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## **PROJECT COMPONENTS:**

### **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support**

#### **a) Peacebuilding context:**

##### **i) Statement of the problem**

In 2012 Somalia experienced major new political and security developments that offered greater possibilities for peace and security than the country had seen in over twenty years. Expectations raised by these developments that are dependent mainly on decisions and moves made by Somali actors have not yet been realized, but the post-transitional period still constitutes a rare window of opportunity. Progress has been slow in the first years of the post-transitional government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud with the country continuing to be plagued by the resurfacing of the same political economy dynamics of the past characterized by: political paralysis, allegation of systematic corruption, in-fighting, lack of progress on outstanding transitional tasks, clannism, and political violence.

Many post-transitional issues remain unresolved and the legacy of the civil war still endures. Patterns and practices of governance by formal state structures are weak, corrupt, and de-institutionalized across all of Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) still lacks the institutional capacity to facilitate the delivery of basic services to its highly vulnerable population, extend its authority outside of Mogadishu or to promote and protect the basic rights and freedoms of its people. Government service provision, even in core functions of policing and the judiciary, is largely non-existent, and most basic services – security, adjudication of disputes, health, education, power, water, even money supply – are provided by the private sector, non-profits, self-help groups, etc. Corruption levels are high with Somalia considered at the top of Transparency International's annual ranking of most corrupt states. A lack of basic consensus on the core politics – constitutions, division of power between central and local government, systems of representation, rules and rights of citizenship, rule of law, and the role of Islam in political life – has led to deep contestation and in many places political paralysis. It has also facilitated the use of political violence as a tool to advance political agendas. The capacity of formal governmental structures across Somalia is weak in part because of very modest budgets, and hence in inability to fund much beyond intermittent salaries for the large security forces they nominally control.

Informal, local governance arrangements remain the primary source of protection and rule of law across all of Somalia, with customary law administered by clan elders the main source. Local governance arrangements vary in capacity and legitimacy from place to place but collectively have formed a patch-quilt of rule of law across the country and have generally been the main source of protection and security for citizens since 1991. Autonomous armed groups are abundant in Somalia, and constitute a critical feature of the Somali political and security context.

Estimates of Somali human development situation rank it near the bottom of the world in almost every category, with unemployment -- mainly an urban phenomenon in Somalia -- at 54% in 2012, and youth unemployment that year was 67%, one of the highest rates in the world. Somalia's youth bulge exacerbates this problem. Somalia has a growing problem of resource scarcity and pressures which include: expansion of agriculture in previously pastoral areas, demand for water, lack of access to pasture due to armed conflict, urban growth, land-banking and land-grabbing, the break-down of water-sharing systems, and charcoal harvesting. Pressures on land and water have led to chronic levels of lethal communal clashes across much of Somalia, and have imperiled region-wide peace across all three zones. Communal clashes over land and water have, thanks to the ubiquity of semi-automatic weapons, produced casualty levels in some parts of Somalia that are more akin to those of a war. Tensions over land and water also provide easy fires for conflict entrepreneurs to stoke when it advances their interest. Peri-urban and urban land disputes have also grown more lethal across

Somalia due to rapid urban growth, a spike in land prices, land-grabbing and land-banking, and poor systems of land registration. Somali landscape is characterized by clan identity and political mobilization of clan. Clan politics has resurfaced with as much vigor as ever in recent years. Almost all political and organizational groupings tend to be assessed locally through the lens of clan composition and clan interests. Due to the prolonged conflict, Somalia has an extraordinarily large diaspora – now estimated at 1.5 million people, or about 15% of the total population – that has come to play an immense role in the country's politics, economy, and peace and conflict trends.

The main site of tensions and armed conflict today continues to be in newly recovered areas in South Central Somalia, often over ownership and control of grazing and agriculturally productive land. This has produced destabilising clan clashes from Hiraan, Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle to the Lower Jubba/Kismayo area, and Gedo. While the situation in Kismayo has relatively stabilized, clashes over control of recovered territory in Lower Shabelle remain a very worrisome flashpoint, coupled with the everpresent threats posed by local armed groups and urgent developmental needs in the region. It is also important to note that other parts of Somalia have enjoyed relative peace and security for extended periods of time, without the benefits of a central state. This is due to either resilient local governance arrangements or to the successful establishment of state-like structures in Puntland and secessionist Somaliland and in some peripheral areas of Somalia where limited local "government" structures are in place.

Furthermore, dialogue and consensus building on major political issues—such as the constitution, federalism, division of power and resources between centre and local government, system of representation, rule of law and the role of Islam in political life—are still in their infancy and need to be carefully managed to avoid political crises. FGS security forces capacity to provide safety and security to the citizens remains weak and tends to operate under weak command and control and with lack equipment and logistical capacity.

#### ii) Challenges of state building:

The legacy of war with gross human rights violations and abuses, including massive displacement, land grabbing, assaults, exploitation and deaths in south and central Somalia has created unresolved grievances that contribute to polarisation along clan lines. A political economy of war and state collapse that took root since the onset of the civil war remains a powerful contextual factor. A number of actors in South-Central Somalia have an interest in maintaining conditions of state collapse, communal tensions, and/or armed conflict, creating an environment replete with potential spoilers. In February 2014 a major joint AMISOM/SNA military offensive was launched to recover 25 districts in South-Central Somalia from Al Shabaab control and remains underway has led to the recovery of major towns. Although the offensive has dislodged Al Shabaab from many strategically important areas so far, the establishment of credible and legitimate government structures and delivery of peace dividends to the population has been slow in gathering momentum.

In terms of the extension of state authority, in the Central regions, the processes of federal state formation are underway, but at an early stage while the region continues to experience inter-clan conflicts. For example, the relations between the FGS and the self-appointed administrations in some of the areas (Himan and Heeb, Al Sunna Wal Jama, and Galmudug) remain to be clarified but efforts to foster a dialogue between the key political actors to promote the state building agenda are ongoing. In Mogadishu, the FGS exercises formal authority since the deployment of AMISOM in 2009 but is dominated by one group and remains socially divided along different sub-clan (and some clan) lines. Since the signing of the 27 August 2013 Addis Ababa Agreement, which established the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), Kismayo and the Jubbas have not experienced the scale of violence that preceded the Agreement but the political and security situation remains fragile underlined by dominance by some clans and creating a sense of exclusion among the other clans. This situation complicates the implementation of the Addis Agreement and the statebuilding process. Politics in the IJA has been further complicated by the rival movements in Baidoa to create a federal state in south west Somalia, with one movement claiming the IJA territories as part of a larger South West State.

