

# Stabilization Priority Plan

2012 – 2014

for the



**INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND  
STABILIZATION SUPPORT STRATEGY**

**For the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**In support of the Government Stabilization and  
Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC).**

*“[C]alls upon MONUSCO to continue [...] to support the implementation of the Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) including through the implementation of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) and **calls upon donors to support these efforts.**”*

*– Security Council Resolution S/RES/1991 (2011), para. 20*

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## Note to the Reader:

To find out more about the background of the Stabilization Priority Plan 2012-2014, please refer to the Integrated Programme Framework (IPF) 2009-2012, the Situation Assessment of August 2011, and recent ISSSS Quarterly Reports.

# Abbreviations

<b>ADF</b>	Allied Democratic Forces
<b>AMP</b>	Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle
<b>CAS</b>	Civil Affairs Section (within MONUSCO)
<b>CAU</b>	Corrections Advisory Unit (within MONUSCO)
<b>CLPC</b>	Permanent Local Conciliation Committee
<b>CNDP</b>	National Congress for the Defense of the People
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Services
<b>CTC</b>	Joint Technical Committee (Comité Technique Conjoint)
<b>CTPR</b>	Technical Committee for Pacification and Reconciliation
<b>DAI</b>	Development Alternatives, Inc.
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DDR/RR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration
<b>DSRSG/RC/HC</b>	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>FARDC</b>	Congolese Armed Forces
<b>FDLR</b>	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
<b>FRF</b>	Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes
<b>GoDRC</b>	Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>HAP</b>	Humanitarian Action Plan
<b>IA</b>	International Alert
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IMA</b>	IMA World Health
<b>IMC</b>	International Medical Corps
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>ISSSS</b>	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
<b>JMAC</b>	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
<b>MDTFU</b>	UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Unit
<b>MONUSCO</b>	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>MSI</b>	Management Systems International
<b>PBF</b>	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
<b>PNC</b>	Congolese National Police
<b>RoL</b>	Rule of Law Section (within MONUSCO)
<b>SRFF</b>	Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility
<b>SSU</b>	Stabilization Support Unit
<b>SWG</b>	Stabilization Working Group
<b>STAREC</b>	Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas
<b>UNDP</b>	UN Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	UN Population Fund
<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	UN Children's Fund
<b>UNOPS</b>	UN Office for Project Services
<b>UNPOL</b>	UN Police

# 1. Foreword

This Stabilization Priority Plan (2012-2014) outlines programmatic recommendations and specific funding priorities for the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) in support of the Government Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) until 2014. The Plan builds on priorities identified by national and international partners at provincial level.

It also takes into consideration a number of lessons learned since the launch of the ISSSS in 2008-2009, including the lack in use of common funding through a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) setting, the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF), the efficiency of which needs to be improved.

This Priority Plan is issued at a critical time in the implementation of the ISSSS. The newest presidential ordinance extends the STAREC for some three years until June 2014. It is the very first time the Government extends the program for such a long period. This provides an additional opportunity for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GoDRC) to reinforce its ownership of stabilization efforts in eastern DRC, and constitutes an ideal structure for the implementation of the Priority Plan.

While building on the Integrated Programme Framework (IPF) 2009-2012, which described the international community's strategy to support the GoDRC's stabilization and reconstruction plan in five components, this Priority Plan identifies feasible program target and support for the second phase (2012-2014) mostly for the Restoration of State Authority, and Return, Reintegration and Recovery components, based on the Situation Assessment conducted earlier this year. With regard to other ISSSS components, when concept notes will be received, a strategic review is to be conducted and its recommendations will be incorporated in the list of priority projects.

In a nutshell, this Priority Plan gives an overview of provincial priorities and project concepts developed by Technical Sub-Committees and endorsed by Joint Technical Committees (CTCs) under STAREC, with the participation of national and international partners. It represents the intersection between STAREC and the ISSSS and ought to be used as the entry point for international support to the 'second phase' of stabilization programming going forward.

Stabilization Support Unit (SSU)  
November 2011

## 2. ISSSS: the Context

*“[...] In keeping with the Mission’s increased emphasis on stabilization, MONUSCO should also continue to support the Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC) through the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo [...].”*

– *Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2011/298 (12 May 2011), para. 83.)*

The overall objective of the **International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy** (ISSSS) is to provide international assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s national efforts to secure and stabilize conflict-affected areas in the east. In this regard, the ISSSS supports the **Stabilization and Reconstruction Programme for War-Affected Areas** (STAREC) and the implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1925 (2010) and S/RES/1991 (2011).

The STAREC program administered by presidential ordinance provides a political and operational framework for the implementation of the ISSSS through a shared vision of priorities and coordination and monitoring mechanisms. STAREC’s *Comité de Pilotage* chaired by the Prime Minister, and the *Comité de Suivi* chaired by the Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Security and Interior Affairs, provide appropriate mechanisms for oversight and guidance, especially regarding the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (GoDRC)’s involvement in the ISSSS program.

As a transitional strategy to move forward from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in eastern DRC, the ISSSS focuses on five key areas of support: security; political processes; restoration of state authority; return, reintegration and recovery; and the fight against sexual violence. In terms of the geographical coverage, the ISSSS activities are currently focusing on the provinces of North and South Kivu, Maniema and Ituri district of Orientale province.

Since the launch of the ISSSS in 2008 and 2009, several milestones have been reached in each of the components. However, serious challenges to achieving a stable environment remain. Notably, the security situation in the East continues to be precarious and civilians remain under imminent threat of violence in many areas.

The ISSSS activities are supported by contributions from some thirteen donors (Belgium, Canada, Germany, the European Commission, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and the United States) as well as resources from the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Additionally, Switzerland has indicated their intension to support the Stabilization Support Unit (SSU).

As of September 2011, some US\$ 243 million had been mobilized, of which about US\$ 168 million have been spent.<sup>1</sup> Of the total funds, 88% comes from bilateral project agreements, 8% from the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and 4% from contributions to the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF).<sup>2</sup> In addition to the funding from donors, the GoDRC has committed about US\$ 20 million for STAREC activities.

<sup>1</sup> By component: Security (51.3m), Political Processes (1.6m), Restoration of State Authority (86.6m), Return, Reintegration & Recovery (71.1m), Fight against Sexual Violence (31.5m). Figures are in millions of US dollars.

<sup>2</sup> See the “Recommendations (p. 13)” for more details about the under-utilization of the SRFF.

**Box1: Relationship between the ISSSS and Other Frameworks**

ISSSS interventions are transitional activities which:

- Build on emergency assistance under the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP);
- Prioritize and accelerate recovery and development activities that are key enablers for stabilization; and
- Fill gaps critical to stabilization that are not already covered by other frameworks.

To ensure continuity of effort, ISSSS activities will be closely coordinated with those in other sectors, including the humanitarian clusters, the reform committees and the GoDRC’s thematic groups.

\* See Annex 3 for more detailed demarcation between HAP and ISSSS.

**Map 1: STAREC Target Areas and the Stabilization Priority Plan**

The areas shaded in orange are the target areas under the STAREC. The Priority Plan focuses on five provinces in the east: North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga provinces.



## 3. Guiding Assumptions

### ■ Seize Windows of Opportunity

The ISSSS is a transitional strategy that “aims to address specific root causes and consequences of conflict, support the implementation of peace initiatives at local level, and help stabilize areas where conflict has recently ceased<sup>3</sup>.” It does not purport to address all of the ills facing conflict-affected zones in the East, but is a process for reinforcing peace and security where specific windows of opportunity exist. It is thus geographically specific in its focus and aims to produce a visible impact by concentrating resources and assets and building upon results in a sequential approach to limit the likelihood of reversal. In this regard, prioritization of provincial targets will continue with a review (twice a year) of the new project concept notes which would have been validated by the STAREC inter-provincial coordination mechanisms.

### ■ Enabling Security and Political Environments

Experience to date has highlighted a number of issues, which condition the future success and overall impact of stabilization efforts in the eastern DRC. The primary issue is the continued volatility in the political and security environments, which threatens the viability and sustainability of ISSSS interventions. Despite the serious challenge, the ISSSS operates under the assumption that STAREC mechanisms strive to strengthen partnerships and address the security and political challenges in a coordinated, coherent and innovative manner. MONUSCO equally supports the security and political processes within the STAREC/ISSSS framework, to support the instauration of an enabling environment for stabilization efforts, especially in the priority areas and along the strategic axes.

### ■ Government Ownership and Contributions

Success of the stabilization program depends largely on the GoDRC's capacity to bring results even beyond the minimum security and political conditions. The GoDRC is expected to actively engage in the stabilization efforts, both technically and financially, and increase its ownership of the activities. In particular, the GoDRC's further involvement in the Restoration of State Authority component is regarded as essential to the sustainability of interventions (e.g. road maintenance, deployment of state officials, their training, payment, administrative fees). The Government also plays an important role in coordinating, the priorities set forward by different Government bodies (i.e. provincial and national governments), and the implementation of stabilization activities.

