



**PEACEBUILDING FUND**

**PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET**

<p><b>Project Title: Support to the Roadmap to Ending the Transition in Somalia</b></p>	<p><b>Recipient UN Organization: UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and UNDP Somalia</b></p>
<p><b>Project Contact:</b> Amb. Augustine P. Mahiga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Address: UNPOS, Mogadishu, Somalia Telephone: + 254 -41-350 - 6811 E-mail: mahiga@un.org</p>	<p><b>Implementing Partner(s):</b> Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia Responsible parties: UNPOS, UNDP, Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Constitution and Reconciliation, Ministry of Interior and National Security</p>
<p><b>Project Number:</b> To be completed by UNDP MDTF Office</p>	<p><b>Project Location: Somalia</b></p>
<p><b>Project Description:</b> This project will support the Somali signatories of the Roadmap to Ending the Transition in Somalia in their implementation of critical transition tasks to ensure the legitimate end of the current transition in August 2012 with particular focus on the constitution-making process and the improvement of security arrangements in the newly recovered areas.</p>	<p><b>Total Project Cost:</b> <b>Peacebuilding Fund: \$995,100</b> <b>Government Input: (not yet formed)</b> <b>Other: \$2,864,556.00 (UNPOS) and \$8,530,489.60 (UNDP)</b> <b>Total: \$11,395,045.60</b> <b>Project Start Date and Duration: 15 May 2012 and 5 months</b></p>
<p><b>Gender Marker Score: <u>2</u></b> <i>Score 3 for projects that are targeted 100% to women beneficiaries and/or address specific hardships faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations;</i> <i>Score 2 for projects with specific component, activities and budget allocated to women;</i> <i>Score 1 for projects with women mentioned explicitly in its objectives, but no specific activities are formulated nor is a budget reserved; and</i> <i>Score 0 for projects that do not specifically mention women.</i></p>	
<p><b>PBF Priority Area(s) and Outcomes:</b> This project proposal is aligned to the PBF's priority areas one and two, namely "to support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue" and "to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts".</p>	
<p><b>Outputs and Key Activities:</b> Paragraph outlining essential details of the programme/project The Somali peace process is at a critical juncture. The two key outputs in this project proposal are crucial to consolidate recent progress made in security and broaden the base of political participation in south-central Somalia, in line with the transition Roadmap and existing peace agreements. The first output is to improve human security in areas recently recovered from Al Shabaab control, notably by supporting the TFG in reaching out to local communities, facilitating reconciliation and establishing legitimate local governance. The second output is logistic support to enable inclusive representation in the first national Constituent Assembly, which will adopt the Consultative Draft Constitution and select the new federal Parliament. This logistical support is essential to ensure smooth, safe and secure participation of all Somali actors selected to participate in the Assembly, especially women and those from areas recently</p>	

recovered from Al-Shabaab, who have been under-represented in the political process in the past. All of these key activities are insufficiently funded at the moment and thus at risk of not being sufficiently implemented.

<i>(for IRF-funded projects)</i>	
<b>Recipient UN Organization(s)</b>	<b>National Implementing Partner(s) (as relevant)</b>
Augustine P. Mahiga Special Representative of the Secretary-General UN Political Office for Somalia [Redacted] David Clapp UNDP Country Director for Somalia [Redacted]	
<b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b>	<b>Representative of National Authorities</b>
Peacebuilding Support Office, NY	



## **COMPONENT 1: Situation Analysis**

The second half of 2011 and first quarter of 2012 saw significant advances in the political and military tracks in Somalia. The military gains by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopia and Kenya, against Al Shabaab have led to the recovery of over 90 percent of Mogadishu, and secured several strategic towns in the south central region.

The signature of the Kampala Accord in June 2011, and the subsequent adoption of the ‘Roadmap for Ending the Transition in Somalia’ in September 2011 created an opportunity to legitimately end the transition in August 2012. Under the terms of the Transitional Federal Charter adopted in February 2004 and the Djibouti Agreement signed in June 2008, the transition was due to end in August 2011. However, most of the tasks set out in the Charter remained outstanding. The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) used his good offices to resolve a five-month dispute between the President and the Speaker of Parliament and to facilitate discussions between the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), regional stakeholders and international partners on the management of the transition after August 2011. This resulted in the Kampala Accord which provides for an extension of the TFIs’ mandate for one additional year while establishing a Roadmap on Ending the Transition with benchmarks, timelines and compliance mechanisms.