The Addis Agreement precipitated a sharp reaction among some communities in the Baidoa region where elders, diaspora and civil society argued they had been excluded from the Agreement. On 24 June 2014 the FGS signed an agreement with leaders from both sides to establish an Interim South West Administration encompassing Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions. Under the Agreement the FGS has agreed to ensure inclusive implementation of the Addis Agreement by accommodating, for example, the interests of the Digil-Mirifle and other excluded groups. The Baidoa Agreement represents a significant milestone towards the formation of a regional administration but significant challenges remain.

Somalia conflict analysis shows the existence of key actors and interest that will be important for future peace and stabilization efforts. State authorities are indeed a key actor with the change of leadership in August 2012 that saw a more effective, accountable, and legitimate authority in place. Self-declared regional states in Somalia are increasing in importance and have substantial revenue flows, e.g. the seaports. Prolonged violence has created classes of political, business, and militia figures who ferment armed conflict or employ political violence in order to advance their political interests. Clan elders in Somalia are considered expert negotiators to defuse tensions to prevent armed conflict while always advancing the interest of the clan. The large Somali diaspora is the main source of political, business, and civic leadership in Somalia today, and are also the main source of private capital and investment and professional expertise. They are considered to play both positive and negative roles in Somali conflicts. Civil society, which has borne the brunt of political violence since 2007, remains the leading voices in Somali civil society, comprises professionals, educators, clerics, journalists, leaders of women's groups and NGOs. They are beginning to reassert the powerful voice in Somalia, and have the potential to play a critical role in promoting messages of peace, mobilizing the public, pressuring government, and building relationships and alliances across conflict lines.

### iii) Capacities for peace

Although much of Somalia has endured conflict for most of the past twenty years, it has also managed to prevent or contain dangerous disputes. Local communities have devoted most of their political energies to conflict management. Somalia conflict analysis indicates immense capacities and resilience for peace in Somali society. The sources of resilience are varied and include: hybrid coalitions, customary law and the role of clan elders, religious leaders and Islamic movements, civil society, women and business networks. During the most violent periods of Somalia's civil war, local communities demonstrated impressive capacities to manage and reduce the threat of armed conflict and violent criminality with efforts that tended to be led by clan elders. Resilience to conflict in Somalia has over the past two decades and across the entire country been most effective where hybrid coalitions of local interests – clan elders, clerics, women's groups, business leaders, professionals, and local government officials (where they exist) – work together to prevent and mitigate conflict.

The most pervasive source of conflict management is customary law applied and negotiated by traditional clan elders and other peacemakers. Customary law governs relations between clans, and determines compensation in the event of a crime. Because customary law is based on collective responsibility and compensational justice, it is known to help to resolve crimes and serve as a deterrent to armed violence. Religious leaders, and Islamic movements have long played a pivotal role as peacemakers in Somalia. Clerics of all persuasions are capable of promoting peace or inciting violence. Civil society groups – especially women's groups, but also professional associations, local NGOs, and the many informal networks that bind Somalis in mutual obligations -- have emerged as important actors in conflict prevention and management with some established to promote security or promote peace. Women have played variable roles in peace and conflict in Somalia, but there is no doubt that women and women's groups are a central pillar of resilience to conflict in Somalia. Many of the top Somali civic figures promoting peace and development have been women. However, women's leadership roles have mainly been confined to civil society, as government and politics at all levels continues to be heavily male-dominated. Business interests have had an ambiguous

relationship with peace-building – some have profited from the war economy and work to undermine statebuilding efforts, but when their business interests have been threatened by armed conflict or political violence, have been a powerful voice for promotion of peace.

**b) Mapping of existing peacebuilding activities and gaps:**

As noted in Annex C (Mapping of Peacebuilding Activities and Gaps), considerable work is underway across Somalia on reconciliation efforts. Much of the present reconciliation work done to date is however focused on capacity building and reconciliation/mediation at a more local and/or individual level. In the absence of formal states and regions, reconciliation efforts have centred on resolving clan grievances, grievances between communities and local administrations, and in building up vital civil society groups that can act as future peacebuilders. The proposed reconciliation conferences for State Formation aim to discuss issues at a higher level, however will build upon the successes (or challenges) faced other partners in their peacebuilding endeavor.

For further details on other peacebuilding initiatives underway, please refer to Annex C of this proposal.

**c) Rationale for this IRF:**

**Government strategy:**

State formation requires political leadership, enabling legislation, national dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms. The FGS, guided by Vision 2016, will facilitate the process of forming Interim Regional Administrations (IRAs) as precursors to federal states consistent with the Constitution and Somalia's laws with the participation of local authorities, traditional leaders, civil society, women and youth. Building on Somalia society's growing capacity and resilience for peace, the UN will support the FGS leadership throughout the negotiations, promote inclusive political dialogue, assist in the development of the legal framework/legislation and help establish and strengthen the capacities of key institutions and core government functions, required for the process of state formation. The UN will work with international partners to assist the federal states and IRAs through a variety of short and medium term interventions, including institution-building and human resource capacity development. UNSOM will support mediation and reconciliation through its good offices and Area Offices and coordinate international assistance to help mobilise resources to support the newly established Interim Regional Administrations.

The Provisional Constitution of Somalia envisages the creation of Federal Member States that will together constitute the Federal Republic. According to the Federal Government's "Vision 2016" document, Somali regions should merge together to form IRAs, which will likely evolve into Federal Member States. The Interim Jubba and South West Administrations (IJA and ISWA) have already been established. Efforts are ongoing to create two more IRAs encompassing Hiran, Middle Shabelle and the Central regions.

**Project Approach:**

Inclusive processes: For state formation to have a lasting effect in Somalia, it is imperative that an inclusive processes that also builds on Somali people's capacities and resilience for peace be taken that involves participation of all key actors, including local authorities, traditional leaders, civil society, women, youth, business networks, elders, clan leaders, etc. With division of power historically based upon clan lines and with historical clan grievances still present to this day, state formation cannot successfully take place without consideration of any lingering grievances.

