

PROJECT HALF YEARLY PROGRESS UPDATE

AS OF JANUARY - JUNE 2013

	Programme Title: Ending the Transition in Somalia				
Project No & Title:	Programme Number: PBF/IRF-55				
	MPTF Office Project Reference Number: 00083667 ¹				
Recipient Organization(s) ² :	Organizations that have received direct funding from the MPTF Office under this programme White the control of the contr				
	 United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 				
Implementing Partners (Government, UN agencies, NGOs etc)	 National counterparts (government, private, NGOs & others) and other International Organizations Office of the President Office of the Prime Minister 				
	 Ministry of Constitution and Reconciliation Ministry of Interior and National Security 				
Location:	South Central Somalia				
Total Approved Budget ³	Total Project Cost: UNPOS: \$374,500 UNDP: \$620,600 Total: \$995,100				
Funds Committed ⁴	\$995,100	% of funds committed / total approved budget:	100%		
Expenditure ⁵ :	UNPOS: \$0 UNDP: \$620,600	% of expenditure / total budget: (Delivery rate)	UNPOS: 0% UNDP: 100%		
Project Approval Date:	2012	Doggible delay in	6		
Project Start Date:	1 June 2012	Possible delay in operational closure date (Number of months)			
Expected Operational Project Closure Date:	3 June 2013	(1 tumber of months)			

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¹ The MPTF Office Project Reference Number is the same number as the one on the Notification message. It is also referred to as "Project ID" on the project's factsheet page the MPTF Office GATEWAY

² Please note that where there are multiple agencies, only one consolidated project report should be submitted.

³ Approved budget should be the amount transferred to Recipient Organisations

⁴ Funds committed are defined as the commitments made through legal contracts for services and works according to the financial regulations and procedures of the Recipient Organisations.

² Actual payments (contracts, services, works) made on commitments.

⁵ Reference to be made to outcomes of the Priority Plan or PBF Performance Management Plan (PMP)

PBF Outcome Area

Outcome Area (from Priority Plan or Project Document):

This project proposal is aligned to the PBF's priority areas one and two, namely "to support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue" and "to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts".

• Provide a qualitative assessment of the level of progress towards overall achievements of the Project at both the outcome and output level

The first outcome of the project was completed by the Joint Constitution Unit between UNDP and UNPOS on 14 October 2012. The convening of the 825 member National Constituent Assembly (NCA) on July 25, 2012 and the adoption of the Provisional Federal Constitution on August 1, 2012 was a significant step towards achieving the tasks of the Roadmap to end the transition in Somalia. Several hurdles created by the politicians delayed the NCA which was originally planned to be held on July 12, 2012 as per the agreement signed by the signatories to the Roadmap. The NCA delegates adopted the new constitution with a landslide vote. Ninety six (96) per cent of the 645 delegates present voted in favor of the new constitution with only 2 votes against it. Following the adoption of the Provisional constitution, the Transitional Federal Charter ceased its existence and the formation of the new institutions is now governed by the Provisional Federal Constitution of the new Federal Republic of Somalia.

The second outcome of the program was not implemented by UNPOS during the reporting period. UNPOS had commenced planning and preparation for implementation during the reporting period, but transition of power from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the newly elected Somali Federal Government (SFG) required UNPOS to hold project funding until the new leadership demonstrated national ownership. In order to ensure Somali ownership of the project, UNPOS requested for a no- cost extension of the project until 3 June 2013.

Qualitative assessment of achievements and challenges

• Use the project indicators and target for the measuring of achievements (see target table at the end)

The overall indicator for the first outcome was "the Provisional Constitution is adopted at the Constituent Assembly within the given timeline". The National Constituent Assembly was convened on schedule and the Provisional Constitution (PC) adopted within the given timeline. 96% of the delegates present voted in favor of the PC while only 2% voted against it. On the sub outcomes,

At the 1st sub indicator level on "the 825 members of the Constituent Assembly, including the 30% women members, are present in Mogadishu by July 25, 2012", all 825 members were present in Mogadishu at the start of the NCA, however, only 24% of the 825 delegates were women, compared to the planned 30% as per the Garowe II agreement.

