**ENDLINE EVALUATION**

**Report Prepared for The Project:** **Mitigating Localised Resource-Based Conflicts and Increasing Community Resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts of Sierra Leone**

**September 2022**

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# Executive Summary

This report outlines research and analysis conducted as part of the endline evaluation for the project entitled: ‘Mitigating Localised Resource-based Conflicts and Increasing Community Resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts of Sierra Leone’. The intervention was funded by the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP), in partnership with key government partners like: the Office of the Vice President (OVP) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). The aim of the project was to mitigate local conflicts between communities, government and private companies by building the capacities of institutions and dialogue platforms that promote peaceful relations and the inclusion of women and youth. It was implemented in pursuit of two main outcomes: 1) communities in target districts benefit with more accountable institutions and mechanisms that promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies, and 2) communities benefit from reduced social tensions through enhanced sustainable livelihoods and food security. This evaluation systematically assessed progress against these outcomes via their associated project indicators, while also evaluating the project against six evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability. The study relied on a mixed methods approach. Secondary research focused on project-related data and reports, while primary research used surveys, interviews, and focus groups. In total, 1,400 surveys – 700 per district – were carried out as part of the evaluation, and there were 47 key informant interviews and focus groups conducted.

## Relevance

The evaluation found that the project was largely relevant to the primary needs of its context. It was aligned with key government priorities and policies promoting sustainable economic development, better governance, and more equitable distribution of natural resources as a route towards building peace in project chiefdoms. Importantly, the project contributed to *Sierra Leone’s Medium-term National Development Plan 2019-2023* and was relevant in supporting the priorities the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) has set out in terms of its agricultural economic development. Efforts under this project also directly contributed to improved food security among beneficiary populations. Sierra Leone has been identified for its “serious” levels of hunger and under-nutrition[[1]](#footnote-1). Improving livelihoods and food security can also help address development concerns underlying social tension and conflict. However, efforts to accelerate growth without attentiveness to how economic benefits and risks are distributed have been noted as a source of instability in Sierra Leone[[2]](#footnote-2). Concession companies working in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts occupy a considerable share of available arable land, leaving vulnerable farming households deprived of access to key livelihoods. Creating effective governance mechanisms that can help articulate and resolve the grievances of local populations was an effort to resolve the tensions that underlie resource-related relationships between companies and communities. Thus, strengthening local governance institutions in project areas was a relevant focus, in an attempt to work with companies to create conditions for a better corporate response to community needs.

## Coherence

The project was designed to create coherent connections along the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus[[3]](#footnote-3). In addition, the project is coherently aligned with the global development efforts set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – most directly under Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, but also under SDGs 2, 5, 8, and 17. Programming for this project built on UNDPs expertise in inclusive democratic governance, sustainability, and inclusive local economic development, and gender equality and women's empowerment[[4]](#footnote-4), leveraging organisational capacities to add value in these areas, while avoiding duplication of efforts with other projects being undertaken by groups like Caritas and Cordaid. Further, the project bolstered inclusive growth by promoting uptake of the Sierra Leone Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (SLEITI) and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forestry (VGGT), and provided actionable insights into key policy gaps that could be addressed through the upcoming *Mining and Minerals Development Act*. Project coherence was strengthened even more after WFP received catalytic funding to scale-up livelihood support under the PBF project, targeting 29 communities with inland valley swamp (IVS) development and agricultural livelihoods training, in addition to the 31 communities supported initially. The project was also coherently linked other WFP interventions in home-grown school feeding, creating market opportunities for the agricultural outputs of beneficiaries.

