UNDG ITF Project evaluation of Project 51104 – Support to the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency 2006 - 2008

5 November 2010

This evaluation was undertaken by Tim Lardner, external consultant to UNOPS, under Individual Contractor Agreement 2010/IICA-SP/22514 dated 1st September 2010.

The evaluation was undertaken between 13th September and 8th October 2010 and involved six days on location in Amman (4 days of which was completion of the mandatory Security Awareness Induction Training {SAIT} course) and three days on location in Erbil and Dahuk, Iraqi-Kurdistan.

The full terms of reference of the project are attached at Annex A to this document.

1. List of acronyms and abbreviations

AP	Anti-Personnel Mine
AT	Anti-Tank Mine
CROMAC	Croatian Mine Action Centre
DA	Dangerous Area
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOI	Expression of Interest
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GDMA	General Directorate of Mine Action
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
IKMAA	Iraqi-Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (formerly Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre {IKMAC})
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMCO	Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IQOC	Iraq Operations Centre
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
MoA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority

NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OFFP	Oil for Food Programme
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
RFP	Request for Proposal
RMACC	Regional Mine Action Coordination Centre
SC	Steering Committee
SHA	Suspect Hazardous Areas
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Services Agency (now MSB)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOPS NAO	United Nations Office for Project Services North America Office
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VA	Victim Assistance

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3. Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the UNOPS executed project number 511204 – Support to Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency. The evaluation was carried out in September and October 2010 by UNOPS contractor, Tim Lardner.

In 2005, UNOPS prepared a project document to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre (IKMAC) for three core elements – Human Resource Development, the provision of mechanical demining equipment and Mine Detection Dog (MDD) training. Funding was identified within the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund (ITF) originating from the government of South Korea. The original start date was scheduled for December 2005 and the funds allocated were $2.9 million.

A project manager for UNOPS was only appointed in December 2006, at which time the project began to be executed. Several changes were made during the early stages, although the core goal did not change. The final implemented project was implemented with IKMAC (which became an Authority – IKMAA in 2007) until completion in May 2008. The core components of the project were procurement of mechanical equipment; procurement of maintenance equipment for extant demining flail machines; procurement of office and support equipment; procurement of specialised demining equipment (personal protective equipment (PPE), detectors etc); specialised Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training; specialised Information and Operations Management training and funding an official study tour to Croatia for ten core staff.

The mine action sector in Iraqi Kurdistan was already well developed after almost ten years of operations under the Oil for Food Programme (OFFP). IKMAC had been established in 2004, initially under the remit of central government in Baghdad, and consisted of a strong core asset of staff and equipment that had been developed and utilised under the previous programme.

This evaluation was commissioned by UNOPS to be carried out as a summative evaluation to determine what the long term effects for the project for IKMAA have been and was undertaken 28 months on from the closure of the project. The evaluation is intended to be used by RFFI, UNOPS and UNDG as part of a broader ITF project evaluation.

The evaluation was undertaken during the period between 13th September and 8th October 2010 and consisted of a period of office based work, and a field visit to Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Key stakeholders were consulted by phone, email and in person during the course of the field visit.

The evaluation finds that there is a clear need for mine action work to be undertaken and that in broad terms, the overall development goal of "*addressing the needs of Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups affected by landmines and ERW"* **has been achieved** and

UNOPS executed the project efficiently. IKMAAs already well established capacity to manage and implement mine action activities has been bolstered by the project in many areas. This was particularly noticeable in the parts of the project that delivered capacity development training and spare and replacement parts for assets IKMAA was already utilising.

The evaluation, however, finds that the project was designed with limited consultation with the recipient, IKMAA. The evaluation also found that although the project had been executed in a very efficient manner, there remain questions as to the effectiveness of a significant element of the project. Half of the project budget was spent on the procurement of six mechanical demining machines that have had very limited output, and in the case of two, not been utilised at all and as a result, one of the project objectives has **not been achieved**. In hard terms, the project was designed to "*improve the rate of mine clearance*", whereas since the implementation of the project in 2006, IKMAA annual productivity has **decreased** by 30% and costs per square metre have **increased** by 200%. In addition, there was no formal agreement in place that the donated assets should *actually* be used and it is questionable whether IKMAA have utilised all the assets toward essentially humanitarian purposes.

During project execution, the relationship between UNOPS and IKMAA appears to have been very positive and open, but although the training element was received positively, it may have been better directed towards the effective use of mechanical demining assets. In general terms, from an overall perspective, the project was doing things right (efficient) but not always doing the right things (effective).[1]

On the basis of the evaluation, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendation 1: *When equipment has been procured as part of a project, there should be a formal agreement between UNOPS and the recipient that requires the recipient to actively and effectively use the equipment* ***for the purposes for which it was principally intended***

Recommendation 2: *Thorough risk analyses stretching beyond the end date of a UNOPS project should be included in project documents*

Recommendation 3: *Greater involvement of recipient stakeholders in development of project concepts and documents should be undertaken to allow effective implementation of a project*

Recommendation 4: *If major operational assets are procured for a project, specific training package for those assets should be considered to be a core component of the project*

[1] "*Efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right things*." Definition taken from: The Effective Executive: The Definitive Guide to Getting the Right Things Done, Peter F Drucker, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007

Recommendation 5: *There should be clear discussions and an agreed requirement between UNOPS and recipients as to the use to which equipment is put and the definition of humanitarian purposes*

Recommendation 6: *UNOPS should consider more effective post-execution oversight of projects*

4. Introduction

4.1. Background

Iraq is heavily contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is primarily the result of internal conflicts, the 1980 – 1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf war and the ongoing conflict following the 2003 second Gulf war. Between 2004 and 2006, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was undertaken in 13 Governorates of Iraq, including Erbil and Dahuk. This found that Erbil and Dahuk governorates were believed to have 544 mine and UXO affected communities between them. The Landmine Monitor 2009 states that the governorates of "*Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah comprise one of the world's most heavily mine-contaminated areas, particularly along borders with Iran and Turkey and along the Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and former President Saddam Hussein's army*"[2] and goes on to state that in Erbil and Dahuk governorates there were 42 casualties in 2008 alone.

Iraqi Kurdistan is officially considered to be under the remit of the central government, in Baghdad. The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) (renamed the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in 2008), is in the Iraqi capital however in reality, Kurdistan effectively operates as an independent autonomous area, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA – was Centre (IKMAC) during the course of the project) operates as essentially an independent authority under the KRG government.

In 1997 the UN Office for the Iraq Programme (OIP) requested UNOPS to develop and implement a UN Mine Action Programme (UNOPS MAP) under the UN Oil for Food Programme (OFFP) to address the situation of mines and ERW within Iraqi Kurdistan. The resulting programme employed more than 4,500 Iraqi nationals working with manual clearance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) and mechanical demining, and included national integrated teams and manufacturing of locally manufactured demining machines. In addition the programme undertook survey, Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (VA).

Following the invasion by coalition forces in 2003, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1483 directed that UN activities should be handed over to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the Northern Iraq Government (KRG) took over, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre (IKMAC[3]) was established in 2004 to operate initially under the auspices of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) based in Baghdad.

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[2] Landmine Monitor 2009, p 473

[3] The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre (IKMAC) changed its title to the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) in the latter part of 2007. Contract Amendment number 3 dated 12th December 2007 notes this. This document subsequently refers generally to IKMAA but the term is used interchangeably

The UN System, under the auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) developed a UN Strategy for implementing support to Iraq's reconstruction and development. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was designated to serve as the lead UN agency for Mine Action in Iraq (effective 1 January 2004) in conjunction with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). This was predicated on the fact that mines and ERW posed a serious threat to the safety of the civilian population by denying access to valuable resources including agricultural land, grazing land, roads, water sources and residential areas.

The United Nations Development Group/Iraqi Trust Fund (UNDG/ITF) Cluster A is designated for agriculture, environment and natural resources. The project "Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Agency" (project number A7-03 {UNDG ITF project number} {or UNOPS project number 51104}), fell under this. The project also came under the umbrella of the NMAA. The project aimed to increase and improve the existing assets of IKMAA under the ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (now under the Ministry of Environment) in Iraqi-Kurdistan and to address the needs of Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups affected by landmines and other ERW.

The original project document was prepared in early 2005 with an initial intended start date of December of that year. However, as a result of delays caused by recruitment of a project officer, the project only commenced in December 2006 and a formal MOA was signed between UNOPS and IKMAC in January 2007.

4.1.1. Implementation of evaluation

The evaluation was undertaken by Tim Lardner, an individual contractor for UNOPS. The evaluation was undertaken during the period between 13th September and 8th October 2010 and consisted of a period of office based work in Oslo, and a field visit to Jordan and Iraqi-Kurdistan that took the following form:

20-23rd September	Attendance on the obligatory SAIT course in Amman
24-25th September	Interviews with several stakeholders in Amman
26th September	Interviews with stakeholders in Erbil
27th September	Field visit to IKMAA base in Dahuk and 2 field locations to see machinery and equipment provided by project: • Blaven minefield, Dahuk Governorate • Kavle Girsaias minefield, Dahuk Governorate
28th September	Interviews with stakeholders in Erbil

5. Description of the project

The primary aim of the project[4] was to "*strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre to address the needs of Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups affected by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).*" and within the UN Strategic Framework Programme to develop *"A National Mine Action Centre capable of managing the mine action functions of government in all of Iraq[5]".* The project was intended to be undertaken over a period of 12 months.

