**Evaluation of The UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal**

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# GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AMMAA | Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies | MRE | Mine Risk Education |
| APF | Armed Police Force | NA | Nepal Army |
| APMBC | Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention | NAMACC | Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre |
| AVR | Armed Violence Reduction | NCBL | Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines |
| BAC | Battle Area Clearance | NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| BCPR | Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery | NMAA | National Mine Action Authority |
| CCW | Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons | NP | Nepal Police |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Accord | NPTF | Nepal Peace Trust Fund |
| CPN(M) | Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) | NRCS | Nepal Red Cross Society |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee | NSA | Non-State Actor |
| DDA | Department of Disarmament Affairs | OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| DoE | Department of Education | PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations) | PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| EOD | Explosive Ordinance Disposal | QA | Quality Assurance |
| EPSP | Emergency Peace Support Project | QC | Quality Control |
| ERW | Explosive Remnants of War | QM | Quality Management |
| GICHD | Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining | RC/HC | Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator |
| GoN | Government of Nepal | SALW | Small Arms, Light Weapons |
| HI | Handicap International | SOP | Standing Operating Procedure |
| ICBL | International Campaign to Ban Landmines | UN | United Nations |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross | UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person | UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device | UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| IEDD | Improvised Explosive Device Disposal | UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| IMAS | International Mine Action Standards | UNMAS | United Nations Mine Action Service |
| IMSMA | Information Management System for Mine Action | UNMAT | United Nations Mine Action Team |
| INSEC | Informal Sector Services Centre | UNMIN | United Nations Mission in Nepal |
| MAC | Mine Action Centre | UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| MACC | Mine Action Coordination Centre | UNPFN | United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal |
| MAJWG | Mine Action Joint Working Group | UXO | Unexploded Ordnance |
| MAU | Mine Action Unit | VTF | Voluntary Trust Fund (for Mine Action) |
| MDTF | Multi-Donor Trust Fund (United Nations) |  |  |
| MoPR | Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Introduction**

The evaluation looked at the “UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal”, which comprised two distinct but complementary components: one managed by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the other by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).[[1]](#footnote-1) The aims of the evaluation were to: (i) assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal; (ii) identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity development and processes that have been established; and (iii) make recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of similar programmes.

After conducting desk research, the three-person evaluation team undertook a mission to Kathmandu from 26 February—9 March 2012. The team focused on three clusters of issues concerning (i) strategy & design, (ii) implementation and (iii) current status and way forward. In addition to the standard criteria for development evaluation,[[2]](#footnote-2) the team was asked to assess the programme in terms of its:

* strategic contribution to peace-building
* complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities

**Context & the Beginnings of the Mine Action Programme**

The 1996-2006 civil war between the Government of Nepal (GoN) and communist rebels left Nepal with a modest but widespread amount of contamination from landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW) and improvised explosives devices (IED). In addition, there were significant stockpiles of IED, much of which rebel combatants were to assemble near to their cantonment areas as stipulated in the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). Among its other mandates, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was asked to inventory these IED stockpiles and to support their destruction. This initiative was financed principally through the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN).

The CPA also required the Nepal Army to mark and ‘excavate’ its anti-personnel minefields and IED fields within 60 days. It did not have the training or equipment to do this and turned to the UN plus some bilateral donors for assistance. Working under UNMIN, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) initially arranged for training in minefield survey and clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal. In addition, building on its earlier work with local and international civil society (NGOs plus the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement) to support mine risk education (MRE) and the surveillance of mine/IED casualties, UNICEF was quick to provide 14,000 hazards signs so both the Army and rebels could make their mine/IED fields.

On its side, the GoN established the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) in late 2006 and, six months later, an inter-ministerial Mine Action Steering Committee and a Mine Action Technical Committee, both reporting via the new Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR). Initially, these committees remained inactive, due in part to the difficulties the country’s political parties experienced in forming a stable government and implementing the more contentious provisions of the CPA.

**Support to National Capacity Development**

The UN mine action programme expanded when responsibility for mine action was transferred from UNMIN to the UN Country Team in late 2008. Within two months, UNMAT and the Army agreed on a joint capacity development plan for NAMCC. This envisaged an expansion in the Army’s capacity for ‘humanitarian demining’[[3]](#footnote-3) to four platoons, each working in accord with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Work on this component went well, in part because the Army hopes to have demining units serve in UN peacekeeping missions, and such units need to be IMAS compliant. Progress on demining exceeded the targets, with the last of the 53 minefields cleared in June 2010; six months ahead of schedule; and with plans in place to clear the last of the IED fields before May 2011.

The Army, with support from the Armed Police Force and the Nepal Police, also has capacity in place to deal adequately with the threat of scattered unexploded ordnance from the civil war and the IEDs being used by a number of non-state armed groups in the Terai region of Nepal. The two police forces also received modest support from UNMAT, mainly through training and materials for mine risk education arranged by UNICEF, and have participated actively in the mine action programme, including the meetings of the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG) – the principal coordination mechanism for mine action, embracing UNMAT, GoN, and civil society.

UN support to mine action again expanded in scale and scope in mid-2009 when the UNMAT received funding for (i) development of a mine action section within the MoPR, (ii) MRE, (iii) Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management capacity within MoPR, as well as coordination of mine action activities and information plus attendance by MoPR personnel at international mine action events. In November 2009 a joint taskforce under the leadership of an Under Secretary at MoPR produced a Plan of Action for Mine Action. This envisaged that the MoPR would house the national Mine Action Centre,[[4]](#footnote-4) with the capacity to (among other things):

* Coordinate and make decisions regarding implementation of Mine Action activities
* Mobilise required resources
* Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
* Manage QA/QC of cleared sites
* Manage National Guidelines for Safety Standards (NGSS)

Among the objectives in the taskforce report was *Nepal to sign APMBT* [i.e. the Ottawa Convention] *within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal*.

Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with NAMACC. The MoPR does serve as the conduit for funding of mine action from the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) – a joint GoN-donor mechanism designed to help finance the implementation of CPA provisions.[[5]](#footnote-5) However, the Mine Action Section within the Ministry remained under-resourced and weak. Responsibility for information management and quality management remained with the Army rather than the MoPR. A draft national mine action strategy was completed in February 2011 and approved by the Technical Committee, but it has not been adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly, National Technical Standards and Guidelines were prepared and adopted by the Technical Committee, but not by the Steering Committee. Mine action legislation was not even drafted.

In addition, although not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents, it is clear the UN agencies involved (UNCT, UNMAS, UNICEF) devoted significant efforts to having Nepal sign the Ottawa Convention through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the attendance of Nepalese officials in international meetings on the Convention, and trying to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince Mirad of Jordan – one of the champions of universalization. The GoN backed away from its initial agreement to the visit by Prince Mirad and has not signed the Ottawa Convention nor the other main conventional weapons disarmament instruments.

**Conclusions and Lessons Learnt**

The evaluation team concluded that the UN strategy and programme design was relevant to the needs in Nepal after the CPA, and the programme expanded appropriately in scale and scope as opportunities arose.

In most respects – and certainly in terms of operations (stockpile management and disposal, demining and MRE) – implementation of UN support to mine action in Nepal went very well. UNMAS support to the capacity development efforts of NAMACC, and the NA Engineering Brigade more generally, was extremely successful. In this UNMAS was aided by two facilitating factors. First, the UNPFN proved to be rapid and flexible in approving appropriate sums for extending the IEDD/EOD project and for expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging opportunities.

Second, UNICEF had prepared the ground well. Its decisions to support victim surveillance and to convene the MRE Working Group were strategic, cost-effective, and provided a firm foundation for a broader mine action programme when the opportunity for expansion emerged. As well, UNICEF’s decision to provide early assistance to both sides of the conflict (e.g. the hazards signs) bolstered trust and helped secure the active participation of the security forces within a broader mine action programme.

UN delivery also appears to have been efficient. In particular, expensive international staffing was comparatively modest (at maximum, four UNMAS and one UNICEF), and size of the international team was reduced as milestones were attained.

As the UN mine action programme in Nepal discharged its mandate efficiently and effectively, the evaluation team concluded that it is a good example of the complementarity envisaged for UNPFN-funded initiatives. The programme addressed politically sensitive issues; activities were within the comparative advantages of the UN agencies involved; the UNMAT was successful in brokering-in the involvement of additional, specialised expertise on short-term assignments from within the international mine action community; and UNMAT leveraged other funding.

The evaluation team also concluded that the UN mine action programme made a number of useful contributions to broader peace-building efforts in Nepal. In particular, demining and the destruction of IED stockpiles removed significant hazards to civilians, including in areas that had supported the rebels. Further, the mine action programme successfully embraced the three security forces, civilian GoN units, and members of local and international civil society, which helped promote dialogue and trust.

Finally, UN agencies involved in mine action made useful inroads on gender issues.

Two of the main objectives of the UN support programme have not been achieved. Firstly, the Mine Action Section in MoPR has not developed into a civilian Mine Action Centre capable of coordination and oversight of a national mine action programme, including those services delivered by the security forces. Secondly, the Steering Committee for Mine Action has not adopted either the National Mine Action Strategy nor the National Technical Standards and Guidelines. As well, the Steering Committee itself appears moribund.

A number of lessons emerge from the Nepal programme, most of which are not new in post-conflict stabilisation and recovery and need no elaboration other than to list them:

* start with the local context/avoid blueprint solutions
* do not downplay the value of good interpersonal relationships
* continuity of key personnel is necessary as ‘institutional memory’ is never adequate
* with commitment from national authorities/local actors, support for capacity development is generally successful; without such commitment, support for capacity development is like ‘pushing on a string’
* facilitating factors such as adequate and flexible funding are not sufficient to achieve success, but may be necessary for success

A clear lesson from Nepal that deserves highlighting because it has not been the case everywhere: the UNMAT mechanism can work effectively. At least four factors that contributed were:

* the willingness of each of the agencies to focus on their areas of comparative advantage
* the relatively modest demining component coupled with a mature MRE programme meant the operational ‘mix’ was conducive to a collegial style of management
* the fact that Nepal did not represent a large-scale and dire emergency in which a command-and-control approach to management may be necessary in the initial ‘campaign phase’ of the programme (and which may prove difficult to transition from as normalcy emerges)
* the UNCT mechanism

A final lesson merits mention: the strategic approach seen in the UN Mine Action programme for Nepal is appropriate for post-conflict environments. In brief, start small with concrete and feasible objectives (points-of-entry), then expand the scale and scope of the programme as opportunities arise.

**Recommendations**

For the short-term, the evaluation team recommends that the relevant UN agencies, plus the international and national mine action NGOs and the Red Cross movement continue with the planned, modest support for mine action. In addition, the UNCT should:

* maintain a ‘Watching Brief’ on Government commitment to mine action
* work to embed mine action concerns and capabilities within one or (better) both of the following programmes:
* Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
* Disability Assistance

For the medium-term, once Nepal adopts a new Constitution and completes its elections, security policy is likely to be a priority for the new government. This could usher in significant security sector reform. A security policy review is also like to touch upon the issues of conventional weapons disarmament and, of course, regional security. It would then be natural to consider whether anti-personnel landmines are an appropriate and credible weapon system for Nepal today.

The likelihood of a security policy review in the medium-term adds weight to the recommendation that the UNCT maintain a Watching Brief on mine action and the opportunities to promote universalization of the APMBC.

# INTRODUCTION

### Rationale, Purpose & Objectives of the Evaluation

The aims of this evaluation were to: (i) assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal; (ii) identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity development and processes that have been established; and (iii) make recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of similar programmes.

### Evaluation mandate

#### Scope

The evaluation was to look at the “UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal”, which comprised two distinct but very complementary components: one managed by the UN Mine Action Service[[6]](#footnote-6) (UNMAS) and the other by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). From January 2009 to December 2011, these two agencies worked closely as the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT), at which point the activities funded via UNMAS were completed. UNICEF support for mine action in Nepal continues.

#### Evaluation Questions

The evaluation questions are provided in the Terms of Reference, which are replicated in Appendix 1. The evaluation team analysed these and proposed that they be treated as three clusters of issues, namely:

1. Strategy & Design:
   1. How project concept & design reflected (i) the overall context and (ii) interests of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
2. Implementation
   1. How project implementation was affected by changes in (i) the overall context and (ii) interests of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
   2. How project implementation influenced (i) the overall context and (ii) interests of key stakeholders (Govt; UN; donors)
3. Current status & way forward
   1. Was capacity development/transition planning & implementation successful?
   2. Is the mine action programme capable of dealing with the residual threat on a sustained basis?

