



## PEACEBUILDING FUND

### PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

<b>Project Title:</b> Immediate response for the reinsertion/reintegration of IDP Returns to Abyei	<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b> UNHCR
<b>Project Contact:</b> Mr. Peter de Clercq, Representative E-mail: declercq@unhcr.org	<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b> Save the Children-Sweden, KUSH
<b>Project Number:</b>	<b>Project Location:</b> Abyei, Sudan
<b>Project Description:</b> UNHCR will provide multi-sectoral support to IDP returnees/communities from Khartoum to facilitate immediate and medium-term reinsertion/reintegration needs through the provision of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Emergency relief/NFI packages</li> <li>2. Transitional shelter kits to vulnerable households</li> <li>3. Counseling/legal aid/information to address customary/communal land tenure disputes/documentation issues</li> <li>4. Vocational training/livelihood support in rural and urban settings</li> <li>5. small-scale community-based initiatives to foster peaceful coexistence and reconciliation</li> </ol>	<b>Total Project Cost:</b> USD 2,000,900 <b>Peacebuilding Fund:</b> USD 2,000,900 <b>Government Input:</b> <b>Other:</b> Deployment of UNHCR staff for project management and training, support of Protection working Group <b>Total:</b> USD 2,000,900
	<b>Project Start Date and Duration:</b> December 2010 -- November 2011
<b>Gender Marker Score:</b> <i>Score 3 for projects that are targeted 100% to women beneficiaries and/or address specific hardships faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations;</i> <i>Score 2 for projects with specific component, activities and budget allocated to women;</i> <i>Score 1 for projects with women mentioned explicitly in its objectives, but no specific activities are formulated nor is a budget reserved; and</i> <i>Score 0 for projects that do not specifically mention women.</i>	
<b>Gender Marker Score by Activity</b>  Emergency relief/NFI packages (Gender marker score: 0) <i>WFP, based on preliminary analysis of the ongoing returnee verification exercise, estimates that approximately 30% of returnee households are headed by women. Every household receives the same NFI reintegration kit, so</i>	

women are not a specific focus, but will significantly benefit from the package.

**Transitional shelter kits to vulnerable households (Gender Marker score: 1)**

*Shelter kits will specifically target vulnerability criteria, with female-headed households expected to comprise a significant portion of the beneficiaries for this objective. Other vulnerability categories will include unaccompanied elderly and returnees with the weakest coping mechanisms and household livelihood strategies. UNHCR will provide a breakdown on the number of shelter kits that are provided to female-headed households.*

**Counseling/legal aid/information to address customary/communal land tenure disputes/documentation issues (Gender Marker score: 1)**

*Although not specifically mentioned in the original objective, UNHCR anticipates that female-headed households will face the greatest difficulties in re-accessing traditional lands, particularly widows who may lack inheritance rights under the traditional land tenure system. The focus of this objective is to ensure that marginalized groups, particularly women, are able to settle and enjoy secure land tenure rights, without discrimination. UNHCR will monitor interventions on behalf of women and report specifically on the*

**Vocational training/livelihood support in rural and urban settings (Gender marker score: 2)**

*A specific budget allocation will be set aside to address livelihood support to women. Needs assessments are ongoing, but so far suggest a strong demand for agri-based livelihood support, with women being a key target group for this activity. Upon completion of the assessments, a formal budget breakdown will be shared with PBSO.*

**small-scale community-based initiatives to foster peaceful coexistence and reconciliation (Gender marker score: 0)**

*Women will indirectly benefit from community-based quick impact projects but will not be the specific target of the interventions. Projects foreseen under this objective include classroom construction, well excavation/repair, irrigation schemes, etc. All will have indirect benefits on the quality of life of women and girls, including lessening the risks of GBV through improved access to education, water points, and other communal infrastructure.*

#### **PBF Priority Area(s) and Outcomes:**

**PBF Priority Area 3: Early economic recovery and immediate peace dividends**

**PBF Outcome 1:** Support protection and reintegration of communities affected by conflict, including internally displaced people, refugees and victims of gender based violence, providing quick dividends and generate confidence in the peace building process.

#### **Outputs and Key Activities:**

**Output 1.1: Provision of Emergency Relief kits:** All returnee households (estimated 4,000 HHs) are provided with emergency NFIs kit to provide temporary shelter and start-up assistance upon arrival, whether in areas of origin or chosen destination.

