

**FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT  
IRFFI/UNDG IRAQ TRUST FUND (UNDG ITF)**

<p align="center"><b>Participating UN Organization(s)</b> <i>(if joint programme, indicate the lead agency)</i> UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services</p>	<p align="center"><b>Sector(s)/Area(s)/Theme(s)</b> Former Cluster: G- Electoral Support Current Governance Sector Outcome Team</p>										
<p align="center"><b>Programme/Project Title</b> Electoral Education Campaign</p>	<p align="center"><b>Programme/Project Number</b> G11-15 UNDG ITF ATLAS project number: 66968 UNDG ITF ATLAS award number; 54968</p>										
<p align="center"><b>Programme/Project Budget</b></p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td><b>UNDG ITF:</b></td> <td>5,006,147 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Govt. Contribution:</b></td> <td>USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Agency Core:</b></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>Other:</b></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b>TOTAL:</b></td> <td>5,006,147 USD</td> </tr> </table>	<b>UNDG ITF:</b>	5,006,147 USD	<b>Govt. Contribution:</b>	USD	<b>Agency Core:</b>		<b>Other:</b>		<b>TOTAL:</b>	5,006,147 USD	<p align="center"><b>Programme/Project Location</b></p> <p><b>Region (s):</b> <b>Governorate(s):</b> Complete national coverage in all governorates of Iraq</p> <p><b>District(s)</b></p>
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<b>Other:</b>											
<b>TOTAL:</b>	5,006,147 USD										
<p align="center"><b>Final Programme/ Project Evaluation</b></p> <p><b>Evaluation Done</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <b>Evaluation Report Attached</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p align="center"><b>Programme/Project Timeline/Duration</b></p> <p><b>Overall Duration</b> <i>October 2007- August 2009</i></p> <p><b>Original Duration</b> <i>October 2007-October 2008</i></p> <p><b>Programme/ Project Extensions</b> → <i>Extended until 31 March 2009 in October 2008 (postponement of provincial elections)</i> → <i>Extended until 30 June 2009 in February 2009 (allocation of savings to additional activities to support Kurdish National Assemble elections of June 2009 )</i> → <i>Extended until 31 August 2009 in May 2009 (postponement of Kurdistan Region Parliamentary and Presidential elections)</i></p>										

## Acronyms

BoC	Board of Commissioners (IHEC)
Com.	Commissioner (IHEC)
CSO	Civil society organizations
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
EC	European Commission
EECP	Electoral Education Campaign Project
EEF	Electoral Education Forum
EEM	Electoral Education Manual
FA	Field Associate (UNOPS)
FCC	Forum Coordination Committee
FVS	First-Time Voter Sessions
GEEC	Governorate Electoral Education Committee
GEO	Governorate Electoral Office
HQ	Headquarters
IEAT	Internal Electoral Assistance Team
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IHEC	Independent High Electoral Commission
KNA	Kurdish National Assembly
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
KRPP	Kurdistan Region Parliamentary and Presidential (Elections)
NEEP	National Electoral Education Plan
NEEW	Neighbourhood Electoral Education Workshop
OLS	Opinion Leader Sessions
POD	Public Outreach Division (IHEC)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (US)
SEC	Secretariat of the Forum (headquarters Baghdad)
SEC-G	Secretariat field officers in the governorates
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General of United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
VRU	Voter Registration Update
VRC	Voter Registration Centre

## FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT

### **I. PURPOSE**

#### **a. Provide a brief introduction to the programme/ project (*one paragraph*)**

The Electoral Education Campaign Project (EECP) sought to raise public awareness of, and create discussion around all aspects of electoral processes by supporting initiatives developed by the Iraqi civil society and by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) of Iraq. This would help ensure Iraqi voters would be better prepared for, and participate more actively in upcoming electoral events. The two core objectives of the EECP were:

1. To establish around the electoral process at national and governorate levels appropriate structures to create close cooperation between the IHEC and Iraqi civil society as a means to increase transparency, independence and success of the electoral processes. These structures will aim to remain a permanent coordination body between the civil society and the IHEC after the conclusion of the project.
2. To enhance public awareness of electoral processes and principles using grant-funded civil society projects as well as opportunities to link local opinion leaders with the IHEC, following policies set by the Electoral Education Forum.

#### **b. List programme/project outcomes and associated outputs as per the approved Project Document**

##### Immediate Objectives are:

1. Establish and support an Electoral Education Forum around the electoral process, composed of prominent civic education-oriented networks and CSOs, the IHEC, as well as IEAT and other international representatives, in which a strategy and action plan for the Electoral Education Campaign can be negotiated, planned and monitored collegially.
2. Enhance public awareness of electoral processes and principles using grant-funded civil society projects and opportunities to link local opinion leaders with the IHEC, following policies set by the Electoral Education Forum.
3. Create close cooperation between the IHEC and Iraqi civil society as a means to increase transparency, independence and success of the electoral processes.

##### Main Outputs

1.1 A National Electoral Education Plan, developed by an Electoral Education Forum made of representatives of the Civil Society and IHEC, sets policies and implementation mechanisms for a national Electoral Education Campaign, including an overall strategy for the Campaign and detailing key messages to be delivered, roles and responsibilities of governmental and non-governmental actors, methods and materials, as well as oversight and coordination mechanisms.

1.2 General public is more aware of and supports the Electoral Education Campaign as a result of a promotional campaign involving media materials (publications, radio, TV).

1.3 The Electoral Education Forum remains a permanent coordination body between the Civil Society and the IHEC after the conclusion of the project.

2.1 In each governorate, a Governorate Electoral Education Committee, composed of representatives from the IHEC, civil society and the media, is able to coordinate the planning, implementation and monitoring of the Campaign at the local level.

2.2 At least 55,000 Iraqis have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the electoral processes, translating into higher participation rate on Election Day.

2.3 Policies on electoral education are reviewed regularly through feedback gathered from grassroots activities.

3.1 The IHEC has developed stronger ties and cooperation channels with the civil society involved in civic education.

4.1 At least 5000 Iraqi citizens of the Northern region have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the KRG election of May 2009, translating into higher participation rate on Election Day

*(Election later postponed to July 2009)*

4.2 At least 1000 Opinion Leaders of the Northern region have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the KRG election of May 2009, translating into higher participation on Election Day

*It should be noted that as of the project revision of February 2009 approved by the UNDG ITF, the following modifications to the original project document were made:*

- Scaling down of the expected outputs related to the production of media material. This was done with consideration to the complementary media activities supported by UNDP and IFES.
  - Inclusion of new outputs related to Kurdish National Assembly (KNA) elections following the request of UNAMI to support the KRG elections through the EEC (outputs 4.1 and 4.2).
- c. List the UN Assistance Strategy Outcomes, MDGs, Iraq NDS Priorities, ICI benchmarks relevant to the programme/ project**
- UNCT Iraq Strategic Goal/Outcome Matrix Goal 3 and Outcome 3.1 UNCT Strategic Goal 3 being to: *Mobilize civil society towards national unity* and Goal 4 (*Promote good governance and democratic processes, assist to uphold the rule of law and establish a human rights regime*).
  - Cluster G Goal 3: *Voters in Iraq understand and participate in Electoral Process (Electoral Awareness & Education)*.

