergence of federal arrangements, is slowing progress towards the achievement of NDP-8 inclusive politics pillar priorities and milestones.97

In today’s Somalia, centrifugal tendencies persist and questions surrounding the nature of federalism remain a point of contention.98 The thorniest political issue, which could either make or break Somalia, has been the country’s federal system. The nature and process of Somalia’s federalism remains ill-defined and continues to lead to endless confusion and political instability. The PC is not clear on some of the key issues.

96 National Development Plan (NDP), Mid-Term Review (MTR) Draft Report, 19 February 2019
97 National Development Plan (NDP), Mid-Term Review (MTR) Draft Report, 19 February 2019
A major challenge as outlined in Somalia’s Vision 2016 and again in the roadmap to 2020 is the articulation of an institutional structure to replace the currently fluid political arrangements that balance state and federal power. The completion of the CRP is requisite for advancing Somalia’s federalism project and ensuring overall stability and prosperity. Unfortunately, the CRP is highly vulnerable to the volatile centre-periphery relations.

Clannism, which is at the heart of political divisions and a major contributor to low levels of trust, continues to play a central role in perpetuating political instability. Clans continuously contest the current and future distribution of resources and power. These contestations engender grievances, lack of cohesion, inter-clan tensions, and sometimes, violence. This is further compounded by the 4.5 clan-based power sharing formula which unintentionally institutionalized clannism as a political system in the country, further dividing the Somali people and perpetuating political instability.

In the absence of local reconciliation, disputes persist among political entities over borders and territory, natural resources, as well as clan tensions over control of nascent administrations. These divisions have resulted in some of the country’s deadliest armed conflicts. These include the long-running conflict in the Sool and Sanaag regions. Such conflicts have the potential to endanger the viability of the broader federal state project.

Moreover, the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab is more of a political challenge than a military problem. AS is not inherently strong, but gets its strength from the weakness or lack of inclusive political processes, weaknesses in governance, lack of reconciliation and clan divisions, the absence of institutions that can deliver citizen security and justice. AS also draws strength from state reliance on a militaristic approach and coercive instruments that result in collateral damage and grievances, and flawed state formation processes that contribute to exclusion and marginalization. Based on this analysis, there is an emerging view that AS gets its strength and resilience by exploiting the grievances of communities and clans to advance their terrorist agendas.

The problems of state fragility, contested authority, impunity, corruption, weak governance and political violence are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and provide conditions for Al-Shabaab to continue to operate by filling the gaps created or unaddressed by the state.

Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 2 on NDP-9 consultations, the main causes of poverty as perceived by stakeholders include: political instability; persistent tensions between federal and state governments; political exclusion; clannism; and political and power-sharing structures. Political exclusion was described as an inability to participate in or influence political processes in which corruption is rife and as being a contributor to continued poverty in Somalia. Similarly, a lack of representation in politics and political instability were identified as key drivers of insecurity, while political and power-sharing structures were seen as factors hampering regional development.

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100 UN Strategic Framework, Somalia, 2017-2020
101 UN Strategic Framework, Somalia, 2017-2020
The outcome of round two NDP-9 consultations confirmed the lack of political inclusivity, reconciliation and public trust as the main political challenges and clannism as the creator of mistrust. Federalism, in its current form, has been described as structured clannism and a source of division. However, according to some stakeholders, leadership deficits make Federalism look bad and if political leaders worked with one another, the country could move forward.

This analysis can be extended to the challenge of social inclusion, and in particular the participation and representation of women in Somalia’s political process, such as the CRP and the state and national electoral processes. Sustainable economic and social development will be built on such inclusion. Important progress was made in this regard in the 2016 electoral process, although the target of 30 percent representation on electoral ballot papers, in electoral colleges and in election outcomes was not reached. Efforts are therefore still needed to ensure the gender dimension of inclusion is properly addressed by the country’s politics.

3.2. Major opportunities for sector development

Following a decade of intense conflict during the 1990s, recent years have seen an iteration of encouraging transitions, laying the foundations for a more stable political settlement. Most importantly, a security transition, facilitated by the ousting of Al-Shabaab from key urban areas including the capital Mogadishu, opened up the space for political dialogue. Secondly, the 2011 agreement to adopt a federal system enshrined in the 2012 PC opened the way for two electoral processes that generated momentum and support for the FGS. Thirdly, wide-ranging institutional reforms have improved public finances and the regulation of the economy helping to address inequities sustained by vested interests. As a result, the country faces a unique opportunity to escape from protracted political crisis and form consensus on the basics of a rules-based governance system.103

The Somali people overwhelmingly accepted the election of the country’s new Parliament through a politically negotiated, limited-franchise 2016 electoral process and the indirect election of a new President by that legislative body. These results indicate that Somalis are becoming accustomed to a peaceful transfer of political power, which also occurred in 2012 following a politically negotiated “selection” process conducted by a far smaller and less inclusive body of electors consisting of 135 male clan elders.104

Despite such challenges, there are a number of opportunities to consolidate the gains and make progress towards a durable political settlement. Some of the main opportunities include:

- Significantly improved public political participation across the country.
- Overall developing state capacity.
- Vibrant civil society.
- Nearly completed federal structure.
- Robust international support for a strong, democratic and stable Somalia.
- Increased representation of female and youth in the 10th parliament.

103 World Bank Group, Country Partnership Framework for the Federal Republic of Somalia, for the Period FY19-22, August 29, 2018
- Public fatigue of conflicts, clan-based political systems and anarchy.
- The high usage of technology, particularly telephones among Somalis presents immense opportunity and platform for electoral processes.
- Positively changing regional dynamics improved diplomatic relations and thrust towards regional economic integration in the HoA.

The list highlights the opportunity of women’s inclusion in Somalia’s political process, as the “flip-side” to the challenge described earlier. Here, it may be noted that Somalia’s progress towards political stability and the development of government institutions this will allow, at both federal and state level, opens up the opportunity for progress to be made in terms of women’s representation in the civil service work force. Acting on such opportunity will be as much an act of political inclusion as improving representation in the electoral process.

4. Lessons Learned

Lesson Learned on Assumptions
- That the threat of Al-Shabaab is more of a political challenge than a military problem – focus and efforts should be exerted on addressing the priority political tasks that will restore public confidence and pave the way for establishing legitimate governance and institutions.
- That federalism is not a panacea by itself and could be a driver of violent conflicts if it is not implemented within the context of inclusive legitimate processes, consensus building, political accommodation and reconciliation.

Lesson Learned on Objectives, Means and Actors
- Inclusive politics pillar state institutional actor’s mandates and objectives should be matched with commensurate institutional capacities to perform core state functions and resource commitments as key determinants of success and performance legitimacy.
- In order to create an enabling environment for inclusive political processes, gaps in the policy and legal environments must be addressed.
- Inclusive federalization, constitutional review and electoral processes ensure legitimacy.
- The importance of restoration of public confidence in a post-conflict context, such as Somalia, in improving and transforming state-society relations.
- There is a need for peacebuilding and reconciliation processes that are realistically grounded on Somalia’s political context, as well as building on and strengthening existing national institutions and capacities for peace.
- In order to move forward constructively and overcome political instability, Somalia needs to start building institutions and identities that span regional and clan divides (including political parties).105

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5. Strategies and Interventions

5.1. Rationale and alignment

The key driving forces of the dynamics shaping the future of Somalia presently at work can be broadly divided into the following four categories: political, security, justice, and economic issues. The political issues are the most critical driving forces determining the future prospects of Somalia. However, the political forces are affected by security, justice and economic factors to have either positive or negative impact.

In its meeting held in May 2019 in Garowe, Puntland, the National Development Council (NDC) assessed and decided the three main national priorities of NDP-9 for the next five years (2020-2024) to be Inclusive Politics, Security and Rule of Law, and Economic Development.

Promotion of political stability, national unity, political and social reconciliation were, amongst others, proposed as priority poverty reduction strategies by the key stakeholders during the NPD-9 first round consultations. The stakeholders also underscored reconciliation between the different communities in the respective regions, as well as the promotion of trust-building between the government and the people as a critical factor. Additionally, the importance of strengthening the capacities of local leadership and institutions, accountability, transparency and effective service delivery to build trust in and respect for government was stressed by the stakeholders.

During round two consultations, an issue raised unanimously was trust building among Somalis in a post-conflict situation and the need for comprehensive reconciliation to address the trust issue at different levels of society. The establishment of a constitutional court, good governance, awareness-raising on federalism, laws governing FGS-FMS relations, the inclusion of fundamental human rights in the CPR, and resolution of the Somaliland issue were proposed by other relevant stakeholders.

The aspirations of the Somali people can be realized through establishing inclusive political processes and promoting comprehensive reconciliation at all levels in the country. Therefore, the successful completion of decentralization, finalization of the constitution and democratization through inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation processes will lead to political stability and restoration of public trust. This will in turn enhance the possibility of successful attainment of security and the rule of law, economic and social development, and poverty reduction priorities.

Due to the overriding importance of reconciliation and restoration of public confidence among citizens and in their governments, reconciliation is considered as a priority crosscutting strategy. For reconciliation and trust-building purposes, NDP-9 will adopt and support the implementation of the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF). The framework has been developed through Somali owned and driven process. It speaks to the root causes and dynamics of the conflict, and is based on Somali culture, values and context. In addition, the framework is designed to build on and strengthen the existing national and local capacities for peace.

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In order to build the capacity and legitimacy of inclusive politics pillar institutional actors to carry-out core state functions, institutional capacity development is included as a priority crosscutting strategy as well.

Furthermore, inclusive politics pillar solutions, instruments and interventions will be formulated and implemented in a manner that ensures inclusive political participation for all segments of the society. The importance of significant – not token – women’s inclusion in political processes should again be highlighted in this regard.

Therefore, the proposed pillar priority strategies and interventions are part of a multi-dimensional strategic framework geared towards sustainable poverty reduction by addressing the key drivers of poverty. These strategic interventions are aligned with the aspirations of the Somali people, the FGS Political Roadmap and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1, 5, 10 and 16.

5.2. Strategic objective:

The overriding strategic objective of Pillar 1 of NDP-9 is to achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political processes and effective decentralization.

5.3. Priority inclusive politics interventions

a) Federalism and Decentralization

Strategy 1: Deepening the Federalization Process

Interventions include:

- Review and development of the policy and legal frameworks necessary for the federalization process.
- Improve relationship between the federal government and federal member states, and establish inter-governmental relations offices.
- Determine status of Mogadishu within the federation.
- Raise public awareness of the federal system.
- Resume and strengthen the FGS-Somaliland dialogue.
- Encourage heightened levels of women’s representation in FMS elections.
- Supervise and monitor FMS elections.
- Further deepen fiscal federalism:
  - Harmonize tax system and revenue redistribution to balance inequalities through the National Revenue Bill.
  - Agree revenue sharing from national natural resources.
  - Complete the framework on the licensing and sharing of petroleum and offshore fishing resources.

Strategy 2: Stabilization and Establishment of Local Governance

Interventions include:

- Implement the National Stabilization Strategy (NSS) and State Stabilization Plans:
i. Community Recovery
ii. Social Reconciliation
iii. Local Governance
iv. Rule of Law

- Establish national and state stabilization coordination structures to conduct regular meetings and set evidence-based priorities including through Government-led joint assessments e.g. community engagement in recovered areas and the Fragility Index and Maturity Model (FIMM).
- Ensure the voices of women, youth, the displaced and other vulnerable stakeholder groups are represented in stabilization coordination structures.
- Provide predictable, balanced and flexible resources to support a) stabilization activities in newly recovered areas (NRAs), b) implementation of the Wadajir Framework, and (c) institutional capacity of the FGS MoI FAR / FMS Ministry of Interior (MoI)
- Support and monitor the stabilization plans of FMS through adoption of the NSS.
- Support NRAs and fragile areas through implementation of community recovery projects and extension of basic state services for the people.
- Coordinate national stabilization efforts and organize Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Strand-3 meetings on stabilization at federal and FMS levels.
- Develop and enact the Local Government Act (LGA)
- Re-establish and complete local/district councils.
- Further deepen (where existing) or establish decentralization frameworks for local governments with a clear division of labour between local governments (districts) and state (federal) levels.
- Establish intra-state fiscal decentralization arrangements for local governments including a proper system of:
  o Expenditure assignment;
  o Revenue assignment;
  o Fiscal transfers.

The FGS will expedite the process of establishing local governance structures to fill the gaps created by the absence of effective government institutions that are capable of delivering state services and managing social or inter-clan conflicts to restore public confidence and ensure local stability. In doing so, care will be taken to ensure that such structures are properly representative of all parts of local society, including women and the youth.

The security situation in the newly recovered areas (NRAs) has improved, but still remains fragile and the gains can be reversed if not consolidated. The main risks are the absence of effective government institutions capable of delivering state services and managing inter-clan conflicts. This is exacerbated by Al-Shabaab exploiting local (clan) grievances and taking advantage of the absence and/or failure of governmental entities to provide rule of law and basic services to the people. It underscores the importance of stabilization interventions in NRAs and other fragile areas.

Inclusive and accountable approaches to peacebuilding and state-building across the focus areas of the stabilization strategy will and should reflect the FGS’s commitment, strategies and policies related to...
P/CVE and the inclusion of women, youth and other vulnerable or under-represented groups. Therefore, stabilization interventions are collectively intended to remove conflict drivers that are exploited by Al-Shabaab, and replace them by developing more inclusive, accountable and democratic structures. To support such inclusive approaches, the NSS recommends that programme interventions should aim to utilize 30% of available funds in support of gender and diversity based initiatives.\(^{107}\)

The Wadajir Framework for Local Governance, which was adopted in November 2015, outlines a series of measures focusing on the third-tier of the government structure: the district level. The Wadajir Framework is built on the notion that each government function should be performed by the lowest level of government that is capable of performing that function effectively, while maintaining sufficient coherence within the state and society structures. Decentralized governance arrangements and service delivery is pivotal in building incremental trust between citizens and federal, state and local government.

Therefore, implementation of the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance will be an extension of the government’s bottom up approach to political and local security stabilization.\(^{108}\)

Local Government is the third and lowest tier of elected, representative government in Somalia and is crucial to building confidence in government structures because of its close proximity to citizens – and likelihood of it being the first encounter for people with government.

\(\)\(^{b)}\) Constitution Review Process (CRP)

**Strategy 3: Finalization, ratification and implementation of the Constitution**

Interventions include:

- Gender-inclusive civic education and public awareness-raising both during the review and after the finalization of the Constitution.
- Finalize the CRP and ratify the new Constitution through a National Constituent Assembly in lieu of Referendum.
- Implement the Constitution by harmonizing all the laws of the state with the ratified Constitution.
- Develop and enact Constitution Referendum Act

In addition to these strategic interventions, other crucial components of the CRP include political and technical review, inclusive validation and parliamentary adoption of the reviewed constitution. A national referendum on the Constitution will be conducted throughout Somalia once the security situation improves country-wide and a political resolution is reached on the FGS-Somaliland unity issue.

Civic education will also be undertaken as a national process that will incorporate a series of structured consultations and dialogues aimed at including all segments of society – in particular, women and young adults – to capture and incorporate their views and encourage broader acceptance and validation of the Constitution.


A well sequenced implementation of all these components will enable a meaningful engagement and participation of all sections of the citizenry which is a critical guarantor for a legitimate constitutional process that is key for sustainable peace and rule of law and protection of human rights.

Furthermore, the CRP will be considered and conducted as an inclusive national reconciliation process that produces a new social contract which attends to the national issues, meets the needs and promotes the values of the Somali people.

Finally, a CRP that culminates in a genuinely Somali-owned and drafted constitution could be the panacea for the systemic problems – deep-rooted institutional and social ills – that have impeded successful peacebuilding and state-building for nearly three decades in Somalia. Therefore, the CRP and its finished product will serve as a cornerstone for ending Somalia's perpetual transition and clan-based political system, and for restoring stable constitutional governance in Somalia.

c) Fair and Credible Elections

Strategy 4: Preparation and conduct of fair and credible elections in 2020/21 and 2024

Interventions include:

- Complete a multiparty democratic system in the country: Roll-out a plan for the official registration of trans-clan, trans-region political parties with national agendas and followership in at least 9 regions.
- Register all eligible Somali voters at or above the age of 18 across the country.
- Conduct gender-inclusive voter education and public awareness-raising in partnership with youth and CSOs across the country.
- Deliver fair and credible democratic elections contested by political parties in 2020/21 and 2024.

Some of the principles agreed upon by the Electoral Working Group include the commitment of safeguarding the rights of women and other vulnerable groups through the envisaged electoral process.

In order to ensure inclusive political participation, the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) engages and delivers for women, minority and marginalized groups through its activity plans, legal frameworks and organizational structure. It provides women, people with disabilities (PWD) and minority communities with access to, and includes them in, its national and state level workforce. The requirements for registering political parties include their inclusiveness in terms of gender, clan and regional dimensions. Additionally, the electoral law stipulates a 30% quota for female representation in the federal parliament and state assemblies. Moreover, it requires that, out of the 51 electoral delegates selected for conducting by-elections to fill vacant parliamentary seats, 16 are women, 10 youth and 25 elders.

Furthermore, during the NDP-9 period, it will be a strategic imperative for Somalia to earnestly launch the process of structurally depoliticizing the clan system and de-clanizing the political system in Somalia to positively influence the country’s successful trajectory in the transition from instability to lasting peace and stability. Concerted efforts must be exerted to support the introduction of a multi-party
system and universal suffrage elections in 2021 and 2024 in order to establish a functional democratic state and end the protracted, highly divisive clan-based political system.

5.4. Crosscutting inclusive politics strategies and interventions

a) Reconciliation and the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF)

Strategy 1: Laying the ground for genuine and comprehensive national reconciliation for the Somali people to restore trust among themselves and confidence in government and its institutions that result in peaceful coexistence and the reconstruction of relationships.

Interventions include:

- Implement national reconciliation plan and process (NRF) at the federal level and devolve to FMS, district and village levels.
  
  i. Renew a national social contract by developing a shared vision of an interdependent, fair and secure society:
     - National Reconciliation Process Mobilization and Campaign
     - Recording, documenting and disseminating/amplifying positive events and stories related to peace and reconciliation
     - Development of comprehensive National Reconciliation Process (NRP) strategic communications
  
  ii. Acknowledge and deal with the past
     - Break the cycle and explore ways to address the past through preliminary conferences geared towards finding lasting solutions
     - Identify and form Reconciliation Committee before the actual Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is formed
     - Draft Act for “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (TRC) and identify and mobilize TRC
     - Societal healing/trauma-healing
  
  iii. Restore and transform community relationships
     - Resolve and prevent active conflicts
     - Form/activate district-level Inclusive Peace and Development Committees
     - Federal Government and Somaliland Dialogue
     - Form a unit for peace and conflict mapping
  
  iv. Build trust in government institutions and structures
     - Form service-delivery government institutions (local councils) and build their capacity
     - Form a Reconciliation Directorate in the MoIFAR Structure and build its capacity
  
  v. Support economic and social recovery activities
     - Nurture peace and establish peace memorials/monuments
     - Revive Somali cultural heritage
vi. Ensure adequate representation of women, youth and other vulnerable groups in reconciliation plans and processes.

- Resolve existing political disputes in certain FMSs and, in particular, revive the FGS-Somaliland dialogue in a manner that ensures national harmony and unity.

The political, social and religious reconciliation activities envisaged in the NRF should be undertaken in order to prevent and resolve local and national political disputes that endanger the viability of the federal system, as well as counter the Al-Shabaab strategy of exploiting clan rivalries and the grievances of marginalized communities.

The incorporation of an inclusive approach into the design, development, and implementation of the NRF is significant because there are entrenched cultural values which prohibit women, youth and minorities from participating in particular public events. Therefore, the community mobilization process will be specially developed to counteract these gender, youth and minority imbalances.

Moreover, NRF coordination mechanisms and implementation will be inclusive, representative and participative consisting of all sectors of society including women, youth and marginalized groups. Representation from every group (men, women, youth, religious leaders, traditional elders, disabled and minorities) is critical in all NRF interventions. Additionally, intentional space will be created for all those traditionally excluded from public decision making roles with focused attention on mobilizing women, youth and minorities’ voices and leadership. The NRF will support an inclusive approach in all levels of the process.\(^{109}\)

Finally, reconciliation is a prerequisite for the successful realization of all the other inclusive politics priorities. Because reconciliation is itself a process of restoring, rebuilding and even renewing positive relationships, a process of healing, repairing and recovering, a process leading to transformation and substantial attitudinal and cultural change towards lasting peace.

**b) Institutional capacity development**

**Strategy 2: Capacity development of inclusive politics pillar institutions to carry out their mandated core state functions and improve their performance legitimacy.**

Interventions include:

- Develop a robust capacity development programs for Lead Inclusive Politics Institutions.
- Institutional capacity development of NIEC:
  - Construct NIEC HQs which houses administrative offices, equipment, centre for electoral information and counting
  - Establish NIEC offices in all FMS
  - Develop administrative framework (country-wide election administration capacity) – regulations, codes of conduct, policies, systems, procedures and protocols
- Develop capacity for legislative bodies – federal parliament/senate, and state assemblies

\(^{109}\) Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, National Reconciliation Framework, Version 8, March 7, 2019
- Develop capacity of local governments/district councils.
- Find funding mechanisms for local councils and raise public awareness about local governance system.
- Strengthen Executive Coordination and Governance.
  - Invest in policy development skills and numbers of trained personnel.
  - Improve coordination of the Cabinet Office including document management, agenda preparation, required systems and processes.
  - Improve M&E oversight skills and numbers of trained personnel.
  - Build leadership capacity in government on oversight and delivery against results frameworks.
  - Establish a national database centre and strengthen statistical capacity and information management.
  - Strengthen planning skills and numbers of trained personnel.
  - Build recovery programme management capacity within federal and state planning ministries.
  - Develop a legislative framework and related consultations on recovery and reconstruction of the governance sector.
- Ensure the representation of women and younger adults in the development and staffing of political institutions, promoting improvements in rates of senior level inclusion.

The capacity development of inclusive politics institutional actors must be informed by institutional diagnosis and designed in a manner that considers the full range of the main institutional capacity areas – stakeholder ownership, policy instruments, and organizational arrangements.

6. Prerequisites and Risks

As concurred by almost all stakeholders, realization of inclusive politics is a prerequisite for improvement of security and rule of law, economic growth and social development. However, there are some prerequisites and risks associated with this pillar that will need to be managed. These include:

- Political resolution/agreement on the critical issues of the federal system and the contentious issues of the Constitution.
- Completion of the requisite electoral legal framework – election law, political party law, etc.
- Enactment and implementation of the Local Governance Act (LGA).
- Political will and commitment of national/subnational leaders and governmental entities.
- Sustained security gains to recover territories from AS in order to further the writ of the FGS and enable achievement of its long-term state-building objectives and hold country-wide elections.
- Proper security planning and coordination for voter registration, elections, and referendum.
- Federated approach to security – agreement on the integration and formalization of armed groups and forces into a federal structure; and disengagement of AS fighters into society.
- Anti-corruption Commission, laws, processes and systems – criminalize/outlaw vote-buying.
- Federal Justice Model, Justice Service Commission (JSC) and Federal Constitutional Court.
- Human Rights Commission, laws, and inclusion of fundamental human rights in the CRP.
- Enactment of the revenue-sharing law to enable effective and transparent contracts with foreign operators in the petroleum sector.
● Devolution of ministries and institutions to bring government presence, public services delivery and access closer to the local people.
● Adequate domestic revenue and government budget for NDP-9 inclusive politics interventions.
● Commitment of the international community, including donor support.
● **Do No Harm:** ensure interventions have positive impact on the situation – avoid adding new conflictual dimensions to the complex political situation or reverse gains made so far in Somalia.

7. **Outcomes and Indicators**

The long-term expected pillar outcome/impact is a stable and peaceful federal Somalia with a well-established politically inclusive, effectively decentralized and functional democratic system.

The expected outcomes, outputs/results and indicators of the strategic interventions are summarised in Table 9, below:

**Table 9: Inclusive Politics Outputs, Outcomes and Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
<th>Expected Outputs/Results</th>
<th>Indicators to Monitor</th>
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</table>
| **Outcome 1:** formal federal system deepened and state powers effectively decentralized | ● Necessary policy and legal frameworks for federalism developed and enacted  
● Inter-governmental relations between FGS and FMS improved  
● Status of Mogadishu within the federation determined  
● CE delivered and public understanding about federalism enhanced  
● FGS-Somaliland dialogue resumed  
● Legality and validity of FMS elections ensured  
● Decentralized revenue-sharing and fiscal arrangements adopted and implemented  
● Stability in Somalia’s fragile areas improved and community cohesion strengthened through NSS  
● Local governance structures and district councils established  
● Proper decentralization frameworks for local governments with a clear division of labour between local governments and state levels deepened and | ● Number of policies and laws formulated and enacted  
● Number/frequency of FGS-FMS meetings, agreements, joint activities and outcomes  
● Availability of Act on the status of Mogadishu  
● Number of civic education activities delivered  
● Women and youth as a % of participants in civic education activities  
● Frequency/number of FGS-Somaliland dialogue forums and outcomes  
● Number of FMS elections supervised and monitored  
● Representation of women in FMS Assemblies  
● Availability of agreement, policies and laws and, respective FGS-FMS proportions of resources and revenues shared  
● Number of recovered and fragile areas stabilized and community recovery projects delivered  
● Number of local/district councils established |
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<tr>
<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
<th>Expected Outputs/Results</th>
<th>Indicators to Monitor</th>
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| **Outcome 2**: Federal Constitution of Somalia finalized, ratified and implemented |  ● CE delivered – Public participation in the review process and understanding of the Constitution promoted  
  ● National referendum law enacted and new federal constitution ratified  
  ● All state laws harmonized with the newly ratified constitution |  ● Number of civic education activities delivered  
  ● women and youth as % of participants in civic education activities  
  ● Availability of a new, ratified Federal Constitution  
  ● Number of laws harmonized with the newly ratified constitution |
| **Outcome 3**: fair and credible elections delivered in 2020/2024 and functional democratic system established |  ● Effective Political parties formed and officially registered  
  ● All eligible voters registered  
  ● CE delivered – Informed electorate aware of its rights and duties |  ● Number of political parties registered and regions covered  
  ● Number/% of eligible voters registered  
  ● Number of civic education and public awareness-raising activities delivered  
  ● % of female candidates  
  ● % of female candidates elected |
| **Outcome 4**: People’s trust among themselves and confidence in all levels of government restored |  ● NRF/processes devolved and implemented at all levels in the country  
  ● Political disputes in FMS and Somaliland issue resolved  
  ● Peaceful co-existence and relationships built |  ● Number of areas NRF is devolved to and implemented  
  ● Number of reconciliation activities delivered  
  ● % of people targeted/beneficiaries of reconciliation activities  
  ● Number of conflict issues – political, social, religious – resolved |
| **Outcome 5**: institutional capacity to carry out core state functions established |  ● Robust capacity building programs developed and implemented  
  ● NIEC’s institutional capacity for effective election management strengthened  
  ● Adequate local government capacity for effective leadership and improved service delivery established  
  ● Enhanced public |  ● Number of institutional actors capacitated  
  ● Number of inclusive politics priorities and milestones achieved  
  ● Number of local/district councils benefited from capacity development  
  ● % or amount of funding/resources availed to local councils  
  ● Number of local governance awareness-
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<th>Expected Outcomes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>understanding of local governance and local council’s access to resources ensured</td>
<td>raising projects delivered • Women as a % of the institutional workforce</td>
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## 8. Pillar 1: Inclusive Politics 5 Year Action Plan

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<th>STRATEGIES</th>
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<td>Deepening of federalisation</td>
<td>Policy &amp; legislation development</td>
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<td>Improve FGS-FMS relations &amp; establish IGR offices</td>
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<td>Raise public awareness of federalism</td>
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<td>Supervise &amp; monitor FMS elections (Galmudug)</td>
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<td>Agreement on revenue sharing from natural</td>
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<td>Review framework for licensing and sharing of</td>
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<td>Harmonize tax system &amp; revenue distribution</td>
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<td>Implement NSS in fragile areas: Community</td>
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<td>Supporting and monitoring the stabilization plans</td>
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<td>Implementation of community recovery projects</td>
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<td>Support Newly Recovered Areas through</td>
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<td>Development &amp; enactment of Local Government Act</td>
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<td>Re-establish and complete District Councils</td>
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<td>CRP political and technical review/negotiations</td>
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<td>Validation conference, adoption by parliament, and</td>
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<td>Harmonise state laws with new constitution</td>
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<td>Conduct constitutional referendum</td>
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<td>Stabilization &amp; establishment of local government</td>
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<td>NSS coordination structures meetings</td>
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<td>Provision of resources to support</td>
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<td>Establish decentralisation frameworks with</td>
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<td>Specify intra-state fiscal decentralisation for</td>
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<td>PILLAR</td>
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<td>PILLAR 1: INCLUSIVE POLITICS</td>
<td>Conduct fair &amp; credible elections in 2020 &amp; 2024</td>
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<td>Cross-cutting imperatives</td>
<td>Embedding respect for human rights across all inclusive politics strategies;</td>
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<td>Ensuring full participation of women and fulfilling representative quotas in electoral process</td>
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<td>Capacity development of political institutions — including the NEC and District Councils; Strengthening of Executive Coordination &amp; Governance</td>
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<td>National reconciliation: National Reconciliation Plan implementation; Renew the social contract; acknowledging the past; FMS dispute resolution</td>
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Preamble

The formulation of the NDP-9 security and rule of law sector plan is informed by the poverty analysis and inputs obtained from stakeholder consultations, described in Chapter 2, which strongly identified the cost of conflict, and the impact of being denied access to justice or a sense of security, as causes of poverty. Improvements in both security and the rule of law within communities were likewise identified as important contributors towards poverty reduction, and as such contribute to progress in the other NDP-9 pillars.

The content of the chapter is guided also by the principles and guidelines of the Security Pact agreed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and International Partners in May 2017. The strategies and interventions of Pillar 2 are selected to complement the three national development priorities selected by the National Development Council (NDC) in May 2019 -- Inclusive and Accountable Politics, Improved Security and Rule of Law and Improved Economic Development.

THE SECURITY SECTOR

1. Introduction

Under the heading of “Shared National Security”, the security sector pillar of NDP-9, shares a vision with domestic and international partners of an inclusive, sustainable and fitting national security structure. NDP-9 outlines progress made in the past two years under NDP-8 in terms of structural, operational and managerial transformation in the security sector and sets out proposals that build upon ongoing efforts in security sector reform (SSR).

Following the collapse of central government and Somalia’s descent into civil war, security personnel joined tribal militias, pledging alliance and loyalties to tribal warlords. The security pillar of NDP-9 will continue to reverse this fragmentation by rebuilding an inclusive and accountable security structure and by building people’s confidence in all aspects of state security apparatus and by limiting the use of force to authorised, mandated federal and state forces. Doing so is a precondition for Somalia’s progress towards reducing poverty, adopting the rule of law and good governance.

After many domestic initiatives and international interventions, Somalia is still a country deeply affected by nearly three decades of internal conflict, which has largely destroyed the country’s economic infrastructure and security and justice institutions. The national government established in 2012 led a process of peacebuilding, state-building and negotiation aimed at forging a new political settlement based on a federal model. Following the 2016 electoral process and with new national leadership there was hope of consolidating the gains made so far and accelerating progress towards long-term recovery and stability.110

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Terrorism

Historically, nation states have viewed security as an external threat to be addressed through foreign and defence policies. However, new global security threats such as terrorism and cybercrime threaten state security and blur traditional social and political lines. Somalia is threatened by interconnected internal and international terrorism networks, which manifest as internal insurgency. Al Shabaab and Da’ish with their international affiliations pose imminent threats to Somalia’s security and statehood. Coping with the challenges from these terrorist organizations has required a broader coordinated response. Since terrorism is a global security threat, Somalia’s security policy must embrace national, regional and international security factors. In addition to contributing to the global effort against terror, the Somali state must seek the confidence of Somali citizens and international partners to develop an effective and comprehensive means to defeat terrorists in order to advance long-term national development.

Cyber Threats

Global developments in cyber security threats make it imperative to invest in cyber security, even though Somalia has yet to experience significant cyber-attacks. The management of today’s digital global system has forced governments and private institutions alike to make national investments. Since cyber security has been recognized to be vital for financial and government institutions, employing modern information technology (MIT) is imperative to safeguard sensitive data or prevent interruptions of business from the ever-growing sophistication of cyber-attack. In addition, MIT is an important part of developing countries’ efforts to integrate their emerging economies into the global economy while at the same time enhancing their national security. However, investing in MIT without effective national cyber security and cyber resilience institutions, capable of preventing cybercrimes and restoring services after cyber-attacks, could increase risk to the national security and economy, due to a false sense of security from MIT alone.

Maritime Security

Despite having the longest coastline in Africa of 3,330 km, Somalia’s maritime and related economic security protection remains underdeveloped. The coastline presents many commercial and strategic opportunities but also associated national security risks, including arms and human trafficking, piracy, and as a channel for terrorists to move arms and personnel from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa. From economic and environmental perspectives, the risks include illegal foreign fishing activity, the dumping of toxic wastes, and unregulated economic activity. In addition, piracy off the coast of Somalia has raised the costs of shipping, presented grave physical risks, and has damaged Somalia’s commercial opportunities to exploit a globally strategic shipping route and rich fish stocks. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has recognized the importance of marine security and has designated the territorial waters of Somalia, the continental shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone, demarcation and matters related to the Red Sea as matters of national security.

Securing Somalia’s coastline, in addition to its security-related importance, has strong links to the poverty reduction initiatives at the heart of NDP-9, including the revival of the country’s “blue economy”. A strong blue economy is expected to increase employment for youth and make available entrepreneurial opportunities for new enterprises, attract international investment and inject new technologies into the sector. In this regard, the Somalia Ministry of Youth has underscored that poverty in Somalia is closely correlated with the high rate of youth unemployment.114 Rather than contributing to the welfare of citizens, the blue economy of Somalia has become an idle resource and a contributor to insecurity and illegal activity. The Somali Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources outlined in its Somali Fisheries Development Framework 2018–2020, the vital needs to revitalize the Somali blue economy sector.115

Water Security

Water scarcity is a significant cause of conflict in Somalia’s nomadic pastoralist societies. In recent history, the Horn of Africa has experienced recurrent drought due to global climate change and related environmental shocks, which contribute to poverty, displacement, biodiversity loss and conflict. Somalia’s primary water resources are the rivers of Jubba and Shabelle. Both originate in Ethiopia and flow into Somalia. The lack of a comprehensive bilateral water sharing agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia raises concerns for Somalia. Projects such as the Melka Wakana dam and hydroelectric power station, and other more recent projects on the Shabelle River, affect the lives of Somali agro-pastoralists on the other side of the border. A national water policy to regulate internal water management and a Somalia-Ethiopia bilateral agreement on the shared waters of Shabelle and Jubba rivers is therefore imperative. In 2017, the Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) commissioned by the Somalia Ministry of Planning in partnership with the European Union, the United Nations, and World Bank, found that, food insecurity and scarcity of drinking water, coupled with displacement, contributes to rural conflict, child malnutrition and water-borne disease. 116

Human security, rule of law, economic development and poverty reduction

Security is essential for economic development and poverty reduction. Human security is key not only for the protection of lives and belongings of people, but also for their participation, movement and protection. The security sector impacts the daily lives of people, at both the national and the individual level. Through greater security at the national level, an enabling environment is created for investment, economic activity and social stability. It moreover creates conditions in which effective and progressive governance can take place.

At the individual level, security allows citizens to move freely and undertake activities free from fear of extortion, violence and displacement. Security impacts positively on the physical safety and advancement of women, by enabling women to move freely and undertake education and commercial endeavours without the threat of physical or psychological violence.

114 Somali Ministry of Youth and Sports, “THE NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA”
116 Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA), 2018 Volume One
In addition, a stable security situation directly impacts economic development and poverty reduction. For example, water scarcity is both a cause of insecurity and a brake on development. Water is not only necessary for human survival, but is also critical for agriculture and livestock – sectors of prime importance for Somalia in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction.

Security is also linked to human development. It allows the participation of people and communities in events, discussions and discourses. It means that children can go to school and enjoy an undisturbed education. Security creates an environment where people can access public services without thinking about their safety, and where property and resource ownership can be protected.

Security and the rule of law are also key challenges for Somalia’s state building efforts; particularly as plans for the transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to national security institutions progresses. In this regard, effective and sustainable state building will require a gradual transition, based on consensus-building, towards the re-establishment of a monopoly over the means of violence, as well as functional rule of law.117

2. Status of the Security Sector

The FGS has identified security sector reform as a key National priority and initiated inclusive discussions with Federal Member States (FMS) to reach a political agreement on a federal security model and architecture. In the high-level meeting between the National President and Presidents of the FMS in April 2017 in Mogadishu, the FGS and FMS agreed the National Security Architecture (NSA).118 The NSA, which was endorsed by the National Security Council (NSC) in May 2017, seeks to address four key areas of reform required for Somalia’s security forces and provide strategic direction:119

(i) The numbers of Somali Security Forces (SSFs), military and police, and adapting civilian oversight role over on the security sector forces.
(ii) The distribution of SSFs at the federal and state levels, Somali National Army (SNA) sectors realignment to reflect the new political dispensation and integration of SSFs so they represent the vision and aspiration of the new Somalia.
(iii) The command and control of SSFs ensuring a greater clarity of the roles and responsibility of institutions both at the federal and state levels.
(iv) An outline of fiscal responsibilities for respective SSFs at the federal and state levels.

According to the NSA, taking into consideration budgetary constraints, Somalia shall have at least 18,000 troops excluding the Special Forces (Danab), Air Force and Navy, of which 3,000 soldiers will be drawn from each of the five FMS and Banadir region. The 18,000 SNA Forces shall be distributed across modified SNA sectors redrawn to align with FMS boundaries as well as military need. The NSA also allows for the formation of 500 Danab Forces in each SNA sector with the input of the state governments, which will report to the Danab Brigade headquartered in Baledogle. Similarly, the NSA requires the Somali Police Force (SPF) to number 32,000 in total (including both federal and state-based police) by the end of 2017.

The NSA together with the Security Pact agreed between Somalia and international partners in London in May 2017 provide the parameters for building viable Somali security institutions and effectively

implementing security sector reform. They will allow Somalia to gradually assume primary responsibility for security from AMISOM, as part of a conditions-based transition.\textsuperscript{120}

In the Security Pact, all partners endorsed Somalia’s existing National Security Policy (NSP), which sets the framework for security institutions and decision-making in Somalia. The partners also endorsed the New Policing Model (NPM) and the existing National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), published in 2016.\textsuperscript{121}

The NSP guides national efforts to consolidate security institutions and policies into an overarching architecture.\textsuperscript{122} The purpose and strategic objectives of the NSP are to direct and coordinate relevant ministerial security and justice-related implementing strategies in the creation of a more secure, safer, and accountable Somalia. The following diagram illustrates the structure and basic outline and content of the policy: Part 1 is a definition of the purpose of the NSP and a description of the desired end-state in terms of vision, development and security objectives; Part 2 is analysis of the current and future strategic environment, available resources, threats and risks; and Part 3, ministerial implementing strategies that will be used to achieve the ends of Part 1.

\textbf{Figure 37: National Security Policy}

\includegraphics{national_security_policy_diagram}

Strategic coordination of ministerial strategies takes place within the NSC with oversight provided by the National Security Advisor and Office of National Security (ONS). However, responsibility for the operational management of individual ministerial implementing strategies rests with responsible ministers and the Council of Ministers under the direction of the Prime Minister (PM).\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (May-August 2017), 5 September 2017
\textsuperscript{121} Security Pact, London Conference for Somalia, 11 May 2017
\textsuperscript{123} The Federal Republic of Somalia, National Security Policy, 9 April 2016
Following the December 2017 conference on security, the FGS and the international community (IC) agreed on a realistic, phased, conditions-based transition plan with clear target dates, drawing on the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA), to gradually transfer security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSFs. This transition plan and its implementation require close cooperation and partnership between the FGS, FMS, Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) and AMISOM, as well as the UN and other international partners.

The FGS strategy is to construct and implement a comprehensive approach to security transition that is not only military, but equally focused on progressing the political roadmap, constitutional reform, stabilization, local governance, and state-building, including the institutional expansion of local policing and justice. The FGS Transition Plan which was developed in 2018 is divided into three areas of focus:

(i) Operational activities: The identification and prioritization of locations to be under full SSF responsibility, including the handover of locations from AMISOM, and the deployment of forces agreed in the NSA.

(ii) Institutional capacity building: Implementation of institutional capacity building programs and plans, including implementation of the NSA, recommendations from the ORA, policing, justice and civil service reform.

(iii) Supporting activities: Aligning non-security force efforts to create the conditions for a sustainable peace, including stabilization, strengthening local governance, reconciliation, mediation, rule of law, socio-economic activities, and P/CVE activities.

The plan is divided into three phases up to the end of 2021 and it is anticipated that the priorities identified in Phase 1 will form the pilot projects in order to align operational, institutional and supporting activities in targeted areas.124

The Transition Plan is the framework for technical planning and implementation of local, operational plans, in which physical security plans will be aligned with supporting activities while institutional capacity building is accelerated. The priority locations for activities are intended to be reviewed on the basis of progress and conditions with a first review scheduled to take place by early 2020. So far a number of operational activities including the handover of Somali National University campus, Mogadishu Stadium and Jaalle Siyad Military Academy from AMISOM to the FGS have been implemented.

2.1. National policies, strategies, legal instruments and institutional frameworks and gaps for the development of the security sector

a) Policy and legal instruments of the sector

The Provisional Constitution (PC) is the most important legal instrument for addressing security issues in Somalia, whereas the NSP is the primary sector policy framework. Chapters 14 (articles 126-131) of the PC address and enshrine the legal tenets regarding peace and security issues. Article 126 (1) assigns the FGS the legal mandate to guarantee the peace, sovereignty and national security of its people through its security services, namely the armed forces, intelligence services, police force and prison forces.125

Table 10: Relevant Ministerial Strategies

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124 Federal Government of Somalia, Transition Plan, 22 March 2018
125 Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia
In the absence of a finalised constitution or relevant legislation, the NSP provides interim guidance for the conduct of security, defence and justice activities in Somalia. As such the NSP is a living document that develops in line with the new national constitution. Somalia’s NSP is an integrated policy statement describing the FGS’s security vision for the country and people, and how the implementing strategies of the ministries charged with security, defence and justice will contribute to the achievement of that vision. In addition, there are also ministerial implementing strategies:

The NSP is designed to assess the current and prospective, internal and external threats and risks to the achievement of government’s security vision and provide clear direction to the security and justice sectors for the development of remedial implementing strategies. Additionally, implementing strategies will address the three critical functions of: capacity building and institutional development; overcoming security challenges and establishing the rule of law nationwide; and transitioning the security function from AMISOM and IC to full FGS ownership.

b) Institutional frameworks

According to Article 126 (6) of the PC, the armed security agencies shall be controlled by civilian agencies. In line with this article, in Somalia the security forces at the national level operate under the authority of civilian headed ministries of the FGS.

To progress the content of this complex sectoral context (and that of the rule of law sector, described below), the FGS developed and adopted a Roadmap for Security and Justice. The roadmap defines the strategic objectives and goals to be achieved, and results and milestones to be accomplished by the lead ministries and attached security agencies in order to achieve the government’s security and justice goals and priorities, including those envisioned in the security pact, NSA, NSP and the Transition Plan. It is within the Security and Justice Roadmap that the key institutional actors dealing with security are placed.

The National Security Council (NSC) is tasked with formulating Somalia’s national security policy and strategy. It’s chaired by the President of the FGS; other members include the Prime Minister (PM); Deputy PM; ministers of Defence, Internal Security, Interior and Federal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Justice; FMS Presidents; the Mayor of Mogadishu; and the National Security Advisor.

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127 Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, August 1, 2012, Mogadishu, Somalia
128 Federal Republic of Somalia, Office of the Prime Minister, Road Map to Security and Justice, 2017-2020
Additional non-permanent, ministerial executive members may be appointed by the Chair of the NSC on an ad-hoc basis. Finally, the following members attend the NSC meetings in an advisory capacity: Chiefs of Defence Forces; SPF Commissioner; National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) Director; and representatives of the Regional Security Councils. The NSC meets every other month.

Somalia is confronting two simultaneous and paramount security challenges that have enormous fiscal and political implications. These are the ongoing insurgency of AS and the creation of a ‘federated’ state. The first requires a comprehensive response, most of which has historically been taken on by international partners, particularly the troop contributing countries (TCCs) that comprise AMISOM. The second requires negotiated ‘security arrangements,’ including a federated approach to security, between the FGS and FMS. Such arrangements comprise iterative dialogue and agreement on the integration and formalization of armed groups and forces into a ‘federal’ structure.\(^{129}\)

Table 11: Lead ministries and security forces under their control

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<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>Security Agencies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS)(^{130})</td>
<td>1. Federal Somali Police Force (SPF)</td>
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<td>2. Immigration and Border Control Agency (IBCA)</td>
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<td>3. National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)</td>
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<td>4. Coast Guard</td>
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<td>5. SEMA (De-mining Authority – Humanitarian and Security)</td>
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<td>6. Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM)</td>
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<td>7. Civil Defence</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>1. Somali National Army</td>
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<td>2. Somali Air Force</td>
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<td>3. Somali Navy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Danab Special Forces (Commandos)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>1. Custodial Corps/Corrections</td>
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The key priority is to agree the on security responsibilities and related arrangements between the federal and regional governments. Agreeing these political arrangements is critical to the definition and

\(^{129}\) Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Security and Justice Sector Public Expenditure Review (PER), UNSOM and the World Bank, January 2017

delineation of roles, responsibilities and resource sharing between federal and regional intelligence and security forces.\textsuperscript{131}

Substantial structural and PFM reforms have been underway since 2018 in the security sector branches, through biometric and age verification along with integration in SNA and SPF sectors, although an effective unitary command and control structure is yet to be operationalized. Despite many efforts to enhance the synergy and capacity of the federal SNA and SPF nationwide, competing visions of federalism and their associated security responsibilities have impeded progress. For the FGS creating a nationally unified army is a constitutional mandate, while FMS seek to remain in control of their own regional armed forces.\textsuperscript{132}

For a state to be legitimate and effective to deliver security for its citizens, state armed forces need to have the trust of the majority of the population. One way of creating legitimacy is to have armed forces that are representative of all groups in society and their security needs. In Somalia, this means that it is important that soldiers are seen to come from all the different regions in order to gain the population’s trust. Therefore, the integration of SNA forces, as well as the disengagement of AS fighters and their integration into society can be instruments of political reconciliation.

However, the pace of security sector development remains a careful balance between political and operational needs. The reality of state building is the ‘security dilemma’: the FMS do not wish to give up their means of self-defence and survival via respective clan militias while trust and confidence in the federal political process remains fragile.

Moreover, in Somalia, alleged corruption in security institutions and judiciary has slowed the development of SSR. Correspondingly, the limitations of local actors and civil society undermine local ownership of the process. The SSR process has been criticized for prioritizing capacity building such as training and equipping, over critical areas like governance, human rights and transformation.

The overall performance in the area of security shows that while the capacity and accountability of state security institutions has increased but significant challenges remain. Only a state with functioning, capable and accountable security institutions and with able, accountable and acceptable security forces can protect the well-being of its citizens and manage both internal and external threats. Additionally, the limited capacity and experience of security agencies in dealing with sophisticated terror groups continues to impede counterterrorism efforts.

Furthermore, the legislative framework and legal statutes that are necessary to govern and guide the actions and operations of intelligence and security forces in a democracy have yet to be fully developed and enacted. Institutional and training gaps still exist, particularly in terms of effective systems, policies and procedures across the entire intelligence and security sectors. In addition the sector operates with limited facilities for housing personnel, weaponry and ammunition, and insufficient infrastructure, including headquarters buildings, command centres and police stations. Finally, there is a severe shortage of qualified personnel at all levels across the intelligence and security sectors.\textsuperscript{133}

3. Challenges, Opportunities and Lessons Learned

3.1. Security sector challenges


\textsuperscript{132}Emma Skepstrom and Per Nordlund, Security, Stabilization and State Formation in Somalia: Challenges for Implementing the Somali Compact, FOI-R—3899—SE, June 2014

The present working provisional constitution doesn’t provide clear separation of powers and duties between FGS and FMS institutions, including the security and judiciary sectors. The legacies of the former military regime and the experience of the civil war lead to ongoing debate about security and judiciary powers, as well as the “Centre-Periphery” working relationship.

The threats to Somalia’s national security are systemic and overwhelming.\textsuperscript{134} The National Threat Assessment (NTA) defines threats as being direct and indirect. The key threats to national security addressed by the NSP include:\textsuperscript{135}

- Al-Shabaab (AS) – the most immediate threat to Somalia.
- Militia and other armed groups – the proliferation of clan-based armed groups is a national concern and reflects a deeper governance problem.
- Criminality – despite improvements in law and order, crime remains a major concern in Somalia.
- Unemployment – a key threat to security and proximate cause of conflict.
- Small arms and light weapons (SALWs) – Somalia is awash with SALWs, in an unstable region with porous borders.
- Maritime threats – piracy, human trafficking, illegal and unregulated fishing, dumping of toxic waste, and the smuggling of weapons and drugs.
- Corruption within the security sector – there is a level at which corruption in the sector becomes a threat to national security.
- Federalization and the constitutional review process – completion of these political priorities is a prerequisite for the creation of viable federated security structures and clear divisions of responsibility.
- The withdrawal of AMISOM – unless efficient, effective and affordable Somali security entities are in place, a too-speedy withdrawal will constitute a significant threat to Somalia’s continued stabilization and development.

Despite progress in degrading its operational capacity, AS still remains the primary threat to the survival of the FGS and the realization of peace in the country. AS still continues to pose a serious asymmetrical security threat to Somalia, as well as to neighbouring countries.

According to AU/UN surveys, the top three main security threats in local neighbourhoods were: Al-Shabaab, unemployment and inter-clan animosity. Concerns about the threat to security posed by unemployment, which disproportionately impacts young people have consistently increased from seven percent in 2014 to 28 percent in 2017.\textsuperscript{136} Therefore, urgent measures are needed to curb the security threat posed by unemployment. In particular, the economy’s inability to generate jobs for youth as they enter the labour force makes them vulnerable to recruitment efforts by Al-Shabaab. The limited capacity of demobilization and reintegration programs to absorb potential AS defectors is an additional worrisome factor.

In addition to the above, the protracted arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on Somalia in 1992, has had a significant, negative impact upon the operational effectiveness of the Somali armed forces and their ability to operate alongside AMISOM.

\textsuperscript{134} Federal Government of Somalia, National Development Plan (NDP) 2017-2019, December 2016
\textsuperscript{136} AMISOM/UNSOM, Citizens’ Perception Survey of Peace and Stabilization Initiatives in Somalia, End-Line Survey Report, September 2017
The proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Somalia remains a destabilising factor and a limitation on the state’s ability to control the use of force. By increasing the security forces and institutions at federal and state level to manage weapons and ammunition, Somalia would not only comply with its obligations under the arms embargo, but it would create a safer environment and reduce the threat of armed violence to the population.

As consistently mentioned in NDP-9 stakeholder consultations, the main causes of poverty in many parts of the country include insecurity and the lack of access to the rule of law. Women and other vulnerable groups are particularly exposed in this regard. As already noted in the Poverty Analysis, insecurity and lawlessness contributes directly to the high incidence of violence against women, and to Somalia’s extremely high levels of displacement. It was noted also that insecurity and a weak rule of law reduce the government’s ability to establish and strengthen institutions needed to support economic growth and sustainable development, and fuel crime and other social ills. While insecurity is an important cause of poverty, stakeholders also describe it as a result of poverty.

Some stakeholders identified insecurity as being the most significant cause of deprivation, underdevelopment and displacement in their respective regions. They also pointed out that collaboration between the public and government security organs is hampered by the public’s fear of and intimidation by the insurgents.

The continuing high levels of insecurity in the rural areas are also a serious constraint on economic activity. Although most of the main towns in the regions are under the control of the government, some areas and main supply routes remain under the control of Al-Shabaab.

In addition, stakeholders reported that the weakness of security and justice institutions is driven by political instability and poor governance. According to those consulted, the state lacks a strong police force and adequate prison facilities.137

The second round of NDP-9 consultations further confirmed that security is the crucial issue that must be addressed in the next five years.

3.2. Opportunities

Despite the challenges, major opportunities exist within the security sector. Al-Shabaab has been removed from most of the major towns and regions in Somalia over the past few years. The terrorist organization now controls only parts of one of the 18 regions – Middle Juba – while many of its leaders have been eliminated. Presently, Al-Shabaab operates as an insurgency group engaged in asymmetric warfare in urban centres. The overall quality and quantity of SNA, police and intelligence is improving. The security forces are now relatively better trained, better equipped and substantially more coordinated than they have been in the past.138

Other positive developments in the security sector in 2017 included the political agreement on and approval of the NSA and the reinstatement of the NSC. Furthermore, federal arrangements around the integration of forces, if properly implemented, have the potential to reinforce the process of state building while simultaneously providing local communities with a stake in the security architecture of the country.

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The political agreement on the NSA clearly sets out the vision to transfer the responsibility for the provision of security from AMISOM to SSFs, defining milestones until the year 2027. In the long-term, the goal is for Somali security forces to play a stabilizing role in major towns, have the capability to open central supply routes and to be able to provide security for the 2020/21 elections.

In addition to the above, other positive developments and opportunities in the security sector include:

- The SNA receives general and specialist training programs delivered at central command and sector levels by various regional and international partners.
- The SNA has been active on operations against AS.
- The development and endorsement of ministerial implementing strategies.
- The successful 2016 electoral process and a legitimate FGS recognized and supported by the international community.
- A strong commitment and willingness of the international community to provide security.
- The acceleration of force generation in line with the NSA.
- The articulation of a national policy for integration of forces was implemented in December 2017, so that integration and subsequent right-sizing can continue in line with the NSA.
- The integration of regional forces from Galmudug and Hirshabelle state into the SNA and SPF.
- Completion of the SNA payroll verification process is expected by the end of 2019.
- Biometric registration was completed for Sector 27 in Galmudug, Sector 43 Jubaland and Sector 60 in Gedo.
- Financial management and procurement guidelines were developed for the SNA.
- Transparent and competitive recruitment of key positions in finance and accounting, procurement and logistics were conducted by the Ministry of Defence and SNA.
- The diversification of non-frontline staffing, including the recruitment of larger numbers of female police officers and ministry (Interior, Defence, etc.) personnel.
- An Operational Readiness Assessment of regional forces was completed, and regional capabilities have been mapped out ahead of future integration of these forces into the NSA.
- Coordination has been strengthened through regular weekly sub-sector meetings chaired by the PM to plan and provide feedback on the implementation of governance, security and safety interventions.
- The Security Sector Reform Project, worth US$12 million, was launched and capacity development is currently going on, benefitting the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), MOIS, MOD and the internal security organs of Jubaland, SWS, Galmudug, Puntland, Hirshabelle and Banadir Regional Administration.
- A functional capacity assessment has been conducted for all the FGS/FMS sector oversight institutions and organizational and institutional capacity development plans.
- Policies and laws for Police, Immigration, NISA and MOIS have been developed and are awaiting Cabinet approval.

3.3. Lessons learned

- Political resolution of federalism and the finalization of the constitution are the *sine qua non* for centre-periphery agreement and the creation of a viable and federated security sector, which is the key driver in the delivery of a more stable Somalia.
- Capacity development interventions for the security forces based on a national security doctrine lead to unified command and control, as well as improved ethos and patriotism.
● Successful SSR will create a secure and conducive environment for development, poverty reduction, good governance and improved human rights, and the growth of institutions based on the rule of law.

4. Security Sector Strategies and Interventions

4.1. Rationale and alignment

The political and security forces are the most critical factor determining Somalia’s future prospects. The successful resolution of federalism and finalization of the Constitution coupled with a political agreement on a federated approach to security will determine Somalia’s peace and security trajectory in the future.

Key stakeholders consulted at national and subnational levels consistently proposed the strengthening of the security sector as a priority poverty reduction strategy.

Therefore, the sector priorities of NDP-9 are aligned with poverty reduction interventions proposed elsewhere in this plan, the FGS Security and Justice Roadmap, and Sustainable Development Goal 16 (‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’), provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.

4.2. Security sector strategic objective

Establish unified, capable, accountable and rights-based Somali federal security institutions that provide basic safety and security for citizens.
4.3. Security sector interventions

The FGS and its international partners acknowledge in the Security Pact that security sector reform (SSR) is an ongoing national priority. The Security Pact is reflected in the political agreement reached by the FGS and FMS in April 2017 on Somalia’s NSA, subsequently endorsed by the NSC. This political agreement provides for achieving sustainable security reform and a transition of primary responsibility of security from AMISOM to Somali security forces.

a) Priority Interventions for MoD

Integration of the Somali National Army (SNA)

- Develop, review and implement the SNA Integration Plan.
- Establish the National Integration Commission (NIC).
- Articulate and implement a national policy for integration of forces so that integration and subsequent right-sizing can continue in line with the NSA.
- Formalize and integrate the SNA under a unified federal command and control structure, with definition and delineation of roles, responsibilities and resource sharing between federal and regional forces.
- Formulate and implement expanded Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes at national and subnational levels.

Integrating the armed forces is a key priority and a critical benchmark for maintaining and advancing the security and stability of Somalia. The National Integration Commission (NIC) is a crucial component of the NSA and Security Pact, under which existing regional forces will become either part of SNA or of the SPF.

The NSA and Security Pact have endorsed the integration of armed militias fit to serve for the country. Armed militias who do not meet the requirements for inclusion in any security force, and ageing military personnel, will undergo a comprehensive process of demobilization and reintegration. The demobilization and reintegration of discharged groups reflects Somalia’s limited resources and the need to reduce security forces substantially. It follows that the DDR and rehabilitation process will be central to effective SSR.

The objective of DDR is to prepare former militias and discharge them for a smooth integration into civilian and productive life. DDR also mitigates the risk of extremist groups recruiting disheartened former security forces personnel.

The FGS vision within the timeframe of the NDP is to make significant progress in creating politically viable and economically affordable national armed forces that are effective, professional, manageable, accountable, and integrated.

Developing and Implementing the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Plan

- Develop the capacity of the MoD to provide civilian oversight by qualified personnel
- Put in place the required legal framework (national defence act, pension scheme law, human rights protection, etc.)
- Adopt a new national Security/Defence doctrine
- Establish a professional, qualified, accountable, integrated and politically neutral military which can defend the country
● Provide adequate salary, healthcare, training and equipment
● Develop computerised registration, verification and personnel management systems including SNA payroll verification
● Establish strong military-civilian relations
● Rehabilitate military bases, infrastructure and other facilities
● Enhance good governance, transparency and establish public financial management as part of SSR.
● Develop and implement a coordinated training program for security forces based on unified defence/security doctrine and policies
● Reform and enhance institutional capacities of security forces
● Increase the representation of women in non-frontline capacities

SSR must be implemented in line with the resolution of the NSC, NSA and mutually determined milestones to advance sustainable security. Furthermore, the SSR must be understood in context of state transformation, state development and good governance, and is based upon the principles of civilian oversight, transparency and accountability.

The objectives of SSR are to simultaneously reduce the armed population nationally and to select the best and fittest for the SNA. This right-sizing reflects the vision of a domestically sustainable army that is manageable and in line with national needs. The SSR will also strive to improve the protection and understanding of human rights through training and awareness campaigns.

Review and Implement the Transition Plan

● Review the 2017-2021 Transition Plan
● Implement the core activities and phases of the Transition Plan.
● Stabilize major towns, securing main supply routes (MSRs) and recovered areas, and participate in offensive operations.
● Enhance the counterterrorism and intelligence gathering capabilities of the security forces.
● Accelerate force generation in line with the National Security Architecture.
● Complete the development of a National Counter IED Strategy.

NDP-9 recognizes the multiple factors that determine the security, political and developmental recovery of Somalia. The transition plan sets out the key elements and political commitments that facilitate Somalia’s ability to transition from a situation of insecurity and dependence on AMISOM forces, to one where it is able to take responsibility for protecting its citizens and maintaining security. It is based on the principle of mutual accountability among Somalia’s political leadership and the International Community. This priority policy is aligned with the principles and shared objectives of the New Partnership for Somalia and Security Pact.