The project strategy to use conferences for dialogue also builds on tested local conflict resolution mechanisms in Somalia that centre around a process wherein clan elders and other stakeholders congregate to discuss and resolve issues. The reconciliation process for State Formation process will use the same approach, and local reconciliation conferences will be undertaken across Somalia to provide a platform for key actors (including local authorities, traditional elders, civil society, women, youth, etc) to together discuss the most appropriate and acceptable format through which State Formation and governance can take place within a particular region. Without such an inclusive, bottom-up approach the likelihood is that grievances will not be addressed and that any future IRA or State will not be viewed as legitimate.

State formation and reconciliation: In addition, local reconciliation efforts are thus crucial to ensure that state formation proceeds peacefully and amicably tackle or address different interests, needs and concerns, while ensuring that the process is broad-based and inclusive of all clans, minority communities, women, and youth. At present, local reconciliation efforts are not proceeding at the required speed due to lack of financial support.

However, local reconciliation conferences have proved successful in Somalia. The recent conferences in Adaado and Dhusamareeb led to the formation of the Galmudug Interim Administration. Similarly, reconciliation conferences between the S6 and S3 groups were instrumental to the formation of the Interim South West Administration (ISWA) in 2014.

These reconciliation conferences were successful because, like the conferences that are to be supported by IRF funding, they provide a reconciliation and mediation process between various clans and ethnic groups and provide a forum for these stakeholders to discuss, learn, and build consensus on key issues surrounding federalism, boundaries, and state formation. While conferences are normally scheduled for one day in duration, a majority of the substantive discussions are in the preparatory phase, where discussions are held with stakeholders to agree on key issues in advance of the conferences.

As local reconciliation is the precursor for overall state formation, it is vital that support be given at the earliest stage possible to both the Federal Government of Somalia and to emerging states to support reconciliation conferences. Should financial support not be available for these reconciliation conferences, there is a risk that overall State Formation be delayed or that State Formation be undertaken without taking into account historical local grievances and concerns. Both above-mentioned risks could negatively impact overall efforts to create a Federal Somalia and may in turn provide space for spoilers (such as Al Shabaab) to seek greater control in the country.

Gender equality and Women, Peace and Security: Somali women continue to face discrimination from traditional elders - during the state formation process women had to fight hard to make their voices heard. In 2014, during the discussions between the FGS and regional representatives (clan and traditional elders) of ISWA and central region a limited number of women were invited to participate in the political discussions. UNSOM Gender Unit provided support to the Somali Women's Leadership Initiative (SWLI) to ensure women are not completely excluded from the process. The SRSG highlighted this exclusion to the then Prime Minister and urged decision makers to include women delegates in the first reconciliation conference. The SRSG furthermore requested that women be represented in the Regional Assembly and in the IRA institutions.

UNSOM through its Senior Gender Advisor and the Integrated Gender Unit (IGU) work collaborative with gender experts of UN agencies, in particular UNDP and UN Women to ensure women's representation and participation in the state formation process. The establishment of SWLI in 2014 was a collective initiative of UNSOM, UNDP and UN Women, which preceded several consultations with local women leaders and authorities in Bay-bakool, Garowe, Kismayo, Hiran, Galmudug, Galgaduud and Mogadishu/Benedir. During the stateformation process UNSOM supported SWLI to undertake Solidarity Missions—a major advocacy, mobilization and lobby undertaking, training Somali women's organizations on political participation and reconciliation in ISWA, IJA and

Galmudug. SWLI leaders mobilized local women leaders, held strategic planning meetings with them, and lobbied the local and federal authorities, clan elders and religious leaders. In addition, UN gender teams have been instrumental in helping with advocacy work during the local reconciliation exercise. To that end, training was delivered in Kismayo, Baidoa and Garowe.

As part of the local reconciliation project, UNSOM Gender Team, UN Women and UNDP will continue to work collaboratively to help build the capacity of Somali women and ensure their voices are heard and issues are addressed. Support will be provided to the SWLI, which to-date has over 300 members across the country, to work with local women's leaders and women and gender machineries, to lobby power-brokers, decision makers on women's inclusion and representation.. The main areas of focus will be mobilization and advocacy and representation and participation of women in the decision making process. Meanwhile, at the political level, the SRSG and the UNSOM political team will continue to advocate for the inclusion and representation of Somali women in the national dialogue and participation in the state formation process, constitutional review and upcoming elections. The process will benefit from the UN Joint Project on Somali Women's Political Participation, "Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia" funded by PBF and implemented by UNDP, UNSOM and UN Women.

Timing and sequencing of tasks: To support overall state formation and in line with the New Deal Somali Compact (PSG 1), the United Nations, through UNSOM and UNDP, are developing a Joint Programme on State Formation. The initial Project Initiation Plan has been approved by both the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs and the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility Steering Committee. Key outputs of the Joint Programme include facilitation and support on reconciliation towards State Formation, support to the formation and establishment of a Boundary Federal Commission, increased understanding of federalism, legal framework, and boundaries amongst citizens and civil society, overall support to the FGS on federalism, and support to new emerging/interim administrations on establishing basic organizational structures. At present, the Joint Programme's Project Initiation Plan has been developed, with work now being undertaken to develop a detailed Programme Document. As such, funding for the Joint Programme is only available for an initial period of six months (April 2015 to November 2015).

It is however noted that with momentum already present in Somalia on state formation, over the coming 8 months, support to holding reconciliation conferences will be urgently required. The request for IRF funding for UNSOM and UNDP to support reconciliation conferences is made on the emerging need to hold reconciliation conferences on an urgent basis.

Comparative advantages of IRF use:

This IRF project proposal is therefore made on the basis of the urgent need for immediate financial support for reconciliation conferences and in recognition that reconciliation is one of the key focus areas for PBF support.

Should it not be possible for reconciliation conferences to take place at the earliest possible time, there remains a risk that State Formation proceed without an inclusive process that takes into account concerns of key local stakeholders. This in turn may affect the legitimacy of any future IRA and State, thereby destabilizing any efforts for creation of a federal systems in Somalia.

Given that further financial support from the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund cannot be obtained for a period of at least six months, should financial support for reconciliation conferences not be forthcoming, this will represent a missed opportunity for the United Nations to support State Formation in Somalia and may also affect Somalia's ability to constructively address local and regional grievances and concerns as it builds a Federal system.