**Output 1.2: Provision of Transitional Shelter:** Transitional shelter kits, consisting of durable shelter materials (corrugated iron sheets, timber, tools and other construction inputs) are distributed to 500 vulnerable households, targeting female-headed households, older persons, and other persons with special needs. Beneficiary population will target 80% new return households and 20% settled population/host community, based on vulnerability criteria



and guidelines to be established.

Output 1.3: Information, legal assistance, counseling on land and documentation issues: A series of workshops and community outreach to address:

- Land-tenure changes, restitution/compensation, inheritance rights, and the customary legal mechanisms to address competing claims among returnees.
- Reconciliation and confidence among emergent communities (returnee/host community, Dinka Ngok-Messirya)
- Information on citizenship rights and options

Output 1.4: Support to livelihoods/local markets: Address livelihood challenges through vocational training and provision of start-up kits (urban) and the provision of agricultural inputs (rural).

Output 1.5: Implementation of Quick-Impact community rehabilitation projects: Demand-driven small-scale rehabilitation projects to address overstretched social services and avoid community tensions in areas of destination or to establish basic services in rural areas of origin, depending on available human resources among communities. It is envisioned that post-referendum, the current tensions between Missirya and Dinka Ngok may have sufficiently subsided to allow for projects that foster peaceful coexistence in contested areas or among communities along traditional migration routes.

(for IRF-funded projects)	
<b>Recipient UN Organization(s)</b> Name of Representative <i>Pelesse Clercq</i> Signature <i>[Signature]</i> Name of Agency <i>UNHCR</i> Date & Seal <i>20/02/11</i>	<b>National Implementing Partner(s) (as relevant)</b> Replace with: Name of Head of Partner Signature Name of Institution Date & Seal
<b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b> Name of Representative <i>[Signature]</i> Signature <i>[Signature]</i> Peacebuilding Support Office, NY Date & Seal <i>20/02/11</i>	<b>Representative of National Authority</b> Name of Government Counterpart <i>A.E. Deng</i> Signature <i>[Signature]</i> Title Chief Administrator, A... Date & Seal <i>20/02/11</i>

#### COMPONENT 1: Situation Analysis

Home to some of Sudan's richest oil deposits/pipeline infrastructure and the subject of a separate protocol agreement, Abyei has emerged a key flashpoint in the final chapter of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, carrying with it the potential to re-ignite a N/S conflict and imperil the CPA. The separate popular referendum for Abyei, the subject of an additional protocol to the CPA, appears to be off the table following a failure among parties to reach agreement on voter eligibility and other technical issues. Furthermore, the failure to implement the decision of the Standing Court at the Hague (commonly referred to as the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision) on border demarcation has significant repercussions for long-term wealth-sharing arrangements and the sustainable livelihoods of all groups that depend on its land and resources. Just as the future of Abyei threatened to derail the CPA negotiations in 2004, the

current political complexities of this contested region again pose a significant threat to achieving durable peace in Sudan.

Abyei is the traditional homeland of the nine Dinka Ngok chiefdoms, as well as an important N/S 'bridge' for the Misserya pastoralists, who spend part of the year traversing Abyei's grazing areas during seasonal migrations. Conflict between these groups has defined Abyei for more than half century, resulting in repeated waves of displacement of Dinka Ngok and a hardening of "Northern" and "Southern" identities, bringing to the fore key questions regarding Abyei's boundaries; who is a 'resident; and, ultimately, whether the territory should remain with the North or become part of a new Southern Sudanese State? The May 2008 crisis, which displaced the entire population of Dinka Ngok from Abyei to Agok and areas further south following SAF/SPLA clashes, underscored the volatility of the situation.

The Misseriya fear that secession of the South, and Abyei in particular, poses a direct threat to their traditional way of life and livelihoods and have historically aligned with the North. Likewise, many senior SPLM officials are Dinka Ngok from Abyei and the surrounding areas and are equally adamant that Abyei should form part of an independent South Sudan. Political tensions have reached the boiling point: relations among Dinka Ngok and Missirya, long characterized by extreme mistrust and lack of dialogue, are mirrored at national level—the AU-sponsored talks in Addis Ababa failed to find any common ground between the NCP and SPLM negotiators on the issue of Abyei. Recent incendiary rhetoric among more radical elements within the Government of National Unity that Southerners in the North could be stripped of basic citizenship rights and a growing atmosphere of intimidation and uncertainty has resulted in a pronounced increase in returns to the South, including Abyei. More than 3700 IDPs are estimated to have returned to Abyei in 2010.