The Roadmap defines a series of tasks to be accomplished by the TFIs to end the transition by 20 August 2012. The four benchmarks in the Roadmap are: *Benchmark 1 - Security*; improved security in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia; maritime security and counter-piracy; - *Benchmark 2: Constitution*; draft Constitution finalized; adopted; parliamentary reform; elections and constitutional reform; *Benchmark 3 - National reconciliation and outreach*; *Benchmark 4 - Promotion of good governance and accountability*. As at the end of May 2012, of a total of 56 tasks identified, 42 percent are on track or have been fully accomplished (24 tasks). About 42 percent (24 tasks) are work in progress and may be delayed but are likely to be completed, and 14 percent (8 tasks) are stalled. Five tasks have been excluded as two have been superseded by the Garowe Principles, and three have been postponed to the post transition period.

While the implementation of the Roadmap is proceeding, some key activities have been delayed or missed the deadlines. One of the most acute and immediate risks in the implementation of the Roadmap is the lack of funding to complete the constitutional track (Benchmark 2) and to support to the TFG in extending their authority in newly recovered areas in south central Somalia. A long-running parliamentary dispute also impeded progress in the implementation of the transitional tasks, since the ensuing stalemate prevented the Parliament from transacting business.

In order to avoid derailing the Roadmap process, the Principals of the Signatories met in Addis Ababa on from 21 to 23 May 2012 and agreed the adjusted timeline of the key Roadmap Tasks to ensure that the Transitional Period will end on 20 August 2012. A follow-up meeting which was held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 20 to 22 June 2012, paved the way for progress (see the adjusted timeline in the Box 1) when the President signed a Decree and Protocols aimed at moving the process forward and the Roadmap signatories approved the final draft Provisional Constitution for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).

### Box 1: Adjusted timeline of the Roadmap

26th May 2012	Arbitration Board of the Traditional Leaders established
1st June 2012	Technical Selection Committee (TSC) established
20th June 2012	TSC publishes the finalized (and fully vetted) list of National Constituent Assembly (NCA) delegates.
30th June 2012	Selected NCA members to be present in Mogadishu; Copies of draft constitution to be received by the NCA delegates
25th July 2012	NCA convened - Opening ceremony
2nd Aug 2012	Provisional Constitution adopted
5th Aug 2012	TSC publishes finalized and fully vetted list of New Federal Parliament (NFP)



7th Aug 2012	New Federal Parliament members sworn in
16th Aug 2012	Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers by NFP
20th Aug 2012	Election of President by the NFP

## **COMPONENT 2: Project justification**

There are two components in the proposed project related to the constitution and the security benchmarks of the Roadmap. Both components contribute to extending the existing peace process to a broader range of Somali actors, which is an essential basis for future peacebuilding activity in the post-August phase.

On the political track, the project contributes to the convening of the NCA, which is a key deliverable under the Roadmap for ending the Transition and is central to UN efforts to broaden the peace process beyond Mogadishu. Given the absence of the security conditions required for a public referendum, the NCA is the body empowered to provisionally adopt Somalia's interim constitution, thereby laying out a new, more legitimate political dispensation for the post-August 2012 period. The project contributes to ensuring transport required to facilitate the safe and secure participation of all selected Assembly members, who will include nominees from across south-central Somalia, including from areas recently recovered from Al-Shabaab as well as those still under their control, with a minimum of 30% women. This represents a critical area in which funding is required, but where donor funds have not been forthcoming despite sustained efforts by UNPOS and UNDP.

