

**Timor-Leste**

**Final Evaluation**

**Thematic Window: Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment**

**Programme:**

**Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Timor-Leste**

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# Executive summary

The joint programme entitled ***Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Timor-Leste*** (the JP) sought to protect women and girls from domestic violence, sexual abuse, economic hardship and human trafficking. This was done by strengthening protection mechanisms such as the Law against Domestic Violence or the draft law to Prevent Human Trafficking; strengthening the capacity of the government and other stakeholders; promoting economic empowerment of the most vulnerable and improving support services for victims.

The JP begun its three-year implementation on December 15, 2008, later extension brought the total implementation period to three years and eight months, closing in August 2012, by which time it had disbursed 91% of its funds. The budget approved was $4.955 million, to be distributed amongst the five implementing agencies, mainly UN Women (the lead agency), UNDP, UNICEF, IOM and UNFPA.

The objective of this final evaluation is to measure the Joint Programme’s contribution to solving the needs and problems identified; degree of implementation; efficiency; quality; the extent to which the JP was able to reach the targeted beneficiaries and the JP’s contribution towards the thematic window and overall MDG fund objectives.

This evaluation was developed in accordance with UNEG norms and standards, giving particular importance to knowledge building through the identification of good practices and lessons learned. It was based on a mixed-method approach including exploratory data analysis, formative assessment and a utilization focused approach. The tools used to triangulate data included secondary data, first hand observations, bilateral interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires.

**Conclusions and Key Findings**

Design and Relevance: The degree of programme relevance is high, with the JP clearly contributing to the achievement of MDG goal 3 (Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women) and goal 1 (to end poverty and hunger). It is also expected to have a long term positive impact on MDG 2 (Achieve Universal Primary Education) and MDG 4 (improvement of child health) through the CCT scheme.

The evaluation was also able to confirm alignment with national priorities and those of the UN country team (UNCT), as well as alignment with the country’s international commitments such as the signed United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, CEDAW and the MDG goals.

The initial design put forward a coherent strategy with a focus on three key areas which covered both impact and root causes. This proposal was developed mostly by the UN with limited inputs from the national counterparts, primarily due to time constraints and the fact that the country was recovering from recent civil upheavals. Similarly, a theory of change was never fully developed and, as a result, the link between the proposed actions and the changes identified at Outcome level remains at times unclear.

The evaluation highlights the importance of the design process as one of the lessons learned which will hopefully be taken into consideration in the drafting of future joint programmes and the upcoming UNDAF. Design requires sufficient time to ensure widespread participation of key players, as well as identification of each participant’s competitive advantages, and how they can be best brought together towards the ultimate goal, as well as identification of potential synergies. It also requires an analysis of the aid architecture within which the programme will need to be implemented, for example, in the case of Timor finding adequate human resources is a challenge that should have been considered at the design stage, which later translated into significant delays. The design should have taken into consideration the government’s ability to absorb the programme, and how the programme could have supported already stretched human resources in the government. Joint programmes can also asses sustainability from the design stage, going as far as obtaining commitments going forward

Another conclusion is the importance of a central monitoring, evaluation and communication strategy, together with agreed tools, identification of realistic and results oriented goals, with sufficient capacity to implement them.

Efficiency & Process: The central coordination and management mechanism were a positive exercise that increased the participants’ knowledge and understanding of other participating agencies and their mandates, have given way to specific ideas on how agencies can work together, and is expected to have a positive impact in the preparation process of the new UNDAF. The joint programme would have been more efficient if synergies had been identified at an earlier stage.

The National Steering Committee (NSC) and the Programme Management Committee (PMC) were set up according to MDG-F guidelines but did not function regularly until the central Programme Management Unit (PMU) was incorporated. The final evaluation concludes the PMC, as initially envisioned by the MDG-F, with regular attendance of agency representatives and high level ministry participation, would have been a more strategic and results oriented approach. Active participation of civil society in the programme’s management (the PMC) was widely perceived as positive step, expanding from the traditional bilateral dialogue between the government and the UN, to a more participatory one.

The Joint Programme worked under a common reporting and progress tracking system, which translated into increased costs for the UN (mainly in the form of double reporting), while on the government side it appears to have yielded benefits such as increased coordination, better understanding of the bigger picture as well as of the roles different agencies can play in the area of gender.

The JP also identifies the Resident Coordinator and a lead agency within the programme structures. The RCO played a key integration role, ensuring coherence between the JP, the work of gender working group and the peacekeeping mission, but was also provided instrumental support to the PMU.

UN Women’s ability to support the JP and “lead it” was weakened by organizational changes (from UNIFEM to UN Women), repeated changes in management, and its relative small size in the country, which also limited its ability to backstop the PMU, suggesting that technical expertise might not be the only consideration when selecting a lead agency. Capacity to lead and support the programme from an administrative and logistical point of view might also be a consideration, alternatively, the leadership role could be divided amongst agencies with one being the technical lead (thematic expertise)and another a programmatic lead (backstop, administrative and logistical support).

The central coordination capacity (the PMU) was weak with the programme coordinator having been recruited two years into the programme, and one support staff joining him six months before the finalization of the programme. In spite of this, there is widespread agreement that the programme coordinator was able to strengthen coordination leading to the identification of synergies and areas for cooperation, highlighting the importance of having a coordination unit in place early in the implementation phase. The programme would have been further strengthened with its own M&E and communications functions. While a communication strategy, once agreed, can be implemented by each agency, a centralized M&E can analyze impact of the JP as a whole and something different from its parts, feeding this information back into management for decision making. While the JP increased visibility of the areas covered, the lack of a communications or advocacy strategy led to dilution of this impact. Greater coherence between the JP and the country initiative for M&E and advocacy would have also strengthened alignment between the JP and the UNCT.

Effectiveness and Results: Both quality and sustainability of results varied, with some of the outputs having been developed through very clear, comprehensive and sustainable strategies, such as the CCT scheme or the participatory process for the drafting and approval of the law against domestic violence, while other activities appear to have been forced by delays and scheduling constraints, for example GRB components. Impact of areas common to all agencies, such as IEC and training, would have benefitted from a more cohesive approach.

Outcome 1: *‘Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights’* was substantially achieved, with the JP having played a key role in moving forward the process of consultation, drafting and approval of the Law against Domestic Violence, the costing of its National Action Plan (NAP) and its monitoring framework. The JP was also the force behind the consultation and drafting process for the proposed Law against Human trafficking, which is pending approval.

The highly participatory drafting process for the law on Domestic Violence is perceived as a best practice which should be further documented for possible replication.

Outcome 2: *‘Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through the establishment of a social protection scheme’* was achieved through the support provided to the *Bolsa da Mae* scheme, another best practice of the JP. The JP also supported outreach mechanisms to victims through existing referral networks, leading to increased coordination of services and better practices, in the form of agreed SOPs or protocols, also providing direct support to outreach services, such as shelters, safe houses, orphanages or NGOs in charge of providing legal support. The development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for national police, gender based violence and human trafficking, was widely perceived as one of the JP’s strengths.

In regards to capacity building, the evaluation concludes that on-the-job training or collocation might have strengthened the transfer of skills, for example, this was done in the form of support provided to MSS, were the consultant was not writing reports herself but supporting the MSS staff to do it. In addition, training needs to be strategic. For example, the JP concluded that it was important to include emergency staff and doctors in protocol training, beyond the training of midwives and nurses, to ensure buy in and sustainability. The same could be argued for inclusion of high-level police to support training of VPU staff.

Outcome 3: The aims of Outcome three, *‘Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting,* are perceived as over ambitious for a three year project. In addition, the bulk of Outcome three was implemented in under 10 months towards the end of the project, which inevitably impacted the quality and sustainability of its products. Most of the tools were finalized in the last month of implementation, too late for this evaluation to be able to assess them.

By the time this final report was drafted significant progress had been achieved towards increased understanding of GRB and it’s potential for achieving equitable and sustainable development in Timor, and significant partnerships had been created, for example, the partnership with Lau Hamutuk (a reputable National think tank now able to do GRB analysis), or with the Ministry of Agriculture, which reflects understanding that “gender issues” need to be addressed at all levels, beyond the SEPI.

Ownership: Significant level of ownership was observed in regards to the goals and objectives of the JP, both from the government and civil society, which will be key to ensuring sustainability. From the interviews and documents obtained, it would appear that ownership has not yet reached the budgetary level, with both the government and civil society continuing to rely on external donors.

Sustainability: Some activities and outcomes of the JP have inherent sustainability, for example, the creation of laws or action plans, never the less, they require adequate allocation of resources for their implementation. It is key for the UN to continue lobbying for the adequate allocation of resources, both human and financial, for the implementation of these plans.

The sustainability of capacity building efforts will be directly linked to i) the quality of the training, ii) the buy in from key decision makers within that group and iii) the UN’s ability to ensure systematization of the training procedures within the national systems. Given the specific characteristics in Timor, the evaluation recommends a substantively more coordinated effort when it comes to training, analysis of the impact the different methodologies used have yielded, some of which were perceived as inefficient. For the most part, the evaluation recommends focus on on-the-job training over a longer period of time, with short trainings only considered useful when there is already a significant level of understanding of the subject matter.

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Overall, the joint programme has achieved most of its objectives and nearly full financial disbursement, but there was little analysis or indicators to measure the quality of the products. The programme has created significant momentum towards joint programming, increasing awareness on the role of gender towards equitable and sustainable development. It has also provided a relatively new country with good practices on participatory policy development, and examples on developing standard operating practices. While the bulk of national focus continues to concentrate on infrastructure, it is important to ensure that the gender perspective continues to filter in at all levels of programming. Impact of GRB at this level could have a significant long-term impact.

Some unexpected positives outcomes, such as new alliances as well as lessons learned and an increased awareness on the benefits of joint programming, could be used to strengthen the new UNDAF and future joint programming in the country.

# Introduction

1. Timor-Leste is a small country in [Southeast Asia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southeast_Asia), officially known as Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The country comprises the eastern half of the island of [Timor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timor) and the nearby islands of [Atauro](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atauro_Island) and Jaco.
2. Timor-Leste is one of the poorest countries in the world with low level of socio economic situation. It is a country in post crisis and transition period, and one of the newest nations in the world, with a history of violent struggle for independence and further civil strife as recent as 2006 and 2008.
3. Timor-Leste became an independent nation in 2002 after four centuries as a Portuguese colony, (and a three year occupation by Imperial Japan), which were followed by Indonesian control.
4. East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent nation on 20 May 2002, becoming the world’s newest nation. On the same day, the Security Council established The UN Mission of Support in East Timor, (UNMISET) to provide assistance over a period of two years until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities. Subsequently, the Council extended the mission's mandate for another year to permit the new nation, which had changed its name to Timor-Leste, to attain self-sufficiency. UNMISET wound up in May 2005. The rebuilding of East Timor is often considered one of the UN's biggest success stories.
5. Security continues to be precarious, and an outbreak of gang violence in 2006 prompted the UN Security Council to set up a new peacekeeping force, UNMIT. The UN said poverty and unemployment had exacerbated the unrest.
6. As one of Asia's poorest nations with little experience as an independent Nation, Timor-Leste is expected to rely on outside help for many years to come. The infrastructure is poor and the country is drought-prone. However, vast offshore oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea hold much potential, making Timor-Leste one of the highest oil revenue earning countries in the world.
7. Currently, the main challenges reported for women are deep poverty and the ongoing impact derived from the conflict. Political participation and economic empowerment are particularly crucial as the conflict left nearly half the married Timorese women widowed and sole providers for their family.
8. Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) is a critical issue for women in Timor-Leste. Domestic violence is the most reported case to the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU[[1]](#footnote-2)) of the police. A study conducted in 2005 indicated that 47% of women suffered physical, psychological or sexual violence by their partners. Others studies[[2]](#footnote-3) indicated that 38% of women aged 15-49 experienced physical violence from the age of 15, and 36% who were or had been married reported –violence –physical, sexual or emotional- by their husbands or partners.
9. Widespread rape and sexual assault of women and children went largely unpunished during the military occupation. As a result Timorese perceive SGBV as normal and a daily occurrence which belongs to the private sphere of family life and can be dealt with through traditional mediation mechanism, which resort to mechanisms such as payment to the woman’s family for the offence, or marriage in the case of rape.
10. Domestic violence has technically been a crime since 2009 under the penal code, but it was not until 2010 that a law clearly defined the crime and mandated victim support services.
11. Women’s weak position in the society also makes them vulnerable to both domestic and international trafficking. With Timor-Leste being a destination for recruitment of sex trafficking of women to and from other Asian countries. There is reported national trafficking, but little reliable data available on the incidence, and scarce services available for support.
12. Recent milestones in legislation were the Law against Domestic Violence, changes to the Electoral Law to increase the number of women candidates for the National Parliament and a Resolution to officially support the designation of Gender Focal Points in ministries and local administrations.

## Background

1. In December 2006, the Government of Spain and UNDP signed a partnership agreement which, together with an additional pledge on 24 September 2008, amounted to a total of €618 million towards the progress of the MDGs, in line with the aid development agenda priorities such as the Paris Declaration and the ACCRA agenda for action.
2. The Fund currently supports 128 joint programmes in 49 countries with an aim to promote increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions. The primary focus is on addressing inequalities and having an impact at the local level through eight thematic windows that contribute towards the achievement of the MDGs, National Ownership and UN reform.
3. The “Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights in Timor-Leste” programme (the JP) is part of the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment thematic window, which supports 13 joint programmes with a total budget of nearly US$90 million. This window’s efforts focus towards achieving progress for the MDG 3 through a rights based approach, access to opportunities and the guarantee of rights. Although the focus is on the MDG 3, through their activities most of these programmes will have a positive impact on other MDG goals such as maternal health (MDG 5), towards reduction on child mortality (MDG 4), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2) as well as fighting poverty and hunger (DMG 1).
4. This final evaluation is part of the MDG-F’s result oriented monitoring and evaluation strategy, which was developed in order to track and measure the overall impact of the MDG Fund (MDG-F) to the MDGs and to multilateralism. The MDG-F’s M&E strategy is based on the principles and standards of UNEG and OEDC/DAC regarding evaluation quality and independence. The strategy builds on the information needs and interests of the different stakeholders, and places the same weight on accountability as it does on learning, seeking to compile evidence based knowledge and lessons learned that could be scaled up or replicated towards more successful development interventions. The fund’s focus is on participation and national ownership, at both local and national level, while promoting increased participation of civil society organizations and NGOs in order to make their governments accountable.
5. As part of the MDG-F evaluation strategy a mid-term evaluation was commissioned by the MDG-F secretariat in December 2010[[3]](#footnote-4), after which an improvement plan was drafted.
6. In addition, Timor-Leste is one of nine focus country, and has received an additional U$510,000 from the MDG-F in order to develop country wide communication and M&E strategies, ($300,000for M&E and $210,000for C&A).