#### Project logic

In fact, there were two UN programmes – one for UNICEF and the other for UNMAS – drawing on separate funding streams and, hence, no one overall programme logic. As well, the UNMAS programme, funded in large part by the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) via the “Support to IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal (UNPFN/A-1)” project,[[7]](#footnote-7) expanded in scope significantly since it commenced in 2007. The evaluation team formulated the logic model for the final version of this project in the form of a Theory of Change diagram, which is depicted in Figure 8 – Logic Model: IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal on page 21.

#### Criteria

A number of criteria were embedded in the many evaluation questions listed in the TORs, but a clear list of criteria were not provided as such. On review of the evaluation questions, the evaluation team concluded that the standard DAC evaluation criteria (relevance; efficiency; effectiveness; impact; and sustainability) would be appropriate.

At the initial meeting with the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in Kathmandu, the evaluation team were provided with the UNPFN Projects Evaluation Guidance Note, which endorsed the DAC criteria but added three additional ones:

1. strategic contribution to peace-building in Nepal (i.e. strategic impact, not just ‘results’)
2. approach to peace-building programming (i.e. *how* the project is implemented)
3. complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities (i.e. relevance)

### Brief description of methodology

The evaluation was conducted in three phases:

Phase I: Will involve the collection and initial analysis of all available documentation, and a review of reports and previous assessments by the United Nations and others, and a meeting with stakeholders if required

Phase II: Will involve a mission to Kathmandu for meetings with UN staff, members of the National Mine Action Authority, international and national NGOs, the Nepalese Army, Nepalese Government officials, Nepalese Civil Society organisations and a presentation on demining.

Phase III: Will involve preparation of a draft evaluation report, sharing this with relevant parties for additional comments, making amendments and finalising the report.

The evaluation team comprised:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Position** | **Role/Responsibilities** |
| Ted Paterson | Head, Evaluation & Policy Research, GICHD | Evaluation Team Leader & lead re: reporting; quantitative data analysis; political economy; transition |
| Abigail Hartley | Deputy Director, MACCA | Lead re: assessment of operations and monitoring mechanisms for operations |
| Prabin Chitrakar | Local consultant | Lead on consultations with NGOs on community development & community security  Conduct/assist with field investigations (demining sites; community visits), translation, plus assistance with local logistics and other arrangements. |

### Problems encountered/limitations

The mission to Nepal was originally scheduled to begin in November 2011, but had to be postponed until late January 2012 because of a death in the family of one of the evaluation team members. In the interim, the UNMAS programme concluded and the last of the UNMAT international staff departed Nepal. This was inconvenient and, although the evaluation team would have benefited by the presence of the last of the UNMAT international staff, it posed no great obstacle. The UN RC/HC, local UNICEF staff, and many personnel from local and international NGOs, plus officers from the three security services, had been actively engaged with the mine action programme since its inception. As well, the evaluation team conducted telephone or skype interviews with a number of the former UNMAT international personnel.

The Government of Nepal (GoN) has instituted processes whereby requests by aid missions to meet government officials need to be vetted in advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While this is a valid concept in principle, in practice the vetting process proved both cumbersome and time consuming. This led to a considerable amount of additional work for the local consultant on the evaluation team, but his perseverance meant that no vital meetings were missed.

The GICHD implemented the evaluation and provided the team leader. This posed a potential for an actual or perceived conflict of interest as the GICHD has played a number of roles in Nepal’s mine action programme. It provided and still supports the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). At the request of UNICEF or UNMAS, GICHD experts conducted a number of missions to Nepal to provide training in mine risk education, international disarmament conventions and broader mine action management, and to facilitate the initial strategic planning sessions.

The GICHD adjudged that the risk from conflict of interest was modest as the assistance provided was episodic and supportive rather than central to the UNMAT programme in Nepal, and the main findings, conclusions and recommendations do not hinge on GICHD activities. The following measures provide further safeguard:

* two of the three evaluation team members were not GICHD personnel
* the evaluation report avoids pronouncing on the relevance, effectiveness or efficiency of the GICHD inputs

### Report Layout

The layout of this report is straightforward. The next chapter provides the context (history of conflict and peace-building; the scope and nature of the mine/IED/ERW contamination; relevant political, economic and social factors). This is followed by the history of the mine action programme and, then, the conclusions on the key evaluation questions and evaluation criteria. The main body of the report concludes with an outline of the current status of the mine action programme and options for the way forward. The standard appendices (Terms of Reference; Itinerary and List of People Met; List of Documents Consulted) complete the report.

# CONTEXT

## History of Conflict and Peacebuilding Efforts

### The Nepali Civil War

The Civil War – termed the People’s War by the Maoist rebels and typically referred to as the Insurgency – was launched in February 1996 by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – CPN(M) and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The stated aim was the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a People’s Republic. The conflict claimed an estimated 15,000 lives and displaced 100,000 to 150,000.

Initially the Royal Nepal Army refused to be drawn into the insurgency, regarding it as an internal policing matter. However, following the breakdown of peace talks in 2001 and the subsequent attack by rebels on the army, the Royal Army responded and the conflict escalated.

Frustrated by the inability of the government to defeat the rebels, in February 2005 King Gyanendra assumed direct control of power. Eventually, this led to a united front between the CPN(M) and other politicians who were opposed to the monarchy, followed by a general strike and pro-democracy demonstrations in Kathmandu, forcing the King to reinstate parliamentary authority and accept a ceremonial role.[[8]](#footnote-8) Both sides then announced ceasefires and entered peace negotiations, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed on 21 November 2006 by the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the Maoists.

### The Comprehensive Peace Accord and its Implementation

In addition to a complete cessation of hostilities, the parties to the CPA agreed on:

* the election of a Constituent Assembly
* stripping the King of political authority and nationalising royal property
* addressing social exclusion and eliminating the feudal system of land holdings
* forming a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission, a Truth Commission, and a high-level Commission for State Restructuring
* rehabilitation and social integration of people displaced during the insurgency
* Management of Arms and Armies provisions, including:[[9]](#footnote-9)
  + cantonment of the PLA in seven locations plus three satellite cantonments, with verification and monitoring to be provided by the UN
  + confinement of the NA to barracks[[10]](#footnote-10)
  + locked storage of PLA arms and ammunition – plus an equal amount by the Nepal Army (NA) – to be monitored by the UN

On 23 January 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1740 established the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as a political mission to monitor the AMMAA, assist in the registration of combatants and their weapons, monitor the NA and CPA arrangements, provide support for the election of a Constituent Assembly and monitor the electoral process.

In February 2007, the GoN set-up the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) to support the implementation of the CPA and subsequent CPA-related agreements. That same month, a Donor Group[[11]](#footnote-11) agreed a Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the NPTF with the GoN.[[12]](#footnote-12) In 2009, the Board invited a representative from the main Maoist party – now called the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – as an observer to counter the perception that the main instrument for implementing the CPA was in the hands of one of the parties to the CPA.

Textbox 1 – Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF)

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| The NPTF had an original mandate to support the GoN in implementing the following key provisions from the CPA:   * Management of camps and reintegration of former combatants * Rehabilitation of Internally Displaced People * Election of the Constituent Assembly * Strengthening law and order and police administration * Support to the peace process   Subsequently, the mandate was expanded to include:   * Rehabilitation of the conflict affected people * Mine action * Reconstruction of public sector infrastructure damaged during the conflict   These activities are grouped into four clusters, each of which incorporates some reconstruction of infrastructure:  Cluster 1: Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants  Cluster 2: Conflict Affected People and Communities  Cluster 3: Security and Transitional Justice (which now includes mine action)  Cluster 4: Constituent Assembly and Peace Building Initiatives (National and Local)  The NPTF is overseen by a Board of Directors, chaired by the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction, with the MoPR Secretary as member-secretary. A representative from the Donor Advisory Group (DAG); the country manager of the World Bank; the UN Special General’s Representative (since departed) and the UN Resident Co-ordinator are invitees.  The Peace Fund Secretariat (PFS) is headed by a Joint Secretary of the MoPR, who is designated by the Ministry as the Director of the NPTF. There is a Technical Committee whose role is to review and recommend projects to the Board, and six sector cluster groups to appraise project proposals and recommend approval to the Technical Committee.  In Phase 1 (2007-2010), just over $104 million was contributed to the NPTF from the GoN (62%) and donors (38%). Phase 2 (also planned for three years) started in January 2010. |

In April 2007, the GoN established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR)[[13]](#footnote-13) with a mandate to support peace-building efforts and reconstruction projects specifically focused in areas and on populations most affected by the conflict. MoPR serves as the main implementation mechanism for the NPTF and, therefore, the CPA.

With the NPTF planned to finance GoN activities to implement the CPA,[[14]](#footnote-14) in March 2007 the UN established a complementary mechanism – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN) – to finance peace-building activities by the UN system for which the UN had a comparative advantage due to, for example:[[15]](#footnote-15)

* as an ‘impartial third party’, the UN is able to address issues that are too politically sensitive for national actors
* providing specialized (‘boutique’) expertise that does not exist in Nepal
* importing institutional capacity from existing UN programmes elsewhere to reduce the need for national investments in institutional development for peace-building priorities of a short-term nature
* leveraging additional financing from global and regional funding instruments

Textbox 2 – the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN)

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| The UNPFN supports activities in four main areas, similar to the four clusters of the NPTF –cantonments/reintegration activities; elections/governance; security; and rights and reconciliation – as well as for ‘Quick Impact Projects’. It also has common governance arrangements to those of the NPTF. The operations of the Fund are designed and carried out under the overall guidance of the NPTF Board, in consultation with the DAG, and according to the instructions of the Executive Committee (chaired by RC/HC[[16]](#footnote-16) with one representative each from MoPR and the DAG). The governance structures of the two Funds are depicted below.  To 31 December 2010 the UNPFN had received $32.27 million in earmarked and non-earmarked donations. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)[[17]](#footnote-17) was the largest single contributor (31%), just ahead of the U.K. (29%) and Norway (25%), with the total for Canada, Denmark and Switzerland at 10%.  The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) in New York acts as the Administrative Agent for both the UN PBF and the UNPFN. |

In addition to these ‘basket’ funding arrangements with their overlapping governance structures, other donors and the World Bank launched separate projects to support the implementation of the CPA. In most cases, the MoPR is the responsible ministry.

Textbox 3 – The World Bank’s Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP)

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| In May 2008, the World Bank approved a $50 million grant for an Emergency Peace Support Project (EPSP). Originally designed to finance cash payments to Maoist militia in the cantonments and to conflict-affected people in the following categories:   |  |  | | --- | --- | | * widows | * Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) | | * families of the deceased | * those abducted | | * families of the disappeared | * orphans | | * the disabled |  |   In 2010 the project was substantially restructured. The plan to provide Maoist ex-combatants was dropped and replaced by new component designed to finance “skills and employability rehabilitation services” for conflict-affected people.[[18]](#footnote-18) |

Therefore, by mid-2008, three large mechanisms were in place to provide about $185 million in support of the implementation of the CPA – mainly via or in cooperation with the MoPR.

Figure 1 – Financing the Implementation of the CPA

**$50 million**

**Donors**

**Govt. of Nepal**

**World Bank**

**UN agencies supporting GoN**

**Ministry of Peace & Reconstruction**

**Cooperation**

**$32 million**

**$64 million**

**$40 million**

**$50 million**

**$32 million**

**$104 million**

**$50 million**

**Government Departments**

**Government Departments**

**Government Departments**

**Ministry of Finance**

### Armed Violence Since the CPA

While armed violence incidents and casualties dropped significantly following the ceasefires in 2006 and the CPA itself, continuing violence by non-state armed groups, especially in the Terai region of southern Nepal, has led to additional IED use and to new victims.

Textbox 4 – The emergence of non-state armed groups in the Terai[[19]](#footnote-19)

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| The Terai comprises 20 districts along the southern border with India. It contains about half of Nepal’s 30 million people and is often sub-divided into the plains (Madhesi) and the hill region (Pahadi). The Madhesi political parties point to numerous grievances against the state, including discrimination and exclusion (only 15% of parliamentarians were Madhesi and up to 40% of Madhesi had citizenship papers and voting rights). Madhesi activists want a single, powerful province with greater autonomy, and some for outright secession. This leads to conflicts with many other groups living in the region who do not want to be subsumed into a Madhesi-dominated province.  Madhesi grievances led to a mass protest movement in January 2007 (the Madhesi *Andolan*), which led to violence against Pahadi communities, a surge of extortion against Pahadi families and threats to journalists and human rights workers. Non-state armed groups have emerged claiming to represent various ethnic and regional groups and sustaining themselves by extortion and other criminal activities. |

## Landmine and other ERW contamination

During the conflict, the Nepal Army (NA) used anti-personnel mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IED) assembled in-country, around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure. The NA stated that it started using mines in 2002 and deployed an estimated 14,000 anti-personnel mines in 53 locations. The NA deployed mines in most locations in accordance with military doctrine, and mapped and recorded 43 out of the 53 minefields.