For the 2nd sub indicator on "Daily participation of the 825 CA members during the Assembly", only an average of 687 Members attended the Assembly in the 7 days it took to adopt the PC.

On the second outcome implementation of the project did not start during the period due to the challenges associated with access to the recovered areas and national capacity to address the specific requirements for activation and implementation of the project.

What are the major - expected and/or unexpected - highlights of results?

On the first outcome, on July 25, 2012, an 825 Member National Constituent Assembly was convened and adopted the Provisional Federal Constitution on August 1, 2012. This was a major step towards the end of transition and was central to UN efforts to broaden the peace process beyond Mogadishu.

On the second outcome, transition of power from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the newly elected Somali Federal Government (SFG) required UNPOS to hold project funding until the new leadership demonstrated national ownership.

• Did the results impact the causes and drivers of conflict?

The project contributed to the convening of the NCA, which was a key deliverable under the Roadmap for ending the Transition and is central to UN efforts to broaden the peace process beyond Mogadishu. Given the absence of the security conditions required for a public referendum, the NCA was the body empowered to provisionally adopt Somalia's interim constitution, thereby laying out a new, more legitimate political dispensation for the post-August 2012 period.

• Were there catalytic effects – additional funding commitments or unleashing peace relevant processes?

Although the convening of the NCA itself and the adoption of the constitution which is the original objective of the programme were significant milestones, the unintended impact of the programme in terms of the quality of institutions and the leadership that emerged from this process is also noteworthy. Many Somalis are today more optimistic than they were in the last 20 years, hence the programme set the pace for stable and peaceful Somalia.

• What are the risks / challenges – and how to address them?

Some of the risks that UNSOM envisages in connection with the second outcome of the project are:

- The lack of political consensus among local interlocutors over their engagement with the SFG.
- Increased use of terror tactics by Al-Shabaab (AS) in newly recovered areas. This is being addressed within Mogadishu through surge capacity of the Somali security forces, but this capability is expected to take longer to introduce for the recovered areas. However, AS has been weakened in recent months due to strategic action on the part of the SFG and security forces to encourage high, medium and low risk AS members to renounce violence and enter a judicial process or the National Programme on Disengaged Combatants and Youth at Risk.
- Limited impact of the SFG's political outreach and reconciliation efforts in newly recovered areas.
- Ability of Somali security forces (Somali National Army (SNA)/Somali Police Force (SPF), supported by AMISOM, to deliver the full range of security conditions necessary to allow the local population to have confidence in the long-term stability of the recovered areas. This is being addressed through increased recruitment and training of the SNA and SPF, but challenges remain in provision of suitable logistic support, which is reducing operational tempo and offensive actions by the SNA.

What can be expected as additional results by the end of year?

Additional expected results will depend on the outcome of the discussion currently

undertaken by UNSOM and the SFG. (see below)

• Is there any need to adjust project strategies?

As UNPOS completed its mandate as of 2 June 2013, UNSOM is now undergoing a process of taking over the remaining fund and implementing the project. However, one year has passed since the original project was developed and the project needs to be modified to address the urgent needs under the current circumstances. The national security sector architecture within Somalia is currently weak, and this is impacting on the ability to initiate projects within the recovered areas (security and gender related). However, the formation of UNSOM has created a new dynamic between the SFG and the international community, and good progress is being made in addressing some of the key area legislative and structural requirements linked to the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC Secretariat. In addressing the establishment and operationalization of these high-level structures, improved linkages with the Recovered Areas and their proposed district and regional governance and security institutions will be possible. This will in-turn set the conditions for key aspects of the project outcomes envisaged under the original project submission to achieved. The National Security Adviser is being consulted on this matter and has been requested to offer new/additional proposals linked to improved national ownership and anticipated developments in national and regional governance and security architecture.