The reform and development of the security institutions reflects the transformational vision of change in the management of the security sector, and the political and technical progress required to achieve it. The Transition Plan envisions a gradual transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali forces, enhancing the technical stock of Somali forces to assume their national responsibility to defend Somalia from internal and external threats.
**b) Strategic Priority Interventions for MoIS**

**Reforming and Strengthening the Capacities of the Ministry of Internal Security and Security Institutions**

- Reform/restructure of the MOIS and the capacity development of its staff
- Reform of the Somali Police Force central command and leadership, and provision of necessary equipment
- Reform NISA organization structure and provide necessary equipment.
- Reform the Immigration and Naturalization Agency
- Strengthen coordination mechanisms between and within security institutions
- Increase the representation of women among Somalia’s security institutions
- Complete on-going biometric registrations for all security institutions

**Development, Review and Enactment of all requisite legislations and Acts**

- Prepare and process into law the following: Federal Police Act, NISA Act, Immigration Act, SEMA Act, Small Arms Act, Private Security Act, and Amnesty Law

**Enhancement of Maritime Security through establishment and capacity building of the Maritime Police Unit (MPU):**

- Build MPU Headquarters in Mogadishu.
- Provide necessary equipment and training.
- Establish clear command and control structures for Maritime Police Unit.

**Priority activities for the Office of National Security**

*National Security Council*

- Facilitate regular meetings of the National Security Council
- Lead a cross-government review of the 2018 Transition Plan
- Strategic oversight of the implementation of the Transition Plan.
- Coordination of international support
- Coordination of donor support to the security sector and ensuring support is aligned to Somali priorities.

*Small Arms & Light Weapons*

- Establish a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission as a national inter-agency body responsible for the policy development, coordination, implementation, and monitoring of SALW in Somalia.
- Prepare and process into law the Small Arms Act and Private Security Act.

**c) Cross-Ministerial Interventions**
5. Preconditions and Risks

The NSA and Security Pact and the outcome of the NDP-9 consultations highlight the need to embark on national SSR and DDR programs to improve security and rule of law as a condition for poverty reduction and economic growth. Prerequisites for effective SSR and DDR include a comprehensive agreement on inclusive politics by the National leaders at both federal and FMS levels.

The main thrust of the NSA and Security Pact is integrated national security forces and security institutions at federal and FMS levels, coordinating and cooperating for the aim of national security. However, while the NDP-9 consultations strongly pointed to the need for SSR, DDR and rule of law intervention, these can’t be realized unless the leaders of FGS and FMS invest in the following:

- Comprehensive political settlement and resolution of federalism and finalization of the Constitution.
- A resumption of the NSC meetings as the platform for political dialogue and formulation of national security policies.
- The formalization and integration of security forces under a unified federal command and control through a clear definition and delineation of roles, responsibilities and the sharing of resources between federal and regional intelligence and security forces.
- Effective National reconciliation.
- The establishment of a system of national justice and corrections

6. Pillar Outcomes (Security)

The outcome of the Security Sector component of NDP-9 is the foundation of a security sector that serves the expectations of its citizens and the purpose of ensuring security and stability. Other outcomes are:

- National coast guard forces to protect the coastline and thereby promote the growth of the blue economy
- The foundations of cooperative national security institutions with clearly defined responsibilities and roles in defending the country internally and externally are laid
- Functioning security institutions at federal and FMS levels, transparently governed, for public service delivery and accountability to the public
- Effectively decentralized Somali security forces, tailored to the Somali federal system and governed by the rule of law
- Increased representation of women in non-frontline security institutions
- Public trust in, and good governance of, federal and FMS security institutions restored
- The guns are silenced once for all and an inclusive national vision for development is instigated
- Investment in capacity building in federal and FMS security institutions to create a secure environment for development and prosperity
1. Introduction

The rule of law is the framework for the provision of security, which, as has been noted, is itself a requirement for poverty reduction and economic growth. The strengthening of the country’s systems of justice, therefore, must be considered an urgent priority for NDP-9.

Since 2013, Somalia has been considered “fragile” rather than “failed”. However, the country remains on the road to recovery and the rebuilding of a fully functioning justice system is one of the most crucial milestones to be reached. This is a particular challenge for the newly established FMS, which have tended to set up state level justice systems without consideration of the existing federal justice system (itself still fragile) and without the benefit of a strong legal foundation.

The rule of law is required for the provision and protection of human rights and for the furtherance of human development. On one hand it protects people’s political, economic, social and cultural rights, and on the other it ensures equality and justice. With rights enacted and implemented, citizens enjoy secure ownership of land and other productive resources, and access to basic social services, including health, education, water, sanitation and social protection. The rule of law ensures that everyone is treated equally in the eyes of law, which allows the poor and vulnerable access to their rights, including justice and legal redress. In that sense, the rule of law is sine qua non for welfare of the poor, and has a significant positive impact on economic and human development.

2. Situation Analysis

In Somalia, the law derives from at least four sources, including a legislative framework that follows the Italian (civil law) and British (common law) legal traditions, customary xeer principles, and Shari’ah.139

The Somali people are a traditional society where elders and religious scholars play an important role in legal disputes. In recent history, there has been a mixed application of modern laws and the customary laws known as xeer. The traditional legal system as it has evolved in Somalia is a combination of Shari’ah and xeer. In most traditional settings, clan elders oversee the implementation of the local xeer, while Islamic scholars are responsible for and called upon to render religious judgments related to criminal acts and civil disputes.140 However, in 1973, the Siad Barre government introduced a unified civil code. Its provisions were mainly focused on inheritance, personal contracts, and water and grazing rights, which sharply curtailed both Shari’ah and Somali customary laws.141 In addition, the new civil code restricted the payment of diya as compensation for death or injury to the victim or close relatives rather than to an entire diya-paying group.142

The civil war that erupted in the country after the collapse of the state institutions in 1991 created mistrust among the Somali people. Fundamental to the role of government is to both establish and operate within the rule of law, and to provide protection to citizens through the rule of law.

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139 World Bank, Federal Republic of Somalia, Security and Justice Sector PER, January 2017
142 Ibid
collapse of the state in 1991 brought lawlessness both to institutions and to communities, where protection and/or justice became inaccessible, particularly for the most vulnerable.

Following the collapse of the state in 1991, the first genuine attempt to reconstruct state institutions was the reconciliation conference held in Arta, Djibouti in 2000. Subsequently, in 2004, a new government with a transitional federal charter was formed in Mbagathi, Kenya, and a Provisional Constitution was adopted in 2012 as the basis of Somalia’s justice system.

The National Security Council endorsed a new Justice and Corrections Model in December 2017. The model aims to strengthen integration and cohesion between the FGS and FMS and its implementation will provide short, medium and long term approaches to extend the rule of law to the regional and district levels and improve basic service delivery to local communities.

In August 2018, the Council of Ministers of the FGS agreed a new system of justice. The new system is intended to be adopted gradually in the regions of the country while the existing system is phased out over a period of time, thus ensuring no gaps occur during the process of transition. Following consultations with justice stakeholders at a federal level and with the FMS, the Ministry of Justice and Judiciary Affairs was able to reach an agreement with the federal member states that will facilitate the transition and harmonization of the justice system and institutions across the country.

According to this Transition Plan\textsuperscript{143}, the justice chain – police, justice and corrections – is critical to security and provision of basic rule of law services to the population in conformity with human rights standards, including the rights of women. The gradual, or incremental, transition will allow Somali rule of law institutions to become sustainable and able to operate without depending on outside assistance, including capacity building of judges, prosecutors, defence counsel and justice chain administrative personnel.

### 2.1. Structure and functions of the judiciary

Articles 105, 106 and 108 of the Provisional Constitution (PC) vest judicial authority in the courts, give independence to the judiciary and provide for three levels of judicial authority – the Constitutional Court, federal courts and federal member state level courts. The Federal Court is the highest court at federal level, while the FMS high courts are the highest judicial authority at the state level. Therefore, the judiciary remains independent from the executive and legislative branches of the government at both Federal and FMS levels whilst fulfilling its judicial functions. That is, members of the judiciary shall be subject only to the law.

The Judiciary Strategic Plan (JSP) for 2019-2022 outlines the context, challenges and strategic objectives and provides part of the input for this NDP-9 justice and rule of law sector development plan. Though yet to be finalized the institutional structures for the judiciary are anticipated to include the following:

**Courts**

- The Federal Constitutional Court
- The Federal Supreme Court
- FMS Appellate Courts
- FMS Regional Courts, and
- FMS District Courts

\textsuperscript{143} Federal Government of Somalia, Transition Plan, 22 March 2018
Council

- A High Judicial Service Council, responsible for defending judicial independence, general oversight over justice institutions, accountability, developing judicial administrative procedures and standards for the country, selection criteria for judicial staff, their promotion, their discipline, proposing judicial needs and implementing a judicial training curriculum. The High Judicial Service Council will also be responsible for the recruitment, removal, promotion and discipline of judges of the Federal Supreme Court, Federal Constitutional Court, Banadir Regional Administrative courts, judges of FMS Courts and the Attorney General at federal level.

Judicial Institutions

- The Judiciary Training Institute
- Federal Attorney General Office
- The Ministry of Justice and Judicial Affairs

Judicial Service Commission (JSC)

- The Provisional Constitution establishes a Judicial Services Commission (JSC) to appoint and discipline federal members of the judiciary, decide on their remuneration and on other work-related matters of the judiciary.\textsuperscript{144} The commission will be responsible for investigating, and managing complaints from judges, while also having the power to appoint, investigate and dismiss judges.

2.2. Ministry of Justice and Judiciary Affairs

The Ministry of Justice and Judiciary Affairs (MOJ) at federal and FMS levels is responsible for reviewing and drafting of respective federal and state laws and the political view of justice, in consultation with the relevant justice institutions. In addition the federal MOJ provides technical support to FMS MOJs as needed, and maintains close relations with them. In addition, the ministry is responsible for holding and convening coordination meetings with all relevant stakeholders involved in the justice and rule of law sector. Both the federal and FMS ministries have overall responsibility to formulate policies to enable justice service delivery for citizens.\textsuperscript{145}

Under its purview, the federal MOJ manages two important units: the Legal Aid Service Coordination Unit (including Legal Awareness) and the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Unit, geared towards facilitating access to justice.

2.3. Legal aid and legal awareness

Legal aid – which supports the claiming of rights and representation by those who cannot afford it – is a cornerstone of a just society where everybody including the poor and vulnerable has equal access to legal and judicial services. The Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia obligates the provision of Legal Aid Services. Article 34 (clauses 4 and 5) declares that the state shall provide free legal defence to people who do not have the means of doing so themselves and the state shall provide free

\textsuperscript{144} Federal Republic of Somalia, Provisional Constitution, August 1, 2012

\textsuperscript{145} Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Justice and Judicial Affairs, Political Agreement on “Justice and Corrections Model of Somalia”, endorsed by Council of Ministers of the Government of Federal Republic of Somalia, Mogadishu, 6 August 2018
legal defence to individuals or communities if they are legally pursuing issues of public interest. The constitution also sets forth the right to legal aid in other articles:

- Article 29 (5): “every child has the right to legal aid paid for by state if the child might otherwise suffer injustice.
- Article 35 (6): “Every person who is arrested or detained has the right to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner and if he or she cannot afford one, the State must appoint a legal practitioner for him or her”.
- Article 15 of the Criminal Procedure code sets out the right to counsel and legal aid.

Moreover, according to Article 14 (2 (b)) of the Justice System Act, the State Court will appoint free legal defence counsel whenever the accused cannot afford to pay for legal defence services.\(^\text{146}\)

There are a number of models for delivering legal aid that have been implemented around the world. Presently, a mixed model of legal aid implementation is emerging where legal aid providers are primarily from civil society, while relying on the coordination of the Federal MoJ for policy formulations.

The MOJ through its legal aid coordination meetings with civil society groups has developed the National Legal Aid Policy, which was approved by the Council of Ministries on 23 June 2016. The policy advocates for a mixed model of legal aid, where legal aid is provided by NGOs, pro bono lawyering and paralegals.

The national legal aid policy is expected to address prolonged lack of access to justice and justice inequality that has existed for the past three decades, while coordinating and facilitating the active participation of various governmental and non-governmental agencies, particularly those providing legal aid. This policy will regulate legal aid providers and provide clear procedures and process in delivering services based on modern methods compliant with national and international standards at both federal and regional levels.

The National Legal Aid Policy prioritizes the following Objectives:

- Ensuring access to justice services for all, and particularly for the poor, women and vulnerable.
- Sensitizing all legal aid providers and users both in public and private sector,
- Training and raising awareness on citizens constitutionally mandated rights.
- Enhancing coordination and collaboration between government and non-government entities providing legal aid services.
- Empowering legal aid providers and legal professionals.
- Reviewing and evaluating legal aid services status and reforming relevant laws.

Somalia is a party to numerous international and regional instruments that promote access to justice and in particular legal aid for indigent persons and vulnerable groups. The commitments laid down in these instruments create obligations that require Somalia to reform their policies and practices to realize human rights and justice for all citizens. The most important applicable international instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). These conventions establish the right to legal aid and are binding on Somalia.\(^\text{147}\)

\(^{146}\) Somali Republic, Justice System Act, 1962

A legal aid program must include legal assistance at all stages of the criminal process, including detection of the crime, statement-taking, investigation, prosecution and trial and post-trial procedures, regardless of whether the case is handled in a federal or regional forum. Specific strategies will be used in order to ensure legal aid at various stages – before trial, at the police station, court proceedings, post-trial and detention.

The MOJ holds monthly coordination meetings with legal aid providers and other stakeholders with the purpose of information sharing and exposure of concerns. Such forums allow the MOJ to monitor the quality of legal aid services being provided.

Over recent years, the Somali Bar Association, Association of Somalia Women Lawyers (ASWL) and local NGOs have provided free legal aid services through lawyers and paralegals for vulnerable groups, including women and IDPs, in Mogadishu and some areas in southern Somalia.¹⁴⁸

Public awareness-raising is intended to educate the public about their legal rights and provide them with information to empower them, particularly those who are likely to need legal aid the most. The ministry will raise awareness of citizens’ constitutional rights, by customizing the campaign for targeted community groups. In this regard, the ministry will develop and enhance specific messages for children, women, youth and other vulnerable groups.

### 2.4. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)

Research conducted by the Traditional Dispute Resolution (TDR) unit of the MOJ confirms the importance of xeer in providing accessible justice and dispute resolution in Somali society, including to poor and marginalised groups. Xeer is recognized as a code of conduct to settle disputes and keep the peace between clans and sub-clans. Historically and today xeer is the primary mechanism used for dispute resolution; however, while it is widely trusted, it is also recognized as having weaknesses and being in need of strengthening through the establishment of a relevant policy framework.

The goal of such policy would be to contribute to ensuring access to free and fair justice and dispute resolution for all Somalis regardless of economic class, gender, age, clan or ethnicity.

In this regard, seven xeer policy areas have been prioritized by the FGS: (1) linkages between state and xeer mechanisms; (2) xeer compliance with the Provisional Constitution of Somalia and with international human rights standards; (3) gender equity in xeer; (4) protection of the rights and wellbeing of children; (5) the legitimacy of decision-makers (elders) in xeer; and, (6) clan equity in xeer processes and decisions; and (7) miscellaneous issues.¹⁴⁹

### 2.5. The Custodial Corps and corrections

As the security situation stabilizes, and the police and judiciary grow and become more effective at investigating, arresting and prosecuting alleged perpetrators, the demand placed upon the corrections sector will also increase.

Prisons are generally very old and the conditions extremely harsh. Underfunding means that prisons are unable to feed and clothe or meet other needs of the prisoners, leading to overcrowding, poor sanitation, and lack of health care, among other human rights concerns. There are also reports of

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¹⁴⁸ World Bank, Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Security and Justice Sector PER, GMF07, January 2017

juveniles and women being detained without trial and concerns regarding the adequacy of security controls in several prisons.

The FGS Custodial Corps, under the authority of the MOJ, manages prisons and corrections facilities. It is also responsible for the security of government buildings and orphanages. The FGS Custodial Corps is estimated to have 1,625 custodial officers, who secure eight prisons in Berweyn, Bulobarde, Beletweyne, Afgoye, Xudur, Baidoa, Mogadishu, and Merca.150

The Custodial Corps is part of Somalia’s National Security Forces and is governed by one unified legal framework. The federal Central Prison is led by the Commissioner of the Custodial Corps and FMS Central Prisons are led by Regional Commanders of the Custodial Corps. Additionally, juvenile rehabilitation centres are planned at Federal and FMS levels, which shall be independent from other prisons led by Commissioner Generals in Federal and FMS levels.

In general, progress is required to elevate Somali prisons to meet minimum requirements for the treatment of prisoners, in accordance with Somali law and international human rights standards.

For the most part, the Custodial Corps has been unable to invest in the rehabilitation and successful reintegration of prisoners, due to limited budgets, poor infrastructure and low staff capacity. There is incomplete separation of different categories of detainees in many prisons, including adults and juveniles, men and women and pre-trial detainees and convicted detainees.151

2.6. Police Forces

Recognizing that professional and accountable policing is a prerequisite for establishing security and rule of law in fragile areas, Somali authorities have developed a New Policing Model (NPM). The NPM was adopted by the National Leadership Forum in June 2016 and subsequently included in the Security Pact at the London Conference on Somalia in May 2017. The NPM codifies a two-tier policing structure comprising the Federal Somali Police Force (SPF) and FMS Regional Police.

While the division of responsibilities and labour has not been fully delineated, some FMS police have started to assume greater responsibility in delivering policing in their respective states. This shift will accelerate with the implementation of the Transition Plan aimed at facilitating the conditions and time-based drawdown of the AMISOM Force over the coming years.

The focus of the Somali Police aspires to move from counterinsurgency to other basic policing tasks, such as criminal investigation, public order, and crime prevention, all of which are critical to sustainable security. However, both the Somali Police and informal regional security actors lack functional divisions that define specializations and roles, and they therefore play multiple and overlapping roles. It is essential that the police have the training to be gender-sensitive and human rights-sensitive in their work.

Criminal investigations are a critical factor in the delivery of justice, and represent a specialized and technical undertaking. They are generally conducted by police assigned to police stations or by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) when the offence under investigation involves a penalty of three or more years’ imprisonment.

150 World Bank, Federal Republic of Somalia, Somalia Security and Justice Sector PER, GMF07, January 2017
151 Joint Corrections Services Support Programme (JCP), August 2018-December 2020, June 2018
The police must coordinate closely with prosecution services in order to efficiently prosecute cases in a timely manner and to prevent prolonged detention. As the link between the police and the judiciary, prosecutors play a key role in reducing impunity.

2.7. Stakeholder consultations and poverty analysis

The concept of justice, and a nation that operates according to the rule of law, are difficult characteristics to quantify. And yet, when stakeholders were asked to identify what they considered to be key drivers of poverty, the absence of the rule of law and lack of access to justice were the third, and fifteenth, most popular answers. Rule of law has a broader definition than merely whether policing and courts are effective. Rule of law is a community and national characteristic, where probity, fairness and adhering to both the legal and commonly accepted principles of behaviour is expected and demanded.

Somalia currently ranks last in Transparency International’s ranking of corruption. Human rights have not yet been embedded or operationalized across institutions and legislation.

Though providing a transparent, independent and fair justice system is a national requirement, there are groups for whom improved justice and the rule of law is especially important. The displaced are often without legal proof on land claims and home ownership or, indeed, even for legal identification. Currently only 39 percent of Somalis have legal birth certificates. Investments in the judicial system are needed to provide the protection and redress needs of the most vulnerable.

As stated in the Judiciary Strategic Plan, the country’s justice systems share with other branches of government in the complete institutional failure over the past 30 years due to civil wars. After many efforts have been made, the judiciary has been reorganized but still faces many barriers such as security, institutions that are not yet fully functional, a limited number of judicial personnel with knowledge and experience to provide an equitable justice service, inadequate financial and operational infrastructure, alleged widespread corruption, and a new federal system that has not yet been adapted in the judiciary institutions.152

Moreover, as consistently mentioned in NDP-9 stakeholder consultations, the main causes of poverty include insecurity and the lack of access to the rule of law in many parts of the country. The impact of insecurity on personal safety and freedom of movement were identified as key drivers of poverty and lack of sustainability. It was noted that these also reduced the government’s ability to establish and strengthen institutions needed to support economic growth and sustainable development, and fuelled crime and other social ills.

In addition, stakeholders said that the weakness of security and justice institutions is made worse by political instability and poor governance. According to stakeholders, the state lacks a strong police force and adequate prison facilities.153

3. Challenges and Opportunities

3.1. Opportunities

Some progress has been made during the last few years towards the strengthening of the rule of law and judicial systems. A political agreement on the justice and corrections architecture has been signed

152 Pg 10 Judiciary Strategic Plan (2019-2022)
by the ministers of justice from the FGS and FMS and is awaiting final endorsement by the NSC. The agreement provides the basic framework within which the Justice and Corrections Model can continue to be defined. In addition progress has been made with the organization of mobile courts, provision of legal aid and awareness, training of justice personnel and equipment and infrastructure. However, the needs remain immense, requiring long term investments in institution building. At the same time, an urgent requirement is to step up the delivery of basic justice services to the communities to increase the legitimacy of the state as well as support stabilization and transition efforts.¹⁵⁴

3.2. Challenges

In general, the key challenge is that justice, corrections and the police are deemed insufficiently effective to realize and protect the rights and needs of, and provide services to, the population. Vulnerable groups, especially women, are particularly affected as they suffer under the rules imposed by the traditional system, thus hampering efforts to create a ‘social contract’ and further develop conditions for a viable Somali state based on the rule of law.¹⁵⁵

The Judiciary Strategic Plan (JSP) outlines four factors which have impacted the shape of the judiciary system. Other background documents provide two additional factors which shape the challenges facing judicial reform:

i. **Political context**: Progress for judicial reform is integrally tied up with achieving progress in formalizing a federal system and resolving the roles and responsibilities between levels of government. NDP-8 states: “The justice model of the country has been under discussion since 2014 and still not final. A challenge faced by the judiciary is the independence and transparency of the judiciary institutions. This is only possible with building and enhancing the necessary institutions such as the judiciary service commission which has not been existent since 2014.”¹⁵⁶

ii. **Economic context**: As outlined in Chapter 1, Somalia’s economy has been riven by drought and conflict. With the majority of its very modest domestic revenue allocated to administrative and security salaries, there have been insufficient funds to support the judiciary. The salaries of the judiciary, including judges, are subsidized by the World Bank. “The operational support provided to the institutions is inadequate and not paid regularly. The judiciary institutions receive fewer shares compared to the executive and parliament despite the country’s huge [need] for effective justice institutions [which] address the grievances of the civil war.”¹⁵⁷ This lack of financial support has led to a hollowed-out function of government with too few incentives to guarantee independence, access and transparent operations. The lack of budgetary support has impacted on the enforcement of judgements, as the justice system deals with a lack of staff as well as coordinating and oversight systems to ensure and monitor compliance. The eventual budgeting process must be constructed in such a way as to protect the independence of the judicial branch.

iii. **Socio-cultural Factors**: As described in the introduction, Somalia operates within the influence of three legal systems, the secular, Xeer and Shari‘ah. “Among the three, Xeer is the dominant system that governs societal relations and serious crimes and plays a great role in resolving the disputes. During the civil wars, Xeer was primarily justice system due to the lack of the formal

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¹⁵⁴ UN Somalia Joint Justice Programme August 2018 – December 2020, June 2018
¹⁵⁶ Ibid pg 15
¹⁵⁷ Ibid pg 16
justice system and its core position underpinning the legitimacy of Somali traditional structures. One of the challenges for the judicial system is the harmonious and supportive offering of the traditional alongside the formal legal system.

iv. **Technological Context:** though substantial hurdles face judicial reform there exists an opportunity within the technological sphere: Somalia has made significant progress in ICT advances and availability, though this is focused primarily in urban settings. Tapping into this affordable service would allow the provision of judicial services in a modern and efficient way.

v. **Infrastructure Losses:** civil war destruction combined with lack of financial resources have decimated the infrastructure of almost all judicial buildings, including court houses, jails, prisons and administrative offices. The lack of physical locations combined with too few staff has severely constrained the throughput of the judicial system, which severely impacts access. Not only is the physical portfolio of court houses in disrepair, there is also insufficient security, which has cost loss of life and physical safety in a number of locations.

vi. **Exclusion:** the disadvantaged and vulnerable, including women, face particularly high barriers in accessing the justice system. A recent UNDP unpublished study on ‘Strengthening Judicial Integrity through Enhanced Access to Justice’ shows that the main barriers for enhanced access to justice for the vulnerable in fragile countries are low education and lack of legal literacy. However, the most significant obstacles in accessing the courts are costs and duration of proceedings. Additionally, judges, lawyers and court staff lack sufficient awareness and knowledge about the specific needs of these groups and communities. They need more training and awareness to serve the actual needs. The findings of this report echo the experience of Somalia.

4. **Strategies and Interventions**

The strategies and interventions for reform of the Justice Sector are based on analysis of the challenges and informed by the current Justice Strategic Plan, amongst others. The goal and anticipated outcome of Justice Sector reform is securing and improving access to justice by all levels of Somali society, including women and the internally displaced, and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary. The strategic objective is to establish independent, accountable and efficient judicial institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Somalia. The following strategies and interventions will contribute to achieving this goal:

4.1. **Reforming the justice system**

- Enhance rule of law enforcement in the country and develop justice and judiciary institutions at both federal and federal member states levels.
- Draft, review, amend and translate key legislation required for rebuilding the country in general and for justice institutions in particular.
- Complete and implement the justice and corrections model of Somalia.
- Develop the capacity of judges, public attorneys, prosecutors and judicial officials, including their knowledge and application of gender equity and other aspects of human rights.
- Increase the representation of women across the judicial system.

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158 Ibid pg 16
4.2. Improving the corrections system

- Reform the Somali Custodial Corps, correction services and prisons in compliance with international human rights standards.
- Complete the national security framework agreement (prisons and rehabilitation forces).
- Complete, reform and segregate prisons and correctional officers.
- Reform the prison service, including biometric registration of personnel, qualifications, improved payroll, productive initiatives for prisoners, and training of prison officers.
- Reform rehabilitation centres and orphanages, including the introduction of necessary policies and regulations.

4.3. Improving equitable access to justice and protecting the most vulnerable

This strategy, which will have a particular emphasis on improving access to justice by women and internally displaced persons, will be achieved through the following interventions:

- Promoting the provision of legal aid services for those who cannot afford to pay legal fees.
- Enhancing public access and awareness of justice services by creating public self-help information counters and designing and implementing modern public intake centres.
- Ensuring all citizens, litigants and defendants are treated with courtesy, responsiveness and respect by trained judges and court staff, on customer services and communications and by implementing an electronic Case Information System to improve ease of doing business within the courts.
- Reforming, modernizing and delivering an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system.
- Integrating customary and state-level systems of justice by building on the 2018 political agreement to establish a transition period where traditional and state systems of justice can be harmonized.
- Providing complaints mechanisms for citizens to report abuse by security forces and complaints concerning judicial institutions to ensure that the voice of the disempowered is represented.

4.4. Reforming the judiciary, securing and improving access to justice and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary

This strategy will be pursued through six sets of intervention:

i. Enhance the security infrastructure of judiciary institutions
   - Modernizing security systems and building the capacity of security personnel.
   - Aligning and coordinating the justice sector security strategy with security institutions to best share experiences and information.

ii. Enhancing independence and accountability of the judiciary
   - Building consensus with the relevant stakeholders to establish an efficient justice model for an independent judiciary.
   - Working with relevant stakeholders for swift action on establishing the Judiciary Services Commission.
● Establishing an independent judiciary budget allocation and developing the capacity to create a unified and independent court budget to ensure responsible and transparent use of public resources.
● Enforcing judiciary decisions/rulings
● Strengthening judiciary governance and establishing judiciary police to oversee the implementation of court decisions.
● Establishing a comprehensive coordination mechanism with law enforcement institutions to ensure enforcement and monitoring

iii. Objective 4: Initiating modernization and amendment of Civil Law and Penal Code

iv. Objective 5: Investigating establishment of a Commercial Court

v. Objective 6: Strengthening institutional capacity for effective and efficient judiciary institutions

● Developing human capital through improved knowledge, skills and abilities of judges and court staff through training for judges and non-judicial staff to achieve equality, fairness and integrity, and enhance efficiency and public satisfaction.
● Establishing court libraries for judges to access knowledge and technical know-how.
● Building capacity for the professional development of judges by strengthening the Training Department and Judicial Training Centre.
● Reviewing, developing and implementing an ethics code and ethics development strategy.
● Enhancing equipment available to judicial institutions.
● Developing and implementing required policies, procedures and strategies for institutional development.
● Improving case management procedures.
● Strengthening and automate key judicial processes to enhance efficiency.

4.5. Strengthening the delivery capacity of the police

● Operationalizing and implementing the New Policing Model (NPM).
● Continuation of the security institution reform process, such as review of human resources, payroll reform and financial procedure for the police force and all other security institutions.
● Continuation of on-going integration and institutionalization of existing regional police forces.
● Force generation, in particular 2000 Daraawish forces to take responsibility of protecting the public in liberated areas.
● Continuation of FMS police training: 700 for Galmudug State Police, 600 for Jubaland State Police, 400 for South West State Police and an additional 400 for Hirshabelle State Police.
● Implementation of the FGS transition plan, in particular taking over responsibility of Mogadishu Port and Parliament from AMISOM.
● Strengthening the police forces to take an active role in stabilization of major towns, securing main supply routes (MSRs) and newly recovered areas (NRAs).
● Establishing effective federal and state police services to take a lead in provision of policing and security responsibilities in all population centres supported by basic functioning judicial and corrections institutions and ADR/traditional justice structures.
● Strengthening the security sector to enable poverty reduction by deploying sufficient numbers of well-equipped and trained police forces across the country.
5. Prerequisites and Risks

The success of the reform of the judiciary is dependent on three outcomes from other NDP-9 pillars:

i. **Improved Security**: progress is needed towards establishing peace and to ensure citizens are able to access judicial services in safety.

ii. **Inclusive Politics**: progress is needed in three areas of Inclusive Politics. The Constitution must be ratified and formalized, establishing the judiciary as an independent branch of government. The federal system must be defined and settled, outlining the roles and responsibilities of all levels of government. And finally there must be a harmonization of the tax and customs arrangement and revenue sharing agreement to provide a solid fiscal basis for the funding of the judicial system.

iii. **Economic Development**: the Somali economy will need to thrive in order to generate tax revenue for the required recurrent cost and capital budgets for the judicial system. This dependency is relevant to the goal outlined in the macro-economic chapter to grow and re-allocate domestic revenue to social development and other underfunded government services.

6. Pillar Outcome (Rule of Law)

The goal and anticipated outcome of Rule of Law and Justice Sector reform is secure and improved access to affordable justice and increasing public trust and confidence in the judiciary. Before implementation gets underway in early 2020, this outcome will be further elaborated and corresponding indicators prepared and incorporated into the NDP-9 monitoring framework.

6.1. Gender and social inclusion through security and the rule of law

As noted, the strengthening of and reforms to rule of law systems in Somalia will be important for sustaining improvements in the country’s security and for creating an environment within which equitable economic growth can take place. However, in light of the disadvantages experienced by vulnerable groups within the population – in particular women, IDPs and certain ethnic minorities – steps must be taken during the implementation of the above-mentioned strategies and interventions that will orientate security and rule of law institutions and systems to their needs.

In part this can be achieved through a number of means, including:

- The diversification of personnel in security and rule of law institutions.
- The raising of skills and awareness among security service personnel and those working in security and rule of law institutions.
- The raising of awareness of rights and available rule of law services among traditionally excluded groups.
- The review of existing legislation for compliance with international conventions and updating it where required.
- The preparing and enacting of new legislation to support the realization of rights by vulnerable groups (e.g. for the sustainable resettlement of IDPs).

Indicators by which these actions and corresponding outcomes can be tracked and reported will be formulated and incorporated into the NDP-9 monitoring framework. It will be important to establish baselines for key indicators. Priorities will include the ability to compile and track crime statistics and, within these statistics, the ability to report on levels of violent crime and on levels of gender-based
violence (GBV). The cost of GBV on the women in Somalia is effectively outlined in the newly approved Women’s Charter for Somalia.

6.2. Governance and security and rule of law

Reform of the judiciary is, by definition, a governance reform programme. However, as with the other parts of NDP-9, there are some strategies and interventions which extend beyond the pillar and touch on all other sector plans.

The need for greater transparency and probity is a recurring theme in stakeholder feedback and analysis of the Somali context. No single institution or piece of legislation will successfully address this weakness; rather the aim of NDP-9 is to strengthen all institutions, along with economic growth and community reconciliation, in order to eliminate the root causes of corruption.

However there are legislative remedies which can support these endeavours, which will be the focus of a strategy to improve transparency across government. This shall be achieved by strengthening anti-corruption legislation and assessing the feasibility of establishing an anti-corruption commission.
## Pillar 2: Security and the Rule of Law 5 Year Action Plan

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<td>Integration of regional forces from Galmudug</td>
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<td>Establishing the foundations of a Cyber</td>
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<td>Reforming and Strengthening the Capacities of the MOIS and Security Institutions</td>
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<td>Reform/restructure MOIS and capacity development of its staff</td>
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<td>Complete development of a National Counter IED</td>
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<td>Development, Review and Enactment of all</td>
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<td>Building MPU Headquarters in Mogadishu</td>
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<td>Establish strong military-civilian relations –</td>
<td>Rehabilitation or building of military bases, infrastructure and other</td>
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<td>Reform and enhance institutional capacities of security forces</td>
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<td>Recovery and Implement the Transition Plan</td>
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<td>Implement the core activities and phases of the</td>
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<td>Stabilization of major towns, securing main</td>
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<td>Establishing clear command and control structures for Maritime</td>
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<td>Review and Implement the Transition Plan</td>
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<td>Completion of on-going biometric registrations</td>
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<td>Capacity development for the MoD – legal</td>
<td>Formulate and adopt new National Defense</td>
<td>Establish professional, qualified, accountable, integrated and politically neutral</td>
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<td>Formulate and adopt new National Defense</td>
<td>Develop computerised registration, verification and personnel management</td>
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<td>Reform prison service, including biometric registration of personnel, qualifications, improved payroll, introducing productive reform of rehabilitation centers and orphanages, along with regulatory framework</td>
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<td>Improving Equitable Access to Justice and Protecting the Most Vulnerable</td>
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<td>Enhancing Public Access and Awareness of justice services</td>
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<td>Reforming the Judiciary</td>
<td>Working with the relevant stakeholders for swift action on establishing the judiciary</td>
<td>Establishing an independent judiciary budget allocation and develop capacity to create a</td>
<td>Strengthened judicial governance and establish of judicial police to effectively enforce</td>
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<td>Establish a comprehensive coordination mechanism with law</td>
<td>Investigate establishment of a Commercial Court</td>
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<td>Establishing effective Federal and State Police services to take lead in the provision of policing</td>
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<td>Cross-cutting Imperatives</td>
<td>Strengthen anti-corruption legislation, monitoring, values and enforcement and investigate establishing an anti-corruption</td>
<td>Embedding respect for human rights across all inclusive politics strategies</td>
<td>Ensuring gendered practices across all defense and role of law institutions</td>
<td>Ensuring judicial reform is accessible to vulnerable and marginalise</td>
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Preamble: Substantial and sustainable economic development in Somalia will be contingent on progress being made under Pillar 1 (Inclusive Politics) and Pillar 2 (Security and the Rule of Law). Further consolidation of federalism to strengthen security, dismantling of internal market barriers to improve efficiency and transparency, improving the business and investment climate, strengthening rule of law, and increasing revenue collection and delivery of basic public services will all underpin economic development in the next 5 years. Consultations with Somali stakeholders were clear that poverty cannot be overcome without a transformation of all levels of the economy that builds national productivity, stimulates markets and value chains across the sectors and increases employment opportunity. While government’s role in ensuring peace and security, and in creating conducive market and infrastructure conditions with the support of international partners is important, sustained growth led by the private sector, together with Somalis’ natural entrepreneurship, is needed to lead the country out of poverty. Private sector targeted interventions under Pillar 3 are therefore central to NDP-9, and will support Somalia’s progress towards SDGs 1, 2 and 8, along with contributions to achieving seven other SDGs.

At the heart of Pillar 3 is the intent to transform the economy by improving the resilience of traditional livestock and crop production industries to better meet the growing challenges from climate change, while at the same time inducing growth elsewhere in the private sector to broaden and sustain the growth base and provide greater employment opportunities. There is a recognition among Somali leadership that dependency on livestock and agriculture poses considerable economic and social risks due to their vulnerability to climate change. According to the Somalia Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) report the drought in 2016/17 alone caused economic losses estimated at US$3.25 billion.

Evidence from elsewhere also calls for more economic diversification: some developing countries that heavily rely on export of commodities, like Somalia, have enjoyed periods of fast growth through effective reforms, but falls in global commodity prices have often exposed the weak foundations of that growth. Fresh approaches are therefore needed to build a more diversified and resilient economy that generate dependable and productive jobs and widespread benefits that improve people’s daily lives. Achieving sustained growth across sectors is therefore at the centre of NDP-9 strategies, not only to reduce poverty through employment-led growth but also to broaden the domestic revenue base and collection to deliver more services sustainably to citizens.

1. Synopsis of Pillar 3

Pillar 3 is the largest and most ambitious component of the NDP-9 poverty reduction strategy. For this reason, the decision was taken to present its content by sector, with corresponding strategies and interventions set out for each, rather than consolidated at the end of the chapter, as is the case for Pillars 1, 2 and 4. However, the underlying economic strategy cuts across these sectors to deliver four outcomes: more resilient traditional livelihood and food production systems; a policy and regulatory environment that is more accessible and attractive to investors and small businesses; a more diversified and future-fit economy; and reduced unemployment through the creation of work that is accessible to all levels of Somali society.

NDP-9’s economic development strategy leads with the strengthening of traditional livestock and agricultural livelihood systems by increasing their resilience to the effects of climate change. In doing so, government will mobilise resources for large-scale investments in watershed management and infrastructure to mitigate the impact on these livelihood systems of recurrent drought and floods. Also, the pre-civil war irrigation and flood control infrastructure in southern Somalia will be rehabilitated to improve the availability of surface water to agriculture. Interventions targeting livestock and agricultural productivity will be complemented by the introduction of modernized livestock and farming techniques aimed at improving productivity.

NDP-9 shall also support the development of a more business-friendly environment by updating administrative and bureaucratic procedures and providing tailored advisory services to encourage micro and small enterprise to become part of the formal economy. At the same time, market regulations shall be introduced that will improve economic efficiency across sectors. In this regard, reforms that can positively affect policy, institutional, regulatory, infrastructure and cultural conditions that govern formal and informal business activities are particularly needed to encourage economic growth among micro and small enterprise, which dominate the Somali economy. Competition and efficiency gains among medium and large enterprises operating in utilities (including energy, water and telecommunication) will also be strengthened through appropriate regulation and oversight.

Building a more diverse and competitive economy capable of taking advantage of emerging regional trade opportunities is the best route to broadening growth and mobilizing revenue in the medium to long term. The government will therefore promote investment in trade corridors linking Somali ports to neighbouring countries, while developing a strategy to encourage labour-intensive industries along these corridors. At the same time efforts will be made towards accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

As part of the economic diversification strategy, the government will develop an appropriate legal and administrative framework for the emerging petroleum sector, in particular to ensure the licensing and concession process is conducted in a transparent and efficient fashion, but also to ensure the effective management of revenues generated for the benefit of all Somalis.

In delivering these four economic outcomes, particular attention will be paid to how sector strategies and interventions can best benefit the most vulnerable groups identified by NDP-9, and in particular to women, the youth and the internally displaced.
2. Overview of the Economy

The Somali economy has historically been, and is still, largely natural resource-based with endowments of abundant agricultural land, livestock and fisheries, although other sectors such as construction, telecommunication and transport have increasingly become important too. In particular, the livestock and crop production sectors still account for the bulk of the GDP as evidenced in Table 1. Traditional pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods that underpin these production systems are shaped by geographic and climatic conditions. While the populations in the Northern and Central regions are mainly pastoral due to arid and semi-arid conditions, the communities in the Southern regions are agricultural or agro-pastoral due to higher rainfall and substantive water resources from two rivers: the Juba and the Shebelle which cut through a large part of the territory with fertile land. Nevertheless, there have been substantial socio-economic changes and a mix of different livelihood strategies can now be found within the same region.

After the long conflict and instability in most parts of south-central Somalia, the country is consolidating peace to build its economy, which is still fragile. Thanks to a sustained period of political and institutional progress since 2012, the economy of Somalia has steadily been recovering. According to the World Bank’s latest Somalia Economic Update\textsuperscript{160} report, economic growth has been steady in the past two years, despite the persisting environmental and political challenges. Real GDP is expected to be 2.9 percent in 2018 and 3.2 percent in 2020, an outlook predicated on the extension of the security gains and policy reforms the authorities have achieved to date but also on an assumption of reasonably favourable weather. Inflation has eased to 3.2 percent in 2018 and is expected to subside to 3.0 percent in 2019\textsuperscript{161}. Public finances have continued to strengthen in 2018. Revenue from taxes and other domestic sources grew by 29 percent in 2018. Changes in tax policies and improved tax administration have to some degree helped to diversify central government revenue away from heavy reliance on customs duties and other trade-related taxes, as discussed in Chapter 10.

However, with the population growing at an annual average of 2.9 percent for the past five years, economic growth has not been sufficient to boost per capita income, with the estimated GDP per capita of US$339 in 2018. As a result, poverty remains high and widespread as evidenced by the analysis of SHFS Wave 2 data in Chapter 3, which shows more than 69 percent of Somalis live on less than US$1.90 per day, in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Transformative strategic planning and investments are therefore needed to improve economic resilience and induce more substantive growth to alleviate widespread poverty. This chapter maps out key challenges and opportunities across the sectors and recommends accordingly a set of feasible interventions to undertake necessary structural reforms to increase productivity, generate employment and hence significantly contribute to poverty reduction over the next five years. These reforms should naturally build on existing strengths of the highly dynamic private sector that has defiantly led growth and expanded over the past decades against the odds caused by totally absent or weak state institutions.


Indeed, as the limited revenue collection and emerging capacity of the public sector poses a considerable challenge for public funding and implementation of NDP-9, the most realistic approach to generate pro-poor growth will be government facilitation of a more business enabling environment for the private sector, together with a diversification both within the traditional sectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and away from these historic sectors and towards other promising sectors. Some such emerging sectors including, telecommunication, financial and petroleum. Diversification should increase economic resilience and mobilise greater revenue for NDP-9 interventions. For the economic development pillar, three overarching strategic areas of focus are (a) enhancing institutions to develop legal and administrative capacity to create a more business enabling environment, (b) rehabilitation and expansion of the key infrastructure to support growth and generate employment, and (c) expanding opportunities and access to public services for all Somalis as a sustainable path to poverty reduction.

Table 12: Crop and livestock share of GDP in Somalia, (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock and livestock products</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop production</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from World/Bank report, Rebuilding sustainable agriculture in Somalia, 2018

3. Livestock

Livestock has been and remains the backbone of the Somali economy, alongside arable agriculture, in terms of GDP contribution, domestic consumption and foreign currency earnings. Indeed this has been the case for centuries and remains the traditional repository of household wealth and social prestige in Somalia. Livestock alone provides 75 percent of total exports by value and is an important source of livelihood for a large part of the country’s population\(^\text{162}\). The vast majority of Somalia’s population also depend on livestock and its products for both employment and food and nutrition security. In recognition of the sector’s importance, the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MoLFR), in collaboration with the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), has prepared a new Livestock Sector Development Strategy\(^\text{163}\) (LSDS), which provides a framework for the sector’s medium- and long-term development, and in particular is intended to guide NDP-9, 2020-2024. The sectoral analysis presented below is based on this strategy.

3.1. Structure of the sector

There are several livestock subsectors found in Somalia but with varying relative economic importance across regions due to the underlying differences in the natural resource endowment, the availability of water, pasture and labour, and the sizes and types of livestock species reared and systems of

\(^{162}\) World Bank/FAO, Rebuilding Resilient and Sustainable Agriculture in Somalia

production. Ruminant animals (camels, cattle, sheep and goats) are widely reared, mostly on the traditional pastoral or agro-pastoral grazing system. There exists a short livestock value chain extending from pastoral or agro-pastoral producers to two key inputs for their production and marketing: animal health services and feed/fodder. Main animal products produced are milk, meat, and hides and skins. However, there are also emerging commercial dairy systems in peri-urban areas of most cities and relatively new value chains and subsectors for poultry and beekeeping. The market-oriented peri–urban camel and cattle dairy systems are driven by growing demand in ever more expanding towns and cities where the sale of raw milk is already a very important economic activity.

Although the livestock sector remains key to economic growth and poverty reduction, the sector’s performance and growth prospects are undermined by considerable structural weaknesses, severe exposure to downside risks, and vulnerability to climate and market shocks. First, the current large livestock population, estimated at 56 million, compared to historical pre-war levels of less than 40 million, is putting a major strain on limited natural resources, such as rangeland, vegetation cover, and water. In particular, the high stock density in the face of increasing frequency of severe droughts in the Horn of Africa means that rangelands have less time to rebound and recover before the next cycle of drought. Consequently, available resources are insufficient to support rangeland grazing systems and sustain rural livelihoods largely based on traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic livestock production. Severe deforestation from decades of unsustainable charcoal production and resulting land degradation complicates the situation.

Second, there is limited and patchy information on the sector’s structure and economic performance. There is insufficient knowledge and data on animal populations, offtake rates, incidence of diseases, and domestic consumption, among others. Somalia conducted its last national census of livestock in 1975. The existing animal population and offtake estimates are largely based on limited surveys and extrapolations. Thus, reliable information, including a comprehensive picture of animal population and its geographical distribution, as well as status of rangelands and water sources, is acutely needed to appropriate inform sectoral policies.

Third, there is a lack of and/or inconsistent implementation of regulations and policies, including critical sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Compliance with such measures is a pre-requisite for export of both live animals and animal products. The failings are due to a weak institutional and policy framework, which has resulted in limited and largely informal organization of the livestock value chain; lack of coordination and integration among its actors; weak human capacity; minimal or zero budgetary resources; lack of enforcement of existing rules and regulations; and poor linkages and ineffective negotiations with main trading partners. Therefore, there is an acute need for government interventions to strengthen resilience to climate change, improve productivity and ensure the quality and safety of livestock products.

3.2. Situational analysis

The LSDS identifies a number of factors relating to the above structural weaknesses and traditional pastoral systems which constrain both the sector’s resilience to climate shocks and its future expansion. The key constraints include: (i) degradation and deforestation of the rangelands; (ii) shortages of water, due to more irregular precipitation and insufficient rainfall harvesting facilities; (iii) high incidence of diseases and weak systems for the monitoring and response to disease threats; and (iv) inadequate
availability of pasture and commercial fodder and feed. There has been considerable effort by
government and development partners to address these challenges over the past decades. However,
much of the external assistance during the past decade has been concentrated on Somaliland and
Puntland due to their relative stability compared to the other regions, with only one recognized project
covering the southern and central parts of Somalia. Most interventions have aimed to strengthen animal
health systems, the policy and regulatory environment, and private sector development. Activities to
accomplish these goals included training sessions, workshops, knowledge and technology sharing,
bringing together stakeholders, capacity building, creation of cooperatives, and trade facilitation. These
objectives are still relevant to the development needs of the country, the livestock sector, and the
targeted beneficiaries. However, some major binding constraints have remained unaddressed due to
the project-based, as opposed to holistic, approach taken. For instance, while many projects focused on
animal health or market linkages, they did not address environmental issues such as degradation and
deterioration of pastures and rangelands, even though these issues were widely recognized across
projects. Similarly, few projects (none in southcentral Somalia) focused on rehabilitating watering
facilities or fostering commercial feed supplies and markets. Therefore, these constraints continue to
undermine sector productivity, export of livestock and livestock products and the food security of the
population.

With regard to opportunities, Somalia’s close proximity to its main export markets and favourable
consumer preferences in the Gulf markets provide Somalia with a competitive advantage that can
support growth of exports of live animals as well as of meat, hides and skins, and possibly other
livestock products. There is a strong preference for Somali livestock and meat in the Arabian Peninsula,
both because of similar and familiar halal handling requirements and because of similar genetic
characteristics between Somali and Gulf region shoats (which in this context means sheep and goats and
not young pigs, as it does in other parts of the world). This latter factor ensures similar body shapes, and
taste and cooking properties of the meat, unlike with animals from Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and
the Americas (LSDS, 2019). To exploit this potential advantage, however, Somalia needs to address
successfully the vexing issue of the reliability and credibility of its health certification system for exports,
and to diversify and reduce both its export product concentration and its heavy reliance on a few export
markets, which makes the live-animal export sector acutely vulnerable to exogenous risks. These
markets include Saudi Arabia and the UAE for shoats, Yemen and Oman for cattle and shoats, Kenya for
cattle, and Egypt for camels.

Expanding domestic consumption driven by urbanisation and remittance also offer great opportunities
for both livestock and crop sector growth. The production of fresh red meat has been on the rise
through the mid-2010s, almost exclusively to meet rising domestic demand. Nevertheless, overall
output remained well below potential, both before and after the severe 2016/2017 drought, largely due
to inadequate slaughtering and marketing facilities. The growth opportunities for milk producers in the
peri-urban context depend upon the remaining availability of fertile rangelands near many peri-urban
areas. Other factors include opportunities to deploy solar and wind power to reduce energy costs,
especially for cold chains, and improved livestock management and feeding practices that can raise
productivity by reducing seasonal fluctuations without expanding herd size.

3.3. Constraints to growth

a) Degradation and deforestation of rangelands
Land degradation is viewed as a process that encompasses soil degradation and it can lead to desertification in drylands if not mitigated. Importantly, our understanding of the scope of this process has broadened to encompass all changes in the capacity of ecosystems affected by land degradation to provide biological, social, and economic services\textsuperscript{164}.

On one hand, severe droughts and flash flooding events continue to impact rangelands, causing declining vegetation cover and topsoil erosion over time. On the other hand, the current large livestock population (estimated at 56 million) creates the above-mentioned environmental pressures. However, herd sizes and composition vary across livestock production systems and hence regions, and so the extent of land degradation due to overgrazing also varies geographically, see Table 13. Average herd sizes range from large to very large in the nomadic pastoral system and are of medium size in the mainly agro-pastoral system with only seasonal livestock migration. In contrast, mixed crop and livestock farming systems, mostly in the inter-riverine regions, may have only a few animals. Different species are generally held together, to make the most efficient use of range vegetation, because camels and goats are primarily browsers while cattle and sheep are largely grazers. Combining different types of livestock also provides pastoral groups with a wider array of animal products. Herd diversification is an important risk management strategy for protecting against diseases, drought, and lack of drinking water or forage.

From a planning perspective, the impact of negative environmental changes needs to be assessed in the light of weak environmental governance and competing resource uses – for example, agriculture production and water for human consumption and other sources of degradation, such as charcoal production, wood collection and increasing frequency and severity of droughts. Evidence on the other drivers is limited but trade bans are likely to have contributed to the negative environmental effects to some degree by reducing offtakes, leading to the keeping of additional unsold livestock on increasingly stressed rangelands.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Camel</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Awdal</td>
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<td>65,700</td>
<td>1,965,500</td>
<td>893,300</td>
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<td>Woqooyi Galbeed</td>
<td>535,400</td>
<td>96,600</td>
<td>2,360,900</td>
<td>968,400</td>
<td>3,961,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togdheer</td>
<td>446,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
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<td>477,500</td>
<td>2,529,500</td>
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<td>Sool</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>899,600</td>
<td>668,400</td>
<td>1,754,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaag</td>
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<td>1,084,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
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<td>1,472,600</td>
<td>672,800</td>
<td>2,914,800</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Camel</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nugaal</td>
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<td>2,040,700</td>
<td>1,125,300</td>
<td>3,477,300</td>
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<td>13,300</td>
<td>1,883,400</td>
<td>777,200</td>
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<td>35,800</td>
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<td>530,100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>945,400</td>
<td>4,954,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
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<td>566,900</td>
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<td>4,864,600</td>
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<td>Gedo</td>
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<td>882,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle Juba</td>
<td>190,100</td>
<td>622,100</td>
<td>781,900</td>
<td>659,500</td>
<td>2,253,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Juba</td>
<td>370,300</td>
<td>711,100</td>
<td>1,135,900</td>
<td>830,700</td>
<td>3,048,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,647,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,531,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,516,600</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,983,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,678,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: FSNAU/FAO Somalia

b) **Shortage of feed and fodder**

Ensuring year-round affordable good quality feed is important to improve animal quality, to mitigate lack of pasture and browse during seasonal or prolonged severe droughts, and to reduce the pressure of a large animal population on increasingly scarce natural resources. The feed subsector, however, has always been and is to this day characterized by a traditional low-input grazing and browsing system, which is subject to seasonal shortages of pasture and very limited commercial feed/fodder production. Other major challenges are the weaknesses of government (since the demise of the pre-war National Range Agency) and of traditional management institutions, as well as the degradation, deforestation and continuous overgrazing driving massive scale soil erosion, desertification, and reduction in edible biomass on the rangelands. Other constraints and gaps are the uncontrolled expansion of enclosures on
previously open rangeland, the low levels of technical knowledge on fodder production and storage, poor access to fodder seeds and other production inputs, inadequate availability of water, storage, and transport infrastructure, and unsettled land tenure issues in southern Somalia.

There is a very limited capacity to supply fodder and animal feed in dry seasons due to lack of an appropriate legal framework and policy for rangeland management together with lack of private sector know-how and investment necessary for largescale production that could meet the demand. Although the latest major prolonged drought that led to high mortality of livestock across the country in 2016-2017 has triggered some interests among investors and traders in producing, commercializing and storing improved feed and fodder from grasses, crop residues (mainly sorghum and maize stalks), and oil seeds, the resultant supply is still limited and localized. Existing small suppliers often rely on traditional methods of production and varieties which result in poor nutritional quality. Therefore, a functioning feed segment of the livestock supply chain capable of meeting demand is yet to emerge. Development ventures in this subsector can rely on growing demand for fodder throughout the year from still expanding commercial livestock rearing operations and can be supported by field testing by some research organizations (e.g. SATG) of promising better grasses, and existing large-scale commercial production in some states of cereals and oil seeds.

c) Water shortages

In dry seasons, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists outside the riverine regions traditionally rely on earth dams and underground reservoirs with cemented walls (or Berkeds) for watering of their animals. There is also a network of shallow wells across the country. During the civil wars many of the old public dams have fallen into disrepair and privately owned Berkeds are insufficient for growing demand for water for both human and livestock consumption. In 2019, SWALIM mapped more than 5,089 water points across the country. From previous surveys, SWALIM estimated that only 2,200 water points are functional and perennial under normal non-drought conditions. Of these functional sources, only around 500 are in improved conditions, mainly deep boreholes. Groundwater sources in Somalia are technically demanding to identify and exploit because aquifers are deep (more than half the boreholes are over 130m deep, with some over 400m) and water within aquifers is often of low quality (salty or hard) that makes it unsuitable as drinking water or for irrigation.

As a result of dropping water tables most shallow wells became less reliable and water quality deteriorated in many parts of the country as water in shallow aquifers became brackish. The dilapidated water reservoirs and transport together with inefficient energy infrastructure resulting from three decades of little maintenance has led to water shortages and higher transport and marketing costs than necessary. The combination of these factors negatively affects livestock health and survival, and therefore productivity and limits its resilience to droughts. This often leads to conflicts over the limited resources.

d) Lack of breeding programs

While local breeds are well adapted to the country’s arid and semi-arid climate and ecology, poor breeding practices are a genetic factor contributing to their low live weight and productivity, eg. in milk and meat yields. At the household level, larger and heavier animals, which attract higher prices, are selected for slaughter or live export rather than breeding. Over time, the stock productivity has gradually declined. Even in the absence of drought, productivity per animal is reported to be relatively
low, with average yield for cows at 4.1L/day in the wet season and as little as 2.4L/day in the dry season – about a 40 percent seasonal drop. Similarly, camel yield averages 3L/day in the wet season and 2.1L/day in the dry season – a 30 percent seasonal drop. These figures are low when compared to the average yield of camels in neighbouring Ethiopia that produce 8.6 litters of milk/day in the wet season and 5.8L/day in the dry season. Weights of Somali livestock also tend to be uneven across the seasons and at times fall short of the requirements of the importing countries for supply of slaughter animals with carcass weights of 7-10 Kg. The low weight problem is exasperated by the high prices for livestock in Somali markets, which make the country uncompetitive compared to other suppliers. Selection of the most desirable genetic traits is therefore necessary to improve productivity across livestock species.
e) Weak veterinary services

There is a limited availability in high quality veterinary service within the country as institutional capacity for training and accrediting this service has been lost following the civil war. The existing private technical secondary schools and higher education institutions in veterinary sciences and animal husbandry lack regulations and standards (usually set by governmental authorities responsible for education at the local, state or federal level). They also lack the infrastructure, financial resources and systemic governmental and institutional checks and balances that ensure effective institutional operations. As a result, the quality of teaching and learning is weak and inadequate to meet the educational demands of Somalia’s livestock sector. While the private sector and livestock professional associations (LPAs), accredited by the MoLFR and funded by development partners, have largely taken up the provision of critical veterinary services, such efforts remain insufficient to address the serious risk of animal diseases and consequent import bans.

Moreover, animal welfare issues arise during loading, transporting and unloading of livestock, not so much because of mistreatment by their handlers but because of the inadequacy of available facilities and services, such as sanitation, nutrition, water, and veterinary care. This occurs both in rural areas and along transit routes. Even though the FGS adopted a National Veterinary Law in 2016, there is need for a more comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework and effective and sustainable institutional arrangements and mechanisms for its implementation and enforcement. Poor veterinary health services and transboundary animal disease control, with occasional flare-up of epidemics, other livestock diseases, and pests, is compounded by limited availability of quality veterinary education and technical training facilities in pastoral areas.

f) Transboundary animal diseases

Animal diseases are regularly reported in the country, with the most significant being of transboundary nature. Among the most notable are Peste des Petits Ruminants (PPR), Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP) occurring mostly in the southern areas, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Sheep and Goat Pox (SGP), Camel pox, and Lumpy Skin Disease (LSD). Other commonly found diseases are Anthrax, Blackleg, Brucellosis, Haemorrhagic Septicaemia, Trypanosomiasis, Salmonellosis, Clostridium, and ecto- and endo-parasites. All of these affect both production and reproduction of animals kept by pastoralists and agro pastoralists as well as the wildlife population. Fowl pox is also a commonly observed disease affecting poultry. Due to the aggregation of a large number of livestock in common grazing areas, watering points, and markets and along trading routes, and to shared grazing on the rangelands with wildlife, the likelihood of disease transmission remains high. Climate variability has also had a negative impact on livestock and human health through vector-borne diseases. Higher average temperatures have supported the expansion of vector populations into cooler areas at higher altitude.

Rift Valley Fever (RVF) remains at the forefront of many of the problems that the livestock export trade has suffered after its presence was first suspected in 1998. Outbreaks in East Africa have occurred periodically at intervals ranging from two years to more than 30 years. The Somali areas bordering with Kenya and the north-eastern region of Kenya went through a massive epizootic of RVF in 1997/98 facilitated by extensive flooding in that region. RVF is otherwise enzootic throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar and reached the Arabian Peninsula in 2000. Permanent irrigation in the western coastal
zones of Yemen and Saudi Arabia will contribute to the risk of the disease becoming endemic in these areas. The FAO, however, believes that RVF is currently not endemic in Somalia (unlike northern Kenya) and thus has not conducted mass vaccination campaigns against this disease, leaving quarantine stations to administer vaccines against RVF to the animals in their care depending on the requirements of the importing country.

g) Institutional capacity constraints

The livestock sector falls under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MoLFR), with the engagement of the livestock ministries of the Federal Member States (FMS). LSDS consultations have found that all ministries suffer from major capacity and resource gaps, which inhibit their ability to deliver even the most basic services. Furthermore, budget allocations and physical facilities are very limited, with most staff lacking up to date training and much-needed specializations. Somaliland and Puntland have developed some capacity over the past two decades. However, the four recently established states in south and central Somalia, in particular, all lack physical infrastructure and receive minimal, or even no, budgetary resources and external project funding, with most or all of their staff working as unpaid volunteers. Due to this lack of domestic capacity, the livestock exporting companies use veterinarians from outside Somalia, who are not registered and accredited by MoLFR and whose qualifications and experience on animal inspection and disease investigations are unknown to both the Federal Government and Federal Member States.