## Purpose of the Final Evaluation

1. This final evaluation is of a summative nature and aims to measure both the level of implementation and the extent to which the joint programme achieved its goals in the initial programme document, or adjustments thereafter. The evaluation has sought to generate evidence based knowledge through the identification of lessons learned and best practices which may be scaled up or replicated.
2. The final evaluation looked at the progress of the Joint Programme from its inception in December 2008 up to and including any progress reported for June 2012, attempting to assess the added value of the joint programme, effectiveness and efficiency of the mechanisms employed, and the sustainability of its achievements.
3. The evaluation focused on the following areas:
4. Design level:

* Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country, the MDGs and the Fund’s objectives.

1. Process level:

* Efficiency: Extent to which resources/inputs (funds, time, human resources, etc.) have been turned into results
* Ownership in the process: Effective exercise of leadership by the country’s national/local partners in development interventions

1. Result level:

* Effectiveness: Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved.
* Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term.

## Methodologies used in the Evaluation

1. The evaluation used a utilization-focused approach, which stresses that an evaluation should be judged by how useful it is. This was done together with the use of contribution analysis, which recognizes that attributing development results to interventions is generally complex and sometimes unfeasible, as it takes time before an impact could realistically be achieved. Furthermore, contribution analysis does not seek to prove contribution, but rather seeks to provide plausible evidence to reduce the uncertainty about the ‘difference’ a programme is making[[4]](#footnote-5).The advantage of this approach is that it is not prescriptive. Allowing for a combination of different methods to be used, is a way of recognizing that aid activities do not takes place in a vacuum, but rather, that they are embedded within political, social and economic realities.
2. The evaluation focused on the joint programme as the unit of analysis and not on each agency individually. The recommendations generated are addressed to its main users, the Programme Management Committee, the National Steering Committee and the Secretariat of the MDG Fund.
3. Sampling strategy: due to time limitations the evaluation reference group (ERG) was responsible for selecting the sample population as well as the locations for the field visit. The evaluation sought to ensure a balanced representation of the different types of implementing partners and beneficiaries, as well as gender balance. In practice this means that the evaluation used non‐probability samples, where sampling units (participants) were selected to reflect particular features within the context of the programme, rather than seeking to be statistically representative.
4. The target population included key stakeholders, mainly the focal points of implementing UN agencies, selected Government counterparts (as both implementing partners and beneficiaries), NGOs, civil society and beneficiaries of the programme. Care was put to ensure participation for all three outcomes. The three regions selected for the in-country visit were, Dili in order to observe the work undertaken at the National level, Covalima as a border district with less readily available services and higher risk of human trafficking, potentially high extreme poverty and VAW. The third district selected was Baucau as a district with high number of reported VAW cases, presence of courts and adequate medical facilities. (see Annex 3 for details of final in-country agenda).
5. The Final Evaluation consisted of three different phases:
   * **Phase one, inception and methodology:** The evaluation begun with an initial literature review. An inception report was prepared and shared with the Evaluation Reference Group. Their comments were later incorporated into a second draft. During this phase a methodology was agreed and the necessary instruments were developed. A questionnaire and some detailed agency-specific questions were forwarded to agency focal points.

Documents reviewed included, but were not limited to: the Programme Document, biannual monitoring reports, M&E frameworks, country M&E and C&A strategy papers, MDG-F mission reports, the sustainability report, Mid-term evaluation, color coded work plans, National Strategic Development plan, Improvement plan, CCA/UNDAF, CEDAW report, amongst others.

Due to the limited time frame, the in-country visit agenda and all the logistics were agreed in parallel during this phase.

* + **Phase two, in country visit: The** second phase consisted of the in-country mission, which took place between June 11 and July 1st 2012. As described above three districts were selected.

Some of the district visit and some of the interviews in Dili and Covalima were done jointly with the consultancy to identify best practices. Initial plans to undertake joint interviews with the ongoing case study evaluation (conducted under the MDG-F M&E initiative) proved unfeasible.

The in-country visit included first hand observation of some of the project activities as well as the centers that have benefitted from the JP. It also included over forty semi-guided bilateral interviews with all UN focal points, as well as with the government counterparts, the RC/SRSG, the RCO, AECID, and the gender focal point for UNMIT. Focus group discussions where held with beneficiaries and implementing agencies. (see Annex 3 for full in-country visit agenda).

A brief presentation of preliminary findings was conducted with participation of the ERG members as part of the findings validation process (see Annex 5 for full list of participants to the debriefing).

**Phase three, preliminary report and validation process for final report:** During this phase the consultant revised the information collected in order, examine, map and summarize the data obtained in the first two phases of the evaluation. Conclusions and recommendations in this report stem from triangulating the information obtained.

A preliminary report was shared with the Evaluation Reference Group for validation. The final report was drafted taking into account any observations, corrections and suggestions made to the preliminary report, while maintaining the necessary independence in accordance with the standards set by the UN Evaluation Group (UNEG).

1. The following **instruments** were developed for the evaluation:
   1. Open ended **questionnaires**, to be completed by each UN implementing partner focal point
   2. **Interview guides** to be used during the bilateral Interviews and focus group discussion (and adapted as needed during the evaluation process).

**Analysis plan:**

1. Data analysis followed the subsequent stages: Collection of data; Management of data; Search for patterns and consistency; Triangulation of findings; Validation (whenever possible); Conclusions and recommendations

## Key Roles and Responsibilities in the Evaluation Process

1. As per the evaluation TORs there were 3 main actors involved in the implementat**i**on of MDG-F final evaluation[[5]](#footnote-6):
2. The **Resident Coordinator Office** as **Commissioner** of the final evaluation was responsible for leading the evaluation process throughout the 3 main phases (design, implementation and dissemination); Ensure the evaluation products meet quality standards (in collaboration with the MDG-F Secretariat); Provide clear specific advice and support to the evaluation manager and the evaluation team throughout the whole evaluation process; Safeguard the independence of the exercise, including the selection of the evaluation team.
3. The **Programme Coordinator** as **Evaluation Manager was** responsible for providing executive and coordination support to the reference group; Provide the evaluator with administrative support and required data; Liaise with and respond to the commissioners of the evaluation; Connect the evaluation team with the wider programme unit, senior management and key evaluation stakeholders, and ensure a fully inclusive and transparent approach to the evaluation; Review the inception report and the draft evaluation report(s).
4. Although the TORs of the evaluation stated that the  **Programme Management Committee** would function as the **Evaluation Reference Group,** the country team developed an evaluation reference group with clear tasks and responsibilities, including review the draft evaluation report & ensure final draft meets the comments on draft report[[6]](#footnote-7); Selection of sample; Facilitate the participation of those involved in the evaluation design; identify information needs, define objectives & delimit the scope of the evaluation. (See annex 2 includes the TORs for the ERG.)
5. **The MDG-F Secretariat** functioned as a **Quality Assurance Member** of the evaluation in cooperation with the commissioner of the evaluation by reviewing and providing advice on the quality of the evaluation process as well as on the evaluation products providing options for improvement.
6. The TORs envisioned an **Evaluation Team** consisting of two members: an international evaluation team leader and a team member to assist during the in country field mission. The ERG decided to undertake the evaluation with only one evaluator.[[7]](#footnote-8)The evaluator was responsible for fulfilling the contractual arrangements in line with the ToRs, UNEG/OECD norms, standards and ethical guidelines; this includes developing an evaluation matrix as part of the inception report, drafting reports, and briefing the commissioner and stakeholders on the progress and key findings and recommendations, as needed.

## Constraints and Limitations on the Study Conducted

1. The TORs envisioned a two evaluator team: an international team leader and a National Evaluation Consultant. Recruitment of the National Consultant was unsuccessful due to limited national human resource capacity. For this reason the ERG decided to undertake the evaluation with only one evaluator, but the team leader was not informed of this decision until the evaluation was already in process, which in effect meant schedule and deliverables were agreed under the assumption that there was another team member. In view of this it was agreed that evaluation questions would be used as guide for the process, but the report would focus only on those most meaningful to the specific Joint Programme. The impact of the evaluation team reduction was also raised during the in-country debriefing.
2. The initial TOR envisioned 95[[8]](#footnote-9) working days over a period of 21 weeks to adequately address all phases of the final evaluation. Due to time and other restrictions already mentioned, only 65 working days over a period of 15 weeks were available for the entire process, which in effect meant that activities took place in parallel, for example, the in-country agenda was agreed while the inception report was being drafted as opposed to after it had been reviewed and agreed; similarly, comments to the Inception report were received while the in-country mission was ongoing, which in effect meant it was too late to take comments into consideration for the agenda or in the development of the tools used.
3. Elections took take place on July 7th, a week after the in-country visit. For this reason, and due to commitments related to the campaign process, some of the government counterparts in the original in-country agenda were unable to meet with the evaluator. Key government counterparts originally envisioned to take part of the evaluation that did not take part include the MoE, MoH or MoJ, as well as focus groups with women parliamentarians.
4. As the final evaluation took place before the finalization of the JP, some of the activities were still ongoing and some of the products were not finalized. This was particularly true for all activities related to Outcome three, GRB. For these activities and products it was not possible to asses quality nor impact.
5. The financial data that presented in this report describes the programme situation as of June 2012. The evaluation sought to acquire more detailed information to better understand cost effectiveness and the detail of the implementation, like distribution per region or by receiving agency (both government and NGOs), but was unable to obtain it. The financial reports were also estimated and unaudited.
6. Due to ongoing changes in the staff, mainly the lead agency, together with the late recruitment of the project coordinator and incorporation of the support staff in the RCO, there was little institutional memory in regards to the first two years of implementation, for example, detail on discussions and decisions of the NSC and PMC meetings (many of which did not have substantive minutes); how the initial PRODOC was designed; how and who decided to change the profile of the programme coordinator; etc were not available for analysis.

# Description of the Development Interventions Carried out

## The Programme

1. The overall goal of the Joint Programme was to improve the living conditions of women and girls through their empowerment and the protection of their rights. This was to be done mainly by strengthening institutional capacity, service mechanisms, and ensuring the existence of an adequate legal framework.
2. The JP was approved on October 2008 and scheduled to run from 15 December 2008 to 15 December 2011, with a total budget of $4,955,000 US dollar for a three year implementation. (The initial budget distribution can be seen in Figure 1). Extensions for an additional eight months of implementation were later approved, with total implementation running up until August 31st of 2012.
3. The programme was implemented in five 5 of the 13 districts: Dili, Baucau, Bobonaro, Covalima (Suai) and Oecussi. District The selection of geographic coverage was done according to the following criteria: Areas where domestic violence and/or violence against women is estimated to be more prevalent; Areas susceptible to a higher incidence of human trafficking; Areas with higher estimated level of female-headed households or pockets of extreme poverty; Areas with potentially high maternal mortality and/or teenage pregnancies; Areas with low enrolment rates or potential high drop out rates for adolescent girls; Areas where participating UN agencies have existing projects and networks; Areas with good potential to build on implementing partners’ work; Presence of courts and adequate medical facilities
4. The JP was spearheaded by the Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), and included the participation of five UN agencies, mainly UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women and IOM, with UN Women acting as lead agency for the programme.
5. The JP was implemented in collaboration with a number of Government partners, mainly the State Secretariat for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI), the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ministry of Education (MoE) and Ministry of Finance (MoF). Some local NGOs, including the Alola Foundation, JSMP, Fokupers, Rede Feto and PRADET, also implemented and took part of the JP’s governance through the Programme Management Committee. Administrations and *Suco* councils of the five target districts were also involved in the implementation, as well as some citizen groups and communities.

Figure 1: Total budget distribution by agency

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Agency | Total U$ | Percentage of total |
| UNDP | 629,995 | 14% |
| UNFPA | 918,445 | 21% |
| UNICEF | 465,450 | 11% |
| UNIFEM | 1,080,546 | 25% |
| IOM | 1,283,716 | 29% |
| **TOTAL** | **4,378,152** | **100%** |
| source: PRODOC | |  |

1. The key target beneficiaries of the programme envisioned in the PRODOC were women and girls survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, as well as poor women (including those heading households). Intended secondary beneficiaries were institutional stakeholders, including policy makers, public servants, NGOs and service providers.
2. The expected programme results consisted of the following three outcomes and eight outputs:[[9]](#footnote-10)

**Outcome 1: Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights.**

Output 1.1: Legislation passed and National Action Plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking.

Output 1.2: Capacity building programme developed and implemented to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the Government officials, NGOs and CBOs involved in implementation of the action plans related to combating domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.

Output 1.3: Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.

**Outcome 2: Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through improved outreach mechanisms and services and the establishment of a social protection scheme.**

Output 2.1: Technical supports provided for improving the design and implementation of on-going conditional cash transfer schemes of the Ministry of Social Solidarity.

Output 2.2: National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

**Outcome 3: Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting.**

Output 3.1: Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members

Output 3.2: Civil society (NGOs, Women’s groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures.

Output 3.3: Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot tested in selected line Ministries and *Suco* councils.

1. The expected programme results were reported to be in line with the long term development plans and priorities of the Government of Timor-Leste, as is reflected in the National Development Plan of 2002, the National Strategic Development Plan 2011-30 and the Law on Domestic Violence approved in 2010. The JP was also in line with the programmatic priorities of the participating UN agencies and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2013, contributing towards realizing the UNDAF Outcome 1 (stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated), and UNDAF Outcome 3.3 (Vulnerable populations, especially children and women, benefit from quality social protection, particularly social welfare services, including in emergencies).
2. The programme objectives were directly linked to the MDG 3 (Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women), and were also expected to have a positive impact on MDG 2 (Achieve Universal Primary Education), MDG 1 (to end poverty and hunger), MDG 4 (improvement of child health) and MDG 5 (improvement of maternal health).