### ■ Benchmarking Progress

The progress made by the ISSSS activities are expected to be systematically measured by effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes. The Situation Assessment concluded the first common analysis of the ISSSS in August 2011. The Assessment's results draw a baseline to measure trends, assess impact, and diagnose the potential program target for the second phase of the ISSSS. Realistic benchmarks and an efficient M&E system must be in place for the assessment of the actual impact of ISSSS interventions to be possible.

### ■ Targeted Programming

A key underlying assumption is that unless the entire programmatic package, as per the objectives of the ISSSS, can be delivered, stabilization as such will not be achieved. We refer

<sup>3</sup> See the ISSSS Integrated Programme Framework (IPF) 2009 – 2012.

here to sequential programming, where activities under each component of the ISSSS are rolled-out as the situation allows and as a result of recorded achievements. Along these lines and fully recognizing that resources and capacity are limited, stabilization programming should reflect a steadfast focus on areas most affected by conflict, based on careful analysis and with a reasonable chance of success. This approach is purely pragmatic and is without prejudice to wider stabilization efforts by the GoDRC under STAREC.

### ■ Consolidate and Expand Progress

Beyond projects and programs that are already underway on existing stabilization axes, there is a need to consolidate progress by ensuring the timely completion of planned activities, satisfying gaps in priority areas and launching fourth component (return, reintegration and recovery) activities in zones where basic security has been consolidated. Large scale youth–employment ventures, land mediation, returns facilitation, or the introduction of improved agricultural practices to increase production are some examples of this. Crucial to consolidating peace and security in the East will be to extend some of the existing axes. The intent here is not to extend the ISSSS indefinitely, but to double the effort to improve the security conditions, which would have an important impact on the overall stabilization effort. For instance, “residual combatants” still active in critical areas outside of the reach of the State can be addressed by this measure. Military gains can be bolstered as the State resumes its functions incrementally and pockets of insecurity can be reduced.

### ■ Timeframe

The recent issuance of new presidential ordinance No. 11/109, signed into law in October 2011, extended the STAREC program for three years until June 2014. The ISSSS in support of the STAREC will enter the second phase in 2012 and is expected to prepare for either an exit strategy or a transition from stabilization to larger development programming by mid-2014. Whether the ISSSS will facilitate a transition or an exit strategy will depend on the level of progress made by mid to late 2013. The SSU will regularly coordinate an assessment of the situation (every six months) and the environment in which the ISSSS operates (e.g. security and safety conditions around the series of upcoming elections) and initiate an impact evaluation in the third quarter of 2013 to recommend which path should be taken by the international community.

## 4. Lessons Learned

Lessons learned and recommendations compiled from the international community's experiences in post-conflict countries, especially as summarized in the Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304) and its ensuing progress report(s), have been consistently integrated into the ISSSS policy formulation and implementation processes where possible and suitable. Key issues put forward by the July 2010 review of the ISSSS were also taken into consideration.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Chapters 4 and 5 below identify some of the experiences unique to the stabilization efforts in the DRC, based on some three years of STAREC/ISSSS operational experience.

### ■ Operational

1. Enormous challenges both in terms of the scale of interventions and the degree of coordination required to achieve a stabilization environment remain. Nearly forty ongoing projects representing an important financial investment (up to US\$ 243 million and rising) are now beginning to achieve their desired results. In addition, the wide-range of actors and partners involved presents important coordination challenges that require day-to-day leadership and oversight. At least ten MONUSCO substantive Sections and an equal number of Government Ministries and departments, the UN Country Team and a growing number of NGOs are involved in program development and implementation.
2. The Technical Secretariat (SSU and STAREC inter-provincial team) is well placed to further propel the STAREC and ISSSS forward and to provide the necessary support and advice to the GoDRC, implementing agencies and international partners. The challenge is to address not only the sustainability of stabilization interventions, but also to keep the consistency of activities with adequate staffing.
3. The ISSSS was initially scheduled to conclude in December 2012, however many contracts of the SSU staff were terminated in mid-2011 because of lack of funding. This caused a significant challenge for the coordination of the STAREC/ISSSS framework.

### ■ Financial

1. While a significant amount of resources have been mobilized to date for stabilization efforts within the framework of ISSSS (US\$ 243 million), the use of the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF) remains limited. During the first three quarters in 2011, contributions that came from the SRFF amounted to only 2% (US\$ 5.09 million) of total ISSSS project funds for the first quarter, and 4% (US\$ 9.2 million) for the second and the third quarters. The SRFF's complex procedure coupled with lack of validated project concept notes were the main reasons for the under use of this funding mechanism.
2. Although improvements have been noted, the GoDRC is still faced with extreme difficulties in providing adequate resources in support of STAREC/ISSSS programs and projects. Programming that does not seriously consider these constraints or provide reasonable guarantees of success should not be pursued.

<sup>4</sup> "Strategic Review of the International Security and Stability Support Strategy for Eastern DR Congo: Final Report," July 2010.

3. For projects to be funded, they must be contributing to the objectives set by the STAREC/ISSSS framework and the concept of the project must be validated by the provincial and national coordination structures.

## ■ Programmatic

1. A stabilization environment requires coherent, targeted programmes rather than a series of individual projects. In addition, the intricacy and breadth of stabilization programming coupled with a complex and fluid socio-political operating environment makes implementation difficult.
2. Sufficient and timely engagement of technical expertise of various partners is very crucial in ensuring accuracy of interventions.
3. Insufficient coordination and information sharing from partners posed a challenge to measure progress made in the STAREC/ISSSS framework. Project implementing partners were often unable to complete reports on time, especially concerning the use of funds they received.
4. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was insufficient due to lack of capacity (human resources and funds) and functioning system (realistic indicators). The indicators identified by the Stabilization Working Group (SWG)<sup>5</sup> tended to lack focus on the availability of data.
5. In cases of absence of government buy-in, whether at the local, provincial or national level, projects and programs are at risk of being delayed and having the desired impact.
6. The best practices and lessons learned from the STAREC/ISSSS program could be shared with other UN missions and the countries going through stabilization processes wherever suitable. Likewise, the ISSSS could further integrate the elements of best practices from other stabilization efforts.

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<sup>5</sup> SWG consists of stabilization focal points from the UN Agencies, MONUSCO Sections, and NGOs.

*“[...] I would like to note the importance of the United Nations continuing efforts regarding stabilization related activities that are also essential for the DRC’s future success. These include continued progress in implementing **the International Security and Stabilization Program** in support of the STAREC program in the East, **for which more funding is needed.**”*

*– Roger Meece, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for DRC  
at the Security Council in June 2011*

## 5. Recommendations

### ■ Operational

1. In view of the enormous challenges facing the eastern DRC and to achieve tangible results under the ISSSS, a more robust and versatile Technical Secretariat (SSU and STAREC inter-provincial team) to accompany the GoDRC and the international community will be necessary until December 2014<sup>6</sup>.
2. Efficiency and continuity of coordination should be ensured with adequate and available staffing and operational funding for the Technical Secretariat.

### ■ Financial

1. Partners are encouraged to channel their contributions through the SRFF going forward. The SRFF is designed to support a transition of eastern DRC from donor-driven forms of international assistance to a GoDRC-led stabilization and recovery process. Its strategic and thematic priorities are directly drawn from the STAREC plan, while programmatic priorities and specific interventions are drawn from the ISSSS. Accordingly, the SRFF is a mechanism that **allows the GoDRC to exercise more leadership** in resource allocation decisions, while **donors also rightly so retain visibility**. Some 104 project concept notes have been developed and validated by the provincial Joint Technical Committees (CTCs) on the basis of their provincial priorities and operational plans.<sup>7</sup> Of all the concept notes validated, 37 projects are presented in this document as priority projects.<sup>8</sup>
2. The actual stabilization of the eastern provinces depends largely on concerted efforts to empower and encourage government authorities to take on vitally important control in the process. While supporting the GoDRC to increase its ownership, it is equally important to take into account the realistic level of support the GoDRC can support the ISSSS programming.
3. In order for the ISSSS to maximize the use of scarce resources and to target those resources most effectively, activities should be based on careful analysis and understanding of local conditions.
4. Projects and budgets should be based on actual needs assessments, not indicative plans and costing to avoid delays in implementation and under-budgeting.

### ■ Programmatic

1. Regroup the too many STAREC/ISSSS projects under a limited number of programs, for better coordination and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Given a complex operating environment, programming should be also simplified while remaining comprehensive.
2. Lead implementing agencies and MONUSCO Sections should demonstrate leadership in the area of their specialization. The coordination should not only be at geographical level but also at the thematic level.

<sup>6</sup> As STAREC is currently programmed, through the newest presidential ordinance until June 2014, an additional period of six months is suggested for the Technical Secretariat to prepare the next steps: transition or exit.