These governance issues severely limit the government’s ability to develop effective policies and strategies for improving productivity and support growth of the sector. There are real conflicts of interest leading to ineffective controls, which in turn result in poor credibility among key importing countries of the system at Somali ports for testing for RVF and other TADs and for preventing tainted shipments. Weak capacity is exemplified by the poor conditions of the public laboratories and the lack of accreditation and supervision of the private laboratories at the quarantine stations. Another major issue affecting credibility is that health certificates are issued by privately paid veterinary officers, a practice that gives rise to conflicts of interest. Although government-accredited and formally government-employed, these veterinarians are not independent from the private companies owning and managing the quarantine stations and paying their salaries (in addition to government-mandated fees).

The third issue relates to the general institutional weaknesses affecting export controls by the authorities, coupled with the impatience among Somali exporters regarding the long waiting period of three weeks in the quarantine stations and reluctance to shoulder the associated livestock maintenance costs. All these factors have led to, and can still lead to, rushed shipments too soon after vaccinations against RVF and FMD, in contravention of importing country requirements – an issue that resulted in the latest import ban by Saudi Arabia in 2016.

3.4. Value addition from animal products

There are real opportunities for value addition of animal products to take advantage of growing urbanisation and incomes, as well as large numbers of diaspora returnees. Meat and milk processing and distribution have considerable potential in terms of both value addition and employment creation, especially for younger people. Modern slaughterhouses and appropriate transport and retailing networks in main consumption centres can generate more value addition than traditional retailing of entire carcasses. The meat value chain, like that for dairy, is also still almost exclusively focused on
supplying the local market. Slaughterhouses and meat markets are largely unhygienic, in various states of disrepair, and lack drainage systems. Many small and medium-size towns have no slaughterhouses at all. While there are signs of incipient commercialization, current processing is minimal, with only three meat processing companies operating in the country. The oldest in Mogadishu (SoMeat) has two modern slaughterhouses and exports frozen cattle carcasses to Oman (and in small quantities also to Qatar) in refrigerated containers, with plans to invest in the machinery required for producing and exporting cuts. The other two operations on the outskirts of Hargeisa (Hilibsan) and Galkayo (Beira Food Factory) process and sell meat in local markets in a hygienic way, have been recently established but have plans to expand, including into meat canning.

Milk processing also has considerable value addition potential. Trade statistics, in particular the large bill in recent years for imported dairy products, ranging between US$60 million and US$82 million annually, mostly for milk powder and long-life packaged milk, indicate the scale of the market. Demand for fresh milk and other processed dairy products will continue to increase in all states beyond the natural population growth, which alone will provide over a million new potential consumers in the next decade. The current poor and inefficient state of the subsector, the large number of available milk-producing animals and therefore oversupply in some seasons, as well as energy cost and technology challenges appear to be the main structural factors limiting competitiveness. Other constraints that have kept milk production and the processed dairy sector from reaching its potential are both institutional. Major growth constraints include most of those affecting negatively the health and welfare of live animals as well as the poor food safety practices and poor environment for private sector investment. The development of the dairy value chain can generate substantial employment opportunities both in processing and retailing, especially among women who are already dominant in the milk value chains from production, distribution and retailing.

Promoting more varied dairy and by-products of meat production and consumption, including from poultry, would have positive nutritional outcomes for the country’s population, besides being an additional source of income for Somali pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.

The poultry subsector remains underdeveloped, with poor linkages between producers, market and consumers, and minimal external donor support. However, because of expanded commercial production and related consumption, poultry has become increasingly important to Somalia’s food security and protein availability. Much of current consumption is met by imports. Despite poor knowledge of the sector and myriad growth bottlenecks, high market demand underlines a strong potential for expanding and upgrading the poultry subsector.

Hides and skins are currently cured mostly to sun-dried or dry-salted stages, with only some processed to wet-blue stage, albeit of very poor quality. They barely register today in the trade statistics because of the extremely low price they fetch. They are nonetheless still exported to Dubai, Pakistan, UAE, China, and Italy, suggesting potential international demand for a revival of exports from Somalia if organizational capacity of hides and skins trading associations are supported and strengthened and private investment in technology upgrading of existing and new slaughterhouses and tanneries is encouraged through, for example, tax incentives and rebates.
3.5. Strategies

i. Modernizing traditional systems for production to build resilience

ii. Strengthening animal health, welfare and nutrition to meet international standards and requirements of importing countries

iii. Financial and human resources for the sector’s development

iv. Ensuring food safety and promoting value addition in livestock products

v. Ensuring the inclusion of vulnerable groups – particularly women, youth and displaced persons – in intervention design and implementation

vi. Ensuring environmental protection is adequately factored into intervention design and implementation

3.6. Interventions

- Mobilising resources for large-scale investments in watershed management and infrastructure that could mitigate the impact of extreme cycles of rainfall, floods and drought will be critical for the resilience of Somali livelihoods dependent on livestock.

- Improving the natural rangelands resource base to sustain the production and productivity of livestock, in parallel with improving livestock productivity and value addition.

- Re-establishing the National Rangeland Agency and enforcing pre-war and/or more recent policies and laws (alongside the traditional systems) to rehabilitate and manage the rangelands.

- Reassessing the relationship between public and private veterinary services and quarantine stations, responsibilities of each stakeholder, and mechanisms for government oversight.

- Applying internationally accepted tools to systematically assess, monitor and improve veterinary services in order to improve the administrative structure and service standards.

- Establishing a national competent authority responsible for official controls of animal health.

- Strengthening government oversight and auditing of processing and handling of milk and meat to ensure food safety and quality standards; and

- Improving land tenure management to deal with grazing rights, the fast-expanding private enclosures on previously communal rangelands, and commercial crop- and grasses-producing areas.

4. Agriculture

Before the civil war, crop production was second in importance to livestock with regard to its shares of GDP and export earnings. It was also crucial to food security as the country was almost self-sufficient in main staples. To a lesser extent it continues to be important. Lack of consistent and updated information on the importance of different economic sectors makes it difficult to assess its exact current contribution to the economy. Although there are no official statistics on the sector, available evidence suggests crops remain second, albeit a distant second, after livestock. The World Bank and FAO have conducted a study intended to support Somalia in implementing the 2017–19 National Development
Plan and to inform its forward policy planning and programming and that of its development partners. Significant parts of the analysis presented in this chapter are based on the findings of that report, which was published in late 2018. We supplement this analysis with information and data from other sources including government, relevant international programs in Somalia and wider literature on agricultural development planning.

Figure 38: Land use systems in Somalia

Estimates available from the World Bank/FAO report suggest there are about 3 million hectares of cultivable land in Somalia, of which almost 2.3 million hectares produces or could produce crops under rainfed conditions. The remaining 700,000 hectares could produce crops under pump or recession-controlled irrigation – mainly along the two main rivers, the Shabelle and the Juba – although only 110,800 hectares are currently irrigated. This is less than half the 222,950 hectares under irrigation just
before the civil war and only about 15 percent of the total potential irrigable land. Almost two-thirds of all cultivable land (rainfed and irrigated) is in the southern parts of the country. Apart from the fertile areas along and between the two major rivers and a small cultivated area in the northwest of the country, Somalia is primarily rangeland, with low productivity potential for crops, as a result of very low and unreliable rainfall. Figure 38 maps the prevalent land use systems, agricultural and agro-pastoral livelihoods across the regions of Somalia.

Most crop production is therefore largely undertaken in the Southern regions by small-scale subsistence farmers with an average of 0.2–3.0 hectares of land and producing cereal crops, mainly maize and sorghum. Nevertheless, there are a small number of medium and large farms often producing fruit crops. Other arable crops of economic importance are vegetables, legumes, and sesame. Among fruit crops, bananas used to be very important, with exports to Italy and Middle Eastern markets. Sugarcane was also of major commercial importance, with exports to the United Arab Emirates and by products used for distillers producing a range of derivatives. In recent years, sesame seed and lemon have become important export commodities and they account for almost all crop export revenue.

From a developmental planning perspective, smallholder farming merits special attention to increase productivity of the sector. According to the FAO, smallholder farming accounts for 80 percent of total crop output and 70 percent of marketed agricultural produce. Targeted intervention strategies are needed to address binding constraints underlying the poor performance of the sector. Use of appropriate technologies and inputs, such as hybrid seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, and good agriculture practices can improve agricultural productivity.

4.1. Situational analysis

The main agricultural production is maize, sesame, sorghum and cowpea, see Table 14. The production of these crops, and therefore their contribution to GDP, in terms export earnings and domestic consumption, have both declined substantially over the past three decades. The causes are the long conflict and resulting insecurity and displacement of a large proportion of the rural population, dilapidated irrigation infrastructure due to collapse of state-run maintenance services, and effects of droughts and floods linked to climate change. Poor farming practices and low levels of input use and mechanisation greatly limit productivity. As result, the average yield per hectare is very low compared to regional average, see Table 15.

Table 14: Main crop production, 2012-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cowpea</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
<th>Sorghum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Area Planted (ha)</td>
<td>Total Area Harvested (ha)</td>
<td>Total Production in MT</td>
<td>Total Area Planted (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>96,484</td>
<td>67,277</td>
<td>18,156</td>
<td>156,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>108,495</td>
<td>85,518</td>
<td>20,206</td>
<td>204,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>115,920</td>
<td>92,724</td>
<td>21,139</td>
<td>218,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>74,925</td>
<td>35,932</td>
<td>7,618</td>
<td>194,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>130,502</td>
<td>67,304</td>
<td>16,536</td>
<td>175,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>131,559</td>
<td>98,878</td>
<td>24,302</td>
<td>180,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FINASU/FAO Somalia
These factors have together resulted in the poor performance of the sector. In this regard, the recent World Bank/FAO report provided a good picture of current production capacity of the agricultural sector. Somalia’s agricultural exports are now only 20 percent of what they were in the 1980s. In recent years, fresh fruit exports were limited to some small test shipments of bananas to Gulf countries. Total vegetable and fruit exports, which include dry lemon exports (which began in about 2009), are only about 20 percent what they were just before the civil war began. However, sesame has emerged as a crop with significant potential for export in recent years. Since 2011, sesame seeds are the second-largest export after livestock. Most of the current $40 million in sesame exports goes to India where seeds are processed and extracted and, in some cases, re-exported.

Table 15: Average yield of main crop of main crops, MT/ha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cowpea</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
<th>Sorghum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sector also meets only 22 percent of domestic cereals needs. Even in the best agricultural seasons, domestic production provides only about 40–50 percent of per capita cereal needs. Pastoral, farming, and fishing communities all suffer from high rates of food insecurities and chronic malnutrition. The combination of increased domestic food demand, driven by rapid population growth and urbanization largely financed by remittances, and the collapse of domestic crop production has led to dramatic increase in food imports and exposure to volatility in global commodity prices.

In looking forward, the restoration of sector productivity, alongside livestock, offers great developmental opportunity: it can help alleviate poverty, increase export and reduce the growing dependency on food imports financed by remittance, therefore improving food security. In particular, a revival and modernization of agriculture present opportunities for youth employment and income generation along the agricultural value chains, from input supply and primary production to distribution and marketing, as well as increased agro-processing capacity. Other opportunities arise from rapid urbanisation and moderate growth of population, which if accompanied by economic development and security improvements can continue to sustain the growth in food demand. Displacement of imports of cereal-based products, and improving road transport and security in the agricultural regions surrounding Mogadishu, which serves both as main market and distribution hub, offer greater opportunities for marketing of agricultural produce.
However, realizing the potential of the sector requires concerted effort by government and development partners to remove several major constraints to growth of the sector.

4.2. Constraints to growth

The analysis above and other evidence collated highlights that both irrigated and rainfed farming systems face many binding constraints which limit the productivity and competitiveness of the sector. They include the following:

a) **Low irrigation capacity**

NDP-9 consultations with local farming communities along the riverine regions found there are several challenges faced by farmers due to frequent water shortages and floods. There is much lower and inconsistent surface water availability in the agricultural heartlands of southern Somalia where most the irrigated farming is located. This is largely a result of the dilapidated state of the pre-war irrigation and flood control infrastructure and minimal rehabilitation efforts, which all make irrigation of crops increasingly unreliable. On one hand river flow has become less predictable due partly to increasingly irregular rainfall upstream and partly to building of dams in Ethiopia. On the other, the pre-war large-scale flood control and irrigation schemes, consisting of barrages, canals, and other infrastructure in the middle and lower reaches of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, particularly in banana production areas, have long fallen into disrepair.

The cumulative silting of the riverbed over the past three decades has also resulted in rivers easily breaking banks in rainy seasons, often causing extensive floods resulting in crop losses and displacement. This also makes rural roads impassable and thus makes transport and marketing of harvest from unaffected areas difficult or impossible. The irrigation canal system consisting of primary, secondary, and tertiary canals, in which barrages or weirs-controlled flow of water, have mostly become unmanageable. Furthermore, pumping stations that supplied water through the canal systems in areas where irrigation by gravity is not feasible have long been either looted or ceased to function due to lack of maintenance. The problems are exasperated by misuse of water resources due to lack of government controls and weak local community oversight. The lack of planning and regulation in irrigation often leads to inefficient water use, increased salinization, and water logging.

Outside the riverine regions, rainfed agriculture is largely practiced. Unpredictable rainfall and resulting water shortages limit the production of main staple grains such as maize and sorghum, as well as the production of irrigated small-scale fruit and vegetables plots in peri-urban areas supplying fresh produce to surrounding towns and cities across the regions.

b) **Poor soil fertility and pest and disease management**

Limited skills in good agricultural practice hamper productivity across the country. Poor soil fertility management has led to gradual depletion of nutrients over the years. Soil erosion linked to land degradation and deforestation causes loss of topsoil in many parts of the country. Inputs such as manure and fertilizer are either used in a suboptimal way or not used at all because of lack of adequate funds and/or limited availability in remote areas. Before the war, key agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides were imported and supplied by specialist government agencies. Since the collapse of the state institutions, the trade and use of these important inputs shifted to private suppliers operating in an unregulated market environment, potentially posing considerable economic,
environmental and health risks to society. It is widely reported that some marketed fertilizers and pesticides, which are imported, were found ineffective due to poor quality. Farmers’ inability to ascertain the quality of input before use exposes them to potential fraudulent trade. Furthermore, in many cases, the application of the fertilizers and pesticides are reported to be suboptimal due to the limited skills in modern agricultural practices and lack of extension services. In addition to the poor yield, there are also considerable risks to environment and consumers, potentially resulting in significant externalities under weak regulatory governance. Improper use of some agrochemicals can negatively affect wildlife and biodiversity, contaminate rivers and groundwater. High levels of pesticide residue and poor handling of chemicals can lead to acute and chronic illnesses.

c) Lack of research and extension service

Following the collapse of the state, agricultural public research capacity has been completely eroded. Consequently, there has been a gradual decline of quality and productivity of crop varieties and plant tissues used in Somalia. Lack of supply of improved seeds and plant tissues resulted in very limited varieties on the market. Most farmers of arable crops now re-seed part of their harvest, repeating this year after year. The absence of phytosanitary controls and extension services to trial imported seed and plant tissues prior to commercial production has also limited the scope for successful adoption of crop varieties from neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia.

It is worth mentioning that research by the private sector is starting to partly fill the gap in the market. For example, Filsan, a seed company, which is a subsidiary of Somali Agricultural Technical Group (SATG) has started to produce its own improved seeds and technologies adapted to local conditions. It currently supplies quality seeds for a range of crops including, maize, sorghum, cowpea, mung beans, sesame and vegetables. The company is also planning to produce banana tissue to improve the productivity and quality of this important crop in the near future. Such research can fill the existing gaps in many areas where there is a clear commercial interest and therefore returns to private investments; typically export and/or high value crops for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, it is worth recognizing that due to the public good nature of agricultural research, some programs may attract little or no private funding due to uncertainties about returns to investment. In these circumstances, a need for public intervention arises because agricultural research is subject to various market failures in that the resulting innovations and technological changes often have important economic consequences for net income and its distribution, and because these consequences are difficult to discern and attribute. Often, these types of research have significant social spill-overs that go beyond direct beneficiaries.

d) Limited mechanization

Limited and unreliable agricultural machinery and equipment and high cost acutely limit the adoption of mechanization. Most producers rely on rudimental hand-held tools to carry out key farming operations including sawing, tilling, weeding and harvest. This greatly constrains the productive capacity of the sector in terms of limiting cultivated area and yield. A greater access to finance and availability of equipment are necessary to improve agricultural mechanization across the sector. Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) schemes may be needed to create incentives for the financial sector to invest in

165 EU OUTREACH Project, Fertiliser and Pesticide policies, July 2019.

agricultural mechanization and inputs, supported by a conducive investment climate and regulatory environment.

e) Poor road transport infrastructure

Badly deteriorated roads, which increase the costs of transporting crops to markets, undermine incentives to expand horticulture. Both main and feeder roads connecting farming districts to markets have long become completely unusable or derelict due to lack of maintenance. The rainy seasons in particular make difficult the marketing of most perishable agricultural produce. Illicit roadblocks collecting extortionist charges and multiple tax collections render some agricultural enterprise unprofitable. NDP-9 consultations at Jowhar highlighted the devastating impact that poor road infrastructure and safety have had on livelihoods of local farming communities in recent years. Jowhar historically produced high value fruits and vegetables for Mogadishu, which is just 90 km away. Before the war, fresh produce harvested on the day or a day earlier used to reach the markets within a couple of hours. It now takes half a day on a badly deteriorated road that cuts through multiple road control posts collecting illicit money and government tax on produce and vehicles. Transit over the very rough roads and resulting delays also leads to spoilage and physical damage of the perishable produce, to the extent that the production of some crops (e.g. tomatoes and lettuce) is no longer a viable for the local farmers.

f) Limited processing capacity

The lack of local processing capacity complicates the situation across agricultural regions as outlined in the recent World Bank/FAO report. Before the outbreak of the civil war, almost all agro-processing industries were owned or heavily controlled by the government and few were fully developed or well managed. All of them were destroyed soon after the start of the civil war. As the northern regions re-established security and self-governance institutions in subsequent years and the regions in the southern part of the country became more secure in recent years, new privately owned agro-processing industries emerged, with high potential for expansion, job creation, and greater and sustained economic growth. Improving the production, trading, and processing of primary agricultural products would not only contribute to the country’s overall economic recovery and growth, it would also have important direct effects on cementing peace and security, strengthening livelihoods, reducing poverty, and enhancing health outcomes in both rural and urban areas.

g) Institutional constraints

As government institutions in Somalia ceased to function at the onset of the civil war that started in 1990, key regulatory functions such as official controls of agricultural inputs, food quality and safety ended abruptly. In addition, the technical and administrative capabilities to develop policies and enact and enforce laws were lost along with supporting infrastructures and services such as technical and legal expertise, laboratory facilities, research and extension services, and documentation archives. The lack of regulation in particular has left farmers, consumers, the general public, and the environment unprotected against potential economic and social risks associated with the unregulated trade and use of agricultural input. Effective design and implementation of such policies is a prerequisite to establishing a business-enabling policy environment that encourages, facilitates, and promotes the development of and investment in agriculture value chains.
In recent years, The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (FMOAI), in partnership with the international partners, has been working towards rebuilding the lost institutional function in order to provide basic regulatory services and stimulate economic growth in the sector. As part of this effort the government has developed several regulatory policies and strategies re-enabling official controls of plant health, including quarantine measures, seed quality, pesticides, and fertilizer controls. However, the enactment of the relevant legislation package and building the necessary institutions are necessary to implement effectively the policies and strategies developed.

4.3. Value addition from crop production

Despite the decline in productivity and the multiple structural and institutional challenges faced by the sector, crop production remains both viable and critical to economic recovery and long-term development. Value addition and sufficient scale of production are needed to support the development of agricultural value chains. Somalia still has large and unexploited areas with fertile alluvial soils for staple cereals, oil seeds, legumes, and horticulture crops that can support both more efficient production and expanded cultivated area for both domestic and export markets. Widespread adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices would increase both resilience and growth for key rainfed crops, for which yields and total area under cultivation could be doubled or even tripled. There are significant opportunities to add value through agriculture processing and marketing to meet increased and still growing demand as well as to increase export.

In particular, the sesame subsector has a high potential for increased production (of seeds) and value addition. Somalia is already exporting sesame, and there is a growing commercial interest and investments in quality sesame production and processing, as well as international support in this area, among these USAID-funded GEEL and DFID-funded PIMS projects. Somalia could increase production of sesame oil for domestic human consumption; produce more sesame cakes, which are added to poultry and animal feed mixes; and begin exporting both. Public investments both in quality control measures for certified seeds and other farming supplies, the collection and dissemination of information on market prices, and extension services, especially in support of small-scale trading and oil-processing cooperatives (traditionally dominated by women) are needed to develop the sesame value chain. Such public investments are likely to encourage more of the recent significant private investments in small and medium-size seed and oil-processing units and in storage and packaging facilities among leading operators in this sector.

The fruit sector also has potential for value addition. Expansion of banana production—albeit to levels that are lower than they were before the war—is a realistic and desirable goal but a significant development in this area is contingent upon parallel investments in infrastructure. The federal and regional governments, local communities, and donors need to rehabilitate critical public infrastructure including roads and ports. The private sector needs to invest in improved input supplies, packaging cartons, food processing of dried bananas, more efficient shipping, and new boreholes to strengthen resilience to droughts and river drying. More analysis of the sector’s international competitiveness and profitability required to assess whether further expansion beyond pre-war levels and into export markets outside the Middle East is economically and environmentally sound and sustainable.

Other labour-intensive subsectors have good potential for growth and job creation. The realization that horticulture can generate higher revenues and income per unit of land than traditional crops has already
drawn considerable interest from Somali investors, including from the diaspora. Recent initiatives include wind and solar installations for pumping water and providing drip irrigation for fruits and vegetables, the processing of tomato paste and ketchup for the domestic market, and the export of grapefruit to Turkey. Public interventions in support of this subsector’s growth and employment potential should focus on improving input supply with certified seeds, establishing a food safety certification system for export, and addressing policy constraints, in addition to improving transport infrastructure and security.

4.4. Strategies

i. Improving the productivity of both irrigated and rainfed farming systems
ii. Improving marketing of agricultural input and output and promoting value addition
iii. Strengthening administrative and technical capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
iv. Ensuring the inclusion of vulnerable groups – particularly women, the youth and displaced persons – in intervention design and implementation
v. Ensuring environmental protection is adequately factored into intervention design and implementation.

4.5. Interventions

- Rehabilitating the pre-war irrigation and flood control infrastructure in southern Somalia to improve supply of surface water availability;
- Improving the inefficiency of water use and irrigation techniques to reduce soil salinization, and water logging through effective water use planning and regulation;
- Increasing crop yield through rehabilitation of research and extension services to disseminate good agricultural practices in both irrigated and rainfed systems;
- Improving the resilience of rainfed agriculture through increased rainwater harvesting and capacity of water reservoirs, together with improved farming practices to increase soil moisture retention and drainage;
- Establishing a competent national authority responsible for official controls of plant health, agrochemicals, seed and varieties.

5. Fisheries

Somalia has the longest coastline of continental Africa, approximately 3,300 km extending from the western passage of the Gulf of Aden to the Indian ocean up to the border with Kenya. The country therefore has a very substantive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), estimated at 825,052 square kilometres covering one of the richest fishing grounds in the region. Furthermore, Somalia’s Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) has one of the strongest upwelling systems in the world creating one of the most
productive ecosystems in the Indian ocean\textsuperscript{167}. Seasonal variations related to the southwest and northeast monsoons support a wide variety of marine ecosystems and a high level of diversity of fish along Somalia’s coast. Between March and October, the warm southwest monsoon pushes surface waters northeast and forms the Somali current, the fastest open ocean current in the world, with an average speed of 3.5 meters per second. These seasonal currents provide optimal conditions for both demersal and pelagic migratory species, especially tuna, for which this area is among the most productive in the world. These upwellings support a variety of concentrations of small pelagic fish, potential prey of scombroids, which have been the basis for limited coastal fisheries for many hundreds of years and had already generated strong interest from industrial fishing before the civil war\textsuperscript{168}.

The sector has a significant potential to contribute to Somalia’s economic development and poverty reduction. USAID\textsuperscript{169} estimated the value of the domestic fisheries sector to the Somali economy was US$135 million in 2015/16. The value of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing was estimated to contribute US$306 million in benefits to other economies, highlighting opportunities for this sector to better support Somali enterprises and livelihoods in the future. Furthermore, potential government revenues from regulated fishing activities, estimated at a value of US$4-17 million per year, could be utilized to fund FGS and FMS co-management schemes necessary for effective fisheries and marine environmental management and invest in sectoral human resource development.

It is worth noting that the illegal fishing is likely to be reduced as Somalia has undertaken a series of measures against these activities in the past five years. The country has settled its longstanding dispute over the size of its EEZ in 2014 by accepting a proclamation of 200 nautical miles from its coastline in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A drastic reduction in piracy and resolution of a disagreement between the Somalia and regional countries over control of deep-sea fishing rights have in particular opened the door to development of a fishing industry off the Somali coast with tremendous growth and job-creating potential. For the first time over two decades, Somalia offshore fishing licenses were issued, legally and transparently, by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) of the Federal Government of Somalia. Under a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Offshore Fishing Association (COFA), 31 Chinese tuna longline vessels were issued with a license to fish for tuna and tuna-like species.

However, a weak regulatory framework and limited enforcement capacity, as well as lack of adequate maritime structure together still undermine Somalia’s ability to effectively protect its marine resources and monitor licensed offshore fishing vessels. The same factors also affect ability to manage inshore fishing activities some of which are now resulting in depletion of high demand species.

5.1. Situational analysis

Somalia has two main distinct fisheries production systems: onshore fishing (up to 24 nautical miles from the coastline) and offshore fishing (more than 24 nautical miles) which are determined by the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Upwelling is an oceanographic phenomenon that involves wind-driven motion of dense, cooler, and usually nutrient-rich water towards the ocean surface, replacing the warmer, usually nutrient-depleted surface water. The nutrient-rich upwelled water stimulates the growth and reproduction of primary producers such as phytoplankton.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} World Bank/FAO, Rebuilding a resilient and sustainable agriculture in Somalia, Volume 1 - Main Report.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} The Strategic Framework for Somalia: 2016-2019
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
characteristics of its continental shelf and seasonal currents in the Indian Ocean. Low-technology artisanal fishing largely practiced by Somalis in shallow water using small boats takes place close to the shore, whilst factory fishing by well-capitalized industrial fishing operations take place in the deep sea and is operated primarily by Spanish, French, Taiwanese and Chinese companies\textsuperscript{170}. However, alongside the artisanal fishing, a fleet of four foreign freezer trawlers has operated inshore off the coast of Puntland for several years, transhipping at sea or landing in Oman, in contravention of Somalia’s laws\textsuperscript{171}.

There is also some inland fishing practiced by share-cropping communities in Somalia who have fished the lower reaches of southern Somalia’s two permanent rivers. These are activities for household consumption and not much as a source of employment and cash income.

\textit{a) Inshore fisheries}

Inshore production methods are largely small-scale fishing activities based on small motorised vessels and artisanal techniques. Except for Puntland, where the continental shelf extends some 300 kilometres to Socotra (in Yemen), the vast majority of Somalia’s EEZ is oceanic, with a relatively narrow shelf along most of the coastline. The narrow continental shelf limits both variety and size of fish available onshore. Diversity of fish is greatest in the coral reef region from Adale to the Kenyan border. The reef systems, and therefore seasonal variation in fish resources, are influenced by the tropical waters flowing north from the coast of Kenya.

Alongside the coastal fishing communities, many rural dwellers along coastal regions of Somalia, including pastoralists, practice seasonal fishing, often as an important source of supplementary food and income. On much of Somali’s Indian Ocean coastline, inshore fishing ceases entirely during the months of the strongest southwest monsoon winds, when many coastal communities return to pastoralism. There is little reliable information on the number of people employed by the sector and its structure. An estimated 4,500 full-time and 5,000 part-time national fishermen in 1990 operated along the entire Somali coast, whilst experts estimate the current figure at about 10,000 full-time and part-time fishermen. Other sources report substantially higher numbers, including unregistered and seasonal fishermen. For example, the World Bank/FAO report cites about 23,000 fishermen operating across the country, of which 730 are in Somaliland, 12,000 in Puntland, and 5,000–10,000 in the rest of the country. Other estimates indicate that the total could be as high as 30,000, plus another 20,000 people on land employed indirectly in the sector. According to the above World Bank/FAO report, on average, Somali fishermen are 38 years old and live in households of eight people. More than half own their fishing boats and half are members of local fishing cooperatives.

Many seasonal fishermen move inland when fish concentrations are the highest during the monsoon driven upwelling as their small vessels are not suited for the rough weather during this period and because summer temperatures are very high at the coast. Lack of transport and cold-chain infrastructure serve as a further barrier to fishing.

\textit{b) Offshore fishing}

\textsuperscript{170} USAID, Somalia economic growth strategic assessment, 2014.

\textsuperscript{171} World Bank/FAO Rebuilding resilient and sustainable agricultural industry in Somalia, 2018
Somalia’s offshore stocks constitute immense resources which the country has not benefited from until recent due to lack of capacity to exploit or police its EEZ, and therefore illegal fishing by foreign vessels. The illegal fishing started soon after collapse of the Somali state and it is believed to continue today, albeit to a lesser extent, due to the limited ocean monitoring and enforcement capacity. However, recent progress in economic governance and membership of regional international organisations is beginning to bear fruit. Under the terms and conditions of recent licenses issued to Chinese vessels, the regional Conservation and Management Measures of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), is currently responsible for recording and reporting all their catch to the Somali authorities. The compliance of licensed vessels is monitored by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) through a satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and through various related reporting requirements.

The Somali fishing industry is largely unable to exploit offshore resources in upwell season when high value migratory species are in Somali waters; therefore, the country can only benefit from these resources thorough the licensing of foreign fishing vessels. Most economically important migratory species of large pelagic species, including tuna and tuna-like species, billfish, and sharks, are harvested offshore by industrial foreign vessels172, some using the “purse seine” net system173. Tropical tuna species (bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin) are caught when they group in surface schools or around fish aggregating devices—such as large flat rafts left in the current that aggregate schools of tuna beneath them. The impact of the latter method has been controversial, because they increase catches of juvenile yellowfin and bige. Longline vessels also catch some yellowfin and bigeye tuna. Longliners come from China; Taiwan, Province of China; and Japan. Purse seiners come from the European Union, Iran, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan, Seychelles, Yemen, and other countries.

5.2. Constraints to growth

Alongside the institutional constraints in managing offshore fisheries, there are several structural factors that hamper the productivity of the inshore fisheries, including lack of modern vessels, fishing gear, skills and inland storage and processing capacity, as well as infrastructure to transport fish to domestic urban markets and neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia.

a) Artisanal fishing fleet

With the exception of the above mentioned four foreign vessels licensed by Somaliland and Puntland, Somali fishermen, largely using small boats designed for artisanal fishing, operate along the coast. According to the World Bank/FAO report, Somalia’s current fleet is composed mostly of small boats, mainly built locally from old designs and generally beach launched. In the mid-2000s, the size of the fleet was estimated at about 650 motorized fiberglass six-to-nine-metre-long vessels, 380 traditional sail boats, and 800 five-metre-long houros or canoes, adding to about 2,000 vessels of all types today. A recent scoping mission by the FAO found the majority to be poorly built and unprofitable, offering poor catch handling. Although a recent introduction by the FAO in some areas of the country of new 6.3-metre, 8.3-metre, and 10.3-meter boat designs meeting international safety standards was useful to

172 Ibid  
create commercial interest among the local producers, the renewal of the fleet and deployment of modern fishing gear necessary for improved productivity requires considerable investment and possibly partnerships with foreign manufacturers and suppliers. Furthermore, artisanal fishing is seasonal as the small boats used cannot go to sea safely during the peak summer conditions generated by upwelling\textsuperscript{174}. The physical and environmental limits on artisanal fishing therefore mean that growth in domestic fisheries will require a new approach to fishing in between the low-tech approach practiced by Somalis today and the industrial methods used by foreign fishing operations offshore\textsuperscript{175}.

b) **Limited landing sites and onshore facilities**

In addition to addressing the capacity constraints, the expansion of fishing activities in this subsector requires development of adequate onshore infrastructure and cold chain. As the 2,000-kilometre-long Indian Ocean coast of Somalia has very strong ocean currents and few natural harbours there is a need for new ports across the country. Kismayo, in Jubaland, is the only natural port; Mogadishu has only a small naturally protected area at the old port, in addition to cargo-oriented commercial facilities. Isolated headlands provide limited protection from monsoon conditions in some other locations and a natural deep-water harbour behind Ras Hafun Peninsula in the north. More than 1,000 kilometres of Indian Ocean coast has little protection for fishing vessels, most of which are beach launched. Unlike the south, the 1,300-kilometre-long northern coast of Somalia is protected from the strong southwest monsoon, but it has only two major deep-water harbours, at Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland, plus limited mooring facilities in Aluula and Laasqoray.

c) **Limited monitoring and enforcement capacity**

As much of Somalia’s continental shelf is narrow, its inshore fish stock is limited and vulnerable to depletion unless placed under careful management. Indeed, the recent successful exports from the Puntland region in recent years have raised sustainability concerns as lobster, which is highly profitable and shipped to the Gulf, is now being depleted. Sea cucumbers, which are essential to the long-term survival of coral reefs are now threatened by high export demand. There is also a growing concern about the extent and some of the methods of fishing by foreign ships. The recently licensed offshore fishing vessels use longline operations that can generate bycatch, including sharks, marine turtles and other pelagic fish. Therefore, an effective regulatory framework and enforcement are critical for sustainable management of both inshore and offshore.

With regard to monitoring of catch, the existing multilevel governance for fisheries control may pose practical challenges for enforcement authorities. FGS manages the access to Somalia’s deep-sea fishing waters, while regional governments manage access to the close-to-shore artisanal fishing grounds. This has allowed the Federal Government in Mogadishu to negotiate with the foreign fishing companies with a view to exchanging fishing permits for support to help grow Somalia’s own local fishing industry. However, the strategy and policy actions for using this revenue stream to develop local fisheries and enforcement capacity and coordination at federal and state levels are not yet developed. For effective


\textsuperscript{175} USAID, Somalia economic growth strategic assessment, 2014.
enforcement, parliamentary approval of no less than 12 subsidiary regulations\textsuperscript{176} is needed to enforce existing fisheries law.

5.3. Value addition from fish

In both coastal and inland urban centres demand for and the availability of fish have been increasing thanks to rapid urbanisation and growing diaspora returnees. However, meat consumption still dominates the Somali cuisine, and there is still little understanding among a large proportion of consumers about fish quality and its nutritional value. This lack of appreciation for fish quality and safety is widespread in Somalia and is a major cultural hurdle to widespread consumption of fish. Unlike fresh (catch of the day) fish, iced fish does not generally receive a premium price, providing little financial incentive for fishers to treat their catch safely. Fresh catch, often sold either on the landing site or in local urban fish markets, attracts much higher prices.

Therefore, developing the value chain for fresh fish requires raising consumer awareness and improved quality and safety to encourage domestic consumption and increase exports. The latter requires the development and implementation of good hygienic practices (GHP) and internationally acceptable application of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) procedures\textsuperscript{177}. Industry players will share an interest in establishing and sustaining the safety reputation of fish exports from Somalia and are likely to find that a professional association will help in this regard. Availability of adequate landing jetties and ports, as well as cold chain to transport catch to markets, can potentially induce investment in modern fishing vessels and technologies for conservation and may also help shift consumer preference toward iced fish over time. The facilities for effective onshore processing and marketing require ice-making and refrigeration equipment, trucks, refrigerated trucks, forklifts, processing equipment. Wind and solar energy are likely to play a role. Indeed, the growth of domestic fisheries will probably depend on Somalia’s ability to participate directly in the offshore catch.

However, Somali fishermen currently lack the experience, skills and capital to fish on the same scale as foreign operators, although there is an encouraging recent development in use of modern fishing vessels among Somali companies. Two recent investor initiatives in fishing and fish processing and the views of informed insiders suggest that a third, niche, fishing industry – between artisanal and factory – is beginning to emerge and Somalis can fill it very profitably\textsuperscript{178}. This kind of intermediate fishing industry would be built around fishing vessels of 50 to 60 feet in length – potentially several dozen – constructed in the region for a few hundred thousand dollars each, and based in or near Somalia’s large ports. They would fish with nets in deep water and bring the catch to port, protecting it with ice until landing. To support the growth in this emerging subsector, the development of processing facilities on land would need to keep pace as the catch capacity expands. Processing could consist of more canning or the more ambitious but more profitable export of fresh tuna by air freight. Quality standards and sanitary certifications will be critical to establishing and maintaining the market because this subsector will depend almost exclusively on exports.

\textsuperscript{176} Federal Government of Somalia, A Review of the Somali Fisheries Law (Law No. 23 of November 30, 1985), in accordance with Article 79, Paragraph (d) of the Federal Constitution of Somalia.

\textsuperscript{177} USAID, Strategic Economic Growth Assessment, 2014.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
Export of canned fish is another area with significant potential for value addition and employment creation, alongside the modest domestic consumption. Somalia currently imports about US$17.5 million a year worth of canned and processed fish (virtually all of which is canned tuna) according to the International Trade Centre. Given the ubiquitous availability of canned tuna in Somali retail shops, this figure, which represents a consumption of less than US$1.50 per capita per year, is a reliable medium-term upper limit to potential domestic sales for a Somali canning industry. In the long term, this subsector could grow very rapidly from virtually nil, by exporting to neighbouring Ethiopia where consumption is high. The ongoing economic integration and anticipated infrastructural interconnectivity creates a real prospect for canned fish export.

5.4. Strategies

i. Develop a legal framework for effective management of fisheries resources and marine environment

ii. Develop administrative and regulatory capacity of the federal and state fisheries institutions

iii. Promote the development of fish value chains to increase both domestic consumption and export

iv. Ensure the inclusion of vulnerable groups – particularly women, the youth and displaced persons – in intervention design and implementation

v. Ensure environmental protection is adequately factored into intervention design and implementation

5.5. Interventions

- Develop national fisheries law that is consistent with international law governing offshore fisheries, including licensing, monitoring and reporting of ocean fishing activities, as well as conservation of marine environment

- Establish subsidiary regulations of the National Fisheries Law governing coastal fisheries at a federal member state level

- Development of capacity building plan for the federal and members states’ ministries of fisheries

6. Food security

The above analysis of the livestock, agriculture and fisheries sectors highlights the collapse of domestic crop production, which has led to a massive increase in food imports. At the same time there has been a combination of increased domestic food demand driven by rapid population growth and urbanization with consumption largely financed by remittances. Agricultural imports rose by a factor of 18, reaching almost US$1.5 billion in 2015, up from an annual average of only about US$82 million in the late 1980s. Despite widespread livestock ownership among Somalis, most households have a diet composed more of cereals (a mix of home-grown sorghum and maize and imported rice and various wheat derivatives) and sugar and oil (also imported). This is complemented by consumption of animal products, mostly fresh milk and meat (including poultry), which are the most important sources of protein. Within even
pure pastoral households there is high dependency on markets and imports for food consumption; Somalia is therefore very vulnerable to market disruptions caused by conflict, droughts or by severe global market hikes in commodity prices.

The recent World Bank Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment has shown that Somali households, regardless of their type (urban, rural, IDP or nomad), spend most of their daily expenditure on food, evidenced by the closeness of food consumption poverty and global poverty lines (see Figure 39).

Figure 39: Food Consumption Poverty

The high level of household income devoted to food expenditure combined with a high dependence on imported food and poor domestic production capacity raise considerable food security challenges for Somalia. A high proportion of the population is vulnerable to environmental shocks and global market shocks. Environmental shocks include droughts or floods (affecting earnings and domestic food production). Global shocks lead to sudden increases in food prices. These observations collectively warrant a more in-depth analysis of household food consumption. We evaluate price and average consumed quantities across seven main food categories including cereals, fruit and vegetables, pulses, meat and fish, dairy and eggs, oils and fats and other foods. We supplement this with a further analysis measuring the extent to which consumption may be sensitive to changes in expenditure on and prices for these seven categories.

6.1. Overview of the data

The average share of expenditure devoted to food expenditure in Somalia is estimated to be 62 percent of the total household expenditure (including food and non-food expenditure, plus attributable expenditure from owned or freely used durable assets, such as houses, cars or washing machines). Table 6 shows that Somali household diet is largely dominated by cereals which account for 27 percent of household weekly total food expenditure, followed by fruit and vegetables (20 percent) and meat/fish (19 percent). These three food categories alone account for 66 percent of the weekly food expenditure. Cereal diet is dominated by a small number of staples such as rice, pasta and maize and sorghum and their derivatives consumed as main meals. Whilst maize and sorghum consumed in Somalia are largely produced domestically, rice, and pasta and a range of derivatives of wheat, such as flour, are imported.
Somalia faces a chronic food crop deficit, as local production meets only 22 percent of per capita cereal needs\(^\text{179}\). Even in the best agricultural seasons, domestic production provides only about 40–50 percent of per capita cereal needs.

Regardless of household income level, one or more of the cereal staples are likely to be consumed on a daily basis. Relatively lower average price (US$0.74) makes cereals more affordable among poor households, compared to other more expensive products such as meat and fish (US$2.18), and fruit and vegetables (US$1.99); see Table 6. Average weekly consumption and expenditure largely reflects the typical dietary composition with cereals accounting for both the highest quantity consumed (3.3kg) and expenditure (US$7.13). Furthermore, all households surveyed in the data reported consuming cereals in the week before the survey date, followed by dairy, fruits and vegetables, and meat/fish in a descending order. Meat/fish and vegetables account for the second highest expenditure (US$5.52), suggesting that they may be out of reach for a sizeable proportion of poorer households based on the lower number of observations.

Table 16: Average price, quantity consumed, weekly and % food expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No. Obs</th>
<th>Price ($)</th>
<th>Quantity consumed (kg)</th>
<th>Weekly expenditure ($)</th>
<th>% Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>5092</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>7.13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit/veg</td>
<td>4708</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>2207</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat &amp; fish</td>
<td>4249</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy and eggs</td>
<td>4280</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; fats</td>
<td>4305</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>4980</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the context of Somali culinary habits with limited consumption of non-animal proteins, the largely calorific diet based on mostly imported cereals can have considerable nutritional implications. Typically, a poor household would mostly be able to afford basic cereals cooked at most with some vegetables or, only occasionally, with lower quality cheaper meat cuts. High quality meat cuts, fish (and fruits) tend to be luxuries whose consumption can only be afforded by wealthy households on a regular basis. Vegetable sources of protein and starch are from a limited number of legume pulses, including cowpea and mung beans, mostly consumed in the southern and central regions of Somalia, whilst the protein sources for households in Somaliland and Puntland are mostly from meat and dairy products. Households in the Somaliland and Puntland regions also consume more cereals, such as imported rice and pasta, compared to South-Central regions where domestically produced maize and sorghum are consumed more. Also, the nomadic population in the remote rural areas has limited access to food markets and therefore mostly consume owned animal products which are affected by seasonality of the livestock production.

Furthermore, the findings of supplementary econometric analysis of food demand (as found in Annex 4) shows that household food consumption is highly sensitive to income shocks but less so to price changes, with the exception of meat and dairy. This shows income is not only a limiting factor of consumption across the food categories, but meat and dairy consumption, the main sources of protein, would be highly sensitive to environmental and market shocks affecting earnings and food prices.

Such overall limited household dietary choice constraints in the context of widespread poverty clearly pose risks of malnutrition due to deficiencies in key macronutrients and micronutrients. As a result, acute malnutrition is widespread among Somalis, as evidenced by recent UNICEF and FSNAU reports. National global acute malnutrition estimates vary from 12 to 19 per cent over the past five years\textsuperscript{180,181}. Chapter 8 discusses further the nutrition and health implications of undernutrition.

The NDP-9 poverty reduction strategy needs to incorporate interventions that increase the resilience and productivity of agriculture and livestock sectors, and trade policies aimed at reducing household exposure to volatility in global prices. Given the inter-ministry policy remit on food production and nutrition and health, it is desirable to have a government-wide approach to policymaking and programming of food security interventions.

6.2. Strategies

i. To establish a national (inter-ministerial) commission responsible for the coordination of the food security agenda across government.

6.3. Interventions

- Selection and appointment of a committee for national commission for food security.
- Preparation of a government food security strategy, taking special account of the needs of the vulnerable, particularly women and young children.

7. Infrastructure

Somalia’s road transport and much of its pre-war port, electricity and water and sanitation infrastructure is in a dilapidated state due to the legacy of conflict and chronic underinvestment for decades. Without a substantial investment to extensively rehabilitate and expand this infrastructure, it is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee any significant economic growth and reduction of the widespread poverty in Somalia. The country’s economic recovery prospects, future growth and competitiveness are therefore all largely dependent on the availability of infrastructure for economic development. Indeed, infrastructure is a prerequisite for achieving key NDP-9 priorities including private sector development, human development and regional economic integration\textsuperscript{182}. Good infrastructure contributes towards a positive investment climate, as it reduces the costs of doing business and in particular enables producers to access both product and factor markets. Infrastructure plays a vital role in each of the pathways through which economic growth can positively impact on poverty, as described

\textsuperscript{180} FSNAU Nutrition Update July 2018, \url{http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/fsnau-nutrition-update-july-2018}
\textsuperscript{181} UNICEF Somalia Nutrition Strategy Note, 2018-2020 
\url{http://files.unicef.org/transparency/documents/Somalia%20Nutrition.pdf}
\textsuperscript{182} AfDB, 2017 Somalia Transport Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme
in Chapter 4: Strategic Framework, Figure 34. For example, basic rural infrastructure can help address poverty through improved access to health, education and WASH services.

Large-scale infrastructure can also contribute to growth and poverty reduction through macroeconomic policy channels, in particular investments generating employment, but also serve as a pre-condition for realizing market potentials as it affects both the patterns and quality of growth through the degree it facilitates access to factor and product markets. Furthermore, there has been increased recognition of the critical role of infrastructure investment for economic growth, as well as its linkages with the provision of social services and the attainment of SDGs. Therefore, more effective intermediation and coordination of development assistance targeted towards the rehabilitation and development of Somalia’s infrastructure sectors is a top priority in NDP-9.

In this section, we cover transport and energy and ICT whilst water and sanitation are covered within the financial sector section (below) and Social Development pillar respectively. Nevertheless, we will cover in this section some FGS level urban planning strategy to guide urban development programmes designed and implemented at regional and state levels.

7.1. Situational analysis

In an effort to support Somalia to rehabilitate and expand its infrastructure there are ongoing and completed government, social and international initiatives. Table 17 provides an overview of the ongoing effort which is mostly project-based and therefore poses some future sustainability challenges in terms of scale and scope of interventions, as well as maintenance of the physical infrastructure built. These programme and projects are under the infrastructure sector portfolio of international interventions. There are other programmes/projects that also undertake infrastructure works but categorised under other sectors such as Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, Security, Democratisation, Resilience etc. Some of the UN and World Bank Multi-Partner Trust Funds include activities that target construction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure.

Table 17: Ongoing Infrastructure Projects in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title &amp; Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Amount in EUR</th>
<th>Main objectives</th>
<th>Area targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road Infrastructure Programme - Somalia (RIP-Somalia)</td>
<td>41,450,000.00</td>
<td>Capability Building of all road sector agencies at Federal and Member State and</td>
<td>Southwest, Jubaland, Puntland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– African Development Bank (AfDB) and Federal Government of Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>rehabilitations of about 355km of key road networks in Somalia.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FGS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Road Maintenance Project (SRMP) - Gesellschaft für</td>
<td>19,739,004.00</td>
<td>Up to 140 km of roads rehabilitated in Puntland and Somaliland; Capacity</td>
<td>Somalia Countrywide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td>enhancement of highway authorities in Puntland Highway Authority and Somaliland’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Road Development to enforce road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title &amp; Implementing Partner</td>
<td>Amount in EUR</td>
<td>Main objectives</td>
<td>Area targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GmbH</td>
<td></td>
<td>maintenance standards; Working with FGS Ministry of Public Works Housing and Reconstruction to Establishment of National Roads and Highways Authority for Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargeisa Urban Water Supply Upgrading Project (HUWSUP) - UNHABITAT</td>
<td>15,800,000.00</td>
<td>Replacement of 23 km of water supply network for Hargeisa City; Construction of new pump house and increase of water supply</td>
<td>Hargeisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLUCITY - Support to inclusive and sustainable development of two strategic coastal cities in Somalia.</td>
<td>22,500,000.00</td>
<td>To contribute to the stabilisation of Somalia and inclusive and sustainable urban development of the regional growth nodes Mogadishu (15MEUR Contribution to WB to rehabilitate Roads) and Berbera (7.5MEUR Contribution to UNHABITAT to strengthen the capacity of the municipality.</td>
<td>Mogadishu &amp; Berbera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title &amp; Implementing Partner</td>
<td>Amount in EUR</td>
<td>Main objectives</td>
<td>Action locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILED Integrated Infrastructure Project - UNOPS</td>
<td>9,000,000.00</td>
<td>Support ILED programme prioritised small infrastructure activities for the four territories in Somalia: Proposed are: Water, Road, Markets and Building Infrastructure Construction or Rehabilitation.</td>
<td>Somalia Countrywide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (TF 072283) – WORLD BANK</td>
<td>5,750,000.00</td>
<td>Support to installation and integration of pilot renewable energy systems into existing electricity grid for urban electricity; improvement of legal and regulatory and institutional frameworks; support to PPPs</td>
<td>Somalia Countrywide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosaso Spring Water Sources Development Project – Terre Solidali</td>
<td>5,000,000.00</td>
<td>To improve access to drinkable, affordable and adequate water service delivery in Bosaso</td>
<td>Bosaso, Puntland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Land and Water Resources Management</td>
<td>3,200,000.00</td>
<td>The Integrated Land and Water Resources Management (ILWRM)</td>
<td>Somaliland and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title & Implementing Partner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title &amp; Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Amount in EUR</th>
<th>Main objectives</th>
<th>Area targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ILWRM) Project – UN Food, Agriculture Organisation (FAO)</td>
<td></td>
<td>project will support establishment of Information Management Centres (IMC) and provision of land and water resources information and services. This project will be managed by FAO, and implemented through a results oriented partnership between FAO-SWALIM and the Somaliland &amp; Puntland partner ministries.</td>
<td>Puntland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted from EU Engagement in Infrastructure Sector & ILED Infrastructure Project

Among the recent initiatives was a comprehensive AfDB assessment of Somalia’s infrastructure needs conducted under the Somalia Infrastructure Fund. It provides a detailed assessment of its condition, and the services and infrastructure institutions, including the overall demand and supply requirements to cater to this demand. Sector requirements were then prioritised and rationalised using an assessment of their implementability to develop a ten-year phased investment programme, within an aggregate cost of US$454 million. Whilst some of the identified priorities were included into NDP-8, unfortunately FGS budgetary constraints and poor implementation arrangements made under the plan together limited government’s ability to make a substantive progress in this area during 2016-2019. As a result work in this area has been conducted in piecemeal fashion through the above international programmes and projects with little or no coordination with FGS in some cases. NDP-9 builds on the NDP-8 mid-term review, OPM roadmaps and output of the AfDB sector needs assessment to identify a set of realistic and forward-looking strategies aimed at informing better the formulation of future policies and institutional and funding arrangements.

#### 7.2. Constraints to growth

Broadly speaking, there are three major areas of infrastructure constraints in Somalia:

1. Very limited public resources to adequately fund hard infrastructure investment in the key sectors of energy, transport, water & sanitation, and ICT sectors as well as resources for operations and maintenance;
2. Insufficient administrative and technical capacity to develop laws, rules, regulations and financial governance required to underpin the national framework for sustainable provision of infrastructure services at federal and state line ministries and agencies levels; and
3. Lack of the specialist technical skills needed for managing the large-scale construction and maintenance of the infrastructure across the sectors.

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183 Ibid
184 Press release, African Development Bank Group signs $28.8 million grant deal with Somalia for road and water projects, 29th Aug. 2019,
Although the above multiple recent and ongoing programmes and projects to some extent helped to address funding and capacity constraints, the skills development needs remain acute across the country. More detailed analysis of these constraints and how they hinder economic development and delivery of key public services will be discussed in turn within each subsector and then related recommendations for strategic intervention priorities drawn.

7.3. Transport sector

Transport is a key infrastructure subsector that directly enhances productivity and living standards. It creates employment while being built and maintained and contributes to improved security and stabilisation. The current poor status of transport infrastructure severely limits access to markets and services across the regions of the country and internationally. This includes roads, ports and airports. For example, poor road transport infrastructure has been highlighted during consultations across the regions as one the barriers to trade and access to employment opportunities, especially among farming communities in districts around main markets of Mogadishu, regional capitals and major towns.

In the following three sections we cover road, marine (ports) and aviation (airports) transport together and identify related strategic priorities.

a) Roads

Main roads connecting the regions and feeder roads have long fallen into disrepair with major segments becoming increasingly unusable, especially during the rainy seasons. The AfDB needs assessment estimated there is a total of 11,434km of all types of roads along the key routes of the country. The length of the primary/main roads was estimated to be a total of 4,124km, of which 2,860km are paved and 1,264km are unpaved or of gravel surface. As of Oct 2016, the condition of the paved roads was classified as poor since more than 90% of the roads have deteriorated and are beyond their design life.

However, there has been encouraging signs of rehabilitation and expansion recently as some roads have been repaired and new roads were built, including some constructed by voluntary community effort involving local business, citizens and diaspora donations over the past four years. An example is the new road between Burao and Ceerigaabo and Ceeladaahir and Ceerigaabo largely funded by business and local community donations. Others were built with the support of international projects, funds raised by the regional authorities, or bilateral agreements with development partners. The start of works for reconstruction of the main roads between Mogadishu and Jowhar and Mogadishu and Afgoye, funded by the Government of Qatar, is a great milestone as it connects farming districts in Southwest and Hirshabelle states to the capital markets. Moreover, planned trade corridors and highways connecting Somalia to its neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti will provide Somali entrepreneurs more access to the market in the region. Ongoing construction of the Berbera-Togwajale corridor, funded as part of the Berbera port expansion plan, in particular has potential to accelerate regional integration by linking Ethiopia – a large land locked country with a rapidly growing economy and an estimated population above 110 million – to the Middle Eastern and Asian markets.

Finally, on 29 August 2019, AfDB announced US$16.86 million to partly finance a US$66.7 million project that will rehabilitate 355km of regional road networks, and also provide assistance to improve the capacities of public agencies.
Whist the ongoing and planned rehabilitation and expansion are encouraging, the scale of road infrastructure need in Somalia to support economic growth and social development is far greater than what can be funded through piecemeal international projects and community initiatives. Going forward, the government needs to develop a road transport strategy with a sustainable funding mechanism to develop and maintain the road infrastructure and, importantly, guide international interventions in this area. As listed above, there are numerous recent and ongoing infrastructure initiatives in country. Among the most prominent international initiatives is the Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF). Approved in October 2016, it is one of the financing windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) of the New Deal COMPACT for Somalia. The Fund’s goal is to support and accelerate Somalia’s inclusive and sustainable economic recovery, peace and state building within the context of AfDB’s Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa. The focus of the SIF is the rehabilitation and development of infrastructure, and related skills development and institutional capacity building. As at December 2018, the AfDB’s active portfolio in Somalia comprised 13 operations of which three are regional and ten national with a total commitment of about US$113 million. In terms of sectoral distribution, it stated that agriculture has the largest allocation of 58 percent; followed by water and sanitation 19 percent; multi-sector 13 percent; and social and humanitarian 10 percent. The impact of this initiative, in terms of physical infrastructure investments, has been minimal so far.

b) Ports

The development of Somali ports is vital for regional and international trade given the proximity to strategic maritime transportation routes and opportunities from rapidly growing regional economies and economic integration agendas. For Somalia to tap into these opportunities major investment strategy and capacity building are needed to accelerate ongoing and prospective ports rehabilitation and expansion across the country. Before, the civil war Somalia had 15 operational ports and jetty-type facilities. Four major class ports were in Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera and Kismayo, whilst two jetty classed ports were situated at Las Qorey and Merca. Additionally, Aluula, Maydh, Lughaya, Eyl, Qandala, Hafun, Hobyo, Garacad and El Ma’an all had smaller facilities. Whilst most of the smaller facilities are still in use, much of their old infrastructure has fallen into disrepair. Only the main four ports, which, except Mogadishu, remained operational mostly through the war, have been repaired and/or upgraded in recent years. In particular, there have been major improvements and new investments in Mogadishu, Berbera and Bosaso.

These investments are large driven by a combination of two factors. First, Ethiopia, a landlocked country that historically relied on Djibouti port for 90 percent of imports since its conflict with Eritrea in the early 1990s, wishes to diversify its supply routes by engaging Somalia to develop new trade corridors. Second, main global maritime transport companies, such as DP World and P&O have developed ambitious plans to open up new supply routes to tap into opportunities from rapidly developing African economies. A third important factor is the new optimism from the Horn of Africa’s changing geopolitics, with Ethiopia and Eritrea peace accords signed and a new regional economic integration agenda agreed. Integration can promote economic diversification, the competitiveness of countries and promote greater regional trade.

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186 Integration can promote economic diversification, the competitiveness of countries and promote greater regional trade, Draft Discussion Note, March 2019.
Somalia’s federal government and regional authorities, buoyed by the new regional cooperation, are actively seeking foreign direct investments in port and road transport infrastructure.

Mogadishu was the most active port in the country in the past, but largely remained closed during the civil war from 1991 to 2006. It reopened in late 2006 and since then has undergone major rehabilitation and modernisation. Mogadishu port has a Turkish operator (Al Bayrak) since 2013, while Simatech has been contracted to expand and run the container terminal at a cost of US$170 million. The second contract with Al Bayrak is being currently renewed by the FGS with agreement to reinvest part of the revenue to improve substantially the infrastructure and bring the port to international standards.

The UAE’s DP World was granted a port concession at Berbera in 2016. Although Berbera has long served as a major export port, especially for livestock export to Saudi Arabia and imports from the Middle Eastern countries, its capacity, in terms of volumes handled, was limited until recently. The deal with DP World envisions a US$442 million investment over three phases and a 30-year concession with the option for extension, including a 400-meter dock, yard expansion, cranes, and a free zone mostly intended to handle the freight to Ethiopia. Work on the port began in late 2019.

Similarly, a UAE ports conglomerate inked a deal in Dubai in April 2017 to update and expand a multi-purpose commercial port at Bosasso, a facility first constructed in the 1980s to ship livestock to the Middle East. UAE-owned P&O was awarded a 30-year concession, which includes $336 million in two phases, with improvements to include port infrastructure, cranes, dredging, and construction of 450-meter quay.

In December 2018, Qatar and Somalia signed a series of new cooperation agreements, including on port development. This will include reconstruction of Hobyo port, some 300 miles northeast of Mogadishu. Thanks to its relative proximity to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which is one of the most important sea crossing points in the world, Hobyo has considerable potential for access to international markets. On 20 August 2019, following a high-level Qatari delegation visiting Mogadishu, the Somali government has announced that Qatar Ports Management Company (Mwani) will enter an investment partnership with Somalia to construct the port. The value of the deal has not been disclosed yet.

The landscape for Somali port development therefore gives two contrasting pictures. Whilst main ports with the highest economic potential attract foreign investments, the smaller ports that mostly serve local business and fishing communities acutely need rehabilitation, alongside the roads that connect them to inland towns and cities. Traffic volumes of all sea freight are currently low, primarily due to the relatively low level of economic activities, but it is expected to increase substantially once ongoing expansion is completed, especially in Berbera and Bosasso. Limited data available suggests that about 2 million tons/year, including 53,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of container traffic, were handled at Somali ports in 2017. Almost all this traffic is handled at the two main active ports – Mogadishu and Berbera, while less activity is registered at Bosasso and Kismayo. This traffic is relatively small compared to regional ports such as Mombasa with total cargo throughput of 26.73 million tons and container traffic of 1,076,118 TEUs in 2015.

