



**PEACEBUILDING FUND
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FACILITY (IRF)
PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET**

Project Title: Support to the International Mediation in Guinea	Recipient UN Organization: UNDP
Project Contact: Address: UNDP Guinea Telephone: E-mail: adama.coulibaly@undp.org	Implementing Partner(s): United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and UNDP
Project Number: To be completed by UNDP MDTF Office	Project Location: Conakry
Project Description: To provide financial support to the ECOWAS-mandated facilitation of dialogue between the <i>Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement</i> (CNDD) and the opposition, the <i>Forces vives</i> , to pave the way for the organization of free and fair elections in Guinea.	Total Project Cost: \$934,935 Peacebuilding Fund: \$634,935 Pledged AU/ECOWAS Input: \$300,000 Other: \$0
	Project Start Date and Duration: May 2010; 7 months
Gender Marker Score: <u> 1 </u> <i>Score 3 for projects that are targeted 100% to women beneficiaries and/or address specific hardships faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations; Score 2 for projects with specific component, activities and budget allocated to women; Score 1 for projects with women mentioned explicitly in its objectives, but no specific activities are formulated nor is a budget reserved; and Score 0 for projects that do not specifically mention women.</i>	
PBF Priority Area(s) and Outcomes: To enable the Facilitator to bring the parties to the negotiating table; To help build confidence between the political stakeholders in Guinea in order to create a peaceful social and political environment conducive to dialogue, social consultation and consensus on the transition; To contribute to the adoption of an agreement leading to the organisation of free and fair elections; To help facilitate national dialogue among Guineans and help defuse social tensions.	
Outputs and Key Activities: The Facilitation entails travel by the Guinean parties to Ouagadougou, where the Facilitator conducts some of the negotiations. In addition, the Facilitator also travels to Guinea to conduct the negotiations, meet with stakeholders and review progress made in the process. National level dialogue, already programmed by the PBF, would feed into the high-level facilitation, allowing all stakeholders to be part of the process. A Senior Advisor, appointed by the United Nations Office for West Africa helps support the work of the Facilitator, assists with the transition and provides a link between the high-level Facilitation and the PBF-funded national dialogue process. The Senior Advisor would also assist the UN Country Team in developing and implementing the mediation dimensions of the PBF Priority Plan.	


Senior UN Representative
Mr. Anthony Ohemeng Boamah
Resident Coordinator, Guinea

Signature

Anthony Ohemeng Boamah

Date & Seal

26 May 2010



Recipient UN Organization


Mr. Adama Coulibaly
UNDP Country Director Guinea

Signature

Adama Coulibaly

Date & Seal

26 May 2010



PBSO

Ms Judy Cheng-Hopkins,
ASG for Peacebuilding Support

Signature

Judy Cheng-Hopkins

Date & Seal

COMPONENT 1: Situation Analysis

On 23 December 2008, a military officer, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, seized power in Guinea in a bloodless coup following the death of President Lansana Conté. Captain Camara immediately announced the dissolution of the Government, suspension of the constitution and that a 32-member *Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement* (CNDD) would take over. He pledged to hold elections in 2010, when President Conté's term was due to expire, and promised to fight corruption and drug trafficking. While the seizure of power by the CNDD was condemned by the country's main regional and international partners, it was welcomed by ordinary Guineans and endorsed by the political class, trade unions and civil society organizations on the understanding that the transition would be short. Under internal and external pressure, the CNDD agreed to hold elections by the end of 2009. Captain Camara also agreed to appoint a Government with both military and civilian members.

On 31 January 2009, during the African Union (AU) Summit, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU set up the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), comprising the country's bilateral, regional and international partners, including the UN, to support the transition and push for the restoration of constitutional order as soon as possible. The ICG-G has so far convened on 11 occasions, mostly in Conakry but also in Sirte, New York and Abuja. At those sessions, the ICG-G met with members of the CNDD and representatives of political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations, collectively known as the *Forum des forces vives*. The ICG-G provides a framework for the international community to accompany Guineans through a transitional period that is envisioned to end with the holding of presidential elections before the end of 2010.

However, by mid-2009, the situation had become increasingly polarized partly due to the failure to move forward on major aspects of the transitional timeframe, such as establishing the CNT. In addition, the growing political ambition of Captain Camara fueled distrust among political stakeholders. During the sixth meeting of the ICG-G in Conakry, on 3-4 September 2009, Captain Camara informed the Group of his intention to contest the presidential election, effectively putting an end to the political dialogue between the CNDD and the *forces vives*. On 17 September, following a meeting of its Peace and Security Council, the African Union gave the CNDD one month in which to formally declare its intentions to abide by its earlier commitment not to present candidates for the election or face sanctions. After the deadline expired without the CNDD abiding by its earlier commitment, the AU imposed sanctions.