Like their Southern counterparts, the Abyei Area Administration (AAA) has begun to facilitate the return of an estimated 35,000 Dinka Ngok residents from Khartoum to areas of origin and/or destination in Abyei. Civil administrators stress that the move is not overtly linked to the referendum, but rather a realization among remaining IDPs in Khartoum that their futures lie in the South. The first convoy of the movement on 04 December carried 9315 individuals rather than the 8080 originally registered. SSRRC officials attributed the increased numbers largely to heightened security fears in areas of displacement in Khartoum. The second facilitated movement is planned for 8080 individuals within the next couple of weeks, but local officials anticipate up to 12,000 new arrivals. A third phase is planned and the AAA is currently appealing for funds to facilitate transport.

Absorption capacity in Abyei has long been overstretched. The population of Abyei town has tripled since the signing of the CPA, resulting in overcrowding, lack of potable water, sanitation and hygiene problems, and insufficient livelihood opportunities. The return of 35,000 individuals under the Abyei Administration's current facilitation plan, if not matched with viable reintegration support in areas of origin and/or chosen destination, could stretch limited resources to the breaking point, create inter-communal tensions and push factors, and further destabilize Sudan's most fragile region, with enormous repercussions on peace in Sudan.

## **COMPONENT 2: Project justification**

### **1. Relevance to Peacebuilding**

The dispute over Abyei is directly linked to the future of Sudan as a unified or separate state, to the possibility of a stable North-South border in 2011, and to the imperative for a central government, be it



in a unified Sudan or a new Southern Sudanese state, which fully integrates and protects peripheral populations. While the proposed project focuses primarily on ensuring the immediate reintegration of Dinka Ngok returnees, it also aims to develop confidence in the larger peace process.

Inter-communal violence has posed a significant threat within the South throughout the five-year CPA implementation period. While the arrival of 35,000 returnees may appear relatively modest, it accounts for nearly one-third of Abyei's existing population, and could result in push factors, increased competition for limited resources, and divisions or violence among returnees and inhabitants. Immediate reinsertion assistance for new arrivals, coupled with a more sustained effort to address assistance gaps (individual and communal) across communities could prove pivotal in sustaining returns and creating confidence in the peace process. Many observers have noted that the inhabitants of Abyei, who have derived few benefits from oil extraction and harbor lingering resentments regarding their separate protocol, have yet to experience a 'peace dividend' since the CPA was signed.

Despite the paralysis and ill-will among both groups in the immediate pre-referendum period, there is some basis for optimism that properly targeted reinsertion/reintegration assistance can mitigate ill-conceived resettlement schemes, preserve individual rights to choose a destination other than that of origin, and eventually foster peaceful co-existence among different groups. Both sides have demonstrated an ability to talk and reach agreement when dictated by interests. In late 2009, for instance, an agreement was reached between more than 200 Dinka Ngok and Missirya representatives at the Tishkin Conference to resolve cattle rustling disputes and establish rules for the carrying of protective arms.

## **2. Filling the Gap**

To date, the humanitarian community in Abyei has mobilized to provide the standard emergency fare to new returns at destination points: three months food ration (WFP), increased mobile health care provided by NGOs/UN (with support of WHO), and possible provision of additional water points (UNICEF), and an NFI reintegration package (UNHCR). Yet these steps, while welcomed by the AAA, will neither ensure the long term sustainability of returns nor address the existing lack of absorption capacity within Abyei. . The proposed reinsertion/reintegration assistance proposed by UNHCR attempts to provide more sustainable assistance and recognizes and responds to challenges posed by prolonged displacement in urban settings, subsequent changes in livelihood strategies, and significant alienation from traditional lands and land tenure systems. Specifically:

- Output 1.1: The provision of **emergency NFIs** will enable returning households to quickly establish emergency shelter in areas of destination and reestablish households. WFP's initial verification of the SSRRC registration list found that more than 50 percent of the new arrivals have remained in Abyei town, while others appear to have spread out in five or six larger outlying 'hub' towns. Many returnees cited ongoing rural insecurity as the primary factor preventing a return to areas of origin.
- Output 1.2: The provision of **transitional shelter kits**, while costly, attempts to avoid aid dependency and the seasonal requests for distributions of plastic sheets. The project will target 500 vulnerable households, primarily female-headed households, the elderly and others with special needs and engage communities to assist with construction, possibly linked with existing food for work programmes. The provision of shelter inputs will reflect traditional modes of construction, support local markets where possible for the procurement of appropriate material inputs, and provide technical expertise and, if necessary, construction support for EVI households. Prior to the facilitation of movement from Khartoum, the AAA informed UNHCR and the RC/HC's office that the remaining Dinka Ngok were the most vulnerable, having

remained in Khartoum primarily because they could not pay for transport for the trip home. In the absence of confirmed registration list the extent of vulnerability cannot be determined; UNHCR is nevertheless anticipating relatively high levels of vulnerability. The fact that many households remain camping in the open within Abyei town more than a week after arrival suggests a high level of vulnerability and a strong imperative for the humanitarian community to immediately intervene.

