



Peace Building Fund (PBF) Priority Plan

**Support to the Ouagadougou Political
Agreement and the
Government Crisis Recovery Programs**

Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

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1. Situation analysis

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) signed between Ivorian ex-belligerents on 4 March, 2007 constitutes a landmark agreement on the road to peace in Côte d'Ivoire. Since then, the country has entered into a transition phase from crisis towards peace building and economic recovery. The OPA led to the creation of a transitional Government of Reconciliation aimed at reunifying the country. The agreement also provides for (i) identification of population; (ii) election; (iii) security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); (iv) restoration of State authority and redeployment of public administration; and (v) national reconciliation and peace consolidation, security and free movement of goods and people.

In order to address these issues, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire has developed a Crisis Recovery Programme (CRP) which aims at strengthening social cohesion and national reconciliation by creating opportunities for economic and social reinsertion of the populations directly affected by the conflict. So far, the peace building process has made significant progress. The latest development was the official announcement of the first round of presidential elections on 30 November, 2008. During this critical pre-elections period, it is essential that development partners continue to be involved in the peace and recovery process, and assist the Ivorian Government in providing the conditions for a credible and transparent election process.

Through a broad range of consultations, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations have reached a common understanding about the root causes of the conflict and a shared vision that sustainable peace and development require peace building and conflict-sensitive development interventions. Consequently, the PRSP for the period 2009-2013, which is under formulation, includes one priority area on peace consolidation. Furthermore, the Government has developed two major national programmes – the National Programme of Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation (PNRRC), and the National Civic Service Programme (NCSP) – in order to address the issues of DDR and socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and youth. Further consultations were conducted beside the formulation of the UNDAF document for the period 2009-2013.

The Government's Crisis Recovery Programme (CRP) has been set-up in order to take into consideration the reinsertion of 45,000 ex-combatants of which, around 2,000 militiamen. Although the disarmament, demobilization components of the DDR programme are reasonably covered the main bottleneck resides on the fact that the NCSP accounted for an amount of 40 billion Francs CFA (*80 million US Dollars*) is not covered in full. From the total budget allocated to the NSCP only 12 billion Francs CFA (*24 million US Dollars*) are earmarked for 2008 in the national budget and the remaining funding gap has been requested to be filled through external sources. However, the portion committed by the Government is at risk since the same faces serious liquidity constraints. As a consequence of the above, the funds put at the disposal by PBSO through the present Priority Plan would enable the United Nations in Côte d'Ivoire to start implementing reinsertion projects in the context of the NCSP and thus avoiding the peace process to remain at a starting block situation at the eve of general elections.

The present peace building **Priority Plan** draws on these prior analyses and provides a framework for key areas that need to be addressed immediately with the objective to catalyze the critical process in view of facilitating a secure environment for the election period and longer term development in Côte d'Ivoire.

Despite some progress and the commitment of the Government to base its development agenda on principles of greater inclusion, equity and stability, the political situation and the peace consolidation process in Côte d'Ivoire remain fragile. The major challenges include: (i) the effective start of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of ex-combatants and militias (DDR/DDM) and the National Civic Service Programme; (ii) the effective return of IDPs to their home communities; (iii) the reconstruction and rehabilitation of communities in the war-affected zones; (iv) the security sector reform and the integration of the two belligerent armies FAFN and FANCI into one national army; (v) the electoral process; (vi) recurrent serious human rights violations and an enduring culture of impunity, (vii) the need to restore basic public services in the northern and western part of the country, to ensure acceptable level of economic and social equity between North and South . In order to avoid unnecessary duplication from existing planning tools, the present Priority Plan will be aligned to the already existing UNDP Country Programme Document for 2008 on the planning front but also to the UNDP/BCPR programmatic activities such as the *Programme d'Appui, de Reconstruction, de Réinsertion et de Réhabilitation communautaire* (PARC).

Successful peace consolidation and PRSP implementation in Côte d'Ivoire depend on the response to the above-mentioned challenges and the extent to which the root causes of conflict will be addressed. However, among these challenges, the successful organization of free and fair presidential elections at the end of November in a safe environment respectful of fundamental human rights remains the key element which will condition any further development process in Côte d'Ivoire. As in any post-conflict country, this period requires special attention in order to ensure that there is no relapse to violent conflict.