Figure 2 – Location of minefields



In addition to AP mines the NA, Armed Police Force (APF)[[20]](#footnote-20) and Nepal Police (NP) deployed command detonated IEDs. The NA used such devices in 275 locations. The APF reportedly deployed command detonated IEDs in 200 locations and the Nepal Police in 47 locations. As well, Army use of mortars and other projectiles resulted in limited contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO). The difficult and often inaccessible terrain would be a complicating factor for demining.

The Maoists had limited access to commercially manufactured arms and instead resorted to the manufacture of improvised devices. The most common device was a “socket bomb” (improvised hand grenades) crafted from plumbing joints. Bombs were also made from pipe, buckets, pressure cookers and other ordinary containers. The fusing mechanisms of these devices were often unreliable and affected by environmental conditions.


Together, this contamination from NA, APF, NP and Maoist use of explosive devices created moderate but widespread contamination. INSEC data showed that accidents took place in 60 of the 75 districts in Nepal in the 2004-2006 period, with most accidents the result of IEDs.

Textbox 5 – Informal Sector Services Centre (INSEC)

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| Established in 1988 as the Informal Sector Research Centre, in 1990 INSEC started a human rights programme to collect primary data on human rights violations through a network of representatives in each of Nepal’s 75 districts. INSEC began working with UNICEF in 2005 to monitor UN Resolution 1612 covering the recruitment and use of child soldiers and other abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict. The following year it was approached by Handicap International (HI) and UNICEF to establish an ‘active’ surveillance system for victim-activated explosions and casualties.  The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL – see Textbox 6) had been collecting and reporting mine/IED casualty statistics since 1998. It relied on secondary sources – principally, media reports – and other organisations believed the data to be inaccurate; perhaps giving an inflated picture of the problem. INSEC uses its national network of representatives to collect and verify data, including casualties, the types of explosive device and the circumstances.  Whenever an explosion affecting civilians occurs, INSEC is notified by one of its many partner organisations and sends a district representative to investigate. Data collected at the district level, usually from the survivor, relatives or witnesses of the accident, is sent to INSEC Regional and Central Offices using a standard form, and then transferred to victim assistance agencies and other members of the mine action community. Data are checked for consistency at the central level and then entered into a database (an Excel workbook). To validate data, INSEC also conducts periodic field visits to meet survivors and local partners.  Data are analysed and summarised in a bi-monthly report, which is disseminated through the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG). Reports are also published on the INSEC website in English and in Nepali. Casualties from victim-activated explosions, intentional explosions and, from 2010, other forms of armed violence (including small arms & light weapons – SALW) are reported separately.  INSEC also provides MRE and assists victims of conflict in obtaining assistance from physical rehabilitation centres supported by HI or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). |

There have been no reports of new use of anti-personnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps by the security forces or the PLA since the May 2006 cease-fire. However, the continued violence in the Terai has led to contamination by socket bombs and similar devices, but on a smaller scale than during the Insurgency. There has been a worrying increase of incidents in recent months, along with some suggestion that the use of these devices by militant groups is becoming more sophisticated.

Figure 3 – The most affected districts



According to the INSEC surveillance system, the number of casualties from victim-activated explosions has been declining since 2006, but the number of incidents has not been falling as rapidly. This is thought to be because smaller, less powerful devices (such as those most commonly used by non-state armed groups in the Terai) are causing a larger proportion of the accidents. In 2011, half the total accidents were caused by ‘new’ devices (i.e. made since the CPA).

Figure 4 – Victim-activated casualties and incidents

Since the CPA, only 5% of accidents have been the result of landmines; almost 80% were due to IEDs. Children – particularly boys between 5-19 years old – suffer the majority of casualties.

Figure 5 – Casualties by age quintile

## Current environment (political; economic; social)

Nepal is a very poor country, ranked 157th of 187 countries on the Human Development Index and with a per capita income of $1,160.[[21]](#footnote-21) Remarkably, during the insurgency poverty levels fell from 42% to 31% in the eight years leading to 2003/04. This was driven largely by a rapid increase in remittances from Nepalese working abroad (from 3% of GDP to 12%), but other contributing factors included rising agricultural wages, the expansion of roads and telecommunications, urbanisation and a fall in the dependency ratio due to a decline in fertility rates.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Nepal’s political and, to an extent, economic difficulties stem largely from social exclusion, which continue in spite of some provisions in the 1990 Constitution.[[23]](#footnote-23)

As a result of continuing armed violence, Nepal has been slipping on the Global Peace Index[[24]](#footnote-24) over the past three years.

Figure 6 – Nepal’s Ranking in the Global Peace Index

Politically, Nepal still faces many challenges. Many of the provisions of the CPA remain undone due to political rivalries among the parties and between leading politicians. This has led to numerous and rapid cabinet changes and, at times, political gridlock. For example, the evaluation team was informed that there have been at least nine different Ministers of Peace and Reconstruction since it was established in 2007. This is the Ministry that, supposedly, is responsible for mine action and the Minister is the Chair of the National Mine Action Steering Committee, which has rarely, if ever, met. In such an environment, it is difficult to sustain issues such as mine action on the political agenda for long enough to resolve them.

The process of drafting a new Constitution appears to have exhausted the main political parties, and the deadline has had to be extended a number of times (most recently on 1 December 2012 for a period of six months). Agreement of a Constitution will require compromises on a range of contentious issues, including: federalism, the number of provinces and the amount of power decentralised to them; the roles and authorities of the executive relative to parliament; and protections against discrimination on the basis of ethnic, caste or regional identity.HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

## Mine Action before the CPA

The first mine action activities in Nepal were initiated by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) in 1995. As the insurrection had not started and there was no landmine contamination, NCBL acted as a national member of the wider International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Textbox 6 – Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL)

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| NCBL started mine action activities in 1995, focusing initially on advocacy and awareness within different parts of the government, political parties and parliamentarians, and district officials. NCBL started data collection of victims of explosion in 1998 based on media reports. This led eventually to the admission by the Nepal Army in 2003 that it had laid landmines.  NCBL started MRE in 2003, initially in five districts, then expanded to 10 districts the next year and finally to 25 districts. In 2004 it also began providing assistance to mine victims as well as the conflict victims more generally. NCBL’s support is usually a grant for children’s education. |

In November 2004, UNICEF assumed the role of the United Nations focal point organization for Mine Action in Nepal. UNICEF set-up a national Mine Risk Education (MRE) Working Group, eventually comprising 16 international and national NGOs as well as the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) and ICRC. In 2006, the group became the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG), acting as a coordination body for MRE, advocacy, victim assistance and accident/casualty surveillance systems. After UNMIN and UNMAS became directly involved in Nepal, the MAJWG also covered demining.

## Mine Action since the CPA

### Requirements Emerging from the CPA and AMMAA

Clear mandates for mine action (stockpile destruction and demining) emerged from the CPA and subordinate agreements. Paragraph 5.1.4. of the CPA stated that *“Both sides shall assist each other to mark the landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and defuse and excavate it within 60 days.”*

AMMAA Section 2 on Reporting and verification stated *“The parties will provide maps and sketches showing current dispositions, including:*

*(2) Minefields, landmines, unexploded ordnance, standard explosives, improvised explosive devices and exact location of such items;”[[25]](#footnote-25)*

AMMAA paragraph 4.1.2 – Weapons storage and control stated *“The parties agree upon the safe storage of all Maoist army weapons and ammunition, in the seven main cantonment areas under UN monitoring...All improvised explosive devices will be collected at designated sites a* *safe distance from the main cantonment areas. Unsuitable devices will be destroyed immediately. Stable devices will be stored safely and under 24-hour armed guard. The parties, in consultation with the UN, will determine a timeline and process for the later destruction of all improvised explosive devices. To ensure the safety of both monitors and Maoist army personnel, no improvised explosive devices or crude bombs will be brought inside the cantonment sites.”*

As required in the AMMAA, IEDs used by the Maoist army were collected at designated areas at each of the seven main cantonment sites.

### Capacities Present in Nepal

The provisions in the CPA relating to landmines and IEDs clearly were aspirational and far exceeded the demining and EOD/IED disposal capacities extant in the country. The NA had the most capacity, but even it lacked the training and equipment needed to clear the minefields.

Given the increasing use of IEDs during the insurgency, in August 2002 the NA established the EOD Holding Unit, responsible for the search and disposal of IEDs. Training and equipment came primarily from the British government.[[26]](#footnote-26) The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit included 15 EOD/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) teams deployed at six regional bases throughout the country.

In December 2006 the GoN established the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) – part of the 14th Battalion of Engineers – within the grounds of the EOD Holding Unit in Kathmandu to assume responsibility for ‘humanitarian demining’[[27]](#footnote-27) and related mine action tasks.

The NA received additional equipment from the British and Swiss Governments including 38 mine detectors as well as robotic equipment for bomb disposal. Eight Nepal Army personnel also received training at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi (supported by the British Government), while five NA engineers trained in operations management at the Mine Action Coordination Centre in South-Lebanon, funded through the UNPFN.

The APF and, to a lesser degree, the Nepal Police also had some EOD capacity, but have played a secondary role in the demining programme.

Textbox 7 – The Armed Police Force

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| The APF was created in 2001 in response to the growing Maoist insurgency. During the conflict, it used command controlled IEDs to protect its facilities. (It has been reported that these areas have been cleared though no evidence has been provided by the NA, APF or NP showing when and how.) The APF also handled many of the bomb disposal tasks during the insurgency. Over 200 APF personnel in six Field Engineering Brigades have had training in India or the U.S. in EOD/IED disposal and MRE. The APF participated in some training from the UN as well.  The APF reports that it has disposed of over 3,000 devices, starting shortly after the CPA. However, it has never received modern mine detection and bomb disposal equipment such as the NA obtained. Accordingly, a policy has recently been agreed between the ministries of Home Affairs and Defence that the Police will contact the NA to respond to IEDs and UXO, and the APF will get involved only if, for some reason, the Army cannot respond in a timely manner.  In 2010, UNICEF agreed a joint plan with the APF to train 75 MRE ‘master trainers’ through three Regional Training-of-Trainers workshops. The APF has been active in MRE since then. The master trainers subsequently trained thousands of APF personnel who, in turn, have delivered MRE in a number of communities in mine/IED-affected areas. |

Textbox 8 – The Nepal Police and Mine Action

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| During the insurgency, NP had a special unit to emplace mines and IEDs around police facilities for defence, and police forces would carry explosives into conflicts. The NP states that all known areas where devices were planted have since been reported to the NA and cleared.  The main NP mine action responsibility has been providing first response to reports from the public of explosive devices or accidents. This remains true. When devices are found, police are trained to contact the NA, make the area safe, and avoid handling the device.  The Police also has a Bomb Disposal Team; part of a larger Special Police Task Force that responds to a variety of assignments for which most personnel lack training. These personnel (700+) have received training locally or in either India or the U.S. They are trained to defuse devices if the Army’s response will be delayed or if public security requires immediate action. Small units are present in over 40 districts.  In 2010, UNICEF agreed with NP to train 120 MRE master trainers from the 25 most affected districts and provide them with MRE materials. These in turn have provided MRE for their own personnel (over 14,000 received training and MRE materials) and for the public (c. 11,000). |

Importantly, in a parallel development HI and UNICEF enlisted a local NGO – INSEC – to establish an enhanced surveillance system for victim-activated explosions. This provided credible evidence on the numbers of accidents and casualties, which confirmed both the extent of the problem and trends over time.

### The UNMIN Response (2007-08)

Immediately after the CPA, UNICEF offered both sides of the conflict good quality, 'made in Nepal' hazards signs designed to international standards. Soon, UNICEF had provided 14,000 hazard signs to mark all known mine/IED fields and known storage areas. At about $1/sign, this was a rapid, practical[[28]](#footnote-28) and cost-effective initiative that enhanced safety and reinforced the understanding of the combatants that they had a responsibility to protect civilians from the mines and IEDs.

Security Council Resolution 1740 (2007) of 23 January 2007 established the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to, among other responsibilities, *“…monitor the management of arms and armies, including the cantonment of Maoist combatants and their arms and munitions, including improvised explosive devices.”* UNMIN immediately established a Mine Action Unit (MAU) to discharge some of these responsibilities.