## Description of the Programme Progress

**Outcome 1: Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights.**

*Output 1.1: Legislation passed and National Action Plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking.*

The JP came to support an already on-going process for the approval of the Law against Domestic Violence. Although attribution for the approval and final design cannot be given exclusively to the JP, there is widespread agreement that the JP played a key role, both moving the process forward, but also ensuring widespread participation and ownership from both the government and civil society through an inclusive methodology, perceived by the evaluation as a best practice that should be further analyzed for possible replication.

1. The JP can be attributed with the development of the National Action Plan (NAP) on Gender Based Violence and it’s costing, both of which will serve as a guidance for identifying roles and responsibilities, as well as the necessary budget to achieve the government’s goals. Drafting of the Domestic Violence NAP begun in April 2011 and was approved in May 2012, with an established steering committee, allocation of budget for the line ministries, as well as an M&E strategy and a coordination body for the implementation of the NAP. The M&E framework was finalized in early July 2012.
2. The JP supported the drafting and revision process that gave birth to Legislation on Human Trafficking, as well as its NAP. Development of the NAP Against Human Trafficking can be more easily attributed directly to the JP. Although community consultations on the draft National Plan Action on Human Trafficking took place in Viqueque, Baucau, Lospalos, Manatuto, Same, Ainaro, Aileu, Ermera, Liquisa, this process appears to have been less inclusive[[10]](#footnote-11). A high level meeting among the MoFA, MSS, and MoJ was held on March 22nd 2012 to make final revision. The main outcome of the high level meeting was support from the three Ministries to this process, with some minor amendments. The draft is expected to be brought to the Council of Ministries as soon as these amendments are made and the new government is in place. Given that IOM MDG funds are finalized, it is unclear who will be spearheading this process.

*Output 1.2: Capacity building programme developed and implemented to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the Government officials, NGOs and CBOs involved in implementation of the action plans related to combating domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*

1. The JP has undertaken extensive training with different target groups in all areas of focus, including:
   1. **Police** training, (UNFPA together with IOM and UNICEF). The JP established a working group and strengthened the initiative. Together with Timor-Leste Police Development Programme, the JP paid for training, booklet and distribution.
   2. Joint training (UNFPA & UN Women) for members of the vulnerable persons unit (**VPU**) in 3 districts Baucau, Liquica, Covalima (Suai). Main challenge being retention of trained staff in the VPU unit, as they are often absorbed by criminal investigation section or called into other units. JP reported ongoing discussions and lobbying with the chief of VPU for an internal policy for VPU members to remain a minimum of 2 years. The programme recently finished a TOT with contents of that manual for use to train within the police academy, this was done at the request of police, who also asked to broaden training to include other areas of the police, such as patrols, criminal investigation, police academy, community police, task force, etc., as they are often the first responders, and therefore need to know how to collect, report, and who to refer to. It was reported that SEPI and the Police Training Centre (PNTL) have agreed to institutionalize components of the GBV Investigations Training at the Training Centre for new police recruits. This training is scheduled to being in Sept 2012.
   3. Through training/Workshop/socialization on human trafficking, the JP reached 543 beneficiaries throughout four districts, namely Bobonaro, Dili**,** Oecusse and Covalima. These training were facilitated by the respective *Suco* Council. In addition, sessions took place in all 5 districts to prepare *Suco* council on how to make proposals to IOM to obtain funding for Human trafficking related projects.
   4. Conducted specialized training of officials in line Ministries in Dili as well as for NGOs, service providers & church officials on human trafficking including advocacy & campaign on NAP (Dili, Baucau, Suai, Maliana and Oecusse).
   5. Some ad-hoc training of *Suco* councils and local authorities in regards to child rights and the new law on Domestic Violence too place.
   6. Extensive training of child protection officers in all 13 districts on areas such as child rights, the new the Law against Domestic Violence and general gender based violence.

*Output 1.3: Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*

1. The JP did not develop an information, education and/or communication strategy, rather, each agency developed materials needed for their specific objectives. For this reason it is hard to differentiate between output 1.2 and 1.3 as both aim at capacity building. Assessment of all GRB related training and capacity building is excluded from this section and included under Outcome 3.

**Outcome 2: Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through improved outreach mechanisms and services and the establishment of a social protection scheme.**

*Output 2.1: Technical supports provided for improving the design and implementation of on-going conditional cash transfer schemes of the Ministry of Social Solidarity.*

1. **TEXT BOX 1: CASE STUDY: Cash Transfer Scheme**

The Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) initiated the Bolsa da Mae (or CCT scheme) in 2007/08 loosely based on the Brazilian model, with an estimated budget of $600,000. The budget has now increased to $2.5 million. MSS approached UNDP for support in strengthening the programme, and it was included as part of the JP.

According to the JP analysis, there was little accountability and transparency in the selection process of beneficiaries, which was done largely through local Village chiefs (Chefe do Suco).

Throughout 2009 UNDP analyzed the existing situation through surveys, monitoring of payments and talking to beneficiaries. The conclusion was that eligibility criteria was not clear, which led to arbitrary selection, which in turn led to problems within the villages. Similarly the quota system (maximum amount of beneficiaries per area), was not linked to vulnerability or population size, and no monitoring of the conditionality was taking place. This was partly due to a lack of clarity on the objective of the scheme: was the focus children? Was it to continue with the same beneficiaries up to university or to focus on primary school? Was it to support female headed households?

UNDP’s approach was to tackle it from all angles: initially discussions helped the government to articulate what they wanted to achieve. Discussion on eligibility criteria continued will into 2011, and it was done based on the information initially gathered, this priorization would lead to an agreed vulnerability rating.

The final decision was to focus on education and immunization, which meant the removal of higher education and the introduction of support for children under 5 years of age.

An expert in social protection was brought in, as well as ICT consultants to work on the database.

Last year the JP begun the process of registering the existing 15,000 beneficiary households. Three different levels of access to registration have been developed: 1) through the village chiefs, 2) through social workers and the referral network that had been strengthened through the JP, and 3) option of self selection. In all cases the data would go into the database to get weighted and according to the weight and the area’s quota the beneficiary will or won’t be included.

The need to ensure transparency and clarity of the eligibility criteria to the beneficiaries was highlighted, which led to the creation a mechanism to ask why they had/had not been selected, and public systems to ensure beneficiaries know when and where they are going to get paid.

Lastly the focus was on ensuring commitment and methodology for adequate monitoring, which included household registration and cards that need to get stamped when the children receive their immunization, as well as to proof of school attendance in order to receive the payments. These changes were being rolled out at the time of the evaluation, for this reason the beneficiaries interviewed were unaware of their existence, and it was not possible to look into their efficiency.

Although the CCT scheme does not have a gender specific focus, changes lead to gender specific benefits, with over 90% of the beneficiaries being women, (woman head of household is one of the criteria heavily weighted). Similarly, before the changes the amount received was dependant on any children meeting the criteria, now the beneficiaries receives an amount per every child under 18 years of age attending school, which promotes continuation of schooling for girls.

*Output 2.2: National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.*

1. Development of three Standard operating procedures (SOP) for national police, GBV and human trafficking, perceived by beneficiaries interviewed as a best practice and highly useful going forward. Development of Standard operating procedures (SOP) on how to do the referrals were also piloted during 2011 in all 13 districts with support from Irish Aid and MSS.
2. National referral mechanisms for GBV and HT were for the most part already in place, but were strongly supported by the JP ensuring funding for the meetings as well as through advocacy and IEC materials. Mapping of the existing services were undertaken to develop MoUs on referral and procedures between MSS and service providers in Dili. The JP also conducted annual training and service monitoring workshops on SOP for service providers and government on Human trafficking (Dili, Baucau, Suai, Maliana and Oecusse).
3. The JP has provided support extending existing “safe space” with trauma counseling services through Pradet, which were replicated it in the 5 districts hospitals. None of which were visited during the evaluation. The center in Oecusse was reportedly finished and scheduled to open in July 2012. Funding was used towards the building, equipment and furnishing such as Doppler and beds. At the time of the evaluation Covalima had also been constructed, and a similar model was being developed in Dili, Baucau, and Maliana in Bobonaro District. , scheduled to be finished and opened after the finalization of the JP, with possible extension also to Mobissi. New staff had been recruited and retained with funding from AusAid, and trained by the JP. Funding for the sustainability of these centers for the next three years was incorporated in the NAP.
4. An existing medical forensic protocol on Domestic Violence was revised, translated, printed and distributed with support from the JP. This work was also done in parallel with support from other donors, with training and salary of the consultant leading this exercise funded by AusAid. An audit is scheduled to take place to ensure that training has taken place and that protocols have been filled out correctly and can be used for the courts etc..
5. Work was undertaken to promote awareness and stronger practices in regards to child protection, including:
6. more child friendly procedure, including for GBV, for the police
7. The JP initially supported the shelters directly, but moved towards strengthening of the government structures for sustainability purposes, supporting MSS to enhance monitoring and management of shelters, as well as expansion to include orphanages and boarding houses which often take child victims of GBV.
8. support to the child protection working group, charged with emergency response to sexual abuse during humanitarian crisis
9. support to child protection networks, socialization of GBV in the communities and strengthening of the referral mechanism through capacity building of parents, teachers and local authorities with specific focus on gender violence. The JP has produced referral guidelines that combine child protection with women victims guideline for child protection officer, police, social services, now charged with looking after children and gender issues.
10. support to victims of human trafficking through Pradet (not exclusive to children but includes children). This was been handed over to the government at the start of 2012.

**Outcome 3: Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting.**

*Output 3.1: Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members*

1. Main tools were still being developed when the evaluation took place, for this reason the consultant was unable to assess their effectiveness, usefulness or quality. The tools reportedly completed by July 2012 include:
   * A tool kit for Gender Working Group on How to do a gender assessment, a gender audit, and how to ensure it has been mainstreamed (developed and printed).
   * Gender Responsive Budgeting in Timor-Leste; Documentation and Assessment of GRB Capacity in SEPI, Line Ministries and Non-Government Organizations to be used for further capacity development actions

*Output 3.2: Civil society (NGOs, Women’s groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures.*

1. The JP provided introductory GRB initial training to NGOs such as FOKUPERS, NGO FORUM, Rede Feto, LUTA Hamutuk and Feto Kbiit Servisu Hamutuk (FKSH); supported one NGO Member from FKSH to attend GRB training in Turin; and in collaboration with Rede Feto, organized a two days GRB training for NGOs’ District facilitators, facilitated by NGO members and UN Women. The district facilitators then rolled out training to elected local village council in Oecusse, Ermera, Viqueque, Lautem and Ermera. As a result of this initiative, an NGO GRB working group was created to continue to advocate for budget allocation for the implementation Law against Domestic Violence. The JP then organized a two day workshop with the working group on how to advocate and influence key line ministries and parliament. The members interviewed reported lack of access to government budget as one of the main barriers to GRB in country.
2. In addition two study tours were organized to Mozambique and India, where beneficiaries from government, civil society and academia where taken to observe and learn on GRB in other countries, and were provided with good practices and successful experiences.
3. The JP also created the Center for Gender Equality in SEPI, mainly as a response to office space within SEPI, providing rent and resources such as computers, with no clear sustainability strategy beyond the JP life[[11]](#footnote-12).
4. In addition, the following tools for NGO gender responsive budgeting analysis and monitoring were reported to have been finalized in July 2012:

* Facilitators ‘Guidebook and Materials for Gender-Responsive Budgeting in Timor-Leste
* Monitoring Gender Responsive Budgeting in Timor-Leste; guidelines for NGOs. UN Women is reportedly in the process of developing an agreement with FOKUPERS to continue supporting NGOs and women organizations to use these guidelines to monitor upcoming state budgets and developed scorecard to monitor services for VAW survivors. The consultant would recommend significant training to Fokupers before they are charged with training of other NGOs.
* An information booklet on GRB for NGOs, member of parliament and government officers, which will also be used to brief new parliament and government officials

*Output 3.3: Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot tested in selected line Ministries and Suco councils.*

1. The piloting could not take place as originally envisioned as a) the tools were only developed at the end of the project and b) it involved sensitive political decisions, over which the JP had no control[[12]](#footnote-13). In its place two pilot projects were undertaken through Fokupers in Covalima and Maliana districts, where after initial training on RGB the NGO undertook discussions with local authorities in order to identify and build a gender responsive project.
2. The programme did provide training to key staff from the three ministries in the context of the already mentioned study tours. Key officers from the Ministry of Education attended GRB training and exchange in Mozambique, and one MSS staff attended a conference in Bangkok on how to strengthen gender mainstreaming.
3. Participatory evaluation assessment was conducted as part of the training.

# Levels of Analysis: evaluation criteria and questions

## Initial findings Design level (relevance and coherence)

1. The initial proposal (Prodoc) clearly identifies the link between the JP objectives and the country needs with a high incidence of domestic violence; concern over the country’s vulnerability to both national and international human trafficking; weak mechanisms (tools and services) and laws to address these issues; increased vulnerability of women due to lower social and economic standing.
2. The evaluation was able to confirm reported alignment between the JP and the UNCT priorities, this was particularly evident as most of the activities undertaken by the project were already ongoing, and in many cases responded to national demand, for example, the Law Against Domestic Violence was a process that had been ongoing since early 2004, the *Bolsa da Mae* was support to strengthen an existing government scheme, similarly, the government had identified the need for Child Protection officers and a VPU unit, which the JP came in to strengthen. Lastly, the JP supports the Government’s international commitments such as the signed United Nations Protocol to Prevent, suppress and punish Trafficking persons and CEDAW.
3. There is alignment with the Government’s commitment to the MDG goals, and to the National Development Plan existing at the time the JP was designed, as well as the newly developed Strategic Development Plan for 2010-2030, which specifically addresses issues of child rights, gender equality and domestic violence in particular, confirming the *JP’s alignmen*t with both National and UNCT priorities.