During his visit to Côte d'Ivoire from 23 to 24 April, the Secretary-General of the United Nations reiterated the commitment of the United Nations to strongly support the peacebuilding process in the country. Against this background, he has recently declared Côte d'Ivoire eligible to receive funding under the second window of the Peace Building Fund (PBF). The PBF will be used to bridge immediate gaps and to catalyze the peace building process that will fit into the PRSP 2009-2013.

1.1. Conflict triggers

National and international development stakeholders focus on conflict factors of the crisis, which have been articulated in the OPA. Following a broad range of consultations at national and regional level with public authorities and civil society organizations, the following major root causes of the conflict have been identified:

Security Sector: Five years of conflict have shattered the principles and fundamentals of the security sector in Côte d'Ivoire with a negative impact on the functioning of the different components of the security forces, such as the army, the police and the gendarmerie. Given limited state capacity in the security and justice sector, Côte d'Ivoire remains vulnerable to lawlessness, violent crime and political instability. In light of the upcoming elections, the organization and coordination of the armed forces need to be immediately enhanced, which

includes: (i) the integration of the two ex-belligerent armies FAFN and FANCI into one national army; (ii) dismantling of militias; (iii) professionalization of the various components of the security and defence forces; (iv) creation of a safe environment to allow free movements of goods and people. The resuming of the DDR process offers an opportunity to launch the Security Sector Reform (SSR), as both SSR and DDR are conflict resolution and management tools that support security, political stability, peace and development through the restoration of mutual confidence. To be successful the SSR should furthermore include the fight against the use and proliferation of illicit arms and measures to re-establish State authority.

Identification issue: The issue of identification in Côte d'Ivoire represents one of the key national priorities and holds a particular place in the various post-crisis agreements. The OPA considers that the lack of clear and coherent identification of populations, as well as the absence of administrative documents proving the identity and nationality of individuals represent conflict sources. The issue of identification, which implies whether an individual is recognized or not as member of the community or a given social group, is strongly linked to the question of democratic participation and access to property and land.

Land tenure: The issue of land tenure as one of the causes of the crisis remains a major area of political concern in Côte d'Ivoire. The difficult access to land due to the high youth unemployment rate, among others, and their massive return to rural areas, have fed conflicts among communities which degenerated during the 1990's. The law n° 98 -750 of 23 December 1998, aims at fixing the land tenure issue generated by the inadequate legal framework inherited from the colonial period. This law allows transforming customary rights into property rights, and constitutes also a reference document for the judiciary administration. However, the promulgation and the implementation of this law are facing some difficulties that hamper the actual application of the law.

Governance: The government of Côte d'Ivoire has reasserted its commitment to give priority to good governance and transparency in the management of public resources at the centre of the envisaged structural reforms. It is determined to fight against fraud, corruption and impunity, to reinforce the rule of law, and to establish an economic and legal framework that enables economic activities. The opacity of the public affairs management, the persisting corruption, and the lack of transparency in the administrative procedure represent strong symptoms of bad governance in Côte d'Ivoire. Furthermore, the justice system and the rule of law are negatively impacted by the dysfunction of the security sector. This led to a public finance crisis and a lack of trust of the populations in the public administration of their country.

While some of these root causes, such as land reform or governance issues will only be addressed after the elections, it is indispensable to ensure a secure environment in the light of the upcoming elections, and to deal with the reintegration of ex-combatants (either directly or through the Civic Service Program) with immediate effect.

In addressing these issues, special attention needs to be given to youth and women, who have been particularly affected by the conflict as well as the human rights situation. In the past, elections in Côte d'Ivoire have been flawed and riddled with human rights violations and the upcoming presidential election scheduled for 30 November 2008 could exacerbate the already poor human rights context. There is a consensus amongst key international stakeholders that, among other things, impunity for gross human rights violations was a root cause of the conflict and need continued engagement. Gender-based violence, including sexual abuse and the vulnerability of women to prostitution has considerably increased since the beginning of the crisis, and has consequently

exacerbated gender inequalities. Despite economic growth in the past years, increasing poverty remains an important factor of insecurity in the country, particularly with regard to the youth, who represents the most unemployed group.

2. Identified priority areas

The presence of the Peacekeeping Mission (UNOCI) and the Impartial Forces remain a crucial element of stability in Côte d'Ivoire. However, in light of the upcoming elections, key investments in capacity building must be made to ensure that national institutions and governmental bodies are able to prevent the outbreak of violent conflicts during the election period.

In this context and following consultations with a broad range of national and international stakeholders, including public authorities, civil society and the international donor community, the present priority plan has been prepared. A mission from PBSO and UNDP BCPR from 4 to 6 June 2008 helped consolidate the plan in close consultation with national and international partners.