## **II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation**

### **a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing:**

**Outcome Statement:** State Formation in Somalia is achieved through an inclusive process that considers the views of local authorities, traditional elders, civil society, women, and youth

**Theory of Change:** If space is provided so that past grievances and other concerns can be addressed transparently and in a participatory manner, then the process of state formation will be timely and sustainable because clans and citizens will possess greater confidence and perceive the process as more legitimate.

**Envisaged Support:** It is estimated that 10 local reconciliation conferences will take place in the Central Region (Galgudug, Hiraan, Shabelle, Banadir) and in the Interim South West State and the Interim Juba Administration region. In addition, it is foreseen that 3 minority rights conferences will also take place in Banadir, Lower Shabelle, and Mudug/Galkayo. While identification of minorities is still to be determined, it is expected that minority conferences will include, in Banadir region, the Barawanis, descendants of arabs, and the Bantus. In Lower Shabelle, it is expected that members of the Hawiye, Habergider, and Ayr clans will participate. Each conference is estimated to include participation of between 300 to 600 persons. Participation will be agreed based on local clan distribution in a particular region and also include civil society, women, and youth stakeholders. While it is not possible to set quotas for gender or youth representation at each conference, UNSOM and UNDP will ensure, through project management, engagement of SWLI and also good offices, that no conference is held without adequate representation, and in the case of women representation all possible efforts will be made, in particular through the engagement of SWLI to attain 30% representation of women. In this respect synergies with Women's Political Participation project will be promoted and maintained.

The areas of support will include financial assistance for holding conferences (transport, venue, catering, facilitation, and other costs), conference preparatory work, including workshops on federalism, boundaries, and legal frameworks, plus startup funding for administrations to ensure agreed follow-up actions can be taken following the culmination of conferences. This project forms part of the greater Joint Programme on State Formation, however, given the present momentum in place for reconciliation conferences in Somalia plus the lack of financial capacity to hold such conferences, PBF support is required to ensure that an opportunity is not missed at present to ensure an inclusive and participatory process be undertaken (especially for minorities and women) as part of State Formation. The conferences are also viewed as an opportunity for local stakeholders to address historical grievances and concerns, and thus ensure that as State Formation proceeds, these concerns can be addressed. This would allow for State Formation to consider the principle of do no harm at the forefront of planning. It should be noted that local reconciliation efforts may raise expectations amongst stakeholders, which may not be met by future local authorities. This is an inevitable side-effect of an inclusive process, which will need to be carefully managed at all stages, but the risk of not having an inclusive process is far greater than a process that may raise certain high expectations. It should also be noted that the UN may not be able to participate in some conferences, due to security concerns, however the UN will work with both national and international NGOs who have better access in these locations and will partner with NGOs and the FGS in implementation of the project.

#### **(b) Project Activity Budget**

The following budget includes the overall budget required by UNDP to manage local reconciliation conferences in support of State Formation. It is envisaged that UNDP will manage the entirety of the project and that funds will be disbursed directly to UNDP. The project budget covers all required costs for convening local reconciliation conferences, engagement of project implementation and management personnel, M&E work, an end of project evaluation and overall project implementation costs, including security, HR, administration, and communications.



It should be noted that the local reconciliation project will form under the overall management arrangement for the UN Joint Programme on State Formation. As such, efforts have been made to ensure that as much economies of scale can be obtained from this arrangement. It should be noted that as a result of this arrangement, use of project funds will be primarily for implementation of project activities, with more management and support costs relatively limited, due to cost-sharing arrangements (where possible) with the UN Joint Programme on State Formation. Where required, the project may also obtain support from the UN's Risk Management Unit. However, it should be noted that the Risk Management Unit support is provided at no additional cost.

Table 1: Project Activity Budget				
Outcome/ Output number	Output name	Output budget by RUNO (\$)	UN budget category (see table below for list of categories)	Any remarks (e.g. on types of inputs provided or budget justification)
<b>Outcome 1: Support the FGS with facilitating Reconciliation towards State Formation:</b>				
Output 1.1 Activity 1.1. Support the FGS in organising & facilitating reconciliation conferences towards state formation process				
	<b>Reconciliation conferences in ISWA( Afogoye, Baware and Merka)</b>			
	<i>Transportation( air / road)</i>	90,000		
	<i>Accommodation/food</i>	90,000		
	<i>Facilitators</i>	30,000		
	<i>Equipment(IT/Internet/Computer)</i>	20,000		
	<i>Venue</i>	20,000		
	<i>Media and publication material</i>	20,000		
		<b>270,000</b>		
	<b>Reconciliation conferences in central region (Adaado, Dhusamareb , Mudug, Galkayo))</b>			
	<i>Transportation( air / road)</i>	100,000		
	<i>Accommodation/food</i>	90,000		
	<i>Facilitators</i>	30,000		
	<i>Equipment(IT/Internet/Computer)</i>	20,000		
	<i>Venue</i>	20,000		

	<i>Media and publication material</i>	25,000		
		<b>285,000</b>		
	<b>Reconciliation conferences (Belletwayne, Jowha, Banadir)</b>			
	Transportation( air /road)	134,000		
	Accommodation/food	180,060		
	Facilitators	50,000		
	Equipment( IT/Internet/Computer/furniture etc)	30,000		
	Venue	30,000		
	Media and publication material	50,000		
		<b>474,060</b>		
	<b>Reconciliation conferences in IJA( Afogoye,Baware and Merka)</b>			
	Transportation( air /road)	60,000		
	Accommodation/food	70,000		
	Facilitators	15,000		
	Equipment( IT/Internet/ Computer/furniture etc)	10,000		
	Venue	15,000		
	Media and publication material	20,000		
		<b>190,000</b>		
	<b>Total 1</b>	<b>1,219,060</b>		
<b>Outcome 2 : Increased understanding of the federalisation, legal framework &amp; boundaries processes amongst stakeholders, citizens civil Society</b>				
Output 2.1.1: Consultations, roundtables, meetings and workshops related to boundaries & federalization	<b>Workshops/Consultations and federalism outreach</b>			
	Transportation( air /road)	20,000		
	Accommodation/food	35,000		
	Facilitators	10000		
	Equipment (IT/Internet/ Computer/furniture etc)	10000		
	Venue	10000		
	Media and publication material	30000		
		<b>115,000</b>		
<b>Outcome 3: Newly emerging/interim administrations have basic organizational structures in place</b>				
Output 3.1.1 Capacity building of IRAs/emerging states entities				
	<b>IRAs : government-community outreach interventions/meets</b>			
	Transportation( air /road)	41000		
	Accommodation/food	30000		