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187 Brooking Institute, Doha. Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, the Horn, & the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea
188 AfDB, 2017 Somalia Transport Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme.
AfDB assessment of key ports has identified a number of structural challenges that, if not addressed, will continue to limit growth of Somali ports. These include low capability in specialised cargo handling, high port costs to trade, limited capacity for liquid cargo handling, and poor hinterland connectivity. There is a need for a port information system that tracks performance and statistics.
c) Civil aviation

There are four fully functioning international airports (Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kismayo, and Garowe) and 14 smaller airfields which are fully or partially paved or gravelled. In the past few years, several major regional and international carriers including Turkey Airlines, Qatar Airways, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, Uganda Airlines, and FlyDubai, have opened up new international routes within Somalia and this is a growing trend. In order to meet international standards, rehabilitation work needs to begin in the aforementioned airports as well as Garowe, Beletweyene, Baidoa and Bossaso airports. Mogadishu airport has reached close to its capacity limit, with operations currently limited only to daylight passenger flights. In the near future, at least one additional airport facility is needed to meet the growing passenger demand.

A major achievement in aviation infrastructure is the re-establishment of the air traffic control system for Somalia. After a long period of management by the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS) operating from Kenya, the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (SCAMA) in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organization finalized a process in December 2014 to transfer control of Somalia’s airspace to the new Air Space Management Centre in Mogadishu. The Centre has been operational since December 2017.

More broadly, for the sustainability of the air transport sector, a regulatory framework (for revenue collection, customs and taxation, and safety) and cargo service would also need to be concurrently developed.

7.4. Strategies (for all transport sectors)

- Reconstruction and maintenance of existing transport infrastructure (including airports, seaports and roads/corridors) to support economic growth and access public services
- Rehabilitation and building of urban infrastructure
- Maximize employment creation during infrastructure development, with a particular focus on young people and the displaced
- Strengthening of policy and legal frameworks, and institutional and technical capacity
- Integration of databases and systems for vehicle registration and driving licences across Somalia
- Ensuring environmental protection is adequately factored into intervention design and implementation

7.5. Interventions

- Developing Policy and regulatory frameworks and technical capacity at the federal and state ministries with a remit on road, maritime and aviation transports;
- Establish a National Directorate of Highways Authority and operationalize this within the next three years
- Rehabilitate the main arterial roads and key feeder road networks across the country
- Develop a strategy guiding external investments for transport corridors to facilitate regional economic integration and trade
- Develop a National Urban Infrastructure Development strategy to guide urban planning and development across the country
- Improve specialised port cargo handling capacity – speed, means, equipment, organisation, and condition of berths
● Lower port costs to trade – harmonise non-port specific charges and fees (mostly related to
government taxes, fees, and customs)
● Improve capacity for liquid cargo – especially for oil
● Improve port-hinterland connectivity while better utilising the port backup area – leveraging
port-industry linkages
● Mobilise investment for new road transport corridors and regional road networks to facilitate
connection between ports and neighbouring countries and domestic trade
● Create a port information system that tracks port performance and statistics for Somali and
external trading partners.

8. Energy

In addressing the many urgent needs of the Somali people, energy access in general and electricity
access in particular will play a major role as these are widely recognised as major drivers of economic
growth. At present, although significant improvements have been made in recent years, Somalia still
faces a situation where energy access is severely limited for the majority of the population. This includes
both access to electricity and other sources of energy like biomass and fossil fuels. In this regard, energy
suppliers have struggled to meet growth in established demand in recent decades. Through the years of
instability, the energy sector has been unable to meet latent demand and provide for stable and
affordable access for most of the population, which has contributed to inadequate social indicators and
hindered economic growth.

Evidence from analysis of the SHFS Wave 2 data shows the electricity access rate is estimated at 15
percent, meaning that around 11million Somalis lack access to electricity services. Urban access is
estimated at 33 percent, and rural access at 4 percent. With an average household size of 5.9, this
translates to approximately 1.8million un-electrified households nationwide. Due to inadequate
infrastructure and regulatory framework, the supply is highly fragmented and therefore inefficient,
leading to one of the highest prices in the world. Private sector players supply more than 90 percent of
power in urban and peri-urban areas using local private mini-grids, having invested in diesel-based
systems of between 500 kVA to 5,000 kVA installed capacity per mini-grid. These mini-grids are usually
zoned, with each operator building, owning, and operating the generation, transmission, distribution
and maintenance, as well as collecting tariffs. Therefore, there is no physical national grid in Somalia.
The system of delivering electrical energy to users comprises a network of isolated distribution grids
with isolated generation providers. These island networks are anchored to specific urban centres with
dedicated electricity service providers (ESPs). Each ESP owns and operates their complete generation-
distribution-customer-revenue chain using a radial distribution island network.

8.1. Energy sources

The resources currently mobilised for energy consumption fall into two prime categories189. One
category is energy resources intended for the generation of electricity and its subsequent utilisation and
the other category is for the generation of heat:

● Current primary sources for providing heat are sunlight, biomass, bottled kerosene, compressed
LP gas and electricity

189 Somalia Power Master Plan, October 2018.
Primary sources for providing electricity are currently high-speed diesel generation sets (HSDGs) with limited use of grid-tied solar photovoltaic (PV) and very limited use of grid-tied asynchronous wind turbines. There is also a significant interest to and utilisation of Pico PV and Small Home Solar (SHS) PV electricity systems for residential lighting in both urban and remote areas. Furthermore, the addition of sizeable grid-tied solar PV generation to the HSDG based systems of some of the various ESP’s electricity generation and distribution networks has resulted in some synchronised hybrid diesel-solar PV electricity generation systems across Somalia.

8.2. Energy prices

Somalia’s price of electricity can reach a maximum of US$1/kWh - one of the costliest places in the world to buy power. The World Bank’s report on Regulatory Indicators for Sustainable Energy (RISE, 2016) found that Somalia ranks in the upper five percent globally for power cost, and in the upper 15 percent globally for power expenditure as a share of GNI per household. This is largely due to low efficiency in both the power generation and distribution systems. Based on data collected from the field surveys for development of the Somalia Power Master Plan (PMP), the country currently consumes in excess of 121,000 litres of diesel fuel per day to support the installed generation capacity. Much of this is occurring in suboptimal and wasteful conditions of wet stacking. These figures will inevitably grow with additional capacity installed and the total daily consumption of diesel is expected to reach 694,000 litres in the medium term, given the growing demand from rapid urbanization.

The PMP identifies a number of challenges on the supply side including:

1) The generation capacity is insufficient to meet the current loads

2) Generation is not being used efficiently due to lack of investment in the equipment required to synchronise operation of existing units as well as shortage of operations and maintenance staff trained in the use of the equipment required for synchronous operation of generating units

3) There are high technical and commercial losses in most systems for which records were available. In a recent study that conducted a sectoral gap analysis of requirements for regulations and laws all the ESPs reported significant losses within their island distribution networks. Causes for these losses are both technical and commercial. Reportedly, these electricity distribution losses are the largest power (instantaneous energy) losses within any of the individual ESP island electricity networks. These electrical energy losses are within both the primary and secondary distribution lines, and comprise both technical losses and commercial (non-technical) losses.

4) Fragmented generation and distribution systems result in considerable inefficiencies severely limiting growth in the sector. Significant improvements can be made to the operation of the power sector throughout the country by increased cooperation between ESPs under some supervision from one or more regulatory authorities. This is specifically in the areas of duplication of distribution investments in order to compete for customers in the same tight geographical areas (i.e., the same street) and the inability to benefit from the economies of scale in the purchase and installation of small units to serve a large market.

There are also opportunities for a diversified energy portfolio to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and to reach rural and pre-urban populations. Both solar and wind resources have significant potentials for
electricity generation in the northern and coastal regions of Somalia. While there are technical challenges to establishing distributed electric generation using solar and wind power and their integration into the electricity supply of urban centres, this has become much easier in recent years, with significant automation and the adoption of smart network management as part of electricity generation.

Another opportunity for energy diversification arises from the new regional integration agenda. Interconnection with neighbouring countries could include Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya in the longer run, although there could be non-trivial technical and economic challenges to overcome. As such interconnections imply long lines, and they would need to be of high voltage in order to keep technical losses to a minimum. This also implies that substantial loads would need to be served to make the arrangement commercially attractive, which means major cities, currently supplied by the local operators, should be part of the supply arrangements to justify investment required for regional interconnections.

8.3. Energy market reforms

Reforms in energy markets are one of the most important prerequisites for Somalia’s economic development, especially for the emergence and expansion of competitive manufacturing industry, which can generate additional employment and incomes and also support achieving Somalia’s strategic goal of economic diversification. Compared to its regional neighbours, Somalia has one of the most expensive tariffs in the world as customers pay USD 0.8-1.2 per KWh. The neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia enjoy average rates of $0.16 and $0.03, respectively; see Table 18. The high prices of electricity also impede a long overdue shift of household energy demand away from environmentally unsustainable sources like charcoal. AfDB reported in 2015 that the majority of Somalia’s population, perhaps 80 percent to 90 percent, relies on traditional biomass fuels, wood and charcoal, and the annual consumption of charcoal is estimated at around 4 million tons per year, which is a rate that is quickly exhausting Somalia’s few remaining forests. However, more recent estimates based on the above analysis of SHFS, Wave 2 data indicate that 47 percent and 20 percent of Somali households surveyed in 2017/18 use charcoal or wood stoves respectively.

Without affordable or reliable access to electricity and liquified gas, Somalis will clearly continue to rely on biomass for basic energy needs, which will worsen the already severe deforestation and land degradation. Considering the growing deficit of and high prices for firewood and charcoal, electricity will need to become more accessible and more affordable in order to sustain further economic growth and improvement in the quality of life. Also, at the social level, the prevalent use of charcoal and wood for cooking has negative health impacts on households.

190 Ibid
Table 18: Electricity access deficit in the Horn of Africa region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population, million people</th>
<th>Access Rate</th>
<th>Urban population rate</th>
<th>Access rate, urban</th>
<th>Rural population rate</th>
<th>Access rate, rural</th>
<th>Installed capacity</th>
<th>Average tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>67 MW</td>
<td>US$0.22/kwh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>130 MW</td>
<td>US$0.21/kwh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>110 million</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>4,300 MW</td>
<td>US$0.03/kwh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>50 million</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2,300 MW</td>
<td>US$0.16/kwh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>103 MW</td>
<td>US$0.8-1.2/kwh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.4. Strategies

i. Developing renewable and non-renewable energy sources to increase supply

ii. Establishing a national regulatory authority for energy market governance

iii. Strengthening the administrative and technical capacity of the federal and states ministries of energy

iv. Ensuring the needs of vulnerable groups – particularly women, the youth and displaced persons – in intervention design and implementation

8.5. Interventions

- Prepare legislation establishing the national regulatory authority for the energy sector and operationalize the agency by 2021

- Undertake energy market regulatory reforms to improve efficiency of generation and supply systems, and therefore improve reliability of supply and bring down energy prices

- Increase the energy supply from both renewable and fossil fuel sources, and as result increase access to energy from 15% to 45% of population by 2024; or 6% growth in access per year

9. ICT sector

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the fastest growing sectors in Somalia. The public telecom and internet sector in Somalia is largely composed of mobile operators and their users,
which account for 35-40 percent of the population, employing about 25,000 Somalis\textsuperscript{195}. Currently the market comprises five major operators (Hormud, Somtel, Golis, Telesom, NationLink) and two MVNOs (SomNet and SomLink). These are primarily Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) which provide voice and data services, mainly in urban locations and surroundings to about four million subscribers. Golis Telecom, Telesom, SomNet and Hormuud are interconnected, while Somtel is a subsidiary of Dahabshiil and is interconnected with SomLink. Nationlink has a very small market share and Somaphone is dormant, although it has an active network in Mogadishu. Amal Telecom is still becoming established - it has made investments but has not yet launched its service. Although some operators have built their own microwave and fibre backbone links in some areas, Somalia does not have an open competitive market in national and international capacity – a necessary precursor to the development of the ICT sector. As a result, growth in internet use is also constrained by both the high cost of international bandwidth and the lack of a domestic fibre optic backbone infrastructure, outside of Mogadishu and Hargeisa, to link the land stations to the other cities and towns across the country.

Deployment of domestic fibre infrastructure to connect the urban areas is a top government priority, necessary to ensure inclusion of the whole country in access to affordable Internet services. Wherever feasible, the national backbone network will prioritize deployment of fibre optic cable, due to its superior network capacity – meeting the expected demand in most urban locations will be economically infeasible using non-fibre solutions such as satellite or microwave links. Initial estimates indicate that the envisaged fibre optic backbone network would cost between US$67-100 million to build. Combining network deployment with planned road reconstruction would provide substantial cost savings on this estimate, while reaching additional smaller cities and rural areas, as well as improving network resilience, in subsequent phases, will require additional investment.

9.1. Mobile service provision

Despite the civil war, Somalia’s telecommunication services have flourished with a phenomenal penetration, but until recently, internet access depended mainly on satellites\textsuperscript{196}. In 2013, the first fibre-optic broadband network, managed by Hormuud Telecom, was built, followed by several other providers soon after, with the introduction of 4G services in main cities. However, most rural areas of the country still lack good mobile and internet service. The increasing availability of broadband across the country and the increasing interaction of Somalis with online and mobile platforms opens up tremendous developmental opportunities. Mobile penetration is high and still rising. About 90 percent of Somalis aged over 16 have a phone, 30.8 percent of which are smartphones. Mobile money is used by 75 percent of phone owners. Market penetration by online platforms and tools is also high. For example, of the 1.2 million Somalis who are active Internet users, 1.1 million were active on Facebook.

Somalia can leverage its high levels of connectivity to provide a low cost, blended instructional model that enables personnel in remote rural areas (for instance, community teachers, new and experienced) with training and qualifications to deliver learner-focused education.

The rapid growth of Somalia’s ICT sector in the past two decades also makes it now an important contributor of GDP, reaching an estimated 11 percent (more than US$995 million) in 2014, and directly

\textsuperscript{195} Somalia Information and Communication Technology Strategy and Policy, 2019-2024, Draft v 0.6, March 18 2019.

\textsuperscript{196} World Bank-FAO, 2018 “Rebuilding Resilient and Sustainable Agriculture in Somalia,”
employing a large number of people. More recent figures on sectoral contributions to government revenue are not available but it is understood that the sector can make substantial fiscal contribution if appropriate reforms are undertaken. If the government replaced the voluntary payments the sector makes to the Central Bank of Somalia by adopting a formal system of taxation and enabling regulation, the ICT sector could contribute US$82.5–103.1 million in revenue annually.

9.2. Market concentration

As highlighted above, the ICT sector is dominated by three major service providers of Hormuud (South central), Golis (Puntland) and Telesom (Somaliland). Whilst the service cost has come down by 50 percent over the past decade, inter-provider calls are still expensive. Also, mobile money transfers between certain providers (e.g. Hormuud EVC and Somtel E-Dahab) are not possible. Limited interconnection results in reduced competitiveness in the market and lower quality of service. In recognition of these shortcomings, the government has prepared a five-year (2019-2024) National ICT Policy and Strategy which provides the regulatory framework needed to leverage the benefits of ICT and support social and economic development. This strategy identifies priority areas of intervention, in line with UN Broadband Commission targets, including:

- Access cost of connectivity and coverage of networks
- Domestic digital infrastructure interconnection/IXPs, local hosting, domain names, quality of service, cyber security
- Consumer protection – e-commerce, privacy, child protection
- Human resource development – digital literacy, ICT skills, R&D
- Content – local online media, applications and financial services,

Additionally, in 2018, the government passed the National Communications Law which established the regulatory authority – the National Communications Agency (NCA) – defining its structure, decision-making procedures and the key areas of its responsibilities. The National Communications Law lays the basis for a competitive and enabling regulatory environment that recognizes the need to ensure access to voice, broadband and postal communication services throughout the country. Nevertheless, the new agency, which has a remit for licensing of operators among other things, is not operational yet. The operationalization of the agency is not only critical for the competitiveness of the sector in domestic markets but can also potentially help sector to enter regional markets, such as Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. The new regional integration agenda offers a platform for Somalia to push for reforms in regional ICT markets. The new agency’s role in supporting domestic operators to take advantage of these potential opportunities could be critical.

9.3. Postal service

Postal services ceased operations during the civil war, however, considering its importance for functioning of the public and private sectors, the MPTT has re-established Posta Somalia as a fully functioning postal service that connects Somalia domestically, and to the rest of the world via a postal

198 Ibid
gateway through Djibouti. Posta Somalia is expected to be a catalyst for e-commerce in the country and will improve existing supply chains for trade and commerce, which are both priorities for the government. To ensure the postal sector is able to meet the expected needs for services, a postal services policy will need to be developed. This will include establishment of a national digital addressing system (NAS) and a National Spatial Data Infrastructure information management system which could support a national postal code addressing system.

9.4. Strategies

i. Extension of the national backbone infrastructure to connect all major urban centres with redundant/duplicate links (to ensure reliability), as well as addressing last mile challenges to ensure universal access to broadband, including efficient interconnection and expansion of the existing 3/4G mobile coverage;

ii. Develop a regulatory framework for telecom operators to take part in (within and cross sector) infrastructure sharing and dig-once policies, supported by other utility network development

iii. Ensuring critical infrastructure is protected – establishing a Cybersecurity and Privacy group to oversee the development and enforcement of national cybersecurity policies, and develop a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

iv. Develop a postal services policy to establish digital addressing and spatial data infrastructure

9.5. Interventions

● Improving the existing policy and regulatory frameworks through harmonization and updating

● Expanding and improving ICT infrastructure through:
  ○ adoption of infrastructure sharing guidelines for all ISPs and mobile network operators to allow for collocation of equipment
  ○ Definition of terms for Rights of Way access over public land infrastructure
  ○ Completion of the implementation of key infrastructure programs (such as national terrestrial backbone network)
  ○ Establishment of effective management of IXP, .so ccTLD, shared services (caching, root DNS, etc)

● Draft a policy on digital financial services including interconnection/interoperability with telecom networks

● Establish a national cyber-security advisory committee, prepare cyber-security policy and adopt cyber-security legislation

● Establishing a national digital addressing system (NAS) and a National Spatial Data Infrastructure information management system.
10. Petroleum sector

Somalia’s petroleum potential is critical for the country’s future development and hence a key to its national development plan. The sector holds hopes for economic diversification and therefore more sustainable revenue streams that could contribute to the inclusive economic development of the country. The upstream petroleum industry shows considerable promise. In Somalia, positive hydrocarbon indications are present, though no commercial discoveries have been made yet. The petroleum resource potential in Somalia may be modest in absolute terms, but could still be very significant for the country.

10.1. Situational analysis

Data acquired between 2012 and 2016 on offshore exploration has attracted interest from global petroleum industry and investors. The industry however appears to need increased oil prices and more security, stability and predictability before considering investments in the upstream. The most prospective areas seem to be offshore in deep to ultra-deep water. Technology has made it feasible for exploration and production in deep and ultra-deep water areas in recent years. The government in 2014 has divided up the entire country (onshore and offshore up to the 200-mile EEZ boundary) into 25,000 km² licence blocks. Somalia has identified 206 blocks of offshore oil. The FGS plan to put 15 blocks up for bid within the next 6 months and then more blocks will be considered on an ongoing basis. Each block will yield at least a US$2 million signing fee (US$2 million is where the bids will start). There is also a lease fee of 10 dollars per km² and each block is 5,000 km². The government aims at continuing oil and mineral exploration and starting licensing agreements of oil by March 2020. Somalia expects actual oil extraction seven years after signing the agreements.

In addition to the revenue from licensing and royalties, Somalia can also potentially meet its fuel consumption and therefore do without imports in the future, if the necessary infrastructure is developed. Somalia at present has no oil refinery or heavy industry. Somalia currently imports refined petrol and diesel and distributes it via two medium sized storage facilities in Mogadishu. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a fuel shortage in the economy and, except during the drought season, prices do not fluctuate unduly. Most recorded deliveries of refined products come from the Gulf States via coastal fuel tankers and are distributed from the tank farms by road tankers. There are no overland fuel pipelines in existence. Therefore, the development of petroleum sectors will likely have a positive impact on the structure of existing domestic industries and markets, especially energy and transport markets.

10.2. Policy principles for the emerging petroleum sector

A careful policy framework and governance structure is necessary for licensing and concession process to operate in a transparent and efficient fashion, but also to efficiently manage the revenue generated. Existing evidence suggest that petroleum discoveries and production can do more harm than benefit to developing countries if the transition to oil-producing country is not managed carefully. Countries that are rich in petroleum have less democracy, less economic stability, and more frequent civil wars than countries without oil. Some observers blame the foreign powers that intervene in oil-rich countries

and manipulate their governments; others fault the international oil companies that exploit these resources in pursuit of extraordinary profits. This is not to suggest that petroleum is by nature cursed, but that, when petroleum is discovered in a country, policymakers and other stakeholders face a challenging and complex task in establishing a petroleum sector and developing their country’s newfound resources\textsuperscript{200}.

The overall objective of Somalia petroleum policy should therefore be to create a governance framework for a profitable production of petroleum that will result in transformation of natural capital in the ground into revenue to be invested into the desperately needed human and institutional development and infrastructural capital that in turn will generate sustained growth that can help reduce the widespread poverty. Put differently, the petroleum resources should be developed in a manner that maximizes benefits to the country by supporting equitable and sustainable growth in domestic businesses across different sectors, employment, infrastructure, institutional competencies, access to training, education, and health services, all while minimizing adverse social, environmental, and health impacts.

Cross-sector policies are instrumental in establishing a national petroleum sector as an integral part of the broader national policy framework. Many policies that are not exclusively governed by the ministry responsible for petroleum may still have direct implications for the organization and governance of the petroleum sector and thus affect the value created in the sector and the distribution of revenue between the government and investors. Some important cross-sector policy aspects are: the fiscal regime, tax collection and administration, revenue sharing, revenue management, social and environmental safeguards, local content, corporate governance of public and state-owned enterprises, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and gender policies.

Effective policy in the petroleum sector is underpinned by five basic principles:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{First}, petroleum sector development should be integrated in the country’s strategic vision of its overall economic and social development in the medium and long term. This integration helps clarify the key objectives and underlying principles of the petroleum sector’s development; informs the sector’s design, including formulation of relevant macroeconomic, fiscal, legal, and contractual policies; and determines the rate of production.
  
  \item \textit{Second}, petroleum policies should promote technical and commercial efficiency across the petroleum value chain. For example, reservoir-management policies and the relevant laws and regulations should maximize the recovery of petroleum resources.
  
  \item \textit{Third}, policies and the resulting regulatory, fiscal, and institutional frameworks should be transparent. Transparency of information on concessions, revenues, capacity, prices, roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures will contribute to efficiency in the sector, build trust between stakeholders, and reduce opportunities for corruption.
  
  \item \textit{Fourth}, policies should be grounded in the principles of social and environmental stewardship. Exploitation of petroleum resources should contribute to peace, stability, shared prosperity, and sustainable development. Petroleum sector development should adhere to the principles of inclusiveness, equal opportunity, transparency, accountability, and minimization of negative
\end{itemize}

environmental and social impacts

- **Fifth**, policies should allow market forces to signal supply, demand, and pricing information to investors and consumers. Government control may be retained as long as the opportunity costs of petroleum development and use are made explicit and policy choices are guided by cost-benefit analysis.

### 10.3. Strategies

In the context of the above policy principles, the Somali government recognises a number of institutional challenges it can face in its efforts to develop the petroleum sector. These challenges require actions, both on policy as well as governance and capacity fronts. The government has taken concrete steps to establish the legal and governance structure for the sector in preparation for allocation of the blocks deemed to have commercial potential\(^{201}\).

Strategic priorities set by the government include:

i. Integrating petroleum strategies with the national development plan: The government recognizes the importance of petroleum operations in the context of comprehensive economic development of Somalia. So it prioritizes the integration of the country’s petroleum strategy with its national development plan.

ii. Strengthening governance of petroleum operations: The government wants to complete and pass the relevant laws for the petroleum and minerals sector. A draft petroleum bill is ready and the government thinks they can finalize/pass it by June 2020.

iii. Enhancing human resources: The government puts special emphasis on human resource development as far as petroleum operations are concerned. The focus is on skill development through training and other means. In doing so, the inclusion of women in the work force will be emphasised.

Somalia also plans to establish the Somalia Petroleum Authority (regulatory body) and the Somalia National Oil Company, Somalia Mining Authority and Somalia Mining Company one year after the petroleum law has been passed. The government is well aware of the challenges related to this task (eg. Environmental Assessment Law, or Procurement Bill).

### 11. Financial sector

The financial sector in Somalia consists of mobile money operators and money transfer businesses and an emerging banking subsector, all regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS). Table 19 provides an overview of the sector. There are a large number of money transfer business, six licensed and four main mobile money providers in Somalia.

#### 11.1. Situational analysis

a) **Mobile money**

Mobile money services occupy multiple roles within Somalia’s financial ecosystem\(^{202}\). Mobile money is the main channel for accessing financial services, with exchange of goods and services done largely through mobile money, even for small transactions. The demand for digital money has arisen largely from lack of faith in the Somali shilling and the difficulty of using US dollars for low-value transactions. Low transaction costs and ease of use of mobile money services make it more preferable than other means available. Reducing the burden of cash also provides freedom of movement and a sense of security while doing business or carrying out day-to-day transactions.

Table 19: Players in Somalia’s financial sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank of Somalia</td>
<td>• Main regulator of financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Licenses and supervises banks and money transfer businesses under the Financial Institutions Law (FIL) of 2012. Currently developing regulation for mobile money services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial banks</td>
<td>• Six banks operate in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bank branches are in urban areas only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Commercial banks function mainly as trade financing institutions; some are part of larger conglomerates with overlapping financial and non-financial sector interests, resulting in large conglomerates and the crowding out of smaller money transfer businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money transfer businesses</td>
<td>• 14 licensed money transfer businesses operate across Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International remittances constitute their core business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some are part of widely diversified enterprises with overlapping financial and nonfinancial sector interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile money operators</td>
<td>• All mobile network operators provide mobile money services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The networks are consolidated into three large conglomerates, divided by region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leading mobile network operators are part of widely diversified enterprises and are developing partnerships with money transfer businesses to facilitate international transfers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Somali economy is highly dollarized, including the mobile money services, which were used by about 73 percent of those aged 16 or older in 2018\(^{203}\). The fast uptake of mobile money transfers in Somalia is testimony to the innovative capacity in the sector. Mobile money has become an essential and widespread part of Somalia’s economic eco-system. Penetration rates are highest in urban areas (83 percent) and camps for internally displaced people (72 percent). But even in rural areas, 55 percent of the population uses mobile money. Mobile money is now the main transaction instrument used by both individuals and businesses in Somalia. About 36 percent of GDP flows through mobile money systems.

\(^{202}\) World Bank; Federal Republic of Somalia – Somalia Economic Update, August 2018 | Edition No. 4

\(^{203}\) World Bank; Federal Republic of Somalia – Somalia Economic Update, August 2018 | Edition No. 3
Mobile money balances are arguably the main monetary asset in Somalia. The value of mobile money transactions in Somalia is estimated at US$2.7 billion a month.

Unlike elsewhere in Africa, balances on mobile money wallets tend to be held electronically rather than cashed out, because mobile money substitutes for the lack of a formal banking sector – an issue that creates considerable risks. The economy would probably be disrupted if the mobile money systems are disrupted. The lack of legal protection for account holders would also probably result in substantial financial losses if these disruptions persist longer or lead to collapse of the system. Three main risks associated with mobile are summarised in Box 2. The CBS Board of Directors approved Mobile Money Regulation on 25 July 2019 but this has yet to go through parliamentary process.

Despite these risks, mobile money transfer offers an opportunity for a rapid reach of the most vulnerable social groups in times of natural disasters, and future reforms to address the above risks need to make an assessment of the implications for the poor. Disaster management/early action and risk financing is an area where there is an increasing interest among international donors and humanitarian agencies working in Somalia. As part of the global-level effort to develop frameworks for shifting financial instruments toward earlier responses, there are ongoing discussions under the Food Action Mechanism (FAM) and Crisis Response Window (CRW) on ways of tapping into the high use of money mobile among Somalis to rapidly reach in-situ those affected by disasters such as droughts and floods. Nevertheless, there are reservations about some of the current use of cash transfers by humanitarian agencies and NGOs following the NDP-9 consultations, which indicate that the current unconditional cash transfer schemes encourage recipients to become dependent on them and hence reluctant to go back to their original livelihoods when the condition that forced them to seek emergency support have improved substantially. As result these schemes were viewed as one of the factors leading to people becoming trapped in poverty, often in urban IDP camps.

**Box 2: Main risks in the Somalia’s mobile money system** (World Bank Economic Update 3, 2018)

1. **Lack of customer protection**: Customers have no guarantee that their e-money can be redeemed for cash, as there is no parity between virtual and real funds. As the float held on the phones of mobile money users grows ever larger, the temptation is for the mobile network operators to use those funds in risky investments or overseas transactions, as there is no requirement for them to hold funds in a trust fund or bank account.

2. **Lack of systematic know-your-customer requirements**: Personal data are not systemically registered for mobile money accounts (especially in southern Somalia), and there is no formal agreement to protect consumers in case of disputes. The ease of opening multiple mobile money accounts without identification makes Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts difficult. Links to global financial markets could be impeded by the absence of strong practice related to customer due diligence.

3. **Lack of monitoring of mobile money services by the CBS**: The lack of monitoring of mobile money services means that consumers have little protection against malfeasance by mobile money operators. The uncontrolled and unregulated issuance of e-money could put inflationary pressure on consumer prices, particularly when parity is not maintained between balances in trust accounts by financial institutions and e-float managed by the mobile network operator held on mobile wallets.
b) Remittances

Around one-fifth of Somali households receive remittances, which represents an important source of income and drives an important part of the financial sector. There are a myriad of remittance agents and networks providing this important financial service across the country, including remote rural areas. They are partly integrated with the mobile money payment systems and therefore can reach anyone with an account and within the mobile network signal.

Remittances, and rapid transmission via mobile money transfer, make an important contribution to household resilience and, in particular, the food security of many Somalis in times of hardship as discussed in Chapter 3. The vast majority of respondents interviewed for a recent study highlighted food as the most significant use and value of their remittances, with little variation (in terms of priority) between urban, rural and pastoralist settings. Regular remittances are also used to maintain access to credit, education and for other basic needs as also found by the World Bank PVA report. Occasional remittance payments are common, especially for health and drought-related problems, as well as for investment purposes. Household interviews indicate that aside from meeting basic needs, the receipt of regular remittances also:

- Improves the possibilities of gaining access to credit, which is useful in times of need
- Contributes to debt repayment and keeping credit lines open
- Plays an important safety net function, smoothing out fluctuations in income and expenditure
- Is an important coping strategy, which can prevent the sale of productive assets (including livestock) or reduce reliance on more negative coping strategies
- Enhances social status and contributes to wealth redistribution processes by enabling recipients to provide support to relatives and other selected recipients eg. sending money, food, hosting meals and visitors, and hosting children for education purposes.

At aggregate level, remittance is an important source of foreign currency. Over the past decades the high imports have been covered by remittances, estimated at about 29 percent of GDP in 2018. Policy challenges around the flow of remittance are discussed in the context of mobile money as the two services are provided by the same companies and a large proportion of remittance payments are made through mobile accounts.

c) Banking

The Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) has overall supervisory responsibility for and oversight of the financial sector. Among these are the regulation and oversight of the mobile money and banking sector to protect consumers and curtail money laundering and corruption. There has been a substantial progress made in these areas in the past two years. Financial sector supervision is improving and credit to the private sector is growing rapidly. The CBS is invigorating its supervisory and regulatory capacities, especially in de-risking and reducing the cost of remittance. It is working with international partners to

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re-establish the functions of core economic institutions and foster financial development, inclusion, and stability while strengthening compliance with anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Efforts to lay the foundation for sustainable financial sector development and strengthen compliance with AML/CFT standards are underway. CBS is improving its inspection capacity; and regulations to supervise mobile money are almost finalized. On AML/CFT, with IMF assistance, regulations for the Targeted Financial Sanctions Bill have been drafted.

More progress in these areas and the banking subsector are already having a positive impact on the economy. Key financial banking subsector reforms, including the licensing of the commercial banks, are giving the private sector confidence to increase deposits and banks confidence to increase lending. The CBS improved its inspection capacity and introduced institutions to combat money laundering. The commercial banking system has expanded, and credit has grown rapidly, though from a low base. The CBS licensed five new banks at the end of 2018 (one money transfer bureau), doubling the number of licensed banks. In 2015–18, from a low base, total banking sector assets grew by 94 percent, from US$194 million to US$377 million, and annual growth in credit to the private sector averaged 53.8 percent. The banking sector is not only sufficiently capitalized, it is very liquid: in 2018 the total loans to assets ratio was 15 percent and the loans to deposits ratio was 50 percent. Financial sector reforms are giving the private sector confidence to increase deposits and banks confidence to increase lending as the CBS builds up its supervisory capacity.

Table 20: Selected financial sector indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total assets</td>
<td>194.4</td>
<td>234.2</td>
<td>345.0</td>
<td>377.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit to the private sector</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>149.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share to total assets</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share to GDP</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-on-year growth</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loans to assets</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to deposit</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another important ongoing financial sector reform effort is the planning of printing of new currency. Currency reform will have two phases. The first would seek to replace damaged or counterfeit bills with new Somali shillings of less than a dollar in value. For this purpose, the CBS will issue four new
denominations (1,000, 2,000, 5,000 and 10,000). The second phase would replace the larger denominations. The government has requested World Bank support for the first phase, introducing new, legitimate, small-denomination Somali shilling notes, targeting the poorest, who are financially excluded. With regard to exclusion, the NDP-9 consultation across the country highlighted that the lack of a trusted Somali shilling and lower access to mobile money services among the rural population limits their ability to benefit from local trade activities, especially when small scale transactions are involved.

However, Somalia still lacks a core banking system – interbank payments and clearing and settlement systems – which is critical for the development of modern financial markets. There is need for an Automated Transfer System (ATS) and National Switch that complement each other, with the ATS facilitating large payments and the National Switch facilitating interoperability of retail payment systems in Somalia, and opening doors to manage international payments in the country from a single platform managed by the CBS. At present, transactions from Somali banks are handled by foreign intermediary banks.

11.2. Constraints to growth

The financial sector is growing and diversifying in a rather healthy manner, as demonstrated by the information above. This is promising for the investment climate and ‘enabling environment’, business development and employment generation. Also, new products, in the form of personal and business loans, that are coming on the market can further facilitate business development and drive innovation in, for instance, social protection programmes as well as directly impacting poverty. There are still a number of constraints to growth of this sector:

1. Whilst the planned introduction of regulation of mobile money is a step in the right direction, the lack of an effective national ID system account will continue to pose risks to the economy, undermine the AML/CFT and limit government’s ability to address financial exclusion. The draft legislation requires a mobile money service provider to take measures to establish and record the true identity of the person seeking to establish a consumer relationship with it or undertake a mobile money transaction. However, a major barrier to both validity of these records and achieving the goals of a more inclusive service provision is that only 3 percent of the population has a birth certificate and the majority lack proof of identity. Hence, new applicants may find it difficult to open new accounts. It is not clear how the new regulation may affect existing account holders. Biometric registration of new applicants and re-registration of the existing account holders by service providers may therefore be necessary, alongside ID requirements.

2. There is no regulatory framework for establishing a link between mobile money and bank credit accounts. This is necessary to improve transparency of financial flows across different platforms and operators, and in particular to tie mobile money credit to real-world credit, ensuring parity between banking accounts and online mobile money credit.

3. The CBS still lacks the administrative and technical capacity to develop and implement effective monetary policy instruments. Building up its institutional capacity and developing independent monetary policy instruments and reserve management guidelines is necessary before embarking on further reforms. In particular, the Bank needs to develop expertise in the design of monetary policy instruments, reserve management policies and exchange rate policies.
4. Lack of interbank payment and clearing systems hampers the development of the financial sector. Interbank payment systems will have a positive impact on economic activity, management of monetary aggregates, transaction costs, and development of new financial products which can become important sources of fee income for financial institutions. These developments will also bring Somalia one step closer to the standards and norms of international financial systems and therefore help build trust in Somalia’s financial institutions.

Overall a continued dialogue with the financial industry, more forceful financial sector regulation, and greater Central Bank capacity are needed to improve governance of mobile money, establish the interbank payment system, manage currency exchange and inflation and facilitate deeper financial intermediation.

11.3. Strategies

i. Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework and promote more inclusive financial services

ii. Strengthen the CBS capacity in the design of monetary policy instruments, reserve management policies and exchange rate policies

iii. Establish safe and efficient payment, clearing and settlement systems and infrastructure.

12. Manufacturing

Although Somalia’s industrial base has been historically small in terms of its contribution to the GDP (e.g. compared to the livestock), the sector was relatively well developed compared to its neighbours (UNIDO, 1988). According to UNIDO/ILO (1988, 1989), Somalia’s manufacturing sector counted for 6.3 percent of GDP during 1977 to 1980. However, share of GDP declined slightly to 5.6 percent in 1981-1985. The growth rate of manufacturing output decreased from 2.4 percent to 2 percent in the mid-80s and capacity utilization was down to 26 percent, which was due to a change of government policy focus from private to public sector.

Prior to 1991, over 50 state-owned small, medium and large manufacturing firms were operational, and Mogadishu was the chief industrial centre of Somalia, with bottling plants, factories producing spaghetti, cigarettes, matches, and boats, a petroleum refinery, a small tractor-assembly workshop, and small enterprises producing construction materials. In Kismaayo there were a meat-tinning factory, a tannery, and a modern fish factory. There were two sugar refineries, one near Jilib, on the lower reach of the Jubba, and one at Jawhar, on the middle reach of the Shabelle.

However, since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, most of these have closed down with the infrastructure destroyed and many factories looted, wiping out the intellectual and material progress of the preceding 30 years.

12.1. Situational analysis

Over the past two decades, some small-scale plants have re-opened and new ones have been created with both Somali diaspora entrepreneur and international investments in light manufacturing –
predominantly in Hargeisa and Mogadishu but also to lesser extent in Bosaso, Kismayo and other small urban centres – in sectors like fish-canning, meat processing, mineral water or stone processing. In 2004, an US$8.3 million Coca Cola bottling plant opened in Mogadishu, with investors from various constituencies in Somalia. The present day modest manufacturing sector is estimated to account for 10 percent of Somalia’s GDP. However, there has yet to be a comprehensive study of the structure and size of the manufacturing sector.

12.2. Constraints to growth

Despite a relatively low purchasing power in the domestic economy (with a GDP/capita of US$339), the sector is expected to continue growing and domestic investment is expected to be increasingly matched by international investment and partnerships. Growing urbanization and consumption financed by remittance is expected to drive demand for manufactured goods. While growth in the larger sectors like livestock, crop production, construction and ICT/telecom as well as the service sectors are likely to create more employment, manufacturing can support the government economic diversification agenda and hence more resilience. As such an industrial strategy for the development of the sector is necessary, in particular to attract investment but also to reduce high energy costs.

Private investment with anticipated returns is already happening in fisheries, mineral water, seed and meat processing, and import-substituting supplies (eg. soft-drinks), construction and household consumables (eg. soap).

The strategic position of Somalia on the global trade-routes as well as sizable inland markets, for instance Ethiopia, point towards future opportunity for manufacturing along trade corridors alongside the ports, especially meat and fish processing for export. Other labour intensive industries such as garment manufacturing can be developed alongside the transport corridors.

Developing the sector, however, requires tackling the constraints that presently prevent the sector growing faster than it does.

The main constraints highlighted during the NDP-9 consultations included:

- Lack of supportive regulatory environment, with significant delays in business licensing and construction permit applications, which tend to be subject to discretionary decision-making;
- Lack of technical skills. With the destruction of the sector during the conflict, manufacturing skills have been lost and training in new technology has been absent with foreign (recruited) labour filling jobs in key areas such engineering and automation. Human capital development in this requires significant structural planning and investment. Nationwide educational standards and a nationwide approach for technical and vocational training will help to improve standards, stability and predictable availability of the required labour. This should be matched by attracting Somali youth into areas of education that provide good prospects for future employment and income earning, for instance the STEM movement brings Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics under the attention of the students.
- Lack of regulatory standards, which often drives up costs in the absence of guidelines on quality and safety control. Lack of standards at ports and airports, which delays or blocks access to
international markets for input and output, often creating scope for bribes but also imports of competing substandard products.

- Lack of business financing and business development services
12.3. Strategies

While opportunity development in manufacturing is mostly an affair for an entrepreneur sensing a business opportunity, investments in livestock and fish processing are high on the agenda of virtually all interest groups that were consulted for the present NDP, and hence these areas will be prioritized, among others through the work of the national Investment Promotion Agency – SOMINVEST – and potential investors will be attracted to the opportunities. In this area of work, it is important that individual emerging enterprises have an increased access to business development services, improving the quality of the products, improving the overall management arrangements as well as marketing and market access. In similar terms, the organization of trade fairs will bring producers and markets in contact and is important to stimulate further growth in the sector.

The key strategic development priorities in the manufacturing sector therefore relate on one hand to tackling and removing the above constraints as much as possible, and on the other, opening up new opportunity for greater business development and investment for building a strong, diverse manufacturing industrial base. These include:

i. Develop an industrial strategy for the manufacturing sector, covering:

ii. Promotion of investment

iii. Development of industrial hubs along the trade corridors and emergence of manufacturing value chains

iv. Building technical skills necessary to support growth, including professional and technical and vocational training, with a particular emphasis on the inclusion of women, young people and displaced persons

v. Developing regulatory standards for manufacturing for products

vi. Embed manufacturing into the Somalia Power Plan to ensure energy constraints are addressed

vii. Improvement of the regulatory service for licensing and permits as part of the small and medium business interventions.

13. Construction

Observation on the level of building activities in main cities suggests that the construction sector in Somalia is booming. Driven by the housing demand from rapid urbanisation, as well as diaspora investments, there is a visible construction spree, predominantly in the capital Mogadishu but also regional capitals and major towns.

13.1. Situational analysis

The construction industry appears to have greatly benefitted from stability, economic growth and overseas investment by the diaspora. In particular, the high demand for good housing, combined with security concerns, has driven the development of upmarket housing estates in and around the capital with at times more than 100 units in contrast to previous individual house construction. Returns to investment in land and property are substantial compared to alternative economic activities. Real estate
investment in Somalia is resurgent, despite being poorly reported, with urban expansion taking place across many cities and towns. In the third quarter of 2017, 27.5 percent of commercial banks credit to the private sector was in real estate projects such as Daru-Salaam in Mogadishu, which boasts 500 residential houses, football pitches, schools, a university, hospital and a glitzy shopping mall, reflect an emerging market attractive to both domestic and foreign investors.

A second major source of demand for construction is from commercial properties including hotels, restaurants, malls and shops, where an increasing number of these service outlets are established in main cities. Many old shopping outlets and areas are being rehabilitated or newly constructed.

Thirdly, the reconstruction of government buildings and the expanding business community requires office and production and service space, and refurbishment and new construction of office blocks as well as small-scale manufacturing spaces complete the picture of the present boom of the industry. Where until a few years ago, the construction sector was dominated by a large number of artisanal construction firms that would generally deliver fairly low quality buildings, in recent years a number of medium scale construction companies have emerged that are capable of construction with high standards. These companies often have foreign partnerships supporting design and also recruiting staff from abroad for construction work and landscaping.

Unfortunately, a sector wide study on the industry size and structure is still to be done, hence unlike other sectors of the economy, solid statistical information and analysis are not yet available for the construction sector. Anecdotal evidence suggests the structure of the construction sector is also diversifying. Alongside the traditional constructors, there are new companies increasingly specialising in a market niche like high end housing, small-scale housing, offices, business units, etc., and the provision of construction-related services like architecture, design, or landscaping, as well as raw material provision like sand or stone quarries. Although financing for high-end housing is increasingly becoming available, (innovative) financing schemes to help constructing housing for the less wealthy and poor are still be developed on scale. There is a concern about lack of access to good housing among the poor.

The lack of urban planning and infrastructure development alongside the construction growth across the country is another area of potential challenges. The current building material choices in the sector lead to high levels of imports, while research in developing local solutions for building materials remains limited. With most construction taking place in the urban environment, as yet insufficiently advanced urban planning capacity vis-à-vis residential, service, recreational, industrial, transport and other urban functions open the risk of locked-in investment in infrastructural choices that are sub-optimal and highly costly to repair.

13.2. Constraints to growth

Although the construction industry is growing due to the high demand for housing and commercial properties, a number of constraints to the growth of the sector. The main ones are:

1. Lack of appropriate regulatory environment and poor governance in the public sector have gradually emerged over the past years as a serious constraint that is hindering appropriate further growth in the sector, especially among smaller firms. Similar to challenges faced by other sectors, obtaining licences and permits remains complicated and often is subject to discretionary decision-making where lack of transparency creates scope for bribes.
2. The lack of building standards and health and safety regulation leaves a risk of poor quality work, high cost maintenance and injury compensation that could create disincentives for investment in the longer run.

3. Increasingly high land prices and disputes may also dampen investment among smaller firms that target low and middle-income markets.

4. Skills shortages and high cost of foreign workers may further reduce investments. Most companies indicated that they find it difficult to recruit sufficiently skilled personnel as, during the conflict, competencies have been lost and training in new technology has been absent. This is reflected in remuneration as well. According to the tracer survey by IIDA, jobs within the industry on average pay more, particularly carpentry, than the jobs that most graduates of other skills training obtain. A series of TVET initiatives focusing on skills useful in the construction sector are implemented across the country, eg. electricity, carpentry, and plumbing, but as also noted elsewhere in this NDP, the TVET structure suffers from absence of standards and much training is one-off and stops once the (project) funding runs out. A more structured approach is needed, and human capital development requires significant and structural investment.

Despite these constraints, the sector has proved to be highly responsive to demand and is growing. The outlook for further growth and employment generation seems positive. The booming construction industry through its ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ linkages has equally a positive impact on, for instance, the solar industry, the furniture industry, the wood and tile industries, and others, with potential emergence and additional growth in associated value chains and subsectors. Appropriately linking regulations, like building standards, with local opportunity stimulates an economy that is energy efficient, uses local materials and generates more jobs that are well paid, and creates strong positive linkages to other sectors in the economy.

13.3. Strategies

i. Promote the market for low cost housing through tax incentives to the market for affordable, good quality housing for the poor

ii. Start to improve security of land tenure, with a particular emphasis on durable solutions for displaced persons.

iii. Establish an accessible system of financing that helps the less well-off buy their homes; particular attention will be paid to accessibility by female-headed households.

iv. Improve construction sector skills to match the labour demand with supply. A nation-wide approach and standard setting for technical and vocational training, targeting the youth and displaced persons, accompanied by structurally increasing the number of training facilities will help to address this concern.

v. Strengthen building standards and health and safety regulation.

vi. Urban planning and infrastructure development to support growth in the sector and improve living standards of cities.

14. The Informal Economy

Informal businesses — those operating outside formal licensing and registration procedures — dominate Somalia’s economy. Formal economic activities are largely restricted to urban areas such as...
Mogadishu and a few regional capitals. The dominant informality is part of the business ecosystem that emerged out of the conflict and three decade of totally absent or weak state institutions. Violence and political unrest have long prevented the development of functioning domestic markets and business environments as government’s ability to provide business services and protection is limited. Despite the recent progress in state-building, not only business registration remains minimal, but business transactions also continue to rely on social trust and labour market is dominated by micro and small household enterprises, largely hiring their workers informally through family and/or social networks.

The informal businesses typically employ less than five workers, who are likely to be engaged in low productivity activities ranging, for example, from one-man street food vendors, kiosks and market stalls to medium-sized businesses providing key services eg. construction, plumbing, electrical services and so on. Regardless of the sector, a common feature of these economic activities is that they are not often registered and licensed by government authorities and pay no tax on their sales and incomes, including employment earnings. It is worth mentioning though that these businesses do pay some tax indirectly as wholesalers, for example, of imported goods would pass the import tariff incurred to their customers.

Therefore, Somalia’s sustainable future economic growth and employment will depend at least in part on the informal businesses, entrepreneurs and traders being linked into regulated markets and government systems of registration and taxation. The challenge, then, is to begin to transition from the current, highly informal arrangement towards a more formal and regulated arrangement. To meet this challenge, it must first be acknowledged that the informal economy is a reflection of underlying conditions of the widespread poverty, poor infrastructure and weak business environment as outcome of the political instability, insecurity and a weak rule of law and frequently reoccurring natural disaster over the past decades. Informality is, in a sense, a mechanism for coping with these unfavourable conditions. As was revealed by NDP-9 stakeholder consultations, the private sector views improved security and rule of law as its highest priorities, along with improvements to the country’s energy and transport infrastructure upon which internal trade so much depends. Improvements in these areas could be expected to have great beneficial impacts on the economy and alone start to address some of the main obstacles and constraints that lead to the failure of informal enterprises to grow and transit to the formal economy.

It is worth noting that micro and small enterprises will benefit from general improvement of the business environment, including introduction of company law, property and intellectual rights law, insurance law and industrial strategies designed to develop the different sectors of the economy. The creation of a more business-enabling environment requires a partnership between government and business community. In this regard, the existing platforms such as Public-Private Dialogue (PPD), chamber of commerce and business association are needed to garnish support to develop and implement legislation.

14.1. Situation analysis

Whilst the existence of informal businesses is well-known, the size, nature, sector and employment of their operations are not well-documented. While government control of the territory and oversight of the economy is gradually becoming re-established, informal business activities have been and will probably continue in coming decades to dominate key sectors such as livestock, agriculture, fisheries, construction sectors.
Although official statistics are lacking, evidence from research on the wider East Africa region suggests that the creation of informal household enterprises in Somalia is the common resort for employment for those who lack education or who are geographically disadvantaged\(^{205}\). This points out the role of the urban informal sector in absorbing voluntary rural migrants and IDP. Another positive characteristic of the informal sector is the strong female presence. A large proportion of the micro and small retail and wholesale businesses across the country are either owned by women or they are employees. The findings of a recent study in Hargeisa tally with the above regional research findings. The local private sector is dominated by micro, small and medium enterprises, many of which are informal\(^{206}\). The majority of small and medium enterprises surveyed are in the services sector while the bulk of micro-enterprises are involved in trade, with the informal economy overall providing about 77 percent of the total employment in the city\(^{207}\). Furthermore, most of the enterprises are family owned and run.

The high informality among the firms operating in regions with a relative stability and functioning administration is probably due to major underlying structural and institutional barriers which prevent these enterprises moving to formality. Economic growth is hindered by the absence of legislative frameworks and adequate infrastructure and banking institutions. Indeed, the NDP-9 consultations across the region indicated that a major barrier to start ups and growth of the micro and small business is limited access to finance, lack of supporting public administration and services and poor infrastructure. Lack of access to finance by informal firms is not surprising because the owner is often an individual or a household member whose capital is not separable from that of the firm and for which there is no reliable accounting that could permit retracing the operations of the firm to elicit external investment. Furthermore, a large part of the literature on the impact of improved business regulations has linked better governance with increased business entry and entrepreneurship. A common finding is that substantial improvements in the ease of start-up are linked with more firms registering: making business registration and operations simple, cheap and fast can encourage formalization\(^{208}\).

### 14.2. Incentivising business formalisation

More can be done, therefore, to support transition to formalisation of the Somali economy through improved public sector governance. While consolidation of political stability, improved security and a stronger rule of law are the focus of Pillar 1 and 2 of NDP-9, critical bottlenecks in Somalia’s infrastructure need to be addressed to encourage and incentivize entrepreneurs and traders to engage with the formal business processes, alongside regulatory requirements for registration and licensing. Put differently, measures can be taken either to attract enterprises into the formal sector through incentives (eg. dialogue to understand their challenges), to oblige them to become more formalized (eg. through requirements placed upon firms participating in government tenders), or to better equip them to engage in formal business processes (growth enablers).

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In going forward, the government needs to undertake a reform agenda and help informal business to move to formal at minimal administrative cost burden. A one-stop-shop, where micro and small businesses can access all basic business services, including registration, licensing, taxation and advisory services, is desirable. Two considerations must be made in developing such a strategy. First, improvements should be made along a continuum; the heterogeneity among informal firms points to different policy approaches for different types of firms. In this regard, the principle of proportionality should apply to registration, licensing and taxation to ensure the associated business cost is commensurate with the economic activities concerned. Second, there should be public-private collaborations on mutual reforms. These reforms can leverage the existing platforms such as Public-Private Dialogue and national and regional Chambers of Commerce and local business associations. These platforms can be used as platforms for raising awareness and information sharing platforms to build mutual trust and collaboration. Education and training are also important vectors that could bring informal sector firms to grow and progressively move towards the formal sector. The government should also adopt a regulatory transition program that allows firms near the margin to accede to the benefits of formality while taking on the obligations gradually over time.

14.3. **Strategy**

i. To create conditions that will require, incentivize and enable currently informal enterprises to engage with and become part of Somalia’s formal economy.

ii. Create a more business-enabling environment through regulation and partnership with business.

iii. Ensure the inclusion of vulnerable groups – particularly women, youth and displaced persons – in intervention design and implementation.

14.4. **Interventions**

- Establish/strengthen the policy and regulatory framework for registering small and medium enterprises;

- Develop Legal, Policy and Regulatory Frameworks that create a more business enabling environment through:
  
  (a) Completion of Company Law
  
  (b) Completion of Intellectual Property Law
  
  (c) Development of insurance law
  
  (d) Development of Industrial Policy and Law
  
  (e) Develop a Public-Private Partnership Policy and Law
  
  (f) Operationalisation of FDI, Board establishment and development of investment policy
  
  (g) Develop policies for Trade, Industries and Investment Promotion

- Operationalise a one-stop-shop for micro and small business to provide all key regulatory and business advisory services under one roof.
Support micro and small enterprises with training facilitating their engagement with the formal economy.

15. Trade

Somalia has a large trade deficit, estimated at over 70 percent of GDP in 2018. This current account deficit is partly due to high imports of food because of a chronic food crop deficit but also import of construction materials, fuel and manufactured goods. Indeed, the reported GDP growth is largely underpinned by strong consumption dependent on remittances and humanitarian assistance to finance these imports\(^2\). Somalia recorded a trade deficit of US$2,148.66 million in 2017. Balance of trade in Somalia averaged minus US$808.89 million from 1998 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of minus US$101.76 million in 2003 and a record low of minus US$2,148.66 million in 2017.

Figure 41: Somalia balance of trade, 2010-2018 Million USD

15.1. Situational analysis

Somalia’s systemic trade deficit is the result of the country’s dependence on imports of food, fuel, construction materials and manufactured goods. Main exports are: livestock, bananas, skins, fish, charcoal, frankincense and scrap metal. Somalia’s main trading partners are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Oman.

The outlook is stable or slightly worsening trade deficit given that the country is unlikely to be able to increase its exports and/or increase the share of its domestic production in consumption substantially in the medium run, and its other potential major exportable output, petroleum, is unlikely to be in production at least in the next seven years. However, improving political relations in the Horn and Red Sea region, with potential new opportunities for Somalia to benefit from its proximity to the Ethiopian market for trade and regional integration, offer a potential rebalancing of trade in the future. Export in

both fresh and canned fish and meat products in particular is promising if processing facilities are built along the trade corridors. Investments in labour-intensive manufacturing, such as garment factories also are potential routes to trade diversification.

15.2. Access to WTO

Somalia’s prospects for expanding trade, both within the region and internationally, are contingent upon its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Somalia submitted its accession application on the 6 December 2016. The application was circulated to WTO members on 7 December 2016 and Somalia’s Working Party was established on the same date. Although the government has undertaken further preparatory work and discussions with WTO, including the drafting of a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) – a summary of government’s foreign trade regime with accompanying legislation and statistical data – the membership has not been secured yet. It has also established an international working group and negotiating team comprising leading international practitioners, trade experts and academics, and prepared an accession roadmap and taken steps to build a local coordinating team between different Somali ministries and governmental agencies. But there is more work to be done to meet the requirements for accession.

a) Benefits of accession

The potential benefits of Somalia’s membership are examined by Jonathan Lim and Burak Eryigit. These can be summarised as follows:

First, WTO accession allows Somalia to participate in the multilateral trading system and gain market access on favourable terms to 164 economies that account for 98 percent of global trade. This means that products from Somalia will have the opportunity to reach new markets and face reduced barriers to trade in those markets. Somalia will also benefit from most-favoured nation treatment, and more so being a developed country, with immediate access to developed markets at the lower tariff rate. This gives Somalia time to catch up with the sophisticated corporations and mature industries of developed countries as it doesn’t have to remove reciprocal tariffs in its markets until later when it undertakes the structural and institutional reforms necessary to withstand the competitive pressures.

Second, WTO accession will probably boost trade for Somalia. There is evidence that WTO accession has a powerful and positive impact on trade, in particular for developing countries that acceded after the Uruguay Round in 1995. Research also shows that WTO accession results in a statistically significant improvement to trade intensity, not just quantitatively but also qualitatively, as trade in services increases for acceding countries.

Third, the WTO accession process provides an opportunity for Somalia to engage with the international community and strengthen international cooperation. Through multilateral and bilateral negotiations...
during accession, Somalia can build and cement trading relationships with key partners in the multilateral system.

Fourth, WTO accession provides an opportunity for Somalia to improve its governance and strengthen the rule of law. The WTO accession process requires Somalia to consider whether its domestic legislation and practices conform with WTO requirements, and the WTO Agreements provide a “blueprint” for comprehensive legislative reform. Throughout the accession process, Somalia can also make use of the enhanced capacity-building and technical assistance available for LDCs.

Fifth, WTO accession can contribute to economic growth. It can be used as a catalyst for structural transformation and economic modernization to enhance competitiveness across sectors. Greater levels of trade and investment, accompanied by sound domestic economic policy, are crucial to boosting economic growth and reducing unemployment in Somalia, and therefore to reducing the widespread poverty.

b) Challenges ahead

WTO access is not a panacea to all difficulties faced by the country. Despite the support that Somalia can garnish through the process as a developing country, achieving the benefits of the WTO accession are contingent upon its ability to undertake the substantial structural and institutional reforms required – both as part of the accession process and as post-accession activities to liberalize trade and build strong economic institutions. Evidence shows that acceding states that did not engage in adequate structural or institutional reform, and as result were unprepared for joining the multilateral trading system, have experienced gradual de-industrialization and declines in agricultural production after accession\(^{213}\).

Structural and institutional reforms are also often costly – they require investment in the building of various institutions involved in trade and investment facilitation, and following through on reforms that face significant domestic opposition. To do this, Somalia will require significant political will in support of accession as well as robust cross-ministerial and institutional support. These should be achievable in principle, given that WTO accession aligns with Somalia’s economic development and poverty development strategy, but they are arduous nonetheless.

15.3. Strategies

i. Finalisation the MFTR for circulation in preparation of the coming Working Party meeting

ii. Re-established formal ties with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in order to obtain its assistance in connection with IP-related matters

iii. Intensify bilateral meetings with representatives of multiple WTO members and a number of different national and international organizations regarding potential technical assistance and capacity-building support; and

iv. Complete ongoing work on identification of existing gaps in Somali legislation with a view to drafting the LAP as part of Somalia’s Accession Package.

\(^{213}\) I. Kolesnikova, “WTO Accession and Economic Development: Experience of Newly Acceded Countries and Implications for Belarus,” 2013, at pp. 16-17
16. Employment

Generating employment is central to NDP-9 and its poverty reduction goals, particularly among the most vulnerable, including women, younger people and the displaced. The lack of decent employment opportunities will have far reaching implications for poverty reduction, stability and security, and population displacement. Somalia’s demographic growth is among the fastest in the world, at about three percent annually and roughly the same rate as the recent GDP growth. An estimated 400,000 young people are entering the labour market every year.214 At this rate the size of the labour market will have doubled in the next 25 years. Employment is mostly informal and most people lack any form of labour or social protection. Women and youth are particularly disadvantaged, as are nomadic populations, internally displaced people and persons living with disabilities. The destruction of the education system, including vocational and technical training, has generated a vast skills deficit.

16.1 National Employment Policy

To address these challenges, FGS has developed a National Employment Policy (NEP) placing employment at the centre of its development agenda. It rests on the recognition that jobs-rich, sustainable and inclusive growth is growth that makes good use of Somalia’s key asset, its labour force. This requires, in turn, an economic policy mix that extends beyond one-sided approaches to opening up and to business environment reforms, into an inclusive employment policy agenda.