The present Priority Plan focuses on two strategic areas, which have been identified as essential to support the current peace process in Côte d'Ivoire: i) support to the Facilitation and direct follow up of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), (US\$ 1,000 000) ii) support to the socio economic reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militias and youth at risk (US\$ 4,000 000).

2.1. Supporting the Facilitation and direct follow up of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)

Since the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) on 4 March, 2007, significant progress has been made in a number of key deadlocked issues since 2003. The peace process has been successfully facilitated to date by President Blaise Compaoré, the Facilitator of the political agreement. The implementation of the OPA overall is progressing well and the economic profile of the country is relatively improving.

The UN support in Côte d'Ivoire has helped to adequately respond to the situation by providing technical assistance and mobilizing necessary funding through core resources, bilateral and multilateral channels to fill the financial gap of the post-conflict program activities and of the support to the facilitation. The UN financial support to the peace process, particularly to the facilitation, has been materialized by the end of 2007 and in May 2008 through the Emergency Window of the Peace Building Fund (PBF) enabling the funding of the Direct Dialogue in Ouagadougou between the belligerent parties under the Chairmanship of President Compaoré for a total amount of US\$ 1,000,000. As a result, the political atmosphere has improved considerably, and consequently the security situation of the country. The rebuilt trust between the parties has facilitated the announcement of presidential elections before the end of this year.

However the ongoing peace process is still fragile, among others due to delays in the voter registration, the disarmament, demobilization and socioeconomic (re)integration of ex-combatants, ex-militias, youth associated with armed groups, and of youth-at-risk, and the national identification process, including the modernization of the national civil registry,

which is a pre-condition not only for free and fair presidential elections, and the respect of fundamental human rights.

In order to accompany and monitor the peace process, the OPA has established a permanent monitoring and evaluation framework consisting of (i) the [Permanent Consultation Framework (*Cadre Permanent de Concertation* (CPC))], gathering around the Facilitator the two signatories of the Political Agreement and the Presidents of the two main political parties (PDCI-RDA and RDR) on one hand and (ii) the Evaluation and Follow up Committee [*Comité d'Evaluation et d'Accompagnement* (CEA)] composed of the Facilitator and the two signatories of the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement on the other hand.

To adequately address the ongoing issues, the Facilitator has appointed a Special Representative and a team to Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) to monitor the peace process and the presidential elections scheduled on November 30, 2008 in particular with respect to the arbitration mandate to solve possible divergences that might come up between the signatories of the OPA during the peace process implementation.

For the successful implementation of the peace agreement in Côte d'Ivoire, there is a need to maintain a strong facilitation team. Taking the upcoming presidential elections into account, it is important to continue to provide significant assistance (technically and financially) to the Facilitator and his team, to ensure constant mediation between the ex-belligerents, the political actors, while keeping a permanent link to the international community, namely, the United Nations and the Development Partners. While the funding from the Emergency Window of the PBF was mainly used to support the facilitator's team in Ouagadougou, the current situation requires also special support to the team of the Special Representative in Abidjan who is facilitating agreements between all stakeholders on the operational procedures of the election process and identification issues.

While ongoing efforts are made by bilateral, multilateral donors and UN Agencies to ensure additional funding to support the peace process, it is necessary to prevent lack of funding, which would undermine the progress made since March 2007. The additional funds required in this proposal submitted to the Peace Building Fund (PBF) will in priority aim at bridging the needs to support the Facilitation and the mediation activities, both in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) until consequent and complementary resources are made available by other donors. So far, funding has been provided by Norway, and France. Negotiations with ECOWAS are very advanced. The requested funds will strategically continue to reinforce the capacity building, orientations and negotiations initiatives of the OPA. The funds will also operationally allow travel and meeting facilities between Ouagadougou and Abidjan, throughout the established permanent monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

2.2. Support to the reintegration of ex-combatants, ex-militias and youth at risk

The politico-military crisis has had serious consequences on the Ivorian youth (both male and female) that represents over 40% of the population and are the most affected group by increasing poverty. Promotion of social, professional, and economic youth integration had often been thwarted by political realities, thereby slowing down social stability, a prerequisite for lasting peace and economic growth. The conflict appeared for many of the youth as an opportunity to overcome unemployment by joining the military forces and militia groups of both sides during the war. Arms and weapons have provided them with the illusion of power

and importance, and generated both recognition and remuneration, contributing to further ‘insecurity’.

