



**COMPLETION REPORT FOR PROJECT:
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Capacity Building and Clearance in
Southern Iraq**

Summary

Participating UN Organisation:

United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Office for Project Services

Cluster:

Cluster 7

Project No. and Project Title:

Project Number 00040846
(IRQ/UNDP/IRQ.TF/04A)
"Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Capacity
Building and Clearance in Southern Iraq"

Project Location/Region/Province:

Southern Iraq, operating from Basra and
Nasariya

Reporting Period:

June – Dec 2005

Operationally closed in October 2005

Report no:

2 (Final)

Counterpart organisations / implementing partners:

UNOPS is executing the project on behalf of the UN Mine Action Cluster (7). UNDP being the lead agency for the UN Mine Action and the UN Mine Action Cluster is responsible for the management of the mine action cluster intervention in Iraq. Part of the project in 2004 was a continuation of the UN emergency response initiated in April 2003 under funding of UNMAS VTF. Funding from the VTF ceased at the end of January 2005. From 1 February 2005 – 30 June 2005 project activities have been carried out with funding from the UNDG ITF.

Project cost:

\$4,767,763
(\$3,30,612 UNDG ITF)

Abbreviations and acronyms:

Amman Implementation Facility (AIF)
Anti-Personnel Mine (AP)
Anti-Tank Mine (AT)
Central Demolition Site (CDS)
Explosive Ordnance (EO)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Mine-Tech International (MTI)
Missile (MSL)
National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
Quality Assurance (QA)
Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC)
RMAC(S) Regional Mine Action Centre South
Specialist Support Solutions AG (S3)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)

Project Duration:

1 November 2004 – Dec 2005

I. Purpose

Main objectives and outcomes expected as per approved Project/Programme/project document:

Provide overall project objectives and outcomes as well as outcomes expected within the six month reporting period.

The overall project objectives have been to strengthen and expand the capacity of the Iraq National Mine Action Authority and in particular the Regional Mine Action Centre in Southern Iraq to undertake explosive ordnance disposal. Specifically the expected outcomes for the project have been to:

1. Continue to conduct EOD training, clearance and supervision activities with the current EOD capacity (five teams of five persons each).
2. Produce and deliver a comprehensive mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal training programme and all associated training materials.
3. Expand the EOD capacity with ten additional teams of five persons (Team Leader, three EOD Deminers and one Medic) each in southern Iraq in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance.
4. Strengthen the management capacity of the teams by providing ongoing training to the team leaders and operations support.
5. Supervise, monitor and continue to work with all teams until they have proven that they can plan and carry out clearance operations independent of international supervision by the end of the project.
6. Provide equipment and supplies for the functioning of the teams.

Reference to how the programme/project relates to the UN Assistance Strategy to Iraq 2005/6 and how it aims to support international and national development goals (revised National Development Strategy Dead Sea July 2005) including the Millennium Development Goals and other goals as pertinent:

The overall UN Goal for 2005-2007 for Iraq is to contribute significantly to the creation of a secure enabling environment conducive to the fulfilment of the rights of the Iraqi people to survival, development and equal participation in Iraq's reconstruction. More specifically Iraq and the Iraq UN Country Team (UNCT) adopted on 24 March 2005 a jointly owned "UN-Iraqi Assistance Strategic Framework" outlining the main priority areas suggested for future action in Iraq which was further refined into a National Development Strategy to reflect the Iraqi Transitional Governments new priorities as articulated at the July IRFFI meeting at the Dead Sea, Jordan. The framework built on the Iraqi owned National Development Strategy (NDS), the UNDG ITF 2004 experiences in implementation, and ongoing and widespread consultations between clusters and agencies and their respective line ministries and government counterparts. The document was written from a rights-based perspective on sustainable human development within the framework provided by the Millennium Declaration, global conferences and Conventions.