	Media and publication material	30000		
	Total 3	101000		
<b>Total Outcomes ( 1,2,and 3)</b>		<b>1,435,060</b>		
<b>Project Implementation and Management team</b>				
Project Implementation team	Project Manager (20%) UNDP	50,000		
	UNSOM : Project Coordinator/Specialist	220,000		
	UNSOM : Project Assistant	35,000		
	M&E officer	65,000		
	End of Project Evaluation	40,000		
Project implementation support	Security cost 2.5 %	46,127		
	M&E and oversight 5%	74,059		
	Finance, HR and Procurement 4.5%	83,028		
	Communication 1%	18,451		
	Total without Project implementation support	631,664		
	Total including Project Implementation support	2,066,724		
GMS 8%		165,338		
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,232,062</b>		

**Table 3: Project budget by UN categories**

<b>Table 2: PBF PROJECT BUDGET</b>		
<b>CATEGORIES</b>	<b>Amount UNDP (\$)</b>	<b>TOTAL (\$)</b>
1. Staff and other personnel	\$370,000	\$305,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$164,000	\$164,000
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$316,000	\$316,000
4. Contractual services	\$735,000	\$800,000
5.Travel	\$300,000	\$300,000
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts		\$0
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	\$201,038	\$201,038
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	<b>\$2,086,038</b>	<b>\$2,086,038</b>
8. Indirect Support Costs*	\$146,023	\$146,023
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$2,232,061</b>	<b>\$2,232,061</b>

\* PBF indirect fee is 7% of budget

**b) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners:**

The Recipient UN organization for this project is the United Nations Development Programme Somalia Country Office. UNDP has a large presence across Somalia, as well as a supporting office in Nairobi. With an annual regular budget of between USD 45 to 70 million and with a total staffing of approximately 300 employees, UNDP is well positioned to implement this project. UNDP is also This section should provide a brief description of the RUNO capacity in the Country, including the overall annual budget (regular and emergency) and the staff, which includes programme management personnel, as well as teams already in place to support M&E and all required administrative/operations functions. UNDP has extensive expertise in peacebuilding work within the Somali context, as noted from their work on community security, rule of law, and governance. The project is part of the Joint Programme on State Formation, which UNDP will implement along with UNSOM. UNDP is also simultaneously undertaking other Joint Programmes such as the Joint Programme on Rule of Law, the Joint Programme on Local Governance. To ensure women's inclusion and representation, the project will benefit from the available gender expertise of the UN—UNSOM SGA, IGU, UNDP Gender Team and by promoting synergies with the UN Joint project on Women's Political Participation.

<b>Table 4: Overview of RUNO funding in the country</b>				
	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>Key Source of Funding (government, donor etc)</b>	<b>Annual Regular Budget in \$</b>	<b>Annual emergency budget (e.g. CAP)</b>
Previous calendar year		Donors	\$71,618,797	\$828,157
Current calendar year		Donors	\$49,524,587	\$828,157

### **III. Management and coordination**

**a) Project management:**

The IRF support towards reconciliation conferences on State Formation in Somalia will be managed through the Joint Programme on State Formation. As such, overall project management and coordination will occur as part of the established structures for the Joint Programme on State Formation. Such project management and coordination structures are as follows:

*Project Management*

The project will be managed by UNDP under UNDP's Direct Implementation (DIM) modality in close collaboration with the designated counterpart in Federal Government of Somalia (Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs - MOIFA). A Project Board will be established, chaired by the MOIFA, which will typically meet on a quarterly basis. The applicable management arrangements are presented below.

*Project Implementation Modality*

The project will be implemented through the DIM implementation (DIM) modality of UNDP with its main project partner, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) (Ministry of Interior and Federal

Affairs). To the maximum possible extent, UNDP's government partners are the ones that implement the programmes, while UNDP provides logistical and administrative support, technical assistance and capacity building to these organizations.

To implement this approach, UNDP focuses on the development of systems and procedures to guide government implementation. UNDP uses a funding modality where the government agrees to produce specific deliverables - such as Draft State Charter, setting up the interim state administration, setting up the secretariat, organising the regional conference, capacity building of the clan elders, etc. - and UNDP agrees to provide the staff, technical assistance and equipment necessary to produce those deliverables. Staff provided through this mechanism are recruited jointly and funded by UNDP, but hold government contracts and are accountable to the government. The staff are monitored through a joint performance assessment modality implemented by the relevant government partner and UNDP. This modality allows the government to assume a leadership role, and also ensures that assistance is transparent and accountable.

UNDP will use a similar modality to implement the decentralised approach through the development of memoranda of understanding between UNDP and Interim State Administration as implementing partners to empower local government partners to lead and manage state formation, governance, development and security strategies at the newly formed federal state level.

Recruitment, procurement, and management and utilization of financial resources will be conducted in accordance with UNDP rules and regulations. Project and advisory staff will be directly recruited by UNDP and gender balance will be ensured in the recruitment process. The UNDP Country Office's Capacity Development Programme, in close coordination with the other UNDP programmes, will provide project assurance and the UNDP Country Office Operations Section will provide support services as necessary.

The overall **project organisation structure** is as follows:

#### **The Project Board**

The management structure is specifically designed to ensure the project is appropriately managed to its conclusion.

The project board consists on the government side of the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs and other selected government bodies (federal and state) including Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, and on the international side the UNSOM, UNDP and potential donors that will come on board to support the project.

The board will meet, at a minimum, on a quarterly basis though may be convened on a more regular basis by the Chair of the board, taking into account overall developments in Somalia on state formation. The Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs or his designated representative will chair the Board, while UNDP serves as the Co-Chair. The role of the Project Board is to: (i) provide overall guidance and direction to the project manager, (ii) review and approve the work plans/budget, (iii) ensure effective implementation of the project, (iv) review project (quarterly) progress report and other relevant reports, (v) raise emerging risks with the project, (vi) address project issues raised by the project manager; (vii) set project tolerances for the project manager; and (viii) consider and decide on the actions recommended by the project manager to address specific issues.


#### **UNDP's roles in Project management**

UNDP is transitioning from a Nairobi/ Mogadishu-centric management structure to regional management and implementation, where the central Mogadishu Country Office will retain responsibility for the overall oversight of the programmes implemented by UNDP, while the implementation responsibilities will be as much as possible placed at state and activity implementation levels.