This project will contribute tangentially to the achievement of:

- MDG 8 concerning the global partnership for development.
- MDG 3 contributing to increase the participation of women in the political life and in elected positions
- NDS Goal addressed: “Strengthen good governance and improve security”
- ICI Benchmarks/Indicators: 3.1.2 Implementation of political/legislative timetable

**d. List primary implementing partners and stakeholders including key beneficiaries.**

- UNAMI/IEAT
- Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC)
- Granted CSOs (75)
- Key beneficiaries are also the 281, 742 citizens of Iraq, including opinion leaders and media representatives, taking part in the Campaign’s electoral education activities

## II. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMME/ PROJECT RESULTS

- a. **Report on the key outputs achieved and explain any variance in achieved versus planned results. Who have been the primary beneficiaries and how they were engaged in the programme/ project implementation?**

### Output 1.1

The creation of the **Electoral Education Forum** was a key achievement, consisting of 19 representatives from various Iraqi civil society organizations (CSOs) and four members of the IHEC. IHEC nominated its EEF members through a decision made by the Board of Commissioners. Civil society members on the EEF were jointly selected by UNOPS and IHEC. UNOPS firstly submitted a draft list of CSOs to the IHEC, who endorsed and approved the final list.

Membership in the EEF was on a voluntary basis. All EEF members signed a Code of Conduct that called for respect to the role of the IHEC, and complete neutrality in their work.

A **Forum Coordination Committee** was also elected during the initial Forum launch meeting. It was composed of one IHEC representative as well as civil society representatives. This committee was empowered to act as the equivalent of a 'Steering Committee' for the EEF, and it met on a bimonthly basis.

The EEF met six times in 2008 to plan and follow up on the Electoral Education Campaign (EEC). The last meeting was also followed by a joint IHEC-UNOPS press conference. The EEF also formulated a National Electoral Education Plan (which provided public outreach organizations with strategic guidelines for voter education in Iraq), and the Electoral Education Manual (which provided the technical tools and methodologies for the grassroots voter education activities). Both documents were published in Arabic, English and Kurdish, and distributed to national and international electoral education providers across the country. Eight Forum newsletters were also produced and distributed amongst stakeholders of the campaign.

### Output 1.2

A comprehensive promotional campaign was designed. The following materials were produced and distributed:

#### *Printed materials*

- Electoral Education Campaign Project (EECP brochure): 1000 Arabic / 500 Kurdish / 500 English
- National Electoral Education Plan: 500 Arabic /500 Kurdish/8126 additional copies printed and distributed to the participants in the Opinion Leaders Sessions prior to the Governorate Council Elections
- Electoral Education Manual: 1500 Arabic / 500 Kurdish/ 10,926 additional copies printed and distributed to the participants in the Opinion Leaders Sessions prior to both the Governorate Council Elections and Kurdistan Region Parliamentary and Presidential Elections
- Forum Newsletter (monthly) 1500 Arabic / 300 Kurdish
- The Final Electoral Education Campaign Newsletter summarizing the whole campaign: 300 Arabic/ 50 Kurdish/ 50 English

- Posters: 3000 Arabic /600 Kurdish
- Pins: 5,200 bilingual: + 2800 pins for the KRPP
- Banners: 200 bilingual:

### ***Audio-visual materials***

- Electronic presentations;
- 7 minutes produced after end of Phase 1 of the Campaign
- 4 minutes produced after the end of the Campaign

As per the project revision of February 2009 (approved by the UNDG ITF), the project reduced the expected outputs related to the production of additional media materials. This took into account the ongoing support to Iraqi media from UNDP and IFES. Activities implemented by the campaign received a significant amount of media coverage (see other outputs), as well as helped to raise the electoral awareness of a wider Iraqi audience. In particular, EEC project material was shared with USAID who replicated and distributed it within each governorate.

### **Output 1.3**

While the EEF remained functional throughout the project, its existence did not continue after the project ended in August 2009.

After the members of the Forum successfully developed the Electoral Education Plan (the overarching project strategy) and the implementation manuals for the campaign, the project of coordinated with each of the 19 Governorate Electoral Education Committees (GEECs). This would ensure necessary adaptation to the local context required local knowledge. Representatives from the GEECs were comprised of IHEC, UNOPS and CSOs.

The various sub-committees and the complex management structure of the project caused confusion to some stakeholders. A number of these issues were resolved during the project, although maintaining the EEF after the closure of the project as a consulting mechanism between the IHEC and civil society was not considered a priority. In the event of similar future project, important lessons learned and recommendations for coordination are explained and presented in the lessons learned section below.

### **Output 2.1**

Governorate Electoral Education Committees (GEECs) were created in all 19 electoral governorates, consisting of representatives from the IHEC, local granted CSOs, UNOPS and the media. A total of 208 GEEC meetings were held to ensure coordination between CSOs and the IHEC at the local level.

Members of the GEEC had responsibility for the overall coordination of the election awareness campaigns, and made sure that all Opinion Leader Sessions (OLS) were planned appropriately. They were also responsible to invite CSOs who did not receive grants, religious leaders and other prominent community members to the OLS.

Despite difficulties in some governorates (see lessons learned), most CSOs who received grants reported positive collaboration with the IHEC while implementing their outreach activities. There was also strong coordination between GEEC members and the media, ensuring their presence in major events of the EEC to get maximum media coverage.

### **Output 2.2**

An efficient electoral education strategy must reach out to citizens in the area where they live, bringing the electoral process to them and to encouraging them to vote. To achieve this, as well as ensure messages reached those living in remote areas, micro-grants (valued at approximately 30,000 USD) were allocated to 75 civil society organizations to carry out direct outreach activities.

In December 2007, UNOPS launched a Call for Proposals all CSOs in Iraq. This competitive process was open for one month, and was disseminated through a wide network of CSO contacts, the IHEC, and other national and international partners. UNOPS did not publish the Call for Proposals in newspapers for security reasons.

UNOPS received 252 proposals in response to the call. Selection criteria included the technical quality of proposal, feasibility of project, reasonableness of budget, number of targeted beneficiaries, experience of the CSO in similar work, and attention given to gender aspects. All proposals were submitted by UNOPS to IHEC (cf. receipt signed on 22 January 08 by Commissioner Ayad, IHEC, and Mr. Nicolas Garrigue, UNOPS).

EECP management proposed to the IHEC that a Commissioner would participate as voting member in the CSO selection process (letter of Ms. Fiona Bayat to the Chairman of IHEC Board of Commissioners on 23 January 2008). On 4 February 2008, UNOPS accepted the proposal of the IHEC BoC Chairman to nominate Commissioner Ayad, and Mr. Abdulrahman Khalifa, Director of IHEC Public Outreach Division. IHEC submitted evaluation grids completed by several IHEC staff (grids signed by Mr. Abdelrahman Khalifa, Ms Hind Ali Sayid, Mr. Moayed Rashed, Mr. Ahmed Mubher, Mr. Aziz al Rafaji, Ms Gulshan Kamal, etc. dated between 31 January and 7 February).

Commissioner Ayad and Mr. Abulrhaman Khalifa, Director of POD, signed a confidentiality affidavit as a “member of the UNOPS evaluation team” on 21 February 2008. However, in order to avoid having to explain to CSOs why they were or were not selected, the IHEC unofficially requested that UNOPS present the IHEC involvement’s as an observer. Therefore, UNOPS and UNAMI officially carried out the selection of 75 CSOs out of the 252, under the ‘observance’ of IHEC. IHEC (Commissioner Ayad) wrote to UNOPS on 15 March 2008: *“Independent High Electoral Commission in Iraq officially approves the below list of names of organizations selected to receive funds through the Electoral Education grant fund [list attached]”*. The final selection list was co-signed by Ms. Fiona Bayat, UNOPS, Ms. Samantha Aucock, UNAMI, Commissioner Ayad al Kinani, IHEC and Mr. Abdelrahman Khalifa, IHEC.