The UN System, under the auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) developed a UN Strategy for the support to Iraq's reconstruction and development. The Plan includes activities in eleven substantive areas and UN Agencies specialized in these areas have been grouped in clusters so as to ensure full coordination in programme and project design as well as in actual implementation. UNPD was designated to serve as the lead UN agency for Cluster 7, Mine Action, in Iraq effective 1 January 2004 with participation by UNMAS and UNOPS in the same cluster. In this cluster the project addresses the problem of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination throughout Iraq.

ERW poses a serious threat to the safety of the civilian population by denying access to valuable resources including agricultural land, grazing land, roads, water sources and residential areas. In many parts of the country the ERW contamination hinders the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees. ERW contamination is also considered one of the major challenges in the implementation of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development projects and programmes in

the country. Working in close coordination with the Iraq National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) the project aims to provide the NMAA with comprehensive management and technical support in establishing and implementing an indigenous and sustainable mine action programme to effectively deal with the humanitarian and developmental problems related to ERW contamination and provide support services to the victims.

Main international and national implementing partners involved, their specific roles and responsibilities in project implementation and their interaction with the agency:

The project was carried out within Cluster 7 on Mine Action and implemented through the UNOPS Mine Action Unit in New York of the Global and Inter-Regional Division. The UNOPS Regional Office for Central Asia, North Africa, Near East and Europe (CANANE) also provided field support, through the Amman Implementation Facility (AIF), in particular to coordinate the small contract for services with Freight Forwarding company in Kuwait, Mayorka Establishment; project monitoring; and, liaison with the Cluster (s) and the ITF Steering Committee.

UNOPS carried out activities in co-ordination with the following government ministries, donors, NGOs and regional organisations.

- **Government:** The Ministry of Planning, Development and Cooperation, National Mine Action Authority, Regional Mine Action Centre, Ministry of Health, Governorates
- **Local community:** In order to maximise the immediate benefit to the community by way of risk reduction, the communities were involved in determining task priorities in the community.
- **International Donors:** International supporters through the VTF and ITF
- **Non-Governmental Organisations:** DDG is the only NGO known to be still operating in Southern Iraq.
- **Institutions:** To implement this programme, UNOPS relied upon and expanded the relationship already established with the RMAC.
- **Others:** UNOPS already established co-operation with UK Ministry of Defense, through UNMAS, for the provision of explosives. UNOPS sub-contractor MTI cooperated with the British army for delivery of services in the field.

Project activities were implemented by way of contracts between UNOPS and several service providers. Mine Tech International (MTI) provided technical services for EOD local capacity building and clearance. UNOPS contracted Specialist Support Solutions (S3) AG to provide on-site Technical Support Personnel Services to the RMAC and Quality Assurance (QA) monitoring of MTI, namely with an Operations Advisor. UNOPS issued Purchase Orders to multiple suppliers for procurement of vehicles and specialized demining equipment for use by the trained demining teams under MTI supervision and for the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC). UNOPS also entered into a small contract for services with Mayorka Establishment, a local freight forwarder in Kuwait for delivery of equipment to Iraq. Activities were carried out in liaison with the UNDP Mine Action Team

The following narrative documents the challenges faced in delivering these activities

1. Background on Local Capacity Building

MineTech International (MTI) was awarded the contract for local capacity building commencing on 1 August 2004, under the UNMAS (VTF) project, "Emergency Mine Action in Iraq". The contract was initially to 31 October 2004 but was then extended to 27 December to enable the supervised Phase 4 Operations Phase for the five new Iraqi EOD teams to be completed. A further extension to 31 January 2005 was then authorised to enable details and funding for a further extension involving the training and deployment of ten more teams to be finalised, including five teams from Nasiriya. This

final extension was completed on 24 June 2005:

The commencement of the new course was delayed by the non-arrival of UN equipment due to bureaucracy at the Kuwaiti border. After a delay, the MTI Programme Manager decided to resume the course on 2 April using the contractor's own resources. On 28 April the UN equipment started to arrive and by 11 June, all equipment was received.

In October 2004, the S3 Operations Advisor under the previous project was seriously injured in a roadside Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack. He was replaced by a new Operations Advisor who was provided with increased security protection. By April 2005, the cost of the Operations Advisor was becoming prohibitive due to associated security protection. The contract with S3 for this QA and technical support could not be extended.

