

COUNTRY
PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT STATUS REPORT
30 June 2012

Project No & Title:	PBF/GNB/B-5: Support to Security and Defense Sector Reform and socio-economic reintegration				
Recipient UN Organization:	UNIOGBIS - UNDP – FAO	Priority Sector:	SSR-Military		
National Authority:	Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Economy and Regional Integration, Permanent Secretariat of the National SSR Steering Committee				
Location:	Guinea-Bissau				
Project Cost:	USD 5,000,000 (UNIOGBIS: \$3,000,000 + FAO: \$1,121,110 + UNDP: \$878,890)				
SC Approval Date:	1 September 2011	Starting Date:	7 December 2011	Completion Date:	7 December 2013
PBF Outcome and Priority area	<p>Priority area: Activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, in particular in relation to strengthening of national institutions and processes set up under those agreements. Interventions under this area will contribute to achieve key-result 1 “Defense and Security Sector Reform” identified under Pillar 1 of the DENARP II (<i>Documento de Estratégia Nacional de Redução da Pobreza</i>): “To reinforce Rule of Law and Republican Institutions”.</p> <p>Strategic Result (Performance Management Plan/PMP): Personnel of defense and security institutions complete civic and peace education within rule of law and democratic values. Demobilized individuals of defense and security institutions received support for socio-economic reintegration.</p> <p>Indicator (PMP): number of PBF supported country programmes which lead to effective demobilisation and reintegration of the armed forces.</p> <p>Indicator (ProDoc): Percentage of disarmed/demobilised/reintegrated population out of total armed non-uniformed population.</p>				
Project Description:	Assistance to the reform of Defense and Security institutions through professionalization, separation from service followed by retirement and Special Pension Fund benefits, and socio-economic reintegration opportunities.				
Immediate Objectives:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense and Security institutions are professionalized to ensure Rule of Law and institutional stability to create conditions for peace and development in Guinea-Bissau. • Specifically: The requisite conditions for identifying the personnel to be retained within the military, police and internal security institutions and those that will require assistance for reintegration purposes are established by way of providing in a first phase: 1) Strategic and technical advice to the national authorities for the process of implementation of the Special Pension Fund as well as early retirement modalities 				

	<p>(including support in the preparation of requisite legislation and the establishment of a Follow-up Commission to manage and monitor implementation); 2) Capacity-building to civilian and military officials that will oversee the demobilization process; and 3) Technical assistance for vetting and certification of members of Defense and Security institutions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support will be provided, in a second phase, to contribute to sustainable reintegration or retirement of ex-military as a means to build confidence and social cohesion between citizens and state institutions.
<p>Project Status as at 30 June 2012</p>	
<p>Funds disbursed:</p>	<p>UNIOGBIS \$1,121,495; FAO: \$109,443; UNDP: zero Total: \$1,230, 938</p>
<p>Delivery rate:</p>	<p>24.6%</p>
<p>Background/ Implementation Context:</p>	<p>Over the past decade, Guinea-Bissau experienced persistent political instability, with recurring crises triggered by the tensions between the civilian and the military leadership, as well as shifting alliances between groups of civilian and military. The devastating civil war of 1998/99 was triggered by an attempted military coup against the then sitting President, and the civilian leadership has struggled ever since to establish oversight and control over the armed forces. The years 2009-2010 saw a resurgence of political violence, notably the assassinations of the President and of the Chief of Defence Staff in March 2009, as well as the detention of the Prime Minister and Chief of Defence Staff by military personnel on 1 April 2010. Military tensions sparked again on 26 December 2011 in what was considered by some as an attempted coup. Elements of the military took positions at the Military HQ and attacked the armory, from where they removed weapons. Although the government of Guinea-Bissau initially denied suggestions of a coup attempt, the Prime Minister said on 30 December 2012 that there had been a plot to assassinate him. Despite such peaks of tension, progress was made by the government of Guinea-Bissau towards maintaining political and military stability during the latter part of 2010 and 2011 and the economy was on a rise.</p> <p>The country has seen a number of efforts in recent years aimed at implementing national SSR strategies and plans, notably the ones approved in 2006, but implementation was often hampered due to the politico-security dynamics in the country as well as lack of financial resources. The “ECOWAS-CPLP Roadmap” in support of national SSR strategies was designed in 2010 and approved by the Government of Guinea-Bissau in 2011. It aimed at fast-tracking the implementation of priority national SSR plans, notably creating the conditions for the rejuvenation of the Armed Forces. As part of a bilateral cooperation agreement between the Governments of Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the Government of Angola, in March 2011, deployed a mission (MISSANG) in the country, to assist with the implementation of a significant part of the “ECOWAS-CPLP Roadmap”. In the aftermath of the 12 April coup and following the deployment of the ECOWAS mission (ECOMIB) in the country, the Government of Angola withdrew MISSANG from Guinea-Bissau, in early June. Other international partners have also suspended their support to SSR including the European Union and CPLP countries notably Brazil and Portugal. The USA also withdrew their support to Guinea-Bissau.</p> <p>Following the premature death of the incumbent President in January 2012, the</p>