16.2 National Employment Framework

Figure 42 provides an overview of the framework for the NEP. The overall vision of the policy is to achieve decent and productive employment for all in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. The framework first identified major challenges to productive employment. These include structural problems linked to informality of the economy, limited skills resulting from decades of underinvestment and poor standards of education and training, considerable inactiveness, unemployment and underemployment which make it difficult to match current skills and labour market demand, and lack of regulations to create an enabling labour market. On that basis three strategic goals were identified as key to generating sustainable employment that can lift incomes and living standards. These include:

Establishing an employment governance system

A coherent set of actions across policy levers is required for an economy to make good use of its key asset, the labour force, and thus generate decent jobs at pace with demographic growth and considering the skill set of its existing workforce. The NEP is therefore designed as a vehicle to make employment central to the national development agenda. An effective governance system is required for such a policy. Employment promotion, as embodied in this policy, will require a new standard of engagement by, and increased capacities of, key public institutions, including the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA). It also presupposes enhanced policy coordination and social dialogue.

Promoting growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

The promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) is a major avenue for increasing productive employment and income opportunities in Somalia. The challenge is two-fold. First, the overwhelming majority of enterprises in Somalia are very small and operate informally. As discussed in Section 14, they are trapped in informality and have not been able to grow into small, medium or large enterprises. Second, entrepreneurial awareness and basic management skills need to be expanded and democratised, for young people to be able to achieve their aspirations within a fast-growing population. In this, Somalia can build on a strong tradition of entrepreneurship, both within the country and in the diaspora. The resilience of the Somali private sector in a fragile environment is impressive in many respects. Further, Somalia can capitalise on a relatively high proportion of female entrepreneurs. This policy sets out work on three levels for MSME promotion: improving access to credit, the regulatory environment, and entrepreneurship capacities.

**Promote growth in labour-intensive sectors**

Evidence from the economic literature has long established that some sectors are more important than others for economic growth and employment creation, and that specific public support to these sectors is warranted. Growth in these sectors generates comparatively more overall output and employment growth for the whole economy, and can be boosted by preferential fiscal or financial measures, and other support programmes. As discussed above growth in light manufacturing (including agro-food processing, leather, and renewable energy), construction (public works and housing) and primary production systems (livestock, crop and fisheries) can all generate significant employment, especially for youth and women.
### Figure 42: National Employment Policy Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key employment problems</th>
<th>Strategic objectives</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Target groups and areas</th>
<th>Vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Inactivity              | Improved governance system for employment | - Enhanced policy coordination and social dialogue  
- Skills gaps are reduced; basic education and TVET are improved and promoted  
- LMIS is established  
- MSMEs have access to credit to start and grow  
- Business environment for MSMEs is improved  
- Entrepreneurship literacy and business development capacity is enhanced  
- Public-private dialogue is promoted  
- Tax and trade policies contribute to employment promotion  
- Public investments and ODA focus on labor-intensive methods | Youth  
Women  
IDPs and returnees  
Climate change  
Nomadic people  
People with disabilities  
Urban areas  
Security, conflict mitigation  
Child labour  
Rural areas | Decent and gainful employment for all |
| Low economic participation of women | Promote the growth of MSMEs | | | |
| Unemployment | Promote the employment-intensity of key sectors | | | |
| Precarious employment | | | | |
| Informality | | | | |
| Underemployment | | | | |
| Low educational levels | | | | |
| Rapid urbanization | | | | |
## 17. Pillar 3: Economic Development 5 Year Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PILLAR</th>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase agric &amp; livestock sectors’ resilience to climate change</strong></td>
<td>2020</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitate existing and build new rural water reservoirs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rehabilitate agric irrigation systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve farming methods &amp; livestock systems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop effective phytosanitary measures</td>
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<td><strong>Implement the energy master-plan</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Energy market reforms to build</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Expand urban &amp; rural coverage of electricity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Build capacity of energy sector regulator</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expand &amp; rehabilitate key (transport) infrastructure</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Repair, maintenance &amp; expansion of major &amp; feeder roads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Repair, maintenance &amp; expansion of ports, airports, fishing jetties</td>
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<td><strong>Put in place national fisheries development strategy</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Subsidiary regulations to enforce</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop, Review &amp; Strengthen marine resource management &amp; conservation laws</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Develop oil &amp; petroleum sector</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop/Implement national strategy for oil</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establish national petroleum agency</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Complete legal framework for licensing &amp;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Review &amp; Strengthen oil revenue sharing &amp;</td>
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<td><strong>Develop enabling legal frameworks</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop &amp; Implement industry strategy</td>
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<td>Develop &amp; Implement regional trade &amp; integration strategy</td>
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<td>Develop national employment policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop &amp; Implement environment management strategy &amp; laws</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-cutting imperatives</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Create an enabling business environment for economic growth across sectors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct a national environmental assessment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop a master water plan for Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Complete ongoing public sector reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop a national urban planning strategy, including public-private partnerships</td>
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CHAPTER 8: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (PILLAR 4)

Preamble: Stakeholder consultations and the NDP-9 poverty analysis consistently identified low levels of education and poor access to other basic public services (such as water, health and sanitation) as leading causes of poverty. As such these issues were identified as priorities for future government action as outlined in the Human Development and Social Protection strategies. In addition, 27 percent of the priority needs identified by the Government’s Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) concern the restoration and improvement of public services. The sustainable provision by Government of quality public services is central to Somalia’s poverty reduction strategy and for building resilience for Somali citizens to economic, conflict and environmental shocks. Therefore, Pillar 4 focuses on improving access to essential services, including education, health, clean water, sanitation, nutrition, and social protection, along with improved disaster risk management. Municipal planning for service delivery, both urban and rural, becomes critical in order to meet the demand for rapid urbanisation resulting from population growth and rural migration (driven by environmental change and conflict) as a substantial number of IDPs relocate to urban centres. Partnership and oversight of the private sector for service provision is critical to this pillar’s success, given their dominant position in current provision of health and education. The long-term vision of service provision by the government will eventually be important for the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of vulnerable groups and the public at large, but due to financial, institutional and human capital constraints, this vision remains outside the scope of the time frame of NDP-9.

In addition to alleviating poverty, the provision of basic services and social protection strengthens the trust between communities and government. Not all segments of society are equally affected by poverty and deprivation. Special attention will be paid to the needs of displaced persons as proposed in the Durable Solutions policy, and to those who are more susceptible to social exclusion and therefore to inequalities that prevent access, including women, youth and the disabled. In doing so, Pillar 4 will contribute to Somalia’s progress towards SDGs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10.

Building resilience for communities requires investments in social protections which allow households to withstand shocks. Provision of public services within the context of Somalia requires cross-government effort and coordination to design efficient and equitable developmental policies and programmes dependent on the mobilisation of necessary resources. Therefore, interventions under Pillar 4 are closely associated with public service delivery, fiscal management and disaster risk management interventions and require progress in Improved Security, Economic Growth and Inclusive Politics.

The overall objective of this pillar is:

To reduce poverty and increase the resilience of individuals and households through improved essential services.

This will be accomplished by the following three strategies and cross cutting governance focus:

- Improved Health, including clean water
- Improved Education
- Improved Social Protection, including urban planning, social benefits and food security
- Governance Strengthening, including Disaster Risk Management, Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (as described in Chapter 5)

The planning and execution of investments will adopt a multi-dimensional approach to poverty alleviation, targeting the poorest and most disadvantaged social groups: Therefore, these developmental strategies directly align with the following NDP-9 cross cutting imperatives:

**Gender and Social Exclusion:** the interventions are designed to reflect pro-poor policies, including targeting the provision of health, education and protection services to the most disadvantaged members of society, with special emphasis on women, infants, children and youth and those with disabilities. The ratification of the Somali Women’s Charter reflects the importance of women’s issues to the future development of the country.

**Durable Solutions for the Displaced:** the interventions reflect a focus on providing services to IDPs as a priority, including urban and municipal planning and vocational training more suited to their urban reality, whilst also supporting their resettlement as the security and economic conditions of rural parts of the country improve.

**Resilience:** Somalis are subject to increasing environmental, conflict and economic shocks. Resilience can be provided through sustainable delivery of essential services along with social protection in times of shocks. Alleviating multi-dimensional poverty requires investment funded by revenue generated by a sustainable, long-term growth in key sectors of the Somali economy, including agriculture, livestock and fisheries.

**Humanitarian Interface:** presently a good deal of these services are delivered by humanitarian partners. The challenge for Somalia in building governance capacity and revenue will be medium to long-term. Therefore, the strategy is to work with development partners to gradually transfer responsibility and resourcing of these services to government, through partnership, capacity development and transition of related programmes toward developmental activities. Dependency on humanitarian aid will be reduced, while relationships between citizens and government will be strengthened.

**Governance:** the delivery of public services is a government mandate and responsibility, stretching through all levels, municipal to national. It will require civil service reform, strengthening the delivery chain in each sector, and it requires a modern legislative and policy framework, funded by ongoing domestic tax revenue. The predominant role of the private sector in provision of essential services requires effective governance oversight.

On that basis, whilst the three National Strategic Priorities are directly supported through their respective pillar interventions, in Social Development the achievement of the Priorities is more contingent upon progress in the cross-cutting imperatives. By delivering improved social outcomes to all Somalis the following national outcomes will be supported:

**Inclusive and Accountable Politics:** strengthening the trust between government and citizens, increasing enfranchisement and equitable access to services. This chapter outlines local governance strengthening interventions.

**Improved Security and the Rule of Law:** improving education and economic opportunities will
reduce the appeal of extremism, while providing essential services reduces rivalry for scarce resources and reduces social conflict.

**Improved Economic Development:** through Human Capital Development, healthy and educated citizens can become empowered members of the labour force, while increased economic growth and adequate social protection policies increase household resilience and therefore reduce the impetus for displacement.

1. Introduction

A nation is only as strong as its citizens – at the heart of NDP-9 is a strategy to increase government revenue and capacity in order to increase its investment in, and ensure provision of, social services, for its citizens. Poverty reduction is not merely aimed at transitioning dependence from humanitarian aid to government dependency, but to provide for human development and thriving. To this end, Somalia is committed to human capital development and participation in the Human Capital Index in conjunction with the production of the necessary socio-economic data from pending surveys, and to the approach outlined in MoPIED’s Human Development Strategy.

The demographics and key social indicators paint a picture of both deprivation and potential. Somalia has one of the highest fertility rates in the world (6.7 total fertility rate in 2016) which has led to a large cohort of children and youth: over 40 percent of Somalia’s population is between six and 18 years old. This represents an enormous demographic shift which, if healthy, educated and resilient, can contribute to the flourishing of the country. However there exist challenges in human capital development that must be addressed – if the current social indicators are not improved the social consequences will last a generation or more. Key investments in nutrition, maternal health and education, especially for girls, will be needed.

Consultations with the national and sub-national stakeholders identified the lack of quality health services, social protection, and particularly education, as key causes of poverty, and as levers for poverty reduction, as outlined in Chapter 2. The recent Horn of Africa report on regional challenges in human capital development indicated that GDP per capita could be 2.3 times higher if children had full education and health.215

The poverty analysis of Chapter 3 showed poverty is tightly linked to household deprivations, particularly in education; maternal and child health; and access to clean water and sanitation. According to the World Bank Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability report 2018, almost nine out of ten Somali households are deprived in at least one dimension: monetary, living standards (including dwelling, access to electricity and source of energy for cooking), education, or water and sanitation. Nearly eight out of ten households suffer in two or more dimensions. Somalia has one of the lowest set of education indicators in the region.216

215 Pg 35 Horn of Africa Issues Annex; World Bank; 2019
The primary mandate for delivering public services is at district and local government levels, but without funding and a settled federal system of government where the roles and responsibilities and revenue-sharing are established, the delivery of these services is currently filled by a range of non-state actors. Private companies, community-based civil society organizations and local NGOs (LNGOs) and international humanitarian NGOs funded by ODA provide the bulk of basic services. Whilst these entities have played a major role in providing services over the years of state failure and continue to play an important role in support services, such fragmented provision poses a major problem for future policymaking. First, much of this work has historically occurred and continues largely to happen outside the control of government. The uneven application of government policies and quality standards and a collective commitment to align the activities of these different types of organizations remains at a nascent stage. This weak coherence calls for greater coordination between Civil Society, LNGOs, private organization and INGOs, especially in the current context of resource constraints, and the need for greater efficiencies. In 2017 total ODA was US$1.3billion, of which only US$138million was directed towards social and human development. Even with this level of spending a majority of citizens are deprived in one or more dimensions of poverty linked to basic necessities – an outcome that calls for greater government interventions to guide and supplement the humanitarian and other actors’ effort to increase access to these services across the country, especially in rural areas where, for security reasons, the humanitarian agencies cannot operate.

Continued limited access to basic services poses multiple challenges for the country. The mismatch between citizens’ expectations and government’s ability to meet them increases the loss of trust. Delivery of required services by other providers leads to disenfranchisement and external dependency. These inevitable developments add to the urgent need for a responsive and accountable relationship between citizens and their governments. Evidence shows a clear correlation between conflict and service provision217. Where the Composite Security Index218 is lower, enrolment in education is also lower. Conflict can also be perpetuated through a curriculum that promotes intolerance or hate towards specific groups and has particularly been known to occur in areas previously under the control of non-state actors which adhere to more extreme ideologies.

These challenges notwithstanding, some progress has been made over the last five years. Supported by external funding, government has made strides in establishing health and education policies, capacity development, and improved the delivery of essential services in some important areas, including increased access to Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS), the deployment of trained female health providers (Marwo Caafimaad), and rehabilitation of some health clinics in more secure regions. A new national education curriculum is being introduced and a new National Social Protection policy has been approved by cabinet.

This chapter outlines the challenges, and strategic responses that Somalia will make in the next five years to begin building the capacity to increasingly meet the citizen-facing services required for thriving communities. In the discussions below the needs of the population as whole and most disadvantaged groups are highlighted. The goal is not only to lift all households from poverty through a multi-

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218 A measure provided in the UNDP Human Development Report of 2012 regarding the attainment of physical, mental and spiritual peace and security of individuals and communities at home and in the world.
dimensional approach but to invest in resilience to ensure gains are not lost. It also reinforces, and is dependent on, local reconciliation and governance strengthening, as outlined in Chapter 5.

2. Situation Analysis

The provision of basic public social services, including social protection, by government has been very low in the past three decades due to the protracted conflict, weak government institutions, and lack of human and financial capability. The recurring droughts and floods have negatively impacted to the infrastructure and personnel and funding of schools, health clinics, hospitals, water and sanitation services, and all other social protection and community enrichment services. In the vacuum both humanitarian aid and private companies have become the primary providers of services and must feature as partners in government’s social and human development strategy. However, the current landscape creates difficulties for the vulnerable: for those without monetary means, access to services such as health or education is out of reach. Moreover, dependency has been established especially for those receiving their basic services from development and humanitarian agencies.

As Somalia lacks revenues that can be allocated for social service needs, financial constraints remain as one of the biggest challenges for service delivery. Infrastructure, in the form of hospitals, clinics and schools needs to be rebuilt, but the current FGS budget provides only 3 percent towards a capital budget, with the bulk of operational expenditures applied to wages focused on security forces. Given that total domestic revenue for the FGS was US$183 million in 2018, the challenge of funds needed for the major social services such as education, health and nutrition is enormous and long-term. The solution to the problem requires a dual approach: greater revenue mobilisation by government and a gradual transition of current ODA funding towards capital and development investment within the timescale of NDP-9. Whilst only sustained long-term economic growth can deliver public services, in the medium-term government will approach development partners for a shift from traditional humanitarian support towards developmental investment. This investment in infrastructure, along with capacity building of education and health and policy reform are essential for the improvement of service delivery and increased capacity in government’s ability to provide basic social services. The government’s plan to invest in infrastructure is in conjunction with its intention to increase overall domestic revenue in order to ensure that Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding is sufficient and recurring.

Stakeholders consultations of NDP-9, combined with a data-driven poverty analysis, highlighted poor basic services (with education mentioned the most often) as lead causes of poverty and identified improved institutions and improved education in the top five desired interventions.

Dependency on humanitarian assistance to meet the social development needs of many vulnerable Somali citizens was also an important cross-cutting risk identified by stakeholders. The poverty analysis chapter of NDP-9 that was based on Somalia’s Household Frequency Survey (SHFS) Wave 2 clearly demonstrates a wide-spread rate of multi-dimensional poverty. Though deprivation in access to basic services was consistently high across all groups, five groups in particular had worse comparative outcomes in basic human development indicators:

- Women
- IDPs
- Rural citizens (Nomads and Agro-pastoralists)
- Youth
The Social and Human Development strategy addresses improving the delivery of essential services for all Somalis while targeting particularly disadvantaged groups. Stakeholder consultations, supported by data, indicated these following four Social and Human Development priorities:

- Improved Health and Nutrition services and outcomes
- Improved Education & Training services and outcomes
- Improved Social Protection services and outcomes
- Improved Disaster Risk Management

The discussion in the following sections summarizes the challenges for each of these essential services. Though discussion of essential services is organised in sectoral terms, best practices indicate that the most effective poverty reduction strategy is based on a multi-dimensional approach to addressing multiple deprivations for the different social groups through tailored, local area-based interventions that incorporate improvements in all services touching citizens’ lives. This approach is outlined later in this chapter and will be dependent on the capacity of local government and local communities.

### 2.1. Human Capital Development

Government is formulating a Human Capital Development Strategy, outlining its commitment to: “human capital development to be a key national priority that will support the economic and political recovery of the nation”\(^{219}\). The strategy recognizes the tremendous potential represented by Somalis themselves, requiring investment in health, nutrition, education and skills in order to reach their economic potential. The interventions outlined in this pillar chapter reflect the priority interventions outlined in MoPIED’s proposed strategy.

The recent establishment of the World Bank’s Human Capital Index (HCI) is an important tool in targeting improvements needed to ensure the full potential of future generations and of nations. Barriers exist at early stages of life, and in key demographics which hinder full participation as adults. The HCI measures indicators in life expectancy, income, education and health (childhood stunting) to determine the HCI index score, and areas for investment to improve outcomes. Though Somalia does not yet have the data to officially measure its HCI, it has several pipeline surveys which will provide a baseline and official HCI measure. Meanwhile the challenges linked to these indicators are clear, and the strategies for the Social Development Chapter feature interventions directed at each of these gaps. By targeting challenges such as malnutrition and childhood stunting, high maternal mortality, low reproductive health, and poor school enrolment, the strategies will form an investment in future thriving and participation.

A summary of the Human Capital Development Strategy is found in Box 3, overleaf.

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\(^{219}\) Pg 2 Human Capital Development Strategy, MoPIED; 2019
Box 3: The Human Capital Development Strategy for Somalia

Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development considers human capital development to be a key national priority that will support the economic and political recovery of the nation as envisioned in the NDP-9. To support the development of the first ever National Human Capital Strategy, studies are under way and preliminary findings of this study suggest the following priority areas of human capital development strategy.

1. Harmonization of Human Capital Development
   Stakeholders: An independent and representative national stakeholder forum is required. The stakeholder forum should include those from national and regional levels of government, civil society, the business community, and educational community. The primary objective of the stakeholder forum is to collect information about market dynamics of the country through systematic data collection, and meet periodically to set national goals and objectives.

2. National Qualifications Framework (NQF): The establishment of a central national qualifications framework will transform education and training. Therefore, the federal government should create a national qualifications authority. This body will be responsible for the development of skills standards.

3. Productive Sector Skills Development: Below are some of the priority areas needed to make agriculture attractive to both local and foreign investors:
   a. TVET Schools with the proper curricula, staff, equipment, technologies and certification criteria.
   b. Renewable energy skills will help provide affordable and sustainable power for irrigation, cold chain, communication and create jobs.
   c. Agribusiness – skills for value chain development will enable farmers to increase their income and deliver value added products to the growing urban populations that now meet their needs through imports.

4. TVET-based national internship program: An important aspect is the creation of a national internship program. The national internship programme should allocate students to work in specific key primary sectors to acquire practical experience, and appreciation for the importance of TVET.

5. The human capital development strategy includes: improvement in trade and small businesses skills, harnessing technology for the service industry and the development of knowledge-based small and medium enterprises to tap into the Somali people’s natural entrepreneurial acumen, great strides in the technology arena including mobile money and the brain-gain due to large numbers of returning highly skilled Somalis from the diaspora.

6. Changing Cultural Mind-Set: Somali society has traditionally been less receptive to certain segments involving manual labour. This mind-set is an obstacle to development. It is imperative that the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States, educational and business leadership collectively develop a national campaign that raises the awareness of all Somalis on the importance of work, understanding one’s dignity is not about who they are, but the extent to which they are engaged in gainful employment.

7. Establishing Civic Education Programs: The national education curriculum should include civic education courses and programs in all levels of education.

The Ministry of Planning in close consultation with the Ministries of Labour and Education commissioned in 2018 a research consortium [consisting of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies and the City University of Mogadishu funded by the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF)] on the creation of an inclusive, indigenous and sustainable Human Capital Development Mechanism (HCDM). The overarching objectives of the HCDM are first to establish partnership with leading human capital development stakeholders from the public sector, private sector, civil society and academia in line with NDP-9. The HCDM research consortium was specifically tasked to: conduct a comprehensive country-wide baseline study with special emphasis on the productive sector (agriculture, fisheries and livestock), to develop human capital development strategy and to propose a mechanism that facilitates synchronization of the efforts by the human capital development stakeholders. The baseline study and the national strategy will be released in early 2020 and will guide developing the human capital of the Somali citizens.
2.2. Social and human development strategy

As social service provision by the government is a key for legitimacy in the eyes of the vulnerable groups and the public at large, the FGS faces a critical decision given the private sector’s domination of provision of education and health. For instance, non-state schools currently provide over half of primary education and over 70 percent of secondary education. Somalia’s private sector has been remarkably resilient and innovative throughout the conflict years. However, this leaves the poor without access and those in more vulnerable regions without service due to the financial cost that comes with private provision. There are three viable options that exist for government: first, it could partner with the private sector, limiting government’s role to legislation, regulation, and standards setting, while ensuring the disadvantaged have access. Second, set a long-term strategy where government itself provides the basic services, involving all levels of government, while continuing to regulate the minority private sector providers. Or thirdly government could establish a hybrid model where, in the short term, local and international NGOs closely engage and coordinate with the government at all levels in order to provide services in the newly liberated rural areas where the provision of services by the private sector is limited.

The low level of government revenue requires that the final shape of provision of social services will not be established until after the time frame of NDP-9. This means the current strategy will feature cooperation and coordination with non-state actors. However, the recent decades of conflict and high levels of mistrust between citizens and governments, along with the high level of deprivation in basic services, encourages government to seriously consider the model of delivering basic services itself as its long-term strategy, once sufficient revenue and capacity have been established. In this transition phase, an important objective will be to avoid duplication of services, or establishment of parallel structures, but rather to ensure there are no gaps of coverage and that government’s role as regulator is primary.

In the interim the NDP-9 strategy consists of:

- Increase government revenue for social service provision (as outlined in the Economic and Macro-Economic chapters)
- Establish legislation and regulation and standards for non-state providers, to ensure consistency across communities
- Focus on provision of basic services with partners to the most vulnerable communities and groups, including newly liberated areas
- Strengthen public service delivery capacity to deliver services, establishing roles and responsibilities as part of ongoing federal negotiations

Linked to this strategy is the urgent need for formal identification of citizens. The World Bank Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (2018) indicates that only 39 percent of citizens have birth certificates. The need for IDs has already been highlighted in the Economic Pillar chapter, but it is equally valid in the Social Development Chapter. School enrolment, beneficiary registries, health clinic access, social protection schemes, land and housing tenure and tracking of human development indicators are all dependent on formal identification documents. This is particularly urgent for IDPs who require a legal basis for establishing new residency or returning home.
2.3. Health sector and clean water and nutrition

Emerging from more than two decades of absent government oversight and funding, the health system in Somalia consists of approximately 106 hospitals/referral health centres, 391 MCH/Health centres and 620 health posts with available human resources of about 6,000 in 2014, including 621 physicians, 2,653 registered nurses, 636 registered midwives, and 198 ‘Marwo Caafimaad’ (FHWs). The number of skilled workers in the country are below the WHO’s minimum threshold for health worker-to-population ratio, with approximately four professionals per 10,000 citizens (the minimum threshold is 23 per 10,000). The country also has 47 medical, nursing and midwifery training programmes for health workers.

The health sector faces many challenges, and among these challenges are:

- Maternal health, including reproductive health, FGM and preventable disease
- Early childhood stunting, child mortality, malnutrition
- Insufficient disease surveillance and prevention
- Inadequate access for the poor and under-served
- Poor regulation of non-state provision and increased professional standards and provision
- Under-developed health information systems

The country has one of the lowest baskets of health indicators in the world with an infant mortality rate of about 132 per 1,000 live births and a maternal mortality rate of 732 per 100,000 live births. The life expectancy at birth is 54 years for male and 57 years for female, according to the WHO.221 Over 98 percent of women undergo Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) putting their health at risk. However, the improvement of the overall livelihoods of Somalis aims at addressing the aspiration of the SDG 3 of ensuring healthy lives and promoting wellbeing for all. Health will be the driver of sustainable development that will produce a healthy and productive society that effectively contributes to poverty reduction.

In 2015, the WHO estimated that annual per capita public spending on health was between US$10 and US$12, almost entirely funded by development partners. In the same review, the WHO characterises the existing health challenges in the following way:

The key challenges facing the Somali health system are: (i) persistently high burden of disease; (ii) limited institutional capacity and stewardship role of ministries of health; (iii) inadequate, unpredictable and unsustainable level of financing, with a high share of out-of-pocket spending on health; (iii) absence of balanced, motivated, well-distributed and well-managed health workforce with the appropriate skills; (iv) limited and unequal access to essential health services, and poor quality and safety of services across all levels of care; (v) inadequate procurement/supply system and irrational use of essential technologies and medicines; (vi) absence of national surveys and census, weak births and deaths registration, limited operational research and disease surveillance; (vii) lack of synergy of humanitarian response to health; and (viii) inadequate action on social determinants of health.222

Even though the health challenges are national, according to evidence from analysis of SHFS Wave 2, access to healthcare is determined by the place of residence. IDPs have better access to healthcare than

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221 This is 2016 data published by WHO. https://www.who.int/countries/som/en/
222 Pg 6 Strategic review of the Somali health sector: Challenges and Prioritized actions; WHO, 2015
rural residents but are worse off than urban residents. A majority of rural women (70 percent) give birth at home rather than in a maternity clinic, maternal and child health centre, or hospital compared to IDP women (40 percent) and urban women (20 percent). Births attended by skilled health staff also vary according to place of resident. The data indicate that about 50 percent of IDP women who gave birth were assisted by a nurse, midwife, or doctor compared to 80 percent of urban women and 30 percent of rural women. These statistics no doubt contribute to the high rates of maternal and infant mortalities. Access to healthcare also varies across gender, regions and within IDPs, urban and rural residents. Those receiving remittances (primarily those in urban centres) have improved health outcomes.

In an environment of wide-spread challenges, priorities must be identified. In order to begin a life-cycle of care, two challenges are of immediate urgency:

- Maternal health
- Early childhood health

In addition to the maternal and childhood challenges the health strategy will also target provision of health services to under-served areas and vulnerable groups, including rural Somalis, those in newly liberated areas, and those in IDP camps. This will be done in partnership with the local and international NGOs that are working in rural areas.

The health strategy will address these early challenges, while building towards improved institutional, funding and capacity challenges. A priority will be establishing the legislation, regulation and standards to oversee the provision of health by private providers and increase access to Essential Health Services Packages. The recently endorsed Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal, Child and Adolescent Health Strategy provides a framework for health action linked to these priorities.

2.4. Clean water and sanitation services

Clean water and sanitation services are significant in the fight against poverty. Related sicknesses put severe burdens on health services and keep children out of school. Despite investments in the sector made by governments, NGOs, development partners, and the private sector, the outlook for access to safe and adequate supplies of water in Somalia is low, with basic water supply coverage at 52 percent (28 percent in rural and 83 percent in urban areas) according to the JMP 2019 Report. The water shortage is exacerbated by drought, which also increases water contamination. Thus, developing a nationwide master plan to ensure sustainable water management among competing uses will be a government priority.

Research has found that improved water and sanitation is critical for health, school performance, productivity and household income. Wave 2 of Somalia’s Health Frequency Survey (SHFS) found out that only half of Somali households have access to improved sanitation, and about 80 percent have access to improved water sources. Access to clean water and sanitation services is higher in urban areas compared to rural, nomadic and IDPs areas. The likelihood of poor households having access to improved sanitation is low while IDPs share facilities. Fewer than half of schools and health clinics have access to clean water and sanitation.

According to the Somalia Joint Multi Cluster Needs Assessment (JMCNA) conducted in September 2018, the long rains improved water accessibility and availability in both natural and man-made sources across much of the country. The assessment found that 74 percent of non-displaced and 59 percent of IDP households reported having adequate access to drinking water in the 30 days prior to the assessment. A
higher proportion of IDP households reported access to improved sources (87 percent) than non-displaced households (75 percent).

The main challenges facing the sector include policy and legal provision; human and government institutional capacities to increase the water and sanitation coverage; quality of water supply services; and inadequate budget.

### 2.5. Nutrition

Protracted conflict and the long drought experienced in Somalia in 2016/17 have caused population displacement and destroyed livelihoods thus worsening the food and nutrition in the country. Over 6.2 million Somalis are food poor and the prevalence of wasting is 14 percent (2016). The most affected by the food and nutrition security are mothers, infants, young children, adolescent girls and women (49 percent are anaemic). Children in Somalia suffer from high rates of malnutrition (13.4 percent of children under 59 months are underweight) and slow growth that has become one of the main causes of child morbidity and mortality. Malnutrition has restricted inclusive development and increased poverty levels through curtailment of good standards of living. Although there have been improvements in the nutrition status in the last five years, children in Somalia suffer from multiple nutritional deprivations.

An estimated 2.4 million Somalis are in danger of facing acute malnutrition due to food and nutrition insecurity in 2019. The impact is worse for IDPs and displaced families according to Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) analysis in July 2018. The nutrition assessment among IDPs in the main settlements and two urban areas showed critical prevalence of acute malnutrition in seven out of 15 population groups surveyed in June 2018.

Both drought and conflict have contributed to food insecurity and famine – conflict has driven households away from their agricultural livelihoods, drought has further degraded productivity and displacement, all of which creates lower food availability and higher competition, which drives further conflict and environmental degradation. Even the supply of food aid contributes to this vicious cycle through tribal conflict over access and control.

Food security and malnutrition are key components of health – however this chapter discusses the interventions needed for vulnerable groups under the heading of Social Protection, where interventions and programs are designed to scale-up in times of crisis and famine.

#### Table 21: Trends in acute malnutrition prevalence in Somalia

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median GAM</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median SAM</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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Source: FSNAU/FAO Somalia

In Somalia, the fertility rate of 2016 was 6.7 children per woman – this high rate, combined with poor birth assistance and poor disease prevention and lack of adequate nutrition is leading to one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. As highlighted by the analysis of food security, limited

223 This number threatens to rise throughout 2019 if drought conditions unfold.
access to and availability of sufficient food pose serious nutritional and health risks to large number of the population, in particular among children and women. The latest FSNAU figures show high national Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) ranging from 12 to 18 percent which is above the ten percent trigger for emergency measures, and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) of two to three percent in children.

High rates of female genital mutilation are also contributing to women’s poor health outcomes, a fact recognized by the pending anti-FGM legislation and by the ratification of the Somali Women’s Charter. Almost 25 percent of children under two are stunted and have insufficient immunization, disease surveillance and disease prevention (including malaria and cholera). These poor outcomes to mothers and children have life-long impacts. Investment in reversing these impacts will begin to have a demographic impact which will help reduce poverty and increase thriving.

### 2.6. Education and training

Education is a key tool for increasing the levels of welfare and helping to break the poverty cycle. Somalia will ensure SDG 4 is met through inclusive and equitable quality education and training that promotes life-long opportunities for all. The envisaged education and training opportunities are expected to meet the demands of education in the country. This is against a backdrop of protracted emergencies stemming from conflict, drought and flooding that has had significant impact on the education system resulting in the breakdown of governance institutions and opportunities for children and youth. The post-war educational reconstruction in the country is slow, with most schools still either owned by the community or managed by private-sector umbrella organisations. A decentralized education system is currently being operationalized by the Federal Ministry of Education, however, the current system is fragmented and newly formed federal member states, regional and district-level offices have limited technical and financial resources.

The challenges confronting the education sector are the direct consequence of protracted emergencies stated above, and the most significant of which include the following:

- Low literacy levels, significantly low among women
- Low enrolment for both primary and secondary school
- Low survival rates for primary school
- Girls’ education indicators lower than boys
- High youth unemployment with few labour market skills
- Insufficient access in rural and IDP locations
- Poor level of teacher qualifications
- Poor regulation of non-state provision and increased professional standards and provision
- Under-developed education information management systems
- Poor education infrastructure and weak capacity for service delivery

Moreover, the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) for 2018-2020 outlines the following figures that provide more context about the existing challenges: in 2016 less than one percent of the government budget was spent on education, far below the OECD or regional averages. Only three percent of schools were rated as good condition. Enrolment rates are low, particularly for early childhood and primary

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224 It is important to highlight that these numbers from FSNAU are not endorsed by the Somali Government, and they were only used here for analysis purposes.
school attendance, and teacher-to-student ratios range between 1:35 and 1:40. The rate of qualified teachers is less than 35 percent at secondary school level. According to the SHFS phase 2, low Gross Enrolment Rates (GER) are witnessed across the country as only 33 percent of primary school aged (6–13) children are enrolled, which is very low compared to an average of 74 percent in low-income sub-Saharan countries. Net Enrolment Rates (NER) for children aged 6–9 years are the lowest and range between 22 and 30 percent. The problem of school enrolment is compounded by the perception of Somali parents regarding the age at which children should start schooling. Predominantly, especially in the rural and nomadic areas, parents enrol their children in traditional Qur’anic schools before they enrol them in the formal primary education schooling system. In the early primary education, girls are less likely to enrol in school compared to boys, placing them at the biggest challenge in accessing education. For rural households, the distance to school is correlated to lower attendance, though safety concerns were cited as often as distance as reasons for low enrolment. Over 100,000 children across Somalia were forced out of school in 2016 due to external shocks, such as conflict, drought and flood. This represents eight percent of the child population.

Institutional weaknesses within the Ministry, MOECE, have contributed to poor educational results. Management capacities are weak, and efforts to decentralize have been hindered by poor alignment of strategies and targets. The ESSP cites transparency, accountability, poor infrastructure and weak capacity as challenges within the Ministry and outlines that fewer than one percent of its personnel are paid from government sources. Only 52 percent of schools are classified as permanent structures, and only 61 percent of those schools have wash facilities. Though the national education indicators are poor, the results are even worse for the disadvantaged. Chapter 3 has a complete outline of the SHFS poverty analysis, but highlights include:

- Only 12% of enrolled children in primary school are from rural areas, while the rural population is 59% of the national total.
- Survival rates to Grade 5 are only 64%, indicating a high drop-out rate.
- There are disparities in school enrolment of children aged 6–13 across geographical locations. Enrolment is concentrated in urban areas (60% in Mogadishu and 55% in other urban), followed by rural areas. Enrolment in IDP camps is the worst recorded in the country.
- Adult literacy rate for IDPs in settlement areas (57%) is lower than that in urban centres but higher than rural areas (45%) and nomad area (16%).

While a national strategy for delivery of better education results is urgent, the strategy addresses the disproportionately poor outcomes for IDPs, girls, rural children and youth. Somalia’s population is heavily skewed towards youth, with 75 percent under the age of 30. Employable skills are urgently required in this population, indicating the need for greater TVET and vocational training. The opportunity represented by this cohort is immense: matching youth to employment is an investment in their lives, and in the future of Somalia. Currently, however, the unemployment rate for young adults is over 70 percent.

Overall strategic objectives for this sector, from the EESP, include:

- Ensure education contributes to peacebuilding and state-building processes.

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225 Pg 27 Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment; World Bank; 2018
226 Pg 23, Education Sector Strategic Plan, 2018
- Support learners and strengthen societal resilience among communities affected by natural disasters and conflict,
- Continue expanding access to education for children (boys and girls), adolescents and youth, especially those from marginalized communities such as pastoralists, IDPs, and the urban poor,
- Improve the quality of learning outcomes, especially at early grade levels, and to ensure the market relevance of learning opportunities,
- Strengthen the market relevance of learning for both formal and informal market opportunities, and
- Strengthen management capacities and systems at federal and state levels, including improving fiduciary mechanisms and increasing budget allocations to the education sector.

2.7. Social protection

The provision of social protection in Somalia is very low compared to its neighbouring countries. This is due to the financial constraints as well as lack of access in rural areas because of security. Both Ethiopia and Kenya have established social protection schemes to provide a system of buttressing shocks primarily related to natural disasters. Ethiopia runs the Productive Safety Nets Program, one focus area of social protection programs aimed at a rapid response targeted at the poorest in times of natural disaster, including public works projects. Between 2012 and 2016 Ethiopia averaged spending one percent of its GDP on social protection, while donors contributed on average 1.6 percent of GDP.\(^{227}\) Kenya likewise has introduced the Hunger Safety Nets Program. Somalia, however, it is averaging 0.8 percent of its much smaller GDP on social spending.\(^{228}\) The National Social Protection Policy highlights key requirements for social protection. One of those requirements is a flexible and scalable funding mechanism\(^{229}\), which can address the multiple hazards that the vulnerable groups continue to face.

The 2019 OECD report Financing Social Protection writes: “[a] key rationale for the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was to replace humanitarian relief in areas that were constantly receiving such support, in particular in the form of food-for-work programmes that were not able to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty or enhance resilience. This policy change allowed for a shift away from short-term poverty relief towards promoting resilience and long-term development of areas that were perennially at risk.”

Building resilience, reducing poverty and transitioning from aid dependency are key tenets for Somalia’s national development. The need for social protection schemes is demonstrated in that 66 percent of Somali’s reported experiencing at least one shock in the previous year (Wave 2-SHFS, 2018), with drought accounting for 50 percent of these shocks, alongside loss of livestock, crop or water. The Economic Pillar chapter has outlined the need, and plans, for Food Security. Given the high ratio of household income spent on food (see Economic Chapter) it is evident that, in times of crisis, vulnerable Somali households will face food shortages and risk of starvation. This often leads to displacement in a search for support at IDP camps. The provision of safety nets and emergency food distribution will cushion the shock and help keep subsistence farmers in place.

Two of the challenges of introducing a social protection scheme are national funding and formal government identification for citizens. On the latter issue only 39 percent of Somali citizens have a birth

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227 Pg 47, Financing Social Protection in Ethiopia; OECD; 2019
228 Pg xxvi; Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment; World Bank; 2018
229 Federal Government of Somalia, 2019, “National Social Protection Policy,” Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
17 percent of IDPs have any form of identification, with urban dwellers reporting 36 percent possession. An effective social protection scheme will need means of identifying and targeting beneficiaries.

On the funding challenge, Somalia’s resource gap is significant. National revenue of US$183 million in the last reported year is dominated by recurring expenditure on administration and security payroll (90 percent), leaving less than US$40 million for basic services and capital projects. In comparison, the Government of Ethiopia contributed US$500 million in 2018 to social protection programs, with donors contributing almost double that amount.

A summary of the particular challenges for social development programs include:

- Funding (including contingency funding to be ramped up during crises)
- Beneficiary registry (requiring provision of all citizens with formal government ID)
- Contingency plans, to be executed immediately during crises
- Early warning systems
- Institutional capacity for delivery of the program and coordination with food security policies

### 2.8. Urban and rural planning

The poverty analysis outlined a large shift from rural to urban settings. Urban and rural planning is critical for Somalia in order to maximize social service provision, especially in clean water and sanitation. In 2016 the number of IDPs totalled 305,000, displaced mostly as a result of conflict, to over 2.4 million at the beginning of 2019, displaced mostly by drought and conflict. According to the World Bank, Mogadishu is one of the fastest urbanizing cities in the world, largely driven by its improving security situation, economic prospects and displacement. The recent *Somalia Economic Update* (SEU) showed that 70 percent of Somalia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is urban-based.

The speed of urbanization necessitates proper urban as well as rural planning. The rapid urbanization brings positive and negative consequences. One positive result of urbanization is the availability of social services that urban communities enjoy. The negative result that comes with urbanization is the overpopulation that brings environmental issues as well as limits of the provision of social services due to the weak capacity in financial, institutional and human capital.

The delivery of improved schools, health facilities and social protection schemes must be integrated into overall city planning, as well as in rural settings. This requires the capacity development of subnational governments and the professional services of city planners.

For service provision, IDPs in urban areas have the least essential service outcomes even though over 70 percent of current IDPs have indicated their intentions to not return home. This calls for urgent urban planning and increase of social services to the IDP communities. Whether the households eventually resettle elsewhere or integrate into host communities, these particular unique social development challenges must be addressed for this group alongside more sustainable delivery of essential services:

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230 SHFS Wave 2 data
232 Pg 98 Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment, 2018, World Bank
• Urban Planning: transitioning from temporary IDP camps on the outskirts of major urban centres to a more permanent arrangement will require urban planning. This is needed to address a range of solutions, including building of schools and health clinics, city services (such as water and sanitation), housing, security, lighting, transportation, green spaces, gathering places and other facilities.

• Education and Vocational Training: many IDPs have relocated from rural settings where livelihoods were based in agriculture and livestock. Training programs for new vocational skills will be needed in the education system for children and that for adults in need of reskilling.

• Rural Planning: if IDPs are to return to their places of origin, the provision of essential services will be needed, including increasing the sense of safety and equitable access in communities better planned to meet environmental and economic shocks.

• Education and Vocational Training: for IDPs who return home they will need agricultural and vocational skills that are better suited to sustainable farming, water management, high yield farming and new crop varieties.

Government will soon publish a Durable Solutions Strategy outlining the complete range of support and interventions required for displaced persons. This support includes the initiatives listed above. Early priorities are to establish a government coordination body, finalize the strategic plan, complete a registration programme for IDPs, and establish an endorsed baseline, perhaps through a national census.

3. Social and human development challenges

The following outlines the major common sectoral challenges within the pillar.

• **Weak human capital and institutional capacity:** The human and institutional capacity in the country is thin. The number of graduates from teacher training colleges, medical schools and other necessary skills are not enough to meet the high demand of a growing population. The number of hospitals and schools are not sufficient and lack capacity to handle the burden of diseases and educational needs;

• **Loss of Infrastructure:** the protracted civil war has resulted in widespread destruction of government infrastructure, including most schools, health clinics, water and sanitation treatment facilities, sport facilities, and others.

• **Dominance of non-state delivery:** complete collapse of institutions and infrastructure, combined with natural disasters and conflict, have created a vacuum in the provision of necessities, which the private sector or humanitarian providers have filled. This creates unequal access for the poor.

• **Poor workforce distribution:** The challenge of shortages, misdistribution and imbalance in Somalia, resulting in a lack of right numbers in the right places, weakens service delivery. Insecure regions, rural areas and newly liberated areas count among the most under-served. Women are only 24% in those employed in the public sector.

• **Lack of information systems to map demands of the population:** Inadequate information systems to monitor the needs of the population and provide the required data for planning and budgeting make interventions difficult to implement and monitor.
• **Funding Gaps in each of the basic services:** The following analysis is based on proportions of national budgets which are recommended levels of spending on basic services. However, it should be noted that the national budget of Somalia is disproportionately low, making percentages of that budget inadequate to meet the needs of the citizenry. The analysis below provides an estimate of the gap between what is currently being spent and what might be needed.

  o **Current Social Development Spending** – the current FGS domestic revenue budget is US$183 million; Somalia GDP is approximately US$4.8 billion. Over 90% of government expenditure is spent on administration and security services; 3% is capital budget; the remainder is a mixture of social services such as health, education and social protection. That represents approximately US$13 million for the delivery of all essential services and other projects.

  o **Education** – current OECD averages are 13% of government expenditures dedicated to education, or 4-6% of GDP, with Low Income Countries advised to target at least 6%.\(^{233}\) If Somalia is able to increase current government revenue to US$314 million by 2022 (as outlined in the Macro-Economic chapter), recommended education spending would reach US$40 million. If it were to meet the recommended level of spending, this would increase to US$337 million\(^{234}\) (a figure closer to the total needed by the sector). Current spending fails to meet the demands (less than 3% of the FGS budget), with education largely provided through ODA or by households paying private sector providers. These estimated totals do not include any allotment for capital spending.

  o **Health** – the Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems recommends health spending of 5% of GDP and/or US$86 per capita. For Somalia, this would require US$280 million for health services, based on GDP recommendations, or over US$1 billion on a per capita basis. However, on the basis of average regional per capita spending (US$28), this amount increases to over US$400 million in required spending.

  o **Sanitation and Hygiene** – the Ngor Declaration recommends 0.5% of GDP for sanitation and hygiene services. By 2022 Somalia would need to invest US$280 million to meet this recommendation.

  o **Social Protection** – Ethiopia is currently spending 1% of its GDP on the Productive Safety Net Program, amounting to US$500 million, with donors providing twice that amount to meet program demands. Based on the current Somalia GDP, 1% equates to approximately US$50 million, a figure far too low to meet the social protection needs of the country. The average investment for low income countries is 1.5% of GDP – in the next three years, with an increased GDP, Somalia would need to invest US$84 million.

  o **Recovery and Resilience** – the 2018 Drought Impact Needs Assessment report outlined US$1.8 billion dollars in unmet recovery and resilience building needs. However, this

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\(^{233}\) World Bank World Development Indicators, 2018 and recommendations of the Incheon Declaration

\(^{234}\) This assumes a 4% GDP growth rate over the period
investment in resilience would save future humanitarian funding requirements, producing US$2.8 in savings for every dollar invested. One of the focuses of recovery and resilience is meeting the needs of IDPs, through a Durable Solutions approach.

The gap between current government revenue and funding requirements is immense. Using conservative figures Somalia would need to increase their spending from just over US$10 million to well over US$1 billion. On the expenditure side a significant reallocation within the budget is needed to meet the social protection needs of Somalia. On the revenue side, the delivery of basic social services is dependent on success in the Economic Growth Pillar of NDP-9, along with progress in Inclusive Politics and Improved Security.

4. Strategies and interventions

Strategic approach – partnering with the private sector

The private sector is the main provider of health and education in Somalia and will remain a significant player during the timeframe of this plan. Government, though, increasingly must play a role in regulating and enforcing standards in both schools and health facilities. This is an early priority, and in fact has already begun with the launch of the Health and Education strategic plans, and the phased implementation of a National Curriculum for Education. The priorities include qualifications standards, a standard curriculum, common language, standard assessment frameworks, provision of health and safety requirements (including clean water facilities), enforcement and monitoring.

Strategic approach – implementation directed at vulnerable groups

This chapter identifies four key strategic priorities, (Improving Health Care; Improving Education, Improving Social Protection, and Improving Disaster Risk Management) to be improved across the nation, while targeting the particularly disadvantaged groups.235 The poor and the rural areas are not well-served by private sector providers, nor can they afford the services. A second early priority for government, therefore, is to ensure that there are service options for the vulnerable.

The delivery of basic services is usually a coordinated effort between all levels of government, with the national level contributing standards, legislation, funding, oversight, and subnational levels focusing on the actual delivery of services, including the construction and maintenance of buildings, hiring and management of staff, operations of boards, delivery of material and perhaps development of curriculum. For Somalia many of these details are pending formalization of an accepted Federal System. However, improvements in the delivery of services can’t wait for a formalized system; instead coordination and improvements will need to move forward in parallel.

The funding gap for the building/rehabilitation of facilities, staff payroll, running costs and training of staff will require years for Somalia to close. This will require budget support from Somalia’s donor groups to continue to deliver and increasingly, transition to government control.

The implementation approach to be taken for improving government delivery of essential services is based on the following principles:

235 Previously identified as 1) IDPs; 2) Rural, both nomads and agro-pastoralists; 3) women; 4) youth and 5) the disabled.
1. Each vulnerable target group and each geographic location have unique concerns. The interventions will be tailored to take place at a local level, in an area-based approach, and aligned to local and state level strategic plans.

2. The most effective means of reducing poverty is through a multi-dimensional approach. The interventions will not be sectoral based, but rather a clustered approach, offering solutions in a range of basic services to the target groups in question, addressing their multiple deprivations.

3. The interventions (for example, building schools, training teachers, opening health clinics, rehabilitating water sources, etc.) will need to rely on Development Partners initially, though over time increasingly with government funding and control. The transition phase will focus on building the institutional capacity of the public service delivery chain, from local to state to national levels.

4. In taking a clustered approach the targeted interventions will leverage existing interventions and budgets, rather than requiring new and duplicated budgets and projects. In this way, progress will be made against multiple SDGs without the need for “projectization” for specific SDGs or targets.

5. Somalia will scale-up, based on the successes and lessons from area-based interventions, in order to eventually deliver basic services at a national level.

6. Over time the FGS wishes to engage with Development Partners, through a strategy of PPP, in an arrangement where aid is directed more towards capital investment in building and rehabilitating facilities, while government increasing funds operations, including salaries, training, curriculum, systems and policies.

A later chapter outlines the Implementation Strategy for NDP-9 in greater detail. The discussion of strategies below should be interpreted as taking place through clustered, pilot local initiatives focused on improving all basic services with the intent of scaling up and institutionalizing the improvements.

**Strategy 1: Improving access to health care**

The overall long-term vision of the health sector is to expand access to basic health care of acceptable quality and establish the building blocks of an equitable, effective, efficient, responsive, and sustainable health care delivery system. In designing health intervention to support the poverty reduction strategy, the principle of leaving no one behind and first reaching those farthest behind will be applied. Strengthening the health sector coordination and health information systems for effective health responses will identify the population that will need urgent interventions. These populations include rural communities, urban slums and vulnerable populations, including women and girls, youth, the disabled and the elderly, many of them displaced by conflict.

During the timeframe of NDP-9 these services will be provided by partners, with government increasingly playing its role as legislator, regulator and monitor of services. Priority will be given to preventive care at community and household level through this phased approach:

In the early years:

1. **Strengthen Health Financing:** The government in collaboration with development partners will budget for priority populations and services to ensure equitable access to quality healthcare to create a sustainable health financing system (this intervention is outlined in the Macro-Economic Chapter)
2. **Legal and policy framework**: Setting standards and the legal and policy framework is an early priority. This includes from a state perspective as well as the regulation of non-state providers. The health sector will strengthen its policy and legal framework to enhance delivery of health services and deepen collaboration with the other key sectors that have an implication on healthcare access. These sectors include Education, Agriculture, Gender, Water, Housing, Trade, Migration, and others.

3. **Health Management Information System**: Establish an effective health management information system that will produce quality and timely information for evidence-decision making.

4. **Focus on health initiatives for the most pressing challenges**: Care for women, particularly mothers, and children, especially the very young, have been identified as key early challenges. Interventions include reducing maternal mortality through greater pregnancy and birth care, reducing FGM rates, better nutrition and improved reproductive health. In addition, the strategy will focus on reducing child stunting and mortality through nutrition, immunization, disease surveillance and access to clean water and sanitation.

5. **Provide health services to the under-served, targeting the most vulnerable**: The government will expand and increase access to the most vulnerable, which includes IDP camps, rural areas (particularly in newly liberated areas) and other under-served communities. Government will partner with non-state providers to rehabilitate or construct health clinics and will increase distribution of Essential Health Service Packages.

6. **Capacity building**: The government will strengthen the existing workforce and train others to address the priority health needs of the population. It will also strengthen the governance, institutional and management capacity of the health sector to offer quality healthcare. For the health infrastructure, public health facilities require robust Operation and Maintenance (O&M) in order to achieve their purpose sustainably.

In the medium to long term:

1. **Complete** the regulatory, and health information system reforms. Begin regular monitoring and enforcement of standards.

2. **Scale-up the community pilots to vulnerable groups more broadly**: government will build on the successful pilots to extend the reach of health services to the poor and vulnerable. Ensure all IDP camps have adequate access to health clinics and integrate into rural planning.

3. **Build on disease surveillance and prevention**: continue to administer services in maternal and child health, but extend surveillance and prevention to other groups, including mental health, emergency care and chronic diseases. Scale up health services and access to the disabled.

4. **Scale-up capacity building**: as part of strengthening public service delivery, continue to analyse and strengthen capacity gaps at all levels of government, focusing on strengthening district delivery of health.

**Strategy 2: Improving access to clean water and sanitation**

The focus of this sector is to ensure availability and access to safe and clean water, sanitation and hygienic conditions to meet health conditions of the population. The sector’s interventions to reduce poverty include:
1. **Coverage to under-served communities:** Targeted interventions to provide safe drinking water and sanitation services (drainage, sewage and solid waste management) to vulnerable communities, including under-served schools and health clinics.

2. **Human and Institutional Capacity building:** Building human and institutional capacities for sustainable water supply. Building technical capacities for data collection and analysis, monitoring and evaluation, safe water provision, and hygiene promotion. Training community leaders, elders, teachers and local authorities on community mobilization to raise awareness on safe water handling, handwashing, and waste management through household visits, campaigns, and community forums.

3. **Hygiene promotion:** Promoting good hygiene practices and behaviour change will lessen the burden on the health sector. Special emphasis on promoting good hygiene and sanitation practices with a combination of provision of safe and clean water in the country;

4. **Build partnership:** The governments will build partnership with the international community and development partners to support water and sanitation related infrastructure;

5. **Policy and Legal framework.** The government will put in place a policy and legal framework to support the sector. Private-Public Partnership law will enhance accessibility and availability of clean water and sanitation service.

**Strategy 3: Improving Education and Training**

Education is a priority focus for Somalia. A number of interventions completed under the NDP-8 have informed NDP-9. These are: the completion of the Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP); the launch of a new education curriculum for primary schools across the country; the administration of national examinations across the country; and the successful conduct of the Joint Review of the Education Sector (JRES). Early priorities include encouraging more girls to enrol, and stay in school; improving survival rates of boys and girls to Grade 5/6; providing increased skills training to youth through TVET and vocational training; improving access for the vulnerable, including IDPs, rural citizens and the disabled; and ensuring private partners meet national and rigorous standards. The Human Capital Development strategy outlines seven priorities, the majority of which are focused on education and skills development. These priorities are reflected in the list below.

In the early years:

1. **Strengthen Education Financing:** The government in collaboration with development partners will budget for priority populations and services to ensure equitable access to quality education to create a sustainable education financing system (this intervention is outlined in the Macro-Economic Chapter)

2. **Legal and policy framework:** Setting standards and the legal and policy framework is an early priority. This includes from a state perspective as well as the regulation of non-state providers. The education sector will strengthen its policy and legal framework to enhance delivery of education services. The national primary curriculum will continue to be phased in and a secondary national curriculum will be developed. The Human Capital Development strategy outlines the establishment of a stakeholder forum as an early priority.

3. **Education Management Information System (NEMIS):** Establish an effective education management information system that will produce quality and timely information for evidence-decision making.
4. **Focus on education initiatives for the most vulnerable**: IDPs, rural communities have the least access to schools. Girls have worse enrolment and survival rates than boys. These challenges will be addressed through partnership with non-state actors, new infrastructure, female teachers and household awareness of the importance of education, supported by increased regional safety and security.

5. **Recruit and train qualified teachers**: Recruiting and training more teachers will offer child friendly and standardized education. The improved teaching staff will also implement the new curriculum across the country;

6. **Target large cohort of youth**: in consultation with employers, labour groups and private sector organizations, vocational training programs, with a particular focus on TVET, will be established to provide the technical and vocational skills needed for the labour market. This will be initiated with the help of partners and as part of the Economic Pillar strategy. The National Youth Policy and the Human Capital Development Strategy consider the expansion of opportunities in TVET programs for the youth as an intervention for youth empowerment and their contribution to society. In addition to TVET skills and apprenticeships, skill development in entrepreneurship and services will be encouraged.

7. **Capacity building**: The government will strengthen the existing workforce and train others to address the priority education needs of the population. It will also strengthen the governance, institutional and management capacity of the education sector to offer quality education.

In the medium-term, because education is such a priority, the government seeks to take early action on many fronts and focus on scaling-up and completing the priorities listed above. In the medium-term the following interventions will receive attention:

1. **Infrastructure and expanse of coverage**: the provision of school facilities, and expanding the coverage of schools, particularly to newly liberated regions of Somalia, will be increased, funded through increased government revenue. Educational and training centres will get a robust Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget to ensure sustainability to function and achieve their purposes.

2. **Professional standards and accreditation**: with the completion of both curricula, the emphasis will turn to increased training of teachers, and establishment of assessment standards, for both teachers and graduating students. This includes the development of National Qualifications Framework and Authority as described in the Human Capital Development strategy.

3. **Strengthened government capacity**: government capacity in educational services is critical and needs to be strengthened in order to deliver.

**Strategy 4: Improving Social Protection**

Experience in the region and elsewhere suggests that one of the most effective instruments for poverty reduction is the provision of social protection systems. This includes social benefits schemes, work schemes and/or food in times of hardship. This is the most underfunded area of social development and the most dependent on increased government revenue. However, there are interventions which can be initiated even as funding ramps up.

In the early years (years 1 and 2):

1. **Provision of Identification Documents**: the development of benefit programs requires the production of official identification documents including birth certificates, passports, driver’s licenses, health cards or other.

2. **Policies and National Strategies for Disadvantaged Groups**: Somalia’s Social Protection Policy, drafted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, addresses the needs of vulnerable groups, and for the purpose of NDP-9, the first phase of the Social Protection Policy covers the period 2019 to 2023. The implementation of the Social Protection Policy will be a key government action plan in the coming five years. Moreover, the government will ratify and implement the national strategy for IDPs and their options for (re)integration, alongside improved land and housing tenure, and support for measures for reunification of lost family members. Government will implement the Disability Roadmap including the passing of a National Disability Act. It will implement the ratified Somali Women’s Charter. Government will ratify and implement the FGM Bill, the National Gender Policy, and the National Plan on Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict.

3. **Increased Food Security**: in conjunction with the food security plans outlined in the Economic Chapter, government will work with partners to strengthen the capacity to deliver food, both in times of crisis for vulnerable groups (especially for subsistence farmers, to help keep them in place) and for the poor having issues affording proper nutrition. Plans include storage, distribution channels, beneficiary registries and quality of food.

In the medium term: (years 3 to 5)

4. **Strengthening Disaster Management**: the provision of public works programs when natural disaster strikes will provide alternative employment and income to vulnerable households. This requires having a pipeline of public works projects (such as road construction, dams, and other infrastructure) with funding and also requires a skills training program. Strengthening of government’s disaster risk management capacity is covered below in Governance.

5. **Urban Planning**: the provision of basic services to all Somalis, including the displaced and underserved, will need the support of long-term city planning services, including capacity, systems and funding.

4.1. **Improved governance – cross-cutting**

Strong governance institutions and human and financial capacity are key for the delivery of basic social services. If those conditions are met, progress in the delivery of basic services will reflect progress in each of the NDP-9 cross-cutting imperatives:

**Gender and Social Exclusion**: the interventions are designed to reflect targeting the provision of health, education and protection services to the most disadvantaged members of the society, with special emphasis on women, infants, children and youth.

**Youth**: as they comprise 70 percent of the population, the youth is the backbone for Somalia’s future for economic and social development. However, the highest portion of unemployment in the country falls under this demographic. The National Youth Policy focuses on those whose ages range between 15 and 40 as the stage in life containing key transitions to different statuses and environments: childhood to adulthood, school to work, dependence to independence. There are priority interventions in education and employment that the National Youth Policy presents. For education, the National Youth Policy asserts that it is critical to ensure all vulnerable youth (poor, IDPs, marginalized groups and orphans receive the education they need. Moreover, the National Youth Policy targets the provision of
accessible secondary education to be increased by 35 percent in 2021. For employment, one of the main strategic objectives for the Ministry of Youth and Sports is to create linkages between education, training institutions and local labour market. In this strategy, a key priority intervention is to provide equal opportunities for young men and women and offer incentives to encourage employers to employ young qualified women. However, the unemployment rate for 15-24-year-olds in Somalia was 22 percent, with variations from 15.5 percent in Lower Shabelle to over 35 percent in Banadir and Bay. Female youth unemployment rates tend to be lower than that of young males.

**Durable Solutions for the vulnerable groups:** the interventions reflect a focus on providing services to IDPs as a priority, including urban and municipal planning and vocational training more suited to their urban reality, whilst also supporting their resettlement as the security and economic conditions of rural parts of the country improve. Durable Solutions aim to create sustainable opportunities for vulnerable groups including minorities. The National Employment Policy that was adopted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs addresses the need to reach out the vulnerable groups through microfinance. The National Employment Policy states that the microfinance market in Somalia is at an early stage of development and requires substantial effort to allow many more, particularly those with limited collateral or other forms of guarantee, to access to these services. This includes women, youth, IDPs and returnees.