On 2 June 2005, the Phase 3 - Training Phase was completed and the Phase 4 - Supervision Phase commenced. All teams over this period have been doing fieldwork under the supervision of international supervisors.

Unfortunately, due to no Operations Advisor being present from 17 April 2005, no training evaluation could be carried out by a third party to ascertain suitability of the locally trained personnel to operate under national supervision. By the time of the MTI contract closure on 24 June 2005 still no third party evaluation had been possible. Full details of the training courses and of the national staff trained are contained in Annexes 1 and 2.

A total of 106,519 munitions were destroyed and 6,531,282 sq m cleared both surface and sub-surface over the duration of the project. Full particulars on the monthly totals are contained in Annex 3.

Due to completion of the project, field operations were halted on 17 June and the project contractor, MTI, demobilised by 24 June 2005.

2. Security

The security situation throughout the contract remained unchanged with on-going threats from vehicle-borne and roadside IEDs mainly directed at security forces and security company vehicles.

MTI and S3 implemented appropriate measures to ensure the security of its camp and work sites and at no time were MTI or S3 personnel or Iraqi national staff under any form of threat, either direct or indirect. Excellent relations were forged with the Iraqi national staff and they often were the source of good intelligence as to what was actually happening outside of the camp. MTI regularly liaised with the Operations Advisor and Security Officer at Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) South on security matters in order to ensure that MTI operations and training only proceeded where and when it was safe for them to do so.

MTI contracted a local security company to provide both base and field security services. An additional four security guards were contracted by MTI to provide a personal security detail for MTI personnel that had to travel in the area on official duties. All of the guards were Iraqi nationals and ex-military personnel and proved to be an asset to the operation. The information received from them allowed MTI to plan their deployments around trouble spots and were thus not at any time under any form of threat. S3 engaged local security guards as well.

3. Procurement and delivery of equipment

In January 2005 UNOPS issued sixteen purchase orders for a total value of US\$1,689,689. Annex IV itemizes the purchase orders and shows the nature and value of the items procured.

All UNOPS purchase orders were paid in full between late March and late June 2005, when the equipment was delivered to Kuwait for further dispatching to Southern Iraq. UNOPS entered into a

small contract for services with a local Kuwaiti freight forwarder, Mayorka Establishment. Freight forwarding services included custom duties, clearance, border charges, transit taxes in Iraq, insurance coverage and loading and unloading at the origin and final destination. The contract took effect on 14 March 2005 and was finally amended to end on 21 July 2005.

As indicated by MTI the delays in routing the equipment to Iraq did not hinder the delivery of the MTI activities since MTI resorted to using its own equipment starting on 2 April 2005. On 28 April the UNOPS equipment started to arrive and the final consignment was delivered on 2 June 2005.

A full inventory, including serial numbers, was done on all UNOPS procured equipment.

The equipment was issued to the National Staff as it arrived so they could become acquainted with its characteristics and use.

However, at the end of the MTI contract on 17 June, the equipment issued to the EOD teams was retrieved, and signed over temporarily to the DDG who secured it in their compound.

With the closure of the project, UNOPS and UNDP have agreed that UNOPS would handover the equipment to UNDP, who will then donate it to the NMAA at an appropriate time. This is in accordance with the original project plan. Both agencies have initiated the process of handover and transference of ownership for the equipment. UNOPS has prepared the transfer documentation for the approval of the SC of the ITF.