With reference to the Secretary-General's Seven Point Action Plan, UNPOS strives for increasing women representation in decision making process during the end of the Transition, including the selection of the NCA and new Federal Parliament members. In support of Somali order to promote women political participation, UNPOS supported a workshop in Mogadishu in June 2012 to share information and devise strategies to ensure the 30% women quota in the nomination of the NCA and new parliament members, as per the Garowe II Agreement, with the TFG Ministry of Women Development and Family Care. Afterwards, advocacy campaign was carried out from 21 and 25 June by the Women Caucus of the CSO collation, targeting the Elders of the five clans. Furthermore, UNPOS appointed one of its Gender Advisors together with the DSRSG as non-voting members of the Technical Selection Committee (TSC), which is responsible for vetting nominees of the NCA members and new parliamentarians, to ensure that the 30% quota is compiled.

On the security side, the project provides immediate assistance to the TFG to plan for the establishment of basic security and law and order in newly recovered areas, while activities are stepped up for recovery projects and programs in those areas. This includes stakeholder mapping exercises and quick security sector assessments with local communities by the TFG in, at least, 4 locations in south central Somalia. These activities will lay the foundation for medium to long-term capacity building support of the TFG and local authority in their stabilization efforts. This is an area of activity that donors have been reluctant to fund in the short term owing to the sensitive political and security situation, but where catalytic assistance is urgently needed to create a framework for longer-term assistance. By ensuring gender experts in the assessment teams as well as women participants of the assessment and its validations, gender security needs will be also looked at. Its findings will feed back to subsequent programming.

## **COMPONENT 3: Logical Framework (including implementation strategy)**

### **1. Sustainability Strategy**

The critical tasks under the Benchmark 1 and 2 of the Roadmap require an estimated \$11.3 million. UNPOS and UNDP have jointly held a number of consultations with potential donors in Nairobi and at headquarters level. Several member states have made pledge. As a result, of this amount, \$9.58 million is available between UNDP, UNPOS and some donors. The required

funding gap is \$1.75 million which will enable UNPOS and UNDP to ensure Somali stakeholders in implementing the remaining key Roadmap tasks in the coming five months.

In addition to financial contributions, UNPOS and UNDP are seeking UN surge capacities, including the Mediation Support Unit's stand-by capacity. Electoral, gender and rule of law experts from the Electoral Assistance Division, the Department of Political Affairs and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are requested to join the mission for short periods of time. The UN continues to advocate with the TFG for a contribution from the TFG's own tax revenues to some of the critical activities. Flexible arrangements such as secondments, stand-by arrangements, surge capacities as well as in-kind contributions from member states are also sought to urgently fill the existing gaps.

The resources requested from the Peacebuilding Fund cover either the areas in which donors have indicated reluctance due to the political or security nature of the activities proposed, or that require urgent kickoff funding in order to prevent the political process from stalling. In addition, catalyst effects are envisaged that would invite additional contributions from traditional and non-traditional donors once activities have successfully been rolled out.

## 2. Logical framework

### Part 1 (Strategic Level):

Objectives	Measurable indicators/Targets	Means of verification	Important assumptions / risks
PBF Priority Area 1. Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements and Political Dialogue			
PBF Outcome(s)  - The TFG has established indirect or direct presences in each newly recovered area with improved safety and security conditions in those areas.	Positive changes in security and safety perception (disaggregated per area)  Evidence that target population in newly recovered areas feels safer with more confidence and trust to state authorities	SG reports and TFG's press releases;  Perception surveys among target populations in recovered territorial areas;	Important assumptions:  - TFG, AMISOM and neighboring forces continue to expand their control of territory. Thereby, The TFG and international community gain access to the newly recovered areas.  - The TFG continues to commit political outreach and local reconciliation in newly recovered areas.  - Al-Shabaab continues suffering from internal splits and weakening their operational capability.
<b>OUTPUTS:</b>  1-1. The TFG obtains skills for basic security sector assessment and gathers baseline information to consolidate their policy and formulate programs for the security sector in the newly recovered areas.	Quality of results of the mapping exercise for security update in the four newly recovered areas (Baidoa, Beledwyne, Dhuusamareeb, garbahaarey)  Positive validation feedback from workshop members  # of the TFG officials trained in mapping exercise and basic security sector assessment  # of participants in the consultations and validations	Report of validation workshop  List of participants in the assessment training and staff in the assessment teams	<u>Risks:</u>  - The lack of political consensus among local interlocutors over their engagement with the TFG.  - Increased use of terror tactics by Al-Shabaab in newly recovered areas.  - Limited impact of the TFG's political outreach and reconciliation efforts in newly recovered areas.