INDICATOR BASED PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT: Using the **Programme Results Framework from the Project Document** - provide an update on the achievement of indicators at both the outcome and output level in the table below. Where it has not been possible to collect data on indicators, clear explanation should be given explaining why, as well as plans on how and when this data will be collected.

	Performance	Indicator	Planned Indicator	Achieved Indicator	Reasons for Variance	Risks
	Indicators	Baselines	Targets	Targets	(if any)	
Outcome 1 ⁷	Indicator	No valid	To successfully	The National	No Variance.	
The	The Provisional	Constitution in	convene an NCA to	Constituent Assembly		
Constituent	Constitution is	existence.	adopt the Provisional	was convened on		
Assembly	adopted at the		Constitution for a	schedule and the		
(NCA) is	Constituent		Federal Somalia.	Provisional Constitution		
convened with	Assembly within			(PC) adopted within the		
inclusive	the given timeline			given timeline. 96% of		
participation				the delegates present		
of				voted in favor of the PC		
representative				while only 2% voted		
s from all				against it.		
major parts of						
Somalia.						
Output 1.1	Indicator 1.1.1	The selected	To ensure the 825	All 825 members were	Although the target of 825	
Inclusive and	The 825 members	members are	members with 30%	present in Mogadishu at	members to be present in	
safe	of the Constituent	dispersed in various	women	the start of the NCA,	Mogadishu prior to the start of	
participation	Assembly,	parts of Somalia	representation, are	however, only 24% of	the NCA was achieved, it could	
of members at	including the 30%	with no clear way of	present in Mogadishu	the 825 delegates were	not be guaranteed that an overall	
the	women members,	attending the	prior to the start of	women, compared to the	30% women representation was	
Constituent	are present in	Assembly.	the NCA.	planned 30% as per the	attained. This is because	
Assembly	Mogadishu by July			Garowe II agreement.	delegates were chosen by their	
secured.	25, 2012.				respectful regional traditional	
					elders. It is also important to	
					indicate that some regions may	
					not have had enough qualified	

⁷ Either country relevant (from the Priority Plan or Project Document) or PMP specific.

Output 1.2	Indicator 1.1.2 Daily participation of the 825 CA members during the Assembly. Indicator 1.2.1	Not known	To ensure participation of all 825 members on a daily basis.	Only an average of 687 Members attended the Assembly in the 7 days it took to adopt the PC.	women to represent them while it would have been unethical to suggest for other regions to increase their women representation as a way to compensate for lack of them in some regions. Lack of dedication from some of the delegates, which resulted in less people attending the NCA.	
	Indicator 1.2.2					
Outcome 2 The TFG has established indirect or direct presences in each newly recovered area with improved safety and security conditions in those areas.	Indicator Positive changes in security and safety perception (disaggregated per area) Evidence that target population in newly recovered areas feels saver with more confidence and trust to state authorities				As covered in the body of the report above there is a requirement to engage further with the SFG due to the challenges associated with access and governance challenges within the recovered areas.	- TFG, AMISOM and neighboring forces continue to expand their control of territory. Thereby, The TFG and international community gain access to the newly recovered areas The TFG continues to commit political outreach and local reconciliation in newly recovered areas Al-Shabaab continues suffering

Output 2.1 The TFG obtains skills for basic security sector assessment and gathers baseline information to consolidate their policy and formulate programs for the security sector in the	Indicator 2.1.1 Quality of results of the mapping exercise for security update in the four newly recovered areas (Baidoa, Beledwyne, Dhuusamareeb, garbahaarey) Positive validation feedback from workshop members		As above	from internal splits and weakening their operational capability. - The lack of political consensus among local interlocutors over their engagement with the TFG. - Increased use of terror tactics by Al-Shabaab in newly recovered areas. - Limited impact of the TFG's political outreach and reconciliation efforts in newly recovered
newly				areas.
recovered areas.	Indicator 2.1.2			
Output 2.2	Indicator 2.2.1			
^	Indicator 2.2.2			