### Programme design

1. The proposed strategy is robust and comprehensive, with a clear focus on three key areas, mainly the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold women’s rights; improved outreach mechanisms and services; and improved allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting. The strategy addressed both framework, services and root causes, providing a comprehensive approach that sought to go beyond palliative solutions towards more sustainable transformations. Participation of civil society further strengthened the programme design by ensuring monitoring and oversight mechanism beyond the programme’s lifespan. However, a theory of change, although implicit, was never fully developed, as a result, objectives and activities are presented clearly, but the link between the two, how the actions proposed were to impact the MDGs and produce the changes identified at Outcome level, remains unclear.
2. The JP was designed at a time when the country was immersed in a very different reality, and when the UN country team was dealing with recent upheaval of 2006, reportedly for this reason, and due to time constraints, there was limited participation of government counterparts and no participation of civil society in the design stage. The JP did include five UN agencies, several ministries and five NGOs, even at the governance level[[13]](#footnote-14), highlighting its comprehensive nature, and was an ambitious proposal towards *delivering as ONE*, in line with the MDG-F goals.
3. The design did not, however identify synergies, competitive advantages or mechanisms to promote joint implementation or cross fertilization beyond those proposed by the MDG fund. It also failed to recognize the need for an inception period, particularly key in a country where identification of human resources is challenging. This led to a delayed start of a weakened Programme Management Unit, and also impacted the work of the lead agency, both with long lasting impact on the programme, leading to parallel implementation, with some of the benefits of Joint programming, such as identification of potential areas of collaboration, only beginning to emerge towards the end of the programme.
4. The main focus of the programme was the MDG 3 of gender equality, but was expected to have a positive impact on the MDG 1 (to end poverty and hunger), MDG 5 (improvement of maternal health), and to a lesser degree on MDG 4 (improvement of child health), and MDG 2 (Achieve Universal Primary Education) through the *Bolsa da Mae* initiative. Impact on the MDGs cannot be measured due mainly to a weak M&E system and the lack of indicators directly linked to the country’s MDG indicators. It is also believed that the size of the initiatives would not be large enough to have an impact on the national indicators (for example the case of the CCT initiative), but clearer M&E mechanisms would have provided proof of their effectiveness for possible expansion. Although not measurable, it is perceived to have had a positive impact on the MDG 3, not only through the achievements related to the Law Against Domestic Violence and proposed law on Human Trafficking, but also through increased awareness of issues, mechanisms and services as well as the importance of GRB. The *Bolsa da Mae* does have an impact on MDG 1, and is expected to have a positive impact on MDG 4 and MDG 2 as soon as the monitoring mechanism are in place. .
5. The programme was built over existing relationship and successful experiences, which allowed for a smooth start. Thematic responsibilities were clearly assigned within the implementing agencies, , mainly UNFPA as the lead agency on Domestic Violence; OIM as the lead agency for Human trafficking; UNDP for the improvement of the CCT or *Bolsa Mae*, UNIFEM (now UN Women) as lead in the area of GRB, and UNICEF covering child protection. Past experience indicates that previous agreement on areas of technical lead facilitates coordination and management of a JP. Opportunities to provide support amongst partners would have increased with a stronger PMU.
6. The geographic focus proposed came across as both a representative yet manageable, and could have led to *de facto* pilot areas with conclusions on the interactions between the different activities. The pre-agree selection criteria ensured that the areas selected were relevant to the programme objectives, while also feasible by guaranteeing existing presence and knowledge of the implementing partners. The evaluation concludes that implementation did not maintain this geographic focus, with many of the activities taking place at national level or covering all 13 districts (for example, CCT and training of child protection officers,) while others focused on just some of the five districts. Further, there is little detail as to the budget distribution and no analysis has been undertaken to understand the geographic impact of the joint programme in the areas pre-identified.

## Initial findings: process level (Efficiency & financial progress)

1. A budgetary summary as of August 2012 (Figure 2) shows final disbursements at 91%, with only UN Women not having achieved full financial disbursement. It should be noted that full financial implementation does not immediately reflect that the initial objective was achieved, nor is it guarantee of quality. The evaluation observed some cases where the quality or nature of the activity suffered as a result of significant changes, for example, the already mentioned shorter time for implementation in regards to the GRB component.[[14]](#footnote-15)

**Figure 2: Financial status as of 31 August 2012[[15]](#footnote-16)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Total Approved Budget** | UNDP US$ 629,995 13%  UNFPA US$ 918,445 19%  UNICEF US$ 465,450 9%  UN Women US$ 1,657,394 33%  IOM US$ 1,283,716 26%  **Total US$ 4,955,000 100%** |
| **Total Budget Transferred** | UNDP US$ 629,995 100%  UNFPA US$ 918,445 100%  UNICEF US$ 465,450 100%  UN Women US$ 1,657,394 100%  IOM US$ 1,283,716 100%  **Total US$ 4,955,000 100%** |
| **Total Budget Committed** | UNDP US$ 629,995 100%  UNFPA US$ 918,445 100%  UNICEF US$ 465,450 100%  UN Women US$ \*1,544,623 93%  IOM US$ 1,283,716 100%  **Total: US$ 4,842,229 98%** |
| **Total Budget Disbursed** | UNDP US$ 629,995 100%  UNFPA US$ 918,445 100%  UNICEF US$ 465,450 100%  UN Women US$ \*1,210,580 73%  IOM US$ 1,283,716 100%  **Total US$ 4,508,186 91%** |

\* Including programme document preparation costs of US$ 20,000

The above financial information includes overhead, M&E and other associated costs.

**Coordination mechanisms: PMC and NSC**

1. The governance of this Joint Programme is done through a two-tier management set-up as per the MDG-F directives, which envisioned a National Steering Committee (NSC) for all MDG programmes in the country to meet bi-annually. The NSC’s main role was seen as that of oversight and strategic guidance of the programme, while operational coordination was to be done through a Programme Management Committee (PMC), which would meet on a quarterly basis.
2. The first NSC meeting took place on October 2007 in order to introduce the MDG-F and agree on the role of the NSC. Once the programme was up and running the NSC did not meet as scheduled, twice a year, but only once a year during the first three years (2008, 2009 and 2010) with two meeting taking place in 2011 and none in the first half of 2012[[16]](#footnote-17). Review of documentation provided leads to the conclusion that the focus of the NSC meetings was the approval of progress reports, funding requests, extension and other such decisions that can only be taken at the NSC level, without much discussion of strategic direction or possible synergies. Discussions on content, such as concerns around sustainability, which were raised at the last NSC in December of 2011, and recommendations for a project specific advocacy strategy (May 2009) appear to have had no follow up actions.

The PMC initially met only after one year of implementation, but has since met quarterly as envisioned in the PRODOC. Participants reported the PMC to be a good mechanism for coordination, and felt it had increased their knowledge and understanding of the other agencies, as well as how the UN system functions, but at the same time felt it lacked focus on results, while report on progress had left little time for more in-depth discussions, where innovation and identification of synergies could have happened. Participants to the PMC changed frequently, affecting continuity and ability to make decisions. Although simultaneous translation was often provided for PMC and NSC meetings, and key discussions were translated when simultaneous translation service was not available, the primary use of the language was cited as a barrier for more in-depth discussion.

**Figure 3: NSC and PMC meetings held**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Date held** |
| **NSC meetings** | October 11 2007  September10 2008[[17]](#footnote-18)\*  May 6 2009  27 July 2010\*  28 February 2011  20 December 2011 |
| **PMC meetings** | 17 December 2009  18 March 2010  16 July 2010  6 August 2010  17 December 2010  January 2011  17 May 2011  12 August 2011  30 November 2011  2 February 2012  19 Aril 2012  29 June 2012 (during the final evaluation in country visit) |

1. It should be noted that the PMC includes the participation of civil society[[18]](#footnote-19) and, in addition, includes an information sharing agenda item where other organizations working in similar districts on the same issues can be invited. CARE International, Oxfam and the Justice Facility[[19]](#footnote-20)were invited to share their work.
2. Inclusion of civil society in the PMC is in line with Timor-Leste where there is a close link between Government and civil society, and where many government responsibilities, such as shelters and legal protection of victims, are undertaken by NGOs. Never the less, discussions usually take place bilaterally between the government and the UN, and inclusion of civil society at governance level was described as an enriching experience for the JP. Both the inclusion of civil society in the PMC and the possibility to reach out to other organizations for information sharing seem like innovative practices which the evaluation recommends should be further looked into.
3. It can be concluded, both from bilateral interviews and the minutes provided that, in spite of the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation, strategic oversight and focus on results did not take place at either instance, with the NSC functioning as high level political instance focused on oversight and approval, and the PMC functioning more as a progress tracking tool. The evaluator believes that the PMC as initially envisioned by the MDG-F, with regular attendance of agency representatives and high level ministry participation, and a stronger PMU as originally envisioned in the PRODOC would have given way to a more strategic and results oriented approach. It was reported that this was the case for the other MDG programme on nutrition in Timor, where a high level biannual PMC meeting takes place, with an informal technical staff level group meeting more regularly. In spite of its limitations, the final evaluation concludes that the PMC was a positive exercise which has increased the participants’ knowledge and understanding, and is expected to yield results in future joint initiatives, some examples of which were already reported during the evaluation, and the preparation process of the new UNDAF.

**Coordination mechanisms: Programme Management Unit**

1. The PRODOC envisioned the creation of a programme management unit (PMU) based within the lead agency, with one international “with an M&E background” and two national staff. Although the PRODOC never identified the roles and responsibilities envisioned for the national staff, it would seem clear from the description of the responsibilities assigned that the PMU was envisioned mainly to act as monitoring, reporting and support tool for the joint programme.
2. An international M&E specialist was recruited in September 2009. Although there is no documentation on the matter, different accounts point to a lack of clarity in the management of the position[[20]](#footnote-21) leading to the resignation of the staff in November 2009. A national coordinator was recruited from January 1st 2010 to June 14 of the same year. The consultant was unable to obtain any further information in regards to this staff’s responsibilities or the reason why the staff member is no longer with the programme. Recruitment of another National staff took place, but due to lengthened UNIFEM procedures, which require approval from Bangkok, by the time the approval of the recruitment arrived the staff had already joined another UN agency. The current Programme Coordinator was recruited in December 2010, and an administrative assistant joined him in early 2012, shortly before the finalisation of the JP. The third staff member was never recruited.
3. Previously the role of programme coordinator was undertaken by the lead agency. Given the limited staffing within the lead agency and the continuous changes in management that took place during the JP, the evaluation concludes that it was ambitious to assume that UNIFEM had the capacity to both lead, implement and coordinate the JP. Information stemming from the evaluation process seems to confirm this, with widespread agreement on the positive impact of the programme coordinator on the JP’s coordination.
4. Concerns were also raised in regards to the interdependence between the PMU and the lead agency, which made it difficult for the programme officer to report independently and objectively in regards to UN Women’s progress.
5. The evaluation concludes that the JP was negatively impacted by a lack of a fully and adequately staffed PMU, with little empowerment from the lead agency. The lack of an independent coordination and a central M&E function led to parallel implementation for most of the duration of the programme, as well as superficial M&E exercises that focused on reporting rather than quality and analysis. Opportunities to identify synergies, which are beginning to arise now, as well as potential benefits stemming from each agency’s added value and the sharing of expertise[[21]](#footnote-22) were lost, with a few joint studies, one IEC joint initiative and some coordinated training session reported as the sole joint activities undertaken.

**Coordination mechanisms: Roles and responsibilities**

1. The RCO played a key integrating role between the JP and the work of the gender working group and the peacekeeping mission, ensuring coherence. In Timor-Leste the RC plays various roles as DRSRG, RC and head of UNDP. This has allowed for increased interaction between the JP and the UNMIT mission, for example, through regular gender meetings that included all participants. It was also reported that due to these many commitments the RC delegated many of the MDG related activities to staff within his office. Given the extent of the responsibilities of the RC in Timor-Leste, capacity of the RCO should have also been assessed from the beginning of the programme, the JP might have benefitted from inclusion of support staff at the RCO level.
2. The evaluation concludes that changes within the lead agency, both in management and internal structure from UNIFEM to UN Women, led to its inability to assert itself as a lead agency. It was also suggested that –although clearly the correct agency from a technical point of view- it could have been foreseen that the UNIFEM office in Timor-Leste did not have the in-country capacity to lead and implement and backstop a $5 million joint programme, Providing the lead to a more established and larger agency might have strengthened the PMU both from an administrative, logistical and more diplomatic point of view. The idea of double lead, experimented in other countries, where one has the administrative lead and another the technical lead, could have been another option.
3. The JP also set out an inclusive Evaluation Reference Group (see Annex 2) which was charged with coordination and oversight of the mid-term and final evaluation on behalf of the PMC.

### Coordination mechanisms: M&E and Advocacy

1. The JP used the MDG-F’s “Implementation Guidelines for MDG-F Joint Programmes” (chapters 5 and 7), as guideline for M&E and C&A purposes, instead of developing a more specific internal document aligned to country priorities.
2. The JP developed a common **M&E framework**, which was agreed and revised every six months with inputs from the agencies. The color coded work plans were developed in consultation and updated every three months. Each agency monitored their own activities, no common criteria were developed. Two joint field visits took place in the context of a joint internal review in September -October 2011. Monitoring reports were submitted quarterly/bi-annually to the PMU for consolidation and discussion at the PMC level. These instruments were regularly discussed in the PMC and used as basis for the drafting of bi-annual reports to the MDG-F Secretariat. The programme also conducted a baseline survey in 2009 through Dili University. Baseline survey questionnaires were developed with inputs form all participating UN agencies.
3. Some participants felt that focus on progress tracking, possibly due to the initial delays and the need for 70% implementation in order to receive further funds, moved focus away from quality and more in-depth discussions that could have strengthened programme coherence.
4. The Mid-term exercise was by and large considered to have had appositive effect on the programme, highlighting gaps and areas that required increased focus, although many of the weaknesses identified continued during the remainder of the programme. Similarly, the sustainability exercise was considered very useful but to have taken place too late.
5. The evaluation concludes that the lack of an M&E expert at the PMU level,, especially given most of the partner agencies, both on the UN and the government side, did not have their own M&E capability, weakened the JP’s monitoring and evaluation. The color coded work plan was regarded as a useful tool which facilitated visualization of progress and budget expenditure, while the results framework was for the most part not useful. Evidence of this is the fact that the results framework continued to change well into 2012, , with the last revision dating to May of 2012, by which time it can no longer serve as a tool to guide implementation and measure progress against original targets, as originally intended.
6. Further, the evaluation concludes both programme coherence and quality would have benefitted from a stronger M&E central unit. This central M&E unit would have been able to focus on quality and impact of the JP as a unit, as opposed to individual activities, possibly providing entirely different insights to those that result of individual analysis.