Textbox 9 – Mandate of the UNMIN Mine Action Unit (MAU)

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| The Report of the Secretary-General on Nepal’s request for UN assistance recommended the establishment of a MAU within UNMIN Headquarters, with the objectives to:   * provide UNMIN with technical advice with respect to mine/IED/ERW problems * register and process information on explosive devices provided by the CPA Parties * assist in developing plans and procedures for the safe and timely destruction of all IEDs * conduct mine/IED/ERW related accident investigations. |

While the disposal of IED stocks and the clearance of Nepal Army minefields was the responsibility of the parties to the CPA, in view of the security risks the UNMIN MAU worked with the Maoist army in the management and demolition of improvised devices. The MAU undertook preliminary assessments of the main cantonment sites in February and March 2007, and the UN engaged a consultant to elaborate a concept of operations and outline a short and medium term strategy for mine action (in cooperation with UNICEF). The short- and medium-term objectives in the consultant’s report[[29]](#footnote-29) went well beyond the requirements stemming from the CPA and reflected the broad consensus which had emerged within the mine action community that national programmes are best organised as an integrated endeavour, combining the five ‘pillars’ of mine action: Demining; Stockpile Destruction; MRE; Victim Assistance; and Advocacy (for the universalization of international conventions and norms).

Regardless, the initial UNMIN mine action project focused narrowly on the stockpile management and destruction requirements stemming from the CPA. UNMAS prepared a proposal to the UNPFN for a $1.43 million project, IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal, that was approved by the UNPFN Executive Committee on 3 April 2007 (the first UNPFN project to be approved).

To implement the project, the firm ArmorGroup was engaged in April 2007 for six months in the first instance to provide technical advice to the Maoist combatants on the safe storage and destruction of all ERW stored at cantonment and satellite sites. ArmorGroup first assessed all the IEDs in storage (over 52,000 items including IEDs, detonators, factory made munitions and other explosive accessories). Over 97% of these were deemed too dangerous to store by UNMIN MAU and were slated for destruction in a cooperative process between the Maoist army and UNMIN (through ArmorGroup).[[30]](#footnote-30)

The UNPFN-funded project was subsequently extended to 31 December 2007 (with a budget increase of c. $235,000), with provision “to address the long-term problems of landmines and explosive remnants of war by providing training to the NA to allow it to undertake mine clearance as per international humanitarian standards.” This expanded the scope of the project to include the demining pillar.

In June 2007, the project received a second, $539,000 extension to train the NA in (i) minefield verification and mapping[[31]](#footnote-31) and (ii) MRE (expanding the project’s scope to include the MRE pillar), as well as to continue technical support to NA clearance teams.

### Emerging Institutional Architecture

Acting on advice from UN mine action personnel, the Cabinet issued a decision in July 2007 that established MoPR as the focal point for mine action. It also created:

* a Mine Action Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister for Peace and Reconstruction with representatives from the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Education and Sports plus observers from the CPN(M), UNMIN and three civil society organisations
* a Mine Action Technical Committee, chaired by the Secretary of MoPR with members from Defence, Home Affairs, NA and CPN(M)

However, these committees existed solely on paper for some time. The Steering Committee met briefly in October 2009 and the Technical Committee did not meet until early 2010. As well, the GoN did not initiate action to (i) draft mine action legislation, (ii) accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), or (iii) develop a strategy for the national mine action programme. In addition, the MoPR itself was viewed at the time as (in the words of one informant) ‘an empty shell’ – with limited capacity to discharge its mandate, including for mine action.

An UNMAT assessment mission in late 2007 expressed concerns that the mine action programme remained overly centred on the security forces, with a blurring of the boundary between humanitarian demining and military operations. For example, it recommended that *“Capacity required to deal with IEDs that are part of any terrorist activities or active insurgency should be segregated from the mine action programme and staffed with personnel that are distinct from the mine action programme in location, uniforms, decals, etc.”*

The assessment team was also critical of the institutional architecture, observing *“It appears that the mechanism as it is now formed with a Steering Committee and Technical Committee in the MoPR and the NAMACC in the Army has a level of redundancy in the MoPR, a disconnect between the Steering Committee and its intended operational capacity in the NAMACC and a lack of separation between the executive level in the NAMACC to oversee operations and the actual implementing clearance units themselves.”[[32]](#footnote-32)* It recommended that:

* *The Government should reformulate the Policy level Steering Committee with a Committee in MoPR headed at the Ministerial level with associated Ministries represented at the Deputy Minister level.*
* *Do not renew the Technical Committee for Mine Action within the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction…*[rather]*…create a distinct mine capacity from within the Nepal Army engineers (currently designated as the NAMACC) dedicated to humanitarian and developmental activities to be formally seconded to the MoPR, and accountable to MoPR for the duration of operations.* (Brady et al, p.23)

The UNMAT assessment team also noted the weaknesses in Victim Assistance.

Textbox 10 – Victim Assistance in Nepal

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| While the Ottawa and (even more so) Oslo Conventions establish clear mandates for States Parties to provide a range of services (emergency treatment, medical care, physical rehabilitation and psycho-social reintegration) to victims of anti-personnel landmine and cluster munitions victims, the mine action field has long recognised that such victim assistance efforts should be incorporated into broader programmes addressing the needs of all those with disabilities.  In Nepal, physical rehabilitation centres are supported by HI (five regional and three satellite centres, catering to all persons with disabilities) and ICRC (one centre in Pokhara, plus support to the Nepal Army Rehabilitation Centre, both open to all victims of war). Various NGOs provide Victim Assistance by helping mine/ERW or other victims of conflict get to one of these centres.  However, as the UNMAT assessment team observed, *“The lack of effective coordination* [for disability programmes] *at the government level with responsibility distributed among three ministries has led to major gaps in the provision of services geographically and in terms of covering the entire spectrum of victim assistance services.”* (Brady et al, p. 19) In recognition of this problem, the MAJWG endorsed work by HI to prepare a Guide to Victim Assistance services available in Nepal, which was delivered in late 2009. |

Textbox 11 – Handicap International & Mine Action in Nepal

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| With 55 staff and a budget of approximately €1.5 million, HI works for the inclusion on people with disabilities through a number of programmes in Nepal:   * Physical rehabilitation delivered at five regional prosthetic/orthotic workshops and three satellite centres with physiotherapy units * Disaster Risk Management (DRM) including Community-Based DRM * advocacy, through mobilising the disability movement   HI has been involved in Mine Action in Nepal since 2005. Until 2010 it partnered with UNICEF and INSEC to establish and support the mine victim surveillance system. HI also provides Victim Assistance providing medical support to victims, but treats all people with disabilities.  HI advocated for Nepal to sign the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD), which was successful. Since then, HI has been working with the Ministry of Social Welfare and others on disability policy – drafting revised legislation and developing a National Plan of Action, as called for in the CRDP. While it feels progress is being achieved on the policy level, service delivery remains a challenge. |

The recommendations from the UN assessment mission did not lead to any changes in the institutional architecture. Demining remained the sole responsibility of the NA, and the GoN did not attempt to build mine action planning, coordination and oversight capacity within MoPR.

### Realignment (2009)

The original UNMIN mandate extended to 23 January 2009, but in December 2008 Nepal formally requested a six-month extension, which the UN Security Council approved subject to a reduction in the size of the mission. Part of the agreed reduction was for the UN Country Team (UNCT) to assume the responsibility for mine action UNMIN.[[33]](#footnote-33) UNMAS recruited a new team for the UNPFN-funded mine action project which, together with the mine action cell of UNICEF, formed the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) in Nepal. With the support of the UNCT, the objective of the project was broadened to include more support to the government; specifically to the MoPR as the government focal point for mine action.

#### Plans for Support for Capacity Development in NAMACC

Working with the NA, in February 2009 UNMAT agreed a joint capacity development plan for NAMCC. This envisaged support for NAMACC’s vision – *By 2010, the Nepalese Army Mine Action Coordination Centre will develop a Mine Action and IEDD capacity to International Standards* – through the development of functional capabilities in the following areas:

* training
* demining operations in Nepal and as part of Peacekeeping Operations
  + survey
  + clearance
  + EOD/IEDD
  + MRE
* Quality Management (QM)
* Information Management[[34]](#footnote-34)
* Logistics/Procurement
* Administration & Finance

Figure 7 – Capacity development challenge by function[[35]](#footnote-35)

For mine and IED field clearance operations, the plan envisage NAMACC fielding two platoons until March 2010, then three platoons until December 2010, and four by 2011. Until the end of 2011, UNMAT would be responsible for accreditation, coaching, mentoring and monitoring of clearance (Quality Assurance – QA) with external quality control (QC). After 2010, UNMAT would continue monitoring, but would reduce its presence and leave QA and QC to NAMACC. UNMAT would continue support for a period for fundraising, external relations, and procurement.

#### Plans for Work with MoPR

In June 2009, funding for the “Strengthening Mine Action Activities” was approved by the NPTF. This MoPR-led project had funds for (i) development of a mine action section within the MoPR, (ii) MRE, (iii) Victim Assistance, and (iv) development of quality management capacity within MoPR, as well as coordination of mine action activities and information and attendance by MoPR personnel at international mine action events.

In spite of the approval of this project, progress with MoPR was slower than with NAMACC because, initially, the Ministry lacked a dedicated mine action unit. In October 2009 however, the National Steering Committee appointed a Taskforce to draft a Plan of Action for Mine Action under the leadership of an Under Secretary at MoPR (who then assumed responsibility for the mine action section within the Ministry). The Taskforce submitted the draft Plan of Action for 2009-2011 in November 2009. This identified a number of gaps, including the lack of:

* a strong inter-ministerial coordination system
* a dedicated mine action unit within MoPR, as well as a plan to develop MoPR’s capacity to discharge its responsibility as the national focal point
* a legal framework to clarify who controls data, quality management, and so on
* national mine action standards
* a centralised database that could support the work of the entire mine action community
* adequate coordination, including for MRE and victim assistance

The vision for MoPR was that, within six months, it would function as the national Mine Action Centre,[[36]](#footnote-36) with the capacity to:

* Provide advice to Mine Action Steering Committee (MASC) and technical committee
* Coordinate Mine Action activities to ensure coverage of areas and function
* Make decisions regarding implementation of Mine Action activities
* Mobilise required resources
* Manage the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database
* Manage QA/QC of cleared sites
* Conduct Boards of Inquiry (BOI) following demining accidents
* Manage National Guidelines for Safety Standards (NGSS)
* Conduct post clearance survey (i.e. to assess socio-economic benefits)
* Establish and implement a Gender plan
* Advocate for Mine Action with all interested parties
* Publicise Mine Action activities and conduct external relations

With these plans to work with both MoPR (as a national MAC) and NAMACC (as the demining operator) agreed, the UNPFN-funded project had clearly gone beyond the mandates stemming from the CPA, embarking explicitly on a capacity development project that aimed to ensure a sustainable capacities in both MoPR and NAMACC for the residual threat. The logic model for the expanded project is depicted on the following page.[[37]](#footnote-37)

Figure 8 – Logic Model: IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal

**Inspect Maoist ERW**

**Safely store Nepal Army ERW**

**Destroy Maoist ERW**

**CPA provisions achieved**

**Verify NA minefields**

**Train NA in demining**

**Train NA in MRE**

**Technical assistance to NAMACC**

**All minefields & IED fields cleared**

**NA clears minefields & IED fields**

**NA trained to IMAS clearance standards**

**Civilian safety, security & livelihoods**

**NA delivers MRE**

**NA trained to IMAS MRE standards**

**At risk security personnel & civilians mine aware**

**ArmorGroup & NA map minefields**

**NAMACC personnel trained in Ops Mgmt**

**NAMACC personnel trained in Info Mgmt**

**IMSMA established & maintained**

**MoPR staff trained in MAC functions**

**Technical assistance to MoPR MAS**

**Capacities for residual problem sustained**

**National Strategy adopted**

**National Technical Standards adopted**

**NAMACC personnel trained in QM**

**Capacities for peacekeeping sustained**

### Implementing Capacity Development Support (2009-2011)

#### Support to the NAMACC Capacity Development Plan

In the main, implementation of the Capacity Development Plan with NAMACC went according to plan and it completed successfully by 31 December 2010. Three weeks later, NAMACC fielded its fourth demining platoon. Since then, mine/IED field clearance operations, as well as EOD/IEDD response activities, have continued successfully. The last of the 53 minefields was cleared in June 2011 and, by the time of the evaluation mission, only six IED fields remained. (NAMACC said these would be completed before May 2012.) In addition, the most recent mission by the GICHD’s Information Management section in November 2011 reported favourably on NAMACC’s use and maintenance of IMSMA for contamination and demining data.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Figure 9 – Current organisation chart of the NAMACC

Chief Coordinator (Lt.Col)

Chief of Operation (Maj.)