- **Output 1.3:** As a result of CPA negotiations and the eventual implementation of the Permanent Court of Appeal ruling on border demarcation, Abyei's geographical territory is expected to contract considerably. This fact in itself has bred resentment and paranoia within Abyei. It also poses serious concerns regarding the absorption capacity of the AAA to integrate relatively large numbers of returns in a short period, as well as the ability of returning households to re-access traditional lands. UNHCR will provide **information, legal advice and counseling** on the native administration and land tenure system, revive traditional dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve simple property disputes, and create a network of community-based organizations to identify and refer cases. While the activity will be loosely modeled on the Norwegian Refugee Council's ICLA programme, which UNHCR has long funded, the project will be tailored and simplified to meet local circumstances, primarily through a series of **workshops on land tenure** and the **dissemination of information** on basic property rights. As part of the local outreach, community members will also be expected to disseminate information on citizenship rights and documentation needs in order to assist their peers in assuring their citizenship during the critical period following the referendum.
- **Output 1.4:** As a result of prolonged displacement in urban areas, livelihood strategies have changed considerably, particularly among the youth. Throughout Sudan, the young have been increasingly drawn to irregular militia activity largely for lack of viable alternative livelihoods. The Small Arms Survey, in its recent reports, has documented a proliferation of small arms traffic and irregular militia recruitment throughout The Three Protocol Areas, including Abyei. The livelihoods component of the project will attempt to reverse this trend through the provision of **vocational training and start-up 'graduation' packages**. The project will also target female-headed households and other vulnerable households to ensure returnees are able to sustain themselves and avoid long-term aid dependency. The design of exact programme activities will depend on a market survey, the eventual formation of small self-help groups and cooperatives, and ultimately be driven by the interests and economic aspirations of the beneficiaries. Initial feedback from potential partners within Abyei suggests interest in carpentry skills, support for establishing small-businesses/shops in the market, masonry, mechanical skills, as well as more traditional agri-support in rural areas—i.e. distribution of seed and tools, communal grinding machines, vegetable gardening, fisheries, etc. The activities will have a specific component to empower women by involving them in non-traditional livelihood activities.
- **Output 1.5:** To address overstretched services and prevent the development of push factors within communities, UNHCR anticipates the need for **quick-impact projects to provide additional classrooms, excavate water points, and rehabilitate communal infrastructure**. These needs will emerge through community consultations once households have reestablished themselves in areas of destination and this project. The heavily politicized pre-referendum context will make it difficult to **address peaceful coexistence** between Misserya and Dinka Ngok communities prior to a political settlement on the future of Abyei. UNHCR anticipates, however, that an eventual political settlement might pave the way for much needed outreach and confidence-building among the communities through demand-driven small scale assistance projects benefiting both sides.



### 3. Catalytic Effect

The simultaneous arrival of some 35,000 returnees, representing nearly one-third of Abyei's total population, on the eve of the N/S referendum carries it with it the potential to stretch already exhausted absorption capacity to the breaking point and, if poorly managed, contribute to area instability. A well-managed reinsertion process, on the other hand, could minimize the trauma of return, pre-empt push factors from within the community, create economic space for sustainable reintegration, and lay the groundwork for post-referendum outreach to Messirya communities that would foster peaceful co-existence and the re-establishment of mutual economic interdependence between the groups.

### **COMPONENT 3: Logical Framework (including implementation strategy)**

#### 1. Sustainability strategy

The overriding objective of the proposed project is to provide targeted reintegration assistance to recent return households that will enable them to quickly reestablish themselves, avoid long-term aid dependency through self-reliance economic activities, address assistance gaps in accordance with local capacity, and mitigate resentments among sedentary and pastoralist communities through their eventual inclusion in assistance efforts. The success of the project will require the full participation of the relevant line ministries, extensive engagement with community-based organizations, and the participation and ownership of communities, particularly in identifying priority areas for QIPs interventions.