The key stakeholders in the development and execution of the project were:

- **UNOPS** – as the managing and executing agency under the supervision of UNDG cluster A
- **UNDP** – supported UNOPS throughout the project
- **UNDG ITF** – was the funding source, with the funds originating from the government of South Korea, who specified that they were to be utilised with the area of mine action in Iraqi-Kurdistan
- **IKMAC/A[6]** – was the recipient entity operating on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government
- **NMAA** – was the responsible entity within the Iraqi government

Under the overall development goal of "... *strengthen{ing} the capacity of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre (IKMAC) to address the needs of Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups affected by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)*", the project's immediate objectives were identified in the project document as:

1. **Human resource development.** To strengthen IKMAC human resources in various mine action related fields.
2. **Procurement of Mechanical Demining Equipment.** To increase IKMAC mechanical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical equipment with other demining tools.

[4] As defined in the project document made available to the evaluator.

[5] UNDG-ITF project document, undated and unsigned but believed to be 2005

[6] IKMAC changed its title to IKMAA in 2007

3. **Mine Detection Dog Training.** To continue the existing IKMAC MDD training regime and integrate MDD with other demining assets.

These objectives were to be achieved through a series of outputs including improving the capacity of IKMAA staff, delivery of an amount of mechanical demining equipment and training and integration of 27 MDD's.

Unfortunately, the original project document and budget were unable to be located, and the financial figures quoted in the logical framework (part of the project document) do not correspond to the overall budget. The earliest budget that was available to the evaluator was the budget attached to the minutes of the inception meeting of May 24th 2006.

The initial project document was developed in 2005 with some limited involvement from IKMAC, but it seems essentially in isolation. The project was originally planned to be initiated in October 2005. An inception meeting was held with IKMAC in Amman on 23rd & 24th May 2006 at which a number of variations were agreed but "no substantive changes on the scope of the project (were made) and that the objectives and outputs remained the same[7]".

Due to the lack of a UNOPS project manager throughout 2006, the project was further delayed until the end of the 2006. A project manager took position at the end of 2006, and execution formally began in January 2007, when a MoA was signed between UNOPS and IKMAC. This identified clear responsibilities *during the execution of the project* for both parties (IKMAC & UNOPS).

The key recipient in the project was the IKMAC, who would receive equipment and training in order to allow them to improve their ability to improve clearance rates within the programme and also to manage their project implementation capacity.

Through a series of requests from the recipient (IKMAA) and discussions between UNOPS and IKMAA, the core deliverables of the project were changed but not the overall goal. All of these elements were fully documented and authorised. The major changes were as follows:

- **Information Management and International Standards training.** In January 2007, IKMAA requested that the package of training allocated for its staff for Information Management and International Mine Action Standards training be removed because they saw no necessity for it. In its place, IKMAA requested that specialist EOD level 3 training be introduced. UNOPS agreed to the change and made an arrangement with Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) to undertake this training. This was done at a cost to UNOPS of $10,000 and to SRSA of 535,000SEK (approx $80,000 at

[7] Minutes from inception meeting between UNOPS & IKMAC, dated 23rd & 24th May 2006.

the mid 2007 rate of exchange), which was funded by Sida and outside of the remit of the budget of the project.

- **MDD.** In May 2007, IKMAA requested that UNOPS remove the MDD element within the programme and reallocate the funding ($259,704) to the purchase of spare parts and a maintenance package for its Bozena flail machines (originally purchased by UNOPS under the OFFP and given to IKMAA in the early 2000's). IKMAA believed that the outputs from the continued operation of the Bozena machines would be more significant than the introduction of a larger MDD component into the programme.

- **Mechanical equipment.** The original agreement was for the provision of 3x front end loaders/sifters; 3x excavators; 2x mini-flails; 2x flat bed trucks; six mobile workshops and spare parts for the machines for 12 months. As the project developed and the RFP was answered, it became clear that the allocated funds were insufficient to cover all the equipment requested. As a result, a negotiated change in the contract between UNOPS and Zozic was signed in October 2007, changing the deliverables, *for the same price* to: 3x excavators; nil mini-flails; nil flat bed trucks; three mobile workshops and spare parts for the machines for 12 months. In addition, 2x water trailers were added.

Minor changes:

- **Procurement methodology.** In January 2007, IKMAC requested that the procurement process for the mechanical equipment be changed from the originally planned prequalified procurement. This was agreed by UNOPS and the competitive tendering process was undertaken. In the end, the previously preselected company won the tendering process.

In addition, it is worth noting that the project provided a strong capacity development element through the implementation of a procurement process, overseen by UNOPS, but implemented by IKMAA, for equipment valued at $136,000. This undoubtedly increased the capacity of the procurement section of the IKMAA.

At the end of the project, the following specific deliverables had been provided by UNOPS to IKMAA:

- Information and Operations Management course delivered to eight IKMAA staff in Amman in August 2007

- EOD level 3 training delivered to twelve IKMAA staff in July 2007 in Iraqi Kurdistan

- Mechanical demining equipment costing $1,441,515 procured and delivered to IKMAA between mid 2007 & May 2008 (consisting three front end loaders, three

excavators, four mobile workshops, two water tankers and spare parts for all vehicles for a year)

- Five vehicles procured and delivered to IKMAA in December 2007 (consisting three Toyota Land-Cruiser, one Toyota double cab and one Hyundai Minibus)
- Operational demining equipment procured and delivered to IKMAA throughout the course of 2007
- Office equipment purchase by IKMAA during the course of 2007 (under UNOPS supervision and within the MOA)
- Spare parts for Bozena flails procured and delivered to IKMAA (costing $261,690)
- Official study tour to Croatia funded for 10 IKMAA staff members

In terms of the total project costs, Figure 1 shows the proportion of each element of the project



Figure 1 – Breakdown of overall project costs

6. Evaluation methodology and approach

This review took place in September and October 2010 and was divided into four phases: 1) **Preparatory phase**, 2) **Field work and data collection** in Jordan and Iraq 3) **Data analysis**, and 4) **Reporting**.

In the **preparatory** phase**,** background material was gathered from stakeholders and an initial analysis undertaken. A number of telephone interviews were conducted and detailed planning (including security arrangements) was undertaken for the field mission to Jordan and Iraq. A desk study was also completed, based upon the available material. The **field work and data collection** phase comprised a series of interviews with key stakeholders in Amman, Erbil and Dahuk. The **data analysis** phase comprised analysis and review of the data collected during phase 3. In addition, further interviews were held with stakeholders as follow up, as well as with those not available earlier.

This evaluation has assessed the relevance and usefulness of the project against the standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, Sustainability, Impact, Effectiveness and Efficiency.

A mix of evaluation techniques was applied to meet the need for a **quantitative** and **qualitative** assessment. The most important tool was key informant interviews with management and staff of IKMAA and UNOPS who were involved with the project, using semi-structured explorative interviews.

Information was then triangulated by using data available from a variety of sources – most significantly the UNOPS documentation chain. Where important stakeholders could not be met in person, **telephone interviews** were used to obtain information from stakeholders. Some information was also provided by e-mail.

A number of limitations and constraints were imposed on the evaluation. The Director of IKMAA was unavailable during the visit to Iraqi Kurdistan, despite arrangements being made a number of weeks in advance. Some correspondence was subsequently undertaken by email and is attached at Annex D. No-one from the Zozic company (the company who manufactured the machines) was available for discussions, security arrangements prevented access to all IKMAA locations and a visit was only possible to one of the two regional offices (the office in Dahuk was visited, but Soran was not). Two demining sites were visited where project equipment was being utilised – one site where a Bozena flail was being used, and one where the Minelab F3 detectors were in use. As issues emerged during the mission, these were investigated further. The final version of the project document was unavailable and an assumption was made that the available (unsigned and undated, but believed to be 2005) document is the one the project was based upon.

7. Findings

The key data gathering element of the project was undertaken as a combination of face to face interviews in Iraq and Jordan, telephone interviews, email correspondence and a literature review. Triangulation of data was achieved throughout the process – in particular in relation to potentially contentious issues.

In summary, while the project was extremely well implemented, the value of some of the outputs (the majority in financial terms) – particularly in relation to the overall development goal of the project – appears to be very low. Although it was not possible to speak to stakeholders who were involved at the very early stage of the project development, it appears that much of the project was asset-driven rather than needs-driven. In other words, there is a perception that the project was based on a donation by the government of South Korea of around $2.9 million to contribute to mine action in Erbil, rather than a project that was designed because there were obvious specific needs within IKMAA.

7.1. Project execution

The project was originally designed by the UNOPS NAO in coordination with the UNDG ITF. It seems that the early stages of project design were undertaken without significant input from IKMAA and this may have caused some difficulties. Once a project officer was identified and recruited in December 2006, the responsibility and execution of the project was transferred to the UNOPS IQOC which was operating under the umbrella of the UNDG ITF.

Once the project commenced, the documentation chain and the recording of decisions made are impressively detailed and thorough. All documentation was made available and appears to fulfil the requirements of the system. There was significant liaison with the client (IKMAA) through a locally recruited field coordinator, who subsequently was employed by IKMAA. It does seem, however, that liaison before this point was limited and IKMAA's involvement in project design was marginal.

In terms of project implementation, it is difficult to fault the actual implementation and UNOPS and the project officer should take credit for this.

In general terms, the project execution is extremely well documented and processes related to the execution of the programme for the UNOPS side appear to have been undertaken almost faultlessly. Given the difficulty of operating in Iraq (the project officer, who was based in Amman, was only able to visit KRG on only two occasions), the liaison between UNOPS and IKMAA appears to have been excellent during the project execution, although there appears to be some latent resentment within IKMAA at the 6% implementation costs

that UNOPS took from the overall budget, with the unspoken belief that IKMAA could have achieved better results if the resources had been given directly by the government of South Korea to IKMAA rather than through UNOPS. This view is not shared by the evaluation.

Finding 1: *The project execution was very well managed by UNOPS.*

7.2. Project effects

While it is clear that the project was extremely well executed, the broader effects of the project are more difficult to be positive about.