Logistic (Capt/Lt)

IMSMA (Maj/Capt)

Planning Section (Maj/Capt)

QA Section (Maj/Capt)

Training (Maj/Capt)

Ops Section (Maj/Capt)

Platoon D (Capt/Lt)

Platoon C (Capt/Lt)

Platoon B (Capt/Lt)

Platoon A (Capt/Lt)

Figure 10 – Minefield clearance by year

The NA has received mine action funding both via the NPTF-funded “Strengthening Mine Action Activities” project (approximately $50,000 for vehicles in 2010-11) and through the regular GoN budget (approximately $50,000 for clearance of mine/IED fields in 2010-11). With the completion of the clearance of mine/IED fields, this supplementary financing for mine action will decline. Regardless, the NA believes it can sustain its capacity for IED disposal and it hopes to contribute demining and EOD personnel for future peacekeeping operations.

#### Support to MoPR Capacity

Progress in developing capacities within MoPR was far less rapid or substantial than with NAMACC. One issue was that there were broad overlaps in the roles envisaged for NAMACC (agreed in February 2009) and for the mine action section in MoPR (as per the Plan of Action issued in nine-months later in November 2009). For example, both entities were to have responsibilities relating to information management and Quality Management (QM). Such overlap is not unusual: it is good practice, for instance, for a national operator to have its own database of contamination and demining, and have responsibility for ‘internal QM’, while the national mine action database and ‘external’ QM responsibilities reside with the MAC. However, if the national authority does not provide more policy guidance on the precise delineation of responsibilities, the rivalries that naturally exist between a MAC and an operator often lead to conflict or stalemate.

In terms of developing capacity within the MoPR, stalemate is what resulted in Nepal. A mine action section was established in the Ministry, but it remained small and under-resourced.[[39]](#footnote-39) The Under Secretary in charge of this section did begin to chair the MAJWG (which remained the primary mechanism for coordination) by August 2010, but the section never sought to take responsibility for information management and QM, leaving these with NAMACC.

A draft national mine action strategy was completed in February 2011 and approved by the Technical Committee, but it has not been adopted by the Steering Committee. Similarly, National Technical Standards and Guidelines were prepared and adopted by the Technical Committee, but not by the Steering Committee. Mine action legislation was not even drafted.[[40]](#footnote-40)

Without responsibility for the information management and QM functions, MoPR was not in a position to exercise oversight of the NA mine action activities. As well, a number of people interviewed by the evaluation team expressed their concern that the MoPR appears to have little interest in convening the MAJWG, which has worked so well to foster coordination among all mine action organisations and to bridge the gap between civilian and security sector actors.

This inattention in recent months appears to be the result of other demands on the time of the Under Secretary of the Mine Action Section, who seems to be working mainly on the World Bank-funded Emergency Peace Support Project. Implementation of this $50 million project has not been progressing as planned, with disbursements lagging seriously behind even the revised plan from June 2011. The Bank has another review planned in March to confirm whether the project should close in June, with almost half the grant left undisbursed.

Figure 11 – Emergency Peace Support Project disbursement plans and actual disbursements[[41]](#footnote-41)



#### Progress in Mine Risk Education

On the other hand, good progress continued in MRE (funded in the main, via UNICEF,[[42]](#footnote-42) international NGOs, the Red Cross movement and, more recently, the NPTF).[[43]](#footnote-43) UNICEF had been proactive and started the MRE Working Group comprising local and international NGOs plus the Red Cross movement, before the CPA. With HI, it also enlisted INSEC to start ‘active’ victim surveillance. When UNMAS became involved to support UNMIN, it began chairing a larger coordinating committee – the MAJWG – that embraced demining and, critically, representatives from the three security forces.

UNICEF seized this opportunity to provide MRE training for almost 19,000 personnel in the APF and NP, as well as the training of ‘master MRE trainers’ and the provision of improved materials.[[44]](#footnote-44) In addition to enhancing the security of NP and APF personnel, this provided a point-of-entry to broaden the network of MRE ‘focal points’ beyond local NGOs and the Red Cross to include members of the security forces. To date, 430 people have received supplemental training as focal points, arranged by UNICEF. Currently, there are focal points in 68 out of the 75 districts, as well as ‘Global Focal Points’ in the Kathmandu headquarters of the participating organisations.

This network – coordinated through the MAJWG – provides coverage wherever there is need for ‘emergency’ MRE, which provides quick response by MRE focal points to any accident or reported mine/IED.

Textbox 12—The Red Cross Movement & Mine Action in Nepal

|  |
| --- |
| ICRC has been supporting mine action programmes through the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), the largest humanitarian organisation in the country with 5,000 organised units and 1.1 million people associated with it. Two rehabilitation centres are supported by ICRC, which provide services available to all, with payment according to the patient’s means. NRCS also assists victims by providing goods to promote economic reintegration, as well as disseminating information on the availability of services for victims.  In addition, NRCS started providing MRE in 2005 on a pilot basis in 10 districts, subsequently expanded by 10 districts in 2006 and ultimately reaching 49 districts. In addition to regular MRE sessions, NRCS also conducts Emergency MRE following accidents or when explosive devices are found. More recently, it has been collaborating on the implementation of the MoPR's community MRE programme in 21 districts, and envisages expanding to additional districts. From 2005 to the end of 2011, the NRCS delivered almost 3900 MRE or EMRE sessions, reaching over 220,000 people.  In terms of advocacy, NRCS also provides information on the APMBC and CCW during its MRE sessions. |

In the past two years, this responsive system has been complemented by ‘systematic’ MRE (via the Department of Education [DoE] plus periodic media campaigns) and community-based MRE (via Local Peace Committees – LPCs). For example, LPCs in 43 districts received about $1,900 each to conduct 30 MRE sessions per district, with 35 people in each session. The DoE programme reaches even larger numbers of school-age children; the age group most at risk.

Textbox 13 – Department of Education (DoE) and Systematic MRE

|  |
| --- |
| Drawing on about $25,000 in funding per year provided by the NPTF via MoPR, plus support from UNICEF, the DoE has been providing MRE via schools in conflict-affected districts. Starting with the 20 most affected districts, DoE received materials and training for MRE master trainers from UNICEF. The master trainers then trained DoE Resource Persons who, in turn, trained over 1,300 teachers. In 2009-10, the Resource Persons and teachers delivered a one period MRE session for each class in over 1,000 schools. This was repeated in 2010-11, in some cases reaching different schools.  The target in 2011-12 is to reach the 30 most-affected districts, then 50 in 2012-13. In addition, risk education has been incorporated in the peace education curriculum for Grade 6. |

The direct delivery of MRE has been complemented by periodic media campaigns. For example, during six weeks in 2010 two MRE public service announcements were broadcast through television and radio stations in six languages, reaching millions of listeners.

MRE in Nepal is seen generally as a success. The November 2011 report by an external monitor of the NPTF observed that a “High level of public awareness exists in mine-risk areas on mine threats” but that “the fear of mines has not been completely eradicated from the minds of the people.” It recommended that the MRE programmes be continued and widened until incidences of explosions are significantly minimized.[[45]](#footnote-45)

#### Advocacy

Although the UNPFN-funded project did not state that having Nepal sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC – the Ottawa Convention) was an explicit objective, the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 did have as its fifth objective: *Nepal to sign APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal*. As well, the UN agencies and a number of the key donors to the NPTF or directly to mine action in Nepal clearly encouraged the GoN to sign the Convention. The UN also was supportive when mine action NGOs undertook advocacy initiatives.[[46]](#footnote-46) The UN also facilitated the attendance of Nepali officials to attend Meetings of States Parties and the second Review Conference for the Ottawa Convention in Cartagena.

The Government did take steps that suggested the matter was under consideration (e.g. setting-up taskforces to examine the issue), and a number of ministers and political parties have publically stated that Nepal should accede to the Convention. However, the Army seems opposed and various ministers have said that Nepal should not sign because India and China have not.

The UN also worked hard to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince Mirad of Jordan – a strong advocate for universailization.[[47]](#footnote-47) While the GoN initially agreed to a visit, it subsequently reversed this decision. Despite repeated efforts – most recently in connection with the June 2011 ceremony to declare Nepal mine free – the GoN ultimately did not agree to the visit by Prince Mirad.

# CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT

As discussed in the Introduction chapter, the understanding of the evaluation team was that there were three clusters of evaluation issues: (i) the initial strategy and programme design; (ii) implementation; and (iii) current status and way forward. We discuss the first two of these in turn in this chapter. We also present some conclusions in the tabular format requested by the UNCT (M&E Framework for UNPFN Projects), and address the additional evaluation criteria for UNPFN-funded projects. A discussion of the current status and way forward is discussed separately in the final chapter.

## Strategy and Programme Design

The initial mine action engagements of the UN agencies in Nepal were relevant (i.e. soundly conceived given the prevailing needs and opportunities) and the projects were designed appropriately. UNICEF began first, building on the work of NCBL which won recognition that a mine/IED problem had emerged in Nepal and was growing. Given the majority of the civilian victims in Nepal have been children, it was particularly appropriate that UNICEF took an early leading role. Its decisions to enlist INSEC in ‘active’ victim surveillance (in partnership with HI) and to convene the MRE Working Group were strategic, cost-effective, and provided a firm foundation for a broader mine action programme when the opportunity for expansion emerged. As well, UNICEF’s offer to both parties to the conflict of signs to mark mine/IED hazards was represented a useful step at an opportune moment.

The original UNMAS advice to UNMIN was also well-conceived and appropriately designed. The initial activities focussed tightly on the mandates stemming from the CPA and AMMAA. The decision to engage a firm to work with the Maoist forces on the IEDs held in-and-around the cantonments proved to be appropriate in terms of getting personnel in place very rapidly. In this, the availability of some funds via the UNMIN regular budget, and the quick agreement by UNPFN to provide additional funding, were important facilitating factors.

## Implementation

### What worked

In most respects – and certainly in terms of operations (stockpile management and disposal, demining and MRE) – implementation of UN support to mine action in Nepal went very well. UNMAS seized opportunities as they emerged for expanding the scope of the project – first with the NA (for minefield clearance and MRE) and subsequently with civilian authorities; principally, the MoPR. In this UNMAS was aided by two facilitating factors. First, the UNPFN proved to be rapid and flexible in approving appropriate sums for extending the IEDD/EOD project and for expanding its scope to capitalise on emerging opportunities. Second, UNICEF had prepared the ground well. The decisions to provide early assistance to both sides of the conflict (e.g. the hazards signs) and expand the MRE Working Group into the MAJWG were sound, in part because these bolstered trust and secured the active participation of the security forces within a broader mine action programme.

With the end of the original UNMIN mandate looming, UNMAS and UNICEF decided to form the UNMAT. Unlike the experience in some other countries, the UNMAT mechanism worked well. Undoubtedly, the personalities of the individuals involved were important to this success. By all accounts, UNMAS and UNICEF personnel worked well together. A contributing factor, perhaps, was that the contamination problem was manageable and being addressed in the main by the NA. This meant that demining and MRE – hence UNMAS and UNICEF – were on a more equal footing than is often the case.

UNICEF also earned the respect it was accorded. It had laid the foundation for the future UNMAT and its MRE activities were both successful and well-supported by the mine action actors, including the three security forces.

UNICEF personnel – both international and national – also provided continuity. One irritant to the UNCT was rapid turnover in the UNMAS Programme Manager position. Although the gap was twice filled by one of the UNMAS personnel already present in Nepal,[[48]](#footnote-48) such changeovers can still be disruptive and it was fortunate to have UNICEF personnel on hand who had a deep understanding of the mine action programme and who commanded the respect of both governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in mine action, including the security forces.

For its part, the UNMAS support to the capacity development efforts of NAMACC, and the NA Engineering Brigade more generally, was extremely successful. NAMACC achieved its target of clearing all 53 minefields some six months ahead of its deadline, and will soon complete the clearance of the remaining IED fields. The NA plans to maintain its four demining platoons as well it EOD response units, in part because the NA hopes to field demining personnel on future peacekeeping missions.

In addition to having been effective in achieving most of the objectives, UN delivery appears to have been efficient. In particular, international staffing was comparatively modest (four UNMAS and one UNICEF), and size of the international team was reduced as milestones were attained.

Figure 13 – International staffing levels

The fact that the funds were adequate and had been approved for an extended period was another success factor. This allowed the UNMAT to plan with assurance to the completion of the project.