**TEXT BOX 2 - CASE STUDY: Development of referral booklet for human trafficking and gender based violence:**

The booklet was originally an IOM/Alola Foundation venture focused on human trafficking. During the process of collecting information it was decided that UNFPA would join and SGBV would be included.

UNFPA, IOM and Alola Foundation met to discuss content and layout of the booklet; IOM suggested a designer and as UNFPA agreed to pay for the printing costs.

All three agencies were involved in updating the Directory for second printing.

1. The development of an **advocacy strategy** for the Joint Gender programme was discussed and recommended during the NSC meeting of 2009, but a separate written document was never developed. Enquiries as to why this strategy was not developed did not yield any results. Instead, each agency developed its own communication and advocacy activities in line with their own activities and needs, for the most part jointly with their government and civil society counterparts.
2. This lack of centralization led to weakening of some initiatives envisioned in the JP, such as the 16 day campaign. The materials produced were not necessarily shared amongst partners, nor were they centralized at the PMU level.
3. Some joint activities did take place, with at least one example of good practice, the booklet developed for victims of HT and SGBV (see Figure 4). There were other joint initiatives such as the production of the postcard and posters on domestic violence (see Figure 5).
4. The evaluation concludes that there is a clear benefit from the joint programme in the form of increased awareness and knowledge at different levels. Nevertheless, there was a missed opportunity to develop a joint strategy with agreed focus and target audience, led by 5 UN agencies and at least as many government counterparts and civil society partners, which would have had more impact, and could have fed directly into the new UNDAF.

## Initial findings: Results level (Ownership and Sustainability)

Ownership

1. High level of interest and knowledge of programme detail was observed amongst the NSC and PMC participants interviewed. There were conflicting reports in regards to ownership amongst government agencies, with most government counterparts themselves admitting that they did not have the capacity to participate in the programme as often as they would have wanted to. Similar responses were obtained from the UN agencies, which leads to conclude that capacity was not adequately assessed at the beginning of the programme.
2. Although simultaneous translation (English-Tetum) was provided for management meetings, as well as translation into Tetum for written materials, the dominance of the English language was cited as a barrier to ownership, of what was often described as a donor driven process. Some participants felt that hosting the meetings in Government buildings, as opposed to the UN complex, would have strengthened national participation.
3. There was a clear awareness and appreciation of the benefits the “jointeness” of the programme had provided, including but not limited to increased understanding of other agencies’ work (both UN and government); better coordination and ability to distribute funding (for example, the government commented that they are normally not aware of which NGOs are receiving funding from donors, while in this case they knew they could use funding from NGOs already supported by the JP towards other ends). There are also many examples of activities that have proven their benefits and are being taken over by the government, such as funding for the Child Protection Officers (initially a pilot funded by UNICEF before the JP, now part of the government budget for all 13 districts), the medical forensic protocol, anger management courses for prisoners and some of the police training.
4. The evaluation concludes there was a high level of ownership in regards to the specific activities and goals, both at the level of UN agencies, government and civil society, with little progress towards ownership and understanding of the joint programme as something different than bilateral/parallel projects, which only begun to emerge towards the end. Little evidence was observed of ownership at the budgetary level, with government and civil society for the most part expecting international donors to fund the continuation of activities.

Figure : The domestic violence postcard AND PSOTER WERE developed jointly between UNFPA, UNMIT and SEPI

DV POSTER.tiff

**Sustainability:**

1. The main pillars for sustainability, as reported by the team,[[22]](#footnote-23)were: a) Establishment of Government leadership in all stages of the cycle; b) Building government ownership of the programme interventions; c)Shaping the Government structures for the promotion of gender equality and women’s rights
2. The JP design had some inherent sustainability elements, primarily, Outcome one sought to provide an agreed and approved protection framework. Outcome two sought to provide the skills to implement and advocate for it, and lastly Outcome three, sought to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated, while empowering civil society to act as monitoring mechanisms. Mechanisms to strengthened the Bolsa da Mae will also be sustainable over time, as long as it continues to receive sufficient funding. In addition, in April 2011 the JP developed a sustainability strategy which sought to identify strengths as well as weaknesses. Alignment with UNDAF and government development plan are an added reassurance of continuity
3. Service related activities, which rely entirely on donor funding to continue, appear to be most at risk and in need of a sustainability strategy, for example the shelters, but initiatives such as the human trafficking NAP and the Domestic Violence NAP also depend on the government assigning sufficient human and budgetary resources to be sustainable. For this reason, continued lobbying for the sustainability of the JP achievements will be necessary to ensure that these are not lost, for example, if the human trafficking NAP is not approved, or the Domestic Violence NAP does not receive significant funding, both exercises might become irrelevant. Similarly, if the VPU unit continues to suffer from lack of support from the Investigation Unit, (cars are taken, staff rotated, lack of clarity as to who is responsible for investigating these cases, etc), training and SOPs will not be useful.

# Conclusions

### Design and Relevance

1. The JP addresses a key national challenge in regards to development and alignment with MDG priorities. External coherence with national priorities both at UNCT level, (UNDAF pillar 7 and the reported intention to include focus on GBV in the upcoming UNDAF) and the agencies’ new country programmes, as well as alignment with national strategies, primarily the new Strategic Development Plan (2010-2030) was also confirmed,
2. The **key target beneficiaries as originally envisioned in the PRODOC were reversed, with primary beneficiaries being** institutional stakeholders, and secondary or long term beneficiaries expected to be women and girls survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, as well as poor women, including those heading households.
3. **Quality of design:**
   1. The initial design had internal coherence with focus on three key areas that addressed GBV at both impact and root levels, but failed to identify synergies and how each partner’s expertise could be used to strengthen the JP.
   2. Similarly, a theory of change, although implicit, was never fully developed, and as a result, objectives and activities are presented clearly, but the link between the two, how the actions proposed were to impact the MDGs and produce the changes identified at Outcome level, remains unclear.
   3. The JP was developed by the UN with limited participation of government and civil society, and little consideration to how the aid architecture characteristics in Timor would affect implementation.
   4. These weaknesses, together with the lack of a programme management unit until the end of the second year of implementation, led to parallel implementation.
   5. There were insufficient human resources assigned to implement the JP effectively, particularly true in the case of the PMU and the lead agencies both on the UN and the government side, which led to significant inefficiencies such as the late recruitment of a consultancy firm to implement most of the GRB component; inconsistent attendance to PMC meetings; or a weakened joint monitoring and oversight function, on occasion having a negative impact on quality and sustainability stemming from this.

### Efficiency &Process

1. **Programme governance structures:**
2. NSC and PMC were set up according to MDG-F guidelines but did not function regularly until the PMU was incorporated.
3. The final evaluation concludes that the PMC, as initially envisioned by the MDG-F, with regular attendance of agency representatives and high level ministry participation,[[23]](#footnote-24)would have given way to a more strategic and results oriented approach.
4. Active participation of NGOs in the PMC is in line with the Timor context, and was widely perceived as positive for the programme.
5. In spite of these limitations, the final evaluation also concludes that the PMC was a positive exercise which has increased the participants’ knowledge and understanding, and is expected to yield results in future joint initiatives, including the preparation process of the UNDAF.
6. **Distribution of roles and responsibilities: RCO, PMU, lead agency**
7. RCO played a key integration role between the JPs and the work of gender working group, integrating work from the peacekeeping mission, ensuring coherence.
8. Continuous changes in the lead agency weakened its role.
9. The PMU was set up late, with insufficient human capacity or empowerment to play a significant role in coordination.
10. The JP would have benefitted from it’s own M&E capacity at the PMU level, and from a common strategy for monitoring, oversight and quality assurance. Greater coherence between the JP and the country initiative would have also ensured alignment between the JP priorities and the UNCT M&E system.
11. There appears to have been insufficient human resources allocated/available for the programme, particularly true in the case of for the case of UN Women, PMU and government lead agency. The RCO also reported having been stretched, and could have benefitted from increased support, or the inclusion of the MDG officer from inception.
12. No particular instruments were developed to facilitate joint programming, and no synergies were identified in spite of overlaps, like working with same Suco for example. In practice the JP, in particular the UN, had increased costs in that it required an additional level of reporting, but did not benefit from the potential synergies of joint programming, such as joint M&E or joint C&A. In particular, in the case of UN WOMEN, extensive delays led to a change in implementation methodology to work through a consulting firm. Although this allowed for program implementation, there is widespread agreement that this had a negative effect on the quality, sustainability and cost effectiveness of the agency’s implementation. On the government side, there does appear to have been benefits and synergies stemming from JP, with increased and better understanding of both UN mandates and the different agencies’ potential roles in the area of gender, as well as better understanding of which NGOs were already being supported.
13. The final evaluation concludes that the JP increased visibility of the JP objectives, but the lack of a communications and/or advocacy strategy led to dilution of impact and visibility.

### Effectiveness and Results

1. The project has achieved or is expected to achieve most of the objectives activities it set out to achieve[[24]](#footnote-25), but the quality or sustainability of many of these achievements varies, and needs to be looked at individually.

On the whole, there are constraints in the effectiveness of the programme because of difficulties in achieving its expected results. There has been slow progress in the implementation of activities which put both achievement and quality of results at risk. The causes for delay observed are in line with those already put forward by the mid-term evaluation, mainly:

* + 1. There is a higher level of difficulty to implement a joint programme in Timor-Leste because of its social, economic and political conditions
    2. The programme design was ambitious; the types of changes that the programme wanted to achieve are complex and most of these are difficult to achieve within the time frame and the specific constraints in Timor-Leste.
    3. The programme took a considerable risk in assigning most of the inputs and deliverables to a single agency, which was also made responsible for programme management.
    4. There have been agency weaknesses in making timely decisions and actions, particularly in the staffing function, as well as lack of clarity in the distinction between MDG-F and agency rules.

1. Both quality and sustainability of results varies, with some of the outputs having been developed through very clear, comprehensive and sustainable strategies, such as the CCT scheme, while other activities have been done more ad-hoc (training or IEC materials), or forced by time and scheduling constraints, (particularly true in the case of Outcome three) adjusting implementation to time constraints.
2. **Outcome 1: Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights.- (19% of total programme funds were assigned to this Outcome) Substantially achieved**

* *Output 1.1: Legislation passed and National Action Plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking.*

**Substantially achieved**, with the JP having played a key role in moving forward the process of drafting, consultation and approval of the Law against Domestic Violence, as well as the drafting of the law against Human trafficking, and both National Action Plans, and the costing of the NAP for the law against Domestic Violence. The UN must continue to lobby for the implementation and adequate allocation of human resources of both these plans to ensure that achievements are not lost.

The drafting process for the law on Domestic Violence, which is seen as a best practice by the evaluator, was reportedly more inclusive of civil society while the drafting process on the Law on Human Trafficking was more government led.

* *Output 1.2: Capacity building programme developed and implemented to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the Government officials, NGOs and CBOs involved in implementation of the action plans related to combating domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*

**Partially achieved**. Achieved in so far as there has been extensive training and capacity building, but no clear objectives were agreed, which would be needed in order to develop a common strategy, rather each agency has developed a parallel system with no identified synergies. In addition, there was little analysis as to the different methodologies used and their effectiveness. This dispersion is considered inefficient, especially given the high number of on going trainings reported to be already taking place in the country outside the scope of the JP, with some of the beneficiaries interviewed reporting training fatigue, or having received similar training from other institutions (for example, child protection officers.)

The evaluation concludes that different methodologies appeared to have different levels of effectiveness, with short or punctual trainings, with civil society or institutions that don’t already have a basic degree of understanding, seeming to produce little to no results, given the low level of understanding of basic concepts observed amongst beneficiaries of this type of training during the evaluation process. Considering support in the form of collocation, such as the consultants based within the Ministries, or through practical analysis, such as case studies or analysis of actual budgets, to be more sustainable.

* *Output 1.3: Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented on domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*

**Partially achieved**. Agencies developed activities to promote education, information and communication, but no common no strategy was developed, leading to dilution of the initiatives (as mentioned above). The drafting of the new UNDAF is a great opportunity to ensure alignment of existing initiatives under one coherent approach, which could be led y the Communication group for the UNCT, aligning strategies, and ensuring issues, lessons learned, best practices, existing materials, district contacts etc… are utilized and made available to other partners.

1. **Outcome 2: Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through a) improved outreach mechanisms and services and b) the establishment of a social protection scheme. (48% of total funds were assigned to this Outcome) –**was **achieved** through support to the *Bolsa da Mae* scheme, possibly a best practice of the JP. I**mproved outreach mechanisms and services** were strengthened through ongoing support to referral networks, leading to a reported increased awareness and coordination of services, as well as through direct support to outreach services, such as shelters, safe houses, orphanages or legal support. The development of standard operating procedures was also viewed as one of the JP’s strengths.

* *Output 2.1: Technical supports provided for improving the design and implementation of on-going conditional cash transfer schemes of the Ministry of Social Solidarity.*

Fully achieved. Very clear strategy, methodology as well as sustainability strategy developed to support an ongoing government scheme. Possibly a best practice of the JP. Reportedly looking into how the referral mechanisms strengthened by the JP could be used to strengthen the system, as one of the synergies stemming from the JP.

Although the approach did not have a specific gender approach, it will have an important positive impact on women, with of the changes having a direct positive impact on women.

* *Output 2.2: National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.*

Achieved. Although most referral mechanisms were established before the joint programme, these were strengthened through ongoing support to regular meetings as well as information and IEC materials. The JP was reported to have increased awareness and coordination of services. Concern was expressed by civil society in regards to sustainability due to the limited human resources and budget of the government, charged with maintenance of these referral systems going forward.

In addition, services were strengthened through support to shelters, safe houses, orphanages or legal support services be it directly to the NGOs or through the government. The JP programme also strengthened services trough training, for example on how to investigate, by developing standard operating procedures, or strengthening medical forensic examination. For the most part the support observed and reported has been in the form of financial support to existing services as opposed technical support based on the agencies’ expertise.