Objectives	Measurable indicators/Targets	Means of verification	Important assumptions / Risks
<b>PBF Priority Area 2.</b> <b>Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution</b>			
<b>PBF Outcome(s)</b> <b>The Constituent Assembly is convened with inclusive participation of representatives from all major parts of Somalia</b>	<p>The Provisional Constitution is adopted at the Constitutional Assembly within the given timeline</p> <p>Significant representation at the Constituent Assembly by areas of South Central Somalia previously less involved in federal institutions for the provisional adoption of the draft Constitution.</p> <p>Proportion of female members among the 825 CA members (disaggregated per clan. 30 % as the target as per the Garowe II agreement.)</p>	<p>Attendance list at the CA</p> <p>The adopted Provisional Constitution</p>	<p>Important assumptions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political commitment toward the peace process, and political outreach and dialogue maintains at national and community levels</li> <li>- The nomination and selection process for the Constituent Assembly, Parliament, Speaker and President are accepted and considered as legitimate by the Somali public and key stakeholders as well as the international community.</li> <li>- Independent and apolitical nature of the selection process of the Constituent Assembly is respected.</li> </ul>
<b>OUTPUTS:</b> <b>2-1. Inclusive and safe participation of members at the provisional Constituent Assembly secured</b>	<p>The 825 members of the Constituent Assembly, including women members, are present in Mogadishu by 25 July 2012.</p> <p>Daily participation of the 825 CA members during the Assembly.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Attendance list with clear indication of gender at the Constituent Assembly.</li> <li>- Press release and media coverage</li> </ul>	<p>Risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The draft Constitution will be delayed due to lack of security or political constraints.</li> <li>- The draft Constitution creates misperception regarding Somali ownership in the drafting process.</li> <li>- The contents of the draft Constitution is not in line with international norms and standards.</li> <li>- Political manipulation of the selection process</li> </ul>

Part 2 (Implementation Level): *This table describes what will be implemented, by whom, how, and how much.*

PBF Outcome: *Public security at the national and local level increased*

Main Activities	Inputs	Rough Cost Estimate (optional)	Person(s) responsible for mobilizing inputs
1. Support the TFG in their mapping exercise in newly liberated areas			
a. Training workshop for the TFG assessment team on methodologies and report drafting for the mapping exercises	Pre-deployment Security Sector Assessment Training (3 days in Nairobi) - Cost for 25 PAX (including 5 women) participants (Accommodation, flights and food) - Cost for 2 PAX facilitators (fee, travel and DSA) - Training Facility	\$ 29,600 (Women related: \$ 4,920)  \$19,200  \$ 3,000	UNPOS Security Sector Development Office and the TFG
b. Mapping exercises in 4 newly recovered areas (Baidoa, Beledweyne, Dhuusamareeb, and Garbahaarey). This includes a focus group discussion with women representatives in each location around their security and specific needs as well their roles to inform policy, planning and programming.	Cost for Mapping Exercise in newly recovered areas (3 day assessment) - In-Country travel from Mogadishu to 4 locations in regions (Baidoa, Doolow, Beledweyne and Dhuusamareeb) - Land transportation in 4 assessment areas - DSA for Assessment Team during their assessment - Consultation workshops targeting 80 PAX (15% women) in each location - Stationary for training and consultations  Basic equipments for District Security Committee (in 4 location and Mogadishu)	\$ 60,000 (Women related: \$ 12,000)  \$ 19,200 (Women related: \$ 3,840) \$ 13,515 (Women related: \$ 2,703) \$ 36,800 (Women related: \$ 5,520)  \$ 3,000 (Women related: \$ 450)  \$ 100,000	UNPOS Security Sector Development Office and the TFG
c. Validation workshops in the 4 assessed locations and Mogadishu.	Validation workshop (1 day) targeting 80 PAX (15% women) in the 4 locations and Mogadishu  Contingency	\$ 59,705 (Women related: \$ 9,181)  \$ 5,980	UNPOS Security Sector Development Office