In March 2008, four regional four-day training sessions for pre-selected grantees were held on proposal writing and grants management. One session was organized in Erbil and three in Baghdad. Trainings for the southern region were also held in Baghdad due to poor security conditions in Basra. In June 2008, four regional four-day training sessions for GEEC members (both grantees and IHEC staff – GEO directors and GEO media officers) were held, one in Erbil and three in Baghdad. These sessions covered how to conduct electoral education activities and how to use the National Electoral Education Plan.

Prior to the January 2009 Governorate Council Elections, an average of 2,000 public awareness activities were implemented each month from July to December 2008. These were held in all 19 electoral governorates of Iraq, targeting minorities, women, youth, IDPs, disabled people, and first time voters. Please see the data on activities prior to the KRPP reported on under outputs 4.1 and 4.2 below)

Field reports from CSO grantees (verified through a multiple-track monitoring system) confirmed that activities successfully reached 264,126 individuals in Iraq, including 107,690 women or 41%.

This included the implementation of 20,331 electoral education activities such as public debates, meetings, training workshops, conferences, cultural and theatrical shows, sports activities, and home visits.

### **Opinion Leaders Sessions (OLS)**

Five different Opinion Leaders Sessions were also organised in each governorate under the Governorate Council Election package. The following groups were targeted under the OLS:

- 1) Political entities involved in the Provincial Elections
- 2) Tribal and Religious Leaders
- 3) Civil Servants, Professionals and Academics
- 4) Women and Youth Leaders
- 5) University Students

Different criteria for the selection of participants in OLS were applied depending on the target group. The priority was to ensure fair treatment of all parties at each stage of selection.

- For the *Political Entities*: All political entities registered in the governorate were invited to participate. The number of seats was divided equally between the parties.
- For *tribal / religious leaders, and minorities*: 33% of participants from each group. The group of minorities needed to be fairly balanced between all minorities present in the governorate, as per UN reports on minorities.
- For *CSOs, academics and civil servants*: The GEECs discussed the selection of the most relevant CSOs in the concerned governorate, and submitted a list for approval to UNOPS.
- For the *First Time Voter Sessions* the selection criteria applied were i) Equal sharing of seats between the main public universities of the governorate; ii) Equal sharing between female students and male students; and iii) No pre-selection by universities: first come, first served.

In each governorate, the IHEC Governorate Electoral Offices (GEO) director was consulted about the selection of the participants. He/she was also requested to endorse the selection list, as well as issue invitation letters.

During the OLS, explanations were given with regard to the electoral law and electoral process, and information materials were distributed. Representatives of IHEC GEO and of the EEF attended all OLS. Field reports confirmed that in the run up to the Governorate Council Election Day, 93 OLS were held in all 19 electoral governorates. These OLS reached 6,798 leaders and 2,181 university students. Additional OLS were held prior to the Kurdistan Region Parliamentary and Presidential Elections (KRPP), reported on under outputs 4.1 and 4.2 below.

The level of media coverage of the five OLS per governorate was high and included radio, TV, satellite and a wide selection of newspaper journalists. In total, 904 media representatives covered these OLS.

### **Output 2.3**

As stated above, both the EEF and GEECs regularly convened throughout the campaign to assess progress and ensure that implementation was proceeding smoothly and successfully. As indicated by the final surveys and monitoring reports (see below), the policies used for electoral education throughout the campaign were extremely successful. This was also confirmed by the coordination meetings held throughout the campaign, which saw no need for modification of the National Electoral Education Plan.

### **Output 3.1**

Reference is here made to the function and structure of the EEF, which provided an arena for continuous cooperation and communication between the IHEC and CSOs. The function of the GEECs and the organisation of OLS (as described above), further contributed to this end.

#### **Output 4.1**

UNAMI's Electoral Assistance Division requested to use the savings made under the project's first phase to support the Kurdish National Assembly's elections of July 2009. This would further contribute towards raising the awareness of Iraqi citizens during the election preparation. Ultimately, UNOPS developed and delivered a special package of electoral education activities for the KRPP elections.

For electoral education for general citizens, UNOPS designed special Neighbourhood Electoral Education Workshops (NEEW). To implement these workshops, additional micro-grants (valued at approximately 9,000 USD) were allocated to the nine CSOs in the KRG who were awarded grants during the first phase of the Campaign. Each workshop targeted 60 participants. During June and July 2009, 201 workshops were implemented. The EEC enjoyed great popularity in the KRG. With its close proximity to voters, the NEEWs led to activities attracting wider segments of the society and even become family events.

In order to encourage a high participation of women, the campaign systematically secured half of the seats at any event for females. When the original registration time for an event was up, and there was still a queue of interested people waiting to get in, women were given an 15 extra minutes to come forth and register before the available seats were given up. This also led to the satisfactory gender balance reported throughout the implementation of activities.

The workshops were designed to reach 5,000 citizens in the KRG and cover 100% of the 99 sub-districts of the KRG. All sub-districts were covered as planned, and 6,530 participants were reached by the NEEW, including 2,121 women.

#### **Output 4.2**

The remaining component of the KRPP package was the Opinion Leader Symposiums (OLS). These OLS also had special First Time Voter sessions (FTVs) as a sub-category. Three OLS were implemented in each of the governorates participating in the KRPP elections. All political entities involved in the KRPP elections were invited to attend these symposiums, as well as tribal and religious leaders, and representatives of minorities and local CSOs. Each OLS gathered 100 participants. UNOPS reached more than its original target of 900 participants, with 1,074 opinion leaders taking part in the OLS, including 102 media representatives.

In each of the three concerned governorates, UNOPS organised FTVs, where 500 students from the main public universities and evening schools of the governorate were invited. Against the original target of 1,500 participants, 1,033 participants were reached, including 38 media representatives. This is the only sub-activity that did not completely reach its quantitative target. This may be true because at when the KRPP package was designed, the election was supposed to be in May 2009, i.e. during the university year. The postponement of the KRPP election to late July 2009 obliged UNOPS to reschedule this sub-activity. This made it difficult to reach students who usually travel back to their hometowns immediately after their June exams, which are often in remote areas.

The OLS activities successfully reached 2,107 opinion leaders and FTVs, far exceeding the original target of 1,000 participants.

**b. Report on how achieved outputs have contributed to the achievement of the outcomes and explain any variance in actual versus planned contributions to the outcomes. Highlight any institutional and/ or behavioural changes amongst beneficiaries at the outcome level**

The Electoral Education Forum (EEF) was successfully established, and developed a concrete strategy and action plan for the Electoral Education Campaign (EEC). The EEF became the first platform for the discussion and coordination public outreach strategies by CSOs and the IHEC. Nineteen Governorate Electoral Education Committees (GEECs) were also established and trained on holding opinion leaders sessions. The GEECs played a critical role during field activities, when local coordination was of crucial importance.

Electoral education activities were implemented by 75 selected CSOs, who were supported with funding and capacity building through the Electoral Education Grant Fund and in accordance with the National Electoral Education Plan developed by the EEF. The CSO grantees successfully reached 270,656 Iraqi beneficiaries for the two elections (if also including members of the media reached), against an original target of 60,000. The positive impact of the campaign is confirmed by surveys amongst participants, the Stars Orbit Monitoring report as well as by IHEC GEO managers (see section on assessments below).

As stated above, the specific OLS, which reached 10,946 community leaders prior to the two elections, also benefitted from significant involvement of IHEC GEO Directors and other IHEC representatives. This allowed for continuous opportunities for local leaders to interact with the IHEC.