The change in the CNDD's intention aggravated the fracture between 1) civilians demanding political reform and the armed forces; 2) stakeholders from different regions, notably the Forestière, who feel that it is "their turn" to govern the country; and 3) an increasingly pauperized citizenry given voice by the trade unions and the ruling elites.

The ferocity of the attack by military and paramilitary elements against a peaceful rally by opposing political parties and civil society activists, in September 2008, evidenced the degree to which military extremists were determined in their intention to remain in power. The international community widely condemned the violence. The African Union, ECOWAS, the Secretary-General and the Security Council of the United Nations, the *Organisation internationale de la francophonie*, the European Union and many of Guinea's bilateral partners including the United States, France and Senegal were among those calling for those responsible to be held accountable. Immediately there were calls for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the events of 28 September in order to bring those responsible to

justice. On 16 October, the Secretary-General announced that he would establish such a commission. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was requested to backstop the Commission with support from the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Legal Affairs. While the Commission would work on the justice track, President Compaoré's mediation would work on the political track of the international efforts to support Guinea's stabilization.

On 2 October 2009, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Mohamed Chambas, led a delegation comprising the Special Envoy of the African Union for Guinea, Ibrahima Fall, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Said Djinnit, to Ouagadougou to present a formal request to President Blaise Compaoré to mediate in Guinea. At its seventh meeting in New York, the ICG-G agreed that ECOWAS should formally mandate President Compaoré as ECOWAS mediator in Guinea. President Compaoré visited Conakry on 5 October 2009, made initial contact with the parties and invited them for consultations in Ouagadougou.

The results of the International Commission of Inquiry showed that the events of September 28 took place in the context of deep internal divisions within the military that coalesce around generational, regional and ethnical rifts that are a microcosm of the divisions throughout Guinean society. The attempted murder of Captain Camara on December 3 by a member of his own military entourage evidenced the degree of disintegration and confrontation among the military ranks and society, plunging the country into new levels of political uncertainty.

While in the context of this new peak in the crisis the more constructive elements in the military regained control over the CNDD, opening a new phase in the process with the setting up of a broad-based transitional government (GNT) incorporating civilian and military government and opposition leaders, as well as civil society and trade unions. The mediation of President Compaoré, supported by the core group of the ICG-G (ECOWAS, AU, UN) resulted in the 15 January Ouagadougou declaration, paving the way for the setting up of a transitional government. As of the writing of this paper, the transitional government has been nominated, the National Transition Council was set up and a 6 month time frame had been set for the elections.

The international community has successively used a combination of incentives and punitive measures coordinated by the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G). These efforts, the unrelenting pressure by the international community, and the determination of the Guinean political actors and civil society, have significantly contributed to the defusing of the tensions and to the development of a road-map for a political transition.

But the crisis is far from over: the new military authorities have only a tenuous control over national institutions, adding to structures of Government that have been historically weakened by the combination of authoritarian rule and corruption. Coming out of a prolonged crisis and sensing the opportunity for political change, the population is anxious to participate in elections that will lead to a legitimate government. However, seeing this new political dispensation, civil society and the political opposition have unrealistic expectations for what can be achieved within the transitional time-frame (reform of the security sector, reform of the mining code, reform of public finances, transitional justice, etc..) Preventing conflict during this period will require managing these expectations through a combination of local, national, and international peacebuilding and mediation efforts supported by the UN system, ECOWAS, and the International Community.

COMPONENT 2: Narrative Section: Project justification

President Compaoré has previously served as a mediator in a number of regional crises, including, most recently, in Côte d'Ivoire. In that country, he helped the Ivorian parties reach a comprehensive accord, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, paving the way for a return to stability in that country. The Facilitation made significant efforts to restore mutual trust between the parties, widely consult with the international community and the Ivorian opposition and to offer its good offices to reach important compromises on key issues of the peace process. In much the same way, there is a need to rebuild trust among the political stakeholders in Guinea following a progressive deterioration of trust, culminating in the 28 September 2009 violence.

In a letter dated 1 October 2009, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua, requested President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso to serve as mediator in Guinea with the support of Guinea's regional and international partners through the International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), which has already been spearheading international efforts to resolve the crisis in that country. During his meeting with some members of the ICG-G, including representatives of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, **President Compaoré presented a budget** for the Facilitation amounting to about \$670,000 and requested the assistance of the partners in defraying the cost of hosting and facilitating the negotiations.