**Resilience:** Resilience can be strengthened through sustainable delivery of essential services along with social protection in times of shocks. However, as the Social Protection Policy states, it is critical to establish clearly defined, long-term, predictable programs that will begin to provide a safety net for highly vulnerable individuals while contributing to the broader well-being and resilience of their constituent households.

**Humanitarian Interface:** entwined in this pillar is partnership and reliance on humanitarian agencies to support ongoing delivery of services, while pivoting towards investment in national capacity. However, it is in the area of improved governance where improved social development is most dependent.

Two areas of improved governance are most relevant to Social Development:

1) Disaster Risk Management and Administration: natural disaster has accounted for the disruption of more than 20 percent of the Somali population, collapsed livelihoods and is the largest contributor to national poverty. Currently prevention of, and response to, these disasters is almost exclusively funded and executed through humanitarian aid. Government plans to position itself to increasingly manage this function.

2) Strengthening Public Service Delivery of Essential Services: a key element of poverty reduction is the re-establishment of public services, such as health, education and social protection. Public sector reform focused on citizen-facing services through all levels of government is necessary for sustainable service delivery.

4.2. Disaster risk management and administration

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237 Ibid
239 Ibid
Humanitarian agencies along with international donors have been the dominant providers of disaster response, preparedness planning and risk management in Somalia for more than a decade. In response to the near-famine of 2016-2017, US$1.4 billion of aid was delivered: 96.5 percent of the response was delivered through international agencies, while 3.5 percent was delivered by Somali NGOs.

Government will develop its capacity and funding to manage this threat, in conjunction with development partners for the foreseeable future. The completion of the Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) establishes a platform for managing disasters going forward.

This pillar has outlined interventions intended to build resiliency in times of crises, allowing vulnerable individuals and households to withstand the shock. However, an important function of government is to build capacity to prevent disasters and mitigate threats. Investment in social development will only be sustainable when disaster management is institutionalised to cope with multi-hazards and support end-to-end early warning system for the protection of lives, livelihoods, and assets at the local level.

Some of the most important disaster prevention interventions have been outlined in prior chapters, particularly in Economic Development. Investment in sustainable livestock and crop management, integrated water resource management, and diversification of the economy will mitigate environmental shocks.

However, the social costs of disaster make Disaster Risk Management important to this pillar as well. The pillar specific strategic interventions proposed to improve this function include:

- Implement National Disaster Management Policy
- Promote gender equality in disaster risk reduction
- Strengthen MoHADM and other state and local disaster agencies and drought committees
- Improve coordination capacities of humanitarian response agencies at national and sub-national levels
- Fully implement priorities set out in the Somalia Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF)
- Design and implement an early warning system, working with existing systems such as those within FSNU, IPC

**Strengthening Public Service Delivery**

Tackling all-encompassing public administrative reform (PAR) has proved too formidable a task for most developing nations. More success has been realized through strengthening the delivery chain of citizen-facing services.

Basic services, such as education, health provision and social protection are critical planks to sustainable poverty alleviation. Inequality in incomes is exacerbated in a country when the rich can afford to pay for public services and the poor are excluded. In the absence of effective and inclusive access to basic services the nature and acceptance of federalism becomes much more difficult for citizens to understand and support. Thus, strengthened public services not only provide an accelerator for poverty alleviation but also for a healthy federal system and a lessening of conflict.

The Mid-Term Review of NDP-8 was critical of the progress made on strengthening government institutions and service delivery, with little evidence that budgetary support or reform initiatives had been established.

The long-term delivery of essential services will largely be the mandate of subnational level governments, though the details of decentralization have yet to be formalized. The challenge for this
NDP is to begin to strengthen the chain of citizen delivery, beginning with the community and building capacity at each level of government and institution.

The strategic interventions proposed to improve this function include:
Conduct selected civil service reform

- Strengthen the executive coordination capacity – the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Ministry of Planning, the Cabinet Office, the Civil Service Commission – building capacity as well for NDP monitoring and implementation (as described in Pillar 1)
- Tied to PFM reform and Security Sector reform, reallocate resources towards establishing a modern civil service, ensuring sustainable and reasonable salaries, adequate training, and proper employment, management and dismissal procedures are in place (with early focus on citizen-facing staff within essential services) (Pillar 2 and Macro-Economic chapter)
- Invest in technology and systems and processes commensurate with a modern civil service
- Develop and promulgate principles and values of ethos of public servants (probit; professionalism; merit; political neutrality)

Strengthen public service delivery systems

- Introduce pilot locations where select basic public services are improved through investment in infrastructure, training of staff, provision of ongoing operational funds, consultation with local citizens and stakeholders;
- Scale up local pilots
- Link all levels of government ministries through delivery chain and build missing capacity
- Capacity development on what it means to be “citizen-responsive”
- Coordination with FGS on required capital and O&M funding for local services (Macro-Economic Chapter)
- Coordination with local government on role and responsibilities to be incorporated into larger federal system negotiations (Pillar 1)

5. Prerequisites and Risks

The following outline the prerequisites needed for social development progress.

- An agreed and formalized federal system which outlines mandates, authorities, responsibilities and funding for each of the social development services (Inclusive and Accountable Politics)
- Peace and security for the communities and households (Improved Security and Rule of Law)
- Increased domestic revenue, which will require harmonized and formal customs and tax legislation as well as a growing economy with increased GDP (Economic Growth and Inclusive Politics)
- Civil Service Reform and institutional strengthening of governance through all levels of government (Improved Governance)
- Effective partnership with Development Partners (Humanitarian Interface)

These prerequisites align well with two international commitments signed by the Somali government. The first is the Kampala Agreement, outlining the state’s responsibilities towards the protection of IDPs. The second is the commitment to pursue the following strategies outlined by the g7+ nations to achieve progress towards SDG 16, the Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions SDG, which is of particular relevance to fragile states. The g7+ commitments include:

1. Inclusive politics to be fostered to reconcile and resolve conflicts
2. Security to be established for all the people
3. Access to justice especially for the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups
4. Economic foundations through the generation of sustainable employment
5. Build capacity to generate revenues and deliver services

The latter commitment is particularly relevant to the delivery of social services, and to building resilience within communities and households.

6. Outcome

To reduce poverty and increase the resilience of individuals and households through improved essential government services.

The anticipated intervention outcomes are:

- Improved health outcomes for Somalis (including greater access to clean water and sanitation) particularly the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
- Improved educational outcomes for Somalis, particularly the disadvantaged
- Improved social protection for the vulnerable, particularly in times of crisis

These outcomes will be monitored by the following indicators:

Table 22: Social Development Indicators

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health indicators</th>
<th>Education indicators</th>
<th>Social protection indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of females undergoing FGM</td>
<td>Proportion of children enrolled in grade 2/3, disaggregated by gender and location</td>
<td>Numbers of IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rates</td>
<td>Proportion of children enrolled in lower secondary school, disaggregated by gender and location</td>
<td>% of national budget allocated to social benefits</td>
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<td>Under-five mortality rates</td>
<td>Number of trained teachers (total and per student)</td>
<td>% of GDP allocated to social benefits</td>
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<td>Prevalence of children under 59 months who are underweight</td>
<td>% of national budget allocated to education</td>
<td>Ratification of key legislation and strategies (Disability, Gender, Sexual Violence, FGM)</td>
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<td>Prevalence of stunting of children under 59 months</td>
<td>Survival rates to Grade 5, disaggregated</td>
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<td>Proportion of births attended by a professional</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate</td>
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<td>Fertility rate</td>
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<td>Contraception prevalence rate</td>
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<td>Life expectancy, disaggregated</td>
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<td>Health indicators</td>
<td>Education indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>% with access to basic water supply, disaggregated</td>
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<td>% with access to basic sanitation, disaggregated</td>
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### 7. Pillar 4: Social Development 5 Year Action Plan

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<th>PILLAR 4: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT</th>
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<td><strong>Improve education &amp; training</strong></td>
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<td>Put in place standards, regulations</td>
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<td>Continued roll out of national</td>
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<td>Continued increase of quality of</td>
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<td>Rehabilitation of infrastructure in under-served areas (including disputed areas)</td>
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<td>Partner with donors for delivery &amp; infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scale up of pilot projects in newly recovered areas &amp; IDP camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on TVET, working with</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focus on training of professionals, establishing qualifications &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review National Qualifications Framework for school graduation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Improve health</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen standards, regulations &amp;</td>
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<td>Immunization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scale up of pilot projects in newly recovered, disputed areas &amp; IDP camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner with donors for delivery &amp; infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen disease surveillance</td>
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<td>Strengthen efforts to reduce</td>
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<td>Focus on training of professionals, establishing qualifications &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strengthen social protection</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Complete national strategy for IDPs</td>
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<td>Implement national strategy for IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Initiate national disability strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilot national disability strategy, focusing on employment skills &amp; legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish pipeline infrastructure projects</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster risk management</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Invest in government capacity for DRM, including early warning systems</td>
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<td><strong>PPP development &amp; oversight</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthen partnership &amp; oversight of private sector in health &amp; education</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WASH</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Setting &amp; enforcing standards for</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure sufficient schools and health clinics to serve growing urban</td>
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<td>Build capacity at all levels of government</td>
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<td>Expand housing, sanitation, water &amp;</td>
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<td>Continued investment in phased planning</td>
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<td><strong>Urban planning</strong></td>
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<td>Resilience: investment in stunting nutrition, food security; strengthen partnership with development</td>
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<td>Durable Solutions: focused delivery of social services to IDPs &amp; most vulnerable groups; investment in</td>
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<td>Gender &amp; excluded groups: reproductive health &amp; pilot service delivery to under-served areas; focus</td>
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<td>Governance: Develop focused strategy for government to deliver social services to vulnerable groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance: Establish roles &amp; responsibilities &amp; improve delivery capacity at 3 levels of government</td>
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CHAPTER 9: MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

Somalia is on the path to recovery from the devastating effects of the civil war which started in 1988 and subsequently led to the collapse of the Government of Siad Barre in 1991. The attendant lawlessness lasting almost 22 years destroyed the nation’s social, economic and institutional structures. Following the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution in 2011 and the establishment of the FGS in 2012, significant progress has been made in promoting economic growth and a stable macroeconomic environment. These achievements though remarkable continue to face serious threats from underlying political and security challenges.

One of the FGS’s achievements was the development of NDP-8 (2017/2019), the first since 1991. Among the objectives of the Plan were:

- Promotion of economic growth and development;
- Stabilization of the macroeconomic environment;
- Increased government revenue; and
- Building of confidence in the management of the economy.

Implementation of NDP-8 faced major challenges immediately it was launched. Persistent civil conflict and insecurity, together with a lack of legal and institutional frameworks, became major constraints to the role out of the plan. When the new government took control of most of the country the civil war had destroyed public institutions essential for implementation of the plan. Moreover, the 2016/17 drought diverted resources and government priorities towards addressing humanitarian crisis. The drought also reduced economic growth from around 3.5 percent in 2015 to 1.3 percent in 2017; and economic growth rates have since remained below the 2015 level. Nevertheless, the Government has implemented policy and institutional reforms to promote social development and peace and security for accelerated economic growth.

The challenges the government faced in the implementation of NDP-8 have informed the processes adopted in developing NDP-9 and the priority reforms identified for implementation over the plan period (2019-2022). Under NDP-9 the overall macroeconomic objective is to promote economic growth in an environment of low inflation, a sustainable fiscal position and current account deficit and healthy foreign exchange reserves. In that regard, the reforms will lay the foundation for economic recovery and growth by enabling key infrastructure development, increased investments and exports; and by improving efficiency in labour markets and providing employment opportunities. The focus of economic policy will be to support sustainable medium-term economic stability and an improved business climate for faster economic development.

Legislative and institutional reforms will be undertaken to underpin economic reforms by entrenching the market economy, macroeconomic stability and rule of law. Legislation to be reviewed and enacted will cover several economic activities, including public financial management, investments, company law, revenues, licensing, energy and fisheries. Enactment and implementation of the legislation is geared to promote good governance and facilitate a conducive environment for doing business.
A brief review of recent economic performance of Somalia over the NDP-8 period (2017-2019) has been offered in Chapter 1, analysing trends in macroeconomic variables and the sources of economic growth. It included monetary and financial policies necessary for macroeconomic stability and the structure of the federal government’s budget, as well as recent fiscal trends and policy reforms. This chapter looks at the contribution of the external sector and analysis of a few key productive sectors in the economy, with emphasis on the importance of generation of tax revenues and export earnings and employment creation. A Medium-Term Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework (MTFF) for Somalia has been developed. Projections of the main economic indicators (GDP, revenues, expenditures, aid flows, consumer price index, balance of payments) are made over the NDP-9 period (2020-2024). These projections are used to determine the resource envelope and to propose financing options, including allocation of the resources by sector. Finally, given insufficient budgetary resources, a proposal on alternative sources of funds for implementing NDP-9 strategic priorities will be outlined.

2. Monetary Policies and Financial Sector Reforms

The Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) has not issued the Somali Shilling (SOS) since 1991. This means the use of SOS in circulation is limited because it has lost credibility and is prone to counterfeiting; making the dollar the main medium of exchange in the local economy. The dollarization of Somalia’s economy has constrained the efficacy of monetary policy by making it difficult for CBS to influence interest rates and money supply. For this reason, the government considers currency reform has an important priority to promote effective monetary and financial sector policies. In the medium term, full implementation of currency reforms will promote the conduct of monetary policy, exchange rate policy and development of liquidity and reserve management capabilities.

Introduction of new currency is a key component of financial sector reforms being implemented by the FGS under the IMF Staff-Monitored Program (SMP). The new currency is intended to end the widespread counterfeiting of the SOS. Another objective of the reforms is to build capacity of CBS to carry out its mandate by strengthening its operational capabilities to (1) develop and implement independent monetary policy instruments and reserve management guidelines, and (2) regulate and supervise financial institutions within its jurisdiction.

So far all the required legal and operational measures for the introduction of new currency have been implemented. Currency reforms will be carried out in two phases. In Phase I, Somali Shilling in circulation will be replaced with new smaller denominated banknotes. Implementation of this phase has been delayed by lack of funds and other operational challenges, which include putting in place frameworks and structures to support the process. Banknotes with larger denominations will be introduced in Phase II of the currency reforms.

Among the financial sector reforms the FGS is implementing under the SMP is the strengthening of supervisory, regulatory and licensing functions of CBS. Support from the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury has capacitated CBS to ensure banking and money transfer bureau (MTB) systems conform to best practices. In order to promote best practices in the financial sector, CBS has since 2014 introduced nine prudential regulations and seven operation manuals to guide operations of the banking sector, and five prudential regulations on mobile money transactions. Further, CBS has been strengthened with the adoption of its new organizational structure by the Board in 2018. The Central Bank has also finalized draft Strategic and Transition plans; these are to be subjected to stakeholder consultations before approval by the Board before the end of 2019.

Strengthening regulatory and supervisory functions of CBS is important given the rapidly evolving developments in Somalia’s financial sector. Until recently there were only six registered banks in the...
country, before five more were registered doubling the numbers following the temporary lifting of the
moratorium of licensing of new banks. Immediate imposition of a moratorium on the licensing of new
banks after the 2018/19 licensing round underlies the weak supervisory and oversight capacity of CBS.
There also two takaful (Islamic compliant) insurance companies, 14 mobile money and money transfer
bureaus (MTBs) and several microfinance institutions under the supervision of CBS. Regulations will be
enacted to provide for risk-based supervision and capacity of supervisors will be strengthened to ensure
the regulations are adequately enforced as the sector grows and in line with international best practices.

The CBS has made progress in enforcing international obligations on anti-money-laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Measures already taken to comply with AML/CFT
obligations include development and implementation of procedures for annual licensing of banks and
MTBs; and enhanced inspection of banks and MTBs. Other measures are publication of AML regulations
governing customer registration, operations and reporting by MTBs; and submissions of the Targeted
Financial Sanctions Bill to Parliament in 2018. The Financial Reporting Centre (FRC), responsible for
monitoring suspicious financial transactions has been operational since December 2017. Going forward,
FRC capacity will continue to be strengthened; application of AML/CFT regulations will be extended to
cover other financial institutions, including mobile money operators; and the draft regulations on
targeted financial sanctions bill will be implemented once enacted by Parliament. Compliance with
AML/CFT standards by Somali financial institutions is necessary to maintain their correspondent banking
relationships, and more importantly to guarantee inflows of FDI and diaspora remittances, which are a
lifeline for the economy.

3. Fiscal Policy and Management

The objective of the government’s fiscal reform agenda is to enhance revenue mobilization, expenditure
controls, and transparency and accountability in the management of public resources. Implementation
of fiscal reforms has improved markedly in recent years; and as a result domestic revenues have
increased, the national budget has become more realistic, and the execution of the budget has
improved. These results are beginning to improve the predictability and credibility of the budgeting
processes and should, in the medium term, enable the government to generate sufficient resources to
scale delivery of services to citizens.

3.1. Domestic revenue mobilization

The government has embarked on a concerted effort to increase domestic revenues by broadening the
tax base, enhancing compliance, and improving collection. FGS revenue collection has improved steadily
over the last five years, with remarkable gains from 2017. Total revenue (domestic revenue plus donor
grants) more than doubled between 2015 and 2018, rising from US$141.1 million to US$298 million
(Figure 42).

The rise in domestic revenues has been driven by new revenue measures, including a sales tax on
telecommunications and hotels, the removal of income tax exemptions for parliamentarians, and
imposition of sales tax on all airline services, including collection of arrears on landing fees. As a result,
domestic revenue increased from US$114 million in 2015, to US$173 million in 2018 and is projected to
rise to US$190 million and US$221 million in 2019 and 2020, respectively.
Trade taxes (on international trade) are the main source of revenues and amounted to US$72.9 million in 2015, and have consistently increased to US$100.3 million in 2018 and are projected to rise to US$116.4 million in 2020 (Figure 43). The second largest tax category is administrative charges and fees (non-tax revenue), which accounted for US$30.2 million in 2015, and had increased to US$44.5 million in 2018. Income and corporate taxes contribute the least to total revenues, however their contributions have consistently risen from US$1.9 million in 2015 to US$8.63 million in 2018 and are projected to rise further to US$9.1 in 2019. The government will undertake legal reforms and develop capacity of Inland Revenue Services to increase receipts from this tax category, the potential for which is great.

Despite progress in revenue collection, domestic revenue remains very low, at 4.0 percent of real GDP\(^{241}\), making it difficult for the Government to provide public services. Total domestic revenue which stands at 55.2 percent of total revenue in 2019 covers 63.2 percent of recurrent expenditure; leaving over one third of the recurrent budget to be financed through donor support. Given the large financial requirements for social and infrastructural development, significant increase in government revenues is necessary.

\(^{241}\) This figure is understated since it reflects only taxes collected in Mogadishu and the surrounding Banadir region while real GDP used is for all the whole country including Somaliland.
Donor grants have risen four-fold from US$26.9 million in 2015 to US$124.6 million in 2018 and are projected to reach US$150.2 million in 2019 (Figure 44). Turkey, the World Bank and the EU are the major source of grants for Somalia, and support by the World Bank and EU has increased over the last two years (Figure 44). The three donors are projected to contribute US$144.7 million of on-budget grants in 2019. This signifies increasing confidence by the donor community on the improving financial management capacities of the Federal Ministry of Finance. The FGS will continue consultations with development partners with a view to encouraging greater allocation of funds for budget support.

Donor on-budget grants are miniscule relative to total off-budget ODA to Somalia. On-budget grants rose from 2.3 percent of off-budget ODA in 2015 to 7.5 percent in 2018 (Table 23), leaving financing of development almost totally in the hands of development partners. Although the FGS coordinates development financing with donors in the context of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), resource flows from the Facility are limited. For effective monitoring and implementation of NDP-9, the government will work with development partners to promote increased use of country systems; by aligning donor support to NDP-9 priorities and increasing off-budget support.
Figure 45: Donor Budget Support

On-Budget Aid (2015-2019)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank MFP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Others 2/</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Sources: FGS, Appropriations Act, 2019

1/ Multi Partner Fund administered by World Bank
2/ AfDB, Qatar, Norway, UAE and UN

Table 23: Off-Budget Aid to Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grants (US$Millions)</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Grants</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>2,091</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Official</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Assistance (ODA)</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>1,513</td>
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<tr>
<td>Of which:1/</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping 2/</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Budget Grants to FGS</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>114.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Budget Grants as % of total Off-Budget ODA</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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Source: Somali Authorities and IMF Estimates
1/ Excludes on-budget grants
2/ Excludes bilateral military aid

3.2. Public expenditure management

Government expenditures have grown significantly in recent years, rising from US$135 million in 2013 to US$286 million in 2018 (Figure 45). This is projected to rise to US$344.2 million in 2019. Expenditure allocations have also become more predictable as manifested by the small deviations between approved and actual estimates during the fiscal years 2017 and 2018 relative to the previous years.
Recurrent expenditure accounts for almost all expenditures, the bulk of which goes to compensation of employees and purchases of goods and services. Expenditure on these categories accounted for 78.2 percent of expenditure in 2018. Capital spending was non-existent in 2013 and 2014, but began to grow in 2015 rising from to 3 percent of total spending and is projected to account for 8 percent and 20 percent of the budget in 2019 and 2020, respectively (Figure 46). Low capital expenditure is a major drawback to the development of Somalia, and allocation of resources to this spending category will be given priority in future budgets.

The number of civil servants increased by 94 percent between 2013 and 2018, rising from 2,849 to 5,526; raising expenditure on wages from 44 percent of total expenditure in 2013 to 52 percent in 2017 (Figure 46). However, even as revenues rose, expenditure on compensation of employees declined from 52 percent in 2017 to 50 percent in 2018 and is projected to decline further to 38 percent in 2020, while expenditure allocations to capital rose.
In terms of sectoral expenditures, administration and security sectors accounted for about 85 percent of recurrent expenditure in 2016 (Figure 47), but had declined to 80 percent in 2018; with allocations to administration declining from 57 percent of total expenditures in 2016 to a projected 43 percent in 2019. Budget allocations for provision of social services rose from about 2.5 percent of total expenditure in 2015 to about 10 percent in 2019. As revenue collection improves the government will increase budget allocations to economic and social services sectors to enhance service delivery and finance development projects.

Current FGS budgeting is based on the principle of zero or positive budget deficit. In this regard, the government is committed not to borrow, either domestically or externally, to finance its expenditures. However, given that over 80 percent of expenditures cover recurrent expenses, adherence to balanced budgets will constrain government financing of development; including the financing of NDP-9 priorities.

In the medium to long term, innovative strategies and instruments such as blended finance will be promoted to catalyze private sector investments directed at financing development projects, including NDP-9 priorities. In particular, the government will work with development partners to use ODA to reduce risk return profiles of identified projects in order to make them attractive to private sector investors. In this way, additional private investments will be generated to supplement ODA associated investments. Some of the sectors which could benefit from blended financing in Somalia are energy, water and sanitation, ports, and value chain development in agri-business and fisheries.

Figure 47: Composition of Expenditure
3.3. Public debt management

Since the government of Siad Bare collapsed in 1991, debt owed to bilateral and multilateral creditors has not been paid and arrears have piled up. With the formation of a new civilian government in 2012, one of the issues of most concern to the government was the reconciliation of data on external debts since most of the relevant records got lost during the conflict. More recently a Debt Management Unit was established to carry out the task; and working with development partners and creditors the Unit has made substantial progress. So far 100 percent of Multilateral and Paris Club debt has been reconciled, while reconciliation of Non-Paris Club debt is at about 95 percent. The government is confident that the reconciliation of all external debt data will be completed by April 2020.

Somalia’s outstanding total external debt in 2018 is estimated at US$4.7 billion, which is equivalent to 99.5 percent of GDP and debt arrears at US$4.5 billion make up about 96 percent of the total debt. The largest debt is owed to bilateral creditors, out of which the Paris Club members are owed the most at 52.8 percent of GDP, followed by multi-lateral creditors at 24.4 percent GDP (Figure 48). In the case of individual creditors, the IMF, World Bank, France, Italy, and USA together were owed US$2.9 billion or 61.7 percent of Somalia’s total outstanding debt in 2018.

Due to large external debt arrears Somalia has been unable to access to financial assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs). This has constrained the country’s development. In an effort to address the challenge FGS has been undertaking policy and reforms under the SMP. The process has enabled FGS to build a track record for implementation of reforms as the basis for engagement with the donor community, including IFIs, on development assistance and debt relief. The recent increase in on-budget grant support by the EU and the World Bank signifies improved credibility of the governments’ capacity to implement reforms.
The SMP IV agreed in July 2019 has been endorsed by the IMF Board as meeting the Upper Credit Tranche (UTC) standards for debt relief under the HIPC process. This paves the way for Decision Point to be reached, in the early months of 2020, enabling the debt relief process to start for Somalia under the HIPC Initiative. The FGS has started discussions with the creditors and development partners on the necessary support for the HIPC process and debt forgiveness. The government will seek waiver on debt arrears in lieu of the country’s tragic history of civil wars and insecurity and the resulting humanitarian crisis and state of fragility which continues to make it difficult to mobilize surplus resources to pay down debts. However, to show commitment to the process, FGS will allocate resources in the 2020 budget to make token payments to the IMF and other IFIs.

Debt forgiveness will enable the government to channel more resources to development and delivery of public services. The FGS is also hopeful that debt relief will encourage development partners to enhance financial support for development projects and programmes, including those outlined in the IPRSP. The government recognizes that prudent management of public debt will be necessary post debt relief, and will take the necessary steps to strengthen the Debt Management Unit. More skilled staff will be recruited for the Unit and technical assistance will be sought build capacity for the Unit.

3.4. Fiscal federalism and intergovernmental transfers

Although the 2012 Provisional Constitution (PC) introduced a federal system of governance, it did not provide for clear legal and institutional structures for managing fiscal federalism. It provided for three levels of government, at the federal, state and district levels. However, the PC neither assigned functions to each level of government nor provided an institutional framework for intergovernmental relations. On the distribution of revenues, the PC provided that it would be agreed between the FGS and the FMS, but this remains an ongoing process. The result has been a fiscal regime with asymmetrical results, where the FGS collects and spends most of the revenues in Mogadishu and the surrounding region (Banadir) while the FMS collect and retain all taxes within their jurisdiction.

Figure 49: Somalia’s external public debt burden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Debt</th>
<th>Debt Arrears</th>
<th>Multilateral Creditors</th>
<th>Paris Club Creditors</th>
<th>Non-Paris Club Creditors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>2018</td>
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</table>

Sources: Somali authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
This anomaly is illustrated in Figure 49, showing that out of the 5 FMS and Somaliland, the states of South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle hardly collect any revenue; and the fact that Somaliland collects more revenue than the FGS. It is evident that those states with operational ports collect more revenue. Moreover, the main sources of revenue in all these jurisdictions are trade taxes (collected mainly in ports), non-tax revenues and taxes on goods and services. Revenues from income and corporates taxes are negligible, signifying weak tax authorities and some element of tax evasion/avoidance. The FGS and FMS also levy similar, but un-harmonized tax rates. These issues are being addressed through the FGS/FMS Intergovernmental fiscal forum (IGFF) established to harmonize tax rates and address other related issues, such as harmonization of fiscal, budget and accounting frameworks, and revenue sharing. It should be noted that municipalities also collect, though insignificant, revenues from charges for services, property rates, licenses, rent and market taxes.

Figure 50: Revenue Collection by FGS and FMS

![Revenue Collection Chart](chart.png)

Source: IMF estimates and Somalia Authorities

In spite of the absence of a revenue sharing framework the FGS budget allocates resources for revenue transfers to the FMS. The allocations rose from US$22.8 million in 2017 to US$27.6 million in 2019, but declined as a percentage of total revenue from 9.2 percent to 8 percent during the same period. Of note is that Banadir gets the largest allocations, followed by Puntland and that even Somaliland gets some nominal revenue allocations (Figure 51).

Figure 51: FGS Budget Revenue Transfers to FMS (% of total transfers)

![Revenue Transfer Chart](chart2.png)

Source: FGS Budget Appropriate Act, 2019
Under the IGFF arrangements progress has been made in promoting cooperation between FGS and FMS. This has led to a natural resource sharing agreement reached in Baidoa in June 2018 and a fisheries and revenue sharing agreement in March 2019 in Addis Ababa. Legislative Bills on revenue harmonization and revenue administration have been tabled in Parliament to bolster cooperation on fiscal matters. More substantially, the Council of Ministers’ Inclusive Politics Forum is reviewing possible fiscal federalism models that could be adopted for Somalia. The outcome of this process will inform the constitutional review process with respect to fiscal federalism. The Forum will clarify functional assignments of FSG and FMS, mechanisms for revenue sharing, management of natural resources and public borrowing powers for consideration during the ongoing review of the Constitution under the Constitutional Review Process.

4. External Sector

As discussed in Chapter 7, traditionally the economy of Somalia is dominated by the agricultural sector and relies on imports for manufactured goods. Climate change therefore has had a great bearing on the country’s economic performance in recent years by diminishing the contribution of the agriculture to the economy. Moreover, the 22 years of civil war destroyed productive sectors and with it the country’s capacity to engage in external trade. As an example, the 2017 drought increased trade deficit from 75 percent of GDP in 2016 to 81 percent in 2017 (Table 24) as exports fell and imports rose. Exports fell from 25 percent of GDP in 2016 to 22 percent in 2017, but rose to 26 percent in 2018. Imports share in GDP increased from 100 percent in 2016 to 102 percent (mostly comprising food) in 2017, but declined to 100 percent in 2018, indicating that Somalia is a highly import dependent economy.

The 2016/17 drought devastated livestock exports. Live animal exports, which account for more than 70 percent of total export earnings, declined by 75 percent, from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 2.9 million in 2017. The contribution of the other exports, hides and skins, oil seeds, fruits, vegetables, and gums and raisins, were insignificant. These products are exported to a few traditional markets of Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Somalia’s top imports are sugar, rice, palm oil and wheat flour, cars, spare parts, clothes and footwear, electronics and construction materials. The leading sources of imports are the United Arab Emirates (30%), Ethiopia (12%), India (9%), China (7%), and Kenya and Oman (6%).

Despite the deterioration in the trade balance, the current account deficit remained unchanged at 9.0 percent of GDP in 2016 and 2017. The impact of the trade balance on the current account was offset by increased current transfers, mainly remittances and official transfers, which rose from 68 percent of GDP in 2016 to 72 percent of GDP in 2017 (Table 24).

The capital account is largely financed by foreign direct investments (FDI), which have been growing in double digits since 2015 signalling an enormous potential for investment in Somalia. Reduction in the levels of insecurity and improvements in the business environment should substantially increase FDI.
Table 24: Balance of Payments in Somalia, 2015–19 (Percent of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-102</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>-98</td>
<td>-98</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current transfers (net)</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private (net) incl remittances</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official (incl direct budget support)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital account and financial account</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Of which foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall balance</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMF estimates.

5. Sectoral Policies

Contributions at the sector level to the Somali economy are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. In this section a summary review is presented for those sectors which are the major contributors to the national economy through export earnings and tax revenues. Policy reforms to enhance the contribution of these sectors are important for macroeconomic stability.

5.1. Agriculture and livestock

The agriculture sector accounted for about 70 percent of GDP between 2013 and 2016, is the largest employer of rural households and the most important source of export earnings. Within agriculture, the share of the livestock subsector rose from 37 percent of GDP in the pre-war period to about 57 percent in recent years.

Crop production, the main activity of rural households, contributes 20 percent of GDP. However, productivity in the subsector is very low, largely due to dependence on rain water and low value chain development. Current production in the subsector is only 5 percent irrigated compared to 50 percent during the pre-war period. Productivity in the sub-sector will be improved through enhanced infrastructure investments, access to credit, inputs and extension services, promotion of climate-smart agriculture, and ultimately by reduction of conflict and insecurity.

The 2016–17 drought and the December 2016 Saudi ban on imports of Somali livestock led to huge reductions in earnings from livestock exports. Livestock exports dropped by more than 70 percent in 2017. Recent improvement in climatic conditions and the lifting of the Saudi ban in July 2018 are expected to promote foreign exchange earnings from livestock exports.
5.2. Fisheries

Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and the country’s large Economic Exclusive Zone is rich in high value fish which should be exploited for export. Foreign commercial fishing operators have taken advantage of a weak and absent government to fish in Somali waters without authority. In recent years some of these operators have been licensed in a non-transparent manner by some FMS. The government has reached agreement with FMS on licensing and the sharing of revenues from licence fees.

5.3. Oil and gas

Oil and gas exploration in Somalia has been ongoing since 1956, but insecurity, including piracy has discouraged oil exploration in recent times. Regulations governing the management of petroleum and mineral resources and especially ownership and revenue sharing, have been agreed between the FGS and FMS and are expected to improve accountability and transparency in the licensing of exploration of oil and gas.

5.4. Transport

Many years of civil war have damaged Somali infrastructure and it is estimated that it would take US$1.8 billion to bring it to good working condition. Increased urbanization in the country would yield high returns to infrastructure development as it would bring citizens close to markets and public services. Moreover, infrastructure to the interior will improve connectivity by linking rural to urban areas and Somalia to neighbouring countries, thus promoting local and regional trade. Development of airports and seaports will also improve connectivity, enhance productivity and lower costs of doing business. Ultimately development of the sector will lead to higher revenues and taxable income.

5.5. Telecommunications and ICT

The ICT sector makes up 11 percent of GDP and is a big employer, with over 25,000 employees in 2014. It has contributed to the growth of financial services, through mobile money services, including money transfers and payment of bills and services. In the past, licensing, frequency allocations and setting of spectrum fees in the sector have been informal, making it difficult to determine operator revenues and potential revenues from taxes and fees. It is estimated that enforcement of a legal framework for taxation and regulation would raise revenues of US$82.5 million to US$103.1 million annually. The government has now made it legally mandatory for operators to report revenues and international remittances delivered through mobile phones. This will enable tax authorities to raise more revenues from the sector by enforcing tax compliance.

5.6. Manufacturing & commerce

The manufacturing sector remains sluggish. Private investment is limited by both the difficult security environment and the harsh business environment. It faces one of the most expensive electricity rates in the world (between US 50 cents and US$1 per kilowatt hour) and some of the lowest access. These circumstances, coupled with security threats, have made it difficult to attract private investment or the technology needed for modern manufacturing. Low investments in the sector also contribute to the poor rankings Somalia receives from international rating agencies. The government is addressing these challenges through policy, institutional and legal reforms and by engaging rating institutions. The government is ready to provide the agencies with all the necessary information they require to undertake objective evaluation of policy development and implementation of reforms.

6.1. Introduction

It is estimated that Somalia’s real GDP grew by about 3.0 percent in 2018 and is projected to grow by 3 percent and 3.2 percent in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The outlook going forward is dependent on maintenance and consolidation of the security gains achieved in the recent past, improvements in weather and agricultural production, a gradual increase in private investment, continued support to the government by development partners, and improved revenue collection.

The growth recovery is also set to continue beyond 2019, lifted by gains from ongoing reforms. Rising domestic demand, remittances, and donor inflows and consolidation of peace and security are expected to drive growth in the medium-term.

Achieving higher growth will however require acceleration of structural reforms, aimed at improving fiscal policy and public financial management; social inclusion through enhanced provision of basic services; and improved resilience of the agriculture sector. In this regard:

- FGS will continue building fiscal buffers needed to provide basic service; broadening the tax base and enhancing compliance, and reducing wasteful expenditures.
- Human development programs will emphasize reduction of infant and maternal mortality, increased enrolment and transition rates at all levels of education, and availability of clean water and sanitation.
- Resilience of the agriculture sector will be developed through irrigation and better water management, land management, environmental protection, improved agricultural technology and extension.

6.2. Risk analysis

Although economic growth is improving, Somalia remains fragile, as ongoing security challenges continue to impede economic activities. Below are risks that may weigh on the country’s growth prospects.

**Security remains a concern:** Insecurity in Mogadishu and southern Somalia continues to pose significant risks to economic activity in the medium term. Al-Shabaab remains a resilient force, diminishing prospects for development activities. The FGS will continue building the capacities and capabilities of the security forces to improve security in Mogadishu and will work with Federal Member States to enhance stability across the country.

**Rising oil prices:** it is projected that oil prices will hover around US$62-63 in 2019–2020 and remain at or above that price in the medium-term. This could affect both production and consumption and undermine Somalia’s growth prospects.

**Impact of drought and floods on agriculture:** the country relies on rain fed agriculture for crop development and regeneration of pasture and water resources for livestock. However, heavy rainfall and subsequent flooding leads to fatalities, massive displacement, and damage to infrastructure and cropland. Similarly, prolonged droughts destroy the livelihoods of farmers and pastoralists and expose the most vulnerable groups in society to deteriorating health and nutritional conditions. Building resilience to these shocks at the national and household levels is critical for reducing vulnerability over the medium term.
Weak implementation of structural reforms: weak institutional capacity, including inadequate capacity in the public sector may undermine domestic economic reforms. Strengthening institutional and legal frameworks is a prerequisite for successful reforms.

Political uncertainty: lack of trust among political leaders undermines broader political processes and may destabilize the fragile political settlement. This impacts negatively on policy making and the credibility of political leadership and ultimately on financial and investment inflows necessary for development. The government is putting in mechanisms to ensure the forthcoming elections are free and fair.

6.3. Medium-term macroeconomic framework

The medium-term economic and fiscal framework provides five year estimates (2020-2024) for national income and prices, FGS finances, and balance of payments (Table 27). This is followed by a detailed analysis of sources of revenues and expenditure items, including budget deficits and public debt over the same period (Tables 28 & 29). Allocation of budgetary resources by sector is provided in Table 30, while Table 25 outlines strategies and interventions for macroeconomic and fiscal reforms.

It should be stressed that analysis of Somalia’s economic development continues to be difficult, as reliable statistics are mostly unavailable. Most of recent macroeconomic data presented here are estimates by the FGS and IMF and at best should be interpreted as such. Discussions on data challenges and proposals to address them going forward are discussed in Chapter 13.

6.4. Growth prospects

The Somali economy has been on the road to recovery over recent years, driven by the private sector, donor assistance and public consumption. The recent recovery has been lifted by a rebound in the agriculture sector following the end of the 2016/17 drought and famine, and the robust growth of the construction, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Political uncertainty and continuing terrorist attacks particularly in Mogadishu, together with slow return to peace in many areas of the country remain a drag on the country’s economic growth.

Going forward a conservative stance is taken on growth prospects, with real GDP growth projected to increase by 3.0 percent in 2019, rising to 3.2 percent in 2022 and 3.5 percent thereafter to 2024 (Figure 51). Over this period, inflation is projected to decline from 3 percent in 2019 to 2.7 percent in 2020 and stay flat for the rest of the NDP-9 period.

6.5. Expenditure prospects

In the medium term prudent expenditure management will be applied, including implementation of pay reforms and expenditure controls in order to ensure operations and maintenance costs remain within budget. Funding of non-salary expenditures of the security sector will remain outside the Core Budget, but the Somali National Army and Police will be reformed. The sizable additional non-salary expenditures required to support the security sector will be financed from external aid. Payments for expenditure arrears, mostly related to unpaid salaries and allowances, totalling US$65.4 million will be given priority. In general, with a balanced budget policy regime, expenditures will be reallocated in favour of activities which are necessary for effective implementation of NDP-9.
Total expenditures increased from US$297.1 million in 2018 to US$340.10 million in 2019 (Table 28); and the trend will continue with total expenditures projected to rise from US$363.6 million in 2020 to US$436.5 million in 2022. Leading expenditure items are compensation to employees and purchase of goods and services (Figure 52). Expenditures on capital and transfers are low, but are also projected to rise as more resources are directed to development and promotion of fiscal federalism.

The share of compensation of employees will decline from 48.9 percent of the budget in 2018 to 45.3
percent in 2019 and are projected to stagnate at between 46 and 47 percent for the rest of the period (Figure 53). Similarly, expenditures on goods and services are projected to remain steady at 34 to 35 percent between 2019 and 2022. Expenditures on the other budget items will follow a similar pattern over the plan period.

Figure 54: Medium term expenditures by category (2018-2022)

6.6. Revenue prospects

The main source of domestic revenue is customs duties collected at the Mogadishu port and Mogadishu Aden Adde airport, amounting to US$5.5 million to US$8.5 million monthly. This is supplemented by sales tax on Khat, also collected at the port and airport, and income tax on government wages and salaries.

In the medium term the Government will increase tax revenues by reforming tax administration, expansion of the tax base, and customs reforms. In this respect, the federal government will issue licences to financial institutions, telecommunications firms (including telephone, TV and radio companies), airlines, large manufacturers and firms engaged in the import and export trade. This will assist in providing information for assessing tax liabilities of the companies. All businesses with fixed premises will be issued licences by local governments.

The tax reform program is estimated to increase domestic revenue collection from US$172.5 million in 2018 to US$286.5 million in 2022 (Table 28 & Figure 54). While the increase in revenue will more than double between 2017 and 2022, as a percentage of real GDP it would be 3.2 percent, a relatively miniscule ratio by international standards. Grants will continue to be a major source of revenue, but stabilizing around 45 percent and 46 percent of total revenue between 2019 and 2022. However, bilateral aid is projected to decline as a source of revenue from 36 percent in 2019 to about 9 percent annually between 2020 and 2022. Multilateral debt is in turn projected to rise from about 9 percent in 2019 to 36 percent annually between 2020 and 2022.
In terms of domestic revenue mobilization, the pattern of tax structure is assumed to remain unchanged in the medium term. Trade taxes will be the main source of domestic revenue, contributing US$97 million in 2019 and rising to US$147.8 million in 2022 (Figure 55). Similarly, non-tax revenue will be the second major source of revenue, contributing US$54.7 million in 2019 and rising to US$94.4 million in 2022. Income taxes remain the lowest source of domestic revenue. Over the medium term the FGS will implement major tax reforms to improve tax effort.

The following are some of the specific measures to reform the tax administration.

1. Strengthening, consolidating, and harmonizing the current tax system to enable FGS to extend collection of taxes outside Mogadishu and Benadir
2. Expanding the tax base and extending coverage to include all large taxpayers not currently paying taxes
3. Focusing on improving compliance among potential taxpayers and areas with the highest revenue yields
4. Simplification of the tax system to eliminate nuisance taxes, curb illicit levies, and avoid
double taxation
5. Introduction of income tax on the salaries of employees of registered private companies and hotels
6. Building of capacity of the tax and customs administration
7. Draft and pass necessary legislations
8. Strengthen the single Treasury account
9. Building staff capacity to implement reforms
10. Provide tax education and information to companies and individuals on their tax obligations
11. Encourage taxpayers to pay taxes by linking compliance to service delivery and development
12. Introduce corporate tax for all registered companies
13. Reform the tax regime to reduce loopholes and remove tax exemptions
14. Introduce strict controls to reduce mismanagement and corruption

The FGS will also review and finalize a revenue-sharing mechanism with Federal Member States, through the intergovernmental fiscal forum and the ongoing constitutional process. FGS and FMS will harmonize their tax regimes and FGS will develop capacity of local/district councils to mobilize local revenues.

6.7. Budget allocations by sector

Sector budget projections indicate the level of ambition in financing NDP sector priorities. Overall, in the medium-term, domestic revenues and on-budget donor support are not sufficient to scale up reallocation of budgets within sectors towards key NDP-9 priorities, such as the social sector and capital spending. Administration and defence and security sectors receive the largest budget allocations throughout 2019-2022 period (Figure 56). However, allocations to projects and the social sectors will rise over time; with allocations for projects rising from $48.7 million in 2019 to $84 million in 2022 and those to the social sector rising from $26.4 million in 2019 to $35.8 million in 2022.

Figure 57: Medium term sector budget allocations (2017-2022)

Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance of the Federal Government of Somalia

More specifically, allocations to the administration sector declined from 46.4 percent of the budget in 2017 to 38.9 percent in 2019 and are projected to remain at 37.7 percent thereafter to 2022. On the other hand, allocations to the defence and security sector rose from 36.5 percent in 2017 to 38.9 percent in 2018 and declined to 32.0 percent in 2019, where it is projected to remain to 2022.
Allocations to the social sector rose from 3.1 percent in 2017 to 7.8 percent in 2019 and will remain constant at 7.2 percent between 2020 and 2022. Allocations to the projects sector are projected to rise from 7.2 percent in 2017 to 14 in 2019 and are projected to rise annually at 17 percent during 2020-2022 period.

Figure 58: Budget allocation by sector (%)

7. Strategies and interventions for the macro-economic fiscal framework

The strategies for macroeconomic and fiscal framework relate to formulation and implementation of monetary and financial policies, and fiscal reforms are summarized in Table 25, below. This includes an outline of the interventions under each of the strategies.

8. Financing of NDP-9 priorities

Given the policy of balanced or surplus budget in the medium term, the FGS budget mainly finances recurrent expenditure with little available for development. Alternative sources of funding will have to be found to supplement the government’s budgetary resources to finance implementation of NDP-9 priorities. One source for consideration is the off-budget development expenditures by the development partners.

Total donor expenditures on NDP-8 pillars amounted to US$1,371.1 million and US$1,135.8 million in 2017 and 2018, respectively and are projected to decline to US$941.6 million in 2019. The largest expenditures (Figure 58) go to the resilience pillar (disaster management, food security, social protection, environmental protection, and migration and refugees). This is followed by social and human development (education, health and nutrition), effective institutions (public administration, PFM and Planning, M&E and statistics), and peace, security and rule of law. Economic growth (agriculture/fisheries/livestock, employment and skills development, and private sector development) and infrastructure (transport, energy, ICT, water and sanitation) gets the least support.

The relatively high expenditure in 2017 is linked to the drought and famine which occurred in that year. This is indicated by the US$720.3 million allocated to the Resilience Pillar, which has since declined as the impact of the drought receded. While allocations to the social sector have progressively increased, allocations to peace and security and effective institutions pillars have declined over the last two years.

In developing NDP-9 priorities, attention has been paid to aligning the pillar strategies and interventions to OPM roadmaps; priorities and plans of FGS ministries; and interventions outlined by the RRF.
However, the costing of implementation of priorities has not been carried out pending further work, including consultations between the FGS and the development partners and the IMF.

Table 25: Macroeconomic and fiscal reform strategies and interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Monetary Policies and Financial</td>
<td>Complete currency reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services Oversight</td>
<td>Reforms financial services to enhance transparency and competitiveness of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve transparency of mobile money transfer services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen regulatory and oversight capacity of the Central Bank of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Fiscal Framework</td>
<td>Initiate and complete debt relief negotiations under the HIPC Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broaden the tax base and enhance compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review expenditure reforms to increase budgets for social services, economic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>development and capital investment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase revenue transfers to FMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGS and FMS to harmonized taxes, licenses and regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 59: Donor funding of NDP-8 Pillars

Considering that the resource envelope in the national budget is not sufficient to finance the
implementation of the plan, it is proposed that donors are approached to align ODA expenditures to NDP-9 priorities. Donor support of NDP-9 priorities is expected to be in line with the current support for NDP-8. What would be required is an agreement on a mechanism for monitoring the donor financing and implementation of the plan; and a modality for evaluating the impact of the support.

It is anticipated that discussions on the financing of NDP-9 with the donors and IMF will guide the FGS in clarification of the projects and programmes aligned to the plan priorities and ultimately in the costing of the priorities. The proposal is to review and agree on the priorities outlined in pillar chapters and thereafter develop costings of each pillar or where possible each strategy. This process will be concluded by June 2020.

**Table 26: Government investment budget for NDP-9 year one**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Business Environment</td>
<td>Legislation, Regulations, Capacity Development in FGS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving Macro-Economic framework</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PENDING</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Regulatory Framework</td>
<td>Hiring and training of enforcement personnel; regulatory monitoring systems; investment in judicial services, establishment of Commercial Court</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving oversight of financial services to better facilitate remittances</td>
<td>PENDING</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Federalization</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>25%</td>
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<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Power Master Plan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Water management projects (including river management and irrigation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PENDING</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td>Pre-requisite investments</td>
<td>Statistical Function</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Identification provision</td>
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<td></td>
<td>PENDING</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<td>TOTAL for 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>PENDING</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>100%</td>
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Table 27: Somalia: Selected economic and financial indicators, 2016-2022

(IMF Quota = SDR 44.20 million; Population: 13 million, 2015 estimate)
(Poverty Rate: n.a.; Main Export: Livestock)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP in millions of U.S. dollars</td>
<td>4,198</td>
<td>4,509</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>4,958</td>
<td>5,218</td>
<td>5,507</td>
<td>5,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP, annual percentage change</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP in U.S. dollars</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer prices (e.o.p., percent change)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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</table>

Central government finances 1/

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Percent of GDP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue and grants</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants 2/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure, of which:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of non-financial assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall balance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock of domestic arrears</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Central bank assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Millions of U.S. Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign assets (gross)</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Reserves of the Central Bank</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Foreign Assets, excl. IMF</td>
<td>21.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBS Liabilities to Government</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Percent of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>-74.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>-99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt</td>
<td>105.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market exchange rate (SOS/USD, e.o.p.)</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Somali authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

1/ Budget data for the Federal Government of Somalia. Fiscal operations are recorded on a cash basis. GDP data cover the entire territory of Somalia.
2/ Includes only donors’ support provided to the Federal Government of Somalia through treasury accounts at the Central Bank of Somalia.

3/ Includes Treasury deposits, grants, and asset recovery balances.

Sources: Somali authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Revenue and Grants</strong></td>
<td>297.1</td>
<td>340.1</td>
<td>373.7</td>
<td>409.3</td>
<td>449.5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Revenue</strong></td>
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<td>189.9</td>
<td>220.9</td>
<td>251.5</td>
<td>286.5</td>
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<td>127.9</td>
<td>135.20</td>
<td>154.4</td>
<td>175.8</td>
<td>200.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax on Income, Profit and Capital Gains</strong></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxes on goods and services</strong></td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxes on international trade and transactions</strong></td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>141.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Taxes</strong></td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Tax Revenue</strong></td>
<td>44.47</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grants</strong></td>
<td>124.60</td>
<td>150.2</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>157.7</td>
<td>162.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral</strong></td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral</strong></td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>120.2</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>129.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>297.1</td>
<td>340.1</td>
<td>363.6</td>
<td>399.2</td>
<td>436.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compensation of Employees</strong></td>
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<td>154.1</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>184.6</td>
<td>206.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Purchase of Goods and Services</strong></td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>126.3</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>153.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers (Grants)</strong></td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other expenses</strong></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net lending and repayments</strong></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 29: Somalia: Federal Government Operations, 2016–2022 (Percent of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Revenue</td>
<td>67.10</td>
<td>57.50</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>55.20</td>
<td>55.10</td>
<td>54.20</td>
<td>54.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue</td>
<td>52.70</td>
<td>45.10</td>
<td>47.80</td>
<td>39.30</td>
<td>39.20</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>38.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on goods and services</td>
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<td>10.30</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>45.40</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td>28.20</td>
<td>28.20</td>
<td>26.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Tax Revenue</td>
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<td>15.90</td>
<td>15.90</td>
<td>16.20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42.50</td>
<td>36.90</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>44.90</td>
<td>45.80</td>
<td>46.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>26.80</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>8.90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>18.60</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>36.90</td>
<td>37.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation of Employees</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>52.50</td>
<td>50.10</td>
<td>45.30</td>
<td>38.10</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>28.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of Goods and Services</td>
<td>41.10</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>28.10</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>29.50</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>24.10</td>
</tr>
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<td>Capital</td>
<td>3.50</td>
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<td>8.00</td>
<td>19.70</td>
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<td>Transfers (Grants)</td>
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<td>9.50</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>15.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other expenses</td>
<td>1.20</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net lending and repayments</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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</table>

Sources: Somali authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.
Table 30: Budget allocation by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
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<td>114.48</td>
<td>133.94</td>
<td>155.72</td>
<td>171.29</td>
<td>188.42</td>
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<td>Administration Sector</td>
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<td>104.18</td>
<td>110.77</td>
<td>130.57</td>
<td>143.63</td>
<td>157.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence and Security Sector</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>24.37</td>
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<td>Economic Sector</td>
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<td>26.39</td>
<td>29.57</td>
<td>32.53</td>
<td>35.78</td>
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<td>77.22</td>
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<td>Projects Sector</td>
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<td>42.72</td>
<td>38.91</td>
<td>37.73</td>
<td>37.73</td>
<td>37.73</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32.18</td>
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<td>31.64</td>
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<td>Economic Sector</td>
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<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Sector</td>
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<td>4.43</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>7.17</td>
<td>7.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Projects Sector</td>
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<td>6.98</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td>17.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Somali authorities
CHAPTER 10: IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

1. Introduction

NDP-9 sets out a broad agenda of political, security, rule of law, economic and social development, and governance interventions that together, as described in the theory of change (Chapter 4), will significantly reduce poverty and vulnerability in Somalia.

Chapter 3 describes poverty in Somalia as a complex phenomenon that is experienced in multiple, interrelated dimensions. These are monetary poverty, a low level of education, a low standard of living, and limited access to water, sanitation and health services. Based on this description, nearly all Somalis experience poverty of one kind or another, while 70 percent of the population experience poverty in 2 or more dimensions.

Moreover, the depth and severity of poverty in Somalia point to extremely high levels of vulnerability within the population, meaning that relatively small shocks and perturbations can easily send poor households into destitution, and nearly-poor households into poverty, from which they will struggle to recover. But Somalia too often is subject to severe shocks, whether arising from natural disasters driven by climate change and environmental degradation, or from conflict, insecurity and displacement caused by the country’s political and economic fragility.

The scale and complexity of poverty in Somalia, combined with still-nascent government capabilities and capacities, significantly increase the challenge of plan implementation. To meet this challenge, we proposed to adopt an implementation approach based on 3 guiding principles.

The first principle is that implementation will be multi-dimensional. Government and partner interventions, at national and state levels, while composed of the strategies described under the four pillars, will be programmed and coordinated to reflect explicitly the conclusions of the stakeholder consultations, poverty analysis and theory of change that underpin NDP-9, and to align with the regional and national priorities identified by the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF).

The second principle is that implementation will preserve national ownership and be commensurate with government capacities. This does not mean that interventions will all be government-managed, or small; government will work with development partners in a manner that effectively multiplies its capacity and allows interventions to be taken to scale. Ultimately, however, interventions conducted under NDP-9 must be fully owned by government.

The third principle is that interventions will be focused and demonstrate progress against one or more indicators contained in the NDP-9 results framework. In this regard, the ambition of NDP-9 demands an incisiveness of its interventions that will be best achieved through very clear articulation of targets, outputs and outcomes and how these contribute to the goals of NDP-9.

Adherence by Government and its development partners to these 3 principles will help address the challenges of scale, complexity and capacity, and will enhance implementation effectiveness.
2. Implementation Framework

2.1. Context

The past seven years have been a period of establishment for the FGS and the FMS. For the first four years (2013-2016) there was no NDP, and the Somali Compact in effect took the place of a national development planning process. Implementation of the Compact’s five Peacebuilding and State Building Goals (PSGs), which depended almost entirely on development partner (DP) support, was managed through the jointly-owned Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), set up in 2014 as a national aid management and coordination architecture.

During 2016, the FGS led the preparation of Somalia’s first NDP since the 1980s, which was adopted in full by the newly elected Government in early 2017. The new NDP – NDP-8 as it was termed – ran for the three years 2017 to 2019.

At the same time, following the expiry of the Somali Compact at the end of 2016, the newly elected government agreed with international partners the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) and Security Pact, which included a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), based on a set of partnership principles, enabling actions, key themes and selected indicators drawn from NDP-8. The NPS retained the SDRF as the body responsible for the overall direction and delivery of NDP-8 and the NPS.

In this way, implementation and oversight of Somalia’s national priorities, as set out in NDP-8, rested with the jointly-owned aid management and coordination system, rather than being embedded fully within government as would ordinarily be the case. It was an arrangement born of necessity, given the government’s limited capacities and resources at the time. Going forward, responsibility for oversight of national development planning and related aid coordination shall be described in a new national aid policy and implemented through an aid architecture, which is being reviewed at the time of writing. Over the life of NDP-9, however, and as government capacities become more established, it can be expected that these responsibilities will start to migrate to sit more completely within Government.

2.2. Implementation strategy

The NDP-9 has adopted a six-fold implementation strategy, as described below.

Strengthen national to local structures and systems

The implementation of NDP-9 will need to be supported by effective and efficient technical working relationships between federal, state and district-level institutions. This applies equally to the delivery of social services, such as health, as it does to the strengthening of judicial systems and public financial management.

Such effective relationships will be built on a clear division of roles and responsibilities between federal and state-level government. That is, federal line ministries (FLMs) will be primarily responsible for policy development, vertical coordination with FMS, data collection and management, and monitoring. In addition, FLMs will develop standard operating procedures by which programme development and implementation will be managed.

FMS FLMs, on the other hand, will be primarily responsible for implementation of the initiatives (projects and programmes) by which national and state-level priorities will be met. FMS will in addition
be responsible for localising the frameworks, strategies and policies prepared by federal FLMs, and conducting state-level data collection and monitoring, all as set out in standard operating procedures.

**Joint Implementation**

For many years, Somalia’s public service needs have far exceeded the government’s capacity for provision. During this time, DPs have often formed close relationships with UN and non-governmental organisations (implementing partners), which have assumed the role of government in the provision of a range of public services: in particular, health, education, water and sanitation. In future, implementing partners will continue to play an important public service provision role, even as Government once again starts to have a significant service delivery function but with the objective of increased government implementation in a phased manner.

The implementation of NDP-9 offers **an opportunity for government and implementing partners to work more closely together to ensure the harmonised and quality-assured scaling up of public service delivery through government**. Under such joint implementation, all public service delivery interventions will be based on needs identification and design conducted jointly by government (FGS and FMS) and implementing partners, in compliance with the provisions of government sectoral policies and in alignment with national and FMS development priorities. Resource mobilisation through DPs will also be done in close liaison between the FGS. Initially, implementation may indeed be led by the implementing partner, but in a manner that explicitly strengthens government (FGS and FMS) service delivery capacities and systems. Finally, intervention monitoring and evaluation shall be conducted jointly and linked to FGS systems of data collection and management.

Joint implementation will become government policy, and over the lifetime of NDP-9 is expected to become the primary public service delivery modality. This policy will be developed in the course of 2020 and will be based on consultations with relevant stakeholders.

**Cost and prioritise**

A key to effective implementation of NDP-9 and development planning in the future will be the consistent and informed costing and prioritizing of strategies and policies so that commitments are made according to national means. In this regard, the preparation of NDP-9 has not been as closely informed by costs as should have been the case – a shortfall that reflects the Government’s still-developing fiscal, data management and planning capacities.

Going forward, therefore, implementation of strategies and policies contained in NDP-9 shall begin with a rigorous process of costing and prioritization of their constituent interventions – the programmes or projects that are the manifestation of strategy and that will ensure policies are delivered. Concurrently, strategy and policy development will be prioritized by applying criteria similar to those used to shape the choice of interventions in NDP-9. That is:

- Is the strategy/policy/intervention pro-poor?
- Will the strategy/policy/intervention be supportive of generating domestic revenue?
- Is the strategy/policy/intervention supportive of the NDP-9 cross-cutting policy imperatives?
- Will the strategy/policy/intervention support progress in more than one pillar of NDP-9?
- Is the strategy/policy/intervention consistent with the stakeholder consultations for NDP-9?
- Is this strategy/policy/intervention required before others in the pillar can be completed?
Applying such an approach will have the effect of properly grounding implementation of NDP-9 in fiscal reality (costing) and an ongoing consideration of the most pressing needs of the people. Furthermore, it will help to ingrain the practice of costing and prioritizing in development planning and related Government work processes.

**Apply area-based approaches**

At the local level, area-based approaches will be developed to target regions, identified by the FGS in consultation with FMS (see institutional arrangements, below), and prioritized in relation to the poverty analysis (that is, the needs of vulnerable populations) and a consideration of enabling factors such as security, political economy and resource availability (that is, opportunities). Note that the term “target regions” need not necessarily correspond to the country’s administrative regions, but to areas where government judges both needs and opportunities to be high. As such, targeted areas may either fall within a single FMS, BRA, or disputed area or may straddle administrative boundaries.

The intention will be to focus NDP-9 interventions on the regions so-targeted, in effect creating local developmental synergies that accelerate progress towards the three national priorities and/or that address one or more of the cross-cutting imperatives. Implementation will be incremental, focusing initially on a small number of target regions – perhaps one or two to begin with – so that confidence builds and early success can be demonstrated in a way that encourages the replication of the approach in other parts of the country.