In sum, the cooperation between IHEC and Iraqi civil society was enhanced through the EEF, the GEECs, and the OLS. Both parties understood the usefulness of the partnership as a critical factor that contributed to the success of the electoral activities.

**c. Explain the overall contribution of the programme/ project/ to the ICI, NDS, MDGs and Iraq UN Assistance Strategy.**

ICI Benchmarks/Indicators: 3.1.2 Implementation of political/legislative timetable.

Through its support to the IHEC in its task to increase awareness of the electoral process amongst citizens, opinion leaders and the media, the project contributed to the necessary public outreach effort envisaged prior to the elections during 2009.

NDS Goal addressed: “Strengthen good governance and improve security”

The project was conceived as a stabilization tool that will help to improve security situation of the country. Transparency and a high participation rate in electoral processes are prerequisites for political and security stabilization. Contributions towards this goal were achieved, as the project successfully enlarged and diversified the Iraqi citizens support to the electoral process.

- UNCT Iraq Strategic Goal/Outcome Matrix Goal 3 and Outcome 3.1 UNCT Strategic Goal 3 being to: Mobilize civil society towards national unity and Goal 4 (Promote good governance and democratic processes, assist to uphold the rule of law and establish a human rights regime).
- Cluster G Goal 3: Voters in Iraq understand and participate in Electoral Process (Electoral Awareness & Education).

The project successfully mobilized citizens to understand and participate in electoral (and therefore democratic) processes and long-term development in Iraq. This contributed towards the UNCT and cluster goals as described above.

This project aimed to contribute tangentially to the achievement of:

- MDG 8 concerning the global partnership for development. (See above)
- MDG 3 contributing to increase the participation of women in the political life and in elected positions. (Please see section on cross cutting issues- Gender below)

**d. Explain the contribution of key partnerships including national, international, inter-UN agency, CSO or others towards achievement of programme/ project results.**

A critical area of project cooperation was between UNAMI and UNOPS, with UNAMI providing overall technical supervision and UNOPS engaged as the executing agency. This project was also closely linked to the on-going Institutional Capacity-Building Program for the IHEC, implemented by UNAMI, UNDP and UNOPS. UNAMI and UNOPS worked closely together and coordinated their activities at all levels with the IHEC and other project stakeholders. IFES, as a member of the IEAT, also provided technical assistance to the IHEC Board of Commissioners and Public Outreach Division during project implementation.

The IHEC was also a key project partner, and all activities were developed as a result of their concerns regarding their electoral responsibilities and how best to convey electoral education information to the Iraqi population. The IHEC formed part of the EEF and GEECs, which were cornerstones of the project. They also formed a part of the Grant Management Unit, responsible for selection and oversight of grantee CSOs who implemented awareness raising activities. To the extent possible under UN rules and regulations, the IHEC was involved in decisions at all levels. This includes decision-making in the main project bodies of the EEF and Forum Coordination Committee at the central level, as well as chairing of the GEECs at the governorate level.

The 75 granted CSOs participated in the GEECs, with some also represented on the EEF. Capacity building was provided for all the CSOs. They implemented the activities of the campaign reaching 270,656 Iraqi voters against the target of 60,000 for the two elections, while still maintaining high quality.

**e. Highlight the contribution of the programme/ project on crosscutting issues:**

- **Were the needs of particularly vulnerable or marginalised groups addressed?**

Through its aim to enhance electoral participation and support the democratic process, the project also worked to ensure that also the voices of the marginalised and vulnerable groups were heard. As such, gender issues were integrated in all phases of the project. Wide geographic coverage of the campaign ensured activities reached Iraqis in all governorates of Iraq, including remote areas. Specific efforts were also made to reach Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), first time voters, youth (under 30) and persons with disabilities. For the OLS, groups targeted included political entities, tribal and religious leaders, minorities, civil society, academics, women and youth leaders, student and first time voters.

- **How did men and women benefit from the programme/project? How were gender inequalities handled?**

Gender issues were integrated in all phases of the project, particularly by establishing minimum quota of women participants for all project components. Out of the 264,126 voters reached during the first part of the Campaign prior to the Governorate Council Elections, an impressive 40% were women. For the KRPP package, 20% of the 6,530 voters reached were women. Women leaders were also one of the groups specifically targeted by the OLS.

- **Were environmental concerns addressed including environmental impact/risk assessment where relevant?**

The impact of the project was not considered to have an effect on the environment.

- **Were there any specific issues in relation to the security situation?**

The prevailing security situation in Iraq affected both project design and implementation. The restrictions on access to remote areas and subsequent challenges to monitoring are outlined in the section on constraints below, as are the elaborate methods developed to overcome these difficulties.

Instability, curfews, threats, direct explosions and other security concerns in many areas also forced CSOs to reschedule times and locations of their activities. While temporarily disrupting, all challenges were resolved due to the strong commitment of all stakeholders. Ultimately the achievement of the campaign was not affected.

- **Did the project contribute to employment generation (gender disaggregated)?**

The project had a small impact on employment as it allowed the creation of approximately 50 full-time jobs in the service provider's team, as well as dozens of operational and financial positions via the 75 granted CSOs.

**e. Provide an assessment of the programme/ project based on performance indicators as per approved project document using the template in Section IV**

In general, this project was a success in terms of both reach and impact. Activities reached 281,742 direct beneficiaries in total, representing 330% more than the original target of 65,400 project objectives. Important savings allowed the UNDG ITF to approve the implementation of activities not included in the original project document to support the KRPP elections, following a request by UNAMI. The media coverage, both by satellites channels and printed press, was also very positive. Over 1,000 journalists covered the project's various activities.

Though highly successful, there were also a significant number of lessons learned that would allow for even further improvements of similar endeavours in the future. These are outlined in the lessons learned section below.

### III. EVALUATION & LESSONS LEARNED

- a. Report on any assessments, evaluations or studies undertaken relating to the programme/ project and how they were used during implementation. Has there been a final project evaluation and what are the key findings? Provide reasons if no evaluation of the programme/ project have been done yet?**

Throughout the duration of the project, continuous communication, monitoring, and assessments of project progress was conducted. Problems, solutions and adjustments were discussed during in the regular meetings of the EEF and the GEECs as explained above.

To overcome the challenges that the security context presented to monitoring (and thus to the quality of information that served as the basis for decision-making), the UNOPS project team applied a multiple track monitoring system to verify reports received from granted CSOs. The

monitoring system aimed to mitigate risks by triangulating sources of information. The system was strengthened even further following UNOPS' discovery of fraudulent invoices in financial reports submitted by the main service provider Al-Yaqeen in 2008 (see sections on constraints and lessons learned below). The monitoring system involved i) the deployment of a limited number of UN field associates who were trained monitors, ii) the use of a larger number of non-UN monitoring agents selected through contracted M&E companies and iii) monitoring focal points from local representatives of the IHEC, based on their availability.

Each activity that was monitored was therefore covered by at least two of the three monitoring layers. Monitors used common forms that were analysed, compared and consolidated in the UNOPS Amman office, which continuously monitored and assessed progress of the campaign.

In addition to the continuous monitoring activities and consultations, there were also assessments and studies of the campaign following the completion of the January 2009 Governorate Council Elections. An assessment was also conducted at the end of the project after the elections to the Kurdish National Assembly July in 2009.

After the elections of January 2009, UNOPS received thank-you letters from 19 IHEC Governorate Electoral Offices Managers, expressing their appreciation for implementation of the project activities.