Some of the broader capacity development focused elements of the project appear to have had a positive effect. Verification of the capacity development objective as found in the project document relies purely on internal reporting, training completion reports and financial reports, all of which indicate a positive outcome. The training courses where IKMAA staff were funded to attend were generally seen to have had a positive effect. It appears that the great majority of IKMAA staff who received training are still working for IKMAA indicating that the investment was retained. In addition, all interviewees indicated the positive benefits that such training had given the IKMAA. Figure 2 gives concrete examples of benefits of these benefits.

- Specialist EOD training (level 2 to level 3) was given to twelve staff of IKMAA. All are still working with IKMAA in EOD roles, and six of these are in the process of developing (with a course planned for the Autumn of 2010) an internal training course to be delivered to IKMAA staff.
- Equipment purchased to support the in-place Bozena machines has allowed the machines to continue operating over the last 2 years
- Purchased office equipment has added to an effective internal communication network
- Purchased VHF repeater stations allowed significantly wider safe operating areas for demining assets
- A process of overseeing IKMAA's procurement of $136,000 worth of equipment provided strong framework for capacity development of IKMAA

Figure 2 - Examples of positive effects of the project

It is more difficult however to be positive about other elements of the executed project. The major part of the project was the procurement of a significant amount of capital equipment for IKMAA by UNOPS – some of it mechanical demining equipment and other parts demining support and office and communications equipment. As in the overall project implementation, the procurement process was undertaken extremely well and the overall procurement expenditure of $2,416,490[8] appears to have been well managed and

[8] Listed in final financial report as "Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport".

documented throughout the process. It is however, a major concern that of the six mechanical clearance machines that were purchased, two of them have never been used at all **since purchase**, and the other machines have produced a total of very slightly over 70,000m^2 of land since their arrival almost 2½ years ago. To give some perspective to this, it would be a reasonable planning figure to expect a machine to achieve 2,000m^2/day per machine in most normal operating environments.

One of the core issues appears to be the actual requirement for the recipient – IKMAA – to *actually* utilise the donated equipment in an effective manner. While to all concerned it may have *seemed* a matter of common sense that there is an implicit moral obligation to utilise donated assets, there was no clause in the MoA between UNOPS & IKMAA, nor any other formal agreement requiring that the machines would be actually used. Further, this issue was never considered in any risk analysis undertaken by UNOPS during the design and implementation of the project.

A key objective of the project was to "*increase IKMAC mechanical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical equipment with other demining tools*[9]*"* and this came under the broader approach to "*... Support the NMAA strategic plan to improve efficiency...*[10]*".*

Unfortunately it is also difficult to see that this has been achieved when the data from IKMAA are analysed. Table 1 shows the clearance and cost data from IKMAA for the period between 2005 & 2009. Bearing in mind the fact that that the machines were donated to IKMAA in 2007 (and these costs have not been taken into account in the total programme value shown in the table), it can clearly be seen that while programme costs have steadily increased, so have the average cost per square metre – by around 200% since 2006[11]. In addition, the annual productivity of IKMAA has **reduced** by 30% since the beginning of the project (Figure 3 shows the detail), which is of particular concern given the significant expenditure on assets designed to increase productivity.

Finding 2: *Although the project was well implemented, there remain questions around the broader effects of the mechanical demining machines, which accounted for 50% of the budget*

[9] Project document Immediate objective 2

[10] Project document page 12, 2.2

[11] Based on $/m^2 costs of 3.6 in 2006 and 10.9 in 2009

Finding 3: *The training, capacity development and exchange element of the project appears to have had a good impact on the capacity of IKMAA*

Finding 4: *The key objective to "improve the rate of mine clearance" has not been achieved*

Finding 5: *There was no formal obligation for IKMAA to use the mechanical demining machines*

Finding 6: *IKMAA costs per square metre have increased by 200% since 2005*



Table 1 - Programme costs and clearance costs

These statistics, however, do not show the whole story. Fuel and labour costs have both increased significantly since 2006 and the sites that are being worked on now are those which offer more challenging access problems and as such add significantly to the core costs that IKMAA need to allocate. The following comments were received from the Director of IKMAA:

> "You have mentioned a 140% increase on IKMAA cost per square meter. You seem though to pass rather indifferently by the issue of salary increase in your e-mail. You must not. After a long struggle with the KRG, the latter approved substantial salary increases for IKMAA staff ranging from a minimum of 85% increase to a maximum of 300% increase. This was a real revolution for our staff who considered themselves underpaid proportionally to the rapidly developing local economy. Hence, the salary of the basic deminer immediately jumped from ID 425,000 ($354) to ID 787,500 ($656) and the salary of an IKMAA driver tripled from ID 150,000 ($125) to ID 450,000 ($375). This change happened in July

> 2007. Look back now at your table. You can see a sharp increase between 2005 and 2006 on the one hand and the other years on the other hand. This is entirely due to salary increase.
>
> There is a more general justification for that increase too. As we move forward, the easiest and closest minefields to communities are being cleared and handed over to their owners. The ones that remain are located in remote mountainous area. These minefields are obviously more costly to clear[12]."

It does appear, however, that IKMAA were not fully prepared for an effective integration of such assets into the programme. IKMAA did not request assistance with training on the equipment, but some consideration of the needs should have been made during the project design phase by UNOPS. In addition to the operational preparedness of IKMAA, the evaluator also noted concerns with regard the operational budgeting and cash flow forecasting capacity of IKMAA, which has resulted in machinery standing for many months (and for the equipment in Dahuk, years), without being utilised

> ***Finding 7:*** *IKMAA were not fully prepared for, or assisted with, the operational integration of the mechanical demining equipment both at the operational and planning levels*

There is, however, no system in place to monitor this as the UNOPS project finished in May 2008 – presumably with the assumption that all would be well.

[12] Email from Shirj Barzani dated 2nd October 2010

8. Answered questions/findings

In general terms, with a couple of exceptions, the project appears to have added a significant degree of value to the mine action environment in Iraqi Kurdistan. IKMAA was well established following years of operations under the OFFP and the professional capacity of programme staff was generally well-developed. At the point at which the project was first conceptualised, an established operational programme existed with a good capacity in place, but with ageing equipments and a management who had seen little of the outside demining world because of problems related to Iraqi passport holders obtaining visas during the 1990's and early 2000's. The logic of the project design from the UNOPS perspective was generally strong and sound but it is difficult to ascertain just how much influence IKMAA had on the development of the project.

This evaluation finds that some elements of the project provided value for money. The purchase of office equipment, demining equipment (less the mechanical demining machines) and the support package for the in-place Bozena flail machines was essential to maintain a capacity for IKMAA to operate effectively.

In addition, the courses (EOD and management training) delivered to key staff in IKMAA appear to have offered good value for money, although it is more difficult to quantify this. The EOD level 2 to level 3 course for example, produced 12 qualified level 3 EOD operators, who are still working in IKMAA, six of whom are about to deliver an internal course to increase the EOD capacity of the organisation.

It is more difficult to define the value-added of the demining equipment purchase (around $1.4 million – 49.5% of the total project budget). Of six machines purchased by UNOPS, two have not been utilised at all by IKMAA, and the other two have only cleared a total of very slightly over 70,000m^2 in the three years they have been in place[13] – very roughly the equivalent of a year's worth of production from a manual demining team. The Director of IKMAA explained the remarkably low productivity from the machines in an email, where he stated:

"As to why the area cleared by "UNOPS" machines is "remarkably low":

There is a whole host of reasons:

> The most important reason relates back to finding long term permanent operators for our machines. IKMAA have indeed largely failed in this. Despite the considerable increase in salary levels, mechanical operators continue favoring private work and not public work. The reason is the following:

[13] Figure as at end of August 2010.

> In case you have had the opportunity to visit this Region earlier and particularly before the 2003 war, you will be able to measure the sheer magnitude of the rapid development this Region is witnessing. One consequence of this development is availability of well paid private sector opportunities as opposed to government sector. Mechanical assets are paid not in "months" of work but rather in "hours" of work. The price paid for one hour of work conducted in the construction sector say for an excavator operator is around ID 75,000 in towns (equivalent of around USD 60 but more expensive in remote areas). Such driver will easily earn up to $ 500 in one single day of work without having to deal with explosives. The salary KRG pays for the same operator is ID 950,000 per month (less than $800).
>
> Hopefully though, this issue is on its way to being improved considerably. We have not yet completed the year 2010 but I am convinced the production figures for those assets for this year alone will be equivalent if not superior to all the production of the past years. At the very moment I am sending this e-mail to you, eight new mechanical operators are being trained at our Rawanduz training facility to fill in for those who have left[14]."

While the core concept of the project appears very sound, given the investment in such a significant amount of equipment (the mechanical demining element), it may have been prudent to introduce some oversight of the equipment use past the project completion point or to provide some broader oversight or training to ensure effective use of the investment.

Finding 8: *The project has added value to IKMAA capacity - although not as much as UNOPS believed it would*

8.1. The UN's partnership strategy and its relation to effectiveness in achieving the outcome

The UNs partnership strategy was based on a tight relationship with IKMAA which was formally established through the Memorandum of Agreement (MoA), signed in January 2007 by IKMAA and UNOPS. In addition, the close relationship between a number of key individuals in UNOPS and IKMAA and the effective co-location of the UNOPS field coordinator based in Erbil (the international project officer was often unable to travel to the region because of security constraints) set the ground for what appeared to be an excellent working relationship between the two organisations.

It is very clear that the relationship proved very positive during the implementation of the project. It appears that most of the decisions with regard the change of project elements were undertaken after an open discussion between the two partners. Both partners documented the work extremely well and no discrepancies have been found.