Again, some of the achievements have their own inherent sustainability, for example the medical forensic protocols, SOP as well as the training will remain, while others, such as payment of staff salary (JSPM) or for goods shelters will need to identify alternate funding in order to continue.

The evaluation concludes that it would have been best if strategies for sustainability, and the necessary commitments to ensure it, had been discussed at the design stage, and played a part as criteria for inclusion –or not- of activities in the JP. Nevertheless, the UN can play a key role in lobbying for funds to ensure that adequate funding is allocated to sustain the achievements of the JP. GRB can be a very useful tool for this.

1. **Outcome 3: Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting. . (21% of total funds were assigned to this Outcome) – Achieved to some degree**

The evaluation concludes that the aims of Outcome three were over ambitious for a three year project, especially in view of the limited in-country capacity of the implementing agency, and the limited knowledge on GRB of both beneficiaries and counterparts. This coupled with the delays in recruitment and changes in the lead agency led to the bulk of Outcome three being implemented in under 10 months towards the end of the JP and mostly through outside consultants. (28 November -7 July 2012). This reduction in implementation time had inevitable impact on both the quality and sustainability of the products, in particular in regards to training and the ability of beneficiaries to internalize acquired knowledge. In addition, there is general agreement that outside sourcing was a recourse necessary to implement within the time frame, but not the most cost effective.

As described the outcome was not achieved, this is partly due to how the Outcome was worded, more as a long term impact than a direct result of the programme. By the time of drafting of final report, most of the deliverables had been finalized and significant progress had been achieved towards increasing understanding of GRB and it’s potential positive impact on development for Timor beyond the sphere of SEPI. Significant partnerships have been created that could lead to important achievements after the JP, for example, the partnership with Lau Hamutuk or with the Ministry of Agriculture, given the high number of rural families that could benefit.

* *Output 3.1: Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members*

Mostly achieved. Most tools were finalized just before the finalization of the JP. Training and capacity building to increased knowledge of senior government officials had taken place, and the tools are expected to provide for more practical exercises on their functions.

As the tools were finalized after the in-country visit, quality, usefulness and impact could not be assessed.

* *Output 3.2: Civil society (NGOs, Women’s groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures.*

Somewhat achieved. Some training and workshops were still ongoing during the evaluation, for this reason impact and quality could not be assessed. JP has begun work with NGOs and academia, mainly through the study tours to Mozambique and India, which received mixed reports, although many participants were able to cite specific examples of elements observed during the tours that could strengthen GRB in the country. Some training sessions took place with NGOs expected to continue training at district level. The JP also created the Center for Gender Equality in SEPI[[25]](#footnote-26),

* *Output 3.3: Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot tested in selected line Ministries and Suco councils*

Not achieved. Pilots at Ministry level did not take place. Practice in monitoring of budgets was undertaken by NGO staff being trained, which was seen as a good participatory capacity building mechanism, and two pilots were run by Fokupers in Covalima and Maliana. The evaluation concludes that the NGO staff did not have sufficient training to undertake this exercise, as a result, two out of three project proposed in the pilots were not gender responsive (mainly, a water and sanitation project in a school for both boys and girls, and private showers for men and women), while the third, a water well, did address a specific gender needs. In addition, the one pilot observed during the country visit had not been built with support of engineers, as a consequence, the showers did not function adequately and were not in use by the community.

**Ownership and Sustainability**

1. Significant level of ownership was observed in regards to the goals and objectives of the JP, both from the government and civil society. This will be key to ensure sustainability. Government expressed intent to integrate and continue may of the successful initiatives, such as systematization of PNTL training, CCT, or anger management. From the interviews and documents obtained, it would appear that ownership does not yet reach the budgetary level, both the government and civil society continuing to rely on the UN and other external donors, and government clearly prioritizing infrastructure development. In addition to lack of budget, concern was expressed by civil society in regards to sustainability given the lack of human resources from the government, for example, with weakening of referral networks since leadership was handed over to government.
2. Many of the JP activities, such as support to NGO implementation (shelters or legal support) will in many cases terminate with the JP, as many of these reported that no alternate sources of funding had been identified. Many of the agencies involved in implementation of the JP had initiated conversation in this regard, and will continue to support some of the activities bilaterally after finalization of the JP.
3. Some activities and outcomes of the JP have inherent sustainability, for example, the creation of laws or action plans, but even with these there is still risk, for example, if the human trafficking NAP is not approved, or the Domestic Violence NAP does not receive significant funding, both exercises would have been in vain. Similarly, if the VPU unit continues to suffer from lack of support from the Investigation Unit, (cars are taken, staff rotated, clarity as to whom is responsible for investigation in these cases is not agreed), training and SOPs will not be useful.
4. Sustained and coherent support from the UN will be needed to ensure that gains are not lost, particularly true in the case of outcome one and three. In the case of outcome 2, capacity building impact and sustainability will be directly linked to the i) quality of the training, ii) buy in from the decision makers within that group (be it police, Ministry or Suco chiefs), and iii) the UN’s ability to ensure systematization of the training procedures within the national systems.
5. However, there are some unexpected positives outcomes/ results, such as new alliances (be it for GRB with Lau Hamutuk and the Ministry of Agriculture, or amongst agencies), as well as lessons learned and an acceptance/increased awareness on the benefits of joint programming, which could benefit strengthening of the next UNDAF.

# Lessons Learned

## Key lessons learned on Design

* 1. Need to allow more time to develop programme design to ensure widespread participation of key players, but also to ensure that synergies and partners’ competitive advantages are identified.
  2. Program planning should include an inception period for recruitment of programme staff and creation of coordination, management and planning tools.
  3. The program design was too ambitious for the country’s reality. Context of implementation was not fully understood or taken into consideration, such as low institutional capacity issues.
  4. The programme design did not adequately asses the existing capacity and human resources necessary. The JP might have considered increased human support to the government in the form of co-location, as well as increased HR in UMW, PMU, RCO and SEPI.
  5. JP should have developed a clear monitoring and evaluation strategy from the beginning, together with common tools, agreed (realistic and results oriented) goals and sufficient capacity to implement it. Similarly, a coherent advocacy focus through the identification of common messages, areas of focus and target beneficiaries would have strengthen impact and visibility.
  6. Sustainability of programme activities needs to be looked at the design stage, on occasion, commitments for continuation or support beyond the JP should be agreed at this stage.

## Key lessons learned on Process

1. Technical expertise might not be the only consideration when looking at lead agencies, capacity of the agency to lead a program and support the PMU (such as administrative and logistical support) should also be taken into consideration.
2. To ensure strategic coordination you need commitment (to the JP and its instances) as well as regular participation to ensure significant decision making and progress. You also need to ensure that there are technical level discussions as well as a more high level approach that looks at results, strategy, synergy and sustainability from the beginning.
3. In order to function properly, the PMU needs to have a certain degree of independence from the implementing agencies, which might be achieved through linkage to the RCO office.
4. Method or type (mechanism) of implementation affects the implementation rate, for this reason some agencies were able to implement much faster than others (for example IOM and UNFPA)

## Key lessons learned on Results

1. Training
   * 1. Collocation might have strengthened the programme and the transfer of skills-(example of good practice support provided to MSS were the consultant was not writing reports herself but supporting the MSS staff to do it. It is important to ensure support as opposed to taking over responsibilities, as well as independence of the staff from the agency being supported). Another best practice observed that could be used in future JP was the fact that the UNFPA focal point for the JP has in her (UNFPA) TORs to act as an advisor to SEPI, beyond the specific activities.
     2. Training needs to be strategic. For example, the JP led to the realization of the need to raise awareness in local hospitals with emergency staff, and doctors, going beyond training of midwives and nurses to ensure buy in and sustainability. The same could be argued for inclusion of high level police to support training of VPU unit.
     3. Training fatigue was reported at various levels, need to agree on priorities and ensure widespread coordination. Thought should be put to effectiveness of incentives (such as DSA), and capacity building methodologies.
2. Costing of NAP should have been developed at the same time as the NAP and the M&E system to ensure inclusion of necessary detail as well as alignment and management of expectations in regards to what a costing can and cannot provide.
3. Need to move away from rights language use simpler language and methods of transmission (such as film or theater).
4. While focus on girls (and women) is key, it is necessary to look at men (and boys) both as stake holders and existing services.


# Recommendations

1. Ensure lessons learned and best practices highlighted in this report are taken into consideration in the upcoming process of drafting the new UNDAF and country programmes. This report, together with the best practices report and the case study evaluation will be valuable resources for this, however, the evaluation recommends a one-day session of the UN, government counterparts and civil society to ensure key elements are taken included.
2. The UN must continue to lobby for the implementation and adequate allocation of human resources and budget to ensure that JP achievements are not lost.
3. Both the inclusion of civil society in the governance structures and the possibility to reach out to other organizations for information sharing seem like innovative practices which the evaluation recommends should be further looked into for future use.
4. The evaluation recommends centralization of all IEC materials developed in the context of the programme. The communication group for the UNCT could help to align strategies linked to Gender based violence, and ensure that each agency’s lessons learned, best practices, existing materials, district contacts, etc, are utilized and made available to other partners in order to strengthen the whole, possibly through the development of gender website which would allow access to all parties. The country team can look to the example of the website for gender based violence developed in Brazil as a result of the MDG-F programme, which holds materials and up to date information provided by the UN, government and civil society, and which sends out monthly bulletins on recent and upcoming events. The management of the site is run by a UNV funded by all participating agencies on a six month rotation.
5. Given the country needs in regards to capacity building, and the extensive training initiatives reported to be ongoing, the JP recommends the following:

* Agreement of priorities and responsibilities with key national and international stakeholders.
* Identification of key decision makers to be targeted, for example, training of head of police units at district level to ensure understanding and support of law on Domestic Violence, and importance of maintaining trained officers in the VPU, and ensuring access to necessary tools such as a car for transportation of victims (ideally separate from the presumed aggressor,) phones, petty cash for food, as well as privacy for interviews.
* Need to ensure increased coordination within the UN but also with outside key players to decrease costs, avoid duplication and training fatigue. (The proposed common website could help in the process of coordination).
* Focus on long term strategies like institutionalization of training and support to academia
* System should include a realistic and effective M&E system that is able to measure impact. This will require early agreement on objectives to develop indicators, as well as identification of responsibilities, and sustainability strategies. Care should be put that indicators do not measure process (number of beneficiaries) but impact. Some best practices observed elsewhere include longer term training with fewer but strategic beneficiaries, where recurrent trainings strengthen internalization of knowledge, and promote sharing of examples of how skills and knowledge acquired was applied.
* The evaluation also recommends that methods of training and their impact are analyzed to evaluate impact and sustainability of new knowledge, and look into more practical on the job trainings such as collocation to support in-house development of both government and civil society structures.

# Annexes:

## Annex 1- Final Evaluation Process: Timeline (Up-dated on 10 August 2012)

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\*Commissioner of the evaluation (CE)

\*\*Evaluation Reference group (ERG)

\*\*\*Evaluation manager (EM)

\*\*\*\*Evaluation Consultant (EC)

\*\*\*\*\*MDG-F Secretariat (MDGF-S)

^National Steering Committee (NSC)

^^ Programme Management Committee (PMC)

Source: PMU

## Annex 2- Terms of Reference of the Evaluation reference group

The MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F) Joint Programme: Supporting Gender Equality and Women’s Right in Timor-Leste is supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in improving the conditions of women and girls through the protection of their rights and their empowerment. UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women and IOM are implementing the programme at the national level and in five selected districts. The Ministry of Economy and Development is the national coordinating authority of the Joint Programme. The State Secretariat for the Promotion of Equality, the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are the main Government implementing partners, and Alola Foundation, PRADET, JSMP and Fokupers are the main NGO implementing partners. In addition, a number of Ministries/State Secretariats and NGOs are direct beneficiaries and implementing partners of this Joint Programme. The 3 years programme was extended for six months and will be ending on 15 June 2012.

The final evaluation of the joint programme will be conducted during March-June 2012. A detailed Terms of Reference for the final evaluation has been drafted (attached) in consultation with relevant programme implementing partners and stakeholders. According to the Terms and Reference, an Evaluation Reference Group has been formed to coordinate the evaluation at the country level.

**Functions and Responsibilities of the Evaluation Reference Group**

The Functions and Responsibilities of the Evaluation Reference Group are as follows**:**

* Provide inputs and participate in finalizing the evaluation Terms of Reference;
* Facilitate the participation of those involved in the evaluation design;
* Identify information needs, define objectives and delimit the scope of the evaluation;
* Facilitate the evaluation team’s access to all information and documentation relevant to the intervention, as well as to key actors and informants who should participate in interviews, focus groups or other information-gathering methods;
* Oversee progress and conduct of the evaluation, the quality of the process, and the products;
* Review the draft inception report and provide feedback to the evaluation team;
* Agenda drafted and agree with evaluation team;
* Review the draft evaluation report and ensure final draft reflects the comments on draft report;
* Disseminate the results of the evaluation.

**Composition of the Evaluation Reference Group**

The Programme Management Committee for the Joint Programme approved the Evaluation Reference Group with representations from the following agencies: State Secretariat for the Promotion of Equality, Ministry of Social Solidarity, National MDG Secretariat, Alola Foundation, Fokupers, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP, UN Women, IOM, UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, Spanish Development Cooperation (AECID) and Programme Management Unit of MDG-F Gender Joint Programme. Names of the members are as follows:

1.Thomas da Silva, Director General, State Secretariat for the Promotion of Equality;

2. Antonia Carmen da Cruz, Director for Social Reinsertion, Ministry of Social Solidarity;

3. Felix Piedade, Coordinator, National MDG Secretariat, Ministry of Finance

4. Maria Barreto, Director of Fokupers;

5. Teresa Verdial, Director, Alola Foundation;

6. Katherine Lester, Programme Analyst, Poverty Reduction and Environment Unit, UNDP;

7. Antonia Luedeke, Head of Child Protection Section, UNICEF;

8. Caroline Meenagh, GBV Programme Manager, UNFPA;

9. Santina Soares, National Coordinator for GRB, UN Women;

10. Maria Mendonca, Senior Project Assistant, Counter Human Trafficking Unit, IOM;

**11. Laura Soriano Ruiz,** Gender and Rural Development Projects Officer, AECID, Timor-Leste;

12. Marianne Dons Tychsen, MDG Coordination Officer - Office of the Resident Coordinator;

13. Md Rafiqul Haider, Joint Programme Manager, MDG-F Gender Equality Programme.

**Schedule of the Fformal Meetings of the Evaluation Reference Group**

1. **First week of February 2012 (PMC meeting):** Adoption of the Terms of References and agreement on the list of documents and reports those will be provided to the Consultants for desk review.
2. **First week of April 2012 meeting:** Consolidation of the feedbacks on the draft inception report and agreement of the agenda (schedule) for in country mission of the Evaluation Team.
3. **Last Week of April to Second Week of May 2012:** Briefing, debriefing and other formal meetings with the Evaluation Team during in country mission.
4. **First week of July 2012:** Consolidation of the feedbacks on draft evaluation report.