Following the changed in the political situation with the signing of the January 15 Ouagadougou declaration and the opportunity for a global political settlement to the Guinean crisis, a new budget for facilitation during the entire transition period was submitted for financing to the UN, AU, and ECOWAS. Financial support for the talks is essential if the two sides are to be brought to the negotiating table.

The **terms of reference** of President Compaoré's Facilitation are herewith attached (**See Annex I**). This project aims to provide financial support to President Compaoré's Facilitation by meeting the expenses that will be incurred in organizing the meetings.

President Compaoré's mediation would be structured around five key areas:

- i) Adopting an agreement on the transition;
- ii). Addressing outstanding issues with the transitional authority;
- iii). Setting and monitoring key benchmarks for the transition;
- iv). Promoting national dialogue to promote respect for human rights, and
- v). Initiating security sector reforms.

This project aims to provide financial support to defray the costs incurred by the Facilitator and a follow-up committee to convene meetings with Guinean stakeholders throughout the transition process in order to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the January 15 declaration. This would also include 2 planned meetings with Guinean stakeholders in Ouagadougou. The amount being sought from the Peacebuilding Fund is based on select budget items drawn from the Facilitator's request for funding. (**See Annex II**).

Rather than act as a mere financier to the Facilitation, the United Nations will also play an active role in both the mediation process and in the subsequent transitional phase. This would be done through the deployment to Conakry of a Senior Advisor at the P5 level, for a period of 9 months, to work with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for West Africa in

support of the Facilitation and with the UN Country Team in Guinea to implement this project. To carry out his mandate, President Compaoré has relied on regular consultations with the leadership of ECOWAS and the AU and with SRSG Djinnit.

The Senior Advisor would work under the direct supervision of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the UN Resident Coordinator for Guinea. As far as the daily work on the ground is concerned, the Advisor will work under the supervision of the Resident Coordinator. The Senior Advisor, who will be situated in the UNRC support unit would also provide UNOWA and other parts of DPA with information and analyses on the political and security situation in the country to enable the United Nations to respond accordingly.

The Senior Advisor would also support the Country Team with its ongoing national and local-level mediation efforts supported by the United Nations through its Peacebuilding Fund. The Senior Adviser will work closely with the UN Country Team and the PBF Coordinator and Security Sector and Dialogue project specialists. The Senior Advisor would feed inputs from the local and national-level mediation into the high-level Facilitation and vice-versa. This would allow broader participation of Guineans in the peace process. The Department of Political Affairs envisages 4 visits from UN Headquarters staff to backstop the SRSG and the Senior Advisor during the 9-month duration of this project.

In addition, the Senior Advisor would be able to draw upon the resources of the Department of Political Affairs Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and the UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) including for the deployment of experts in particular areas, where required. MSU and UNDP would provide terms of reference and funding for the deployment of these experts. The terms of reference for the Senior Advisor are herewith attached (**See Annex III**).

In addition to this project, the Peacebuilding Fund is also supporting related activities through a Human Rights, Justice and Security project which is managed by UNDP. With the support of other international actors, a security sector assessment is foreseen under this project as well as a number of validation, dialogue and consensus building activities regarding the security sector. Through this project, UNDP and UNOWA will ensure that the outcome of these activities will feed into the mediation process.

Without the financial support of the Peace Building Fund for this project, the United Nations would lose a crucial opportunity to help shape the political outcomes of the ongoing processes in Guinea in line with UN values.

COMPONENT 3: Logical Framework (including implementation strategy)

Part 1 (Strategic Level):