It seems that the project's effectiveness has been supported and encouraged by the positive relationship between the two key partners

[14] Email from Shirj Barzani dated 2nd October 2010

Finding 9: *The relationship between UNOPS and IKMAA during project implementation was very good*

8.2. The UN's strategic positioning and its comparative advantage

The UN's strategic positioning was effectively to undertake a project that positively assisted the Iraqi Kurdistan people with regards to the impact of mines and ERW in the most effective manner. The partnership with a relatively strong and already established government body appears to have been designed to ensure longevity and stability. Although the project document refers to the Iraqi National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) (part of the Ministry of Planning and Development within the central Iraqi government, the NMAA appears to have had zero influence on the project). It seems that the NMAA was mentioned in the project document purely to allow political acceptability within the Iraqi context.

This positioning, given UNOPS' previous involvement with IKMAA under OFFP made absolute sense and, given the knowledge in place, should have assured a high relative efficiency of the project, thus giving a significant comparative advantage. That comparative advantage allowed for effective mobilisation of resources with an overhead cost of 5.7% and allowed for transparency and bringing neutral technical skills to the project. Although this advantage is generally more noticeable when implementing with government agencies where capacity is low – and this was not necessarily the case in IKMAA at the time – there is no doubt that UNOPS did bring an element of experience and support to this project and gave "value added". As an example, it is likely that UNOPS had significantly stronger negotiating power than a smaller organisation – the initial quote of $1,654,735 from Zozic in the bid was negotiated down to $1,441,515, a 12% reduction. In addition, it is noteworthy that the project officer was able to mobilise significant resources beyond the core funds in the form of "no-cost" (to the project) support from SRSA and several mine action programmes.

Finding 10: *The UN brought significant value to the project and was well positioned to implement*

8.3. Cross-cutting issues applicable to the project/ programme

The project has had some impact on cross-cutting issues. In general terms, the positive development of IKMAA and the implementation of mine action projects in Iraqi Kurdistan have been beneficial for the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. The project was targeted at supporting the needs of vulnerable and marginalised groups and, to a limited degree, it has achieved this, although the more recent focus of IKMAA on supporting the commercial, and to a lesser degree, developmental sectors may have detracted from the focus on "pure" humanitarian support as UNOPS saw it. Mine Action supports women and men, boys and girls. IKMAA does have a gender focus within its MRE work and the project's end results – cleared and safe land – benefits the whole population and gives a safer and more secure

environment in which to live, thus improving the quality of life. The project has also allowed IKMAA to maintain employment opportunities, although it does seem that this has not been a major impact.

Finding 11: *The project has contributed to broader cross-cutting issues in Iraqi Kurdistan*

9. Problems and needs

It is clear from the current understanding of the degree of contamination (and the understanding of the problem back in 2005), that there is a significant mine and ERW problem in Iraqi Kurdistan, and specifically within the two provinces that IKMAA operates. The OFFP established a strong operational capacity within the IKMAA area of operations and at the time of initial project development, IKMAA was operating well, and at the end of 2005, employed nearly 800 operations staff in 61 mine action teams (having been reformed from the Regional Mine Action Centre North at the end of 2004 utilising essentially OFFP assets and trained staff). The extant situation in early 2005 essentially seemed to be that of a reasonably well functioning organisation, but with operational assets (across the whole range – office equipment, vehicles, demining equipment and PPE) that were reaching the end of their serviceable life.

It was difficult to ascertain the degree of involvement of the national entity (IKMAA) during the early design and development stage as the corporate memory of UNOPS was no longer available. However, the perception of IKMAA is that there was very little involvement during the early stages of project design. It appears that the first real involvement of IKMAA began during the inception meeting held in Amman in May 2006. It was at this meeting that IKMAA identified some of the difficulties they had with the project design as it initially stood. The discussions between IKMAA and UNOPS rapidly identified areas of concern and immediately rectified the issues – for example, the removal of the MDD capacity and replacement with Bozena spare parts is an excellent example of IKMAA expressing their requirements and UNOPS addressing the needs quickly and responsively.

Although the mine and ERW problem in Iraqi Kurdistan was (and still is) significant and the only capacity in Erbil and Dahuk at the time was within IKMAA, there was still a feeling that the design of the project to some degree was asset-driven, although there were also clearly some needs as well based on a thorough problems analysis. However, the project design and logical framework clearly identify those areas where IKMAA needed support. The initial logical framework clearly lays out the three immediate objectives and gives a clear series of indicators and verification methodologies. During the course of the project, two of the three original immediate objectives remained the same, while the immediate objective to undertake MDD Training was removed in January 2007, changing the objective to the procurement of other demining equipment (Bozena spare parts).

Although the measurable indicators identified in the logical framework are clear, it does not seem that they have been used as part of any project monitoring – Indeed, it seems that monitoring was tightly monitored **during** the project, but as soon as it closed down, no further consideration was given. This has led to a situation where assets that used 50% of the project budget were either un- or under- utilised.

The analysis of risks and assumptions undertaken in the project document appears sound but has one major omission, in that there was no consideration of whether the assets procured for IKMAA would actually be used. Linked to this, there was no real consideration of a monitoring and evaluation element of the project, such that as soon as the project was closed in May 2008, there was no further oversight (until this evaluation) of any of the project deliverables.

Finding 12: *IKMAA involvement at the design stage of the project was very limited*

Finding 13: *There is a clear need for mine action activities in Iraqi Kurdistan*

Finding 14: *There is a perception that the project design was asset-driven rather than needs driven*

Finding 15: *50% of the total project funds are not being utilised to their full potential*

9.1. Effectiveness

In broad terms, effectiveness is about "*doing the right job*". The core deliverables of the project were delivered in an effective manner – on time and on budget. The quality of day-to-day management of the project was excellent and implementation was clearly managed and processed throughout the project.

In terms of the transformation of resources into outputs, some of the project has been executed effectively. The procurement of mechanical demining machines was executed in a clear and transparent manner. There were several steps along the way:

- The Project document indicated a pre-selected manufacturer
- At the inception meeting held in May 2006, IKMAA requested an open tender process
- The change was supported by UNOPS and formally approved in early 2007
- An EOI and subsequently an RFP was issued in January 2007
- A contract was signed with Zozic (the only qualifying bidder) in June 2007
- An amendment was made to the contract altering the deliverables in October 2007
- The final pieces of equipment was delivered in March 2008

The transformation of deliverables to the implementation of goals and objectives was also generally achieved well for some of the project. Responsibilities were shared well between stakeholders and IKMAA and UNOPS worked well together in order to achieve the goals.

Unfortunately, with regard the mechanical demining machines, although the resources were transferred to deliverables with great efficiency, the deliverables did not contribute significantly to project goals and objectives and an output of 70,000m^2 in total is a poor result for such a large investment.

Although the core development goal was achieved to some degree, it seems that some of the outputs from the project could have had greater impact. In terms of the "hard" deliverables, the project excelled. Aside from the implementation delay caused by the fact that a project officer could not be hired until 12 months after the planned start date, the project was implemented on time and on budget; changes that were made (after vigorous discussions with IKMAA) were done rapidly, clearly and with a transparent decision trail available for scrutiny; equipment that was purchased through the tendering process was delivered on time and fulfilled the specification.

The initial specific objectives agreed were:

1. **Human resource development.** To strengthen IKMAC human resources in various mine action related fields.
2. **Procurement of Mechanical Demining Equipment.** To increase IKMAC mechanical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical equipment with other demining tools.
3. **Mine Detection Dog Training.** To continue the existing IKMAC MDD training regime and integrate MDD with other demining assets.

Objective three was subsequently removed and not replaced. Although it is not possible to see (because a copy of the complete final project document and budget has not been made available to the evaluator), it is assumed that the procurement of other demining and office equipment is considered to be under specific objective 2.

It is clear that the objectives under the heading **Human Resource Management** have been achieved. This can be broken down into:

- Information Management course delivered to eight IKMAA staff in August 2007
- EOD level 3 training delivered to twelve IKMAA staff in July 2007
- Official study tour to Croatia funded for 10 IKMAA staff members

The current management capacity of IKMAA is strong and these three elements have undoubtedly increased the capacity of IKMAA to manage a major programme. As far as could be ascertained, all capacity that was trained, or given external exposure with the official study tour to Croatia, is still within the organisation and this has continued to add to the impact that the project had.

The risk factors identified in the project document described problems getting sufficient space on training courses, availability of international advisors and the security situation as factors. However, it did not recognise the possibility that IKMAA may not wish to utilise the equipment invested in as a risk factor – something that should perhaps have been considered earlier.

It is not clear that the objectives under the heading **Procurement of Mechanical Demining Equipment** have been achieved. This can be broken down into two separate elements:

- ***Procurement of other equipment*** *(including office equipment, demining equipment and spare parts for Bozena machines).*

The equipment provided as part of this project appears to have had significant positive effect within IKMAA, providing a much needed boost to the life of machinery in the field, deminer equipment, and office and communications equipment.

- ***Procurement of mechanical demining equipment*** *from Zozic company*

The equipment provided under this element is a much greater concern. As the project progressed, the requirements were adjusted as a result of discussions and involvement of IKMAA. All of these activities were undertaken in a transparent and effective manner. In the end, six demining machines were delivered to IKMAA as part of the project. Unfortunately, two of these have never been used since delivery, and the other four machines have cleared a total (to end August 2010) of 70,000m^2 – a very low figure.

> ***Finding 16:*** *Transforming deliverables to goals and outputs was not completely successful*
>
> ***Finding 17:*** *The procurement of spare parts, office and communications equipment and demining equipment added longevity and value to IKMAA*
>
> ***Finding 18:*** *The Human Resources development element of the project was successful*

It should also be noted that the effectiveness of the project was bolstered by the contacts and negotiating strategy that the project manger brought. Significant resources were mobilised for the project at effectively no cost. These included the EOD training given at virtually no cost by SRSA, and the provision of the information management training course in Amman where significant resources were again mobilised at no cost to the project.