## Annex 3 – Final In-Country Mission Itinerary (14 – 30 June 2012)

| **Date/Day** | **Time** | **Events/Persons to Meet** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 14 Jun (Thu) | 15:00 | Arrival |
|  | 16:30-17:30 | Joint briefing by the JPM, RCO and UN Agency Focal Persons for the MDG-F Gender JP and re-confirmation of the mission itinerary |
| 15 Jun (Fri) | 08:15-10:00 | Meeting with Caroline, Carla and Josefa of UNFPA |
|  | 10:15-12:00 | Meeting with Armando da Costa-Director SEPI, Christine Chan- GE Policy Adviser, Jo-Anne Bishop- Gender WG Adviser and Susana Camacho-GRB PM |
|  | 13:30-14:15 | Meeting with Jorge Mouzinho, National Officer for MDG-F C&A initiative |
|  | 16:00-17:30 | Meeting with Rita Fernandes, Task Manager, Case Study Evaluation under MDG-F M&E initiative |
| 18 Jun (Mon) | 08:30-10:00 | Meeting with Inspecter Daria Ximénies, VPU, PNTL (Police) |
|  | 10:30-12:00 | Meeting with Antonia Carmen da Cruz, Director for Social Reinsertion of MSS |
|  | 14:00-15:30 | Meeting with Theresa, CEO of Alola Foundation |
|  | 16:00-17:30 | Meeting with Ivovio Lames, Acting Director, Claudia Soares-Office Consular and Chief of the Cabinet for meetings of the MoFA |
| 19 Jun (Tue) | 08:30:10:00 | Meeting with Antonia Luedeke, Dulce and Jacinto of the UNICEF Child Protection Section |
|  | 10:30-12:00 | Meeting with Gil of the Gender Unit in UNTL |
|  | 14:00-15:30 | Meeting with Santina Soares- National Coordinator for GRB and Janet Wong- UN Women Representative |
|  | 16:00-17:00 | Meeting with Md Rafiqul Haider-JPM of the PMU |
|  | 17:00-17:30 | Protocol meeting with Finn Reske-Nielsen-UN Resident Coordinator |
| 20 Jun (Wed) | 08:30-10:00 | Meeting with Maria Mendonca, Sr. Project Assistant and Clalio of IOM |
|  | 10:30-11:00 | Protocol meeting with Snra Idelta Maria Rodrigues-Secretary of State, SEPI & PMC Co-chair |
|  | 14:00-15:30 | Meeting with Felix Piedade, Coordinator, National MDG Secretariat |
|  | 16:00-17:30 | Meeting with the Nadia and Marianne of UN RC Office |
| 21 Jun (Thu) | 09:20-12:30 | Travel from Dili to Sui by Helicopter |
|  | 14:00-15:00 | FGD with the beneficiaries of the social mobilization activities on Child Protection |
|  | 15:30-16:30 | FGD with GRB training beneficiaries (participants of the GRB training) |
|  | 16:30-18:30 | Visit Holy Spirit Sisters Safe haven in Salele |
| 22 Jun (Fri) | 09:00-11:45 | Travel back to Dili |
|  | 15:00-16:00 | Meeting with Rita Reddy, Gender Advisor, UNMIT |
|  | 16:00-17:30 | Meeting with Katherine Lester and Justino of UNDP Poverty Reduction unit |
| 24 Jun (Sun) | 14:00-16:00 | Travel to Baucau |
| 25 Jun (Mon) | 09:00-11:30 | Meetings with MSS Regional Coordinator and Child Protection Officer in MSS Office |
|  | 11:30-13:00 | Meeting with Chief of VPU and District PNTL Commander in Baucau |
|  | 14:00-14:30 | Meeting with Baucau Sub-district Administration and District Gender Focal Point |
|  | 14:30-15:30 | Meeting with the Tirilolo Suco Chief in Baucau District |
|  | 16:00-16:30 | Meeting with Fukupers staff in Baucau office |
|  | 16:30-17:00 | Meeting with Caretaker of the Uma Pass in Baucau |
| 26 Jun (Tue) | 09:30-10:00 | Meeting with Baucau District Administrator |
|  | 10:00-10:30 | Meeting with the Secretary of Baucau District Administrator’s office |
|  | 11:00-11:30 | FGD with CCT beneficiaries |
|  | 11:30-12:30 | FGD for the beneficiaries of social mobilization on human trafficking |
|  | 14:00-18:00 | Travel back to Dili |
| 27 Jun (Wed) | 09:00-12:00 | FGD with NGOs operating shelter services in Dili (PRADET, Fokupers, JSMP, Casa Vida) |
|  | 14:00-17:00 | FGD with NGOs involved in GRB (Rede Feto, Luta Hamutuk, Fokupers, Lao Hamatuk, APCS TL) |
| 28 Jun (Thu) | 08:30-10:00 | Javier Jose Calvino Pazes, Coordinator General and Laura Soriano Ruiz, Project Officer, AECID |
|  | 10:30-12:00 | Meeting with the participants on Psycho social support to the victims of child abuse |
|  | 16:00-17:30 | Meeting with GRB Consultant of the Worldwide Consultants |
| 29 Jun (Fri) | 14:00-17:30 | PMC meeting followed by debriefing to all stakeholders |
| 30 Jun (Sat) | 14:00 | Depart Dili |

## Annex 4- Evaluation Questions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1. Evaluation criteria: Relevance  Extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people , the needs of the country and the MDGs | |
| To what extent was the JP designed, implemented, monitored & evaluated jointly | The JP was designed by the UN with little input from the government counterparts and civil society. Implementation has been done in parallel by the implementing UN agencies and their government/ NGO partners. Monitoring has been done by each implementing partner, with one mid-term evaluation undertaken by the MDG-F secretariat, one internal review undertaken jointly towards the end of the programme life cycle. |
| To what extent was the JP was the best option to respond to the challenges in the JP | The JP was not envisioned nor designed to act as something different to bilateral programs. In spite of this, and due to the joint mechanisms in place, such as the PMU and the PMC, the JP has created increased awareness and understating of the potential benefits of joint programming, and given fruit to inter agency initiatives. No such initiatives were observed on the side of the government or civil society. |
| To what extent the **implementing partners** had an added value | Each partner had an area of expertise that was brought into the JP implementation. However, the JP design did not seek to identify how each partner’s expertise could benefit other partner’s work, strengthen outcomes or promote new partnerships. There was some spill over observed, for example, greater awareness in regards to GBV within UNDP as well as some synergies such as GRB pricing of the Domestic Violence NAP, (but not for the Human Trafficking NAP), or the integration of PNTL training between UNFPA, UNICEF and IOM which led to cost savings as the venue was shared. |
| Usefulness & reliability of the **M&E** strategy | Color coded work plan was for the most part considered useful for progress tracking of implementation and budget disbursement. There was general agreement that the results based framework did not provide useful insight to partners’ decision making, but was useful towards reporting. Reliability of the M&E system is uncertain as there was no oversight and each agency used different methodologies, which raises questions in regards to the JP’s accountability, as it relied on reporting provided. |
| Usefulness & reliability of the **C&A** strategy | No C&A strategy was developed, partners developed materials according to their own needs. In spite of this, due to the large number of agencies involved and the three plus years implementation, visibility of the programme raised visibility of the different areas of work, some more than others, clearly this impact would have been stronger had the JP developed a common approach. |
| If the program was revised, did it reflect the changes that were needed | No significant revisions took place with the assumption that a six month extension would be sufficient to address the delays and gaps identified. |
| Was a **gender** sensitive assessment carried out at the design phase | No specific assessment was carried out, programme was built over existing knowledge and assumptions, in spite of the fact that many of the data is not reliable or available, for example, in the case of human trafficking. |
| Was there any affirmative action planned in order to reduce inequalities | The primary objective of the programme is to reduce inequalities, therefore all activities are geared towards this. |
| 2. Evaluation criteria: Efficiency  The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country and the MDGs | |
| Efficiency of the JP’s model (instruments, economic, human and technical resources) | Evaluation concludes that there were insufficient human resources assigned to implement the JP effectively, particularly true in the case of the PMU and the lead agencies, both on the UN and the government side. This led to significant inefficiencies such as the late recruitment of a consultancy firm to implement most of the GRB component, inconsistent attendance to PMC or the lack of a joint monitoring and oversight function. There are concerns as to the quality of outputs and possibly decreased sustainability stemming from this. |
| To what extent was a **JP** more efficient to bilateral single agency intervention | From the UN point of view, and given that few synergies were identified, the JP was not more efficient than bilateral single agency intervention, but rather less efficient, in that it required an additional level of coordination and reporting. From the government point of view, the JP programme facilitated oversight, coordination as well as understanding of the UN and the different instruments available to them, with no additional costs, it would appear that for the government the JP was more efficient than bilateral single agency intervention would have been. |
| To what extent did the **JP** increase or reduce efficiency in delivering outputs and attaining outcomes | There are some indications that the JP was a perceived as a source of security or guarantee that was able to attract other funding to areas of support to the ongoing activities, for example, the case of Irish aid support to UNFPA, which saw the JP as a guarantee of three years funding where none of the agencies could drop out, with the backing of the Spanish cooperation. |
| Contribution of the **governance** structure (PMC, NSC and PMU) to the JP’s efficiency and effectiveness (useful towards development, ownership, delivering as ONE and management ) | Benefits stemming from the governance structure were observed and reported by all parties, it is believed that benefits would have been much stronger if i) PMU had been set up at the start of the programme, with strong M&E focus, fully staffed and empowered by the lead agency; ii) PMC attendance had been consistent and in line with the MDG-F design with high level management and more results oriented focus, possibly with the support of informal technical groups.  These changes would have allowed for a more results and strategy oriented focus of the PMC, and would have presumable led to more synergies and better quality outputs. |
| What type of work methodologies (financial instruments, best practices…) have the **implementing partners** used to increase efficiency in delivering as one | PMC meetings and color coded work plan were reported as the sole useful joint programming tools. |
| **Obstacles** (administrative, financial or managerial) and how they affected efficiency | Changes in management in the lead agency, together with changes in structure (from UNIFEM to UN Women) had significant negative impact on the JP. Similarly, the need to process all administrative work through Bangkok, and lack of clarity between MDG versus UN Women practices, led to delayed decisions, with some negative effects such as the loss of PMU staff or delays in the final evaluation. |
| Usefulness and impact of the **MTE**, was the improvement plan implemented? | Partners reported that the MTE was a useful exercise which provided insight into gaps and weaknesses. However, the improvement plan focused on the agreement to extend the life cycle of the joint programme, and did not address other underlying issues such as lack of coordination, delayed implementation for some of the agencies or a weak M&E system. |
| **2.1. Ownership: Effective exercise of leadership by the country’s national/local partners in development interventions** | |
| Level of **ownership** of targeted population, NGOs, participants, local and national authorities. Modes of participation | Given the large number of activities, implementing agencies and target groups coupled with the limited time allotted for the final evaluation, it is difficult to assess details in regards to ownership at different levels. While the UN agencies, NGOs and government showed great level of ownership towards the activities implemented, which for the most part had begun implementation previous to the program, a lower level of ownership and more superficial understanding was observed at district level. Given that there is an ongoing nine-month exercise that will assess ownership and coordination of the MDG programmes, the final evaluation will not attempt to go into greater detail, but recommend that the case study evaluation ensure enough detail is available to observe potential differences between the two MDG programmes under evaluation. |
| Impact of **ownership** (or lack of) in efficiency and effectiveness of the JP | High level of ownership was reported, but little was reflected in government budget or human resource allocation, this raises serious questions in regards to sustainability of achievements and progress of the JP. Inconsistent participation to PMC had a negative effect on effectiveness of the programme. |
| 3. Evaluation Criteria: Effectiveness  Extent to which the objectives of the development intervention have been achieved | |
| **Outcome 1: Improved protection of women and girls through the establishment of legal frameworks and mechanisms to uphold their rights- Achieved to a great degree**  *Output 1.1: Legislation passed and National Action Plans developed to prevent and combat domestic violence and human trafficking.*  First part of this outputs should have been worded differently as the JP/UN cannot pass legislation. Although passing of the law cannot be attributed to the JP, it was clear during the evaluation that it played a key role in the process of consultation, drafting and lobbying for approval of the law on DV, well as the drafting of the NAP and the costing exercise, which will not only support allocation of resources, but helps the government to understand the entire process necessary. Attribution to the drafting process and NAP development of the proposed legislation on Human trafficking is more clear, but unfortunately it did not pass, and will need continued lobbying to ensure it becomes legislation or the whole process would have been in vain.  Inclusive consultative methodology used in the development of the Law on Domestic Violence was perceived as a best practice.  Risk is that budget is not allocated (or in the case of Human Trafficking, law is not approved) and the laws are not implemented. Continued high level lobbying from the UN is necessary to maintain this achievement. A concerted/ coordinated joint effort likely to have a stronger impact  *Output 1.2:****Capacity building programme developed and implemented*** *to upgrade the knowledge and skills of the Government officials, NGOs and CBOs involved in implementation of the action plans related to combating domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*  Somewhat achieved, in so far as there has been extensive training and capacity building, but not a clear strategy nor clear objectives as to what the JP hope to achieve.  The evaluation sought to understand the quality and sustainability of the capacity building methodologies:  There are also questions in regards to the efficiency of the methodology, dispersion and lack of coordination (within JP but also with outside players) has diluted potential impact.  Questions in regards to quality and sustainability of short TOT training (to Suco chiefs or NGOs with little previous knowledge, conclusions after observation of outcomes and discussions with both beneficiaries and community members would lead to conclude that the knowledge of beneficiaries of these TOT training was not strong enough to ensure quality , which led to confusion, misunderstanding of key concepts, vague or erroneous ideas, (for example, community kids believed child rights meant that parents could not ask them to do house chores; suco chiefs presented drugs smuggling cases as examples of human trafficking.)  The evaluation acknowledges the environment and the degree of challenge of this task given the low level of understanding of many of these areas, coupled with the large number of players imparting training in the country.  *Output 1.3:****Information, education and communication strategies developed and implemented*** *on domestic violence and human trafficking at the national and local levels.*  The evaluation did not find evidence of an information, education or communication strategies. Activities have taken place for all in parallel and often not shared, which raises issues around efficacy, dilution of impact and opportunities lost | |
| **Outcome 2: Reduced vulnerability of women and girls through a) improved outreach mechanisms and services and; b) the establishment of a social protection scheme.**  *Output 2.1: Technical supports provided for improving the design and implementation of on-going conditional cash transfer schemes of the Ministry of Social Solidarity.*  Achieved. Clear and comprehensive strategy and methodology guarantees sustainability as long as the government continues to fund the scheme. Considered a best practice of the JP that should be documented, and presented as a case study in the body of the report.  Going forward clarity as to how UNDP will continue to support implementation.  Introduction of the use of referral mechanisms a spill over effect from the JP .  *Output 2.2: National and local referral mechanisms and services established and/or strengthened for the protection of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.*  For the most part these referral mechanisms were already established, and have been strengthened by the project through, for example, the creation of brochures which provide comprehensive information as to the existing services available, and support to ensure regularity of meetings, leading to increased awareness of services and increased coordination.  Issue of sustainability was raised by civil society which claims that since leadership was passed to the government it is not working regularly.  Support to shelters, attention centres attached to hospitals, forensic examination training and manual, etc… will have a impact on the quality of the services (for example in the case of training or the forensic medical protocols), increased awareness in regards to specific needs of the victims, some of it sustainable, such as buildings and training, others, such as staff salary, and shelters maintenance costs or continued legal support of the JSPM, will need continued funding. Sustainability strategies for these activities should have been included in the JP design, seeking commitments from the government.  This is a government responsibility, Un can play a key role in lobbying for funds. GRB training will act as support for this | |
| **Outcome 3: Improved social and economic situation of women and girls through a fair allocation of resources using gender responsive budgeting.**  This outcome appears too ambitious for a 3 year project, and should have been worded differently. As described not achieved, although progress has been achieved, for example, awareness and understanding of what GRB is, beyond the SEPI; some important alliances were formed, for example, with Lao Hamutok or with the Ministry of Agriculture.  As this was fully led by UN Women, changes within UN Women management and structure have had a significant impact on this outcome, which led to significant delays as well as change of implementation strategy –mainly through outside consultants- in a very reduced period of time, with negative impact on the quality and sustainability of the activities. None of the products were finalised at the time of the evaluation, and for this reason cannot be commented on in detail. There is a risk that they may not be finalised by the end of the JP.  *Output 3.1: Tools on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting developed to increase the knowledge and skills of senior government officials, members of local assemblies and local council members*  Expected to be ready but Still pending. Quality cannot be assessed (see previous section for details)  *Output 3.2: Civil society (NGOs, Women’s groups, CBOs, academia) trained on gender sensitive planning and gender responsive budgeting to advocate for, scrutinize and monitor public expenditures.*  Done. In a significantly reduced time, which did not allow time for absorption and piloting of the concepts learned.  *Output 3.3: Gender responsive budgets prepared and pilot tested in selected line Ministries and Suco councils.*  Not done in ministries. Pilot tests at suco council level with insufficient time led to weak and for the most part unsustainable results. | |
| Contribution to **MDG** goals at local and national level | Not possible to measure given weakness of M&E system. (see core of the report for more details) |
| Contribution to thematic window goals (**gender**) | Not possible to measure given weakness of M&E system. (see core of the report for more details) |
| Contribution to implementation of the Paris Declaration Principles and Accra agenda for action | Not possible to measure given weakness of M&E system. (see core of the report for more details) |
| Contribution towards goals of delivering as one | Increased awareness of the benefits and potential of joint programming. Some synergies and some saving identified. More synergies expected to take place post JP. |
| What kind of results were reached. To what extent where these results synergistic and coherent towards development | Quality of results was varied. Detail presented throughout the body of the report. |
| Extent of JP’s impact on target population | Target population as per the PRODOC were “women and girls survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, as well as poor women (including those heading households). Secondary beneficiaries are institutional stakeholders, including policy makers, public servants, NGOs and service providers.” With the exception of beneficiaries of shelters and other improved services (such as legal or medical support), in practice it was the reverse, with the primary beneficiaries being were institutional stakeholders, including policy makers, public servants, NGOs and service providers, and the implied theory of change assuming a trickledown effect in the medium to long term to the women and girls survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, as well as poor women (including those heading households). |
| Identification of **best practices**, success stories, lessons learned and transferable examples  DESCRIBE AND DOCUMENT THEM. Focus on **gender** equality | A Report on best practices was commissioned by the JP in parallel to the final evaluation, will be finalised July 31st and will be included as an annex in the final version of this report. For this reason there has been little focus in identifying best practices (as highlighted in the inception report) with only a couple of best practices identified and documented throughout the report, such as the CCT scheme. |
| Differentiated effects (sex, race, gender, rural, ethnic..) and extent | The JP did not seek any differentiated effects. No data to observe impact was available. |
| JP’s contribution towards fostering **ownership** processes and outcomes (national development plans, public policies, UNDAF) | Potential biggest benefit would be the inclusion of lessons learned and synergies identified in the agency country programmes as well as the UNDAF currently under development. |
| To what extent did the JP help to **increase stakeholder/ citizen dialogue and/or engagement** on issues and policies | PMC inclusion of both government and civil society created a forum for discussion. Similarly, the JP supported referral networks, as well as consultation processes. |
| **3.1 Sustainability: Probability of the benefits of the intervention continuing in the long term** | |
| Have necessary decisions and course of actions to ensure sustainability been taken | The JP developed a sustainability assessment in early 2011. This was reported as a useful exercise to visualise gaps in sustainability, however, this identifies gaps but not solutions, and does not seek commitment from any of the parties. At the time of the evaluation it was still unclear how the gaps identified would be addressed. The end of the JP coincides with the drafting of the UNDAF and many of the agency’s country programmes, which is an opportunity to ensure sustainability of the activities/ objectives, lesson learned should be applied and sustainability measures should be addressed at the design stage. |
| Institutions at local or national level   * To what extent did they support the JP * Do they have the capacity and commitment to continue or/and upscale * Have operating capacities been created and/or reinforced * Do they have the financial means to maintain the benefits | Commitment to the activities was reported and observed, but for the most part both budget, skills and human resources at national level were still insufficient at the time of the final evaluation. |
| To what extent will the JP be replicable or scaled up | It would not make sense to replicate the JP as is, given that the initial selection of activities for inclusion was not done with a clear strategy in mind, to the extent that some of the parties themselves believe they should not be part of a “gender” programme. Future joint programmes should take the lesson learned and ensure that activities brought together are able to strengthen each other or a common goal.  However, some of the activities have proven successful and relevant and should be continued, expanded or replicated. |
| To what extent did the JP align itself with national development priorities or/and the UNDAF | The expected programme results were reported to be in line with the long term development plans and priorities of the Government of Timor-Leste, as is reflected in the National Development Plan of 2002, the National Strategic Development Plan 2011-30 and the Law on Domestic Violence approved in 2010. It is also in line with the programmatic priorities of the participating UN agencies and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-2013, contributing towards realizing the UNDAF Outcome 1 (stronger democratic institutions and mechanisms for social cohesion are consolidated), and UNDAF Outcome 3.3 (Vulnerable populations, especially children and women, benefit from quality social protection, particularly social welfare services, including in emergencies). |