PBF Outcome: Significant representation in new political institutions by (i) areas of South Central Somalia previously less involved in federal institutions and (ii) women

Main Activities	Inputs	Rough Cost Estimate (optional)	Person(s) responsible for mobilizing inputs
1. Support to stand up and convene the maximum member 825 Constituent Assembly.	In-Country travel and Transportation for the 525 Constituent Assembly members to Mogadishu - 525 PAX @ 1,000 USD  Hiring local mini-buses in Mogadishu during the Constituent Assembly for their member to commute to the venue. - 55 buses @ 1,000 USD	\$ 525,000 (Women related: \$ 157,500)  \$ 55,000 (Women related: \$ 16,500)	UNPOS/UNDP Joint Constitution Unit (JCU) through UNDP funding mechanism

**COMPONENT 4: Budget**

PBF PROJECT BUDGET				
Categories	UNPOS	UNDP	Amount (USD)	Women related
1. Staff and other personnel costs	-	-	-	-
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	-	-	-	-
3. Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture (including Depreciation)	100,000	-	100,000	-
4. Contractual Services	28,200	55,000	83,200	20,220
5. Travel	41,620	525,000	566,620	162,304
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	174,200	-	174,200	32,640
7. General Operating and Other Direct Costs	5,980	-	5,980	-
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	<b>350,000</b>	<b>580,000</b>	<b>930,000</b>	<b>215,164</b>
Indirect support costs**	24,500	40,600	65,100	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>374,500</b>	<b>620,600</b>	<b>995,100</b>	<b>21.6%</b>

\* See the UNDG Harmonized reporting to Donors for Joint Programmes approved in 2006 and available on <http://www.undg.org/docs/9442/Explanatory-Note---Annex-D.doc>.

\*\* The rate shall not exceed 7% of the total of categories 1-5, as specified in the PBF MOU and should follow the rules and guidelines of each recipient organisation. Note that Agency-incurred direct project implementation costs should be charged to the relevant budget line, according to the Agency's regulations, rules and procedures.



### **COMPONENT 5: Management Arrangements**

UNPOS was established in April 1995 to advance the cause of peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The current mandate of UNPOS includes Security Council resolutions 1814, 1863, 1872, 1910, 1976, 2010, 2036 (preamble) and relevant reports of the Secretary-General. UNPOS's budget in 2012 is US\$17.4 million, covering 99 staff members, around half of which are Somalia based. By March 2012 UNPOS has spent 40 percent of its annual budget in support of the Roadmap activities.

UNPOS Security Sector Development Office was established in 2010 pursuant to the Security Council in resolution 1863 (2009). One of its main tasks is to support Somali authorities in preparing a coherent and nationally owned strategy for developing the justice and security sectors, based on the rule of law and with respect for human rights. UNPOS has been co-chairing the Joint Security Committee (JSC) since August 2009, the JSC and its three Technical Working Groups bring together the most relevant actors from the Government, the United Nations, AMISOM and the international community to achieve such coordination in the areas of military, police, justice and corrections.

The mission has also continued to advise the key Ministers within the security sector, namely the Ministers of Defence, Interior and National Security, and Justice and Religious Affairs. Additionally, the military and police advisers of the Security Sector Development Office have worked closely with the security sector leadership in Mogadishu, including the National Security Forces Chief of Staff and the Somali Police Force Commissioner, as well as with the AMISOM Force Commander and the AMISOM Police Commissioner.

The proposed activity under the Benchmark 1: Security will be executed through the UNPOS Security Sector Development Office. Funds can be received through the 'Trust Fund in Support of the Somali Transitional Security Institutions' which was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009), and is managed by UNPOS. The purpose of the Trust Fund is to build the capacity of the Somali Transitional Security Institutions.