9.2. Efficiency

In broad terms, efficiency is about "*doing the job right*". All in all, the project was extremely well implemented, involving all stakeholders and maintaining a high quality monitoring system during implementation. The quality of the equipment was high (although the equipment was reconditioned, it appears to be performing well and no concerns {aside from the Director of IKMAA – see Annex D} were expressed from the IKMAA staff) and timelines were fully respected. It is clear that the project was well and effectively executed and some elements of the project have had a solid effect on IKMAA and reach toward the goal of strengthening the capacity of IKMAA to address the needs of the Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups.

The implementation of the project was achieved in an excellent manner, with the project officer maintaining momentum, coordinating with the key partner, IKMAA, and remaining flexible as the situation changed. It appears to the evaluator that all administrative procedures were followed and documented and any problems that arose were dealt with quickly and efficiently. During the early implementation phase, UNOPS was very responsive to the requirements of IKMAA and responded with rapid changes of project design, while still maintaining focus on the core deliverable development goal of addressing the needs of the Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups.

Finding 19: *Transforming resources to deliverables was undertaken with great efficiency*

Finding 20: *The procurement of mechanical demining equipment was executed well*

Finding 21: *Aside from the 12 month delay caused by UNOPS staffing issues, the project was executed on time and on budget*

9.3. Impact

Evidence points toward the overall goal, as well as one of the immediate objectives of the project as being achieved, but the evaluation has major concerns about the impact that the project has had on the immediate objective 2 - "... *to increase IKMAC technical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical equipment with other demining tools*".

Looking at the productivity figures from IKMAA (Figure 3), the total area cleared annually has steadily decreased by 30% since the beginning of the project, whereas the average cost per square metre (Figure 4) has increased from $4.25 to 2009's figure of $10.9.



Figure 3 - Total productivity of IKMAA 2005-2009

Although such figures are not completely indicative of the value of a demining programme, and there are a number of mitigating factors with IKMAA[15], the declining productivity and the increasing costs indicate that the immediate objective of "*increasing IKMAA mechanical capacity **in order to improve the rate of mine clearance***" has **not** been achieved. Discussions with IKMAA regarding these figures provided a number of explanations, but raised further concerns. Increasing operating costs undoubtedly contribute to output costs, but one of the reasons cited for failing to use these items of equipment efficiently was the requirement for IKMAA to change their taskings rapidly due to commercial projects emerging rapidly. This evaluation has serious concerns that equipment donated for humanitarian purposes is not being used for the purposes for which they were intended to the imperative of rapid commercial tasking mentioned above[16].

Finding 22: *IKMAAs involvement in commercial activities, while utilising assets donated for humanitarian purposes causes some concern*

[15] In mid 2007, salaries in IKMAA increased substantially by between 85% & 300%, fuel costs rose substantially and the easily accessible tasks had been completed.

[16] It should be noted that commercial projects DO bring in funding to IKMAA. 90% of fees are passed on to the government of KRG and 10% is passed directly to IKMAA staff as "bonus" payments.

In discussions with the Director of IKMAA, the following response was received with regards this issue:

> "Finally, it seems that with all the experience you have in this business, you are also sort of blaming IKMAA for having deployed the machines in support of the development sector. Oil industry that you have mentioned in your e-mail is actually only one of the development areas IKMAA supports; we have also used the machines to support construction of roads and bridges, high tension electricity transmission towers, GSM communications towers, asphalt factories, agricultural projects etc.
>
> Here, you must fully appreciate that we are a government Agency and not a private company. According to Iraqi law, for a government entity to be granted the status of an Agency, that government entity must generate revenues for the government. The KRG provides funds for our agency every year but a percentage of IKMAA budget is generated by IKMAA itself.
>
> More precisely, when we sign a contract with say an oil company, in accordance with the approval obtained from the KRG Council of Ministers, 90% of the revenue is returned to the Treasury at the Ministry of Finance and 10% of it is distributed among IKMAA staff participating at the project to cover their extra hours and days (Commercial projects are different from humanitarian projects in that companies always push for faster results and our staff have to work six to seven days a week when standard humanitarian work here is five days a week in addition to longer working hours per day in the commercial sector)
>
> As for the 90% that goes back to the Ministry of Finance, the KRG will use this money to provide funds to IKMAA for the following year and therefore the revenue gained from the commercial projects returns to IKMAA again for implementing humanitarian projects. Now, if you have a problem with commercial projects funding humanitarian projects, I am afraid I cannot help you with that[17]."



Figure 4 - IKMAA cost per square metre 2005-2009

[17] Email from Shirj Barzani dated 2nd October 2010

Further, it is a **major failing** that two of the six machines (at a cost of $1,441,515 – 50% of the total project budget) donated have not been utilised at all since their purchase and arrival at IKMAA in May 2008. The fact that there was no consideration of this eventuality on the part of UNOPS causes some concern. In addition, because the project finished in the same month the machines were delivered to IKMAA, there was no methodology in place for monitoring any effective implementation.

Aside from the issue discussed above, the remaining part of the budget appears to have a greater degree of impact:

- Information Management course delivered to eight IKMAA staff in August 2007
- EOD level 3 training delivered to twelve IKMAA staff in July 2007
- Official study tour to Croatia funded for 10 IKMAA staff members
- Five vehicles procured and delivered to IKMAA in December 2007
- Operational demining equipment procured and delivered to IKMAA ~~in~~ throughout the course of 2007
- Office equipment purchase by IKMAA during the course of 2007 (under UNOPS supervision and the MOA)
- Spare parts for Bozena flails procured and delivered to IKMAA
- Official study tour to Croatia funded for 10 IKMAA staff members

All staff trained on the courses above and those exposed to Croatian experience and knowledge are still within IKMAA and add to the strong management capacity of the organisation, and the equipment purchased is still in use and supporting IKMAA field activities.

Finding 23: *The overall goal of the project has been achieved*

Finding 24: *The immediate objective targeting increased productivity has **not** been achieved*

Finding 25: *Average costs per square metre have increased by 200% since the implementation of the project and overall productivity has decreased by 30%*

Finding 26: *The mechanical demining machines have cleared a total of 70,000m^2 between their introduction and the end of August 2010*

Finding 27: *Training courses, exchange activities and spare parts purchases have had a good impact on IKMAA capacity*

Finding 28: *The risk analysis had not considered the possibility of machines not being utilised, or being underutilised*

9.4. Sustainability

Essentially, the sustainability outputs can be divided into two elements: those activities and purchases that are NOT related to the purchase and delivery of mechanical demining machines, and those that are.

With regard the mechanical demining equipment, there is undoubtedly significant potential for sustainability, but as it stands at the moment, 50% of the project budget has not been utilised to anywhere near its potential, nor has it created any significant contribution to the project goal and objectives. This has not been the case and there are no indications that IKMAA see this as a major concern. However, eight machine operators are currently being trained and it is hoped that this will assist with an improved productivity and efficiency rate within the programme's mechanical clearance component. It may have been prudent for the project to have considered providing a training element to go with such a major purchase of specialist equipment.

In broader terms, however, the project involved stakeholders (primarily IKMAA) throughout the whole process and were very responsive to their needs and requests. Although for the duration of the project, there was no international presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, the national field coordinator, together with the project officer who was based in Amman, provided an excellent liaison between UNOPS, IKMAA and latterly the machine manufacturer, Zozic. In addition, IKMAA management staff were very well prepared, educated and trained for the utilisation of all assets (with the exception of the mechanical machines) provided under the project. As a specific case, the provision of spare parts for the Bozena machines has allowed a further 2-3 years of productive work.

The equipment provided to IKMAA should, in theory, fit the needs of IKMAA. The demining equipment purchased, as well as the office equipment, vehicles and Bozena spare parts have provided a long term sustainability boost, whereas the mechanical demining machines, although with potential for significant benefits, seem to have added little to the overall capacity.

From a technical perspective, it is clear that the machinery provided under the project has the potential to increase productivity significantly.

Finding 29: *Stakeholder involvement, past the initial project design was strong and supported sustainability*

Finding 30: *The **potential** for the mechanical demining machines to contribute to goals and objectives is significant, but still needs further development*

Finding 31: *A major element of the project budget was spent on assets without providing any specific technical training for the assets*

10. Conclusions and recommendations

This report has identified one major shortcoming of the project, but the remainder of the project has generally had a positive impact on the capacity of IKMAA and a concomitant effect on the population of Iraqi Kurdistan.

10.1. Conclusions

Finding 1: *The project execution was very well managed by UNOPS.*

Finding 2: *Although the project was well implemented, there remain questions around the broader effects of the mechanical demining machines, which accounted for 50% of the budget*

Finding 3: *The training and exchange element of the project appears to have had a good impact on the capacity of IKMAA*

Finding 4: *The key objective to "improve the rate of mine clearance" has not been achieved*

Finding 5: *There was no formal obligation for IKMAA to use the mechanical demining machines*

Finding 6: *IKMAA costs per square metre have increased by 200% since 2005*

Finding 7: *IKMAA were not fully prepared for, or assisted with, the operational integration of the mechanical demining equipment*

Finding 8: *The project has added value to IKMAA capacity - although not as much as UNOPS believed it would*

Finding 9: *The relationship between UNOPS and IKMAA during project implementation was very good*

Finding 10: *The UN brought value to the project and was well positioned to implement*

Finding 11: *The project has contributed to broader cross-cutting issues in Iraqi Kurdistan*

Finding 12: *IKMAA involvement at the design stage of the project was very limited*

Finding 13: *There is a clear need for mine action activities in Iraqi Kurdistan*

Finding 14: *There is a perception that the project design was asset-driven rather than needs driven*

Finding 15: *50% of the total project funds are not being utilised to their full potential*

Finding 16: *Transforming deliverables to goals and outputs was not completely successful*

Finding 17: *The procurement of spare parts, office and communications equipment and demining equipment added longevity and value to IKMAA*

Finding 18: *The Human Resources development element of the project was successful*

Finding 19: *Transforming resources to deliverables was undertaken with great efficiency*

Finding 20: *The procurement of mechanical demining equipment was executed well*

Finding 21: *Aside from the 12 month delay caused by UNOPS staffing issues, the project was executed on time and on budget*

Finding 22: *IKMAAs involvement in commercial activities, while utilising assets donated for humanitarian purposes causes some concern*

Finding 23: *The overall goal of the project has been achieved*

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Finding 30: *The **potential** for the mechanical demining machines to contribute to goals and objectives is significant, but still needs further development*

Finding 31: *A major element of the project budget was spent on assets without providing any specific technical training for the assets*

10.2. Recommendations

Based on the analysis undertaken and the findings identified in section 10.1, the following recommendations are made for consideration when executing similar projects.