UNDP senior management, component leads and senior technical advisors for the PSGs and Capacity Development programmes operate from the Mogadishu office and ensure UNDP participation in the relevant coordination mechanisms. They equally manage and oversee support to the federal and (emerging) state institutions as well as the decentralized staff in each project region responsible for finance, procurement, human resources management, IT, finance and security. The office in Nairobi will provide predominantly project implementation support services. UNDP will establish a project team for the implementation of the present project overseen by the central Capacity Development team, headed by the Emerging State Project Manager and consisting of the following staff:

- Project manager (international P4 level – overall project implementation and management)
- Project Operations Manager/International UNV (International P 3 level – mainly responsible for day-to-day operational management of the project)
- International M & E and reporting officer
- Three Project Officers (national SC 10 level – mainly responsible for UNDP – government relationship management)
- Two Project assistants( finance and Logistics) (National SC 5/6 level)
- State Advisors (National and international staff in the capitals of the newly formed states)

For the purposes of the IRF submission for support to Local Reconciliation Conferences, IRF funding will contribute 20% of costs to the above mentioned Project Manager (P4) post and support (at a value of \$50,000) costs for an M&E Officer, who will be part of the Project Support Team. . In addition, IRF Funding will also support the recruitment of an UNSOM Project Specialist/Coordinator and Project Assistant.



The Project team will serve as the secretariat for the project board and will be supported by national and international (host-term) advisors as required.

UNDP project offices in the newly emerging states will be established – security permitting – to manage the on-the-ground activities in the region or sub region and ensure harmonisation of the UNDP programmatic interventions with newly formed state authorities by facilitating the coordination among UNDP projects, between UNDP and interim state level authorities and with locally present other (international) development actors.

#### **UNDP field presence**

UNDP will significantly increase and improve its field presence. The UNDP field presence will consist of Project offices (in the newly emerging states) and teams of staff placed within the offices of Interim State Administration and other key structures.

UNDP may support staff under government contracts in each Interim State Administration office, to support state formation and build the capacity of newly created state structures to work in partnership to coordinate, lead and manage government services and development assistance.

#### **Donors**

The project aims to primarily receive funds from the Peacebuilding Fund. However, it will also form part of the larger UN Joint Programme on State Formation, which will receive funding from donors through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund. It is envisaged that the IRF funding will allow the UN to immediately support local reconciliation efforts, which will pave the way for greater State Formation work, which is to be funded by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund. The IRF funding will therefore assist in starting up the overall State Formation project. Besides providing the funds needed for activity implementation, donors will also provide general oversight through their presence on the Project Board. Donor representatives will be invited to participate in the field visits where possible.

#### **Periodic Review and Coordination**

The Chair of the Project Board with UNDP support will organize monthly review and coordination meetings. All stakeholders contributing to the state building efforts are invited to the review and coordination meetings. Every stakeholder will present the progress achieved, problems incurred and lessons learned. This forum will also share central level guidelines and policies.

#### **b) Risk management:**

Given that Somalia remains a country where security and access remains a challenge, in addition to a complex and, at times, politically volatile environment, it is recognized that the risks associated with this project are overall set at high. The UN, including UNDP, have however considerable experience of operating in such an environment, and mitigating measures (as noted below) will be implemented to ensure that, as much as possible, the use of IRF funding results in considerable peacebuilding gains for Somalia. To assist in management of risks, the UN has set up a Risk Management Unit, within the Office of the Resident Coordinator. This Unit, as well as the Department of Safety and Security, will be called on to constantly advise UNDP so as to ensure that appropriate mitigation measures be in place. In addition, as UNDP will implement this project in close coordination with UNSOM, the political perspective will be constantly at the forefront of planning and, where needed, UNSOM's good offices will be used to advance project implementation.

Table 5 – Risk management matrix			
Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
<p><u>Security:</u> Security remains the single most important challenge to project implementation. Many regions remain inaccessible for security reasons. This will make interventions at the regional level more problematic.</p>	High	High	<p>For the reconciliation conferences, implementation will be undertaken in regions by government partners, with UNDP providing logistical support. If necessary, staff from the inaccessible regions will be brought to Regional centres or Mogadishu for training and coaching to ensure the rollout of UNDP programmatic activities. UNDP development approach provides the government the resources and ability to build its capacity and reduces the need to place UN employees in insecure environments. Through memoranda of understanding with Interim State Administration, UNDP can continue to build the institutional systems by providing the resources to directly employ the human resources required to build capacity at the interim administration level in the regions. UNDP also exercises flexibility in the sequencing of its implementation, especially at the Regional level. UNDP can reduce security risks by deferring, or reducing its level of operations in insecure areas until these areas have been stabilized.</p>
<p><u>Political Support:</u> Internal policy contradictions within the Government and lack of concerted efforts may hamper, undermine or make impossible implementation of these programs and achievement of the relevant results. In addition to this, the highly centralized nature of the government could impact roll out of the programme</p>	High	High	<p>The project through UNDP, will enforce the implementation of the initiatives by encouraging political commitment centrally and locally by supporting government coordination mechanisms and widely communicating those initiatives. Development partners can also help identify entry points to overcome any obstacles.</p>



and the cooperation needed at the regional level.			
<u>Marginalization of Certain Groups:</u> Groups, such as women, youth, and minority clans, continue to be marginalized in all sections of Somalia society,	Medium	High	UNDP recognizes this risk and will try to ensure that all programme activities address this issue and that marginalized groups are encouraged to participate and will follow the core principles of inclusiveness and commitments such as Article 3(5) of the Provisional Constitution. Where feasible, arrangements in the sense of quota – for instance in representative bodies – will be made.
<u>Fraud and Corruption:</u> The risk of fraud and corruption at different levels in the country may have a negative effect on project implementation. Moreover, devolution of authority to Interim State Administration authorities and increase in funds managed directly by some of the government and non-government entities entails additional risk of financial mismanagement and corruption.	Medium	High	UNDP will support strengthening of internal and external audit mechanisms, including regular conduct of audits in Interim state Administration offices and will encourage more effective oversight of IAs and CSO over the use of the project budget. Where necessary, support from the UN Somalia Risk Management Unit will be sought.
<u>Managing Expectations:</u> Reconciliation conferences may give rise to high levels of expectations amongst differing stakeholders, which IRAs, once set up, may not be fully able to manage. This could in turn affect credibility and legitimacy of the entire state formation exercise	High	High	Workshops on legal frameworks and federalism will be held to ensure better understanding by stakeholders on the state formation process. Reconciliation conferences will also stress that issues raised may take time to address and that an inclusive state formation process is a living process. Capacity building of IRAs will also be conducted so that necessary resources and development of governance bodies is undertaken. Throughout the process, the UN will work closely with the FGS and Interim Regional Administrations, to ensure that expectations are understood and managed. In addition, the project will also keep other actors in the UN

			updated to ensure that support to new states is possible, so that new states can be provided with assistance to meet the expectations of the conferences.
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### c) Monitoring & evaluation:

The present project will operate in accordance with the programming policies and procedures outlined in the UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures and also the applicable policies and procedures of the Peacebuilding Support Office, as noted below in the administrative arrangement section.. ,

In this context, the following quality assurance and PME arrangements will be implemented:

- On a quarterly basis, the chair of the Project Board with UNDP support will organize review and coordination meetings to continue to ensure alignment between the various partners and discuss and address urgent or newly emerging issues;
- The planning of the project will be adapted accordingly on a quarterly basis to reflect emerging developments;
- The project will submit two progress reports to the Board:
  - One quarterly report after three months of implementation, focusing on progress towards the completion of key results. This report will equally serve to document adaptations of the past quarter and the expected adaptations for the coming quarter.
  - One final report after completion of the project (after eight months) providing a comprehensive overview of activities implemented, results achieved and financial resources deployed as well as lessons learned.
  - In undertaking the above-mentioned periodic reports, reports will not only highlight what events have taken place but also will seek to obtain feedback from participants to conferences and will also seek to track progress of recommendations from conferences as State Formation proceeds.
  - Where applicable data will be presented in sex-disaggregated manner.

Applying the UNDP (Atlas-based) quality assurance tools, the project management will activate and update:

- the Issue Log to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change;
- the Risk Log - based on the initial risk analysis below;
- the project Lesson-learned Log to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report as part of the final project report;
- the Monitoring Schedule Plan to track key management actions/events.

The monthly reviews and quarterly progress and planning sequence ensures a participatory planning processes where all stakeholders are involved.

An evaluation will also be conducted following the conclusion of the project –\$40,000 has been allocated for this purpose.

A further \$ 136,000 has been allocated to support overall M&E. This includes cost-sharing of an international M&E officer that supports the State Formation Joint Programme. Furthermore, M&E work will also benefit from other data collection work to be undertaken by UNSOM, such as the annual perception surveys which will be used to monitor outcome monitoring.

#### **d) Administrative arrangements**

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

#### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

#### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than 30 July;

- Annual and final narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.


#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

#### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

**Annex A: Project Summary** (to be submitted as a word document to MPTF-Office)



**PEACEBUILDING FUND**  
**PROJECT SUMMARY**

<b>Project Number &amp; Title:</b>	PBF/SOM/SF/1/15 Support to Somalia Local Reconciliation Conferences	
<b>Recipient UN Organization:</b>	UNDP	
<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>	UNSOM, Federal Government of Somalia, Interim and Emerging States in Somalia	
<b>Location:</b>	<b>SOMALIA</b>	
<b>Approved Project Budget:</b>	<b>\$2,232,061</b>	
<b>Duration:</b>	<b>Planned Start Date:</b> 1 September 2015	<b>Planned Completion:</b> 1 May 2016
<b>Project Description:</b>	In support of overall state formation in Somalia, UNSOM (through UNDP) will support the Federal Government of Somalia (and emerging Interim Regional Administrations) in convening 10 local reconciliation conferences and 3 minority rights conferences to consider key issues for the process. These reconciliation conferences will assist in ensuring that the state formation process is inclusive and considers views of all including clans, minorities, women, and youth in order to facilitate the formation of viable Interim Regional Administrations in Somalia that will in the future likely evolve into Federal Member States.	
<b>PBF Focus Area:</b>	National Reconciliation (PBF Focus Area 2.1)	
<b>Project Outcome:</b>	State Formation in Somalia is achieved through an inclusive process that considers the views of local authorities, traditional elders, civil society, women, and youth	
<b>Key Project Activities:</b>	<p>The project will encompass the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Convening of 10 local reconciliation conferences (in the Interim South West Administration Region, Interim Juba Administration region, Central Regions, Belletwayn, Jowhar, and Banadir)</li> <li>• Convening of 3 minority conferences (in the Interim South West Administration Region, Interim Juba Administration region, Central Regions, Belletwayn, Jowhar, and Banadir)</li> </ul> <p>In convening the above conferences, support will include support for transportation (road and/or air), conference services, facilitation, and capacity building of implementing partners, if necessary.</p>	

## Annex B: IRF Results Framework

Country name: Somalia												
Project Effective Dates: 1 S 2016												
PBF Focus Area: 2.1 (National Reconciliation)												
IRF Theory of Change: Successful completion of local reconciliation conferences in Somalia will be the precursor to and support overall State Formation and Federalism in Somalia.												
Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Year 1				Year 2				Milestones
Outcome 1: State Formation in Somalia is advanced and supported by citizens as a result of an inclusive process that considers the views of local authorities, traditional elders, civil society, women, and youth		Outcome Indicator 1 a: Citizens in regions are of the opinion that State Formation has progressed through an inclusive process  Baseline: State Formation exercise is at an early stage, so not possible to determine perceptions Target: Majority of respondents either “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” that State Formation has been an inclusive process	UNSOM Annual Public Opinion Survey		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences  Conferences agreed to by stakeholders  Conferences held at agreed date  State Formation proceeds based on successful reconciliation conference
	Output 1.1: Reconciliation and Minority conferences in ISWA (Afogoye, Baware, and Merka)	Output Indicator 1.1.1 3 reconciliation conferences and 1 minority conference held between June 2015 and February 2016  Baseline: 0 Target: 4	Reports on conferences provided to UNDP/UNSOM		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences  Conferences agreed to by stakeholders  Conferences held at agreed date