II. Resources

Total approved budget and summary of resources available to the programme/project from the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and non-Trust Fund resources where applicable:

Source of funds for the project

\$3,340,612 (UNDG ITF)

\$1,427,151 (UNMAS VTF)

Budget Component	Description	Amount Committed	Amount Disbursed	Total Expenditure	Budget Balance
71600 - International Travel <u>1,896</u>	Travel costs for UNOPS AIF Manager to Kuwait re. Delivery of equipment	1,896	1,896	1,896	0
72100 – Sub-contracts <u>55,272</u>	Payments to S3 in 2005	55,272	55,272	55,272	0
<u>1,318,433.38</u>	Payments to MTI in 2005	1,311,752.83	1,311,752.83	1,311,752.83	6,680.55
72200 – Equipment <u>1,681,716.91</u>	Procurement of equipment in 2005	1,681,716.91	1,681,716.91	1,681,716.91	0
<u>64,749</u>	Payments to Mayorka in 2005 for freight forwarding of equipment	71,429.55	71,429.55	71,429.55	(6,680.55)
UNOPS F&A 2004-2005 @7% 218,544.71		218,544.71	218,544.71	218,544.71	
TOTAL BUDGET 3,340,612		3,340,612	3,340,612	3,340,612	BUDGET BALANCE 0

The UNDG ITF funded the procurement of project equipment (100%), part of the MTI contract in 2005 (the other part was funded by UNMAS VTF), part of the S3AG contract in 2005 (the other part was funded by UNMAS VTF) and 100% of the Mayorka subcontract in 2005.

III. Results

An assessment of the extent to which the programme/project component / programme /project is progressing in relation to the outcomes and outputs expected for the year:

The EOD training and clearance activities under contract with MTI were delivered as scheduled, with the exception of third party Quality Assurance (QA). The lack of QA was due to the end of the UNOPS contract with S3 for provision of the services of the Operations Advisor which ended on 17 April 2005 and to the fact that the Regional Mine Action Centre (RMAC) also had no QA monitors available and so could not assist. The delay in the delivery of the equipment did not prove a handicap, as the equipment on hand for the task proved to be sufficient and of good quality, and the odd breakdown/failure could be repaired by the MTI international staff. The following narrative documents how the completed delivery of the contract basics sets the stage for future employment creation for the national trainees, capacity development in support of the NMAA and policy dialogue

1. **Part One.** The first part of the MTI contract (under UNMAS funding), to complete the training of five teams, went off smoothly and all of the trainees were accredited by the RMAC. This took place by December 2004.

2. **Part Two.** The second part of the project commenced on 8 January 2005. The second part involved expansion to ten additional teams (Team Leader, three EOD Deminers and one Medic). 52 potential Iraqi deminers commenced the Basic Demining Course (Level) 1 using MTI equipment and stores. However, instructions had to be subsequently issued by UNOPS to suspend the training from 15 January as funds were not yet received from the ITF. On 20 January 2005 it was confirmed to UNOPS that funding would be available. UNOPS therefore confirmed to MFI that training should resume but this could only happen when the new equipment would be delivered.

The original plan as described in the project document signed on 11 November 2004, was that UNOPS would immediately order equipment for the new EOD teams so that it would be available upon their completion of training. This could not happen due to the late arrival of funds from the ITF.

Unfortunately, training was further delayed by the non-arrival of UN equipment due to bureaucracy at the Kuwaiti border. After some delay, the MTI Programme Manager agreed to resume the training course on 2 April 2005 on a reduced scale, initially using MTI's limited equipment. On 28 April the equipment started to arrive and by 11 June, all equipment was received. The remainder of the training went off smoothly with no further equipment problems. However, after the two-month suspension, it was difficult for MTI to retrieve all the trainees who originally began the training in January. Some had taken other jobs or it was not possible to locate them. As a result, the number of successful trainees from the second group was reduced.

In the second group, the trainees proved to be of a higher calibre than the previous course and although 12 were removed from course for poor performance, the remainder forged ahead and passed their final examinations. A list of sample examination papers, as well as the Course Programmes are contained in Annexes 1 and 2. On 2 June, The Team Leaders Course was successfully completed thus completing the Phase 3 - Training Phase of the contract with MTI.

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By June, all trainees had completed formal instruction and were all functioning under Phase 4 Supervision Phase.