In this way, the conflict has provided ‘employment’ for many young people, who chose to be engaged in unlawful income-generating activities. The number of young ex-combatants in Côte d’Ivoire is estimated at 34,000 according to the Joint Operation Plan of the armed forces. Youth unemployment is, therefore, increasingly considered not only as a socio-economic issue, but also as a political and security issue, posing a serious obstacle to peace, security and development in Côte d’Ivoire. The insecurity is increasing the vulnerability of the local communities, notably young people and women, as they are more exposed to criminality, and all kinds of violent acts.

Furthermore, the crisis has seriously affected social cohesion among communities and aggravated the fractures within the society. In particular in the Western part of the country, inter- and intra-community conflicts continue hampering the return of internally displaced persons and further consolidation of the peace process. Given the increasing circulation of illicit small arms and light weapons and the high number of ex-combatants that have still not been properly disarmed, the peace process could be seriously threatened during the elections, should these potential risks be not taken into consideration.

The Ouagadougou Political Agreement reiterates the need to implement a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for combatants and a disarmament and dismantling of militias programme for other armed and non-armed groups. This process will however not be completed before the election and, although some of the ex-combatants may have been disarmed and demobilised before the elections are held on 30 November 2008, they are unlikely to be in long-term reintegration programmes as these are not yet up and running. This is likely to lead to an increase in frustration amongst a volatile group who will have few prospects for employment, for whom there is currently very limited reintegration assistance and who are trained in the use of and may have access to weapons. There are therefore strong risks of destabilization around this date, particularly in the CNO part of the country (Centre, North, West). In order to prevent conflict and outbreak of violence, it is therefore crucial to support the socio-economic reinsertion of ex-combatants, for which the cantonment process started on 22 April 2008.

The requested funds (US\$ 4,000,000) to PBF will help contribute to reinforcing peace and security in the country, in particular in the northern and western parts, through the provision of socioeconomic reinsertion opportunities to former combatants, militias, youth associated with armed conflicts and youth at risk. The project activities will operationally focus on micro projects for ex-combatants and militias in the North, the Centre, the West and in the East through the National Program of Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation (NPRCR). The second component is aiming at capacity building programs for youth at risk through short term professional training and support to income generating activities. Rehabilitation of socio professional training centres for the National Civic Service Program (NCSP) will also be part of the project activities.

Among others, the reinsertion assistance programme will contribute to achieving the following goals applicable to former combatants, militias, youth association with armed conflicts and youth at risk:

- Create the preconditions for a sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex combatants and militias.

- Reduce the engagement of former combatant and militias in unlawful income generating activities;
- Reduce the use of weapons as an income generating tool;
- Reduce unemployment and poverty rates of these sensitive groups;
- Create conditions for safe return of internally displaced persons;
- Reduce intercommunity conflicts, criminality and the wanton violation of human rights;
- Promote within the communities new opportunities of professional reinsertion and stimulate local economies;
- Improve the living condition of the beneficiaries as well as the condition of vulnerable groups such as women, children affected by the conflict and HIV/AIDS affected groups.

Additional sources of funding are under consideration. The UNDP administered Basket Fund has already taken the initiative where past DDR contributions have been reactivated in order to fund the DDR component of the Government's Crisis Recovery Programme. In addition, the World Bank's grant of 120 million US Dollars of which 40 million US Dollars is to be used for economic reinsertion purposes can scale up the 1,000 micro projects.

3. Management and coordination arrangements

A Joint Steering Committee (JSC), co-chaired by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and by the Prime-Minister's Office will be responsible for coordinating and managing the PBF. The JSC combining both policy review (steering) and project review and approval functions, Other Governmental representatives on the JSC may be drawn from relevant ministries at the discretion of the Co-Chairs. The Steering Committee will include furthermore the DSRSG/RC/HC, a representative of the donor community, of the international financial institutions, and of civil society organizations. Details on the JSC will be included in the JSC TOR and Procedures. Project proposals and implementing partners will be selected based on a clear set of selection criteria that will be defined by the JSC.

The JSC will make best use of existing mechanisms. The Funds will be channelled through the UNDP-administered Basket Fund mechanism to implementing partners, who will be accountable for the achievements of the planned results. Potential implementing partners, such as UN agencies or international NGOs in the project area, will be selected based on their operational capacities. They will work in close collaboration with the Government, local authorities and civil society organizations to ensure a coherent approach and a strategic use of the available resources. Actual partners and stakeholders will be defined in the project documents.