As noted in Chapter 4 (Strategy Framework), NDP-9 is unable to address each and every priority need of each and every FMS. There will be some local priorities that will not fall within the scope of NDP-9 interventions. In such cases, and where feasible, unmet priorities will be reflected in FMS-level strategic plans. These will be formulated both to align with NDP-9 national priorities and cross-cutting imperatives, and, as resources and opportunity allow, to address other FMS-specific development needs.

While the scope of NDP-9 is necessarily constrained, government is firmly convinced that the focused, area-based rolling out of selected NDP-9 interventions by the FGS in partnership with FMS has relevance for all parts of the country. The approach, combined with the second and third elements of the implementation strategy (described below), will demonstrate that local poverty-reduction is possible and will start to create examples of success that can be scaled up and replicated across Somalia.

**Focus on the monitoring of development results**

The paucity of data available to Government on progress being made against development indicators contained in NDP-8 renders decision making difficult at many levels. At a technical level, government and DP officials struggle to know what works and what doesn’t, and what needs are being met and what needs remain. It follows that key decisions about resource allocation are not as informed as they need to be. As a partial result, aid spending in Somalia has tended to be sub-optimally balanced – or at least perceived to be so – with certain sectors appearing to attract a greater proportion of aid than other sectors, without any clear justification.

An emphasis on monitoring by government of a more accessible set of leading indicators, for which reliable and consistent data is available, is therefore needed. To this end, the Department of National Statistics and the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Planning, Investment and
Economic Development (MoPIED) will be mandated and resourced to provide improved information flows to aid policy and operational decision makers.

**Build core government functions**

The final element of the implementation strategy is to strengthen core government functions that are essential to meeting the demands of NDP-9 and to sustaining the progress achieved. The rolling out of NDP-9 interventions, therefore, will mainstream the building of selected federal and state-level government capacities. These will include:

- NDP oversight
- Results management
- Management of the humanitarian-development nexus
- Data management
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Aid management and coordination
- Performance management
- Communications

2.3. Cross-cutting policy imperatives

Chapter 4 outlined six cross-cutting policy imperatives, each of which is vital to achieving sustainable and inclusive national development. Summary coverage of how these policy imperatives have been represented in NDP-9 has been placed in implementation arrangements because for each of these imperatives it not only matters what interventions have been planned, but equally for which target group(s), for what purpose, and how the interventions will be implemented. For example, achieving greater gender equity is not merely a matter of having a few stand-alone interventions in each pillar, or even having a dedicated gender pillar, but an implementation question to be asked of each pillar and intervention.

The following chart outlines where each cross-cutting imperative is located in NDP-9. It also serves as a check on implementation arrangements for all stakeholders in project and programme design:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Pillars</th>
<th>Gender and Other Excluded Groups</th>
<th>Durable Solutions</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Humanitarian Interface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 1: Inclusive Politics and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Increased involvement of women, disabled and youth in:</td>
<td>Ensuring IDPs can vote; Ensuring IDPs are involved in CP review; provision of formal identifications</td>
<td>Water management security; Regional Water agreements</td>
<td>Water management security</td>
<td>Cooperation and Coordination with Development Partners features in all Pillar Chapter and in implementation arrangements. Reducing dependency on Humanitarian Agencies a focus of Pillar 4, improved Social Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties Government employment</td>
<td>Women and youth to be included in security forces, including police and judiciary.</td>
<td>Ensuring IDPs have access to legal aid and alternative dispute resolution</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior government employment (women)Community reconciliation efforts</td>
<td>Violent crime to be reduced, particularly GBV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pillar 2: Improved Security and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Youth employment and skills training, TVET and Stem programs</td>
<td>Development of urban infrastructure to improve electricity and water supply and affordability.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment in agriculture and water systems to promote employment for</td>
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<td>Pillar 3: Improved Economic Growth and Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Pillars</td>
<td>Gender and Other Excluded Groups</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved Social and Human Development</td>
<td>women and youth investment in fish processing plants (for women)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formalisation of micro and small enterprise to improve profitability and employment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved health priorities focused on maternal and early childhood health</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education focused on girls and youth (skills training)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social protection programs for the excluded</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Durable Solutions</th>
<th>Resilience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved Disaster Risk Management</td>
<td>Improved Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Health and Education</td>
<td>Improved Health and Education</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Humanitarian Interface</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions</td>
<td>Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Disaster Risk Management</td>
<td>Improved Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Health and Education</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Pillar 4: Improved Social and Human Development
- Pillar 5: Improved Economic Development
- Pillar 6: Improved Governance
- Pillar 7: Improved Humanitarian Interface
2.4. Institutional arrangements

As a means of managing and accelerating implementation of national priorities under NDP-8, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) has established four roadmaps, for inclusive politics, security and rule of law, economic development, and social development. The roadmaps align with the pillars of NDP-9, thereby harmonizing existing coordination frameworks within the country and positioning NDP-9 as the federal government’s principal tool for management and oversight of progress towards national development priorities.

With guidance from MoPIED, FGS ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) will align their programmes with NDP-9 priorities, strategies and interventions. As noted, these shall be costed, prioritised and sequenced to reflect budget ceilings and on-treasury aid flows and carried forward through the national budget. Oversight of budget execution will be the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Finance (MOF). Overall direction and policy coordination will be provided by the OPM.

Each FMS, under the leadership of its Minister of Planning (or equivalent), will establish state level roadmaps that set out state targets and milestones pertaining to the implementation of NDP-9 strategies and interventions, and those relating to other regional priorities contained in FMS strategic plans. As for the federal level, the targets will be reflected in state MDA plans and budgets.

Progress towards national development goals, as measured through the NDP-9 results framework (see Chapter 13), will result from budget implementation by government (federal and FMS) and off-treasury (but on-plan) programme implementation by development partners (through government or otherwise). This progress will be monitored by MoPIED, working in collaboration with FMS and BRA planning counterparts, and reported to the OPM, the National Development Council (NDC), and the SDRF Steering Committee (see aid coordination below).

2.5. Technical assistance

The NDP-9 implementation strategy represents a significant departure from that of NDP-8 and will require the Government to strengthen its performance across a range of functions. Inclusion in the strategy framework of a cross-cutting governance/institutional strengthening imperative recognises this challenge.

However, the building up of core government functions is a long-term undertaking, which will extend beyond the time span of NDP-9. Technical assistance from development partners will therefore form a critical part of the implementation strategy.

3. Relationship with international development partners

Since 2017, the international community’s contribution to Somalia’s development has been shaped by the New Partnership for Somalia (NPS) and an accompanying Security Pact, carried forward through a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF). As already noted, the MAF consists of a set of partnership principles, enabling actions, key themes and selected indicators drawn from NDP-8, and is reviewed bi-annually at the Somalia Partnership Forum (SPF).
During NDP-9 implementation, the SPF is expected to continue to be a forum for inclusive political dialogue between the government of Somalia and international partners at the highest level. The MAF shall be replaced by NDP-9 and it will reflect lessons learned from its implementation during 2017 to 2019, and shall continue to be a central feature in Somalia’s relationship with its development partners.

However, in addition to and ahead of NDP-9 implementation the Government will put in place a National Aid Policy. An inclusive and fully owned aid policy establishing the overall framework for development cooperation at the country level, agreed to by all key stakeholders, is essential for implementing international commitments on maximizing the effectiveness and results of development cooperation. Research shows in this regard that aid recipient countries need to adopt a strong aid policy to ensure balanced mutual accountability for results between governments and their development partners.

In Somalia, the absence of a national aid policy reduces the value that aid can contribute to the country’s development goals, for lack of a formal framework linking it to management of the government’s budget. It follows that high proportions of aid are managed off-budget by donors (via their own implementation agencies or civil society organizations). A national aid policy will help to channel development assistance flows through the budget, as well as to coordinate and monitor off-budget flows.

In addition, a strong aid policy strengthens partnership and is one of the criteria by which progress on mutual accountability is being measured as part the agreement reached by development partners in the follow up to the Busan conference.

3.1. Aid management and coordination

At the time of writing, the FGS is conducting a review Somalia’s aid architecture that will be dove-tailed with the development of the new National Aid Policy. The new aid policy and revised aid architecture will be rolled out together as central components of NDP-9 implementation arrangements under the leadership of the Federal Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development.

a) Current arrangements

In 2018, official development assistance (ODA) to Somalia totalled US$2.012 billion, or 27 per cent of the country’s gross national product (GNP). Of this amount, US$874.2 million was estimated to be development aid (rather than humanitarian aid). The management and coordination of development aid to Somalia, and oversight and guidance of the NDP, is conducted jointly by the FGS and DPs under the umbrella of the SPF, through the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) Executive Group. See Figure 59, below.

The SDRF currently consists of the following:

- The SDRF Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and a DP representative, usually a head of agency. The Steering Committee provides strategic oversight and guidance for NDP implementation; serves as a forum for FMS reports on state level progress.

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242 National aid policies: Key pillars of mutual accountability. A guidance note for stakeholders of development cooperation. Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015

243 Aid Flows in Somalia – 2019; draft aid flow mapping report, MoPIED
and challenges; monitors adherence to the New Partnership for Somalia; and acts as a governing board for three multi-donor trust funds, reviewing and endorsing pipelines and approving project funding decisions.

- Three multi-donor trust funds: the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF); the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF); and the African Development Bank Somalia Infrastructure Fund (SIF).
- Nine NDP Pillar Working Groups, co-chaired by FGS and DP representatives. The Working Groups provide sectoral and programmatic coordination, including the review and endorsement of funding proposals to the SDRF trust funds; promote knowledge sharing and policy coherence; and prepare NDP progress reports.
- The National Development Council (NDC) is a ministerial level forum for vertical intergovernmental coordination between FGS and FMS. The NDC, also plays an important role in preparing government for its participation in the SDRF and plays an advisory role to the SDRF Steering Committee.

The SDRF and CAS will require adjustment to reflect the content of NDP-9 and the outcome of the ongoing review of Somalia’s aid architecture.

Figure 60: Somalia's current aid architecture

The CAS Executive Group is co-chaired by the Prime Minister and a DP representative (usually an agency head), and is responsible for

- Strategic decision making; risk management; coordination on policy and mutual accountability
- Monitoring and supporting progress on milestones; agreeing on success criteria and timelines
- Overseeing coherent delivery of policy, technical/operational and financial support under six CAS work streams, or Strands:
Strand 1: AMISOM
Strand 2A: Defence
Strand 2B: Internal Security
Strand 2C: Justice
Strand 3: Stabilization/CRESTA
Strand 4: C/PVE

Current coordination and secretariat support to the aid architecture is currently as follows:

- Technical/programme coordination within the SDRF between the SDRF and CAS Executive Group is provided by MoPIED
- Secretariat and administrative support to the SDRF is provided by the Aid Coordination Unit, domiciled within the Office of the Prime Minister.
- Technical and secretariat support to the CAS Executive Group is provided by a CAS Secretariat.

The aid architecture is further supported by the tracking of aid flows by MoPIED, which has been conducted annually since 2015. The monitoring process has strengthened during the intervening period, as its underlying data collection and analysis processes have become more developed and as DP engagement has grown. As a result, the latest report offers a detailed account of humanitarian and development aid to Somalia in 2018, and a projection of funding likely to be available in 2019. The analysis breaks down aid flows by donor and location, looks at use of country systems and SDRF trust fund performance, and maps development aid against the pillars of the NDP-8.

In future, while the government’s tracking of aid flows will continue, the expected launch of the Somalia Aid Information Management System later in 2019 will start to bring the process online and offer a “real-time” picture of aid flows, rather an end of year snapshot of the past year and a partial estimate of the current year.

Accurate and dependable aid flow information will be a key component of the revised aid architecture and, along with the monitoring of development results (see below), is required for effective aid coordination and NDP oversight.

b) The revised aid architecture

At the time of NDP-9 preparation, the review of the aid architecture was still ongoing. However, it is likely to be a more streamlined version of what currently exists, with mandates of the constituent structures – committees, working groups – more clearly focused on the strategic purpose of aid management and coordination.

In this regard, the strategic purpose of the aid architecture is four-fold: (a) oversight and guidance of the NDP and NPS, (b) aid coordination, (c) partnership strengthening, and (d) programme coordination (e.g. the nexus). These strategic functions are supported by (d) SDRF trust fund governance, and (e) systems such as aid flow tracking, development outcome monitoring and the MAF (until December 2020 after which it will be replaced by NDP-9). This proposed purpose can be represented schematically, as in the figure below.

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244 The monitoring progress towards national development targets and partnership milestones.
245 The matching available resources with national development needs.
The purpose then becomes a fixed point of reference for the aid architecture, and is reflected systematically in the terms of reference of its constituent parts.

It is also expected that during the life of NDP-9 the aid architecture will support the establishment of a strong government-domiciled aid coordination function. Over the past seven years, this function has been assumed by the SDRF (at least for projects funded by the SDRF trust funds). Going forward, and as NDP-9 rolls out and the new National Aid Policy is put in place, the government will quickly seek further modification of the aid architecture to accommodate an evolution towards a properly empowered Somali aid coordination function. In such an arrangement, the MoPIED would be responsible for liaising with DPs to assess how a proposed intervention (programme or project) aligns with national development priorities, and if it does, to ensure that required horizontal and vertical coordination across government takes place.

4. The role of the private sector

Drawing on experience since 2016 of the Somali Public Private Dialogue (PPD)246, and building on the financing strategy of the RRF, the government will continue to explore the role of the private sector in reaching development targets.

The PPD is a structured and inclusive discussion between a set of relevant and local stakeholders that identify, prioritize, and recommend consensus and fact-based solutions to a specific need, challenge, or problem. It is a framework that structures the partnership between the Federal Government of Somalia and the private sector and guides both development impact and business benefits, going beyond what each stakeholder could have achieved individually. Key to its success is an environment where private actors and public officials can discuss the regulatory and competitiveness environment in structured and systematic conversations.

The RRF financing strategy attempts to mobilise new blended finance and alternative financing modalities in furtherance of the shift towards New Ways of Working (NWoW), Funding to Finance (F2F) and Maximizing Financing for Development (MFD). Such an approach assumes close collaboration

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246 See [http://somaliappd.com/](http://somaliappd.com/)
between five partners: governments; the private sector; Official Development Assistance (ODA) providers; non-governmental organizations; and banks.

In this regard, new strategic partnerships, including private sector, are critical to building sustainable capacities through knowledge transfers and technical advisory support. In support of building core government competencies in key economic and infrastructure areas, high feasibility opportunities for blended finance and options for realistic new strategic partnerships will be identified.

Therefore, working closely with potential new partners, and in consultation with development finance institutions – such as the IFC, the World Bank and the African Development Bank – the Government will identify and review high feasibility investments within NDP-9 that could be trialled for blended financing and other modalities. Such investments would in effect be pilots and would set the stage for wider adoption.

It is acknowledged that private investment in Somalia is beset with substantial risk. These risks not only reduce capital and commercial expansion, but they also starve the economy and communities of important opportunities for wealth creation. Overcoming the barriers to private capital in Somalia will, in part, occur once debt is forgiven and normal financial markets are restored. At the same time, because markets do not function very well, returns are often too low to warrant investment, and donors have focused on creating an enabling environment only, with direct collaboration between public and private funds being limited. Blended finance models have the potential to shift the investment risk-return profile with flexible capital and favourable terms, in key sectors identified in the DINA-RRF where such investments make sense.
1. Introduction

Fragile countries are particularly exposed to risks – the challenges are broad and deep compared to more stable jurisdictions and often the risks that created conflict in the past remain as threats to implementing national development plans.

Each pillar chapter has outlined the major dependencies for achieving progress, each of which represents a risk to be managed. The Macro-Economic chapter has also outlined some risks to growth. In addition to these pillar-specific risks, there are a number of higher-level risks which could hinder progress.

This chapter identifies risks under two broad categories: external and internal, and offers a risk mitigation plan.

2. Risk identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Identification</th>
<th>Risk Analysis</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td>Two specific climate risks are listed separately (drought and floods) but Somalia’s coastline, energy costs, and air quality are exposed to climate change impacts.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>Somalia’s traditional cycle of droughts has shortened considerably in the last decade. Somalia’s economy and households cannot withstand an increased frequency of shocks.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>In conjunction with drought, floods in river valleys have created economic and living hardships.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Economic slowdown</td>
<td>The US yield curve has inverted, signalling a possible economic recession in the coming year. Trade wars and recessions will impact funding and availability of capital for the NDP.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of Oil</td>
<td>An increase in the price of oil would impact growth prospects.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Conflict</td>
<td>National conflict rarely does not involve regional actors with vested interests in outcomes. As Somalia negotiates new federal arrangements and systems there are risks of influence and involvement from elsewhere. In addition to the risks of regional interests at work within Somalia there also exists risks of regional conflict outside of Somalia which go on to create economic, social and refugee pressures. (e.g. refugees from Yemen)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>There are several disease related risks which could jeopardize the NDP. Human disease, including measles, polio, HIV, tuberculosis. Livestock disease and crop disease are also</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Identification</td>
<td>Risk Analysis</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>Impact</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Fiscal</td>
<td>Efforts are underway to better manage fiscal arrangements within the Somalia financial system, but much remains to be done and there are significant macroeconomic risks.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary</td>
<td>The NDP outlines a number of monetary reforms, including currency reform. Having access to capital along with effective money transfer systems are key to progress and represent risks to the system.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Partner</td>
<td>The NDP outlines plans to grow domestic revenue but there will remain a funding gap for the duration of this plan. Somalia will need to rely on development partner support even as they develop their own capacity and revenue going forward. This will require ongoing cooperation and partnership even as relationships are redefined.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of plan</td>
<td>A national development plan, by definition, is broad in its ambition and puts forth strategies to deal with the numerous challenges. The breadth of interventions can pose an implementation risk.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Al Shabaab and other tribal based conflicts can place parts of Somalia off-limits for implementation.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-government relations</td>
<td>Negotiating agreements between levels of government is a key priority for achieving the NDP. Should these efforts stall or be subject to worsening relations there is substantial risk to domestic revenue arrangements and other necessary intergovernmental cooperation.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Capacity</td>
<td>The low starting point of government capacity at all levels places sustainable delivery at risk.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Implementation</td>
<td>Line Ministries, FMS stakeholders and local level government may not align annual workplans to the NDP, or align budgets to NDP priorities.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Establishing baseline data and developing capacity in all Ministries, and other levels of government, for annual review continues to be a point of vulnerability within Somalia government.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Risk Mitigation

The NDP pillar chapters outline plans to mitigate specific sectoral risks. The underlying analysis in each chapter outlines the challenges and highlights the priority interventions, chosen to directly address the risks. For instance the risk of livestock and crop disease is addressed by agricultural interventions,
including the possibility of introducing crop insurance, while health risks are covered through increased vaccination interventions and other disease prevention measures.

There are some important plan-wide risks, however, which require monitoring and managing. These include:

**Fiscal Risks:**

Somalia is making good progress on implementing Public Financial Management (PFM), tied to modern systems and policies and capacity. Increased transparency and a settled revenue sharing system along with a harmonized tax base are critical to funding the plans in the NDP, and to providing political and security stability, as well as attracting foreign investment. Completing PFM is a key risk-management priority for the entire NDP.

**Environmental Risks:**

The consequences of drought and floods are widespread, impacting the economy, domestic revenue, livelihoods, and leading to displacement and human misery at the individual, household and community level. Climate change is a global phenomenon and risk, but NDP-9 outlines priority interventions in each pillar to both prevent and respond to environmental crises. These include water management investments as well as investment in renewable energy for Somalia.

**Implementation Risks:**

NDP-9 has incorporated lessons from NDP-8 and applied a methodology and set of criteria to reduce the total number of interventions. More importantly the interventions were chosen for their interdependency with other pillar areas – i.e. selected because progress in them would also concurrently deliver progress in at least one other pillar area. Finally the implementation approach helps mitigate risk: in taking a multi-dimensional approach at a local level the NDP supports a joint effort by implementation partners without having to create specific projects and budgets. The funding risks are lessened and the risks of projectization are also reduced.

The Mid-Term Review of NDP-8 discussed that it was unclear, and perhaps doubtful, that line ministries and other government entities had aligned their workplans to the priorities of the NDP. The methodology adopted by NDP-9 mitigated this risk through extensive consultations in all rounds of developing the plan and worked with line ministries to each identify only three workplan priorities under the strategies developed in the NDP. It is intended that FMS planning ministries align to priorities and strategies rather than specific interventions. Also, the OPM roadmaps were used to align pillars and strategies to ensure harmony between the two initiatives.

**Monitoring and Evaluation Risks:**

One of the early priorities of NDP-9 is to invest in the collection and management of data, and the capacity of the National Directorate of Statistics to ensure an extensive baseline of performance data is collected and analysed. This investment is concurrent with investment in surveys and production of national IDs in order to establish beneficiary registries and track individual and household supports in poverty reduction.
External Risks:

The table of risks outlined a number of significant events that lie well outside the control of any single actor. These include climate events, regional conflict, epidemics, refugee influx, and world economic slowdown amongst others.

As indicated earlier, the pillar chapters contain interventions meant to mitigate risks and increase resilience. Water management systems will assist with the impacts of drought and flood; renewable energy against the cost of fossil fuels; ongoing reconciliation at community level and establishing working agreements with all levels of government helps reduce security and political conflict. Many other examples are offered in pillar chapters.

However in the event of a crisis impacting the progress of the NDP in spite of mitigation, it will be important to have these following principles operational:

- Early warning systems where possible, particularly for drought and conflict/displacement signals
- Ongoing monitoring of key indicators, including health, economic and poverty ones
- Ongoing dialogue with development partners at local level
- Ongoing and regular coordination meeting with development partners in order to respond quickly to emerging threats
- Pipeline initiatives which are pre-approved and pre-funded to launch in times of crisis

4. Next Steps

The low level of resourcing currently available for government investment substantially increases the risk of slow progress against aspirational targets. The macro-economic targets have been conservative in nature while the poverty reduction target is aspirational and dependent on economic growth and employment growth within the five-year time frame.

NDP-9 is an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy – it has been published as a learning document, one that requires ongoing review and course-correction, as more answers are provided to outstanding questions. As with the Monitoring and Evaluation framework, which is intended to be reviewed periodically and often in order to be deepened and amended as required, so too will the risk management framework. NDP-9 will be responsive to new and developing risks, amending direction as required. It will be reviewed at least annually through the five-year time frame.
1. Progress since NDP-8

The Somalia National Development Plan of 2017-2019 outlined the data gaps and challenges associated with monitoring progress, and the plans in place to strengthen the national monitoring and evaluation system. These initiatives included:

- A M&E Framework for monitoring NDP-8
- A M&E Policy – establishing the requirements, roles and capacity development required to establish government-wide systems of monitoring and evaluation

Since the publication of NDP-8, progress has been made on three fronts:

1. The M&E Policy was finalized and adopted (as outlined in a later section)
2. The Directorate of National Statistics (DNS) has deepened its capacity and regular data collection for use by a wide range of stakeholders.
3. A national M&E Strategy was completed and approved.

The DNS compiles four annual (or more frequent) data sets, and a further number on a more periodic basis:

**Table 31: Surveys carried out by FGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Most recent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
<td>To measure inflation</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Trade</td>
<td>Trade data (Import and Export)</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Statistics</td>
<td>Education, Health and Gender Statistics</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual National Statistics and Gender Statistics Booklet</td>
<td>Summary headline data (Somalia Facts and Figures)</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Population Census</td>
<td>Household and individual characteristics</td>
<td>Ten years</td>
<td>2014 – funds are being sought to complete a Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Census</td>
<td>Agricultural Holdings and Building Survey</td>
<td>Ten years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Budget Survey</td>
<td>Household survey</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>2017 – a further survey is planned for early 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Survey</td>
<td>GDP and national accounts</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>1985 – plans are at an early stage to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
26. Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Most recent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
<td>Working age person’s economic activity</td>
<td>Periodic</td>
<td>2015 – a further survey is pending and will be complete in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Demographic Health Survey</td>
<td>Health, fertility, mortality, morbidity and population growth</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>2018 – results pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey</td>
<td>Household cycle survey on women and children</td>
<td>Five years</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Registration and Vital Statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Currently under construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Survey</td>
<td>Employees of Enterprise Survey including Labour Force indicators</td>
<td>Periodic</td>
<td>Under discussion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ongoing and planned initiatives are covered later in this chapter. Given the significant surveys that are currently underway and will be completed by early 2020 (particularly the Labour Force Survey and the Demographic and Health Survey) the M&E framework in NDP-9 will be updated regularly with additional indicators and baselines incorporated as they are finalized.

2. Principles for the M&E framework

As outlined in prior sections of the NDP, there is a need for continued institutional strengthening of DNS and other statistical offices across FGS (along with FMS and district governments). A dearth of available data hampers the ability of government and partners to target appropriate interventions, establish evidence-based policies and to monitor progress.

Lessons learned in completing mid-term reviews of NDP-8 included the risks associated with including baseline metrics provided (and collected) by development partners. Government has no access or control over the surveys or raw data and tracking progress against targets proved difficult. A number of principles were established for NDP-9 to mitigate the risks of the M&E plan:

1. To limit the baseline data and targets to metrics endorsed by government and nationally collected. In this way progress against the plan can be monitored.
2. To limit the initial M&E framework to a small number of strategic baselines and targets linked to high level objectives (this is covered in more detail below). This table is titled M&E Framework at the Strategic Level.
3. To present a secondary “pipeline” table as a roadmap for development for the statistical function in government (this is covered in more detail below). This table outlines baseline indicators by pillar area and provides an indication, where possible, on when the baseline data will become available.

4. To make institutional strengthening not only a key component of the M&E plan but of the national development plan itself (this is covered in more detail below).

5. To map all indicators, pipeline and current ones, to SDG indicators. The choice to use SDG targets allows NDP-9 to be aligned to development partners within a common global framework, making alignment of funding and interventions straightforward. This table is presented in Annex 3.

6. To not establish targets in the first iteration of the M&E Strategic Framework. This is based on two limiting factors: costing of NDP-9 was limited to a one-year time frame, and the budget was limited to US$10-15 million in the first year. Meaningful targets in most areas were not possible given these constraints. A later discussion outlines the intentions for deepening the M&E framework over the five-year scope of the NDP. Macro-economic targets have been included, however, based on the agreed three-year projections.

7. Though targets have not been established for many of the strategic indicators, the intention is to monitor progress against the baselines on a regular basis (minimum every year, but within six months of publication) to track whether progress is going in the right direction. Once trends have been confirmed, and spending increased in priority strategies, meaningful targets can be established by government.

These last two principles are consistent with NDP-9 being an interim PRSP compliant document. Given the incipient nature of available data and statistical collection by FGS, NDP-9 will be in a stronger position to increase the number of pillar-related baseline indicators along with targets as the plan unfolds.

The high-level strategic M&E framework is limited to 13 Indicators, which have an endorsed baseline and an ongoing monitoring plan, linked to many of the most important strategic lever points of the NDP.

3. The 2030 Agenda

As with NDP-8, this plan has made extensive use of the 2030 Agenda, not only for the M&E Framework but for the mapping of initiatives and linkages to ensure that strategic management of the initiatives takes place at the programme and strategic level, rather than through proliferation of projects. Tackling the poverty issues of Somalia must take place on a multi-dimensional basis, as provided through the SDG framework.

With the vast number of signatory nations committed to making progress on each of the 17 SDGs there is a wealth of knowledge sharing, tools, experience and support for nations such as Somalia, who face unique challenges in their security and natural disaster fragilities.

Somalia has been a member of the g7+ network since 2010. The g7+ member countries share common challenges through conflict, climate change vulnerability and other fragile conditions. Many of these fragile states made little or no progress on MDGs and were determined that the 2030 Agenda wouldn’t face a similar fate. Through their advocacy SDG 16 was incorporated into the 2030 Agenda, with its focus on peace-building and state-building. The commitment of this group to the SDGs is not framed in terms of adding this work on top of the national agenda, but rather recognition that harnessing the
framework and goals is the path to sustainable development. In 2016 the g7+ committed to joint monitoring of 20 key indicators, three related to SDG 16 and one further indicator for each SDG.

Annex 3 provides the M&E table with a roadmap of baseline indicators, along with suggested future indicators, aligned to the 17 SDGs. As the road-map table of indicators is completed, this SDG-linked matrix can also be reviewed and updated, complete with SDG relevant targets. It is important to note that this table is presented only as a guide for consideration by DNS and FGS. Some suggested indicators are based on official SDG indicators, but it is important that these be localized and defined appropriately for Somalia’s context. As such Annex 3 is not presented as an M&E plan, but rather as a guide for consideration going forward.

4. M&E Policy for Government

The government published its Monitoring and Evaluation Policy in December 2017 and its requirements guide the implementation of the monitoring, review, evaluation and reporting of and on NDP-9.

As presented early on in the policy, the requirement for robust M&E systems within government are not merely a means to an end (ie. not merely as compliance or best practice) but rather at the core of implementing sustainable development within the country. Weak data allows chaos and a proliferation of temporary projects to clutter the development field, while robust data exposes entry points, catalysts for change and tailored approaches.

The adoption of the policy allowed Somalia to make its first step away from voluntary data collection and reporting to the re-establishment of a national, mandatory system. The policy requirements apply to all member states, line ministries and government agencies.

The policy also spells out:

- Conduct of monitoring and evaluation in the public sector
- Roles and responsibilities of key actors in mainstreaming monitoring and evaluation of public sector programmes and projects
- Creation of supporting institutional structures for monitoring and evaluation systems
- Reporting framework (and frequency) in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public sector programmes and projects
- Monitoring and evaluation capacity building

MoPIED is the custodian of the policy, the Directorate of National Statistics has the legislative mandate for the collection, dissemination and publication of national statistics, while the Directorate of M&E has the mandate for oversight of all monitoring and evaluation in the national system.


Completed in August of 2017, the strategy document lays out the four-year plan to strengthen DNS based on the report’s assessment, including the following goals:

247 Full policy is contained in Annex 4
Overall goal – to make DNS an authoritative source of accurate, reliable and timely official statistics on Somalia that satisfies the needs of different data users.

Accomplished through:
- Improved data production and dissemination
- Strengthened statistical coordination
- Established conducive statistical environment
- Strengthened human resource development and management

6. Objectives, Roles and Responsibilities for Monitoring the NDP-9

The objectives of M&E of NDP-9 remain the same from NDP-8:

i. To inform the development and the design of policies programmes and projects set out in the NDP
ii. To improve the performance of the public sector through the production and use of objective information to effectively and continuously monitor the performance of the NDP and evaluate its impact
iii. To enhance the basis for policy makers and planners to make evidence-based policy, planning and programmatic decisions
iv. To promote accountability and transparency and improve the confidence of the Somali people in the capability of government to account for results based on reliable information;
v. To generate knowledge and ensure policy makers know about what works and does not work for wider application, and for building new theories and models
vi. To strengthen partnerships for the supply and demand of information and promote cross learning
vii. To create a new culture of learning from mistakes and increase data demand and information use through changing the mind-set of the leadership and the managers

The roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder in the M&E of NDP-9 adhere to roles and responsibilities laid out in the national M&E Policy.

6.1. Statistics function

The National Director of Statistics has the prime responsibility for collecting and/or consolidating statistics gathered from line ministries or other agencies as related to the indicators for NDP-9. Line ministries, member states, local governments and other government agencies, have a duty to collect up the management information relevant to the NDP as outlined in the M&E Policy and as directed by NDS and MoPIED. Coordination with development partners will be vital as the FGS expands its capacity to collect and maintain management information on a sustainable basis. As outlined in the Governance pillar chapter, there is an urgent need to invest in institutional strengthening in this function, both within the DNS and line ministries. There is also a clear and present priority for the Government to (i) unconditionally have access to all data collected in the country, (ii) set definitions of variables and methodologies on a national level as a pre-requisite for government endorsement and (iii) set nationally adhered quality control measures on data collection.
6.2. Monitoring function

Each stakeholder, as outlined in the M&E Policy, has a duty to collect and monitor its relevant management information contained in NDP-9, as requested by MoPIED. The stakeholders must also ensure a budget is established for the staffing and operational costs of monitoring the relevant NDP initiatives and management information. Overall monitoring of the NDP is the responsibility of MoPIED. The chapters on Aid Coordination and Implementation outline joint responsibilities for monitoring implementation.

7. M&E Plan

Two tables have been included in this chapter for the M&E Plan.

The first table (below) outlines the strategic M&E framework for NDP-9. Indicators have been selected for this framework which:

1. Are linked to many key priorities for the NDP
2. Have a robust and endorsed baseline
3. Are able to be monitored immediately and ongoing through national collection/access. These include:
   a. Indicators currently being collected & monitored by government
   b. Indicators being collected by government in partnership with international stakeholders.
      (What are not included are indicators collected by international stakeholders, as government has no ongoing access to these figures for monitoring or verification purposes)
4. Are significant measures of reducing poverty or achieving national objectives.

Many are macro-economic in nature. Macro-economic data is being tracked by government with the support of the World Bank and the IMF. Social indicators will be collected regularly by government in partnership with the WB and Statistics Sweden in late 2019 and early 2020. Eventually this will transition to a regular Household Budget Survey completed by DNS.

One inclusion exception has been made to the Strategic M&E Indicator table: employment baselines will be completed by October, 2019 in the ongoing Labour Force Survey being completed by the ILO and FGS. Four employment indicators have been included at the end of the first table without baselines, given the importance of economic development and employment growth to NDP-9 and the anticipation of being able to complete the baselines before the end of 2019.

A second table has been included in the M&E plan, which serves as a roadmap table for completion by government over time. These indicators are gathered under pillar headings.

It’s important to note there are three current or planned surveys which will have a significant impact on the M&E indicators. These include:

1. The Labour Force Survey, planned for completion and release in December 2019
2. The Demographic and Health survey, planned for completion and release in December 2019

In addition the DNS has planned a national census for which they are seeking funding.
These surveys will be important sources for additional baselines within the first six months of 2020, and will serve to deepen the M&E framework. Information on pending surveys has been included for each indicator in both tables. The M&E framework is therefore being presented as a “living plan”, one that will be updated routinely (at least annually) and for which targets will eventually be completed.

The final set of indicators are output related measures, identified in each pillar chapter, which tend to be of a lower and binary level (yes/no completion) in order to track the progress of interventions. These tables can be found at the end of each pillar chapter.
### 7.1. M&E framework at the strategic level (million US$ where relevant)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Source/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP-9 strategic indicators</td>
<td>% of households deprived in two or more of these dimensions (monetary health, education and living standards)</td>
<td>Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment report (SPVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% living under $1.50 a day</td>
<td>SHFS-Wave 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs</td>
<td>Drought Impact and Needs Assessment Report (DINA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>Somalia Economic Update (SEU) #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid to GDP ratio</td>
<td>Aid Flows in Somalia report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Annual Domestic Revenue (TAR)</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Government budget allocated for social services (GSS)</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports of goods and services (in $)</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports of goods and services (in $)</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Indicator Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline Year</th>
<th>Source/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP-9 strategic indicators</td>
<td>% of households deprived in two or more of these dimensions (monetary health, education and living standards)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment report (SPVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% living under $1.50 a day</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment report (SPVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of IDPs</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Drought Impact and Needs Assessment Report (DINA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Somalia Economic Update (SEU) #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid to GDP ratio</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Aid Flows in Somalia report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Annual Domestic Revenue (TAR)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Government budget allocated for social services (GSS)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance report, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports of goods and services (in $)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports of goods and services (in $)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The interim baseline will be replaced in 2020 when Somalia government will complete a compliant MPI measure using the Alkire-Foster methodology using Demographic and Health Survey data.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Baseline Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export of livestock</td>
<td>$409</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Aid as a % of total ODA</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Aid Flows in Somalia, 2019 (MoPIED)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually in Aid Flows Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>$408</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remittance</td>
<td>$1,432</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of citizens with birth certificates</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>SHFS-Wave 2 calculation</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated in 2020 Household Budget Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment to Population Ratio (%)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth Unemployment Rate (males, females) (%)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Force Participation rate (%)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal/precarious employment rate (males, females, total)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Defined as those working without pension or health insurance coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2. Targets

As indicated earlier in this chapter, few targets will be established until baselines have been updated, and a basis on which to establish targets has been strengthened. However a few exceptions have been made.

Three-year macro-economic projections have been agreed with government and these targets have been included in the M&E strategic indicator table.

Also, a five-year poverty reduction target was established. The target is based on research conducted by DFID in 2008 which found, using comparative studies across dozens of developing countries, that a 10 percent rise in income would lead to a 20-30 percent drop in poverty (another comparative analysis showed for every one percent rise in average income there was a drop of 1.7 percent in national poverty rates).

The NDP-9 M&E framework has an aspirational target of a 20% decrease in poverty rates. During this five year time frame the poverty reduction will be dependent on increased employment and income levels of 10% per capita. This target is based on early and effective investment in economic growth and employment as supported by an improved enabling economic environment, more effective regulation, increased external confidence by investors, and investment in key economic sectors.

7.3. Roadmap M&E Table (by Pillar)

The following table presents possible indicators by pillar, some of which have no current baseline or ongoing collection or monitoring by government or in partnership with agencies. All of the indicators for which DNS has responsibility are mapped against relevant SDGs in Annex 3, and form an important template for completion, as indicators important to the measurement of progress in each of the four pillars, and thus for the poverty reduction strategy.

Health indicators in particular are out of date and will be updated in the upcoming Demographic and Health survey, to be completed in 2019. It will be important not only to update baselines of suggested indicators but to examine supplementing the suggested indicators with additional baselines from the survey.

A few indicators will be the responsibility of line ministries (such as crime statistics, judicial indicators, completion of pillar outputs) and a method for collection will be established in dialogue with the appropriate line ministries as part of the ongoing implementation of NDP-9.
### Table 32: Roadmap Indicator Table (by Pillar) - for review and completion periodically

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>SDGs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Baseline Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive and Accountable Politics</td>
<td>Deepening the Federalization Process Stabilization and Establishment of Local Governance Finalization, ratification and implementation of the Constitution Preparation and conduct of fair and credible elections in 2020 and 2024. Reconciliation Institutional Strengthening</td>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of FGS transfers to subnational jurisdictions (in $)</td>
<td>$23 M</td>
<td>Macroeconomic Chapter NDP-9</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>A line ministry responsibility to collect and monitor. To be agreed in discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% FGS meeting conditions of transfer</td>
<td>Baseline pending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Female employment in government (%)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>HR Audit report</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Female Employment in Grade A (%)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>HR Audit report</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Disabled employed by government</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>HR Audit report</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of local governments established</td>
<td>Baseline pending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A line ministry responsibility to collect and monitor. To be agreed in discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of FMS Development Plans completed</td>
<td>Baseline pending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A line ministry responsibility to collect and monitor. To be agreed in discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Security and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Reform of Security Forces Reform of Judiciary Embedded Human Rights Improving Access to Justice for the most vulnerable Protecting the most vulnerable</td>
<td></td>
<td>% reporting feeling very safe (disaggregated by group and demographics)</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be updated in 2020 Household Budget Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Commercial Court</td>
<td>Yes/no</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A line ministry responsibility to collect and monitor. To be agreed in discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Increase (decrease) in crime rate (Property, GBV, Assault, Murder)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police specific reporting. A household specific question may be included in upcoming surveys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Economic Development and Employment Growth</td>
<td>Create an enabling economic environment Sustainable food production Diversify private sector Sustainable communities Opportunities for disadvantaged</td>
<td>1 (Poverty) 5 (Empower Women) 7 (Energy) 8 (Prosperity) 9 (Infrastructure) 10 (Reduce Inequality) 11 (Sustainable Cities) 13 (Climate Change) 14 (Protect Oceans) 17 (Partnership)</td>
<td>% living under $1.90 a day</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>SHFS-Wave 2 (government endorsed)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated in new LFS by late 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data of 2019 LFS will be available by end Oct 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline Data will be available by Oct 2019</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pillar</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force Participation rate (%)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labour Force Participation rate (%)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Projected to be completed by October 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal/precarious employment rate (males, females, total)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal/precarious employment rate (males, females, total)</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td>Coming in 2019 LFS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Defined as those working without pension or health insurance coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of livestock</td>
<td>$409</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>Export of livestock</td>
<td>$409</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Annual Growth in Crop Production (in tons) – Southern Somalia only</td>
<td>76,700 tons</td>
<td>SEU #4 (figures sourced from FAO)</td>
<td>% Annual Growth in Crop Production (in tons) – Southern Somalia only</td>
<td>76,700 tons</td>
<td>SEU #4 (figures sourced from FAO)</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government to provide national estimates in economic updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Annual Growth in Livestock Production</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government to provide estimates in economic updates</td>
<td>% Annual Growth in Livestock Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government to provide estimates in economic updates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% households with access to electricity</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td>% households with access to electricity</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Household Budget Survey 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic revenue for FGS (in $)</td>
<td>$184 M</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Domestic revenue for FGS (in $)</td>
<td>$184 M</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometres of main inter-city, inter-state and inter-region rehabilitated/constructed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kilometres of main inter-city, inter-state and inter-region rehabilitated/constructed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with birth certificates</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>SHFS-Wave 2 calculation</td>
<td>% with birth certificates</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>SHFS-Wave 2 calculation</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be included in Household Budget Survey 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% mobile phone penetration</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be included in Household Budget Survey 2020</td>
<td>% mobile phone penetration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To be included in Household Budget Survey 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with access to mobile banking</td>
<td>70% urban 55% rural</td>
<td>SPVA</td>
<td>% with access to mobile banking</td>
<td>70% urban 55% rural</td>
<td>SPVA</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be included in Household Budget Survey 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exports of goods and services (in $) - annual</td>
<td>$675</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imports of goods and services (in $) - annual</td>
<td>($3,481)</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Government budget allocated for capital projects (FGS)</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>3.4% in 2022</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>$408</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remittance</td>
<td>$1,432</td>
<td>Central Bank</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abroad (Diaspora) remittance transfers (% of GDP)</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Doing Business Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Social Development</td>
<td>Improving Access to Health Care</td>
<td>1 (Poverty)</td>
<td>Amount of government budget allocated for social services (FGS)</td>
<td>$26</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>$35.8 by 2022</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Will be updated annually by Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving Education and Training</td>
<td>2 (Nutrition)</td>
<td>Prevalence of wasting (%)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>DNS (DHS Nutrition Survey)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be updated in December 2019 with completion of Health Demographics Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving Social Protection</td>
<td>3 (Health)</td>
<td>Under five mortality rate</td>
<td>137 per1000</td>
<td>DNS</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>To be updated in December 2019 with completion of Health Demographics Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Survival rate to Grade 5 (children continuing to attend school)</td>
<td>66% boys 62% girls</td>
<td>SEU #4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of households with access to improved housing</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Will consider disaggregation by groups (urban, rural etc) Note that for many of these socio-economic baselines the international definitions have been applied. Somalia will investigate tailoring definitions to local context in near future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of households with access to improved sanitation</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Updated in 2020 HBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of households with access to improved drinking water</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>SHFS Wave 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Updated in 2020 Household Budget survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio</td>
<td>732 per 100000</td>
<td>DNS</td>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Will be updated by December 2019 in Health and Demographic Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevalence rate of FGM</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>DNS (MICS, DHS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>DNS to confirm ongoing plans to monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevalence of stunting in children age 0-59 months</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>DNS (DHS Nutrition Survey)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Will be updated by December 2019 in Health &amp; Demographic Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillar</td>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of primary school teachers qualified (certified) to teach</td>
<td>pending (20-30% estimates)</td>
<td>Somalia Economic Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gross and Net Enrolment rates for Primary School (%)</td>
<td>pending</td>
<td>Somalia Demographic and Health Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gross and Net Enrolment rates for Primary School (%)</td>
<td>pending</td>
<td>Somalia Demographic and Health Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Capital Index rank</td>
<td>pending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To be completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Next Steps

8.1. Plans to complete data gaps and strengthen the statistical function

Pillar 1, Inclusive and Accountable Politics, includes a strategy for the strengthening of Core Government Services. A key aspect of this strategy are interventions to invest in planning, policy and monitoring functions in executive functions of government, along with investment in the capacity, systems, resourcing and professionalism of the Directorate of National Statistics, along with the function of statistical management across government.

Specifically there are plans underway between FGS and the World Bank and the Government of Sweden (Statistics Sweden) to collect and analyse key statistical data and to work with statistical offices across FGS to strengthen their function and to conduct Household Budget Surveys, to be completed every 3-4 years. In the intervening time the WB plans to conduct Integrated Rapid Monitoring Surveys (IRMS) to update poverty statistics and other key indicators through light and quick data collection (less onerous than the High Frequency Surveys). The IMRS is intended to improve the quality of GDP and poverty indicators, should funding be approved for this initiative.

In addition, the World Bank will work with the government to collect, compile and analyse administrative and economic surveys to produce Somalia’s first production-based GDP estimates in decades. To achieve this will require the relevant statistics units in the line ministries, departments and public agencies (MDAs) of the federal government and federal member states to contribute to the wider national statistical system by producing timely, high-quality statistical information that adheres to international standards. And finally, the World Bank will work with the government to produce a nationally-representative Consumer Price Index, needed for monitoring inflation, while in close coordination, Statistics Sweden will support with the collection, processing and analysis of price data. Subject to availability of funding, the World Bank proposes to support the automation of price data collection across FMS.

Overall this program is intended to strengthen the national statistical system to monitor the core social and macroeconomic statistics - poverty, GDP, inflation and socio-economic indicators. The anticipated cost for this program is estimated at US$15 million for the World Bank with additional funds to be provided by Sweden.

By the end of the NDP-9 period, therefore, it is anticipated that more relevant indicators will be collected by government to broaden and deepen the monitoring of progress against strategies and priorities. Specific plans for four additional surveys, ongoing or planned, have been outlined earlier in this chapter.

The intention is to review the M&E framework often during the five years of NDP-9 implementation. The first review should take place no later than June 2020, when it is anticipated that at least two substantial surveys will be complete (LFS and the Demographic and Health Survey). Results of these surveys can be inserted as updated baselines in both M&E tables. Established targets should be reviewed for any indication of progress. Discussions with government ministries and other stakeholders can take place in order to set new targets for NDP-9.

The intention is to have monitoring and evaluation be an iterative and learning process, where baselines and targets are expanded and strengthened.
National-level consultations (Mogadishu)

First round consultations with national-level stakeholders took place in Mogadishu in January 2019.

**Civil Society**

The civil society group agreed that poverty means being unable to obtain the basic needs in life. In this regard, the group distinguished between **primary needs** (food, water, shelter, fuel or power) and **secondary needs** (access to health and education services).

Interestingly, the group also identified **environmental vulnerability** as an important dimension of poverty in Somalia. Environmental vulnerability denotes lacking access to an environment that supports sustainable livelihoods and resilience to drought and other kinds of natural disaster. For example, when drought occurs many households are left with no choice but to leave their homes and seek refuge in settlements for displaced persons. The group further stressed the importance of environmental considerations in the return or resettlement of such displaced households.

The civil society representatives identified **Somalia’s national debt** as being an important contributor to poverty. Here it was argued that the Government must prioritise the debt relief/forgiveness process as a means of freeing up resources that could be used to pay for poverty reduction measures.

**Continuing insecurity** and the absence of (or lack of access to) **the rule of law** in many parts of the country, and their impact on personal safety, freedom of movement and justice, were identified as important underlying drivers of poverty. It was noted that these also reduced the government’s ability to establish and strengthen institutions needed to support economic growth and sustainable development, and fuelled crime and other social ills.

In general, **poor governance** – limited capacities, knowledge and skills, and corruption – was seen as an important driver of Somalia’s continuing high level of poverty. Related to this, the group also identified **political exclusion** – being unable to participate in or influence political processes in which corruption is rife – as being a contributor to continued poverty in Somalia.

**The Private Sector**

Unsurprisingly, the representatives of the private sector who took part in the consultation viewed poverty mainly through the lenses of economic development and employment creation. Their definition of poverty was consistent with that of the civil society group, but their thinking on poverty reduction had a quite different emphasis.

In terms of what causes poverty, the private sector identified Somalia’s **poor transport infrastructure** as a constraint to economic growth and, as such, a contributor to poverty. **Insecurity** was also referenced as a driver of poverty, but in the sense that it restricted freedom of movement of goods and people.

The group identified **poor education and limited vocational skills** as negatively affecting employment opportunities for young people, and therefore contributing significantly to poverty in Somalia. Both
should become a priority for future government spending. However, cultural norms and behaviours that prevent people from striving for a better standard of living were also cited as an important factor.

Looking forward, business leaders viewed poverty reduction in terms of investing in and promoting Somali-owned business. The group argued that the process of building Somali-owned business needs to be supported by the regulation of imported goods, whether through tariffs or import caps, which would encourage local production.

Finally, the group recognised the importance of strengthening tax collection from the business sector to support government revenues needed for economic development measures.

**Federal Government Institutions**

The group was comfortable with the proposed multi-dimensional description of poverty to be used in NDP-9, and agreed that the new plan should be focused on poverty reduction and economic growth. However, the relevance of the US$1.90 international poverty line to the Somali context was questioned on the grounds that it is too low to meet basic needs.

Turning to causes of poverty, the group identified conflict and widespread insecurity, and environmental degradation, as key drivers. High unemployment and limited livelihood opportunity, exacerbated by low levels of training and skills among the youth, both emerge from and amplify the poverty and vulnerability arising from conflict and environmental causes.

Another important factor in this analysis were barriers within Somali society that result in unequal access to education, employment and other kinds of economic opportunity. The challenge of gender equity in Somalia is one such social barrier.

The group suggested that Somalia’s poor cope with poverty through a cascade of options, starting with taking on unskilled or manual labour and drawing support from family and social networks. The important role of remittances to Somalia was highlighted in this regard. If these options are unavailable, migration to another part of the country (especially urban migration) or out of Somalia altogether may be considered. Young men are most likely to take this route. A last resort, if all else fails, is to relocate to an internally displaced settlement in order to gain access to available relief supplies and services.

Government officials were of the view that NDP-9 should focus on security and environmental degradation as its top priorities. The group said the low resilience arising from recurrent conflict and drought needs to be addressed through a range of interventions. These include employment generation and skills development, and the strengthening of key productive sectors of the economy, namely agriculture, livestock and fisheries. All will be required urgently as part of a national strategy for recovery and economic growth.

In addition, the group identified a number of political and governance-related challenges that will need to be addressed by NDP-9. These include:

- Persistent tensions between federal and FMS governments
- The limited capacity of government institutions to develop the policies and programmes required for poverty reduction and economic growth, and to coordinate governance systems in a federated system
- Poor awareness of national development planning among Government officials, which in itself may constrain successful plan implementation
- Increasing and better managing government revenues needed to fund and deliver essential social protection and employment creation programmes.

Members of the National Parliament

The fourth stakeholder group to participate in the consultation was national parliamentarians, represented by the Parliamentary Oversight Committee of Budget, Planning and Finance.

Committee members were generally satisfied with the account of the NDP-9 process and the approach being taken to the definition and analysis of poverty. They also agreed that the key drivers of poverty in Somalia included conflict and insecurity, and repeated exposure to natural disaster, in particular drought. In respect of the latter, the Committee urged the Government to prioritise the development of national disaster risk management strategies and capacities.

The group went on to highlight the importance of the productive sectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and argued that a larger portion of Government spending should be focused on poverty reduction initiatives, including employment creation schemes.

Finally, the Committee’s attention focused – perhaps unsurprisingly – on the key issue of NDP-9 affordability: would the priorities identified by the plan and the financial, human and other resources required for their implementation align with available resources? The Committee members also stressed the importance of the plan being firmly grounded in Somalia’s own resource base – revenues and capacities – and not dependent on external donor funding.

Hirshabelle

Consultations in Hirshabelle were conducted in the state capital, Jowhar, over a four-day period from 10 to 15 February 2019.

Civil Society

Participants reflected on the events and underlying causes leading to the extreme poverty now seen in Somalia, and affirmed that a strong national development plan is an important means of identifying and countering these phenomena. For this reason, the group welcomed the consultation and expressed optimism for the national planning process and confidence in the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, noting that Hirshabelle is the youngest of Somalia’s FMSs and therefore in need of considerable support from the federal government.

The discussion then probed more deeply into the key issues facing the people of Hirshabelle, and concluded that the highest priority facing the State is the management of the Shabelle river, upon which so many livelihoods and indeed national food security depend. In this regard, the river is prone to recurrent flooding yet almost dries up at other times of year. The problem is especially apparent in Jowhar, where river management and related disaster prevention and mitigation are almost completely absent. The result is the accumulation over the past 30 years of high levels of silt and rubbish in the river channels, which in turn causes increasingly frequent bank over-topping and damage to surrounding
farmland. Then, in dry seasons, water flows in the river have become lower and lower, sometimes failing altogether, due to upstream damming and over-use in Ethiopia.

An immediate consequence of flooding is the displacement of local populations and their further impoverishment. The group therefore urged the Federal Government to assist local communities and the state government to set up a programme of desilting of the Shabelle river channel, and to engage the Ethiopian authorities on the excessive diversion and abstraction taking place further upstream. Furthermore, in addition to desilting the river channel, effective flood control will require the repair of old water management infrastructure, including dams, offtakes and sluices.

Surprisingly, some group members suggested that sometimes the flooding was deliberately caused by local communities in order to attract additional humanitarian assistance and to benefit from related employment opportunities.

These challenges aside, the group also highlighted the high agricultural potential of Hirshabelle State, and in particular the areas around Jowhar. The unmet potential of fresh water fisheries in the state was also pointed out.

However, exploiting this potential is made difficult by the poor state of transport infrastructure in the state. For example, the main road between Jowhar and Mogadishu is critically important for the marketing of agricultural produce – also for accessing social services like health and education – and its poor state of repair is a real constraint.

Continuing high levels of insecurity in the rural areas is also a serious constraint on economic activity development in Hirshabelle (the main towns in the state are under the control of the government). The group linked the problem of insecurity with weak and corrupt local governance and on limited access by ordinary citizens to good and affordable justice. Participants described local politicians as inaccessible and inclined to nepotism, and accused the state administration of failing to manage public funds in an effective and transparent way. The group therefore stressed the importance of strengthening the capacities of local leadership and institutions, and noted that accountability, transparency and effective service delivery are needed to build trust in and respect for government. It follows that the activities undertaken by those in public office must be monitored and evaluated to ensure accountability for performance.

Finally, criticism was levelled by participants at the World Food Programme (WFP) for contributing to food insecurity in Hirshabelle. Here it was argued that by using imported grains for its food distribution activities WFP weakens local markets and undermines production by local farmers. Instead, where possible WFP should look to procure its food supplies from local sources, and thereby help to support local markets. WFP’s increasing use of ration cards or food vouchers as an alternative to general food distribution was noted.

The Private Sector

Representatives of the Hirshabelle private sector met on the second day of the consultation.

Similar to the civil society consultation the day before, the private sector group immediately focused on the role of the agriculture sector, and noted the importance of Hirshabelle to regional and national food security. The agriculture sector requires support and stimulation; starting with the more effective
management of the Shabelle river (the group confirmed the earlier analysis by civil society representatives). The group also suggested the Government should limit the import of rice and encourage aid agencies to locally source food for general distributions and other feeding programmes.

The private sector group was generally critical of NGO activities in Hirshabelle, which they perceive as not addressing the interests or priorities of the state. Instead, NGOs responses tend to be driven by their own priorities, rather than by local needs.

The group also highlighted the difficulty of marketing fresh agricultural produce and livestock (both meat and milk) in the absence of a functioning transport infrastructure. Again, the poor state of the Jowhar to Mogadishu road was mentioned, which, combined with ongoing insecurity in rural areas, significantly increases the cost of transportation and further reduces the region’s competitiveness.

Separately, the impact of outbreaks of pest and disease – affecting both livestock and food crops – was cited by the group as another important constraint on local productivity. It was suggested here that the combination of inefficient traditional crop cultivation and poor road infrastructure has led some farmers to produce marijuana for the Mogadishu market as a cost-effective alternative.

Finally, the private sector representatives stressed the role of the private sector in promoting “industrialisation” and employment creation, which underpin and sustain economic growth.

State Assembly Representatives
Consultations were held with representatives of the Hirshabelle State Assembly (parliament).

The group immediately identified insecurity as being the most significant cause of deprivation and under-development in Hirshabelle, and an important driver of displacement within the region. The point was also made that collaboration between the public and government security organs is hampered by the public’s fear of and intimidation by the insurgents.

Concern was also expressed about the planned withdrawal of AMISON troops from the region. The group believes this will have a significant negative impact on the ability of government to maintain security in the areas it currently controls, small as they are.

Like the previously consulted groups, the parliamentarians pointed to the poor management of the Shabelle river as being a key contributor to poverty, citing the recurrent flooding that now takes place and the severely reduced flows during the dry seasons. Flooding is clearly linked to the accumulation of silt and debris in the river channels over the past 30 years, which causes frequent over-topping of the river banks and immense financial loss to farmers. Repeated drought, which has become a feature of Somalia’s climate, equally impacts on agricultural and livestock productivity.

Both flooding and drought cause frequent population displacement within and from Hirshabelle.

The parliamentarians identified one other key structural driver of poverty in the region, which is the poor state of its transport infrastructure. They also noted the reluctance of traders to use Somali Shillings and the hardship that this causes among the majority who have no access to US Dollars.

The negative impact of poor governance and administration on the region’s development was noted by the parliamentarians. Similarly, security and justice institutions are weak in Hirshabelle: for example, the...
state lacks a strong police force and adequate prison facilities, and the judicial system is very under-developed.

A large part of the governance problem is the lack of institutional capacity, including office space, equipment and personnel, which limits the state’s ability to develop and implement effective policies to reduce poverty and promote economic growth. In this regard, the group suggested that training in skills needed for good governance – teachers, planners, administrators, legal professionals – and access to Federal Government scholarships would help to overcome the challenge.

Finally, the group pointed to the importance of education and the need for strong educational institutions in the fight against poverty. Education increases access to employment opportunities and promotes self-sufficiency, and is a prerequisite for the alleviation of poverty.

State Government Institutions

Consultations were held with director generals (DGs) of Hirshabelle State Government line ministries.

The DGs were in broad agreement with the definition of multidimensional poverty, which was stated in terms of a minimum level of income and food consumption, education and access to adequate shelter, fuel (for cooking and heating), water supply and health services.

The group aligned with the conclusions reached during the earlier consultations, namely that poverty in Hirshabelle is driven principally by insecurity, recurrent drought, repeated flooding caused by the poor management of the Shabelle river, and a degraded transport infrastructure.

However, the group also identified a range of other contributory factors. For example, insecurity is driven by political instability in the country and by poor governance that result, inter alia, in weak security and justice institutions.

The DGs suggested that weak governance in Hirshabelle – limited capacities alongside nepotism and corruption – drives poverty by limiting people’s access to essential services, such as health, which are themselves under-developed.

The problem of limited employment opportunities in the region is itself fuelled by low levels of education and a lack of vocational skills among the population, and compounded by the tendency for appointments to be made on the basis of family or social connections, rather than on merit (similar to weak governance, above). One consequence of this is the outward migration to other regions of young people that do have education and/or skills, but who are frustrated by the lack of opportunity on offer.

In common with other stakeholder groups in Hirshabelle, the DGs were critical of the activities of NGOs working in the region, who are perceived to work according to their own agendas rather than the needs of the people.

Hirshabelle Vice President and Ministers

The final day of the consultations presented an opportunity to meet informally over dinner with the Hirshabelle Vice President and a number of ministers.

The Vice President noted that Hirshabelle is the youngest FMS, and that substantial assistance from the federal government will be needed to realise the desired levels of development. Both vice president and
ministers concurred with the outcomes of the discussions held with the other stakeholder groups, and concluded that Hirshabelle's principal needs lie in the following areas:

- Security
- Management of the Shabelle river
- Strengthening of transport infrastructure
- Education
- Health

Jubaland

Consultations in Jubaland were conducted in the state capital, Kismayo, from 15 to 19 February.

Opening session

The consultations started with an opening plenary session that allowed senior government officials and representatives from civil society and the private sector to receive an overview of the NDP-9 preparation process and to ask questions of the MoPIED team.

Following presentations by the MoPIED team, a number of questions were raised:

**What were the challenges faced by the federal government during the implementation of the current NDP (NDP-8)?** The midterm review of NDP8 is near completion, and this document will answer all the challenges that the government has faced during the three-year implementations of NDP-8.

**Will these consultations be the basis of NDP-9?** NDP-9 is a “blank document” that will be filled by the outcomes of the consultations that we receive from the Somali people. It was stressed that the whole process of NDP-9 is a Somali owned and led process.