Activities under Benchmark 2: Support to the constitution-making process is implemented by the UNPOS/UNDP Joint Constitution Unit (JCU) in cooperation with other sections of UNPOS. The JCU was created in 2011 based on an MoU between UNPOS and UNDP. Physically located within UNPOS offices, the unit is staffed by UNDP allowing both organizations to co-lead on the political and technical aspects of the constitution. Funds to UNDP can be channeled directly to UNDP through a standard cost-sharing agreement negotiated with interested donors or through amending already existing agreements in support of the constitution making project.

While the fund for supporting the TFG in their mapping exercise in newly liberated areas will be channeled through UNPOS, the one for standing up and convening the National Constituent Assembly will be through UNDP.

### **COMPONENT 6: Monitoring and evaluation**

Reporting, monitoring and evaluation of the overall proposed activities will be carried out through the monitoring and compliance mechanisms set by the Roadmap, including the Technical Committee; International Coordination and Monitoring Group and the Regional Political Initiative. Two Roadmap progress reports were published in the last six months. The UN with support from IGAD, AMISOM and League of Arab States (LAS) has been supporting and monitoring the implementation of the Roadmap.

As for the mapping exercise in newly liberated areas, monitoring and evaluation will be conducted by existing security sector institution and coordination mechanism. This includes the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) Secretariat, the national body which is responsible for implementing the NSSP and overseeing its progress, and the JSC which is the coordination mechanism between the Somali stakeholders and international community in the areas of security and justice sector development. The monitoring and evaluation will be based on the NSSP M&E

framework and made against its targets. In addition, impact evaluation, including security perception survey, will be carried out at the end of the activities with support of the UNPOS Security Sector Development Office. This will not only review activities implemented, but also draw lessons in order to inform future planning and program design.

In term of the support for the NCA, the UNDP internal M&E framework consists of 6 core interdependent components: At project level, they include: project monitoring and results based quarterly reporting (narrative and financial). At programe level, this includes: program oversight, compliance reporting. At the Country Office level, this includes qualitative monitoring of UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) 2011-2015 sub outcomes, and CPD Outcome level monitoring. Utilizing quantitative and qualitative methods, sourcing primary and secondary data, in collaboration with counterparts, the framework provides all stakeholders with information and data on the progress, process, outputs, and outcomes of projects, programs, and strategies to enhance the evidence base, accountability, and best practice. Project level monitoring costs will utilize donor funds. At program and Country Office level, UNDP core resources may be utilized.

## **COMPONENT 7: Analysis of risks and assumptions**

<b>Risk</b>	<b>Risk Management</b>
<p><b>Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultative Stakeholder Conferences inside the country are potential targets of terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab and/or other militant groups who are opposed to the constitutional process.</li> <li>• Constituent Assembly inside the country will be a potential target of terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab and/or other militant groups opposed to the constitutional process.</li> <li>• Establishment of new political entities involved in the constitutional process (IIEC, CA) operating in the country are new potential targets for terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab and/or other militant groups who are opposed to the constitutional process.</li> <li>• The ongoing humanitarian crisis could detract public participation in the constitutional process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Close cooperation with AMISOM in planning and managing events.</li> <li>• Undertaking the required forwards planning and expenditure required to minimize security risks.</li> <li>• Consider secured location for convening the CA (including construction of special venue, ship in harbour, close AMISOM presence etc.).</li> <li>• Use of modern communication technologies to communicate with the public and minimize the risks related to movements on the ground and public gatherings.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Political</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The ongoing parliamentary crisis, unless ways found to resolve it or get around the hurdles presented by it, become an obstacle in implementing the roadmap.</li> <li>• Relationships between constitutional bodies/entities involved in the finalization/adoption process compromised: tasking and responsibilities between IFCC and CoE remain contentious, PCC marginalized and unlikely to support the legislative agenda required to finalize and adopt the constitution</li> <li>• Establishment of a CA could be seen as compromising the charter, any comprising of the charter could set a precedence for the disregard of rule of law in the future, selected members of the CA (even if previously respected) may be compromised for accepting role in the CA, CA might reject the draft and thus enforce a restart of the constitutional process</li> <li>• Major Somali stakeholders/signatories to the roadmap might get dissatisfied with the constitution-making process and might pull out</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use high-level consultation mechanisms (regional and international) to support consensus building and find face-saving win-win-solutions.</li> <li>• Decisive political actions to show international commitment to the constitutional process and not to individual stakeholders.</li> <li>• Invest in relationship building between and among Somali constitutional bodies, as the individual members are likely to remain politically relevant and useful for the post-adoption political dispensation.</li> <li>• Provide technical expertise/political guidance to the constitutional bodies.</li> <li>• Invest in a credible CA process (transparent and inclusive appointment procedures, public information about scope and function of the CA)</li> </ul>