	<p>beginning of 2012 was dominated by the preparations for the elections, and the UN concentrated its efforts in supporting the electoral process to discourage violence and/or any violations of the Rule of Law. Following the first round of the presidential elections and indications of a victory of the incumbent Prime Minister in the second round, on 12 April 2012, the military carried out a coup d'état and arrested the interim President and the Prime Minister. The 12 April 2012 coup d'état was assumed by the military hierarchy and led to a variety of human rights violations, including illegal and arbitrary detention, looting and damage to State and private property, persecution of former members of government, violation of the rights to freedom of movement, expression, peaceful association and assembly, and the unlawful dismissal of civil servants at national and regional levels.</p> <p>The international community, including the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, and the European Union condemned the coup d'état and called for a return to constitutional order. ECOWAS took the lead in mediating between the military junta, political parties and civil society in this respect. A 12-month transition period was set and, in mid-May, on the basis of a Political Transition Pact, a transitional government was established. The Pact was signed by 17 political parties, including the main opposition party in the Parliament (PRS); however the PAIGC, the largest parliamentary party did not sign the agreement. The Interim Speaker of the National Assembly and former presidential candidate, Serifo Nhamadjo, was appointed Transitional President with full powers, while a member of the PRS, Rui Duarte de Barros, was appointed Transitional Prime Minister. In addition to the Pact, the newly-appointed Transitional President, the military junta and the signatories to the Pact signed another agreement outlining several measures: to remove obstacles towards reform of the security sector and to collaborate with the authorities in clarifying the “killings since the last amnesty law” in 2008; the return of the military to the barracks and to seek National Assembly approval for an amnesty for the perpetrators of the 12 April coup; to make Cabinet appointments subject to consultations with the political signatories of the Pact and the military junta. The new, transitional government in place sought recognition and support from the international community, including to pursue SSR, however with limited results so far.</p> <p>The implementation of the joint projects has slowed down as a result of the politico-security developments starting at the end of 2011 and continuing through the first half of 2012. These developments have impacted planned project activities and affect deliverables for 2012 as the UN conducts ongoing activities with its national counterparts primarily at technical level.</p>
<p>Outputs delivered:</p>	<p>Output 2.1: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Permanent Secretariat of the National SSR Steering Committee benefit from technical assistance on retirement process, including Pension Fund management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of first batch of eligible retirees (100 Police, 142 Military) compiled and approved by the national government; • Support provided to National Technical Mixed Independent Commission for first phases of vetting process (registration and selection) for about 4,000 members of police and internal security institutions; (this process is to be replicated in the military); • Statute and regulations for the Follow-up Commission to oversee the

	<p>implementation of the Special Pension Fund have been drafted;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular contacts with national authorities at both political and technical levels, on preparedness for the activation of the Special Pension Fund and updating the security and military censuses; • Regular coordination meetings of SSR international partners, including the working groups dealing with Pension Fund and connected projects, as well as training, legislation and infrastructure; • Proactive liaison with the selected bank to ensure preparedness for the management of the special Pension Fund. <p>Output 2.2: The Government of Guinea-Bissau receives a financial contribution towards the Pension Fund, directly in the account.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrangements put in place with banking institution for administration of the Special Pension Fund (contract signed, account established); • Government signed Grant Agreement for UN contribution to the Special Pension Fund (22 February 2012); • First tranche (40 percent) of UN portion to the Special Pension Fund disbursed and received in the established account; • International partners were approached in order to make pledge for the special Pension Fund, following the gesture by the government to contribute. <p>Output 3: Demobilized individuals of Defense and Security institutions receive support for socio-economic reintegration.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO International Reintegration Coordinator recruited; • Terms of Reference for the national team prepared and recruitment process initiated; • Contacts established with the national authorities (MARD-Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) to prepare orientation modules for beneficiaries of reintegration process; • Technical advice provided regularly to national authorities.
<p>Achievements and challenges:</p>	<p>Output 2.1: Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Permanent Secretariat of the National SSR Steering Committee benefit from technical assistance on retirement process, including Special Pension Fund management.</p> <p>Output 2.2: The Government of Guinea-Bissau receives a financial contribution towards the special Pension Fund, directly in the account.</p> <p><u>Achievements</u></p> <p>First practical steps initiating the demobilisation process through retirement and social reintegration of selected military and police professionals (including former freedom fighters) have been successfully taken. In respect of the financial resources required, the Government made a contribution to the Pension Fund while the UN was the first international donor to contribute to the programme. Owing to the political and security</p>

developments in the country, including the focus on the presidential elections in the early part of the year, with the UN-facilitated establishment of the Military-Police Joint Command to ensure security of the electoral process, several other activities have not progressed further. The 12 April coup impacted heavily on the planned activities, also causing the withdrawal of key partners. The first group of eligible beneficiaries (242) of the Special Pension Fund was formally identified and sufficient funds to kick-start the demobilization of that group were made available, notably through the catalyst contribution from the UN. The process was, however, not launched politically as the commencement ceremony, originally planned for 23 January, was postponed *sine die*; documentation to guide the Follow-up Commission, which is to monitor the implementation of all activities in connection with the special Pension Fund, has been prepared but is awaiting political endorsement by national authorities in order to be fully activated.