The importance of the contribution of CSOs to the electoral process was acknowledged in Baghdad in January 2009 by the SRSG Mr. Staffan de Mistura during a special round table about the role of CSOs and UN in the electoral process. This session gathered the representatives of the CSOs granted under the Electoral Education Campaign and representatives of United Nations (UNHQ EAD, UNAMI, UNOPS), in the presence of representatives of the IHEC.

These positive results were also confirmed by the 35 participants from the IHEC National Office, Governorate Electoral Offices and Kurdistan Regional Electoral Office. These participants gathered from 12 to 15 April 2009 in Erbil for a four-day workshop on public outreach lessons learned from the Provincial Elections. The IFES report (annex IV) about this workshop stated: "Of all the tools for voter outreach and education available to them, symposiums were universally acknowledged as most successful [...]."

A nationwide opinion survey was implemented at the end of the project. This included a random panel of 2,345 beneficiaries from the provincial elections package, and another random panel of 2,997 beneficiaries from the KRPP elections package. Answer sheets were stored in a database, and indicated a level of satisfaction superior to 90% ('very good' + 'good'). The survey also indicated an 88.7% turnout in provincial elections of citizens who participated in the Electoral Education Campaign's activities, against the national turnout of 51%. The Electoral Education Campaign has therefore exceeded its quantitative objectives, but also reached its general objective, by clearly impacting beneficiaries' perception of the electoral process and beneficiaries' decision to vote.

In addition to the surveys conducted, the monitoring company Stars Orbit also produced a 232 page Monitoring Report of the entire EEC Project (see Annex). Some of the key findings are quoted from the summary of the report below:

- "Both elements of the Electoral Education Campaign project were an astounding success. OLS reached an unexpected 8,979 beneficiaries. Of these beneficiaries, approximately 25% were women, thus demonstrating a significant stride towards facilitating greater gender equality as related to electoral participation. Another even greater impact was made through the cooperative efforts of the GEECs and the 75 UNOPS grant recipient CSOs. This aspect of the

project greatly exceeded its expected output, reaching an astounding 264,126 individuals, 40% of whom were female. CSOs also proved to be very effective at reaching the key demographics mentioned above, benefiting thousands of individuals in each category.

- Additionally, significant efforts were exerted to facilitate a strong media presence for the OLS. This aspect of the project was also a powerful success, with nearly 1,000 media representatives from radio, television, and a wide selection of print media outlets attending various OLS throughout the country.” (Pages 3-4 Stars Orbit Monitoring Report)

Furthermore, during the summer of 2009, 125 participants in the OLS and CSO activities in each governorate were given the chance to respond to a survey. The purpose of this survey was to ascertain the degree to which EEC events impacted the target audiences, as well as gather details about the demographics of the participants. This survey revealed that EEC activities were highly successful in presenting material in a clear and effective way, with 92% of participants ranking the overall strength of the EEC activities as either good or very good. Some 93.9% of participants ranked the knowledge and effectiveness of the lecturers as good or very good and 89.9% felt that the group discussions warranted one of these two ratings (good or very good). Additionally, 99.6% of participants said that the EEC activities influenced their decision to vote, with 88.7% actually voting.

The survey results also revealed that these events were able to reach citizens from a wide range of age groups and educational backgrounds. Education levels of survey participants ranged from individuals with only primary school education to those with graduate degrees. Participants also included a wide range of ages, from 18 to over 50.

Additionally, the survey examined the effectiveness of the media coverage of these events. Survey results indicated that 79.8% of participants thought that the media coverage was good or very good. Additionally, 66.6% of participants felt that the meetings were the most effective way of conveying the EEC’s message, with television being the second most popular method.

After the success of the activities discussed above, a new initiative was launched by UNOPS and the IHEC to support the presidential and parliamentary elections of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in July 2009, using the same model as activities from the provincial elections. The goal of this second initiative was to facilitate the same sort of understanding of the importance of the electoral process that the EEC activities had achieved in the provincial elections. This second initiative consisted of nine OLS (targeting political leaders, religious and tribal leaders, and minorities, and leaders of civil society organisations) and three OLS style sessions for FTVs amongst university students. Additionally, nine CSOs were given grants from UNOPS to facilitate the Neighbourhood Electoral Education Workshops (NEEWs) to support the KNA elections of July 2009, covering 100% of the sub-districts of the KRG.

As with the CSO activities enacted during July-December 2008, the June-July 2009 OLS sessions and CSO activities in the KRG were successful. The OLS and FTV seminars reached 1,967 opinion leaders and university students, and 140 media representatives (totalling 2,107 people). The NEEWs implemented by the CSOs reached 6,530 voters in KRG, 30% of which were women.

A survey was conducted based on the evaluation forms collected from the beneficiaries of the CSO NEEWs in the three northern governorates during the summer of 2009. Similar to the national sessions, the summer CSO NEEWs were widely perceived as providing high quality information in an understandable way, with 85.5% of participants ranking the over all strength of the EEC activities as either good or very good. Some 92.3% of participants ranked the knowledge and effectiveness of the lecturers as good or very good and 89.7% felt that the group discussions

warranted one of these two ratings. Additionally, 99.7% of participants stated that the sessions influenced their decision to vote, with 97.7% indicating that they actually voted.

The collected demographic information revealed that the participants represented an array of educational backgrounds and age groups. Nearly all levels of education were represented at the CSO events, with participants ranging from 18 to over 50 years of age.

The survey results also indicated that media coverage of the CSO events was highly effective, with 81.1% of the attendants rating it as either good or very good. Some 54.3% of survey participants ranked the CSO meetings as the most effective way to promote the EEC's message. Television was the second most popular mode of communication, with 45.9% of survey takers ranking it as most effective." (Pages 4-5 Stars Orbit Monitoring report)

In April 2009, a Lessons Learned and Future Planning Conference was organised for members of the IHEC and IEAT in Istanbul. Eight of the nine Commissioners of the Board of IHEC were present, together with 13 senior officials of the electoral administration and five members of the IEAT. Lessons learned and recommendations for the several electoral events upcoming in 2009 - 2010 were drawn from these discussions. In addition, the EEC project was discussed, and lessons learned were identified. These are found in the relevant section of the Lessons Learned report from the conference (see Annex) and are incorporated below.

- b. Indicate key constraints including delays (if any) during programme/ project implementation**
- c. Report key lessons learned that would facilitate future programme design and implementation.**

Despite the project's positive achievements, major challenges were encountered during EEC implementation. Careful analysis and discussions of these have resulted in lessons learned and recommendations to address these issues in the preparation of future electoral education projects.

Some of the challenges are inherent to the Iraqi context, and could usefully be acknowledged (rather than addressed) by a future project. This includes the security context and its impact on both the implementation of project and the monitoring standards, the frequent postponement of elections, the limited mutual trust between civil society organizations and state representatives, and the potential for corruption and fraud from field activities. A number of Iraqi specific issues can be addressed by ensuring a practical and field-oriented project design. In the case of the EEC, the success of the project was helped by efforts made during implementation to immediately integrate lessons on grant management, remote monitoring, management of information about providers, and security/visibility balance.

Lessons learned from the EEC may be helpful for future electoral education projects, ensuring they incorporated these experiences into the original project design. Lessons from the EEC were shared with the interagency mission on Somalia of May 2009, and they found this experience to be helpful.