Recommendation 1: *When equipment has been procured as part of a project, there should be a formal agreement between UNOPS and the recipient that requires the recipient to actively and effectively use the equipment **for the purposes for which it was principally intended***

Recommendation 2: *Thorough risk analyses stretching beyond the end date of a UNOPS project should be included in project documents*

Recommendation 3: *Greater involvement of recipient stakeholders in development of project concepts and documents should be undertaken to allow effective implementation of a project*

Recommendation 4: *If major operational assets are procured for a project, specific training package for*

those assets should be considered to be a core component of the project

Recommendation 5: *There should be clear discussions and an agreed requirement between UNOPS and recipients as to the use to which equipment is put and the definition of humanitarian purposes*

Recommendation 6: *UNOPS should consider more effective post-execution oversight of projects*

Annex A - The Terms of Reference of the evaluation

UNDG ITF Project Evaluation of Project 51104

Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Agency

Terms of Reference with guidance for the project evaluation

1. Introduction and context

1.1 Introduction to the project within the social, political and economic context of Iraq

The UN System, under the auspices of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) developed a UN Strategy for the support to Iraq's reconstruction and development. United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) was designated to serve as the lead UN agency for Cluster 7, Mine Action in Iraq (effective 1 January 2004) with participation by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in the same cluster. This cluster is addressing the problem of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination throughout Iraq. ERW poses a serious threat to the safety of the civilian population by denying access to valuable resources including agricultural land, grazing land, roads, water sources and residential areas.

The three northern governates of Iraq comprised of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulamaniyah remain one of the most serious landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affected regions in the world. Landmines remaining from numerous internal and external conflicts are effecting the population and are a major hindrance to resumption of normal livelihood activities. In late 1997 the Office for the Iraq Programme (OIP) requested UNOPS to implement the UN Mine Action programme (UNOPS MAP) under the UN Food for Oil Programme (OFFP) to address the situation. The resulting programme employed more than 4,500 Iraqi nationals working with manual clearance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), marking, Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) and mechanical demining, including indigenous integrated teams and manufacturing of indigenous demining machines. In addition the programme undertook survey Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA).

Following the invasion by coalition forces in 2003 the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1483 directed that UN activities should be handed over to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the Northern Iraq Government (KRG) took over, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Centre (IKMAC[18]) was established to operate under the auspices of the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) based in Baghdad.

United Nations Development Group/Iraqi Trust Fund (UNDG/ITF) Cluster A is designated for agriculture, environment and natural resources. The project with the title "*Support to the Iraq-Kurdistan Mine Action Agency*" (project number A7-03 (UNDG ITF project number) (or UNOPS project number 51104)), fell under cluster A. The project was also under the umbrella of the NMAA. The project was aiming to increase and improve the existing assets of the indigenous IKMAA under the ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (now under the Ministry of Environment in Baghdad) in Northern Iraq and to address the needs of the Iraqi Kurdistan communities and vulnerable groups affected by landmines and other ERW.

1.2 Description of the project

[18] Now known as IKMAA.

The project was managed by an International Project Manager who was based in Amman, Jordan during the duration of the project. The Project Manager was supported by a National Field Coordinator based in Erbil, Northern Iraq. The Project Manager was responsibility for the overall supervision and monitoring of the project and for preparing and submitting all financial and substantive reports related to the project. The Project Manager conducted regular visits to the project (as the security situation allowed and granted that security clearance was given) to provide advice and assistance to the implementing partner and for meetings with IKMAA during the course of the project. The Field Coordinator would also travel to Amman, Jordan on occasions for meetings with the Project Manager.

1.2.1 Intended outcomes and outputs

The overall objective of the project was to contribute to the capacity building of the IKMAA as follows:

- Increase demining performance and production rates through provision of up to date mechanical demining equipment and accessories to IKMAA;
- Increase IKMAA mechanical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical demining equipment with new tools;
- Strengthening of IKMAA human resources in various mine action related fields;
- Provide courses in EOD Training and Information and Operations Management and to conduct a study visit to another Mine Action Programme;
- Procurement of mine detection equipment including mine detectors and personal protection equipment;
- Procurement of IT Equipment; and
- Procurement of spare parts for the existing fleet of mine detectors and mechanical mine clearance equipment.

The expected output of the project was increased production rates and enhanced demining performance through provision of to date demining equipment, office equipment, mine clearance accessories and training of IKMAA senior staff.

1.2.2 Time line of the project

Initially the project was supposed to run during the period December 2005 until December 2006; however activities and expenditures were slower than predicted due to the lack of a Project Manager during most of 2006.

In May 2006 an inception meeting was held between UNOPS, UNDP and IKMAA in Amman, Jordan to discuss the project and decide on its objectives.

A UNOPS project manager was initially identified during early 2006 but the candidate later rejected the offer why a new candidate had to be identified. A suitable candidate was later identified in September 2006 but could not take up the position in Amman until early December 2006 due to other commitments and employment in another UNOPS Mine Action Programme.

The project document was signed between UNOPS (for UNDP) and UNDG/ITF on 23 March 2006. Therefore while the project's original timetable was from December 2005 – December 2006, the delayed start-up of project activities changes the timetable to January 2007 – December 2007.

Since the recruitment of the Project Manager was delayed until December 2006. The MOA with IKMAA was signed in January 2007. The project was later extended through May 2008 through a request to the Steering Committee (SC). The project was completed in May 2008 through the delivery of the last demining machines to IKMAA.

For a detailed timeline of the project and the project activities see the below.


Administration
May 2006 – Inception meeting between UNOPS, UNDP and IKMAA in Amman .
6 April 2006 – UNOPS Implementation Analysis Note signed
December – UNOPS Project manager hired and in Amman.
January 2007 - MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA signed.
28 March - 1st amendment to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA
5 June – 2nd amendment to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA.
19 December – 3rd amendment to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA.
May 2008 – Completion of the project



Initially envisaged project duration	Actual project duration
December 2005 – December 2006	December 2006 – May 2008

1.2.3 Budget and procurement under the project

The overall budget of the project was USD 2,921,852 of which USD 165,388 was estimated to be UNOPS project revenue.

The demining equipment procurement actions under the project were completed by UNOPS following UNOPS rules and regulations for procurement. Some of the equipment was purchased using existing UNOPS long term agreements while other equipment, such as the demining machines were procured using the Request for Proposals (RFP) modality. IKMAA was given the responsibility of inspecting and receiving the equipment and to provide UNOPS with Receive and Inspection Reports (RIR). UNOPS would then make the payments directly to the respective supplying companies

Some equipment was also purchased directly by IKMAA in Northern Iraq as a part of the MOA with IKMAA. Through the MOA with IKMAA, UNOPS provided IKMAA with some limited funds for equipment to be purchased locally in the Northern Iraq. This equipment was purchased using UNOPS rules for sourcing and procurement. Payments to IKMAA under the MOA were only done once IKMAA provided evidence and supporting documentation of following UNOPS rules. The procurement undertaken by IKMAA was also monitored by the Field Coordinator.

The MOA was implemented with the following payments to IKMAA; US$ 25,000 upon signature of the MOA, US$ 100,000 upon receipt of IKMAA's RIRs of the items purchased up to a minimum amount of US$ 8,000 and acceptance of the procurement process followed by IKMAA using the funds under the first instalment of US$ 25,000 and US$ 11,003 upon receipt of IKMAA's RIRs of the items purchased and production and acceptance of the procurement process followed by IKMAA using the funds under the second instalment of US$ 100,000. The reasoning behind allowing IKMAA doing this procurement locally was that IKMAA could do it at a lower cost locally since no freight costs would be charged. The procurement was completed during the month of January 2008.

Since the procurement done under OFFP by UNOPS years before the commencement of the project in support of IKMMA, no new equipment had been purchased by IKMAA. Also during the Ronco funding phase in 2004 while NGO operating costs were covered, no procurement of essential equipment was done. Much of the demining and office equipment had suffered normal wear and tear through the years and was therefore in urgent need of replacement.

The demining machine construction was implemented by a local company (Zozik[19]) that was selected by UNOPS through an RFP process in Northern Iraq. The construction was carried out under a contract between Zozik and UNOPS. The competitive process was carried out in early 2007 and included the issuing of an Expression of Interest (EOI) and the subsequent issuing of an Request for Proposals (RFP). The contract was subsequently awarded by UNOPS to Zozik in Northern Iraq. IKMAA had the responsibility of monitoring and supervising the construction, which was completed in May 2008. In addition IKMAA had the responsibility of reviewing and certifying the weekly and monthly reports submitted by Zozik. The machines were constructed in the Northern Iraq and delivered after six respectively twelve months.