## Annex 5- List of participants to the in-country debriefing

**List of Participants of the PMC meeting dated 29 June 2012**

| **Sl** | **Name** | **Designation/Title of the Post** | **Ministry/ Institution** | **Mobile** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Thomas da Silva | Director General | SEPI | 7305076 |
| 2 | Janet Wong May Chin | Country Representative | UN Women | 789 2240 |
| 3 | Mikiko Tanaka | Country Director | UNDP | 7231049 |
| 4 | Armando da Costa | Director, Planning | SEPI | 7305702 |
| 5 | Tony Duarte | Advisor | SEPI | 718 0784 |
| 6 | Christine Chan | GE Policy Adviser | SEPI | 7430866 |
| 7 | Jo-Anne Bishop | Gender Working Group Advisor- | SEPI | 7237429 |
| 8 | Susana Camacho | GRB Project Manager | SEPI | 7177055 |
| 9 | Honoria P Lopes | Gender Officer | Fokupers | 7335764 |
| 10 | Maria Barreto | Director | Fokupers | 7273953 |
| 11 | Susan Kendall | International Clinical Mentor | PRADET | 7262744 |
| 12 | Manuel dos Santos | Acting Director | PRADET | 3321562 |
| 13 | Marcelina Amaral | Acting Coordinator | JSMP-VSS | 7275553 |
| 14 | Lisa Mortimer | International Advisor- | JSMP-VSS | 7609990 |
| 15 | Jona Ihan | International Advisor | Luta Hamutuk | 7405488 |
| 16 | Katherine Lester | Head of Poverty Unit | UNDP | 7476464 |
| 17 | Justino da Coasta | Programme Analyst | UNDP | 7965763 |
| 18 | Antonia Luedeke | Head of Child Protection Unit | UNICEF | 7231104 |
| 19 | Min Yuan | M&E Specialist | UNICEF | 7231098 |
| 20 | Norkham Souphanouvong | Education Specialist | UNICEF | 7121978 |
| 21 | Carla da Costa | Programme Officer | UNFPA | 7553066 |
| 22 | Santina Soares | GRB Coordinator | UN Women | 7235653 |
| 23 | Mirata Mato | Project Officer | IOM | 7301653 |
| 24 | Juliao A Nunes | Project Assistant | IOM | - |
| 25 | Marianne Dons Tychsen | MDG Coordination Officer | UN RC Office | 730 4383 |
| 26 | Jorge Mouzinh | MDG Advocacy Officer | UN RC Office | 723 0283 |
| 27 | Rita Fernandes | MDG-CSE Task Manager | UN RC Office | 7327077 |
| 28 | Romaldo da Costa | MDG-CSE Assistant | UN RC Office | 7119825 |
| 29 | Angelica Arbulu | Evaluation Consultant | MDG-F Gender JP | 7982028 |
| 30 | Kaoru Yamagiwa | Documentation Consultant | UN Women | 7180801 |
| 31 | Basilio Pereira | Programme Assistant | UN Women | 7230935 |
| 32 | Md Rafiqul Haider | Joint Programme Manager | MDG-F Gender JP | 7882770 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## Annex 6- TOR of the evaluation

1. The VPU is a unit set up specifically for vulnerable people including women, children and the elderly [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. the government’s most recent [demographic health survey](http://www.dne.mof.gov.tl/published/TLDHS%202009-10/Final%20Report%20TLDHS%202010.pdf).  [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The mid-term evaluation can be found at http://ww.mdgfund.org/sites/default/files/Timor%20Leste-Gender-Mid-Term%20Evaluation%20Report-Final-en%20UPDATED.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Mayne, 2001 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. See Annex 5 for full list of responsibilities as per the TORs [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. in this regards it must be noted that although comments provided will be taken into consideration and can be reflected in the final report, in accordance with UNEG standards the evaluator will keep full discretion as to the contents of the final report [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. This decision was reportedly taken as it was not possible to identify a national evaluation consultant that met the requirements, and there was disagreement as to weather a second international consultant should be brought on board. The evaluator was informed that there would be no second consultant only after the evaluation had already begun,. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. 65 days were envisioned for the lead evaluator, and 30 days for the support member during the in-country mission. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Source: PRODOC [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. as reported by civil society members interviewed during the evaluation [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Evaluator was informed that as of writing of final report SEPI was still negotiating with government for allocation of funds for office upgrading and human resource to manage the implementation of the project [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. The country team informed the evaluator that the idea of piloting ministries had proven to be significantly challenging as it involved highly political decisions, particularly in relation to planning and budgeting. In February 2010 several presentations on GRB were made to the MoE, MoH and MSS. The pilot could not take place because the tools were only developed at the end of the project. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Some NGOs participated of regular Progamme Management Committee meetings [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. further details provided in other areas of the report [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Source: PMU Revised Final Narrative Report, August 24, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. The consultant sought to understand why no more meetings took place. As of August 2012 no more NSC or PMC meetings had taken place. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. no minutes were available for this meeting, and there was no evidence that it had taken place, but was presented in the mid-term evaluation report. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Civil society members of the PMC: Manuel dos Santos (Director of PRADET); Teresa Verdial (Alola Foundation); Luis Oliveira Sampaio (Director JSMP); Maria Barreto, (Director Fokupers); Elio Pereira (Luta Hamatuk) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. a bilateral co-operation between the Government of Timor-Leste and Australia [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. as reported to the evaluator, the staff was hired on a one year contract, then switched to a short consultancy with the intention of turning it into a core UNIFEM position, but the reason behind the change was not explained to the staff member, leading to the staff member securing a more permanent position. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. These were benefits of joint programming identified in the programmes PRODOC [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Source: revised and up-dated sustainability strategy of the MDG Funded JP: Supporting Gender equality and women’s rights in Timor-Leste, April 19, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. It was reported that in April 2011 a proposal was submitted to the PMC co-chairs to invite the high level ministry officials in the PMC meetings as it was indicated in the approved ProDoc. But government co-chair of the PMC strongly disagreed, and advised to continue the current structure till the end of the JP. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. taking into consideration intent as opposed to literal interpretation of expected outcomes, which for the most part were worded in a very ambitious manner. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. As reported, this center was setup mainly as a response to lack of office space within SEPI, with the JP providing rent and resources such as computers. There was no sustainability strategy beyond the JP life in place at the time of the evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)