The UN agencies involved in mine action also made useful inroads on gender issues. From the start of cooperation with the NA, UN personnel advocated that the Army include women in its mine action activities. A number of female deminers were, in fact, trained and at least two of these were promoted to site supervisor level (a captain) for demining.

The mine action field has, for some time and in the main, ensured that sex and age-disaggregated data are collected when relevant (for example, for victims and participants in MRE). This has been the case in Nepal as well and the UN agencies undoubtedly deserve some of the credit for this. Gender and social inclusion issues are also addressed appropriately in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines.

### What did not fully work

Two of the main objectives of the UN support programme have not been achieved.[[49]](#footnote-49) Firstly, the Mine Action Section in MoPR has not developed into a civilian Mine Action Centre capable of coordination and oversight of a national mine action programme, including those services delivered by the security forces. Although the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 stated that MoPR would develop capacity for mine action information management and Quality Management, the MoPR has not sought to do so.

Secondly, the Steering Committee for Mine Action has not adopted either the National Mine Action Strategy nor the National Technical Standards and Guidelines. As well, the Steering Committee itself appears moribund.

There is also a concern among many representatives from UN agencies and NGOs that the MoPR has not been sufficiently active in terms of coordination, and that the Mine Action Section may not continue to convene the MAJWG.[[50]](#footnote-50) Most mine action actors continue to view the MAJWG as an important mechanism, in part because it provides a means for obtaining information that otherwise would not be forthcoming from the NA and other security forces.

In addition, although it was not listed explicitly as an objective in the UN project documents,[[51]](#footnote-51) it is clear the UN agencies involved (UNCT, UNMAS, UNICEF) – as well as a number of key donors – hoped that Nepal would sign the Ottawa Convention. They devoted significant efforts to make this happen through discussions in Nepal, facilitating the attendance of Nepalese officials in international meetings on the Convention, and trying to facilitate a high-level mission by Prince Mirad of Jordan.[[52]](#footnote-52) In the end, and despite repeated efforts, the GoN did not agree to the visit by Prince Mirad and Nepal has not signed or ratified the APMBC nor the other main disarmament conventions governing conventional weapons.

## Relevance and Contribution to Peacebuilding

The UNPFN Projects Evaluation Guidance Note presented to the evaluation team at the initial meeting with the UNCT identified three criteria that the UNPFN Board had endorsed for use when evaluating any UNPFN-funded project, in addition to the standard evaluation criteria endorsed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC):[[53]](#footnote-53)

1. Strategic contribution to peace-building in Nepal (i.e. strategic impact, not just ‘results’);
2. Approach to peace-building programming (i.e. *how* the project is implemented);
3. Complementarity to national mechanisms and priorities (i.e. relevance);

The second of these has been covered in the discussion to this point, and the remainder of this chapter touches on the first and third of these additional criteria.

### Strategic Contribution to Peace-building

While it is always difficult to attribute broad peace-building impacts to work in any one sector, in the eyes of the evaluation team UN support to mine action made a number of contributions to peace-building which, collectively, appear important.

As UNMIN was established as a political mission without peacekeeping forces, its mandate afforded fewer opportunities for UN personnel to interact with the security forces and the former rebels. The mine/IED provisions in the CPA provided one such opportunity, which the UN seized. Joint initiatives towards concrete, commonly accepted objectives can foster understanding and trust, assuming the activities deliver useful results. The UN mine action initiatives were quick off the mark (e.g. delivering signs for marking hazards plus inventorying IED and other munitions stockpiles around the cantonments) and were implemented successfully.

UN mine action personnel also were quick to seize opportunities for cooperation with the Nepal Army, delivering training, equipment, etc. that allowed the NA to begin enhancing public safety, including in areas that had been sympathetic to the rebels (thus providing a peace dividend). The fact that NA commanders had their sights on providing IMAS-compliant military engineers to UN peacekeeping missions created a real opportunity, as it meant the NA had greater incentive to perform its demining mandate effectively. Still, the UNMAT capitalised well on this opportunity.

The UN engagement eventually embraced the other security forces in practical ways by delivering risk education to security personnel security forces and supporting the Police and the APF in providing MRE to the public. As well, the MAJWG proved to be an effective mechanism for security forces, civil servants, local civil society, international donors and the UN to share information, develop common objectives and collaborate in achieving these, all of which enhances mutual respect and trust; sentiments which are difficult to quantify but which, nonetheless, are essential ingredients in peace-building.

### Complementarity

The UNPFN was designed explicitly to finance activities (i) by the UN system and (ii) for which the UN had a comparative advantage. In the eyes of the evaluation team, Mine Action is a clear example of where the UN system has both capacity and comparative advantage. In particular:

* The UN was asked to assume the role of an ‘impartial third party’ to address politically-sensitive issues. Clearly, a number of the mine action mandates stemming from the CPA (e.g. inventory of IED stockpiles around the cantonment) were politically sensitive
* The UNMAT agencies demonstrated their capacities to supply or broker-in specialized expertise. Initially, it contracted a reputable international firm to provide specialised stockpile management and destruction services at short notice. As subsequent opportunities emerged to promote capacity development and national ownership, UNMAT fielded its own team of experienced individuals to discharge this more ambitious but amorphous responsibility[[54]](#footnote-54)
* The international mine action community acknowledges that UN agencies are the default choice to take the lead in supporting efforts of national authorities to develop their capacities to plan and implement mine action
* UNMAT can readily draw upon specialised expertise and tools from within the international mine action community,[[55]](#footnote-55) obviating the need for significant investments in a comparatively small programme which cannot capture economies of scale

In addition, UNMAT members – both UNMAS and UNICEF – leveraged additional funds for UN support to Mine Action in Nepal.

## Lessons Learnt

A number of lessons emerge from the Nepal programme. Most of these are not new to mine action or to the broader fields of post-conflict recovery and development, and need no elaboration other than to list them:

* start with the local context/avoid blueprint solutions
* do not downplay the value of good interpersonal relationships
* continuity of key personnel is necessary as ‘institutional memory’ is never adequate
* with commitment from national authorities/local actors, support for capacity development is generally successful; without such commitment, support for capacity development is like ‘pushing on a string’
* facilitating factors such as adequate and flexible funding are not sufficient to achieve success, but may be necessary for success

A clear lesson from Nepal that deserves highlighting because it has not been the case everywhere: the UNMAT mechanism can work effectively. At least four factors that contributed were:

* the willingness of each of the agencies to focus on their areas of comparative advantage
* the relatively modest demining component coupled with a mature MRE programme meant the operational ‘mix’ was conducive to a collegial style of management
* the fact that Nepal did not represent a large-scale and dire emergency in which a command-and-control approach to management may be necessary in the initial ‘campaign phase’ of the programme (and which may prove difficult to transition from as normalcy emerges)
* the UNCT mechanism

A final lesson merits mention: the strategic approach seen in the UN Mine Action programme for Nepal is appropriate for post-conflict environments. In brief, start small with concrete and feasible objectives (points-of-entry), then expand the scale and scope of the programme as opportunities arise. Along the way, small initiatives might be started to encourage national authorities/local actors to raise their ambitions, even though some of these ultimately may prove infeasible. But ‘big bets’ on initiatives that require sustained commitment from national authorities should be avoided in volatile post-conflict situations.

Table 1 – Achievements of outputs planned for the project Support to IEDD/EOD Operations in Nepal (UNPFN/A-1)

**Outcome targets:**

1. The Government of Nepal and Maoist Army have the capacity to meet the CPA commitments to dispose of all explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines planted during the conflict.
2. Ensure the standalone national capacity to effectively deal with the remaining landmines, IEDs and other ERWs in Nepal and minimize the number of casualties.

| **Planned outputs** | **Indicator** | **Target** | **Achieved** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Nepal Army has the capacity to undertake independent clearance operations of anti-personnel minefields to international standards. | # of trainings conducted for Nepal Army staff in support of clearance activities. (1 training = 1 staff trained in 1 subject) | 526 (Dec 2010) | Fully achieved |
| All anti-personnel minefields and IED fields in Nepal cleared to international standards. | % of 53 mine fields cleared [to IMAS standards] | 100% (Dec 2011) | Fully achieved |
| Maoist Army ERW are safely stored and destroyed, as per the terms of the CPA. | % of 58,000 items of ERW safely stored at seven cantonment sites | 100% (Jan 2010) | Fully achieved |
| % of 58,000 safely destroyed registered ERW held at Maoist cantonment sites | 100% (2008) | Fully achieved |
| The safety, security and livelihoods of civilians is improved by minimizing the danger posed by landmines/ERW through their safe storage and destruction. | # of victim activated injuries and deaths (a) total and (b) from anti-personnel mines (2007 baseline – 104 IED casualties; 6 landmine casualties) | Expected decrease in casualties:   * from IEDS by 50% (Dec 2011) * from mines by 100% (Dec 2011) | *Partially achieved* (2011):   * IEDS casualties 🡻 70% * mine casualties 🡻 67% |
| A National Mine Action Strategy is developed and implemented. | National Mine Action Strategy in place | NMA Strategy in place (Dec 2010) and endorsed by Technical and Steering committees (Dec 2011) | *Partially achieved* (Strategy approved by Technical but not Steering Committee) |
| MoPR is coordinating mine action activities including Quality Management | National Mine Action Section in place and operational in MOPR | NMA Section in place and operational (Dec 2010) | *Partially achieved* – NMA Section in place but under-staffed & devoting little time to mine action |
| National Technical Standard Guidelines (NTSG) in place and endorsed by both the Technical and Steering inter-ministerial committees | NTSG Standards endorsed by Technical and Steering Committees (Dec 2011) | *Partially achieved* (NTSG approved by Technical but not Steering Committee) |
| No indicator set for MoPR’s role in Quality Management |  | MoPR not delivering Quality Management services |
| # of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting led by MoPR | 3 meetings in 2011 | Target achieved in 2011 but unclear whether the MoPR will convene meetings in the future |

Figure 14 – Timeline of Mine Action in Nepal since 2005[[56]](#footnote-56)

**Other donors AusAID, DFID, ECHO, Japan,Sida**

**UNPFN**

**UNICEF**

**2005**

**2006**

**2007**

**2008**

**2009**

**2010**

**2011**

**2012**

**2013**

**MRE Working Group**

**CPA**

**National Authority**

**IED stocks destroyed**

**MoPR 1st chairs MAJWG**

**Minefield free**

**IED field free**

**UNMAS**

**UNICEF**

**VTF**

**UNMIN**

**NPTF 1**

**NPTF 2?**

**75%**

**50%**

# CURRENT STATUS AND WAY FORWARD

## Existing capabilities and gaps

Nepal still lacks the institutional architecture for a national mine action programme under civilian coordination and oversight. In addition, it has not ratified the APMBC or the other conventional weapons disarmament conventions. On the other hand, thanks to the efforts of (especially) the Army, APF and NP, Nepal is mine-free and there is both the capacity and commitment to complete the clearance of the remaining IED fields and respond to ERW/IED accidents and reports of devices with both disposal and MRE assets.

Given Nepal’s success in the eliminating is mine problem and its capacities for MRE and EOD/IED response, does the weakness in the capacity and commitment of civilian mine action institutions constitute a problem? In the view of the evaluation team, yes. Of course, this is far from the major problem Nepal faces at this juncture, but rectifying it would cost little and, if not rectified, the problems are likely to grow over time.

One concern relates to information management. NAMACC has IMSMA and adequately trained personnel to maintain it. However, it only enters data on contamination and its own demining activities. INSEC continues to maintain a separate database covering both victim-activated explosions and casualties from intentional explosions. These data would be more securely maintained on IMSMA, but the Army says it has no mandate to track victims. This may be true in a strict sense, but the Army would have a mandate to track reports of explosive devices, accidents and (especially) intentional explosions, which provide essential information on requirements, trends and priorities for the EOD response teams. Given the multiple on-going conflicts in the Terai, the importance of accurate, complete and timely data on explosive devices and accidents should not be undervalued. The Army could have an accident and explosive devices surveillance system that would produce the data on casualties as a by-product.

However, even if the Army adopted this solution, the lack of civilian oversight and the recent dormancy of the MAJWG would means requests for information from NAMACC would probably have to go through the Army’s chain of command; likely to prove a daunting process. This would make it more difficult for civilian mine action organisations to obtain the information they required for MRE response and victim assistance.

All parties recognise that INSEC’s victim surveillance system is a temporary solution: it is the responsibility of the government to maintain such a system. Given the indifference on the part of the Army, plans are to transfer accident surveillance responsibility to the Nepal Police. On the surface, this makes sense: indeed, the Police say they already collect such data. The task of obtaining such data from the Police would normally be less difficult than via the Army’s chain of command. Unfortunately, all such information collected now by the Police is compiled and analysed by the Anti-Terrorism Unit. Typically, such units are not forthcoming with requests for data from civilian organisations, so this may not be an ideal solution in practice.