#### 2. Logical Framework *Please see attached.*

### **COMPONENT 4: Budget**

PBE PROJECT BUDGET	
CATEGORIES	AMOUNT
1. Emergency NFI packages (4000 HHs)	320,000
2. Transitional Shelter Kits (500 HHs)	400,000
3. Livelihoods (vocational training, start-up kits, provision of agri-inputs, TBD)	650,000
4. Training and Workshops on legal aid, native administration and traditional dispute resolutions mechanisms	100,000
5. Community-based rehabilitation projects (TBD)	400,000
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	<b>\$1,870,000</b>
Indirect Support Costs	130,900
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,000,900</b>

### **COMPONENT 5: Management Arrangements**

#### 1. Project implementation and supervision arrangements

The project will be directly managed by the recently-established UNHCR Field Office in Abyei. Several aspects of the project will be implemented by NGO partners to be identified, however at least one longstanding UNHCR partner, Save the Children, has local expertise in the project areas and has the required implementation capacity. Community-based organizations, likely under the umbrella of an international NGO, are expected to play a key role in community mobilization and identification of demand-driven quick-impact projects, the identification of property disputes and dissemination of information on land tenure issues and other legal issues such as citizenship and documentation, and identifying vulnerable households from the longstanding population for inclusion in individual shelter and assistance efforts.

UNHCR will assume full responsibility for all PBSO reporting requirements and will provide regular oversight of all project implementation. Furthermore, UNHCR's expertise in durable solutions and prevention of statelessness (the Messirya are among the groups most likely at risk of statelessness in the event of state secession) will ensure that the project objectives are implemented in accordance with established protection principles and target the most vulnerable, despite the volatility and politicization of the current context.

## **2. Coordination arrangements**

UNHCR is the nation-wide lead on protection among humanitarian agencies in Sudan and chair of the protection cluster/sector, which will directly support and provide technical guidance during the implementation of the proposed activities. Furthermore, UNHCR, in collaboration with IOM and government officials, plays a key role in the monitoring of voluntary North-South returns, ensuring that all movements are carried out in conditions of safety and dignity, reintegration needs are met on in areas of destination, and that freedom of choice is preserved in decisions regarding permanent settlement.

The activities proposed are varied and will require the participation and full engagement of the Abyei Area Administration and established line ministries to ensure the sustainability of quick impact projects. UNHCR, in collaboration with implementing partners and mandated agencies, will ensure that the Administration and local communities have full ownership of all project interventions.

## **COMPONENT 6: Monitoring and evaluation**

UNHCR will be responsible for submitting the quarterly updates on project progress including financial data as well as final project progress report (both narrative and financial), summarizing all the outputs to the UN Country Team and PBSO. The financial reporting will capture the quantitative indicators for many of the project interventions (i.e. no of HHs assisted with shelter kits, no. of classrooms constructed, no of workshops, etc), but more qualitative data is desirable in several areas.

UNHCR will prioritize monitoring/evaluation in two key areas—the transitional shelter project and the provision of legal advice/support regarding land tenure issues, citizenship and documentation issues—possibly via external evaluation. UNHCR is piloting the transitional shelter programme in other areas of the South, in conjunction with a renewed effort to focus international attention on sustainable reintegration in urban and peri-urban contexts, and lessons learned in the early stage of implementation are essential. Likewise, it is assumed that longstanding IDP caseloads from Khartoum may face particular obstacles in re-accessing traditional lands—as a result of their prolonged absence and subsequent alienation from the land, frayed kinship ties and possible suspicions regarding loyalties, and interim land occupation by



resettled groups. The incorporation of new strategies and lessons learned are important in understanding changing return trends and dynamics in rural areas.