<sup>7</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

<sup>8</sup> These projects are further categorized into four levels of priorities based on preconditions (e.g. security, accessibility) and necessity of the project to achieve the ISSSS objectives in the second phase. Projects categorized into two top levels are presented in this Priority Plan.

3. Project implementing partners should keep the Technical Secretariat (SSU and STAREC inter-provincial team) updated on the progress and the use of funds for their projects by submitting quarterly reports on time.
4. Accountability of project implementers ought to be reviewed, especially as too often, deliverables have been late, under-budgeted, and incomplete.
5. M&E needs to be strengthened by increasing the capacity (human resources and funds) and setting up an effective system in place with realistic benchmarks. The stabilization focal points in the SWG need to support the effort with providing and updating the necessary data.
6. Joint needs identification, planning, implementation and M&E of stabilization activities will further government engagement and ownership of planned interventions.
7. Programs should, wherever possible, consider not only each component of the STAREC/ISSSS but also any preconditions which need to be fulfilled to minimize complications in implementation. Where conditions are not met, interventions should not be considered<sup>9</sup>.
8. Security and basic public administration are a pre-requisite for a range of other stabilizing activities. Within the ISSSS, concrete results in this area will make possible the launch of return and reintegration activities along the stabilization axes
9. In addition to the best practices and coherent approach drawn from the Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304) and its ensuing progress report(s), the ISSSS should integrate other stabilization efforts' best practices wherever possible and suitable.
10. In an effort to consolidate gains already achieved, current stabilization interventions on existing axes in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri should be completed.
11. Extend priority ISSSS programming in North Kivu along the Masisi – Walikale, and Hombo – Walikale axes.
12. Enforce the sustainable deployment of government personnel to new facilities. The deployment of state employees along the axes represents a litmus test for government engagement upon which the success or failure of the ISSSS may very well hinge.
13. Mainstream conflict resolution and the creation of linkages between targeted communities and local and provincial authorities, including with the Permanent Local Conciliation Committees (CLPCs), in all fourth component programming while taking into consideration local civil society initiatives.
14. Develop project under the fourth component in the recent stabilized areas targeting community recovery and youth employment to consolidate progress through peace dividend.
15. Complete the current *Centre de Négoce* pilot project in all five locations and measure progress carefully before extending to additional sites or extending activities.

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<sup>9</sup> The technical secretariat SSU/STAREC will set up a system to identify and manage risks related to the project implementation. Specific risk mitigation measures will have to be considered for each program.

## 6. Provincial Priorities

The programmatic approach outlined in this Priority Plan builds on the Situation Assessment of August 2011 and the priorities identified by the STAREC provincial Joint Technical Committees (CTCs) and the STAREC national coordination structure, with the support of ISSSS international partners. These represent a bottom-up, **needs-driven and government-led process**, which the ISSSS aims and commits to support.

### ■ Background on Situation Assessment

The Situation Assessment (August 2011) benchmarked progress against the core objectives defined for the ISSSS when it was launched in 2008. The process was driven at local level in the target areas of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. Its summary of findings gives an overview of the key results and a diagnostic for forward planning.

The Assessment evaluated progress against three ISSSS objectives: Security, Restoration of State Authority, and Return, Reintegration & Recovery. Based on the indicators for a total of 18 territories identified by partners of the Stabilization Working Group (SWG) in June 2011, the Situation Assessment suggests program implications and identifies immediate priorities going forward.

In addition to the program recommendations, the Assessment applied key criteria, which measure the impact of the ISSSS projects, to define priority activities and achieve expected outcomes and strategic benchmarks outlined in the Integrated Programme Framework (IPF).

The Situation Assessment is the first analysis of its type for the ISSSS. It was prepared by the SSU with the support of the local Integrated Mission Planning Teams (IMPT). The IMPT is chaired by the MONUSCO Head of Office and it comprises heads of UN agencies and chiefs of MONUSCO substantive Sections. International NGOs were also invited to participate based on their previous involvement with ISSSS and STAREC planning.

### ■ Background on Concept Notes / “Fiches de Projets”

Project concept notes were developed and validated by the Technical Sub-Committees for each STAREC component and subsequently validated by the CTCs on the basis of provincial priority plans.<sup>10</sup> The CTCs are provincial level coordination mechanisms composed of government and international partners and provide political and strategic oversight as well as operational coordination of STAREC activities. As of November 2011, some 104 concept notes had been presented at provincial level and 74 of them have been validated by the CTCs. In addition, 29 concept notes are currently under consideration at provincial level.

In the interest of efficiently using the limited resources and attaining results within the timeframe for the second phase (2012-2014), priority project concept notes are divided into four levels of priority (A-1, A-2, B-1, and B-2). This document presents the 37 top priority projects, rated A-1 and A-2, which met the criteria for immediate implementation.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Proposed project implementing partners are as indicated in the project concept notes (*fiches de projets*) and are subject to change.

<sup>11</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority projects. See Annex 2 for the project prioritization criteria.

The description of the A-1 and A-2 prioritization ratings is the following: <sup>12</sup>

- A-1: Expected to consolidate progress and complement other ISSSS interventions by strategically targeting the priority activities. The implementation of the project is considered a top priority and is ready for immediate funding.
- A-2: Expected to have a direct impact in achieving the ISSSS objectives. However, prerequisite conditions need to be met before the implementation of the project.

Below is a statistical summary of the current project concept notes (*fiches de projets*):

Province	Presented to CTC or SC <sup>13</sup>	Validated by CTC	Proposed in this Priority Plan <sup>14</sup>
North Kivu	29	23	9
South Kivu	34	11	12
Orientale	19	19	9
Maniema	9	8	2
Katanga	13	13	4
Regional	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>37</b>

With regards to the selection process of the concept notes, partners of the SWG as well as the members of the STAREC provincial Joint Technical Committees (CTCs) have developed a general guideline, “*note d’orientation aux CTCs*” for CTCs and Technical Sub-Committees, in order to ensure the consistency and harmonization of the international efforts and to further improve the existing mechanisms.

### ■ Provincial Priorities and Program Targeting

The following pages will describe the provincial priorities of five eastern provinces: North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema, and Katanga provinces. The priorities were identified based on the lessons learned during the first phase of the ISSSS, feasibility of the projects as well as the results of the Situation Assessment published in August 2011. The maps show the program targeting options for the second phase, demonstrating the findings from the Situation Assessment.

<sup>12</sup> Descriptions of B-1 and B-2 are the following. B-1: Requires modification to meet the prerequisite conditions for the implementation of the project. B-2: Requires significant modification to meet the selection criteria.


<sup>13</sup> SC: STAREC provincial Technical Sub-Committees

<sup>14</sup> Some priority concept notes which have not been validated by CTCs, but are considered priority for the second phase, are included in this Plan. Most of the non-validated concept notes are in the process of being validated at provincial level. See Annex 1 for the list of priority projects.

## ■ North Kivu

Security conditions remain a challenge in many areas (*red zones*). This includes the Masisi-Walikale border area, southern Lubero, and the current ISSSS focus area of Rutshuru.


### 1. Options to extend RSA projects “blue zones”



#### Analysis

- (1) Reinforcement of civilian state authority appears to be feasible in *blue zones*, the areas where the security environment is permissive.
- (2) *Red zones* are where security remains fragile. It is necessary to create an enabling environment before attempting work with police or other civil institutions.
- (3) Strategic axes: the Masisi-Walikale axis is possible but would require *désenclavement* (road rehabilitation) and dedicated military support. As for the Rutshuru-Ishasha axis, the road is fully open and the RSA efforts should be reinforced in tandem with continuous military operations.

### 2. Options to extend RRR projects “yellow zones”



#### Analysis

- (1) Areas with permissive security, indicated as *yellow zones*, could be suitable for area-based programs for basic services and economic / agricultural recovery. RRR activities are currently not recommended in *red zones*, where the security situation remains precarious.
- (2) Over 10% of the population is currently displaced in Masisi and Lubero, with smaller proportions in Walikale, Rutshuru and Beni.
- (3) The directly affected areas are generally high-risk for RRR programs.

## Priority Program Areas

### A. Consolidate progress in Masisi and Rutshuru

North Kivu has experienced considerably less violence and threats to stability since early 2009, allowing notable progress on two priority stabilization axes in North Kivu: Sake – Masisi and Rutshuru – Ishasha. Nonetheless, improvements in security have been uneven. The FARDC continues to disrupt the activities of “residual combatants” from both Congolese and foreign “ex-armed groups,” but have not been able to defeat any of them decisively, with detrimental consequences for civilian populations. Unilateral operations, over which MONUSCO has little to no influence, have become the norm. At the beginning of 2011, although a gradual decrease was recorded, the number of IDPs in North Kivu is estimated to be over half a million. These figures are symptomatic of the impact on the civilian population of widespread insecurity. Nonetheless, an equivalent number of returnees were also recorded during the same period, pointing to the existence of pendular movements and pockets of stability.