Before examining the specific EEC lessons learned, an incident with the service provider Al-Yaqeen must be mentioned. This type of project required the involvement of an Iraqi service provider to i) assist with the monitoring, logistical and organizational tasks required to achieve with the large quantitative targets and ii) overcome the difficulties UN staff face in directly accessing project locations due to security constraints. From October 2007 to August 2008, all EEC logistics and monitoring was conducted through a dedicated Forum Secretariat. The organization in charge, Al-Yaqeen Centre, was identified through a competitive tender process approved by UNOPS HQ. It was selected primarily due to its presence in all Iraqi governorates. However, in August 2008, UNOPS uncovered fraudulent invoices in financial reports submitted by Al-Yaqeen. The contract of Al-Yaqeen was immediately terminated, and it did not receive the payments for which forged reports were submitted. In order to urgently resume the project, a private company specialized in logistics and monitoring was hired, Stars Orbit, in November 2008. This company handled the organization of the OLS very satisfactorily. While temporarily disrupting the project management, these fraudulent activities did not affect the overall quality of implementation of the campaign, or the final achievement of the outcomes.

## **General Design and Methodology**

### **Lesson 1: General complexity and lack of 'readability' of the project.**

The initial project design created certain challenges to implementing activities in the Iraqi context. This led to a lack of full ownership by IHEC. For example, the myriad of committees and subcommittees (i.e., the Electoral Education Forum, intended to be a steering committee of the Campaign; the Forum Coordination Committee, a steering committee of this steering committee; and the 19 local GEECs) generated confusion. It also made it impossible for key stakeholders to attend all meetings, produced inter-committee tensions, and froze the decision-making process. On several occasions, the IHEC commented negatively on project components that they initially endorsed, but for which no records of negotiations/discussions were available.

*Building upon the positive design revisions made during project implementation to address these issues, it is recommended:*

- To design future projects ensuring they are clearly integrated into the IHEC strategy;
- To favour a more consultative approach during the design phase, and ensure that the project is discussed and fully agreed with IHEC from the outset;
- To communicate broadly and openly about the project concept with other stakeholders, including civil society organizations, during the formulation phase;
- To ensure that the project can be understood by a non-specialized audience;
- To shape a clear chain of command and workflow, as well as focus on result-oriented meetings;
- To formalize in a Memorandum/Letter of Agreement the agreement of the IHEC on each component of the project, including a precise description of respective roles and responsibilities.

### **Lesson 2: Ad hoc activities versus centralized functioning of IHEC.**

The project needed to be embedded in the IHEC's strategy in order to be successful. It therefore required the direct involvement of IHEC HQ as well as IHEC field staff. IHEC field staff, notably the Governorate Electoral Office (GEO) Managers, sought approval of activities on a case-by-case basis. This significantly slowed down project implementation. Conversely, the IHEC's approval of deploying UNOPS staff to IHEC premises at both the HQ and provincial levels proved to be a very efficient. It helped to both to speed up project delivery as well as increase the understanding of the project by GEO staff.

*It is recommended:*

- To request IHEC's approval to maintain deployment of UNOPS national staff in the premises of IHEC for future projects;
- To request the Board of Commissioners (BoC) to give GEOs an advance comprehensive approval or clearance (instead of individual approvals per activity) at the beginning of a new project. This would be supported by a general presentation of the project, a brief description of activities, a timetable, and an explanation of the roles of GEOs in the project.

### **Lesson 3: Selection of service providers and the "all eggs in one basket" risk.**

During the initial phase of the project, a singular service provider was selected and charged to implement a comprehensive package of services, including most project activities. This created a situation where the service provider effectively took control of operations, and interfered with the UNOPS-IHEC relationship. When fraud by this service provider was later uncovered and the contract terminated, project implementation of the project became blocked. Through the combined efforts of IHEC, UNAMI and UNOPS, implementation was successfully resumed. A new service provider (a private human resources company) was selected to implement a reduced package of activities, based on management of logistics and human resources.

*It is recommended:*

- To outsource human resources and logistics of project activities as needed, but not strategic decisions on contents and methods of activities;
- To organize the project in several autonomous modules of activities, and to select, if possible, different service providers for each module of activities. This diversification would (i) reduce the impact on implementation of problems with particular service providers; (ii) avoid any tendency to be lenient with a service provider due to risk of project blockage; and (iii) place service providers in a competitive process, which should encourage productivity and positive results; and

- To favour competent private companies (as opposed to NGOs) when selecting a service provider to monitor and evaluate project activities; as NGOs are competing for donor funding, this may introduce the risk of distortion and bias into the M&E process.

## **Electoral Education Forum (EEF) and Governorate Electoral Education Committees (GEECs)**

### **Lesson 4: Which Forum, and for what?**

The EEF, which was initially designed as the keystone of the campaign, ultimately did not play a fundamental role in implementation. This was due to a lack of a clearly defined mandate. The EEF evolved into merely an “endorsement committee.” with no real consultative or decision-making role. The lack of structural connection between the decentralized committees of the project (the GEECs) and the EEF also created poor coordination between these bodies. This became a source of frustration for several members, who progressively deserted the EEF or altered its “raison d’être” into a channel for their complaints to IHEC.

*To further the involvement of the EEF or another similar structure in future projects, it is recommended:*

- To identify concrete coordination requirements, develop a coordination mechanism in the mandate and workplan, and then establish the EEF on this basis;
- To ensure that the mandate of the EEF does not overlap with the core mandate of the IHEC;
- To clarify the rules of exclusion in case of absenteeism or political bias;
- To conduct an independent assessment to identify the most relevant CSOs to join the provincial committees;
- To establish at the central level a structure based on geographical representation and bottom-up methodology: create provincial committees first, which then designate delegates to the EEF;
- To diversify the composition of the EEF by better involving professional associations and media representatives; and
- To promote the EEF as a unique platform of interaction between IHEC and civil society, and to encourage all Board of Commissioners members to make proper use of it.

## **Grant Fund**

### **Lesson 5: The training-first approach.**

The selection of grantees under the EEC was a complex process, due to the relatively low quality of proposals received from CSOs. Division of responsibilities in the selection process between UNOPS, UNAMI and IHEC was unclear. This led to an ambiguous situation wherein IHEC participated as an observer, but then requested to be consulted for endorsement of the selections. The grants allocated to 75 CSOs in all governorates of Iraq had a quantitatively large impact on project implementation, exceeding the original population targets. Qualitative assessments of activities by grantee CSOs were more mixed, and it was noted that some electoral information disseminated by CSOs might not have been completely accurate. Although balance between governorates was respected when allocating grants, the figures of invalid ballots tend to indicate a smaller impact in some governorates. In addition, no criteria were set for the balance between districts within the same governorates, thus creating a discrepancy between districts or between rural and urban areas. It was further not possible to track the participants in all of the activities, or to assess their satisfaction.

A more serious concern was the complaint received from some GEO Managers about possible political bias in activities implemented by a limited number of CSOs; this suspicion was reinforced by the candidacy in the provincial election of 3 CSO Directors (after the end of their granted projects). It has highly cumbersome for UNOPS to monitor and evaluate all 75 granted projects.

In addition to a very limited number of attempted fraud cases, the main problems were lack of financial management and reporting skills of the CSOs, failure of CSOs to comply with deadlines, difficulty of UNOPS to obtain information about dates and places of events to allow for M&E, and lack of visibility given to IHEC and UNOPS support.