	Output 1.2: Reconciliation Conference in central region (Adaada, Dhusamareb, Mudug, Galkayo)	Output Indicator 1.2.1: 4 reconciliation conferences and 1 minority conference held between June 2015 and February 2016  Baseline:0 Target:5	Reports on conferences provided to UNDP/UNSOM		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences  Conferences agreed to by stakeholders  Conferences held at agreed date
	Output 1.3: Reconciliation Conferences in Belletwayne, Jowha, Banadir	Output Indicator 1.3.1 3reconciliation conferences and 1 minority conference held between June 2015 and February 2016  Baseline:0 Target:4	Reports on conferences provided to UNDP/UNSOM		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences  Conferences agreed to by stakeholders  Conferences held at agreed date
	Output 1.4: Reconciliation conferences in IJA (Afogoye, Baware, and Merka	Output Indicator 1.3.1 4reconciliation conferences and 1 minority conference held between June 2015 and February 2016  Baseline: Target:	Reports on conferences provided to UNDP/UNSOM		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences  Conferences agreed to by stakeholders  Conferences held at agreed date
Outcome 2: Increased understanding of federalism, legal framework and boundaries process amongst		Outcome Indicator 2 a; Citizens and civil society have greater knowledge on key issues on federalism, legal frameworks and boundaries increased. te discussions at	UNSOM public opinion survey		X	X	X	X				Request made by FGS and regions for convening of conferences

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**Annex C – Mapping of peacebuilding activities and gaps**

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Source of funding (Government/ development partner)</b>	<b>Key Projects/ Activities</b>	<b>Duration of projects/activities</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Description of major gaps in the Outcome Area, programmatic or financial</b>
<p>Strengthened interaction between state and society to allow for improved local governance and service provision in the security and safety sector and more accountable, robust and durable local institutions;</p> <p>Target communities are safer as a result of improved behaviour towards Small Arms/Light Weapons, Explosive Remnants of War and increased ability to manage inter-personal conflict through community driven initiatives.</p>	<p><b>Funded by DFID implemented By Danish Demining Group.</b></p> <p><i>Working in 3 districts of Gedo Region Luq, Dolow&amp; Belet Hawa Districts</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Community Police Dialogue Mechanisms</li> <li>2) Conflict management education, establishment/ strengthen of Peace committees</li> <li>3) Logistics support to Reconciliation/Mediation efforts at community level</li> <li>4) Village and District forums to bring together Administration and community</li> <li>5) Community Grants to support peace building activities</li> </ol>	October 2012 – Aug 2015	6,000,000 GBP for All Somali	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 8 District Peace committees established in Jubaland regions.</li> <li>- Capacity building to committee's</li> </ul>	<p><b>District peace committees funded by Somali Ceweru</b></p> <p><b>Establish/Strengthened in</b> (Lower Juba region (Kismayo. Badhaadhe, Doble and Afmadow</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Establishment/ strengthen of district level Peace committees</li> <li>2. Training in Conflict management and peace building</li> </ol>	<p>(Badhaade, Doble, Afmadow, Elwak, Belet Xawo, Dolow and Luq) Aug 2012</p> <p>Kismayo District</p>		

	Districts) and Gedo region (Elwak, Beled Hawo, Dolow and Luq Districts)		(March 2015)		
-	<b>Pact Kenya / World Wide funded by USAID</b>	1. Capacity building to grass roots peace builders in Gedo and Juba's. 2. Community police dialogue mechanisms 3. Grants peace dividend	2013 to present: Area they operate in Gedo and lower Juba we have ( Belet Hawa, Damasse, Elwak, Ausquran, Daresalam, Gherille, Diif, Doble). The organization is less active at the moment.		
- To strengthen non – state actors in the south central to engage in domestic and international policy dialogue and decision making to bring about secure and peaceful future	the South Central Non-State Actors Association (SOSCENSA) – Funded by Safer World	1. Creation of the non state actors 2. Support to reconciliation and political dialogue 3. Capacity building 4. Assessments on community perceptions on policies. 5. Facilitates forums between authorities and international partners	2014 – 2015		
- To increase the visibility of, and confidence in government by improving government service delivery	<b>TIS/DIA Funded by USAID</b>	1. Jointly identify small grants priorities with government officials, civil society members. 2. Strengthen regional administrations. 3. Supports peace and reconciliation	2015		
<b>Galgadud (Addado and Dhusamareb)</b>					
Resolution of inter-/intra- clan conflicts	<b>1. Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), 2. Life and Peace Institute (LPI)</b>	1. SSF: Local reconciliation of clans, 2. LPI: peace-building and conflict transformation (such as resolving marriage and rape issue,	1. SSF: May 2014-Jan 2016 2. LPI: Mar 2012-Sep 2015	1. SSF: (about 3 million USD) 2. LPI: (about	In Galgudud regions, SSF has been engaged in

		reducing road blocks, saving community resources from intra-clan conflict, making peace between pastoral community-and host community, implementation of ceasefire agreement, training of traditional leaders, reducing revenge killings, etc.)		300,000 USD)	inter-clan/intra-clan reconciliation in order to prepare the ground for the formation of a new state. Since the launch of the state formation process in April 2015, its resources have been mostly used to the state formation conference. To note, the Dhusamareb reconciliation conference in February-March 2015 did bring many clans together and they reconciled; however, some of them were quickly patched up due to time constraint and reportedly discussions were shallow.
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					<p>The conferences UNSOM intend to organize are intended to help resolve remaining clan conflicts and/or address grievances that re-emerge during the state formation process. Concerning LPI's effort, it is assessed that their focus is more on resolution of individual cases.</p>
Mudug					

Peacebuilding in south and north Mudug/Galkayo	<b>1. The Center for Peace and Democracy (CPD), 2. Galkayo Education Center for Peace and Development (GECPD), 3. Horn Africa Centre for Peace (HACP), 4. Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC)</b>	1. CPD: Civic education for peace, democracy, development to empower civil society, 2. GECPD: Awareness and advocacy campaign on women's rights and promotion of peace, 3. Horn Africa Centre for Peace: Cross-section dialogue for peace, conflict resolution, regional peace committees, 4. PDRC: Consultation and engagement	Unknown	Unknown	There have been grass-roots efforts involving elders, youths, women, religious leaders, and business community and they have exercised their capacity to reduce political tension between Puntland and Galmudug administrations in the past. That said, with the progress of state formation in the central regions, tension could rise in south and north Mudug and hence a broader and structured dialogue will be required not only to conduct
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					consultation on the boundary issue but also discuss future-oriented issues such as how to identify and pursue mutual benefit (such as fight against Al Shabaab, economic opportunities).
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