1.2.4 Key implementing partners

The project was carried out within UNDG's Cluster A with overall project management from the UNOPS Mine Action Unit (UNOPS MAU) and the UNOPS North America Office (UNOPS NAO) and field implementation from the Project Manager based in UNOPS Iraq Operations Centre (IQOC) and the National Field Coordinator based in Erbil, Northern Iraq.

The Project Manager reported to the IQOC Country Director on matters relating to project coordination, field support and reporting to the ITF Steering Committee, and to the UNOPS MAU Portfolio Manager on technical matters of substance. The Project Manager was travelling to Iraq to oversee the implementation of the project. The project manager also worked in close consultation and cooperation with the UNDP Mine Action Team in Iraq (with office in Amman, Jordan). The Project Manager was supported by a UNOPS National Field Coordinator who reported directly to the Project Manager.

A MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA that delineated the role of UNOPS as IKMAA's implementing partner was drafted in December 2006 for signature by both parties. The MOA was signed in January 2007. Procurement and contracting was carried out by the Project Manager using UNOPS long term agreements and UNOPS procurement

[19] www.zozik.com

channels through the UNOPS NAO. The MOA was subsequently amended on 28 March 2006, 5 June 2006 and 19 December 2006 to incorporate changes necessary to the project and requested by IKMAA.

Through a contractual agreement between UNOPS and Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA (now known as Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB[20])), SRSA provided support to IKMAA during July 2007. SRSA provided three EOD trainers for a period of six weeks to train twelve IKMAA EOD staff and to bring their EOD training from Level 2 EOD to Level 3 EOD[21]. This training was provided at a cost to the project of only US$ 10,000 and also included provision of equipment to IKMAA at no cost from SRSA. During the Information and Operations Management Training course for eight IKMAA senior Information and Operations Management staff, SRSA provided one instructor at no cost for a period of three weeks through a MOU between SRSA and UNOPS. During the said course, which took place in Jordan during August 2007, UNDP Iraq, the Mine Action Centre in South Lebanon (MAC SL), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and the Mine Action Office (MAO) in Sudan also provided instructors at no cost (except for travel). During the course students from the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) in Jordan also participated together with two students from SRSA.

During the month of April 2007, ten IKMAA staff travelled to Croatia to visit the Croatian Mine Action Programme and the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) for a period of nine days. During this period the ten IKMAA staff also participated during the CROMAC annual demining symposium in Sibenik (in 2007 focused on mechanical demining machines).

1.2.5 Underlying logic as per the programme design

The various objectives and actions under the project were determined during a workshop including UNOPS, UNMAS and IKMAA in Amman, Jordan in May 2006. During this workshop the UNDP Senior Technical Advisor, the UNOPS Senior Portfolio Manager and senior staff from IKMAA participated and established the requirements and objectives under the project.

The project was designed to assist in addressing the Cluster A objective "*…to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development; to reduce casualty rates and risks from Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination, and; to clear land and infrastructure assets for productive use*". Specifically, the project was to contribute to the realisation of the following outcomes/outputs in the Mine Action Results Matrix:

High-level impact by the end of the programme cycle: "To support the NMAA strategic plan mainly by improving its mechanical efficiency"

Programme outcomes: "A national mine action authority having the necessary equipment and assets to cover all mine action functions in all of Iraq"

Programme outputs 2005 (later delayed): "Continuation/expansion of operational mine action activities in accordance with, and in support of the National Mine Action Authority strategy.

During the April 2006 workshop three detailed immediate objectives were identified as follows:

Objective 1. - Human resources development:

To strengthen IKMAA human resources in various mine action related fields.

Objective 2. - Procurement of mechanical demining equipment:

To increase IKMAA mechanical demining capacity in order to improve the rate of mine clearance through the integration of mechanical equipment with other demining tools.

[20] See www.msb.se

[21] See www.mineactionstandards.org

Objective 3. – To continue the existing IKMAA MDD training regime and integrate MDD with other demining assets to speed up mine clearance operations. This objective originally included training of 27 MDDs.

1.2.6 Major divergences in the design and implementation

Upon commencement of the project IKMAA requested that Objective Number 3. should be changed since IKMAA no longer were using MDDs during their operations. This part of the project was to include purchasing of MDDs, MDD food, MDD medicine and hiring of MDD staff at a total cost of US$ 259,704. The Director General for the IKMAA on 18 January 2007 requested that the output related to procurement and training of puppies (US$259,704) should be replaced with the purchase of spare parts to repair the existing fleet of Bozena mini flails and to purchase Bozena spare parts and 3 camcorders. The reason for this was that the originally envisaged cost to repair the Bozenas was much higher than what had been quoted by Bozena in January 2007. The result was that funds needed to be added to the budget line in order to enable UNOPS to purchase all the spare parts required. This request was supported by UNOPS and was also subsequently approved by the UNDG ITF SC in early 2007. Subsequently the spare parts were purchased by UNOPS and the Bozena mini flails were all repaired by service technicians from WayIndustry in Slovenia during the month of July, 2007 and were thereafter back in operational use again. Under this contract the service technicians also trained IKMAA national service technicians.

In December 2006 it was requested that the project Objective Number 2. “construction of mechanical clearance equipment” with a budget of US$ 1,992,000 for construction of mini flails, front end loaders and excavators with sifters to be utilized for clearance of landmines to be contracted through an initial competitive process (through an RFP) issued by UNOPS from the IQOC), rather than through prequalification as per the original project document. It was previously requested by the Iraqi NMAA and IKMAA during a meeting held in Amman in May 2006 that the contract would be awarded through a competitive process (including the issuing of an Expression of Interest and the issuing of an RFP locally in Northern Iraq) in order to invite other possible contractors and to provide transparency through open tendering. This request was supported by UNOPS and was also subsequently approved by the UNDG ITF SC in early 2007 based on a formal request from UNOPS.

In addition to the above, IKMAA requested that Objective Number 1. in the Project Document outlining that Awareness courses on quality and International Mine Action Standards should be completed, were not necessary and therefore should be replaced with EOD Training, Information Management Training and Planning and Operations Training. This request was supported by UNOPS and was also subsequently approved by the UNDG ITF SC during early 2007. The EOD training was completed by SRSA during the month of July 2007 and the Planning and Operations Training was completed in Jordan during the month of August 2007.

Under Objective Number 2. the original plan was to purchase one low loader under the project for transportation of the mine clearance machines constructed under the project. However Iraqi IKMAA later requested that the purchase was not necessary due to a number of implications including the limited use since IKMAA had other means of transportation for demining machines, the cost for the maintenance of the low loader through an external subcontractor and workshop (this cost had not been included in the annual IKMAA budget) and the fact that the low loader would not be able to enter some of the former Iraqi forts used by IKMAA for storage and accommodations. For this reason it was requested that the funds would be used to purchase three Toyota Land Cruisers, one Toyota Pick-Up Double Cabin and one Hyundai Mini Buss The new vehicles were subsequently used for IKMAA demining operations and shared equally with demining teams in the field for operational purposes and the maintenance of the vehicles was covered through IKMAA's own resources and workshop facilities.

The construction activities under Objective Number 2. originally included the construction of one medium flail. This was later cancelled since IKMAA already had a sufficient number of flails in the programme and the existing fleet also was made operational through the contract with WayIndustry for renovation of the existing machines.

2. Purpose of the evaluation.

The evaluation is to be carried out as a summative evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be used by used by the IRFFI, UNOPS and UNDG in to evaluate this specific project as a part of a number of ITF projects being evaluated by the IRFFI.

3. Evaluation objectives

The objective of this evaluation is to determine what the long term effects of the project for IKMAA have been. It is now close to two years since the project was completed and it should be evaluated how the project effected IKMAA operations in terms of the results found from the project, focusing on effectiveness, efficiency, impact and

sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target group (IKMAA) for the support; and new methods and progress.

For this reason the focus should be on the long term effects of the project as such. The evaluation should also address the relevance of the project, the efficiency of its implementation and the resulting changes to the IKMAA mine action programme as a whole.

The evaluation should also provide recommendations for similar future projects under similar conditions and security situations.

4. Evaluation scope

The Project Evaluation Consultant will undertake a combined mission to Amman, Jordan and Erbil, Northern Iraq. During the visit to Northern Iraq a visit to the IKMAA regional office in Dahuk should also be undertaken to meet with the former UNOPS Field Coordinator. If possible the mission to Northern Iraq should also include a field visit to observe the machines constructed under the project during operations. It is estimated that two days will be required in Amman, Jordan and that three days will be required in Northern Iraq. The first visit should be to Amman followed by the mission to Northern Iraq. It might be required that the Project Evaluation Consultant undertakes the Security Awareness Induction Training (SAIT) in Amman during a four day period before travelling to Northern Iraq. In such case it will be required that the Project Evaluation Consultant stays in Amman for a period of one week before deploying to Northern Iraq. This requirement will be determined by UNOPS at a later stage and will also affect the timing and duration of the mission.

The purpose of the visit to Amman, Jordan is mainly to meet and interview UNDP Iraq and staff within the UNOPS IQOC EMO. In Northern Iraq the purpose is to undertake interviews with IKMAA staff including the former UNOPS Field Coordinator and the Zozik Company, which was responsible for the construction of the demining machines that were delivered under the project.

Other interviews with SRSA, the former project manager and other stake holders will be undertaken through telephone interviews and through e-mail correspondence.

For a comprehensive list and contact details of the individuals to meet and interview see Annex 1.

No previous evaluations of the project have been undertaken.

5. Key evaluation questions

The specific objectives are to assess the following aspects of the project in support of IKMAA:

- Relevance and usefulness of the project;
- Outcome at an overall level: the results found from the project, focusing on effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target group (IKMAA) for the support; and
- Identification of lessons learned and recommendations: based on the above, identify lessons learned, challenges and recommendations for other similar future projects.