There is also the reasonable concern that the MRE system could degrade from neglect unless some government agency takes responsibility for coordinating the many actors involved.

For these reasons, the appropriate institutional solution remains a Mine Action Section within the MoPR that reports to an inter-ministerial committee. MoPR should seek to build its capacity to plan and coordinate a small but still necessary national mine action programme. However, there appears to be no champion within the MoPR for this role. As well, even with commitment on the part of the Ministry, some modest level of assistance would be required to develop the requisite capacities in, at least, information management and Quality Management. Donors who are, for the most part, States Parties to the APMBC might well balk at providing more funding to a country that has spurned their previous efforts to sign the Convention, particularly if there is no mine action champion in MoPR who would bolster confidence that more assistance would lead to results.

Further, given the success of the Nepal Army in clearing the mine/IED fields and maintaining a response capacity for EOD/IED disposal, the explosives contamination problem is now modest, lowering the likelihood of donor support on humanitarian grounds.

## Recommended Way Forward

### Short-term

The evaluation team recommends that the relevant UN agencies, plus the international and national mine action NGOs and the Red Cross movement continue with the planned, modest support for mine action. In addition, the UNCT should:

* maintain a ‘Watching Brief’ on Government commitment to mine action
* work to embed mine action concerns and capabilities within one or (better) both of the following programmes:
* Armed Violence Reduction (AVR)
* Disability Assistance

Given the modest scale of the explosives contamination in Nepal today, mine action is a natural fit within both AVR and Disability programming. As is the case elsewhere in South Asia, explosives are a weapon of choice for non-State Armed Groups; indeed, the distinction between mine action and AVR seems strained given the nature of violence perpetrated by armed groups in the Terai. Mine action organisations in Nepal have developed a number of capabilities (e.g., an accident and victim surveillance system; nation-wide networks of well-trained personnel for Risk Education) that would be a boon to a future AVR programme. Conversely, AVR’s traditional strength in policy research and policy dialogue is precisely what the mine action community will need in the coming years to keep mine action from slipping entirely off the political agenda.

Similarly, the linkages and common interests between the mine action and Disability Programming communities are strong. Mine action has long since recognised that assistance programmes catering exclusively for victims of landmine, cluster munitions, and UXO are neither sustainable or justified. At the same time, most in the mine action community endorse and promote the obligations in the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions to provide victim assistance. The result is that relatively well-funded mine action programmes often ‘jump start’ broader disability programmes in countries affected by conflict: organisations receive mine action funding and build their facilities in parts of the country which are affected by mines and ERW, but these facilities cater to all people with physical disabilities and, eventually, become part of a national disability programme.

Again, mine action capabilities in accident and victim surveillance and the nation-wide networks of well-trained personnel for Risk Education are an asset for disability programmes. As well, the disability assistance community typically is a strong supporter of the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions because of the strong victim assistance obligations contained in those instruments. A number of the leading international actors in disability assistance, such as ICRC and HI, are also active members of the mine action community. Indeed, the dormancy of the MoPR means that HI and other civil society members of the MAJWG may feel free to engage more actively in advocacy for Nepal to sign at least the APMBC.

From the UN perspective, UNICEF is the natural choice to serve as lead agency in Nepal for mine action. It still has an experienced two-person mine action unit. Although the work plan is for them to work only 75% time on mine action in 2012 and 50% in 2013, their other duties include both disability programming and AVR.

Continued oversight from the RC’s office would still be required to ensure a ‘one UN’ response as commitments grow to disability programmes (which is likely) and AVR programmes (possibly), in part because other UN agencies will assume leading roles (WHO for disability; UNDP/BCPR for AVR).

### Medium-Term

Once Nepal adopts a new Constitution and completes its elections, security policy is likely to be a priority for the new government. This could usher in significant security sector reform. For example, in most countries with a federal constitution the responsibility for normal policing would lie with the provincial level. Assuming this happens in Nepal, it would create the opportunity to convert the Armed Police Force into the federal government’s policing service.

The role of the Nepal Army would also be examined in any review of security policy by a new government. It is possible the Army mandate will be more tightly focussed on its primary responsibility of national security against external threats, leaving more responsibility for internal security with the APF. Should reform move in that direction, there would be implications for which of the security services has responsibility for EOD/IED response and disposal.

A security policy review is also like to touch upon the issues of conventional weapons disarmament and, of course, regional security. It would then be natural to consider whether anti-personnel landmines are an appropriate and credible weapon system for Nepal today. Regardless, the issue of conventional weapons disarmament will be higher on the political agenda than it has been since the CPA.

The likelihood of a security policy review in the medium-term adds weight to the recommendation that the UNCT maintain a watching brief on mine action and the opportunities to promote universalization of the APMBC.

# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1 – Terms of Reference

**UN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME IN NEPAL**

**BACKGROUND**

From 1996 to 2006, Nepal was gripped by a Maoist insurgency that coincided with and influenced political change in the country. The insurgency was initially dealt with by the Nepal Police, but the Nepal Army was actively involved from 2000 onward. The conflict has been typified by violent clashes with Maoists who on relied on homemade bombs because they lacked funds and access to commercially manufactured weapons. Improvised weapons were also used by the Nepal Army and Police. Since 2005, efforts had been made to reach a peaceful settlement to the conflict. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1740 (2007), the United Nations launched the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in early 2007 to assist the Seven Party Alliance Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) to implement the November 21, 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies.

The Constituent Assembly elections were finally held, after two postponements in 2007, in April 2008 and a coalition government was formed for the first time in the history of Nepal. The first Prime Minister, President and Vice President were elected and sworn in to office, though many posts within the new government are being filled with less expediency. There are still major challenges facing the implementation of the CPA and the formation of a new federal Constitution and the UNMIN mandate, set to expire on July 23, 2008, was extended to January 23, 2009 and finally expired on 14 January 2011. After several month of internal argument to elect a new Prime Minister, the political parties came to an agreement and a new Government was established during the first week of February 2011.

During the conflict, the Nepal Army laid 53 minefields and an additional 275 locations containing command-detonated IED within their defensive perimeters. After the conflict, the Nepal Army had neither the technical capacity, equipment nor management capacity to deal with the existing minefield threat, thereby preventing it from being able to safely meet its obligation under the CPA and Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) to clear all minefields. To address this problem, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit proposed the development of a national mine clearance capacity within the Nepal Army Directorate of Engineers funded by the UN Peace Trust Fund. Starting in September 2007, UNMIN MAU and its contractor, ArmorGroup, provided initial training and capacity building to establish a demining management capacity – the Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC).

Since the inception of the Project, NAMACC deminers trained through this Project have cleared 41 of the 53 minefields to international humanitarian standards and are now able to independently plan, manage and conduct demining activities. In early 2009, at the request of the Nepal Army (NA), the United Nation Mine Action Team (UNMAT) and NAMACC jointly developed a 5-phases Capacity Development Plan (CDP) to assess and plan the needed capacity development activities and the evolution of the roles of the UNMAT and NAMACC personnel into 2011. After two years of activities the CDP was successfully completed the 31/12/2010 and since, UNMAT monitors the Nepal Army demining activities.

In January 2009, the UNMIN Mine Action Unit became part of the UN Country Team, the UNMAS directed programme together with the mine action section of UNICEF formed the UN Mine Action Team in Nepal. While the UNICEF and UNMAS component maintain separate funding sources, together after chairing the Mine Action Joint Working Group (MAJWG) in Nepal they are now supporting the increasing leadership of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) Mine Action Section (MAS) and work to assist the mine action community in Nepal in developing an appropriate response to the country’s mine action needs in the areas of demining, MRE, VA and some advocacy. This arrangement mirrors the UNMAT concept at the HQ level and is designed to utilize the synergies that exists between the various UN agencies involved in Mine Action.

This Programme also provides support to the Government of Nepal to develop and implement a comprehensive and sustainable Mine Action Strategy inclusive of all pillars of mine action including victim assistance, mine risk education and advocacy through the development of the MoPR MAS.

The programme is designed to continue UNMAT support to the Government of Nepal until December 2011. This support will be scaled down throughout the timeframe of the programme and will ultimately lead to the completion of direct UN support to clearance activities in Nepal. The project will ensure the standalone national capacity to effectively deal with the remaining legacy of landmines, IEDs and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in Nepal.

UNMAT supports the Government of Nepal through specific activities with the Nepal Army, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and the members of the MAJWG.

The aim of the UNMAT strategy in Nepal for 2010 -2011 is to support the Government of Nepal in addressing the impact of mines, IED and other ERW in the short term, through supporting implementing partners with technical advice and logistical support and to develop the institutional capacity to address the residual impact of mines, IED and ERW after 2011.

**Main objectives of the Programme**

* Assist in the development and implementation of a National Mine Action strategy and policy
* Support the CPA and Agreement of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA)
* Continue to enhance the capacity of the NA to clear mine fields to internationally recognised humanitarian standards and meet the residual threat
* To enhance the UN, NGO and government capacity to meet MRE needs
* To support in the development of a national strategy in the care and rehabilitation of survivors of explosive devices
* Nepal to comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
* Support and development of surveillance systems
* To transfer completely from UN supported MA activities to nationally supported activities.

**Key actors**

MOPR MAS; NA; UN: Resident Coordinator, UNICEF, UNMAT, UN Peace Fund for Nepal; Danish and British Embassy; other donors to the UN Peace fund for Nepal; International and national NGOs.

**AIM OF THE EVALUATION**

The aims of this evaluation are to assess the efficacy of the UN Mine Action Programme in Nepal, to identify strengths and weaknesses in the relationships, structures, capacity development and processes that have been established; and to make recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of similar programme.

This evaluation will focus on: Humanitarian Mine Action, Capacity Building; and Coordination between UNMIN, UN Agencies and National structures, mechanisms and within UNMAT.

**OBJECTIVES**

In order to achieve the aim of the evaluation, the evaluation team will:

* Evaluate UNMAT, to assess its effectiveness in its coordination of mine action and capacity development activities in Nepal;
* In particular, the team will:
  + evaluate/analyse the work of UNMAT in supporting national goals, concentrating on support to operational management, national capacity development including development of national quality management structures and responsibilities;
  + evaluate the UNMAT approach in Nepal and make recommendation when this approach might be considered in other UNMAS MAPs;
  + evaluate/analyse process and progress of institutional and national capacity building and suggest recommendation for additional actions to be taken to strengthen this development if need it.
* Evaluate the inter-agency approach and relationships with UNHRCO, UNCT, UNICEF, with a focus on how the relationships have impacted UN coordination and humanitarian mine action and capacity development in Nepal. Areas to be looked at include but not limited to planning, resource mobilisation, capacity building, tasking and quality management, reporting and information sharing. Emphasis shall be given also to the predictability and reliability of response of national mine action centers under coordination and support of UN to medium - long term needs for mine action, clearance, EOD/IEDD, MRE, Advocacy and VA in Nepal;
* Evaluate the programme’s performance, donor support/interests and national support/interests in responding to humanitarian and development mine action needs in Nepal. Review the current mine action resources and comment on the balance and shortfall across various asset types and regions, in order to highlight area, if any that would require more active resource mobilisation efforts. Review information sharing with key donors on needs of resources for agencies seized with mine clearing activities, namely UNRCO, UNCT , UNICEF, and UNMIN;
* Evaluate how the project contributed to the UNPFN cluster outcome (as per the UNPFN results framework) and strengthened the UN contribution to Peace Building in Nepal.
* Evaluate the programme’s response and capacity to deal with development-related mine action needs in Nepal and comment on the way forward for coordination in the mine action sector based on known information and donor/national interests in this sector;
* Evaluate whether gender consideration have been taken into account during planning, priority setting and implementation of activities;
* Evaluate the implementation status and the monitoring mechanism of the operational plan and the strategic plan as developed by the programme and national authorities, identify and analyze areas where implementation has not reached the target and comment whether resource distribution within UN Mine Action structure in Nepal (including the UN partner agencies) and national authorities is adequate and appropriate in light of achieving its strategic objectives;
* Evaluate the quality of support services provided to the programme and the impact they have on the efficacy of the programme. Review the adequacy of assets and skills used by UNMAT against the priority needs by all agencies and national authorities;
* Evaluate the capacity building and institutional development of the national counter parts in view of the transition of the mine action management/support from the UN to the national authorities. Comment on the national participation in the coordination function and the feasibility of the envisaged future transition;

**EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team will be composed of (x)members of the GICHD. UNMAS will assume the role of managing the evaluation exercise, working closely with the members of the evaluation team to ensure effective monitoring of the exercise and adherence with the objectives as defined by the TOR.