Objectives	Measurable indicators/Targets	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<i>Support the transition institutions and address outstanding issues through the facilitation of President Blaise Compaoré in order to lead to free and fair elections and the consolidation of peace..</i>	<p>Major milestones in the electoral timeframe are achieved, i.e. completion of voter registration, establishment of a functional National Transition Council, establishment of a transitional mechanism to oversee the elections; and free and fair elections are held.</p> <p>(1) Completion of voter registration (2) Approval of new constitution (3) Electoral code (4) Campaign</p>	<p>- The international community declares that the elections are free and fair and they are accepted by the stakeholders.</p> <p>- No major outbreaks of violence during the pre-election period.</p>	Parties will show good faith and accept the Facilitator's decisions, in addition to allowing the United Nations to implement its projects.
<i>Support Facilitator's activities in a way that maintains the momentum already achieved in moving forward the transitional process; Allowing the parties to continue consultations, without interruptions because of lack of funds.</i>	<p>- Meetings of the parties to the conflict take place at 6 times with the Facilitator and/or his envoy</p> <p>- Facilitator and / or his envoy participates in key meetings, including 3 stages of SSR evaluation. 1 week-launch mission (February), 15 day technical assessment mission (March), 15 day validation mission, (April).</p> <p>- Presentation of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/UN assessment on the Security Sector to the Interim President of the Transition.</p> <p>- 4 briefings to the facilitator by the ICG-G Tripartite (AU/UN/ECOWAS)</p>	<p>- Respect of the Ouagadougou Declaration.</p> <p>- Signing of a "Code de Bonne Conduite" by political parties.</p>	That the parties will demonstrate political will and a spirit of compromise.
Strong international engagement	<p>(1) International Contact Group on Guinea assesses progress in the transitional process during 6 meetings meetings.</p> <p>(2) Multi-donor participation in key activities, notably SSR and election support.</p>	6 Press releases by ICG.	The International Community maintains a common and unified position.
<i>Facilitator and/or envoy is able to travel to and from as well as accommodation in Ouagadougou, Conakry, and Abuja.</i>	<p>- Funds to enable the parties and the Facilitator to travel, as indicated and related accommodation expenses and technical expertise.</p> <p>- 3 meetings of key stakeholders are held in Ouagadougou, Facilitator and/or his envoy participates in at least 6 missions to Guinea.</p>	<p>- Midway and final Financial Reports.</p> <p>- Facilitator is consulted on a regular basis (at least 10 times) by stakeholders of transition.</p>	Resources are made available in a timely fashion.

Part 2 (Implementation Level):

PBF Outcome:

Expenditure	# of meetings/ consultations
I. Meetings	4
Lodging/Accommodation	4
Food/catering	4
Rental rooms and decoration	4
<i>International Travel</i>	
<i>Local Travel</i>	4
<i>Security</i>	4
II. Facilitator Visit to Guinea	2
Facilitator's travel (guinea 2 visits)	
Guinea	2
SSR mission participation	2
III. Guinean Facilitation	
Legal strategy	90
Military strategy	90
Per Diems Consultants (60 days *3)	180
Guinea Consultations	
<i>Transportation</i>	
EVALUATION	
UNOWA evaluation visit for 3 days	2
MSU lessons learnt/best practices	1
Audit	1

COMPONENT 4: Budget

PBF PROJECT BUDGET	
CATEGORIES	AMOUNT
1. Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport	
2. Personnel (staff, consultants and travel)	\$305,859.96
3. Training of counterparts	
4. Contracts	
5. Other direct costs	\$287,537.40
Sub-Total Project Costs	593397.36
Indirect Support Costs**	41537.82
TOTAL	634935.18

GLOBAL BUDGET FOR FACILITATION OF GUINEA CRISIS

PBF Outcome:

<i>Main Activities</i>	<i>Inputs</i>	<i>Cost</i>
1. PBSO support to Facilitation	Organize meetings with key stakeholders	\$634,935
2. UNOWA deployment of mediation advisor	Link with national peacebuilding and international mediation efforts	50000
3. Setting and monitoring key benchmarks for the transition.	UN to provide expertise, including from MSU, in areas including constitutional reforms, defence and security, facilitation of dialogue and gender.	<i>In-kind contribution from MSU</i>
4. Promoting national dialogue to support respect for human rights.	UN to provide expertise, including a Senior Advisor, to hold workshops, provide input from local and national level dialogues into the high-level facilitation, support the transition and assist the Country Team with its Peacebuilding Priority Plan.	\$290,000
5. Initiating security sector reforms.	Facilitator to organize 5 meetings with Guinean stakeholders to agree on addressing this issue.	\$115,000
	UN to work with ECOWAS military advisor and other stakeholders, including AU, to prepare for security sector reforms, and help secure the elections.	\$300,000
2. ECOWAS Support	1 st stage Facilitation	\$200,000
3. AU Support	1 st stage Facilitation	\$100,000

COMPONENT 5: Management Arrangements

1. Management Structure

In close collaboration with UNOWA, UNDP will provide technical expertise and receive and manage the funds. UNOWA and UNDP will be responsible for the overall substantive supervision of the project while, as administrative agent and implementer, UNDP will provide day-to-day substantive follow-up. UNDP will submit required technical and financial reports on the project's expenditures. UNDP will also ensure the integration of the project deliverables and activities into the UNCT and into national frameworks and planning processes. UNDP will also ensure coordination between this project and the Human Rights and Justice and Security Projects.