In addition the objective is to evaluate the following evaluation questions:

- The value-added of the programme or and project in comparison with alternatives
- The UN's partnership strategy and its relation to effectiveness in achieving the outcome
- The UN's strategic positioning and its comparative advantage
- Provision of disaggregated information by gender, ethnicity and other relevant criteria
- Cross-cutting issues applicable to the project/ programme

6. Evaluation methodology

The methodology shall consist of desk studies, a field study in Amman, Jordan and Northern Iraq and interviews with the various stake holders with focus on IKMAA.

A minimum of 13 interviews will be undertaken through telephone, in Amman, Jordan and in Northern Iraq by the Project Evaluation Consultant during the evaluation. Additional interviews might be deemed necessary by the Project Evaluation Consultant during the evaluation. For additional interviews the Project Evaluation Consultant may identify and include such during the course of the evaluation.

7. Expected deliverables

Following the evaluation the Project Evaluation Consultant is required to deliver a draft evaluation report containing the parts outlined in Annex 6. The draft report will be reviewed by UNOPS before the final report is completed by the Project Evaluation Consultant. The report will be used by the IRFFI, UNOPS and UNDG for internal purposes following its completion. The report will be further distributed at the discretion of IRFFI.

8. Skills and experience of the Project Evaluation Consultant

The evaluation will be carried out by one Project Evaluation Consultant who will carry out all the interviews and mission travel to Amman and Northern Iraq.

One highly qualified independent Project Evaluation Consultant will be hired for a maximum of 20 days to perform the various phases of the evaluation as per outlined under paragraph 10 here below.

Given the nature of the subject, the Project Evaluation Consultant will have to be multidisciplinary and should have a professional background and extensive experience in humanitarian demining and humanitarian aid and/or reconstruction actions, the work of national and international agencies, gender expertise, and experience from Iraq and if possible from Northern Iraq.

For the study in Northern Iraq the Project Evaluation Consultant might be required to hire one local staff for interpretations and as a driver for the mission to Dahouk and for transportation in Erbil.

8.1 Qualifications of the Project Evaluation Consultant

The Project Evaluation Consultant is expected to have the following work experience:

Minimum of 11 years of relevant practical/technical experience in the field of monitoring and evaluation, project assessment, and programme design, ideally in a post conflict environment.

At least five years of progressive experience in:

- Planning and implementation of M&E systems;
- Field research in developing countries;
- Logical framework approach;
- Best practice in M&E methods, tools, and approaches (including qualitative and participatory); and
- The demining tool box with focus on mechanical demining.

The Project Evaluation Consultant is expected to have the following qualifications:

- Extensive experience in conducting complex evaluations of projects in an international development context and a proven record delivering professional results;
- Experience from UN executed/supported Mine Action Programmes;
- Experience from UNOPS implemented projects is an advantage;
- A good knowledge of Mine Action as a whole;
- Proven knowledge of humanitarian demining techniques and equipment;
- Knowledge of mechanical demining machines is an advantage;
- Experience in the context of Mine Action policies and programming;
- Experience from working in mine-affected countries;
- Excellent drafting and writing skills;
- Knowledge of mine action programme development and implementation;
- Superior communication skills and able to speak fluently in English;
- Security awareness and knowledge of UN security procedures will be an asset;
- Proficiency in usage of computers and office software packages; and
- Experience with project and fund evaluations.

Following is a short non inclusive description of the minimum requirements for the role of Project Evaluation Consultant for this evaluation. The Project Evaluation Consultant will:

- Have overall responsibility for the evaluation and its outputs;
- Ensure methodological soundness of the evaluation process;
- Prepare the evaluation in accordance with these TORs;
- Prepare the field mission;
- Establish contact with all interviewees as listed in Annex 1.;
- Perform research as necessary;
- Coordinate and prepare all evaluation activities (e.g., meetings with official, interviews, telephone interviews, e-mails, field visits and more);
- Complete the evaluation report and submit the same to the responsible UNOPS Portfolio Manager; and
- Liaise and seek advice as necessary with the UNOPS Portfolio Manager.

The Project Evaluation Consultant should have an advanced University degree in business/commerce, economics, international relations, political science, agriculture, development studies or another field relevant to international development assistance; or Senior Military Staff Course; or relevant military (mine/countermine warfare, explosive ordinance disposal) or civilian humanitarian experience in mine action or a First University degree in related fields combined with extensive experience in similar responsible position.

The Project Evaluation Consultant shall be independent meaning that he/she have not been involved in the design, implementation or monitoring of the project under evaluation.

9. Management Arrangements

9.1 Role of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)

The IRFFI enables donors to fund activities administered by UNDG ITF on behalf of the Participating UN Organisations and/or activities administered by the World Bank ITF (WB ITF) under a joint coordination and monitoring mechanism that operates in accordance with the IRFFI TORs.

Coordination is achieved through the Donor and the Executive Committees. The Executive Committee is chaired by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC), and is comprised of the Donor Committee Chairperson, and representatives of the United Nations and the World Bank. The Executive Committee ensures alignment between IRFFI activities and the overall Iraqi priorities, including those in the ICI, and coherent planning, monitoring, and reporting between UNDG ITF and WB ITF activities.

The IRFFI Executive Committee and donor governments decided that a selection of ITF projects should be evaluated as the ITF is coming to a close. The project in support to IKMAA has been selected as one of the projects to be evaluated.

9.2 Role of UNOPS

This evaluation has been commissioned by the IRFFI but will be managed by UNOPS who will contract an Project Evaluation Consultant to complete the evaluation in accordance with these TORs and in accordance with the contract between the Project Evaluation Consultant and UNOPS. UNOPS will administer the evaluation in question.

9.3 Role of the Project Evaluation Consultant

The role of the Project Evaluation Consultant is to complete the evaluation in accordance with these TORs and as per outlined in the contract with UNOPS.

10. Indicative Work Plan

Phase	Key Activities	Time Frame	Responsibility

Preparatory phase	• Collection of back ground material. • Studying of back ground material. • Preparations for interviews. • Contacts with interviewees. • Commence telephone interviews and collection of information through e-mails. • Clarifications from UNOPS as necessary. • Travel preparations as necessary. • Review of the Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System. • Review of the UNEG Ethical guidelines.	Five days	The Project Evaluation Consultant with the assistance of the responsible UNOPS Portfolio Manager as necessary for the contacting the various interviewees.
SAIT training in Amman, Jordan	• Completion of the Security Awareness Induction Training (SAIT) in Amman, Jordan.	Four days	UNOPS and the Project Evaluation Consultant .[22]
Field work/Data Collection - Jordan	• Meeting and interviews with UNDP. • Meeting and interviews with UNOPS. • Meeting and interviews with UNDG.	Two days (not including travel time)	The Project Evaluation Consultant.
Field work/Data Collection - Iraq	In Erbil, Northern Iraq: • Meetings and interviews with IKMAA. • Meetings and interviews with Zozik. In Dahouk, Northern Iraq: • Meetings and interviews with IKMAA.	Three days (not including travel time)	The Project Evaluation Consultant.
Data Analysis	• Analysis of interview data. • Collection of additional data through telephone interviews as required.	Two days (home based)	The Project Evaluation Consultant.
Report preparation	• Completion of the report. • Submission of draft report to UNOPS for review and approval. • Submission of the final report to UNOPS.	Five days (home based)	The Project Evaluation Consultant.
Dissemination	• As determined by UNOPS.	Two days	The Project Evaluation Consultant and UNOPS.
	Total	17 – 21 days	

[22] Note that it might not be necessary for the consultant to complete the SAIT training for a mission to Northern Iraq.

Annex B – List of persons/organisations consulted during the evaluation

Name	Title (during project)	Agency (during project)	Interview date	Interview location
Raad Yousif Gilyana	Head of Support Services	UNOPS IQOC	20th Sep 2010	Amman
Pehr Lodhammar	Project Manager	UNOPS	Between 13th Sep & 5th Oct 2010	By Skype
Kent Paulusson	Technical Advisor	UNDP	30th Sep 2010	By Skype
Shadin Goussous	Programme Officer	UNOPS	25th Sep 2010	Amman
Rickard Hartmann	Head	SRSA mine action section	20th Sep 2010	By email
Jamal Jalal Hussain	Demining expert	IKMAA	26/28th Sep 2010	Erbil
Niyazi Argoshi	DG of Technical Affairs	IKMAA	26/28th Sep 2010	Erbil
Faris Zubair Ali	Operations Manager Erbil	IKMAA	27th Sep 2010	Dahuk
Waleed Ahmed	Field coordinator	UNOPS	27th Sep 2010	Dahuk
Mariwan Khoshno	Quality Assurance Officer	IKMAA	26th Sep 2010	Erbil
Mithaq Najeeb	Director of Logistics	IKMAA	28th Oct 2010	Erbil
Peter Sorensen	Director IQOC	UNOPS	29th Sep 2010	By Skype
Siraj Barzani	Director	IKMAA		By email

Annex C – Literature and documentation consulted during the evaluation

1. MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA

2. Amendment 1 to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA

3. Amendment 2 to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA

4. Amendment 3 to the MOA between UNOPS and IKMAA

5. Minutes from the inception meeting between UNOPS, UNDP and IKMAA on 23 & 24 May 2006.

6. UNOPS Implementation Analysis Note

7. UNDG Project Document

8. End of project report

9. TORs for the Project Manager

10. TORs for the Field Coordinator

11. The EOI documentation for the construction of demining machines

12. The RFP documentation for the construction of demining machines

13. RIR for the equipment received by IKMAA

14. UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (separate attachments)

15. UNEG Ethical guidelines (separate attachment)

16. Governance in Iraq, Common Country Assessments, September 2009

17. Gender and Guidelines – from concept to practice. Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines Geneva – 2008

18. *A Guide to Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War*. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva 2007.

19. *Mechanical Demining Equipment Catalogue*, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva 2008.