A number of pledges by international partners to the SSR process, and in particular to the Special Pension Fund did not materialize (neither before nor since the coup), leaving the Fund short of the required financial resources to demobilize the intended number of beneficiaries for a five-year period. This is confounded by the decisions of a number of international partners in the SSR process, in the wake of the coup d'état, to put on hold their support to Guinea-Bissau. The "ECOWAS-CPLP Roadmap", which included support to the special Pension Fund, had been approved by Heads of State of ECOWAS, by the CPLP and the Guinea-Bissau Government, but its Memorandum of Understanding was never signed. Angola became the major partner helping bilaterally the implementation of the Roadmap, through MISSANG, and stated its willingness to contribute to the special Pension Fund, however it withdrew the mission in early June, after the coup and the arrival of ECOMIB. ECOWAS had announced since October 2011 that an amount of USD 23 million aimed at supporting SSR, notably the special Pension Fund, had been deposited in a bank account in Bissau but the pledge was never materialized. Brazil, Cape Verde and Equatorial Guinea also made pledges.

Output 3: Demobilized individuals of Defense and Security Institutions receive support for socio-economic reintegration.

Preparatory steps for providing support to future participants of the demobilization process have been taken, together with the EU-funded National Support Programme to Socio – Economic Reintegration (PARSS) and the Permanent Secretariat of the National Steering Committee on SSR (SPCP), with the respective working group on the Special Pension Fund also attended by international partners. As a consequence of the political delay in the actual commencement of the demobilization arrangements, however, no practical steps on socio-economic reintegration could yet be implemented.

Lessons Learnt/Recommendations

The Mission is in the process of establishing quarterly implementation targets as a means to enhance planning as well as to review projects' benchmarks adjusted to the evolving politico-security environment against which to measure progress in future periods of project implementation.

In preparing the joint programme, the contributions of other donors to the security sector reform process in Guinea-Bissau were carefully taken into account in order to ensure no duplication and to create the best-possible synergies. However, this created a certain dependency of the UN on those partners and their contributions, requiring the Mission now to adjust its own activities in light of the withdrawal or suspension of such support.

Support to the rejuvenation of the Armed Forces needs to be stepped up, through its first stage demobilization, so as to help achieve civilian oversight and thus address a main root cause of conflict and instability in Guinea-Bissau.

In the absence of a functioning Joint Steering Committee on Peacebuilding, alternative ways need to be found to allow project implementation in accordance with PBF principles.

Conclusion

Preparations for the implementation of the joint programme were initiated quickly following approval of the project document. National counterparts embraced the joint management and coordination process of the programme, and preparations were made and required documentation was speedily prepared in close cooperation between the United Nations and the national authorities.

Following the attempted coup d'état in late December and the death of the then-President in early January, the focus in the country shifted to the preparations for holding presidential elections in the spring, reducing the engagement of national counterparts in the joint management and coordination structures of the peacebuilding projects, which was then interrupted with the 12 April coup d'état.

The coup d'état undoubtedly impacted the pace of implementing the joint programme, and the establishment of transitional authorities may, in some cases, require some adaptations to the implementation procedures. In particular, the coordination mechanisms with national counterparts will need to be reactivated and revamped.

Furthermore, the decisions by some international partners in the SSR process, in the wake of the coup, to put their assistance on hold may require some adjustments to the planned projects as and where those partners' contributions will leave gaps.

It is also of some concern, that not all pledges made by international partners were honoured, even in the period before the coup d'état, which contributed to delays encountered in commencing the demobilization of the first group of eligible candidates.

In a letter (dated 26 April) to the SRSG, the ASG for Peacebuilding Support informed the Mission that due to the 12 April coup the PBF had decided the following: no new Fund transfers would be made to Guinea-Bissau, UN partners needed to cease immediately and until further notice activities in direct support of Government, while those in support of civil society could continue alongside minimal recurrent project expenditures, and the entire portfolio should be fully suspended and reviewed should constitutional order not be rapidly restored.

The transitional authorities, in an agreement they signed on measures they will take, undertook *inter alia* to "remov[ing] obstacles towards reform of the security sector". UNIOGBIS will engage with its national SSR counterparts to confirm their commitment to the objectives of the joint programme as co-signed by the previous Government. Once

	<p>such commitment is in place, the Mission considers it important as well as justified for project activities to continue as planned – and funds to be unfrozen – as the projects under implementation are for the benefit of the population and relate to fundamental rights and freedoms. The projects aim at a reorganisation and rejuvenation of the Armed Forces, by means of demobilisation through retirement and socio-economic reintegration programmes, and a refocusing of the Military on its national defense mandate by way of enhancing the understanding of the personnel of their civic obligations, all of it facilitating the civilian oversight of the Armed Forces, which can only be achieved by changing people. These efforts will neutralise the Armed Forces as a destabilising factor and contribute to greater political stability in the country, providing the basis for improved governance and for the population to live in a secure environment that provides for critical economic, health and educational needs.</p>
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