The Secretariat of the basket fund in the UNDP post-crisis unit will support the JSC and provide reports through the cabinet of the DSRSG, and the Prime Minister Cabinet in charge of the recovery programs. The post-crisis unit in UNDP has sufficient capacity to manage the PBF with the existing staff members. Furthermore, the Secretariat will ensure that a mid-term review will be conducted in order to evaluate progress and results, and recommend adjustments to the implementation strategy if necessary.

In terms of programme implementation, the NPRCR and the NCSP, responsible for the management of the lists of ex-combatants and for the successful implementation of the

reintegration programs for ex-militias and youth at risk in Côte d'Ivoire, will play a key role in coordinating project activities and implementing partners on the ground.

Conclusion

The planned activities of the project will be implemented within a period of six to twelve months starting in July 2008.

Annexe: Summary of project activities (US\$ 5 million)

Supporting the Facilitation and direct follow up of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)

Recipient UN Organization: UNOCI/UNDP		Priority Area: Facilitation of political dialogue	
National Authority: Prime Ministry of Côte d'Ivoire			
Title: Support to the OPA facilitation process			
Estimated cost: Up to US\$ 1 000 000			
Starting Date	July 2008		
Short description:			
<p>Ensuring and enabling the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator in Côte d'Ivoire to follow up the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement pursuant to the provisions of the SCR 1765: Organization of stakeholder meetings of the OPA, in particular of the CEA and CPC, and support to the facilitation activities. Enabling the Special Representative of the Facilitator to ensure timely and appropriate support in Abidjan. Advocacy and resource mobilization: Organization and participation of meetings with national authorities, civil society and development partners. The project implementation will follow a gender-sensitive approach.</p>			
<p>Main implementing partners will be the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator in Côte d'Ivoire, the facilitation team in Ouagadougou under President Compaoré UNOCI, ONUCI and UNOPS.</p>			
<p>Additional donors, sustainability of funding: So far, funding has been received from Norway (FCFA 85 million), and France (FCFA 33 million). Negotiations with ECOWAS are very advanced. Further resource mobilisation efforts are ongoing.</p>			

Support to the reintegration ex-combatants, militias and youth at risk

Recipient UN Organization: UNDP/UNOCI		Priority Area: DDR	
National Authority: Prime Ministry of Côte d'Ivoire (PNRRC, PNSC)			
Title: Support to the reintegration of ex-combatants, militias, and youth at risk			
Estimated cost: Up to US\$ 4 000 000			
Expected duration: 12 months			
Starting Date	July 2008		
<p>Short description:</p> <p>Direct reintegration - Microprojects for ex-combatants, ex-militias and youth at risk in close collaboration with the National Programme of Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation. This project implementation will be coordinated in a close collaboration with the national structure in charge of reintegration programs (PNRRC): Capacity building in programme management, counselling, income generating activities, identification and enrolment of beneficiaries both men and women as well as children affected by the conflict, capacity building for reintegration of beneficiaries including people affected by HIV/AIDs.</p> <p>Indirect reintegration through the National Civic Service – support to construction/rehabilitation of socio professional training centres for the program, through capacity building for ex-combatants and youth at risk and support to income generating activities and equipments and supplies for training centres, development tools and curricula for training sessions, identification and enrolment of beneficiaries. The project implementation will follow a gender-sensitive approach.</p> <p>Potential implementing partners are the NPRCR, the Civic Service Programme, the Integrated Command Center (ICC), UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS, FAO, OOIM and UNOCI or international NGOs</p> <p>Additional donors, sustainability of funding: The PNRRC, and the Civic Service Programme are included in the national budget 2008. Through a UNDP-administered basket fund, these initiatives are co-funded by Denmark (FCFA 1.5 milliard), Sweden (FCFA 311 million), Norway (FCFA 444 million), France (FCFA 656 million), Belgium (FCFA 873 million) and UNDP (FCFA 126 million).</p>			

Comment: appropriate consideration should be taken to the fact that projects are already been “screened” jointly by UNOCI DDR Section, with the support of the *Impartial Forces* and UNDP Post-Crisis Unit with the involvement of the *Forces Nouvelles’* elements (COM Zones) and the PNRRC. In addition, the projects are income generating projects of an average

duration of 12 months so as to enable the beneficiaries to be reintegrated to the social tissue of local development. The aim is to cover the largest possible number of ex-combatants before the elections in order to contribute to a secure pre-electoral and electoral environment. It is clear that the reinsertion programme will continue after the elections.