2. Execution Arrangements

UNOWA will have overall responsibility over the project. The project will be implemented by UNOWA and UNDP, in full respect of existing rules and regulations. The project funds will be used to reimburse the Facilitation for its expenditures and/or, as requested, reimburse service providers upon the Facilitation's request.

3. Project Management Unit

A joint UNOWA-UNDP team will implement the project's activities. The team will include the PBF coordination team and technical experts and other technical staff that may be required, based on the budget allocated for staff and consultants.

4. Duration of the Project

The project will be implemented within seven months.

COMPONENT 6 : Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and Evaluation will take place at two levels:

1. On the management of the project and the proper utilisation of funds;
2. On the achievement of the objectives set forth by the mediation (political); and on the capacity of the UN system to “work as one” to effectively and efficiently provide support to the facilitation process (technical).

Administrative monitoring and evaluation

Project oversight, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation will be conducted in accordance with UNDP’s procedures and pursuant to the Programming Manual. The project will be regularly monitored and the management team will issue a mid-point progress report, while providing implementation and financial reports as required.

Political and technical evaluation

UNOWA is well positioned to provide the political monitoring and coordinate the technical monitoring, given the important role of the office and the SRSG in the mediation process since the events of December 2008, September 2009 and January 2010. The Mediation Support Unit (MSU) has developed methodological frameworks for evaluation based on their experience of supporting mediation/dialogue efforts in other areas including Kenya, Sudan and Guinea Bissau. The methodology for the evaluation will be flexible and context sensitive to adapt to the volatile nature of the situation (before, during and after presidential elections).

The Political and Technical evaluation will take place in 2 phases:

During the process

Monitoring and evaluation will take place during the mediation with the aim of taking stock and improving the process while it is still underway. The methodology is adaptable and will include the evolution of dynamics of the conflict; evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses and efficacy of the mediation strategies and tactics; decide whether adjustments should be made and other methods introduced; and consider means of overcoming obstacles to progress. UNOWA will provide monitoring of the mediation process, including the specific activities funded by PBSO. Two visits of three days will be conducted during the process.

Upon Completion

The mediation will be evaluated upon completion, examining whether or not it was successful, and identifying positive and negative lessons that ought to be taken into account in future, drawing on the experience and methodology of the Mediation Support Unit. The closing evaluation will be conducted during a 10 day period, with interviews in Conakry, Dakar and Ouagadougou. This will be presented at an internal inter-agency validation meeting at UNHQ.

COMPONENT 7: Analysis of risks and assumptions

The situation in Guinea is currently characterized by hope for the speedy return to constitutional order. It will be imperative that the current political dispensation will allow for the transition to succeed in the establishment of free and fair elections.

Risks and assumptions to consider are:

1. Socio-economic Tensions

In Guinea, tension is already heightened, owing to growing sentiments among ordinary people that the military Government has failed to deliver on basic social services and that it has reneged on its pledge not to field candidates for the forthcoming elections. Failure to take into consideration the concerns of various sectors of Guinean society, through inclusive dialogue, could lead to further disgruntlement. All stakeholders need to feel a sense of ownership in the resolution of the numerous challenges facing the country and this could be achieved through inclusive, multi-level consultations.

2. Military Divisions

Another potential risk is that divisions within the military, increasingly developing along ethnic lines, could deepen. Captain Camara's grip on the military is increasingly being questioned. Following the violence, he publicly claimed that he did not have full control of the army. Indiscipline within the ranks, the recruitment of militias into the army, some reportedly from neighbouring countries, and growing disgruntlement among the professional units of the army could fuel an implosion.

Possibility of full-scale conflict

Failure to obtain a consensus on the way forward among the stakeholders in Guinea could place the country in danger of more instability and the possibility of open conflict. In a worst-case scenario, internal conflict could produce a major humanitarian crisis in Guinea leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people escaping Conakry and other major towns to safe havens. The impact of refugee flows into neighbouring countries could have disastrous consequences. And the risk of contagion is high. Guinea shares borders with four countries that have suffered serious armed conflict or political instability over the last 10 years – Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.

3. Impunity

If no redress is forthcoming for the victims of the gross human right violations of 28 September, victims will continue to suffer with the feeling that perpetrators can get away with impunity. This anger is a potential element for destabilization in future. However, the announcement by the Secretary-General that the UN will open the office of the High Commission for Human Rights, following the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry, is a welcome move.