Under the ISSSS, some 1,700 Congolese combatants have been demobilized and almost 1,000 have received reintegration assistance. DDR processes for residual elements of ex-armed groups are unfortunately blocked by the central government despite the successful program development and fundraising. The “integration process” albeit fragile and fraught with discord over the confirmation of ranks was boosted by the decision of the CNDP to join AMP, the political coalition of President Kabila, in December 2010<sup>15</sup>.

While road works on both axes for semi-durable rehabilitation are “complete,” more work and longer-term solutions are required especially in areas negatively affected by heavy rains and flooding. However, it is noteworthy to mention that, particularly during the dry season, travel time has been reduced from between five and eight hours to between two and half and four hours, with significant improvements in terms of access for security services and local authorities as well as the movement of the people and goods. Additionally, a maintenance plan, for which the parastatal body, *Fonds National d'Entretien Routier* (FONER) will be responsible with technical oversight provided by UNOPS and with DFID funding, is expected to establish a sustainable maintenance regime on both axes.

The re-opening of these roads is complemented by infrastructure works in support of the Restoration of State Authority. At the time of writing, some 20 facilities for police, civil administration, judicial and natural resource management are complete and have been handed over to the GoDRC, while two facilities await construction. The deployment of adequately trained state officials to these facilities is taking place as agreements are reached with national and provincial authorities. This process has been very slow and complicated by disparities between government employees targeted for training and those designated for deployment, as well as lack of clarity over chain of command and policy for the integration of elements of ex-armed groups. However, preliminary results are encouraging. Of a total of almost 900 civil servants planned to be deployed to the facilities, about 500 were deployed, of which 300 received training.

Plans to realize outstanding facilities and associated deployment requirements on the Rutshuru – Ishasha axis, to further reinforce the police, have also started. Once this is achieved, additional measures will be required for them to become a recognized authority and reliable service provider. This will require continuous and consistent technical and professional

<sup>15</sup> “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” S/2011/20, 17 January 2011, p. 4. Available at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20s-2011-20.pdf>

support and full engagement of relevant provincial and national government authorities. In this regard, training programs and professional development services are underway, provided by UNDP, CAS, RoL and CAU, with funding from the PBF and Canada. Additional advocacy interventions to encourage the GoDRC to assume responsibility for remuneration, operational expenses, as well as the management and maintenance of material will likely be necessary as the process unfolds.

With the Restoration of State Authority in progress, it will be necessary to revive the local economy and improve basic social infrastructure to provide a direct and tangible dividend to the affected communities (i.e. returning and receiving populations). Such a measure is expected to further limit the influence of residual armed groups and criminal elements, while also working towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in targeted zones. So far, 14 communities in Masisi and Rutshuru have benefited from reconciliation, recovery and reintegration programming financed by USAID and implemented by Management Systems International (MSI) in partnership with International Alert (IA). Much more remains to be achieved in this domain to realize a stable environment.

Popular unease linked to the looming return of refugees from neighbouring countries to North Kivu, particularly in historically sensitive areas, will need to be managed with great care. After a series of delays regarding the legal standing of *Permanent Local Conciliation Committees* (CLPCs) created under the Goma agreements, the North Kivu government has established a Group of Experts to steer the initiative. Seven *groupements* have been selected to pilot the initiative with technical support provided by UNHCR and financing from the PBF. Creative measures aimed at building trust and creating linkages between CLPCs and state authorities, citizens, and their representatives will help ensure the coherence of development between community and *groupement*. Similarly, conflicts related to housing, land and property will require close monitoring and a pragmatic approach, which can adapt to contextual constraints.

Lastly, at the time of writing, there were some encouraging signs of dialogue over thorny issues related to the continued presence of parallel administration, especially in Masisi.

In summary, the following projects are recommended to consolidate progress:<sup>16</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partners	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Community recovery and Livelihoods (regional project)	(TBD) via USAID RFA	20,000,000	A-1
Restoration of social and economic cohesion with the construction of basic structures in favour of the returned and displaced population, receiving communities, and the most vulnerable population in Masisi and Rutshuru territories of North Kivu	NRC	3,565,000	A-2
Support to the reinsertion of returnees through agricultural activities in area of return / North Kivu	FAO	3,000,000	A-2
Land program for reintegration and community recovery in eastern DRC (North Kivu)	UNHABITAT, UNDP, FAO	1,800,000	A-1 or B-1
Peace consolidation & community reconciliation	International Alert	1,200,000	A-1

<sup>16</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

## B. Extension into Walikale territory

The extension of the Sake – Masisi and Miti – Hombo axes into Walikale territory will mark a natural expansion of stabilization activities in North Kivu, but also an important step toward the road opening (*désenclavement*) of the largest territory of the province<sup>17</sup>. Reopening the road between Masisi and Walikale and the road between Hombo and Walikale will connect both Goma and Bukavu to Walikale, North and South Kivu to Kisangani, and finally by way of the Congo River, eastern and western Congo for the first time. This intervention is expected to boost economic activity, further extend State authority, and deny safe haven to armed groups. Creating an opening in this territory, plagued with the presence of predatory armed groups and their unrelenting assaults against civilians, will allow the progressive stabilization of one of the most sensitive zones in the East.

The remote and isolated character of Walikale territory coupled with weak State presence has let several armed groups, particularly FDLR and the Mayi Mayi Groups, set up bases and control the forests in Walikale. The presence of armed groups and military operations against them have caused persistent threat against civilians, especially in the form of sexual violence against women and girls. This situation has led to the displacement of 10% to 20% of the population in both Masisi and Walikale territories over the last 12 months.

Greater engagement along the Sake – Masisi and Miti – Hombo axes will support efforts to reform the mining sector, including demilitarization of mining areas and the implementation of the *Centre de Négoce* (mining trade center) project, which aims to reintroduce state authority into key mining sites. To date, control of mining areas and the trade of minerals remain an important source of financing for armed groups. For example, the Bisiye mine in Walikale territory, which is the largest cassiterite mine in North Kivu represents an important driver of North Kivu's economy, was under the control of various “groups of residual combatants” and FARDC contingents until very recently. Although not a direct cause of conflict, the illicit trade of natural resources contributes to the continuation of enduring insecurity in the Kivus<sup>18</sup>.

Reopening these roads will allow regular patrolling by FARDC and MONUSCO contingents and provide an opportunity to deny safe haven to “groups of residual combatants.” Access to vulnerable populations and humanitarian actors is also expected to significantly improve. Moreover, better accessibility will enable the Ministry of Mines to deploy necessary personnel and provide oversight to the mining sector. It is equally expected that this intervention will boost economic activity by facilitating trade between the North and South Kivu provinces, with Kisangani and along the Congo river.

In a nutshell, the opening and rehabilitation of the roads on the Masisi – Walikale and Hombo – Walikale axes have three objectives. First, it is aimed at contributing to the overall security situation by improving access and enabling the FARDC, PNC, and MONUSCO Force to patrol and control the areas. Second, it is expected to facilitate intervention for the Restoration of State Authority objective in key administrative areas, with a court and a prison in Walikale, several police stations and administrative buildings along the two axes. Finally, it is foreseen to facilitate commercial exchanges and socio-economic recovery, with particular emphasis around extractive industry areas. Improved access to Walikale will also contribute to the delivery of life-saving activities by humanitarian actors.

In summary, the following projects are recommended to extend the stabilization into Walikale territory:<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Walikale territory covers close to 40% of North Kivu's surface area

<sup>18</sup> See the final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC. Available at: [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/596)

<sup>19</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Reopening and maintenance of the Goma – Walikale - Hombo axes (292 km)	UNOPS	24,241,596	A-1
Restoration of state authority Masisi – Walikale – Hombo (police, administration justice) – infrastructure, deployment, training	UNOPS, UNDP, FAO	9,245,513	A-2
	UNDP, IOM, CAS, UNPOL	3,682,868	
Economic Recovery in Walikale territory	Rescate	5,000,000	A-2

### C. Extension of State Authority and recovery activities in the “Grand Nord”

Interventions in the Lubero – Beni area, known as the “Grand Nord,” have been recommended for a second phase of stabilization activities by the North Kivu CTC. The security situation in the north Lubero – Beni area is adequately stable for the Restoration of State Authority and the return of displaced population.

Under the third component of the ISSSS, Restoration of State Authority activities focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructures destroyed during the war, the reinstallation of basic equipment, deployment of civil servant and strengthening their capacities. However, these types of activities were carried out only in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories during the first phase of the ISSSS.

A specific project is recommended for the reinforcement of the administrative, police, judiciary and prison institutions in the Beni and Lubero territories. It entails the construction of (1) administrative buildings in Kamango, Mbingi, Mutwanga, Kimbulu, Lubero, Butembo, and Kanyabayonga, (2) police stations in Lubero, Beni, Butembo and Oicha, and (3) a court and a prison in Butembo. These constructions will be accompanied by specific training and support to the deployed personnel. It is expected that the trust relationship between the administration and the population would improve through sensitization campaigns.