(though Galkayo seems to have reaffirmed their commitment to the process).	
<p><b>Operational</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Roadmap timelines/series of consultative meetings/establishment of required entities (IIEC; CA) delayed.</li> <li>• Remaining time insufficient to deliver final draft.</li> <li>• Inadequate technical capacities of members of constitutional bodies entrusted with finalizing the draft constitution.</li> <li>• Inadequate supporting institutions to support the finalization of the draft (Census and Boundaries Commission, civil service).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prioritize work with constitutional bodies (IFCC, CoE, PCC, JCA, IIEC, CA) with support of international experts to finalize the draft constitution and its adoption without being distracted by the on going political manoeuvring.</li> <li>• Invest in adequate strategic and technical support for the constitutional bodies (IFCC, CoE, PCC, JCA, IIEC, CA).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Financial</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadequate funds to support the inclusive, consultative, representative process envisaged under the roadmap/Garowe principles (political consensus building with diaspora, regional stakeholders/signatories of the roadmap, establishment and operationalizing a 1000 member CA)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to engage with and persuade traditional donors of the importance of this process at this juncture of the Somali history, approach potential new donors (like Turkey, Gulf states).</li> </ul>
<p><b>Regulatory</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation mechanisms indorsed by the International Community restricted and inflexible due to internal regulations and security pressures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be creative and work with partners in seeking more flexible and rapid technical assistance.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Strategic</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Somali people lose trust in negotiated constitutional process and political settlements.</li> <li>• International Community loses confidence in Somalia's constitutional and political processes.</li> <li>• Damage to UN/UNDP reputation and relationship to Somali, international and regional counterparts.</li> <li>• UNDP core business in supporting constitutional and electoral processes in post-conflict countries undermined.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular, open and honest communication with Somali, international and regional partners providing updates, including identification of actual challenges and setbacks.</li> <li>• Strategize with Somali, international and regional counterparts on constructive solutions and way forward.</li> </ul>

**PEACEBUILDING FUND  
ANNEX I**

**PROJECT SUMMARY**

<b>Project Number &amp; Title:</b>	PBF/				
<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b>					
<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>					
<b>Location:</b>					
<b>Approved Project Budget:</b>					
<b>Duration:</b>	<b>Planned Start Date:</b>		<b>Planned Completion:</b>		
<b>SC Approval Date: (Actual Dates)</b>		<b>MDTF Funds Transfer</b>		<b>Project Activities Start Date</b>	
<b>Project Description:</b>					
<b>PBF Priority Area:</b>					
<b>PBF Outcome:</b>					
<b>Key Project Activities:</b>					
<b>Procurement:</b>					

**QUARTERLY PROJECT UPDATE**

<b>Period covered:</b>			
<b>Project Number &amp; Title</b>	PBF/		
<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b>			
<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>			
<b>JSC Approval Date:</b>			
<b>Funds Committed<sup>1</sup>:</b>		<b>% of Approved:</b>	
<b>Funds Disbursed<sup>2</sup>:</b>		<b>% of Approved:</b>	
<b>Forecast Final Date:</b>		<b>Delay (Months):</b>	

<b>Outcome/Indicators:</b>	<b>Achievements/Results:</b>	<b>Challenges (incl. expected effect on project results):</b>

<sup>1</sup> Project commitment is defined as legally binding contracts signed for goods, works, and services as permissible by the respective agency's financial rules and regulations.

<sup>2</sup> Actual payments (for goods, works, and services) made against signed contract commitments. In most cases, total reported disbursements should not exceed total commitments, except in cases where disbursements are made against non-committed project funds (such as small scale payments, indirect programme costs etc, where no commitments are raised prior to payment).