**How will diaspora communities be able to input to the NDP-9 consultations?** The diaspora will be engaged and there will be consultations in Somali populated cities.

**How can the government can retain the technical people who are working in Somalia since they are required to pay visa fees whenever they enter the country?** Visa fees are a form of revenue generation for the country and cannot be abolished. The option for our diaspora returnees is to apply for permanent residency if they intend to stay in the country for a long period of time.

The Private Sector

The group agreed with the multi-dimensional description of poverty being used by the MoPIED team. However, one additional characteristic was proposed, which concerned access by elderly people to care in their old age, including health care.

**Drivers of poverty** highlighted by meeting participants included:

- Unemployment
- Conflict
- Weak governance and corruption
- Lack of education/vocational training
Natural disasters and an absence of disaster preparedness planning
Poor markets for livestock and local produce
A lack of investment in productive potential
Dependency on foreign aid

The population copes with poverty by taking on unskilled and low paying work (women also); sending children to work; petty trading and small business. They also look for education. Groups pointed out that begging, stealing, migration/immigration and displacement are part of the coping mechanism that people use. The poor people also risk their lives by taking unsafe employment.

**Strategies** that would be useful for poverty alleviation include:

- Employment creation through agricultural development schemes and infrastructure rehabilitation
- Support and promote investment in small businesses and equality in employment
- Strengthen vocational skills
- Strengthen the security sector and access to justice
- Strengthen governance by tackling corruption, tribalism, favouritism and nepotism
- Improve access to clean water, housing, healthcare services and education
- Invest in the energy sector
- Invest in agriculture, livestock and fisheries

**Civil Society**

To begin with the civil society representatives asked five questions:

**Will Jubaland create a new strategic plan for the state after the current regional plan of Jubaland ends in 2020?** From 2020, NDP-9 will be used as a sole development plan for Jubaland.

**Given Somalia’s plentiful agricultural land, shouldn’t Somalia focus on production instead of importing our food from outside of the country?** One of the proposed NDP-9 pillars is economic growth, which should include a focus on productive sectors such as agriculture and livestock. Further discussion of the issue will take place during the consultation.

**Will MoPIED open an office in Kismaayo for inputs on NDP-9?** The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) of Jubaland is the focal point in Kismaayo where any inputs for NDP-9 can be forwarded.

**Will NDP-9 prioritize women?** Women play and have played a significant and prominent role in every aspect of the Somali society; thus NDP-9 will focus on addressing women’s concerns.

**Will security be included in NDP-9?** Security is central to one of NDP-9’s proposed pillars.

The group defined poverty as not having basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing. Also, the group added that poverty is a lack of income/employment, education and health services. This corresponds to the multi-dimensional definition being used during NDP-9 preparation.

It is estimated that 80 percent of people in Jubaland live in poverty and insecurity. The group identified the following **causes of poverty**: 
The effects of poverty, according to the group, are displacement, loss of livestock and agriculture, poor healthcare, low purchasing power.

There are different approaches that the people of Jubaland use to manage or cope with poverty. Unsafe labour, petty crimes, displacement and migration are some of the things people engage in. Also, the civil society group stated that people reach out to their relatives and NGOs/INGOs for support to manage poverty. Furthermore, engaging in low level jobs, such as loading and unloading, construction labouring, fishing, seeking help from within the community, remittances from diaspora relatives and taking loans were pointed out as mechanisms for coping with poverty. On the negative side, the group reported that stealing, begging, child labour, child militarizing and joining radical organizations to seek income are also used as mechanisms for confronting poverty.

In terms of poverty alleviation, the civil society group stressed the following:

- Strengthening peace and security
- Enforcing justice and rule of law
- Increasing local economic production
- Investing in and marketing of national/local commodities (e.g., bananas)
- Improving access to quality education
- Promoting political stability and national unity
- Promoting good governance and fighting corruption
- Prioritizing infrastructure development (roads, ports and airports, agriculture and industries)
- Creating employment opportunities and building vocational skills
- Managing natural resources more effectively

The group placed emphasis on the importance of effective institutions and fighting corruption, equal resource sharing and the enforcement of justice and equality as key mechanisms for poverty alleviation. Somalia is a country with resources, and the group underlined the need for awareness on how to utilize natural resources as a means for poverty alleviation. Further, they advocated increasing the country’s production, re-starting industries such as the sugar factory, the meat industry, leather and fishery, and exporting natural resources and national products and minimizing imports.

Finally, the group also stressed the importance of strengthening national and state level planning for poverty reduction. However, there is also a need to ensure integration between national and sub-
national plans, which should be based on a comprehensive approach to local planning for poverty reduction.

**Jubaland State Line Ministries**

This consultation engaged principally directors general and technical advisors of line ministries within the Jubaland government. Following the MoPIED presentation, participants asked three questions:

**Has MoPIED conducted surveys and population censuses?** The Directorate of Statistics at MoPIED conducts surveys with the support of international partners. Some of the statisticians from MoPIED regularly visit federal member states when they conduct surveys, such as the Household Surveys. MoPIED has not yet conducted a population census, but plans to do so at the right time when conditions allow.

**Has NDP-8 been able to address poverty, and if so, what did we learn?** NDP-8 addresses the poverty conditions of the country; however, there is a midterm review (MTR) document that will be finalized soon. After this document comes out, we will then draw and include lessons learned into NDP-9.

**How will the reprinting of the Somali currency be planned and managed in relation to the use of the EVC+ system?** The Somali Shilling is still in use and valid, and the government will incorporate the new notes into the economy of the country. It was stressed that the printing of new currency is the responsibility of the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) in collaboration with other relevant institutions and they will come-up with the requisite policies, institutional and regulatory frameworks regarding currency printing and related issues including EVC+.

The line ministry groups confirmed that poverty is the condition where a person/individual does not have the basic needs, such as food, water, healthcare, clothes, and education. Also, in terms of accessibility, the group defined poverty when a person does not have water, electricity, healthcare and education. The definition that the group contributed captures and reinforces some of the universal definition of poverty. In answering the question of whether poverty exists in Jubaland regions, the line ministry group discussion affirmed that it does.

In terms of **causes of poverty and its effects on people**, the group listed the following:

- Insecurity
- Natural disaster, including drought
- Dependency on foreign aid
- Injustice
- Unemployment and a lack of vocational skills
- Low levels of education
- Lack of infrastructure
- Poor governance and corruption
- Tribalism
- Loss of assets, including livestock

The group went on to describe coping mechanisms of poverty, which include: migration/displacement or immigration legally or illegally, joining militant or gang groups, begging in the streets and engaging in unskilled labour. In addition, the group listed obtaining support from diaspora relatives, aid from relief
organizations, doing jobs with high risk to life, engaging in criminal activities, and drug abuse as other coping mechanisms that the people of Jubaland use in order to manage poverty.

Finally, the group considered interventions that should be prioritized to support poverty reduction:

- Strengthening security and the rule of law
- Reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
- Improving governance and fighting corruption
- Better management of risks and natural disasters, such as droughts and floods
- Employment creation
- Vocational skills training
- Investing in local production and markets
- Building awareness on how to utilize natural resources
- Improving access to affordable (free) quality education
- Improving access to clean water and clean energy

**State Assembly Representatives (MPs)**

Following a presentation on NDP-9 and a round of group discussions, Jubaland State Assembly Representatives summarised poverty as being when an individual is unable to fulfil their basic human needs such as food, water and housing, and services such as healthcare and education. The representatives overwhelmingly underscored that there is poverty in Jubaland region.

In terms of the causes of poverty and its effect on Jubaland people, the representatives noted the following:

- Insecurity and conflict
- Natural disasters, such as droughts and flood
- Aid dependence
- Injustice
- Unemployment and a lack of vocational skills
- Low levels of education

Displacement was noted by the group as both a result of some of the above and an additional driver of poverty.

According to the representatives, there are a number of strategies that Jubaland people use to cope with poverty, including: migration, radicalization, begging, dependency on relatives or aid organizations, and taking on unsafe and unskilled work.

In terms of what needs to be done to address poverty, the group suggested the following:

- Strengthening of security
- Reconstruction of infrastructure, such as roads, highways, ports and airports
- Proactive management of natural disasters
- Employment creation
- Improved access to education
- Increasing local agricultural, livestock and natural resource productivity
- Strengthening private sector accountability
Finally, the representatives underscored that the Federal Government should develop a plan to eradicate poverty, and engage and work with the federal member states (FMS) on poverty alleviation strategies.

**District Commissioner of Kismayo**

The Commissioner updated the MoPIED team about the Master Plan that is now in progress, and there were two commissions within the city who were working on this project. One commission was responsible for land issues and the other was working on conflict resolution.

The Commissioner stated that **the needs of the city are huge** and include the following:

- The city needs equipment for agriculture and health
- Water is the most critical issue in Kismayo, and Yoontoy is one of only two sources of water
- The river is short of water, and dams and canals could help irrigation
- Electricity is very expensive as people in the city pay US$1 per kilowatt hour
- Awareness about fishing is needed
- Education is needed especially the IDPs
- Housing projects are needed
- Health care facilities are needed as there is only one free hospital in the city
- Waste management equipment is a critical issue for the city
- Infrastructure is the biggest issue as there is only one road in the city
- IDPs are the most vulnerable groups in the city
- There is high unemployment
- Kismayo port is badly managed

In addition, the Commissioner reported **the needs of the city administration**, which include:

- Offices in use are old, and there is a need for new offices
- There are no fire extinguishers, and no waste management mechanism
- There are only two tracks equipped with machines
- No salary is given to city workers due to lack of taxation and other resources

In conclusion, the Commissioner identified the **three most urgent priorities for Kismayo**: 

- Water and sanitation
- Waste management and equipment
- Infrastructure

**South West State**

**Civil Society**

The group agreed that the multi-dimensional nature of poverty presented by the MoPIED team covered key characteristics of poverty but proposed that the definition should include a limited physical ability to earn a living through the traditional (regional) productive activities of livestock and agriculture. They indicated that, in the context of South West region, being disabled coincides with being poor.
On whether poverty existed in the region of South West State, the answer was unanimously and emphatically yes.

The group noted there were a large number of people living in IDP camps and relying on irregular handouts, and among them were a lot of destitute households.

Poverty caused misery and loss of independence. Over the past two decades, people were forced by conflict and droughts to leave their way of living, that is farming and livestock rearing. They gradually aggregated into IDP camps or settled in cities and towns with a meagre existence. These IDP residents were subjected to malnutrition and diseases, and access to no or little education and health service, as well as water and hygiene and sanitation facilities.

Poverty was caused by prolonged civil war and insurgents. Al Shabaab had displaced a lot of people from their villages and rural dwellings, forcing them to seek the hand of government in main towns and cities.

NGOs often refused to serve outside the main cities, which creates long-term displacement by encouraging people in safe areas to abandon the rural villages and countryside – becoming IDPs to seek assistance. Once people settled in a camp, they were unlikely to go back to their place of origin even if the condition that forced them to leave had favourably changed. Therefore, they become completely dependent on handouts, accepting living in conditions with little means to support their families.

Impact of frequent droughts is a major cause of displacement. The rains had become erratic in recent decades. Traditional water reserves have become filled with sand after three decades without any maintenance, leaving the community with very little capacity to withstand droughts. Irrigation canals have fallen to disrepair with no or little irrigated crops increasingly grown in the region, except those who can use water pumps. The poor condition of roads has also made it difficult to market agricultural produce to cities.

People in the region use a variety of coping mechanisms: manual odd jobs in towns and cities such as building work, collection of wood, cropping in marginal land in the rainy season; taking up rural labour opportunities such as “farm assistant” or tending livestock on behalf of owners. Other jobs include driving TukTuk (mainly by the youth in order to earn a small income). Many receive remittance from relatives in the diaspora and begging has also emerged as a means of coping with poverty.

Concrete poverty alleviation interventions were called for:

- **Improving security** in the region with the government strengthening capacity by equipping the national army.
- **Resettling IDPs to rural areas** and supporting them to return to farming and livestock production
- **Justice and equity** by ensuring the country’s resources and opportunities are shared among the population, especially poor, unrepresented people. Most poor people historically own assets (eg. land and dwellings) which are illegally taken over by others, with no hope of reclaiming these assets under the week governance in the region.
- **Free education** to people to gain skills in order to better themselves and a proper health service to reduce disease and mortality (highly important).
Rebuilding canals and rural water reserves and also constructing wells as a means of encouraging the displaced to return to farming and livestock rearing.

**The Private Sector (Chamber of Commerce)**

The chairman of the South West State Chamber of Commerce, noted that Baidoa and other cities of the state used to be among the most resourceful regions in Somalia, explaining that the region used to provide produce, livelihood and resources to the remaining parts of the country. The chairman also stated that it is a great loss that a country like Somalia, with immense resources, is today facing disasters like drought and that poverty was such a factor in the country.

**Poor administration** was described to be a contributing factor to poverty.

**Lack of security and poor infrastructure** were identified as the main causes of poverty. Roads were so bad that the private sector found it very difficult to expand commerce beyond cities and their immediate vicinity. The road from Baidoa to Mogadishu was a notable problem.

**Agriculture needs to be promoted** as it is a prerequisite for sufficiency and poverty reduction. Import needs to be minimized and regulated, it is important for domestic production and export to be promoted.

**The political structure and power sharing** structure were described as a factor for the various needs in regions not being met accordingly.

**Industrialization and domestic production is the foundation for poverty reduction.** National development must function as a promoting base for industrialization in the country. Through the promotion of industrialization, job creation will increase and a larger portion of the society will be able to attain jobs. Skills, technical and vocational skills need to be promoted.

There need to be mechanisms to support cooperation between the private sector and foreign businesses.

Security (specifically lack of it) was described by the participants as one of the driving causes of poverty and lack of sustainability. Security is repeatedly emphasized by the different participants as being the main factor in poverty.

**Roads,** although poor, are also inaccessible due to presence of the insurgent group of Al Shaba, this hampered the transport of goods.

The private sector would like to see stronger oversight and coordination of NGOs, adding that NGOs should function as job creating, rather than providers of cash support/food vouchers. With many NGO present in the region and in Somalia overall, the NGOs were also described as visiting the region to collect data and carry out research, only to disappear and reappear to collect more data. NGOs were described by the private sector as failing to function as desired and causing more problems in the region. NGOs should function as job creating, rather than providing cash support/food vouchers.

Over dependency on NGOs is described as causing farmers to collect aid rather than attempt to continue farming, which consequently leads to lack of motivation to self-sufficiency, which also leads to poor production rate.
Resettlement of displaced people and supporting returnees to restart farming was also mentioned as a means of poverty alleviation.

Livestock and agricultural promotion is identified as critical in order to increase the quality of the livestock and produce in the region.

The private sector also said poor governance and political structure was hampering development in the region.

The private sector identified Somalia’s weak system of justice as one of the drivers of poverty. Strengthening of the judiciary in the region is important as a lack of a strong judiciary presence simultaneously contributes to the lack of security in the region.

The importance of creating markets for local produce, livestock and agricultural were also mentioned and appeared to be a communal opinion amongst all participants.

Poor infrastructure and youth unemployment were identified as key factors in poverty in the country. The youth in Somalia is estimated to be around 70% of the Somali people, so youth unemployment must be addressed.

Security forces, especially the military need to be strengthened, financially and logistically, and provided with the right equipment. Armed forces are present in the region; however, they are constrained due to equipment scarcity.

Integration between government and community (governance) needs to be strengthened. Health services, education and public services in general also need to be promoted in the region. Although, health institutions are present, the quality and the capacity is very limited due to lack of resources.

Water resources are managed poorly and in a non-transparent way. Water scarcity is a problem, with the number of boreholes in the city of Baidoa being very few, and very far from sufficient.

Tax collection by various authorities (including insurgents due to insecurity in travel by land) leads to higher costs of products in the region, forcing local businesses to sell at higher prices. The private sector identified the following points to be the most pressing for poverty reduction.

- Security/ Justice
- Infrastructure, roads etc.
- Domestic production - Aid dependency (Accountability of NGOs)
- Education/ Health services
- Resource management (governance)

Regional Assembly Members (MPs)

The group viewed the poverty line of US$1.9 a day as too low for regional context. They argued that a large number of people in the region have been exposed to extreme poverty conditions and multiple deprivations over the course of a longer period of time, in the context of lacking any infrastructure and services. So a household would need much more money to achieve an adequate standard of living. On whether there was poverty in the region, telling examples of the existence and extent of poverty in the region were the more than 300,000 displaced people in Baidoa alone. These people live in extreme poverty. Other towns and cities in the region also have large centres for IDPs.
The group described poverty to be caused mostly by conflict, insecurity and natural disaster risks from frequent droughts and floods. Poor road infrastructure and dilapidated waterways exacerbate the situation. People were forced to move to safer areas controlled by the government eg. Baidoa. These cities and towns were surrounded by Al Shabaab and road movements were limited, making trade of livestock and agricultural produce very difficult, especially to Mogadishu. As result there was little employment opportunity for youth and households to earn living.

Poverty exposes people in IDP camps to disease, poor hygiene and sanitation conditions and insecurities due to overcrowding. It also created a situation of helplessness in which people lose hope and independence to have a dignified life; along with loss of self-esteem and pride. There is a loss of skills among generations of children who were born in an IDP camps or brought to camps at a young age. These youths are unable to learn basic life skills in the traditional agro-pastoral livelihoods. The loss of productive activities and livelihoods makes people dependent on handouts by NGOs, which in turn has wider negative implications for the society and economy of the country. Cash transfers used by NGOs in particular had a negative impact on productivity. The NGOs were described as unwilling to support people affected by droughts and floods in their villages and towns, even if they live in a safe area. As a result people moved to IDP camps in main cities to access assistance. The continued assistance, long after conditions improved, makes the return of people to their livelihood activities impossible.

People seek support often by moving to IDP camps. They may ask relatives to send remittance or seek their support in the towns and cities where the relatives reside. They also seek employment in cities or towns to which they moved, often working in low paid manual labour jobs. Begging has emerged in the streets. Meals may be reduced in order to cut expenses.

The group noted that the government needs to prioritise security of the country, developing a clear strategy to gain controls of Somali territory. A well-equipped and resourced military and police forces with sufficient numbers of regular soldiers is necessary to restore and maintain security across the country. Restoration of justice is also described as an important component of peacebuilding, so that trust in public institutions and leadership is enhanced and a greater civic engagement in political, social and economic decision-making of the country is possible.

Employment opportunities for youth must be created through infrastructure building and recruitment for the public sector.

Investment to increase access to free education and health service is critical for welfare of citizens.

Maintenance of canals and riverbeds, as well as rural water reserves is critical for returning people to rural areas and increasing productivity of agriculture and livestock.

Resettlement of IDPs back to regions of origin is required to restore rural livelihoods. Provision of support in the form of agricultural input (tractors, fertilisers, pesticides, veterinary services) will help people to resettle.

State Line Ministries

The representatives of the regional ministries differentiated poverty from being poor. In the context of the Somali language, poverty can be divided into two states. Being poor is described by the
representatives as not having any income at all, whereas poverty is described as having an income, however very limited. (‘Sabool’, and ‘Faqri’)

**Different levels of poverty were also described,** lack of basic needs, such as food, water and shelter is described as a kind of poverty, where lack of education and health services were described as another type of poverty.

The group also described **various conditions that result from poverty**, among them were ill-health and **displacement**. Although lack of education was described as a form of poverty, the group also noted that a big part of the Somali community are farmers and pastoralists, therefore the concept of lack of education as poverty is not so applicable. However, the group noted that **for the Somali people in urban settings, lack of education can be described as poverty**. With many youth in the urban setting being forced to work rather than going to school.

Poverty can be alleviated by **strengthening the security in the region**.

The group identified **a chain of circumstances and events** as being **the causes poverty**: lack of security, lack of employment, injustice, and corruption. Climate change, natural disaster and poor disaster prevention and management were part of the circumstances causing poverty. Stagnant development, poor health, education and public services were contributing to the inability for people to prosper away from poverty, often leaving people with a sense of being caught in a vicious cycle.

Remittances from relatives in the diaspora, NGOs and begging are described as **means of coping** with poverty. However, the group also described the very same coping mechanisms as causing dependency. Many people have simply become adjusted to receiving aid in various forms which leads to a lack of motivation.

Lack of security (related to insurgent groups in the region) is also described as not only causing poverty, but also to sustaining poverty and hampering development. Poor governance was a factor.

**Strengthening government institutions** and **maximising the capacity of the armed forces** were identified as most pressing in order to alleviate poverty. Government funding to regional institutions must be increased as many of the regional government institutions are constrained by insufficient budgets, often hampering their work.

Finally, the group identified **reconciliation between the different communities** in the region as critical, and also trust building between government and others needs to be promoted. Decades of anarchy has led to poor public trust in the government.

**Galmudug**

Representatives from federal MoPIED travelled to Dhusamareb, the capital of Galmudug State, during the period 22 to 27 February 2019. An introductory session was held with high level state government officials and other public figures, at which NDP-9 and the consultation process was explained and questions answered by the MoPIED team. Strong interest in and support for the national planning process was expressed, as was the importance of grounding such plans in local needs and opinions, and avoiding top-down prescriptions from federal government. Economic diversification and social cohesion were identified as leading issues that need to feature in any poverty reduction effort in Galmudug.
Civil Society

In the meeting with civil society representatives, there was agreement with the proposed multi-dimensional definition of poverty. The group stressed that poverty was widespread throughout Galmudug, and is driven principally by insecurity, injustice (or limited access to justice), weak infrastructure (roads), low levels of education and skills, and recurrent drought.

The group also highlighted problems with the availability of the Somali Shilling, which has been replaced by the US Dollar and mobile money transfer. This limits market access by poor people – who may have neither hard currency nor mobile phones – and in addition drives inflation because of the lack of small denomination currency units.

In Galmudug, people cope with these challenges in a variety of ways, including taking on unskilled work (labouring, etc), small scale trading and migrating to look for work (which can amount to economic displacement). Social and family networks were also identified as being important in this regard, as was access to relief handouts from NGOs. The group also highlighted the tendency for young people to be drawn to criminal activity when faced with poverty.

In terms of Galmudug’s poverty alleviation priorities, the group identified the need for political stability and reconciliation, the strengthening of security, the rebuilding of economic infrastructure (roads, ports, etc), and job creation. The importance of improved governance was also highlighted, which is required for improved access to health and education services, good environmental management, and effective disaster preparedness and risk management. Finally, poverty alleviation will require investment in small business to help drive economic growth and employment, and increasing the availability of the Somali Shilling.

The Private Sector

Representatives of the private sector concluded that poverty is defined as the lack of basic needs – shelter, food, clothing etc. – and limited access to essential services such as healthcare, education, clean water and sanitation. Using these criteria, poverty is indeed widespread across Galmudug.

The group observed that the business community is often a source of support to destitute households in the state.

In terms of what drives poverty in Galmudug, the group identified a range of factors. Foremost of these is insecurity and recurrent conflict, the degraded road infrastructure, and the lack or absence of health and education services. Water shortages arising from drought are a significant driver of poverty, as is limited opportunity for employment in the region. Weak governance and the corruption and mismanagement found in public institutions also contribute to poverty and result in the region’s lack of development programmes and support to the agriculture and livestock sectors. Interestingly, the private sector group agreed with the view expressed by civil society representatives that the unavailability of Somali Shillings is an important factor bearing on poor people.

The group stressed that it is the poor and vulnerable who are most exposed to these drivers. However, it was also noted that herders and farmers are also greatly affected by political instability and related inter-clan violence and by recurrent drought.
The group’s analysis of how people in Galmudug cope with poverty echoed the conclusions reached by civil society representatives. People seek out unskilled work, engage in small-scale trading or migrate. They rely on social, diaspora and family networks for financial support and will often borrow money. Relief handouts from NGOs were also identified as a key means of coping with hardship.

In terms of poverty alleviation priorities, the group identified reducing insecurity and supporting local reconciliation. In this regard, emphasis was placed on strengthening the rule of law, and the role of the police and justice system in preventing violent conflict.

The group also noted the prime importance of rebuilding old and degraded economic infrastructure (roads, ports, airports). They also noted the need to increase the number of deep tube-wells in the area to support livestock herding and agriculture, and the importance of developing sources of affordable energy/electricity.

The group went on to highlight the need for small business investment and micro-finance schemes, and advocated for the introduction of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programs in the state as a way of supporting employment growth.

Underlying all of these priorities is the need to strengthen state and local level governance across Galmudug as a prerequisite for poverty alleviation.

**Senior government officials and public figures**

A short meeting was held with an “elite” group of senior government officials, academics and businessmen. The discussion highlighted a number of keys issues.

The importance of institution building in Galmudug was highlighted. For example, in the justice sector there is no clarity of the respective roles of traditional elders and state institutions. At present, people seek mediation from traditional elders, but doing so is more about reducing conflict than serving justice. Moreover, decisions made by traditional elders are not considered binding. Conflict often results. Therefore, a first priority needs to be the strengthening of the state government administrative capacities needed to enforce the rule of law.

There must be a focus on increasing government revenues to allow for improvements in public services. In this regard, agriculture, livestock and fisheries are not systematically taxed and represent significant lost revenue to the government.

It follows that the productive sectors – and in particular livestock and fisheries – should be key development priorities for Galmudug. Within this priority, attention needs to be given to the challenges of marketing – see infrastructure below.

**Improved education and healthcare services** were identified by the group as key priorities. For example, in Dhusamareeb, the state capital, there is no functioning hospital.

The group noted that a key component of Galmudug’s economic development will be the repair and rehabilitation of the state’s infrastructure. In particular the Mogadishu-Bosasso road that runs through Galmudug, and which is in very bad condition, is needed to support inter-regional trade. In addition, development of the port at Hobyo would contribute greatly to the region’s economy, while the paving of airstrips would promote aviation links, which at present are negligible.
Another critical need identified was the development of the state’s water resource infrastructure, and in particular water points for livestock. These are particularly important given Somalia’s recurrent droughts, the high livestock mortality rates that result, and the conflicts that flare up when herders compete for scarce pasture.

**Representatives of Galmudug State Assembly (Parliament)**

The parliamentarians agreed that poverty is defined as a lack of income, of basic needs (food, water and shelter) and of access to essential services (health, education) and employment. On this basis, the group confirmed that poverty is widespread in Galmudug.

Driving poverty in the state is insecurity arising from political instability and internal conflict. However, these drivers are linked closely to climate change, drought and gradual environmental degradation, which cause loss of livestock and livelihoods. Moreover, generally low levels of education mean that people are not equipped to seek alternative livelihoods. The impact is seen in high levels of displacement and malnutrition among children, women and the elderly.

People – especially the young – cope with these circumstances by taking on unskilled work and becoming involved with criminal gangs. Petty trading is also important. Support from the diaspora and social networks plays a role, as does relief from NGOs.

In terms of poverty alleviation priorities, the parliamentarians stressed the importance of the livestock sector, including the development of livestock water sources and the introduction of technology to help with the processing and storage of hay. The rehabilitation of the region’s road infrastructure would support this and other economic development in the region.

Also of key importance is the need to strengthen political stability and seek reconciliation of long-standing clan-based conflicts in the region.

Finally, the group singled out the need to strengthen governance in Galmudug in order to improve the delivery of essential services, including health, education and water supply.

However, it was also noted that a key requirement of NDP-9 is affordability, with clear and practical financing of the activities included.

**Representatives of State Government Line Ministries**

The government officials agreed with the earlier assessment of poverty – its definition and extent -- by the parliamentarians.

The group identified conflict, recurrent drought and the lack of infrastructure (roads and water) as key drivers of poverty in Galmudug, which are exacerbated by the state’s weak capacity for governance and disaster preparedness and planning. Also of importance is the region’s weak economy, limited employment opportunities and the problem of the availability of Somali Shillings in the market.

To cope with poverty, people turn to support from social and family networks, including diaspora, seek out unskilled work, and engage in small business (petty trading) and charcoal production. Relief from NGOs is also of importance. The group also noted that the young may be tempted by criminal gangs, including the insurgents, who offer regular income.
Turning to poverty alleviation, the Government Line Ministry group singled out the need to **rebuild Galmudug’s governance institutions**, in order to **strengthen law and order and justice**, and to **improve the availability of essential services**. The importance of **restoring economic infrastructure** (roads, ports, airports, water resources, energy) was also emphasised.

In addressing natural disaster, the group pointed to the need for **effective preparedness and planning**, **social cohesion** (unity), and the **strengthening of the productive sectors** as a means of leading **economic development and job creation**.

Importantly, the group also underscored the need to **include women and youth (social equity)** in poverty alleviation processes.

### Puntland

The team from the MoPIED NDP Secretariat conducted Round 1 consultations with Puntland stakeholders over the three-day period 26–31 March 2019. Four stakeholder groups participated in the consultations: civil society; the private sector; state government line ministries; and parliamentarians from the Puntland State Assembly.

#### Civil Society

Consultations with Puntland civil society were conducted in 3 groups: non-governmental organisations (NGOs); civil society organisations (CSOs); and university personnel.

**NGOs**

Poverty was described by the group as people existing on less than US$1 per person per day, and being unable to meet their essential needs. In Puntland, the group concluded that **poverty is driven by** frequent droughts with ever greater impact; price inflation; weak governance; limited employment opportunities; poor natural resource management; corruption and nepotism in both public and private sectors; limited government revenues and the impact of this on public services; and low levels of education and vocational skills.

**The impacts include** displacement; family dependency; desertification due to overexploitation of natural resources; crime; a “brain drain” resulting from the emigration of educated youth; water scarcity; family break up and separation; political dispute and inter-clan conflict; and greater corruption and abuse of power in the public sector.

**People cope with these impacts** by obtaining help from family networks (including remittances) and local charities; accessing international humanitarian assistance; engaging in micro-business or petty trading; and taking on low paid manual work.

**Poverty reduction requires** the eradication of widespread corruption and the strengthening of economic and social policies that would strengthen social justice and equity, build civic awareness and tackle inflation. The government should increase revenue collection in order to provide key social services, including education and health, and provide vocational training. To increase household and community resilience to drought, a strategy to increase agriculture, livestock and fisheries production is required, as is better water and other natural resource management. Economic growth and commercial
development would be encouraged through the development of renewable energy sources to bring down high energy costs, and the strengthening of Puntland’s infrastructure (ports and roads).

**CSOs**

The group defined poverty as being unable to meet basic needs such food, shelter and water; however, no income level was specified.

**Poverty in Puntland is driven** by a weak justice system and corruption and a lack of accountability in public life. Insecurity is a contributing factor as is an under-qualified and unskilled workforce that is unable to meet the demands of the labour market.

**Responses to poverty** include migration of youth, piracy and displacement, with the latter often resulting in limited social services in urban centres being further over-extended. The poor cope with poverty by engaging in micro-business activity and manual labour, and by seeking out help from international NGOs and from social and family networks.

**Poverty reduction requires** the strengthening of governance, equity in resources access and use, public investment in key productive sectors of agriculture, fisheries and livestock, skill development through TVET, building infrastructure, support of energy sector to bring down prices, and environmental protection strategies to reduce deforestation and land degradation in countryside.

**Universities**

Poverty was described by the group as being unable to meet the basics needs such as food, water, shelter, lack of education. Lack of education, especially for girls, is seen too as an indicator of household poverty.

**Poverty is caused by** poor leadership/governance, under-utilizing the natural resources of Puntland (especially fisheries), endemic corruption, discrimination against women and disable people, lack of good education, lack of quality health services, recurring droughts and natural disasters, lack of security/tribal conflicts, poor quality of institutions, low productivity agriculture and livestock sectors, as well as business.

**Poverty results in** migrations, corruption, urban infrastructure and service collapse due to over use, social class systems with exclusion of the poor, injustice and nepotism, insecurity and conflict over limited resources, destitution and begging due to loss of livelihood and widespread unemployment, often resulting malnutrition. **Common coping strategies** include relative and family support, creating micro business if one has access to savings or loan, remittances from diaspora relatives, support from NGOs, community (clan) educational support to get support on cost of schooling or university, especially for very poor households and/or those with orphan children.

**Poverty reduction priorities should include** promoting good leadership/governance, improving justice systems, reduction of/fight against corruption, job creation, creating small industries eg. cement factory to replace import and therefore create jobs, improving education system, investing in productive sectors (agriculture), rebuilding infrastructure, improving business access to finance (eg. through micro-finance), encouraging inclusive economic growth and politics, develop clear policies towards the natural disasters, and proving TVET opportunities.
Private Sector

Poverty was defined by private sector representatives as when a person cannot afford the basic needs such as: food, shelter, clean water, electricity, education, sanitation and hygiene.

Poverty is caused by a lack of technical skills, a dependency culture with able people living on other’s support rather than working, lifestyle management problems with people often living beyond their means, corruption, unfair distribution of opportunities and resources with the country.

Poverty results in a high unemployment rate, limited income to afford basic needs and dependence on international aid. Poor people seek the support of relatives, charitable donations, loans, international and local charity, and engage in micro business.

Poverty reduction priorities should include utilization of rainwater, energy sector investments, improve education systems, community awareness, strengthen domestic production and marketing.

Government Institutions

In consultation with Puntland MoPIC, the participants from the public sector were divided into five subgroups along the lines of area policies covering infrastructure, social sector, governance, livelihood (productive) sector, security and justice.

Synthesising the conclusions of the groups, poverty was defined as having insufficient food and access to basic needs such as shelter, water, sanitation, clothing and employment, and to essential services such as education and health services. The US$1.90 poverty line was considered realistic.

The main causes of poverty include: insecurity (both on land and in coastal waters); limited employment opportunities; low skill levels in the workforce; the consumption of khat; weak systems of justice; weak infrastructure; corruption and weak governance; recurrent drought and desertification; low levels of literacy; poor political leadership; and resource inequality.

Poverty results in: displacement; illegal youth migration; radicalization; crime (including piracy); deforestation and environmental degradation; separation of families; poor public services; economic depression, low productivity and hyperinflation; aid dependence and reliance on others; a shortened live expectancy.

People cope with the effects of poverty by seeking access to zakat (religious obligation to support the poor), remittances, charitable donations and international aid; and undertaking micro-business activity and unskilled or manual labour. Those with means will invest in livestock, seek out microfinance loans or take part in social saving schemes.

Poverty reduction interventions should include reducing insecurity and strengthening Puntland’s systems of justice; employment creation and skills training; and increasing access to essential services (health, education, housing, water, sanitation, etc). The importance of improved governance seemed to underpin these suggestions and the desire to see corruption addressed.

In addition, the group highlighted the importance of attracting foreign investment to induce economic growth and the financing of livestock, agriculture and fisheries as key to creating employment and improving food security. Economic growth will also require the strengthening of Puntland’s infrastructure – roads, airports, sea ports, the bridges, water catchments.
Environmental conservation and management, and rural development generally, were identified as key to building resilience to recurrent drought. However, the importance of improved disaster management and preparedness was also highlighted.

**Parliamentary committee for economic development and planning**

In line with the approach to consultation with the federal parliamentarians, the discussions with Puntland’s parliamentarians were less formal than they were for other stakeholders, with the focus placed on assessing the extent of poverty and preferred options.

**The extent of poverty in Puntland**

The committee members indicated that there is widespread poverty among the local population. Rural populations were particularly affected by reoccurring severe droughts over the past 10 years or so, with livestock numbers falling and rural livelihoods becoming untenable for most nomads. Consequently, many were increasingly moving to cities and towns as IDPs. Conflict in the regions of Sool and Sanaag particularly affected the rural people as, unlike other regions, they cannot access international aid support due to their disputed political status. The indication is that people in those regions are facing extraordinary hardships. Other social factors such as consumption of Khat contribute to poverty as they affect people’s ability to support family and divert income from household; they also move hard currency to Ethiopia without meaningful exchange for Somalia to reduce trade deficit.

There is growing interest and investment in farming but lack of skills in modern agricultural practices and limited availability of water are limiting productivity. Fishery resources are not protected and are exploited by other countries using modern vessels, leaving local fishermen who use low technology, with little resources to earn living. Limited institutional capacity within the public sector makes the situation more challenging as skills and resources necessary to improve productivity across the sectors are lacking. Poor infrastructure limiting people ability to access markets, support and opportunities elsewhere make things more difficult too.

**Government intervention to reduce poverty**

The committee identified a number of possible intervention options for the government to alleviate poverty. Government should first of all develop a holistic strategy to tackle the multiple causes of poverty including:

- **Rehabilitation of infrastructure** to improve road connectivity across the cities and towns and therefore promote trade and movement of goods and services.

- **Restocking of livestock** for nomads, **creation of water reserves** (dams), **resettlement of displaced rural populations** living in camps, **environmental protection** measures to reduce deforestation. It was recognized that the traditional nomadic way of life is no longer viable due to climate change impact and a shift to agro-pastoral livelihoods is the way forward. However, introduction of training in modern farming and livestock systems is necessary for people to undergo the necessary cultural changes and adjust their livelihood strategies accordingly. Resettlement and reorientation of large displaced populations in rural areas is important to rehabilitate the rural economy.

- **Better exploitation of natural resources** including oil and minerals through foreign investments by those who have interest. However, a conducive legal framework and local business willing to engage in
partnerships is necessary for new sectors’ development. Bilateral agreement with other countries should be considered to invest large projects for economic development.

**Fisheries** need to be protected and local fisherman supported to access more modern fishing gain and investment in cool chain technologies and supported to gain access in regional markets for export. Presence of foreign anti-piracy taskforce is seen to create protection for foreign fishing vessels and prevent local fishermen going to good fishing grounds away from the coast.

A **clear aid policy** to guide best use but also prevent negative aspects of aid. WFP interventions were in particular seen to create some disincentives for displaced people who, once they settle in a camp and receive food and cash on a regular basis, become no longer interested to go back to their place of residence and livelihoods. This entails a **culture of dependency** which undermines the country’s ability to be economically productive and meet its needs.

**Skills development**, especially in construction, which increasingly employs foreign migrants from Yemen, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. There are real employment opportunities within the sector which is growing fast. In all sectors technical skills development should meet demand and training in vocational skills should be encouraged and invested in.

**Improved civic awareness** in governance to support good civic behaviour and support for good policy making. There is much public resistance to new policies, which limits government’s ability to make large scale changes to restore country’s governance, develop economy and so on.

**Benaadir Regional Administration**

Consultations with the Regional Administration, civil society and business representatives from Benaadir took place in Mogadishu on 7 March 2019.

**Regional Administration officials**

On 7 March, a consultation was held with Regional Administration officials at which NDP-9 and the consultation process was explained and questions answered by the federal MoPIED team. Meeting participants split into seven groups to consider the characteristics and causes of poverty in Benaadir and what could be done most urgently in terms of its alleviation.

Overall, very similar themes emerged from the breakout groups, with **improved security** identified as the highest priority needed to reduce poverty and as a prerequisite to stability and prosperity. **Good governance and justice** were also identified as important condition for attaining political stability. Improvements of **urban infrastructure**, such as roads, were seen to have impact on the mobility and movement of business and trade with the region.

There was a common view that Banaadir region is rich in resources but that development is held back by **poor public resource management and the continued presence of large numbers of IDPs in the region.** The second of these is thought to overwhelm public services and has a negative impact on security. Unlike the consultations in other parts of the country, the **group viewed poverty as a consequence of external factors.**
When asked to select the **top three regional priorities** to consider for inclusion into NDP-9, the attendees selected **security, good governance and justice, and improved tax collection and revenue management** in descending order.

**The Private Sector**

The second day of the consultation, the private sector was consulted and the objective was to get the thoughts of Somali business owners when it comes to tackling poverty and creating employment opportunities.

The participants expressed their appreciation for the consultation and the government approach, they underlined the importance of getting viewpoints of the different sectors of the society in order to accomplish a highly consultative National Development Plan that aims to alleviate poverty and improve the standard of living.

The main questions that were asked of the participants were: what defines poverty, how poverty affects them. The answers that came out of this consultation did not differ from those of participants consulted in the Federal Level. The viewpoints of defining poverty were all similar, but the causes of poverty and coping mechanisms were slightly different. The participants who came from different layers of the business spectrum pointed out that, **security and justice must prevail** to have any chance of alleviating poverty in Somalia. They also emphasized the importance of **investing in local production to nurture small business** owners. This will create job opportunities and at the same time it lowers the rate of young people joining extremist groups.

The participants suggest that the government needs to come up with a **plan to solve the ever-growing number of IDPs living in the major cities**. They urged the government’s immediate attention because these less fortune people live in a dire situation, they don’t have enough latrines, affordable education and free health care. On top of that, they suffer continuous evictions every now and then by the local district authorities.

Finally the group summarized the following **lack of security, poor infrastructure, corruption, lack of skill trainings, lack of justice and nepotism** as key drivers of poverty in Somalia.

**Civil Society**

In the previous round of the federal-level consultations, civil society was consulted because BRA and federal civil society is more less the same, so this consultation was a follow-up meeting which was intended to reach un-consulted stakeholders in BRA.

The outcomes of these two civil society consultations were similar, the participants expressed a great concern about the **continuous displacement from rural areas caused by drought and lack of security**. They stressed the importance of developing a comprehensive National Development Plan that addresses the burning issues, such as the **widespread poverty, deteriorating security situation, neglected IDPs and lack of investment and job opportunities**.

On the other hand there was a great optimism and the group recognized the efforts of the current government to put in place the necessary mechanisms to reduce poverty by conducting extensive consultations with grassroots communities.
When defining poverty, the group generally had a similar perception of poverty. They defined poverty as, the lack of basic needs in one’s life and they divided poverty into two categories: Primary needs such as shelter, food, water; and secondary needs, such as education, health etc. The group believed that, lack of security and natural disasters such as droughts are the two major triggers and contributing factors of the current situation of poverty.

Finally, in order to alleviate poverty, the participants suggested the government should address the following issues; improve security, re-integrate and resettle IDPs, provide quality health services, improve vocational and skill training, create job opportunities and improve judicial systems.

Summary of Round 2 Consultations

In June, 2019, a set of three consultations was held with members of the private sector, CSOs/non state actors, and with the Parliamentary Committee of Budget, Finance and Planning. The following is a summary of their discussions.

Feedback from the first workshop with private sector participants focused on addressing constraints for economic growth. Their points included:

- Investment in infrastructure development as priority; infrastructure development as key to job creation; and job creation contributes to improved security.
- Leading role and potential of the private sector in job creation.
- Development/strengthening of cooperatives in the fishery sector (job-creation).
- Development and enactment of investment, insurance and copyright laws.
- Establishment of legal/regulatory framework for controlling business monopolies.
- Development of quality control policies, laws and institution.
- Poverty as the main driver of conflicts.
- Challenges of the private sector: poor governance, lack of infrastructure, costly power/lack of alternative sources of affordable energy, and lack of protection for domestic production from imports.
- Shift in cooperation modalities between Somalia and its development partners through the NDP as the guiding policy framework with which all development interventions must be aligned and enhanced coordination role of MoPIED.

Stakeholder participants from CSOs/NSAs raised the following key points:

- Availability and access to safe and clean drinking water for all the people.
- Management of drought and floods including river management (river bursts).
- Vocational skills training and job creation for the youth.
- Establishment of the Constitutional Court.
- Human development to improve lives and wellbeing of the people.
- Economic growth through increased productivity of the productive sector and promotion of small scale industries which leads to employment generation.
- Infrastructure development.
- Banks which finance/provide loans for the development of small scale factories.
- Civic education and raising public awareness on federalism.
- Water management through water policies and construction of dams.
- Inclusive politics and good governance.
• Need for policy to guide cash transfer programs.
• Need for a law which governs FGS-FMS relations (the Constitution).

Finally the Parliament Committee members provided the following feedback:

1. Security and Rule of Law

Security is the crucial issue

Challenges:
• Poverty
• Lack of inclusive politics and reconciliation
• Federalism (thorniest political issue)
• Lack of public trust/confidence

Requirements:
• Security sector – technical know-how, equipment and assets (eg. bomb/explosives detection)
• Emphasis on security – specific security agenda and action points
• Reform of the justice sector
• Security and development nexus
• Rwandan-style local justice/reconciliation process – Gacaca courts (NRF)
• Capacity development and rationalization of the security forces

2. Economy Growth

Challenges:
• Lack of legal and regulatory frameworks and banking systems
• Inability to export local products such as salt and fish to neighbouring countries
• Problem of water management is one of the biggest challenges

Requirements:
• Livestock export – livestock is the backbone of the economy and food security; need for clear government policies for livestock sector development
• Construction of abattoirs and slaughter houses
• Promotion of domestic trade
• Establishment of Letter of Credit (LC) bank guarantee systems
• Job creation
• Nutrition and food security
• Development and reconstruction of schools
• Development and reconstruction of infrastructure – roads
• Technical skills training/education – need for specific agenda
• Poverty reduction

3. Inclusive Politics

• Inclusive politics is a prerequisite for security and rule of law, and economic growth
• Census – to facilitate registration of citizens/voters
• Federalism will be decided by the Somali people through referendum, however it has thus far become a source of division/tension
● One national goal and unity of people
● Establishment of local government structures/councils
● Reconciliation and cohesion/cooperation between local governments and people
● Fundamental human rights (inclusion) vital for the constitutional review process
● Resumption of FGS-Somaliland dialogue and resolution of the Somaliland issue – priority for Somali unification
● Multi-layered reconciliation at all levels including intra/inter-regional

4. Crosscutting (Social Development/Governance)
● Capacity development for the civil servants of the various FGS Ministries
● Health for both people and livestock – necessary
● Government service delivery (basic service provision) – very important
● IDPs – part of war economy – need interventions to address the issue
### ANNEX 2: IMPACTS AND COSTS OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General impact</th>
<th>Physical/bodily harm</th>
<th>Impact on livelihoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Widespread loss of lives / deaths</td>
<td>Death toll: Necrometrics, around 500,000 people</td>
<td>Displacement and refugees: the conflict created about 1m IDPs and 1.1m refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widespread displacement, poverty and vulnerability</td>
<td>Widespread physical violence</td>
<td>Destruction of houses and properties caused widespread destitution, poverty and displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distortion of social relations, culture, &amp; traditional systems (governance, lifestyle, gender relations, economy)</td>
<td>Maiming of/handicapped youths who were/are militarized</td>
<td>Loss of income and assets: people’s earning capacity and purchasing power have suffered significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted access to public utilities, social services and infrastructure</td>
<td>Destruction of government apparatus and security institutions</td>
<td>Shifts in means of livelihood and changes in gender roles: most women assumed the role of head of the household and main breadwinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Destruction of public and private property</td>
<td>Access to resources became limited: competition for scarce resources heightened potential for violent conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>Destruction of the country’s physical and socio-economic infrastructure</td>
<td>Destitution due to destruction of employment opportunities and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of manpower and loss of productivity</td>
<td>Increased civilian casualties caused by Al-Shabaab’s asymmetric terrorist attacks</td>
<td>Loss of and shift in land ownership: farmers lost their farms and moved to IDP camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtailment of public and private services and opportunities</td>
<td>Increased number of widows and orphans</td>
<td>Collapse of agriculture, manufacturing and related activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disruption of all economic activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Traders: limited access to markets due to insecurity and therefore loss of income</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 3:
### SD LINKED M&E ROADMAP TABLE

This table provides alignment between the SDGs and the strategies of NDP-9 for future consideration. It offers a roadmap for future completion as and when baseline data and supporting surveys are in place. Where existing baseline definitions are absent, baseline indicators from the official list of SDG indicators are suggested for consideration. However it will be important for the government of Somalia to tailor indicators appropriate to their context. Not all targets will be relevant, but all have been listed for future consideration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>SDGs Goals/Targets</th>
<th>Pillar Area</th>
<th>Cross-cutting Policy Imperative</th>
<th>NDP Strategies</th>
<th>Baseline (from 2018 unless otherwise stated) (US $)</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Indicators (local where appropriate, otherwise SDG indicator wording has been used)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions</td>
<td>Security; Politics; Economy; Social Development;</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>2018 SHFS</td>
<td>% of people living below national poverty line of $1.90 a day</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable</td>
<td>Security; Politics; Economy; Social Development;</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of population covered by social protection floors/systems, by sex, distinguishing children, unemployed persons, older persons, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, newborns, work-injury victims and the poor and the vulnerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in</td>
<td>Economy; Social Development</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity;</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proportion of population with access to internet</td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>1.5 By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters</td>
<td>Economy; Social Development; Politics; Security</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Environment</td>
<td>Proportion of population with mobile phone</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proportion of total government spending on essential services (education, health and social protection)</td>
<td>Proportion of households with access to electricity</td>
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<td>Proportion of households with registered land tenure</td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td><strong>Goal 2.</strong> End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>Achieving milestones in National Disaster Management Plan</td>
<td>Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster (famine) per 100,000 people</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round</td>
<td>Economy; Social Development;</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Improved Social Protection (Food Security) &amp; Adapt national food production systems to the realities of climate change</td>
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<td>Baselines to be provided in 2019 Demographic and Health Survey</td>
<td>Prevalence of wasting</td>
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<td>Exclusive breastfeeding rate</td>
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<td>Prevalence of underweight children under 59 months</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevalence of anaemia amongst women</td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons</td>
<td>Economy; Social Development</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Prevalence of stunting among children under 59 months</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, in particular women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment</td>
<td>Economy;</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Adapt national food production systems to the realities of climate change</td>
<td>Average income of small-scale food producers, by sex and indigenous status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality</td>
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<td>People</td>
<td>2.5 By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and their related wild species, including through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the national, regional and international levels, and ensure access to and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, as internationally agreed</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereal yield in metric tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underutilized or orphaned crops yield in Metric Tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development; Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baselines to be provided in 2019 Demographic and Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV incidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis incidence per 1,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria incidence per 1,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pent 3 coverage rate for 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality rate attributed to cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
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<tr>
<td>People</td>
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<td>People</td>
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<td>People</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Development;</th>
<th>Humanitarian Interface; Resilience; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance; Durable Solutions</th>
<th>Improving Education and Training;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of children in grades 2/3</td>
<td>Proportion of children in lower level secondary school</td>
<td>% of government budget spent on education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64% EES</td>
<td>Survival rate to Grade 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of 3-4 year olds participating in early childhood program:

- <20-30% EES

% of secondary school teachers certified to teach

Proportion of young adults with ICT skills

NDP-9 The Path to a Just, Stable and Prosperous Somalia
<p>| People | 4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations | Ratio of male to female |
| People | 4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy | Literacy rates of adults |
| People | 4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development |  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economy; Social Development; Politics; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reforming the Security Forces; Reforming the Judiciary;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Institutions; Ratifying Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whether or not legal frameworks are in place to promote, enforce and monitor equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Development; Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reforming the Security Forces; Reforming the Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence and by age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving access to Health Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline to be provided in DHS 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of girls and women who have undergone female genital mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.4 Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic; Inclusive Politics;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society; Strengthening Institutions for more effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFS 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of women in labour force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision making in political, economic and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic; Inclusive Politics;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Humanitarian Interface;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society; Strengthening Institutions for more effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFS 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female employment in government/public service (overall and in Grade A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Planet | 6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all |
| Planet | 6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations |

| Economic Development; Social Development | Humanitarian; Environment; Resilience; Gender & Social Equity; Durable Solutions; Governance |
| Proportion of population using safe drinking water services | Percentage of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary schools providing basic drinking water |
| Proportion of population using safety managed sanitation services, including a hand-washing facility | Percentage of pupils enrolled in primary and secondary schools providing sanitation services |
| Planet | 6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse globally |
| Planet | 6.4 By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity |
| Planet | 6.5 By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate |
| Planet | 6.6 By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes |

| Economic Development | Humanitarian; Environment; Resilience; Governance | Strengthening key economic infrastructure | Definition of localized indicator to be produced with input from Relevant Ministries |
### Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries</td>
<td>Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Strengthening Disaster Management</td>
<td>Yes - national</td>
<td>Have adequate disaster strategy at national and local level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning</td>
<td>Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society</td>
<td>National Environment Impact Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning</td>
<td>Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Strengthening Disaster Management</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Plan and Awareness Raising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people</td>
<td>2.1 M displaced (2017)</td>
<td>DINA</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning</td>
<td>Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society</td>
<td>National Environment Impact Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning</td>
<td>Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Durable Solutions; Governance</td>
<td>Strengthening Disaster Management</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Plan and Awareness Raising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people</td>
<td>2.1 M displaced (2017)</td>
<td>DINA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.1 By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.3 Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, to levels that can produce maximum sustainable biodiversity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Resilience; Environment; Governance</th>
<th>Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of the national exclusive economic areas managed follows an ecosystem approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average marine acidity measured by a number of representative staging stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fishing vessels registered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fishers registered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of fish caught in Somali waters (in $Million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.5 By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information</td>
<td></td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.6 By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>14.7 By 2030, increase the economic benefits to Small Island developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>halt biodiversity loss</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planet</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.1 By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Forest cover as a % of total land</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planet</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planet</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.3 By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planet</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.4 By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Coverage by protected areas of important sites for mountain biodiversity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>SDG Indicator</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>Ensure fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and supply of illegal wildlife products</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planet</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Red List Index | Number of countries that have adopted legislative, administrative and policy frameworks to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits |
| Red List Index | Proportion of traded wildlife that was poached or illicitly trafficked |
| Red List Index | Proportion of countries adopting relevant national legislation and adequately resourcing the prevention or control of invasive alien species |
| Red List Index | Progress towards national targets established in accordance with Aichi Biodiversity Target 2 of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</th>
<th>HBS</th>
<th>Proportion of population with access to durable electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services</td>
<td>Economic Development; Social Development</td>
<td>Create the economic foundations for sustainable communities and businesses; Improving Social Protection (urban planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix</td>
<td>Resilience, Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
<td>Proportion of people dependent on charcoal for fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td>% of renewable energy in total energy supply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</th>
<th>HBS</th>
<th>Energy intensity measured in terms of primary energy and GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 percent gross domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries</td>
<td>Economic Development &amp; Macro-Economic Chapter</td>
<td>Create an enabling environment for economic growth; Strengthen key economic infrastructure; Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society; Adapt national food production systems to the realities of climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Achieve higher levels of economic productivity through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high-value added and labour-intensive sectors</td>
<td>Resilience, Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>Annual growth of real GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Domestic Revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Productive Sector Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Abroad (Diaspora) remittance transfers ($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Abroad (Diaspora) remittance transfers (% of GDP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Finance</th>
<th>FDI (annual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$184 M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$408 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adapt national food production systems to the realities of climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.4 Improve progressively, through 2030, global resource efficiency in consumption and production and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation, in accordance with the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production, with developed countries taking the lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.6 By 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.9 By 2030, devise and implement policies to promote sustainable tourism that creates jobs and promotes local culture and products</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>8.10 Strengthen the capacity of domestic financial institutions to encourage and expand access to banking, insurance and financial services for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Macroeconomic Chapter**

**Governance; Resilience**

**Strengthen the capacity of the Central Bank**

**Ministry of Finance**

**Proportion of remittances which go through mobile transfer**

**Kilometres of main inter-city, inter-state and inter-region rehabilitated/constructed**

**% of employment in industry in total employed**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prosperity</th>
<th>9.3 Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Amount of microcredit as a percentage of total credit loaned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>9.4 By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofit industries to make them sustainable, with increased resource-use efficiency and greater adoption of clean and environmentally sound technologies and industrial processes, with all countries taking action in accordance with their respective capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>9.5 Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.1 By 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.3 Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.5 Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>10.5 Improve the regulation and monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the implementation of such regulations</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Economics; | Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Gender & Social Equity; Durable Solutions; Governance |
| Economics; | Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Gender & Social Equity |
| Economics; Inclusive politics | Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society |
| Inclusive Politics; Social Development | Diversify the private sector, making it more resilient to climate change and accessible to poorer segments of Somali society; Reconciliation; Ratified Constitution; Strengthening Institutions |
| | Ratified Constitution; Formal Federal System; Social Protection; Strengthening Institutions |

69% HBS % of people living below national poverty line of $1.90 a day
| Prosperity | 10.6 Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions |
| Prosperity | 10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies |
| Prosperity | Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable |
| Prosperity | 11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums |

| Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable | Resilience; Humanitarian; Environment; Gender & Social Equity; Durable Solutions; Governance | Improving Social Protection; Reconciliation; Strengthening Institutions | 2.1 M | DINA | Number of IDPs (annual cumulative total) |
| Economic Development; Social Development; | | | | | |
| Humanitarian; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Gender and Social Equity; Governance | Create the economic foundations for sustainable communities and businesses; Improving Social Protection (urban planning) | 55% | HBS (baseline from SHFS) | Access to improved housing |

| Inclusive Politics; Social Development; Security | | | | | |

**Prosperity**

**Goal 10.** Ensure that the economic benefits of growth are equitably shared and that the most vulnerable are protected.

**Goal 11.** Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
<p>| Prosperity | 11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons | Economic Development | Resilience; Governance | Create an enabling environment for economic growth; Strengthen key economic infrastructure; | Proportion of population that has convenient access to public transport, by sex, age and persons with disabilities |
| Prosperity | 11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries | | | |
| Prosperity | 11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage | | | |
| Prosperity | 11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prosperity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Goal 11.6</strong></td>
<td>By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management</td>
<td>Economic Development; Humanitarian; Resilience; Environment</td>
<td>Create the economic foundations for sustainable communities and businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prosperity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Goal 11.7</strong></td>
<td>By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities</td>
<td>Security; Inclusive Politics; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Resilience; Governance</td>
<td>Reform of Security Forces; Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace</strong></td>
<td><strong>Goal 16.1</strong></td>
<td>Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</td>
<td>Security; Inclusive Politics</td>
<td>Reform of Security Forces; Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children</td>
<td>Improved Security</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Resilience; Governance; Durable Solutions</td>
<td>Improving Access to Judicial Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Resilience; Governance</td>
<td>Strenthening Institutions</td>
<td>Improving Access to Judicial Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Resilience; Governance; Durable Solutions</td>
<td>Strengthening Institutions; Completing PFM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms</td>
<td>Inclusive politics; Macro-economic chapter</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
<td>Strenthening Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels</td>
<td>Inclusive politics; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
<td>Strenthening Institutions; Completing PFM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels</td>
<td>Inclusive politics; Gender &amp; Social Equity; Governance</td>
<td>Strengthening Institutions; Fair and Credible Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>Gender &amp; Social Equity; Resilience; Durable Solutions; Humanitarian; Governance</td>
<td>Improving Social Protection</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Finance 17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilization, including through international support to developing countries, to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection</td>
<td>Inclusive Politics; Economic Development; Macro-Economic Chapter</td>
<td>Resilience; Governance</td>
<td>Create an enabling environment for economic growth; Formalizing a Federal System (tax and customs and revenue sharing); Completing PFM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Finance 17.3 Mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources</td>
<td>Economic Development; Macro-Economic Chapter</td>
<td>Resilience; Governance</td>
<td>Create an enabling environment for economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Policy and institutional coherence 17.14 Enhance policy coherence for Strengthening Institutions (strengthening Core Government Services)</td>
<td>Inclusive Politics</td>
<td>Resilience; Governance</td>
<td>Strengthening Institutions (strengthening Core Government Services)</td>
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</table>
### Sustainable Development

**Partnership**

Data, monitoring and accountability 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

**Inclusive Politics**

Resilience; Governance

**Strengthening Institutions**

(Strengthening Core Government Services - Statistical Function)

% increase in number of data points tracked routinely by DNS

### Surveys:

- Household Budget Survey (HBS)
- Labour Force Survey (LFS)
- DINA (Drought and Impact Needs Assessment report)
- DHS (Demographic and Health Survey)
- SHFS (Somalia High Frequency Survey 2017/18)
## Annex 4:
### Food Demand Elasticities

**Panel A: Expenditure (or income) Elasticities evaluated at sample means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cereals</th>
<th>Fru_Veg</th>
<th>Pulses</th>
<th>Meat</th>
<th>Dai_Egg</th>
<th>Oil_Fat</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YED</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>1.196</td>
<td>1.044</td>
<td>1.435</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: Price elasticities of demand for food group (Row) to price changes in food group (Column) - evaluated at sample means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cereals</th>
<th>Fruit/Veg</th>
<th>Pulses</th>
<th>Meat/fish</th>
<th>Dairy/Eggs</th>
<th>Oil/Fats</th>
<th>All others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>-0.471</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit_Veg</td>
<td>-0.595</td>
<td>-0.983</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>-0.923</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.723</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.554</td>
<td>-0.402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy_Egg</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.589</td>
<td>-0.507</td>
<td>-0.567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil_Fat</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>-0.586</td>
<td>-0.402</td>
<td>-1.403</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>-0.803</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
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