**TIMEFRAME AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE EVALUATION**

The Evaluation is planned to commence from xxxx 2011. The period xxxx 2011 will be spent in New York with UNMAS and UNOPS staff, and other UN Agencies if required.

The Evaluation team will undertake the remainder of the interview work over a one to two week period in Nepal from xxxx - xxxx 2011, based largely in Kathmandu. Arrangements for the internal travel requirements inside Nepal will be the responsibility of UN Mine Action Programme Manager for Nepal. From xxxxx – xxxxx 2011 debriefing in NY.

The final report should be provided to UNMAS by xxxxx 2011.

## Appendix 2 – Itinerary and Persons Met

| **Date** | **Person** | **Position/Organisation** | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **In advance of the mission** | | | |
| Via Tele-phone | Stephen Robinson | UNMAS | Former Director, UNMAT Nepal |
| Patrick Tillet | Former Programme Officer, UNMAS New York |
| **Sunday, 29 Jan 2012 – Ted Paterson (TP) & Abigail Hartley (AH) arrive in Kathmandu** | | | |
| 30 Jan | Team meeting – TP, AH and Prabin Chitrikar (PC) | | |
| 31 Jan | Robert Piper | United Nations | Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator |
| Patrick Fergusson | Peace-Building Advisor |
| Danee Luhar | UNICEF | Child Protection Officer, Mine Action |
| Krisha Subedi | Armed Violence Monitoring Officer |
| 1 Feb | Bijaya Gauttam | INSEC | Executive Director |
| Prashannata Wasti | Programme Coordinator |
| 2 Feb | Bri.Gen. Dhanidas Karki | Nepal Army Mine Action Coordination Centre (NAMACC) at EOD Holding Unit | Director, Engineering Directorate |
| Col. Krishna M. Neupane | Deputy Director, Engineering Directorate |
| Lt. Col. Yam P. Dhakal | Commander, EOD Holding Unit |
| Lt. Col. Tek J. Dhamala |  |
| Lt. Col. Nabin Siwal | Commander, Kali Prasad Battalion |
| Maj. Manoj Gurung | Chief of Ops, EOD Holding Unit |
| Maj. Rohit Shrestha | IMSMA Officer, EOD Holding Unit |
| Maj. Ramjoty Bohara |  |
| Capt. Roshan Thapa |
| Capt. Dikshya Rajbhandari |
| Lt. Bashu Dev Pangeni |
| Bomb disposal equipment display and minefield demonstration – EOD Holding Unit | | |
| Meghnath Sharma | Dept. of Education | Planning Officer, Programme & Budget Section |
| Umesh Prasad Dhakal | Nepal Red Cross Society | Executive Director |
| Krishna Hari Koirala | Program Manager, Mine Action |
| Jerome Fontana | ICRC | Deputy Head of Delegation |
| Brian Veal | Cooperation Delegate |
| Binisha Shrestha | Cooperation Officer |
| 3 Feb | Shaligram Sharma | MoPR | Under Secretary (Head of Mine Action Management Section) |
| Departure of Abigail Hartley | | |
| **Saturday-Sunday, 4-5 February** | | | |
| 6 Feb | Sangay (Amina) Bomzan | Handicap International | Deputy Country Director |
| Christine Smerdon | Disability Coordinator |
| Kiran Wagle | Project Manager, Advocacy |
| Juliet Wattebot O'Brien | DFID Nepal | Peacebuilding Adviser |
| Anders Gardelin | UNDSS | Field Security Coordinator (FSCO) |
| Ashok Rana | Local Security Assistant |
| 7 Feb | Purna Shova Chitrakar | NCBL | Coordinator |
| Thakur Mohan Shrestha | Armed Police Force (APF) | Additional Inspector General of APF |
| Ram Saran Paudel | Senior Superintendent of APF |
| Bhishma Prasai | Nepal Police (NP) | Additional Inspector General of Police |
| Kedar Rijal | Superintendent of Police, Special Task Force |
| 8 Feb | Work on debriefing & report | | |
| 9 Feb | Robert Piper | United Nations | Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator |
| Patrick Fergusson | Peace-Building Advisor |
| Anne-Sophie LE BEUX | Programme Specialist UN Peace Fund for Nepal |
| Hanaa Singer | UNICEF | UNICEF Representative |
| Danee Luhar | Child Protection Officer, Mine Action |
| Krisha Subedi | Armed Violence Monitoring Officer |
| Afrah A. Al-Ahmadi | World Bank | Senior Human Development Specialist |
| 10 Feb | Aleksander Micic | UNRCPD | Deputy Director |
| Julia Knittel | Associate Political Affairs Officer |
| Michael Brown | UNDP (PBRU) | Head |
| Departure of Ted Paterson | | |
| **Post-mission** | | | |
| 16 Feb (via tele-phone | Stephen Robinson |  | Former Director, UNMAT Nepal |
| Hugues Laurenge |  | Former Technical Advisor, UNICEF Nepal |
| Justin Brady |  | Acting Director, UNMAS |

## Appendix 3 ­– List of documents consulted

**UN and other Official Documents**

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\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, *Plan of Action for Mine Action (2009-2011),* Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Nov 2009

*NAMACC/UNMAT Capacity Development Plan*, Feb 2009

*Nepal National Mine Action Strategy 2011-2012*, Feb 2011

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*Providing Victim Assistance in Nepal: A Handbook for Assisting Victims of Explosive Devices*, Handicap International and UNICEF, 2009

**Other Documents**

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International Crisis Group, *Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Nears,* Asia Briefing N° 121, Dec 2011

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, *Nepal: From Two Armies to One,* Asia Report N° 211, Aug 2011

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\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, *Nepal’s Political Rites of Passage,* Asia Report N° 194, Sep 2010

*\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?* Asia Report N° 173, Aug 2009

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
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\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, *Interim Strategy Note for Nepal*, Report No. 38119-NEP, January 2007

World Bank and DFID, *Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal*, 2006

## Appendix 4 – UNMAT Organisation





1. From 2009 to 2011, these two agencies worked closely as the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), these are relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In mine action, ‘humanitarian’ generally means activities undertaken for the benefit of the general community, and not for military or purely commercial purposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a national mine action programme, available from [www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/](http://www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. NPTF funding for mine action goes largely to the Department of Education, which provides mine risk education in the schools. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. As is the case with most UNMAS projects, the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) was contracted to provide many services required for project implementation, including contracting of personnel, procurement of equipment, etc. Regardless, UNMAS retains ultimate responsibility and we will refer to this as the UNMAS project. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in New York serves as the Administrator of the UNPFN. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. In 2008, the Constituent Assembly abolished the monarchy. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. These provisions were augmented by an Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA) signed by the Government and the CPN(M) and witnessed by the UN on 28 Nov 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. However, the Army would continue to provide border security and protect strategic installations, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UK Department For International Development; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Norway; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; Government of Denmark; Government of Finland. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. This sets-out terms and procedures for financial support to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and serves as a coordinating framework for consultation with the GoN, for joint reviews of performance, for common procedures on disbursement, for reporting and for audits. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. This, essentially, replaced the Peace and Rehabilitation Commission agreed in the CPA. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. All projects approved to date are for GoN implementation despite the stipulation in the NPTF Programme Document that entities eligible for funding from the Fund would include Nepali and international NGOs. In fact, the NPTF has not issued a call for proposals from NGOs. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. A more complete list is provided in the Independent External Review of the UNPFN, p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The UNFPN originally came under UNMIN but, in January 2009, management of the Fund came under the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. UN PBF is a multi-year fund for post-conflict peace-building, “with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peace-building activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.” It is supported by 50 donors and development agencies. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. This was due to *“management concerns that the monthly payments made to Maoist ex-combatants … might have been misused in a manner inconsistent with the project objective of consolidation of the peace process.”* Therefore, the GoN budget absorbed these payments and the $18.55 million in the EPSP budgeted for payments to ex-combatants was reprogrammed. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Taken largely from Saferworld, et al, *Armed Violence in the Terai,* Aug 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. This was created by the Government in 2001, largely in response to the insurgency. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. In Purchasing Power Parity terms. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The female employment rate also rose significantly during the conflict, which may also have contributed to the decline in poverty. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. This declares that all citizens are “equal irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe or ideology” but also protects “traditional practices” that open the door to discrimination and exclusion. See World Bank and DFID, *Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal*, 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See [www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2011/scor](http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2011/scor) and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Peace_Index> [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. This is also stipulated in section 4.2.2 Commander responsibilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The U.K. ran counter-terrorism bomb disposal courses from 1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. In the mine action field, ‘humanitarian demining’ is best understood as any demining that is not for military or purely commercial end use. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Fortunately, Nepalese did not steal the signs, as has been the case in some other countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Cipière, Michel, Mine Action Support to the UN Mission in Nepal, Mar 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. This set of activities is well covered in Cranfield University’s evaluation of UNMAT in mid-2009, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. ArmorGroup was also to verify all minefields. In November 2007, however, NA notified the MAU that access to most of the minefields will not be granted due to security concerns. As a solution to this access problem, ArmorGroup provided training to NA personnel in minefield reconnaissance, thereby developing additional capacity within the Army. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Brady et al, [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. This transfer from UNMIN to the UNCT actually occurred in November 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. No concrete targets were set for Information Management. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Scoring was on a simple 5-point scale: 1= No evidence of relevant capacity, 2= Anecdotal evidence of capacity, 3= Partially developed capacity, 4=Widespread but not comprehensive evidence of capacity, 5- Fully developed capacity [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The typical functional responsibilities of a national MAC are outlined in IMAS 02.10 – Guide for the establishment of a national mine action programme, available from [www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/](http://www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/) [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. The legend for the logic model is: blue boxes = activities; green = outputs; yellow = outcomes; black = impacts. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Aurora Martinez, Back to Office Report – NAMACC, November 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. At the November 2010 UNPFN Meeting it was reported that a three-person Mine Action Section had been established in MoPR. It seems however that only two personnel – an Under-Secretary and an officer – have been appointed and neither of these work full time on mine action. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Part of the reason for the delay was that no functioning government was in place on a number of occasions. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The graph shows disbursements in ‘Special Drawing Rights’ (SDRs). The budget of SDR 31.3 million is equivalent to $50million. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Since 2004, approximately $1 million has come via UNICEF for its MRE work in Nepal. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. On a couple of occasions, the UNPFN-funded project provided some funding for MRE activities, but this has been modest. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Coordinated by UNICEF, the many organisations involved in MRE have developed a common MRE curriculum and use common materials. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Scott Wilson Nepal Pvt. Ltd., *External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund*, pp 18-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. For example, in January 2011 the NCBL organized a workshop on the Nepal and the Mine Ban Convention, chaired by the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction with presentations by the three security forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNICEF, the ICBL, and NCBL. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Prince Mirad was the President of the 8th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and, since then, has been a high-profile advocate for universalisation. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The Programme Officer assumed the position of Programme Manager after the incumbent departed in April 2010. When she departed in December 2010, the Senior Technical Advisor remained in his role until the minefield clearance was completed in June 2011. Thereafter, the UNICEF Mine Action Officer assumed the role of senior UNMAT officer until he left in December 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. In a strict sense, the target to eliminate mine casualties by 2011 was not achieved, as there were two casualties from landmines in 2011. Regardless, all minefields have now been cleared, so this objective has been achieved for the future and is not discussed in this section. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. It is important to note that most mine action stakeholders stated that the individual heading the Mine Action section in MoPR was very capable. The failure was institutional rather than individual. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. The Terms of Reference for this evaluation also states on of the objectives of the programme was for *“Nepal to comply with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.”* Countries can comply (and, arguably, Nepal has done so for the main provisions) without signing or acceding to the Treaty. As well, the Plan of Action issued by the Mine Action Taskforce in late 2009 did have as fifth objective: *Nepal to sign APMBT within a realistic timeframe as determined by the Government of Nepal*. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Prince Mirad was the President of the 8th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC and, since then, has been a high-profile advocate for universalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The DAC is part of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The standard DAC criteria are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. This makes it difficult to capture the activities and outputs required in a Statement of Work for a commercial contract. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. In Nepal, UNMAT engaged of facilitated the efforts of ArmorGroup (stockpile management and destruction), Cranfield University (mid-term review), Centers for Disease Control, and the GICHD. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. This is adapted from the excellent timeline prepared by UNICEF as part of its presentation on mine action in Nepal. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)