Since June 2009, a joint program for stabilization and conflict reduction has been implemented in the Grand Nord by UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF. The first phase of the project will end in May 2012, and the proposal for the second phase is retained in this Priority Plan. The objective is to contribute to the reconstruction and stabilization in the west of Beni, by providing support to returnees and the vulnerable populations and their socio-economic opportunities recovery through multi-sectorial intervention packages, rehabilitation of basic social services, and activities for agriculture revival. This program will target some 9,000 returnee families (more than 45,000 persons), including most vulnerable women and youth.

The following projects are recommended for the “Grand Nord”:<sup>20</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Restoration of state authority on the axis Beni – Lubero (police, administration, judiciary and prisons) – infrastructure, deployment, training	UNOPS, FAO, UNDP	7,125,490	A-1
	UNDP, IOM, CAS, UNPOL	8,457,841	


<sup>20</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

Support the stabilization of Beni with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's conflict prevention and resolution capacity in return areas in the west of Beni	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF	6,000,000	A-1
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## ■ South Kivu

Security conditions remain a challenge in many areas (*red zones*). This includes parts of Kalehe, the Fizi – Uvira – Mwenga border area, and much of Shabunda territory.


### 1. Options to extend RSA projects “blue zones”



#### Analysis

- (1) Reinforcement of civilian state authority appears to be feasible in *blue zones*, the areas where the security environment is permissive. Further security assessment is needed for the zones marked in red.
- (2) Parts of Kalehe, Shabunda, Mwenga and Fizi are accessible, although mobility for civil and military officials is limited.
- (3) Progress on the Burhale - Shabunda and Miti-Hombo axes provide an opportunity to initiate new projects\*.

### 2. Options to extend RRR projects “yellow zones”



#### Analysis

- (1) Areas with permissive security, indicated as *yellow zones*, could be suitable for area-based programs for basic services and economic / agricultural recovery.
- (2) Lack of security constrains the return of IDPs and refugees in many *red zones*.
- (3) Displacement is currently about 10% of the population in Kalehe, Shabunda and Uvira. These areas are generally high risk for RRR programs.

\* Note: It is planned that the *yellow zones* and the *blue zones* will be gradually expanded westward to the Shabunda territory.

## Priority Program Areas

### A. Consolidate progress on the Burhale – Shabunda and Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe axes under the state authority component

The situation in South Kivu has stabilized significantly since the first activities under the stabilization program were launched in 2008. Sizeable areas of the province, in and around the stabilization priority axes, enjoy relative calm, albeit with some isolated incidents. The overall situation does remain volatile however, particularly in the areas where access is difficult (e.g. Ubwari, the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi. remote swaths of Shabunda and Mwenga territory).

The presence of ‘groups of Congolese and foreign residual combatants,’ in particular Mayi Mayi Yakutumba and the FDLR, and their exactions on communities persist. The reorganization of FARDC regiments in South Kivu in 2011 and the subsequent vacuum created by the departure of troops from sensitive areas only helped exacerbate conditions for local populations. The activity of ‘groups of residuals combatants’ and FARDC military operations continue to trigger internal displacement. As of April 2011 UNOCHA recorded a steady increase in the number of IDPs, estimated at 680,000 individuals,<sup>21</sup> which is the highest concentration in the East. At the same time, an increase in the number of returnees, more than 225,000 over a period of 18 months, points to a situation where insecurity is localized and variable.

Against this background, there have been many positive developments under the ISSSS. For instance, about 850 combatants have been demobilized and some 900 enrolled in UNDP community reintegration projects under the security component. In 2011, renewed dialogue between the GoDRC and ex-armed groups has brought about the integration of 800-900 elements from the FRF and Mayi Mayi Kapopo into the FARDC. Further delays in the payment of salaries and confirmation of ranks could derail this positive development.

Also, under the Security component of the ISSSS, permanent barracks for three FARDC battalions and their dependants, located in two different sites in South Kivu, are nearing completion and could be operational by the end of 2011. Although these projects will have a direct impact on only a small fraction of FARDC cadres in the East<sup>22</sup> and are not expected to significantly alter the stabilization environment, they are an important test-case for the military garrisoning. Disagreements among the FARDC hierarchy on what building standards are acceptable and practicable, as well as an apparent disconnect between short and long-term needs further question whether this type of permanent garrisoning projects should be in a stabilization programming at all.

Road works alone have had a tremendous impact on the province. For example, on the Miti-Hombo axis, travel time has been reduced from nine to two hours, which has had a positive effect on transportation costs as well as the price of staple goods. Transport between Miti and Bunyakiri now costs approximately FC 3,500, which represents a reduction of over 20%, while the price of a local beer in Bunyakiri has gone down from FC 2,000 FC to FC 1,500. The Burhale – Shabunda road, leading to the west of the province, was reopened by UNOPS in December 2010 rendering it passable for the first time since 1996, although additional work is needed for its use by regular vehicles.

<sup>21</sup> See UNOCHA displacement figures. Available at: <http://www.rdc-humanitaire.net/>

<sup>22</sup> 1,330 cadres and 5,235 dependants of a total estimated 50,000 FARDC troops with 40,000 dependants said to be deployed in the Eastern DRC.

Improvement of access is being followed by efforts to restore state authority along all three stabilization axes. The majority of the 46 facilities in support of local administration, management of natural resources, provincial and border police and the justice sector are complete. Over the next three to six months, the handover of completed infrastructure to the provincial and local governments will be accompanied by technical and professional support for newly deployed personnel, including on-the-job training and coaching.

The second phase of works on the Burhale – Shabunda axis will focus on stabilizing road structures to manage an expected increase in traffic and to develop a sustainable road maintenance scheme with FONER (*Fonds National d'Entretien Routier*).

Newly deployed personnel are expected to reach over 700 persons. The effort already underway to train these personnel should be continued to ensure a positive and lasting impact. The introduction of new technologies to improve communication between remote administrative entities and their central counterparts will also improve oversight and accountability. In addition, advocacy with the provincial and national governments will be necessary to ensure that deployed civil administration officers, judges, and police receive adequate support (i.e. payment, equipment, and maintenance works).

Emergency works on 140 km of the Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe axis were completed by ACTED with financing from the European Commission in October 2010. A particularly difficult terrain, heavy rains and traffic between Fizi and Minembwe have meant that only the first 40 km of this stretch were passable. In addition to the MONUSCO Chinese Engineering Company which is currently working on the axis, more support will be needed to ensure the accessibility to the Hauts Plateaux.

The Burhale – Shabunda and Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe axes are of vital political and strategic importance for the stability of South Kivu as a whole. If security conditions improve in the Shabunda territory and the Hauts Plateaux (Fizi – Minembwe), the moment will be opportune to reinvigorate stabilization efforts and facilitate the durable access of and restoration of state authority. Outstanding requirements in terms of infrastructure and deployment of government personnel in support of the restoration of state authority will need to be addressed to ensure the stabilization of this important area. The projects proposed for the second phase include the construction of five administrative buildings, three police stations and two additional prisons along the two axes.

In summary, to consolidate progress on the Burhale – Shabunda and Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe axes, the following projects are recommended:<sup>23</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Sustainable rehabilitation of road axis / Burhale – Shabunda (Phase Two)	UNOPS, FAO	15,097,675	A-1
Rehabilitation and maintenance of road axis / Baraka – Fizi - Minembwe	UNOPS	9,500,000	A-2 or B-1
Restoration of state authority on the axes Burhale – Shabunda and Fizi – Minembwe (police, administration, judiciary and prisons – infrastructure, deployment, training)	UNOPS, UNDP, CAS	5,586,357	A-1 or A-2
	UNOPS, UNDP, FAO, UNPOL, CAS, MONUSCO RoL, CAU	8,870,989	

<sup>23</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

	UNOPS, UNPOL, CAS	10,297,996	
Strengthening State Authority in Walungu territory	Cordaid, AAP, RFDP	1,950,000	A-1

## B. Create conditions for return in stable areas

The largest investments toward achieving the STAREC/ISSSS objectives have been made in South Kivu on the Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe, Burhale – Shabunda and Miti – Hombo axes. A major joint program (UNDP, UNICEF and FAO) to facilitate the return of displaced persons and community recovery in South Kivu closed in March 2011, after two years of activity. The program focused on the Walungu and Kalehe territories along two ISSSS priority axes, complementing state authority works in these areas. Similar projects, which target the communities most affected by conflict, and linkages between communities and provincial government authorities, are needed to consolidate gains.

To offset potentially damaging incentive structures, wide-scale economic and social recovery activities are also needed. Alternatives to a conflict economy need to be made available to break the cycle of violence and deliver on peace dividends. Employment and vocational training programs will have some effect in minimizing the likelihood of reversal. Community-based income generation schemes are also expected to kick-start the recovery process.