*It is recommended:*

- To clarify the role of IHEC with the Board of Commissioners in the selection process;
- To incorporate a training program and certification for CSOs, either prior to, or as a condition of their selection as a grantee. This will help to ensure a standard level of knowledge in topics such as project development, budgeting, financial management, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and electoral education methodology;
- To develop Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) allocating a cluster of activities and districts to eligible CSOs, based upon a pre-established national strategy agreed with IHEC;
- To differentiate between activities implemented to motivate participation in voter registration and activities to motivate participation in the election;
- To avoid launching activities before clarification of the legal framework and procedures;
- To require CSOs to base their presentations on the factsheets of IEAT/IHEC;
- To specify in the MoUs executed with the grantee CSOs the following obligatory responsibilities of the CSOs: (a) to provide UNOPS field staff with advance notice of all project activities; (b) to collect and analyze signed evaluation forms at the end of each activity, according to a standard evaluation form provided to all CSOs; (c) to document activities with pictures taken on a digital camera, as appropriate; and (d) the specific criteria for grant cancellation (e.g., failure to provide timely information on activities, failure to comply with deadlines, or candidacy in an election); and
- To ensure understanding of IHEC staff (particularly the GEO Managers) of both the rights and obligations of CSOs, as independent organizations.

### ***Opinion Leaders Sessions (OLS)***

#### **Lesson 6: Establishing a long-term relationship with Opinion Leaders.**

The OLS can be considered the most successful activities implemented under the EEC in many aspects. It was highly successful in objectively conveying the intended electoral messages to a unique and influential target group of beneficiaries. Some 6,500 opinion leaders (including tribal and religious leaders, political entities, local civil servants, academics, and association leaders) were reached in the approximate 100 sessions held from November 2008 to January 2009.

While students were highly motivated to participate, they sometimes felt intimidated to ask questions in front of the opinion leaders. Following numerous requests by students in the field, 2,800 students were engaged on an ad hoc basis and special student sessions were organized.

Finally, it would have been beneficial to structure the OLS to allow for the establishment of a long-term relationship with the individual opinion leaders met during these sessions and their communities. These relationships could be beneficial to future elections projects, as well as other social and economic recovery programs.

*It is recommended:*

- To avoid launching activities before clarification of the legal framework and procedures;
- To involve IHEC at each step of the development of the session's agenda and to request BoC official endorsement of the agenda;
- To require that facilitators base their presentations on the factsheets of IEAT/IHEC;
- To develop special first-time voter sessions for students only;

- To implement follow-up sessions, where the Leaders will be invited to discuss how they have relayed the knowledge they acquired during the Opinion Leaders Sessions in their community; and
- To formulate a strategy for long-term relationship building with Opinion Leaders and their communities, following participation in OLS.

#### IV. INDICATOR BASED PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

	Performance Indicators	Indicator or Baselines	Planned Indicator Targets	Achieved Indicator Targets	Means of Verification	Comments (if any)
<b>IP Outcome 1</b> Establish and support an Electoral Education Forum around the electoral process, composed of prominent civic education-oriented networks and NGOs, the IHEC, as well as IEAT and other international representatives, in which a strategy and action plan for the Electoral Education Campaign can be negotiated, planned and monitored collegially.						
<b>IP Output 1.1</b> A National Electoral Education Plan developed by an Electoral Education Forum made of representatives of the Civil Society and IHEC, sets policies and implementation mechanisms for a national Electoral Education Campaign, including an overall strategy for the Campaign and detailing key messages to be delivered, roles and responsibilities of governmental and non-governmental actors, methods and materials, as well as oversight and	<b>Indicator 1.1.1</b> A fully operating Electoral Education Forum with the IHEC, Iraqi NGO networks and international actors	N/A	6 meetings	6 meetings	- Agendas and minutes of the Forum's meetings. - Structure of the Forum's Board	
	<b>Indicator 1.1.2</b> Existence of a fully developed National Electoral Education Plan that provides a structured strategy for electoral education in Iraq	N/A	Development of the NEEP by the Election's day	NEEP developed and distributed in all electoral governorates, GEOs, granted NGOs and participants at the OLS.	- Development of the National Electoral Education Plan - Numbers of distributed NEEP copies	

coordination mechanisms						
<p><b>IP Output 1.2</b> Increased public awareness about and support to the Electoral Education Campaign thanks to a promotional campaign involving media materials (publications, radio, TV).</p> <p>Ninth six report” 1.2: General public is more aware of and supports the Electoral Education Campaign as a result of a promotional campaign involving media materials (publications, radio, TV).</p>	<p><b>Indicator 1.2.1</b></p> <p>Delivered promotional campaign utilising a range of media materials – publications, radio and TV</p>	N/A	N/A	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of formulated media materials and evidence of their delivery together with feedback on their impact.</li> <li>- Project Progress reports and feedback, both specific and general, on the development of the Electoral Education Forum.</li> <li>- Reports and feedback on consultations and negotiations through the EEF</li> </ul>	<p>This output was revised in light of other organizations’ work on the media component, mainly UNDP. The budget line concerning this output was thus reallocated to serve other areas of the project. A comprehensive promotional campaign has been designed and foresees the production of the following materials: Printed material EECP brochure: 1000 Arabic/ 500 Kurdish/ 500 English National Electoral Education Plan: 500 Arabic/ 500</p>

					<p>Kurdish</p> <p>Electoral Education Manual: 1500 Arabic/ 500 Kurdish 10,926 additional copies printed and distributed to the participants in the Opinion Leaders Sessions prior to both the Governorate Council Elections and Kurdistan Region Parliamentary and Presidential Elections</p> <p>Forum Newsletter (monthly) 1500 Arabic/ 300 Kurdish: Electronic copies only/ not printed Posters:3000 Arabic/ 600 Kurdish</p>
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						<p>Pins:5,200 bilingual Banners:200 bilingual</p> <p>The Final Electoral Education Campaign Newsletter summarizing the whole campaign: 300 Arabic/ 50 Kurdish/ 50 English</p> <p>Audio- visual material</p> <p>Electronic presentation</p> <p>All audiovisual materials production is pending upon the reply of IHEC to UNOPS request to airing of the materials. Finalization of the implementation of the</p>
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						<p>promotional campaign is a priority for the coming month. The present request proposes to reallocate the funds foreseen for the activities “radio spots” and” TV spots” to the output 4. These activities are indeed overlapping with other IEAT members activities (notably UNDP) during the presentation of the provincial election of the 31 January 2009. It also proposes to replace the activity “production of a documentary on the Campaign” by an activity “production of a electronic presentation on</p>
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						the Campaign”, as this electronic format allows a broader dissemination(by CD Rom) to the project stakeholders and media. The presentation has been developed and disseminated in January 2009
<b>IP Output 1.3</b> The Electoral Education Forum remains a permanent coordination body between the Civil Society and the IHEC after the conclusion of the project		N/A	EEF remaining as a permanent coordination body after the conclusion of the project	While the EEF remained functional throughout the project, its existence did not continue after the project		After the members of the Forum successfully developed the Electoral Education Plan (the overarching project strategy) and the implementation manuals for the

				ended in August 2009.		<p>campaign, the project of coordinated with each of the 19 Governorate Electoral Education Committees (GEECs). This would ensure necessary adaptation to the local context required local knowledge. Representatives from the GEECs were comprised of IHEC, UNOPS and CSOs.</p> <p>The various sub-committees and the complex management structure of the project caused confusion to some stakeholders. A number of these issues were resolved during</p>
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						the project, although maintaining the EEF after the closure of the project as a consulting mechanism between the IHEC and civil society was not considered a priority. In the event of similar future project, important lessons learned and recommendations for coordination are explained and presented in the lessons learned section below.
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**IP Outcome 2**  
 Enhance public awareness of electoral processes and principles using grant-funded civil society projects and opportunities to link local opinion leaders with the IHEC, following policies set by the Electoral Education Forum