#### **COMPONENT 7: Analysis of risks and assumptions**

- **Possibility of renewed conflict:** In a worst-case scenario, the inter-agency humanitarian contingency plan anticipates the displacement of the entire population of Abyei, likely to Agok. The risk of conflict is real, perhaps even likely, and would considerably affect the implementation of this project. Many longtime observers of the conflict, including a recent report by the International Crisis Group, noted the tendency within Sudan for 11<sup>th</sup> hour grand political bargains and cited the possibility for a last minute compromise on Abyei. However, as it now stands, the future of Abyei and post-referendum N/S citizenship issues have remained deadlocked.
- **Weak implementing partner capacity:** There are few available NGO partners operating in Abyei and UN agencies have routinely cited the lack of implementation capacity as an obstacle to programming in the Area. The existing international NGOs have to date focused primarily on emergency relief interventions and care-and-maintenance support for the remaining displaced population in Agok. Local civil society is weak and the AAA lacks capacity to provide sufficient protection and extend social services to its population. The proposed activities will require a shift from emergency relief to programmatic strategies that encourage self-reliance. However, discussions with potential implementing partners on different aspects of this proposal have been encouraging and there appears to be considerable buy-in.
- **Appearance of political favoritism:** A key complaint among Misserya has been that the international community has favored the Dinka Ngok and prioritized their needs over those of the pastoralists. The proposed projects, if not carefully implemented in a 'do no harm' approach, could add to these perceptions, deepen resentments and foment further conflict. Therefore, UNHCR has included Quick-Impact projects, which could also be used to manage perceptions of favoritism among Misserya, as well as to lessen resentments of Dinka Ngok inhabitants who might benefit in lesser numbers from individual assistance targeting new returns. While the political situation in the short term will make project interventions targeting peaceful coexistence between the two communities impossible at the moment, UNHCR will monitor the post-referendum situation for opportunities to engage with both sides in projects of common interest and benefits.

#### **Management of Risks:**

The strong possibility of renewed conflict in Abyei represents the greatest risk to the proposed project interventions. The immediate needs of returnees and the imperative to demonstrate a 'peace dividend' in the midst of a complex political crisis will need to be carefully balanced with the timing of making smart investments. Therefore, UNHCR is taking a number of steps to address the management of risks, including:

- Differentiating immediate humanitarian/reintegration needs against the longer-term peace-building interventions. Essentially, the project will closely monitor larger political developments to ensure wise investments during the project cycle: efforts will be made to support the peace process at local level, but balance this against the risks of renewed

conflict and destruction of property. Therefore, the NFI distributions will proceed in the immediate term, as will the transitional shelter activities. Regarding the latter, shelter designs under consideration are taking into account the possible relocation needs of return households (i.e. construction inputs take into account possible future displacement and can easily be deconstructed and moved). During the 2008 crisis, much of the movement of IDPs to Agok was pre-emptive, and many households packed belongings.

- The 'software' component of community mobilization, assessment for the legal aid, livelihood interventions, and QIPs will be preceded by a conflict mapping exercise to appropriately address different risks across communities, look for openings to pre-empt conflict among Dinka Ngok and Misseriya communities and address the potential for inter-communal conflict in areas of high-return density.
- The 'Kadugli Agreement' of 19 January in which high level representatives of the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya communities agreed on compensation issues and the management of the upcoming migration season will be a critical area of intervention. To work effectively, the agreement will need the buy-in of local communities along migration routes, providing a clear entry point and opportunity for this project to create momentum for peace under objective 1.3. While the activities are intended to ensure that small land disputes are handled fairly, it is also anticipated that the conflict-prevention component will include opportunities to ensure dialogue and peace during the annual migration.



## PBSO Abyei

<b>Project Budget</b>	
<b>Cost breakdown</b>	<b>Amount (USD)</b>
<b>A. Supplies/commodities/equipment/transport</b> <i>(please itemize expendable operational inputs (e.g. quantity of food, medical supplies etc and asset purchases))</i>	<b>320,000</b>
NFIs Emergency Package for 4,000 Households	320,000
<b>B. Personnel (staff, consultants, travel)</b> <i>(please itemize travel costs, salaries and entitlements of UN staff and consultants)</i>	<b>0</b>
<b>C. Training of counterparts</b>	<b>100,000</b>
Training and Workshop on legal Aid, native Administration and traditional dispute resolutions mechanisms.	100,000
<b>D. Contracts</b> <i>(please list and provide general cost breakdown for each implementing partner)</i>	<b>1,450,000</b>
<u>Mercy Corps Scotland</u>	
- Community Based Rehabilitation Projects	400,000
- Transitional Shelter Kits for 500 Households	400,000
- Livelihood (vocational trainings, start up kits, provision of agri-inputs, TBD))	650,000
<b>E. Other Direct costs</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Subtotal project requirements</b>	<b>1,870,000</b>
<b>Indirect program support costs (PSC)</b> <i>(not to exceed 7% of subtotal project costs)</i>	
- 7% indirect cost	<b>130,900</b>
<b>Total project cost</b>	<b>2,000,900</b>