Control of mining areas and the trade of minerals remain an important source of financing for ‘groups of residual combatants,’ allowing them to purchase weapons, rations, and other supplies. Although the illicit trade in natural resources was not the original cause of conflict, it has become one of its significant drivers, thus contributing to persistent insecurity in the Kivus and elsewhere. The *Centres de Négoce* (mining trade centers) initiative aims to i) disrupt criminal and militarized trade networks and deprive ‘groups of residual combatants’ of their sources of income by restoring state authority, ii) assist the GoDRC’s measures to gradually improve regulation of mining activities, iii) introduce traceability and due diligence to the supply chain of minerals and metals in eastern DRC, and iv) promote improved living and working conditions in mining areas.

The *Centres de Négoce* initiative is a key element of the STAREC plan and of the ISSSS. The Security Council, with its resolutions S/RES/1906 (2009), S/RES/1925 (2010), and S/RES/1991 (2011) explicitly endorsed the concept. MONUSCO, under the guidance of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), is working with the Ministry of Mines to establish five pilot trading counters in the Kivus. The first trading counters will be soon operational in South Kivu, at the Mugogo site. In order to achieve the objectives of the *Centres de Négoce* initiative, additional financial support is necessary to launch sustainable economic recovery activities in targeted mining communities. Such interventions will improve livelihoods and adjust the incentive structures, which help fuel a conflict economy. The first target areas for this pilot initiative will be Walungu and Mwenga territories.

The following projects are recommended for South Kivu:<sup>24</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Support to community dialogue initiatives	Life & Peace Inst	1.432.680	A-1


<sup>24</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

Support the return of Congolese refugees in South Kivu	UNHCR, FAO, UNHABITAT	TBC	A-2
Economic and community recovery (Walungu - Mwenga)	ILO, UNDP, FAO	2,652,591	A-1
Restoration of social and economic structures for youth employment in Mwenga territory	NRC	1, 200,000	A-1
Support the stabilization in South Kivu with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in return areas around the axes Uvira-Baraka and Miti-Hombo	UNICEF, UNDP, FAO	10,500,000	A-1
Joint project on economic recovery, creation of descent job, and improvement of life condition in favor of the victims of conflicts	ILO, UNDP, FAO	5,305,183	A-1
Pilot project: Transformation of Mugogo mining zones into sustainable socio-economic development poles	UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, ILO	4,500,000	A-1
Transformation of mining zones into economic and social development poles / 'Ores Amani'	CRS	1,400,000	A-1

## ■ Orientale


Comprising 22 percent of the territory of DRC, nearly double the size of Maniema, South Kivu, and North Kivu provinces combined, Orientale province contains four districts—Bas Uélé, Haut Uélé, Ituri, and Tchopo—and has its capital in Kisangani. Orientale’s infrastructure has been degraded and destroyed due to war and neglect. The main usable roads extend between Kisangani and Lubutu, Kisangani and Bunia, and Mahagi and Bunia. Roads linking towns in Bas and Haut Uélé are generally poor.

### 1. Options to extend RSA projects “blue zones”



- (1) Reinforcement of civilian state authority appears to be feasible in *blue zones*, the areas where the security environment is permissive.
- (2) Security is a constraint in the south of the Irumu territory (*red zone*). Residual combatants interfere with freedom of movement and effective functioning of civil officials in parts of Irumu. FARDC illegal taxation and policing are also major problems.
- (3) Efforts on the Bogoro-Gety-Boga axes should be continued.

### 2. Options to extend RRR projects “yellow zones”



#### Analysis

- (1) Areas with permissive security, indicated as *yellow zones*, could be suitable for area-based programs for basic services and economic / agricultural recovery.
- (2) Inter-communal conflicts in Irumu, Djugu and Mahagi remain as issues of concern inside *yellow zones*.
- (3) With the improvement of road accessibility, opportunities to expand RRR projects into the Mambasa territory should be explored.

## Priority Program Areas

### A. Consolidate progress in Ituri: RSA and RRR

The ISSSS program has thus far spent some US\$ 29 million in Ituri. The main areas of interventions are Restoration of State Authority along the priority axis of Bogora-Gety-Boga in Irumu territory, and on border police projects.

Some 141 state officials are currently deployed along the priority axis. The objectives for the deployment of local administration staff in the first phase are achieved. However, only one out of three planned facilities were constructed (the local administration building in Bogoro) and only 6 % of the deployed personnel received training.

With regard to the police, only 80 of the planned 350 police officers have been trained and deployed to new facilities in Bogoro, and to various border posts along Lake Edward, and at the border with Uganda and South Sudan. These police officers have also received a specialized training on sexual violence. The police station in Gety is almost completed. Although the construction of police facilities in Boga was also planned, they have not been realized due to lack of funds. Although Ituri District suffered most in budget revisions during the first phase, planned activities along the axis should be completed in the second phase and extended to the border with Uganda.

Between 1999 and 2004, the divide between the Hema and Lendu deepened, and both Hema and Lendu-led armed groups carried out massacres, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing. In addition, other ethnic groups in Ituri became embroiled in the Hema-Lendu conflict. While the major armed groups emerging in 2002 were predominantly either Hema or Lendu, many other ethnic groups were represented in rebel ranks. As the massacres mounted, intolerance of “the other” intensified, particularly in rural areas.

Today, South Irumu is facing major security challenges due to land conflicts, especially between the Hema and Lendu (tension is militarized), and the presence of rebel groups and undisciplined soldiers from the FARDC deployed to the area. During the last two years, constant looting and displacement of populations at certain areas were observed. A special security assessment is recommended for South Irumu to enable ISSSS interventions.

The increased tension between Hema and Lendu is also a concern in Mahagi, Aru, and northern Djugu territories, where the Lendu population do not leave Hema concessions they occupied during the war, and where returnees of many different ethnicities have encountered problems reclaiming their land. There are many disputes over concessions, administrative boundaries, and individual parcels. Some disputes pre-date the war, some were created during the war, and some are related to the return of displaced populations. Thus, one of the priorities is to continue the efforts to assist in land disputes and focus on consolidation activities for Ituri.

The following projects are recommended for Ituri:<sup>25</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
Consolidation of the restoration of state authority in Irumu (local administration)	IOM	1,250,000	A-1
Strengthening of the judiciary and prisons in Ituri	IOM	4,800,000	A-1
Land program for reintegration and community	UNHABITAT,	2,550,000	A-1 or B-2

<sup>25</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

recovery in eastern DRC (Ituri)	FAO, UNDP, FAO		
Support the stabilization of the district of Ituri with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in the areas of return	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR	8,500,000	A-1

## B. Extend stabilization efforts in the Uéléés

Since September 2008, a series of violent attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) against the civilian population in Haut Uélé and Bas Uélé districts have put the issue back on the regional and international agenda. Since then, over 280,000 people have been displaced in northern Congo, with at least 20,000 more Congolese displaced to South Sudan and the Central African Republic<sup>26</sup>. The number of the killed and abducted population is estimated to be 1,922 and 2,107, respectively<sup>27</sup>. Since January 2011, UNHCR has reported that 52 raids by the LRA have targeted the towns of Niangara, Dungu, Faradje and Ango, which lie in the Haut and Bas Uélé districts<sup>28</sup>. Although attacks in Bas Uélé are fewer compared to Haut Uélé, access is severely hampered and attacks are likely to go underreported. Bas Uélé is also believed to be an important rear base, safe haven and transit point for the LRA from which incursions are launched.

Joint operations by the FARDC and the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) were fraught with chain of command tensions, and difficulties with re-supply and logistics. Although weakened, the LRA remains a serious threat to civilians. Local security forces, the UPDF, and MONUSCO were often unable to defend local inhabitants. Counting no more than 400 fighters across the sub-region, the LRA operates in autonomous, highly mobile and scattered sub-groups averaging between 10 and 40 cadres<sup>29</sup>. Devoid of recognizable political objectives the LRA has become an organization dedicated to the continued survival of its top leadership through a predation on a largely defenceless civilian population. These small fighting forces employ particularly brutal tactics and their capacity to wreak havoc should not be underestimated.

In the DRC alone, the LRA operates in an area of roughly the size of East Timor, where only 900 – 1,000 peacekeepers of the MONUSCO Force are deployed. A difficult terrain and the almost complete absence of infrastructure, in particular roads and communications, make combating the LRA difficult if not virtually impossible. The effective deployment of military forces to the areas where populations are at risk is also severely hampered. The lack of state authority, especially police, only helps to compound the problem.

Nonetheless, there is renewed international momentum to address the LRA. In November 2010, the United States (U.S.) Government published its "Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army"<sup>30</sup>. The strategy aims to "mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the LRA" by increasing protection of civilians, bringing LRA leaders to justice, promoting the DDR of LRA fighters and increasing humanitarian access and relief to the affected communities. More recently, in October 2011,

<sup>26</sup> UNOCHA. "Situation en province Orientale et plus particulièrement dans les Uéléés." Presentation to HAG on 18 February 2011.