3. **Constraints.** The major external constraints that inhibited the progress of the project were reported in Weekly and Monthly Situation Reports (Sitreps). These were circulated to UNDP, UNMAS, the RMAC and UNOPS. They are summarised as follows:

(a) The untimely departure of the Operations Advisor meant that:

- No external Quality Assurance/Quality Control was being carried out on the training; and,
- UNOPS, the Operations Advisor, the RMAC and the Contractor (MTI), were unable to determine at what stage the teams could be deployed under national supervision as planned under the project.

(b) The RMAC had no QA monitors on its staff and as a result, no QA monitoring was done after the departure of the Operations Advisor.

(c) Due to funding and resulting delays in equipment, training had to be suspended for more than two months. Unless equipment was available, newly trained teams could not function under Phase 4 – Supervision Phase. The two-month suspension of training had a knock-on effect in limiting the funds and therefore time available for Phase 4 - Supervision Phase.

It is recalled that external QA of the contracted EOD training and clearance services provided by MTI was set up because UNOPS could not directly monitor projects inside Iraq with UN personnel due to the prevailing security situation. Also, the RMAC did not have the QA capacity.

4. Operations Progress. Operations progressed well throughout the contract. Visual, surface and sub-surface BAC; de-mining and bulk disposal of ammunition was carried out on various sites in Southern Iraq. Most of these sites were either strike sites or staging areas that the previous Iraqi Army had used. This provided the trainees with a large variety of blind and stray ammunition on which to practice their newly learned skills under international supervision. It also helped remove bulk ammunition that was obviously being used for terrorist bombings against the local population.

Regular meetings were held with the British Army EOD section and much information was shared. However, the British Army was not involved in any form of EOD clearance work. They were purely involved with Force Protection and only reacted when tasked to do so by their own headquarters. The British Army had more than one database to collate information and these were all sparsely populated and are not compatible with IMSMA.

Humanitarian. The trainees were deployed in the rural farming areas to help relieve the humanitarian problem caused by UXOs. Although these sites were not heavily contaminated, the cluster munitions and blinds prevented farmers from etching out a living and a large variety of munitions were found. A full list of the types of ammunition found is contained in Annex 3. This also proved to be a good training area. As MTI had been in the area some time, it had excellent working relationships with the local population, farmers and other civilians who arrived at the MTI camp on a regular basis to report UXOs. All of these reports were investigated by the EOD Quick Response Survey and Disposal Team and were dealt with as a matter of priority. Often when a site was worked on, farmers from adjacent farms arrived to report UXO contamination. This was immediately investigated by the team and dealt with as part of the present task. In this way, large areas of land were visually cleared thus relieving the humanitarian UXO problem.

Central Demolition Site (CDS). MTI operated a CDS on the uninhabited salt flats South of Basrah and used it for bulk disposal of munitions. This site proved to be useful as a lot of MTI's work was in close proximity to habitations. The British Army also had a site nearby so MTI co-ordinated the bulk disposal programme which was not a problem.

EOD Survey and Tasking. The RMAC(S), due to staff shortages, was not conducting any survey work and most of the tasking, although sanctioned by the RMAC(S), was originated and conducted by MTI. The establishment of an EOD Quick Response Survey and Disposal Team by MTI proved beneficial and also allowed the trainees to do practical survey work. Surveys and disposals were recorded in the Information Management Systems for Mine Action (IMSMA) in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and forwarded to the RMAC(S).

Effectiveness Report. Although the MTI contract was a training contract and not a clearance contract, the effectiveness of the EOD resources deployed by MTI for humanitarian EOD operations was measured in terms of the statement of work as follows:

The number of EO items destroyed.

The areas cleared in square metres in accordance with normal BAC procedures.

Table 1: Contract Totals for Munitions Destroyed

AP	AT	Rkt Msl	AC Bomb	Sub Munitions	EO	SAA	Grand Totals
12	353	987	2	906	18,718	86,173	106,519

The total area cleared for the contract was: 6,531,282 sq m

5. **Quality Assurance.** Normal MTI internal QA responsibilities and procedures continued to be implemented by EOD teams including checking of daily worksheets, equipment checks, safety briefings, site visits by the Programme Manager and 10% checks of areas cleared.