<b>IP Output 2.1</b> In each governorate, a Governorate Electoral Education Committee,	<b>Indicator 2.1.1</b> Presence of Governorate Electoral	N/A	1 GEEC per Governorate	1 GEEC per Governorate	- Reports on GEEC meetings through the service provider.	
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composed of representatives from the IHEC, civil society and the media, is able to coordinate the planning, implementation and monitoring of the Campaign at the local level.	Education Committees in each governorate					
	<b>Indicator 2.1.2</b>  At least 2 CSOs in each GEEC together with presence of IHEC Governorate Electoral Office	N/A	2 CSO's in each GEEC  114 GEEC meetings to be held	All granted CSO's in each governorate are represented in GEEC  108 meetings held	- Reports from all events, conferences and other meetings organized by and through the project on the attainment of the project's outputs.	
<b>IP Output 2.2</b> At least 55,000 Iraqis have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the electoral processes, translating into higher participation rate on election day	<b>Indicator 2.2.1</b>  Activities implemented through projects directly assisting Iraqis understand the electoral process and how they can impact upon it.	N/A	55,000 Iraqis	246,126 Iraqis	- (19) Governorate Reports and 1 National Report on all activities of the Electoral Education Campaign prepared for the EEF.  - Granted NGOs submit mid-term reports and final reports on their activities to UNOPS	
	<b>Indicator 2.2.2</b>  Established and fully operative Electoral Education Grant Fund, benefiting a number of NGOs together with academic / educational	N/A	70 NGOs in 18 Governorates	75 NGOs in 19 electoral Governorate (18 Iraqi Governorates)		

	institutions and media outlets in all 18 governorates				
<b>IP Output 2.3</b> <b>Policies on electoral education are reviewed regularly through feedback gathered from grassroots activities.</b>					Both the EEF and GEECs regularly convened throughout the campaign to assess progress and ensure that implementation was proceeding smoothly and successfully. As indicated by the final surveys and monitoring reports, the policies used for electoral education throughout the campaign were extremely successful. This was also confirmed by the coordination meetings held throughout the campaign, which saw no need for modification of the National Electoral Education Plan.

<p>At least 2,500 opinion leaders (religious, tribal, women, youth, academics, local politicians, students, etc.) have been consulted and trained on main elements of the electoral framework and messages in a series of focus group events facilitated by the 18 Governorate Committees</p>	<p><b>Indicator 2.3.1</b> Number of opinion leaders – and their sectors (religious, youth, academic etc) – that have participated and been trained in the electoral framework and messages.</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>2,500 opinion leaders attending the OLS</p>	<p><b>8,979</b> opinion leaders attending <b>93 OLS</b></p>	<p>Final project report that will detail the achievements of the project in terms of realising project outputs and reports of UNOPS field staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political Entities</li> <li>- Tribal &amp; Religious Leaders</li> <li>- Civil Society leaders , Professionals and Academics</li> <li>- Women and youth Leaders</li> <li>- First time voters</li> </ul>	
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**IP Outcome 3**  
Create close cooperation between the IHEC and the Iraqi civil society as a means to increase transparency, independence and success of the electoral processes.  
“Fiche”

Create long –term support of the IHEC towards the Iraqi civil society involvement in electoral education as a means to increase transparency, independence and success of the electoral processes.

<p><b>IP Output 3.1</b> The IHEC has developed stronger ties and cooperation channels with the civil society involved in civic education</p>	<p><b>Indicator 3.1.1</b></p>	<p>N/A</p>		<p>The Electoral Education Forum is composed of 19 representatives from various Iraqi civil society organization and 4 members are from the IHEC.IHEC nominated its members to the Forum through a decision made by the Board of Commissioners. Civil Society members on the Forum were jointly selected by UNOPS submitted a draft list of NGOs to IHEC who endorsed and approved the final list. Membership in the Forum is on a voluntary basis. All Forum members have signed a Code of Conduct that calls for respect to the role of IHEC and complete neutrality and impartially in the conduct of their work. A Forum Coordination Committee composed of one IHEC</p>	
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					representatives was also elected and empowered to act as the equivalent to a “Steering Committee” for the Electoral Education Forum. The committee meets on a bimonthly basis. In 2008, the Forum developed its own internal rules, held 6 meetings, and made plans for the Electoral Education Campaign. The Forum also revised and approved the National Electoral Plan. Six Forum newsletters have been produced and disseminated.	
	<b>Indicator 3.1.2</b>	N/A				

<b>IP Outcome 4</b>						
<b>IP Output 4.1</b> At least 5,000 Iraqi citizens of the Northern region have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the KRG	<b>Indicator 4.1.1</b> Activities implemented through projects directly assisting Iraqis understand the	N/A	5000 Iraqis	6,530 Iraqis (2,121 were women)	These outputs were achieved by a comprehensive set of activities based on lessons learnt and assessment needs	

election of <b>July</b> 2009, translating into higher participation rate on election day.	electoral process and how they can impact upon it.				<p>developed during the participation of the provincial election of the 31 January 2009.</p> <p>It comprised of the implementation of Opinion Leaders Sessions in the Northern region targeting specifically the dissemination of information related to KRG elections to the political entities involved in KRG elections, as well as to tribal and religious leaders, civil servants, academics and association leaders of the 3 concerned governorates.</p> <p>It also involved implementation activities by well-established civil society organizations of the 3 concerned governorates.</p>	
	<p><b>Indicator 4.1.2</b></p> <p>Established and fully operative Electoral Education Grant Fund,</p>	N/A	9 NGOs in 3 Governorates	9 NGOs in 3 Governorate	Neighborhood Electoral Education Workshops (NEEW): to implement Neighborhood Electoral Education Workshops, additional micro-grants	

	benefiting a number of NGOs together with academic / educational institutions and media outlets in 3 governorates				(approximately 9,000 USD) were allocated to the 9 Kurdish civil society organizations awarded grants during the first phase of the Campaign. Each workshop targeted 60 participants. All in all, the workshops were designed to reach 5,500 citizens of Kurdistan and to cover 100% of the 99 sub-districts of KRG. All sub-districts were covered as foreseen, and 6,530 participants were reached, including 2,121 women.	
<b>IP Output 4.2</b> At least 1,000 Opinion leaders of the Northern region have gained accrued understanding of and interest for the KRG election of July 2009, translating into higher participation rate on election day.		N/A			Three symposiums were implemented in each of the governorates participating in the KRG elections. All the political entities involved in the KRG elections, the tribal and religious leaders, as well as the representatives of minorities and local civil society organizations, were invited to attend these symposiums, which	

				<p>each gather 100 participants. Against an objective of 900 participants, 1074 opinion leaders participated, including 102 media representatives.</p> <p>First-Time Voter Sessions (FVS): UNOPS organized in each of the three concerned governorates, a First-Time Voter Session, in which 500 students from the main public universities and evening schools of the governorate were invited. Against an objective of 1,500 participants, 1,033 participants were reached, including 38 media representatives. This sub-activity is the only one which did not completely reach its quantitative objective, which can be explained by the following reason: at the time were the KRPP package was</p>
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					<p>designed, KRPP election was supposed to be held in May 2009, i.e. during the university year and before the election. The postponement of the KRPP election to the 25 July 2009 has obliged UNOPS to reschedule this sub-activity during the month of July, thus making difficult to reach students who generally travel back immediately after the June exams for the summer to their hometowns, often in remote areas.</p>	
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