<sup>27</sup> Human Rights Watch. "Overview of LRA Attacks in the Central African Region." November 11, 2010. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/10/lra-attacks-overview-documented-human-rights-watch-and-united-nations>

<sup>28</sup> UNHCR. "New LRA attacks against populated areas of north-eastern DRC." Briefing notes, 1 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4d6ce0299.html>

<sup>29</sup> ENOUGH. "The Lord's Resistance Army of Today." November 2010. Available at: <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/lords-resistance-army-today>

<sup>30</sup> Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/24/letter-presidentstrategy-support-disarmament-lords-resistance-army>

the U.S. Government announced the deployment of about 100 U.S. troops to central Africa to “counter LRA efforts” in the region.<sup>31</sup>

Notwithstanding ongoing efforts to improve protection of civilians and assistance to the affected populations, a wider stabilization plan for these districts has been lacking. In November 2010, the CTC was convened to approve district-wide STAREC plans prepared by the Haut and Bas Uélé’s CTLs, following a series of joint consultations and assessments with local communities. In March 2011, this plan was reviewed and revised to concentrate on those areas most affected by the LRA and to prioritize interventions. It also reflects the recommendations of the UN Inter-Mission workshop on LRA affected areas, held in Entebbe in June 2010. It will achieve the dual objectives of improving access for humanitarian agencies and inputs, as well as reinforcing the presence of the State in the affected areas.

The output of this process included the identification of two priority axes for Haut and Bas Uélé: Isiro – Niangara – Dungu – Faradje, and Buta – Bambesa – Dingila – Ango, respectively. These axes were selected to improve access to the areas most affected by the LRA and with significant IDP populations. The axes are also the main arteries of each district, linking capitals to important territories.

The highest priority is to open these axes to vehicular traffic. In Haut Uélé, this will involve the segment between Niangara and Dungu, since the Dungu – Faradje is already under rehabilitation by MONUSCO, and Niangara – Isiro is passable. In Bas Uélé, the Bambesa – Dingila – Ango axis is the priority. At the moment these areas are largely inaccessible for civilians and military personnel alike. Security forces project little authority outside of main towns and are unable to provide security in rural areas where the majority of the population were previously engaged in subsistence farming<sup>32</sup>. Improving this road network will have an impact to connect the Haut and Bas Uélé’s districts, as well as the provincial capital.

Once physical access is improved, the gradual restoration of state authority is envisaged. This includes the rehabilitation and reconstruction of facilities for civil administration, police and the judiciary in principal territory and district administrative entities. Support for the deployment and training of personnel to improve performance and sustainability is also expected. Limited support to the returning population and economic recovery, mainly in the agricultural sector, is also planned as time allows. Given the timeframe, it will be necessary to determine what can be accomplished within the available funding.

In summary, the following projects are recommended to launch the ISSSS in support of STAREC in Haut and Bas Uélé:<sup>33</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
<i>Haut Uélé (Isiro – Niangara – Dungu – Faradje)</i>			
Reopening and maintenance of the Dungu – Niangara axis (95km)	UNOPS, FAO	5,152,807	A-1
Restoration of state authority Dungu, Faradje et Niangara and Isiro (police, administration, judiciary and prison) – infrastructure, equipment, deployment, training	UNOPS, FAO, UNDP	23,859,778	A-2

<sup>31</sup> “Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army,” the White House, 14 October 2011.

<sup>32</sup> RESOLVE. “From Promise to Peace: A Blueprint for President Obama’s LRA Strategy.” September 2010. Available at: <http://www.theresolve.org/our-publications>

<sup>33</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

<i>Bas Uélé (Buta – Dingila)</i>			
Reopening and maintenance of the Ango – Dingila (105 km) et Dingila – Bambesa (55km) axes	UNOPS, FAO	9,381,272	A-1
Restoration of state authority Buta, Bambesa, Dingila and Ango (police, administration, judiciary and prison) – infrastructure, equipment, deployment, training	UNOPS, FAO, UNDP	11,913,959	A-2

## ■ Maniema & Katanga<sup>34</sup>

### Maniema

The Maniema province is one of the areas in DRC that is less supported by the Government and international partners. It accentuates the weakness of State services and the obstacles in delivering basic services to the vulnerable as well as the overall population. Although Maniema has been part of the STAREC focus areas since June 2009, only a few projects have been developed and implemented. For instance, an agricultural and economic revival project has been recently launched, funded through the SRFF.

The political and social context is characterized by the weakness of State authority, which was caused by the temporary control of the province by certain elements of armed groups during the war. This condition still remains in parts of Maniema that are in a precarious security situation with additional risks linked to land conflict and mining issues.

With regard to the economy, the average revenue by household was estimated as US\$ 37 compared to the average of US\$ 42 per month for the overall DRC some years ago. Women appear to be among the most vulnerable groups with limited access to education and healthcare, and little participation to political institutions, although they are active in the economic sector. The rehabilitation of the road from Kindu to Bukavu through Shabunda will open an access to the east for trade of goods.

A containment approach is developed in order to avoid and stop the expansion of insecurity spreading from the persistent conflicts in North and South Kivu, towards bordering provinces and territories. It supports local administration and state authority in the areas close to and potentially affected by conflicts and for which job creation and economic opportunities are effective means against the proliferation of militias and tension within and between communities. Furthermore, this strategy aims at developing peace dividends by enabling the province to promote local development.

### Katanga

Between 1998 and 2006, north Katanga was affected by conflict and clashes involving the FARDC and different armed groups, resulting in the displacement of populations towards Zambia, Tanzania and south of the province. These large-scale displacements (of some 200,000) created significant socio-economic consequences. Although the dismantling of the major armed groups in 2006 and the general elections created an important momentum and steps towards the stabilization of north Katanga, the economic situation remains very fragile. It is estimated that only 30,000 people had returned by 2010.

Legal and prison infrastructures are in unfavorable condition. For instance, the prisons of Manono, Nyunzu, and Kabalo have been entirely destroyed and those in Kongolo and Moba require substantial improvement. Given such circumstances, the rehabilitation of courts, police stations and the prison of Kongolo, followed by the deployment of personnel are some of the first priorities of the district of Tanganyika.

Peace consolidation is possible only through sustainable economic gains for the local populations. Agriculture is the critical sector through which the economic revival is possible. It

<sup>34</sup> Maps indicating the program targeting options are not available for Maniema and Katanga provinces at the moment, as the first Situation Assessment conducted in mid-2011 focused on North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri district of Orientale province. However, it is expected that the priorities and program targeting for Maniema and Katanga provinces will be further developed in the future.

requires a specific approach based on the capacity reinforcement of the local organizations and the commercialization of their products.

The activities suggested here will reinforce social cohesion, increase income of the rural population through better agricultural productivity, breeding, fishing and access to markets. The surplus of production will be stored in suitable infrastructures and will be marketed at an appropriate timing. It will allow the population to acquire a more predictable income and to satisfy its basic social needs, such as education for children.

The following projects are recommended for Maniema and Katanga:<sup>35</sup>

Project Title	Proposed Partner	Budget (US\$)	Priority
<i>Maniema</i>			
Restoration of state authority in Maniema (training and support for police, administration judiciary and prison)	UNDP, CAS	TBC	A-1
Reopening and maintenance of the Kindu – Shabunda axis	UNOPS	TBC	A-1
<i>Katanga</i>			
Restoration of state authority in Kongolo (court and prison)	UNDP	185,184	A-1
Support to border police in Tanganyika district	UNDP, IOM, UNPOL	943,074	A-1
Support to judiciary in the Tanganyika district	UNDP	341,109	A-1
Support the stabilization of Katanga with sustainable socio-economic recovery and strengthening of the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in return areas of Kalemie, Nyunzu, and Kongolo	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF	7,500,000	A-1

<sup>35</sup> See Annex 1 for the list of priority project concept notes / *fiches de projets*.

# Annex

**A1. List of Priority Projects**

**A2. Prioritization Criteria**

**A3. Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) and the ISSSS**

**A4. ISSSS Flow**

## A1. List of Priority Projects<sup>36</sup>

### Project Priority Rating

In order to efficiently use the limited resources and attain results within the timeframe for the second phase of the ISSSS program (2012-2014), concept notes which have been validated by the STAREC provincial mechanisms are prioritized into four categories.