Unfortunately, the Operations Adviser was demobilised on 17 April 2005 and subsequently no QA of MTI was carried out on completed work and training progress. The RMAC(S) also had no QA monitors available and thus could not assist. These inhibiting factors were highlighted in Weekly Situation Reports and Monthly Reports.

6. **EOD Incidents.** There were no EOD incidents/accidents

7. **Equipment Matters.** The original plan was for UNOPS to order the required equipment at the start of the project in November 2004. The equipment was to be available to the trained teams in January when they were to start field operations. However, UNOPS was unable to order the equipment due to the late arrival of funds from the ITF. Funds were not received until 16 February 2005. Based upon the assurance that funds were forthcoming, at the end of January and early February 2005, UNOPS issued Purchase Orders

The equipment for the task proved to be sufficient and of good quality. It was reliable and the odd breakdown/failure could be repaired by MTI staff with no affect on the task at hand.

On 28 April, after bureaucratic delays on the Kuwaiti border, the long awaited equipment finally arrived. On 2 June, the final consignment arrived. This was more than three months later than planned.

A full inventory, including serial numbers, was prepared for all equipment procured under this project. The equipment was issued to the National Staff as it arrived so they could become acquainted with its characteristics and use.

Due to the project coming to an end, the equipment issued to the teams was returned, cleaned and signed over to the DDG, who has these assets secured in storage in their compound.

8. **National and International Staff.** At project completion, national staff of MTI totalled 112 (including 66 trainees) and MTI international staff totalled 18.

On 22 June, all national staff were released with the exception of the Logistics Manager (Iraqi) and the Administration Manager (Iraqi). Full time security has been maintained to protect MTI assets held at the compound pending future direction. Details of the national staff employed by MTI are contained in Annex II, including the list of trainees who successfully completed.

Main activities undertaken and achievements/ impacts:

Sixty six (66) trainees successfully completed training. This included 15 team leaders, 36 EOD deminers and 15 medics. These personnel constitute the basis for constituting EOD teams in the South for tasking by the RMAC. These teams are fully equipped and with support and supervision can continue clearance work. In this respect the project achieved its objective and expected outcomes.

The project completed significant clearance work with more than 6.5 million sq m of land cleared. The benefits of this clearance accrue to the local population are able to engage in productive cultivation of cleared land, generate income and enjoy greater mobility.

Implementation constraints, lessons learned from addressing these and knowledge gained from assessments, evaluations and studies that have taken place during the reporting period:

The late arrival of funds was a serious constraint. The project should have been re-appraised and re-designed when the funds did not arrive after three months. While the project continued, the benefits of continued international supervision on-the-job had to be sacrificed due project closure in June 2005, only weeks after completion of formal training.

The early involvement of nationals in QA monitoring could have avoided the absence of any QA in the final month of the project.

Key partnerships and inter-agency collaboration, impact on results:

A key partnership was with the RMAC. As the follow up organisational arrangements, in terms of absorbing the newly trained teams, were not yet in place at project completion, the full impact of the project was yet to be realised.

Highlights and cross cutting issues pertinent to the results being reported on, e.g. Gender disaggregation, policy engagement and participation of the public:

The project created employment for over 130 nationals during operation. Future employment prospects are improved for the 66 persons trained as team leaders, deminers and medics. Given the level of contamination in Iraq, there is a continuing need for

IV. Future Work Plan

Priority actions planned for the subsequent reporting period to overcome constraints, build on achievements and partnerships, and use the lessons learned during the previous period:

The project was completed at the end of June 2005. Transfer of the project equipment to UNDP is planned to support further capacity building in Mine Action and continuation of EOD clearance and mine clearance activities by the national authorities.

Indication of major adjustments in the strategies, targets or key outcomes and outputs:

Arrangements with UNDP for continuation of the teams is ongoing, including seeking approval for transfer of the equipment procured under this project.

Estimated Budget required (including any major funding shortfalls):

Not applicable. The project and demobilisation are completed.