- A-1: Expected to have a direct impact in achieving the ISSSS objectives. Present security conditions and accessibility permit the implementation of the project and it is ready for immediate funding.
- A-2: Expected to have a direct impact in achieving the ISSSS objectives. However, prerequisite conditions need to be met before the implementation of the project.<sup>37</sup>

Following a review based on the lessons learned, projects are regrouped under thematic programs, for better coordination and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

No.	Project Title	Budget (US\$)	Proposed Partners <sup>38</sup>	Priority
<b>Objective: Restore and Strengthen State Authority</b>				
<b>Program 1: Rehabilitate Key Access Roads</b>				
1	Reopening and maintenance of the Masisi – Walikale – Hombo axis (292 km)	24,241,596	UNOPS	A-1
2	Sustainable rehabilitation of road axis / Burhale – Shabunda (Phase Two)	15,097,675	UNOPS, FAO	A-1
3	Reopening and maintenance of the Kindu – Shabunda axis	TBC	UNOPS	A-1
4	Reopening and maintenance of the Ango – Dingila (105 km) et Dingila – Bambesa (55km) axes	9,381,272	UNOPS, FAO	A-1
5	Reopening and maintenance of the Dungu – Niangara axis (95km)	5,152,807	UNOPS, FAO	A-1
6	Rehabilitation and maintenance of road axis Baraka – Fizi – Minembwe	9,500,000	UNOPS	A-2 or B-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>63,373,350</b>		
<b>Program 2: Support the Screening, Training and Deployment of Officials</b>				
1	Strengthening State Authority in Walungu territory	1,950,000	Cordaid, AAP, RFDP	A-1
2	Restoration of state authority in Maniema (training and support for police, administration judiciary and prison)	TBC	UNDP, CAS	A-1

<sup>36</sup> The prioritization in this Plan focuses on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> components as the majority of the project concept notes (*fiches de projets*) received and validated by STAREC provincial Joint Technical Committees (CTCs) were for the Restoration of State Authority (3<sup>rd</sup> component) and Return, Reintegration and Recovery (4<sup>th</sup> component).

<sup>37</sup> Descriptions of B-1 and B-2 are the following. B-1: Requires modification to meet the prerequisite conditions for the implementation of the project. B-2: Requires significant modification to meet the selection criteria.

<sup>38</sup> "Proposed Partners" are as indicated in the current project concept notes received and are subject to change.

3	Consolidation of the restoration of state authority in Irumu (local administration)	1,250,000	IOM	A-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>3,200,000</b>		
<b>Program 3: Rehabilitate State Infrastructure</b>				
1	Restoration of state authority on the axis Beni – Lubero (police, administration, judiciary and prisons) – infrastructure, deployment, training	8,457,841	UNDP, IOM	A-1
		7,125,490	UNOPS, FAO, UNDP	
2	Restoration of state authority on the axis Burhale – Shabunda and Fizi – Minembwe (police, administration, judiciary and prisons) – infrastructure, deployment, training	5,586,357	UNOPS, UNDP, CAS	A-1 or A-2
		8,870,989	UNOPS, UNDP, FAO, UNPOL, CAS, MONUSCO RoL, CAU	
		10,297,996	UNOPS, UNPOL, CAS	
3	Strengthening of the judiciary and prisons in Ituri	4,800,000	IOM	A-1
4	Restoration of state authority in Kongolo (court and prison)	185,184	UNDP	A-1
5	Support to judiciary in Tanganyika district	341,109	UNDP	A-1
6	Support to border police in Tanganyika district	943,074	UNDP, IOM, UNPOL	A-1
7	Restoration of state authority Masisi – Walikale – Hombo (police, administration justice) – infrastructure, deployment, training	3,682,868	UNDP, IOM, CAS, UNPOL	A-2
		9,245,513	UNOPS, UNDP, FAO	
8	Restoration of state authority Buta, Bambesa, Dingila and Ango (police, administration, judiciary and prison) – infrastructure, equipment, deployment, training	11,913,959	FAO, UNOPS, UNDP	A-2
9	Restoration of state authority Dungu, Faradje et Niangara and Isiro (police, administration, judiciary and prison) – infrastructure, equipment, deployment, training	23,859,778	FAO, UNOPS, UNDP	A-2
<b>Total</b>		<b>95,310,158</b>		

### Objective: Facilitate Return, Reintegration and Recovery

#### Program 1: Promote Local Reconciliation and Peacebuilding

1	Peace consolidation & community reconciliation	1,200,000	International Alert	A-1
2	Support to community dialogue initiatives	1,432,680	Life & Peace Institute	A-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,632,680</b>		

<b>Program 2: Reduce Conflicts Related to Housing, Land and Property Disputes</b>				
1	Land program for reintegration and community recovery in eastern DRC (North Kivu)	1,800,000	UNHABITAT, FAO, UNDP	A-1 or B-1
2	Land program for reintegration and community recovery in eastern DRC (Ituri)	2,550,000	UNHABITAT, FAO, UNDP	A-1 or B-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,350,000</b>		
<b>Program 3: Boost Livelihoods and Economic Productivity</b>				
1	Community recovery and Livelihoods (regional project)	20,000,000	(TBD) via USAID RFA	A-1
2	Support the stabilization of Beni with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's conflict prevention and resolution capacity in return areas in the west of Beni	6,000,000	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF	A-1
3	Support the stabilization in South Kivu with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in return areas around the axes Uvira – Baraka and Miti – Hombo	10,500,000	UNICEF, UNDP, FAO	A-1
4	Joint project on economic recovery, creation of descent job, and improvement of life condition in favor of the victims of conflicts	5,305,183	ILO, UNDP, FAO	A-1
5	Restoration of social and economic structures for youth employment in Mwenga territory	1,200,000	NRC	A-1
6	Support the stabilization of the district of Ituri with sustainable socio-economic recovery and by strengthening the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in the areas of return	8,500,000	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR	A-1
7	Support the stabilization of Katanga with sustainable socio-economic recovery and strengthening of the population's capacity in conflict prevention and resolution, in return areas of Kalemie, Nyunzu, and Kongolo	7,500,000	UNDP, FAO, UNICEF	A-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>51,505,183</b>		
<b>Program 4: Prepare for Voluntary and Safe Return</b>				
1	Restoration of social and economic cohesion with the construction of basic structures in favour of the returned and displaced population, receiving communities, and the most vulnerable population in Masisi and Rutshuru territories of North Kivu	3,565,000	NRC	A-2
2	Support to the reinsertion of returnees through agricultural activities in area of return / North Kivu	3,000,000	FAO	A-2

3	Support the return of Congolese refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania in South Kivu	TBC	UNHCR, FAO, UNHABITAT	A-2
4	Economic Recovery in Walikale territory	5,000,000	Rescate	A-2
5	Economic and community recovery (Walungu - Mwenga)	2,652,591	ILO, UNDP, FAO	A-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>14,217,591</b>		
<b>Program 5: Management of Natural Resources – Centre de Négoces (Mining Trade Centers)</b>				
1	Pilot project: Transformation of Mugogo mining zones into sustainable socio-economic development poles	4,500,000	UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, ILO	A-1
2	Transformation of mining zones into economic and social development poles / 'Ores Amani'	1,400,000	CRS	A-1
<b>Total</b>		<b>5,900,000</b>		
<b>Grand Total (approximately)</b>		<b>243,000,000</b>		

## Annex 2: Criteria Used to Prioritize Projects


1. The project is validated (or in the process of being validated) by CTCs;
2. The project is relevant to the IPF's strategic framework and each component's specific strategies (especially regarding the fourth component);
3. The project's objectives are cross-thematic and inter-component;
4. The project consolidates progress and is complimentary;
5. Security condition in the targeted zone;
6. Sustainable zone of return is possible for the IDPs and refugees;
7. Level of vulnerability in the targeted zone;
8. Accessibility to the targeted zone;
9. The targeted zone has not been covered by the stabilization activities;
10. The cost;
11. Expertise of the partner organizations in the proposed domain is complimentary to STAREC;
12. Proposed project timeline;
13. Feasibility of the project;
14. Number of the beneficiaries; and
15. Sustainability of the project.

### Annex 3: Demarcation between HAP and ISSSS Activities

Framework	Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP)	Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) <sup>39</sup>
Objectives	To respond to the humanitarian consequences of armed conflict	To address the 'structural' causes of conflict and help build long-term peace
Implementation focus	Direct delivery of assistance by international and national actors, principally NGOs	Focus of implementation on strengthening local and national capacities and promoting ownership
Desired impact	Provision of immediate life-saving assistance and to reduce human suffering	Provision of durable solutions for IDPs and refugees which can be sustained beyond the life-span of international assistance
Geographic targeting	Displacement zones and sites (e.g. IDP camps), return areas, as well as (but not limited to) areas with limited access and security	Primarily relatively secure and accessible areas, including areas of durable return for IDPs and refugees according to key protection benchmarks
Sequencing of interventions	Assistance to be provided in the immediate-term to address urgent and critical needs, often but not exclusively at the household level, before passing onto other more long-term actors.	Assistance to address post-conflict transition needs at community level, stabilize local conditions, and prepare the groundwork for more long term recovery interventions following end of emergency / humanitarian assistance
Duration of interventions	Less than one year	One year or more
Funding (common) mechanisms	Pooled Fund, CERF	Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility

<sup>39</sup> See the ISSSS Integrated Programme Framework (IPF) 2009-2012.

## Annex 4: ISSSS Flow – Strategic Objectives and Benchmarks



For more information or to receive specific project concept notes / *fiches de projets*:

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