## Effectiveness

The following were key project achievements:

* Drafting and validation of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report* to determine the impact of extractive industries on the availability and quality of arable land for community farmers.
* Awareness raising on land rights, regulatory frameworks, and land acquisition processes, and community radios discussions on land acquisition and conflict prevention.
* Strengthened local structures like: Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs), Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs), and Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs).
* GRCs handled some 78 cases on a diverse range of issues to resolve some 26 disputes.
* One hundred members of the LPPBs and Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were given training on human rights, conflict resolution, and other topics.
* A total of 500 hectares of IVS land was developed through the project (262 hectares of IVS developed in 2020 and 238 hectares in 2021), with workers receiving cash-based transfers of approximately USD 2.90 per day for sixty days.
* Sixty communities were supported and 3,705 farmers (2,448 males and 1,257 females) were trained as part of farmer based organisations (FBOs) in topics such as: improved cropping techniques, water management practices, post-harvest techniques for rice production, etc.
* Training and equipment was provided for 34 community Youth Contractors.
* WFP procured 55 metric tons of locally produced and milled rice in 2021 and 53 metric tons in 2022 for school feeding, and connected FBOs to ten schools in Pujehun for vegetable sales.

The following are key implementation challenges:

* Delays caused due to the COVID-19 pandemic were a key reason why project was extended.
* Project coordination proved challenging and needs to be improved for joint interventions.
* Considerable turnover at UNDP created delays in project activities.
* Financing issues also created delays across both project outcomes.
* Although the project successfully established the GRCs, MSPs, and worked with youths, women and CDCs, there were: delays in implementation, reports of infrequent meeting, perceived lack of impartiality, and insufficient capacity and self-sufficiency.
* Validation of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report* was significantly delayed.
* Stakeholders from around project areas did not possess a clear overall understanding of how project communities for livelihood activities were chosen.

## Impact

Analysis of progress towards project indicators suggests that the impacts of project were frequently positive, but with significant remaining challenges. For instance, endline respondents were less likely to say that concession companies in their area respond to the needs of communities than did baseline respondents. Findings may be indicative of a greater awareness among respondents about their relative to companies. The endline survey also showed that the trust that people have in companies is still generally low. Qualitative research indicated that some consultation between communities and companies does occur, but with insufficient follow-up action by companies; perhaps the best indication of this is the lack of resolution to inadequate drainage systems by Vimetco in Lower Banta Chiefdom, which has created considerable problems with flooding in IVSs in a number of project communities.

The key benefit of platforms such as the MSP and GRC was that they provided a space for dialogue. Endline respondents that are aware of the GRC are likely to hold more favourable opinions about it than were baseline respondents. In particular, there was a significant shift in perceptions that the GRC represents the best interests of everybody. However, successes from the project may have been largely “symbolic”, with much work remaining to make the companies more accountable. Many issues between companies and communities remain unresolved. Qualitative research also indicated specific concern about the transparency of the GRC in Malen Chiefdom, the membership of which is believed to be strongly connected to the local Paramount Chief. Groups like Malen Affected Land Owners and Users Association (MALOA) were excluded form participation in project processes. Moreover, there have been reports of intimidation, harassment, and criminalisation of MALOA members and citizens in Malen[[5]](#footnote-5). Looking at the MSPs, the PBF project was successful in building MSP capacities, given that these were mostly not functioning when the project commenced. However, key groups – most notably Green Scenery – were not fully included in the MSP, undermining its utility as a peacebuilding instrument. Finally, people’s impression of SLP officers was generally unfavourable, but many more expressed a positive opinion of LPPBs, which were present and functioning in all project chiefdoms.

At the household level, the endline also found that average total monthly incomes household increase from SLL 984,775[[6]](#footnote-6) at the baseline to SLL 1,063,948 at the endline, for a modest 8 per cent increase in income during the project period. Qualitative research confirmed higher incomes due to livelihood activities, with research participants across project chiefdoms indicating better incomes from rice farming and second croppings of vegetables and other agricultural commodities. The endline also measured food expenditure, an important indicator of household food security, finding that almost half of endline respondents (46.8 per cent) can be classified as very poor according to this measure, which is up from 34.4 per cent at the time of the baseline. It is likely that rising food prices[[7]](#footnote-7) are the reason that food expenditures are rising despite increasing incomes. Positively, both the number of households reporting acceptable and borderline food consumption increased from the baseline. Unfortunately, price increases in food may be leading households to cope by seeking other forms of financing for food purchases, which may help explain why actual food security has increased during the same time period, especially Moyamba District.

Importantly, the endline evaluation indicates an overall reduction in social tensions; only 4.2 per cent said of endline respondents they had been involved in a dispute in the past two years, compared to 12.2 per cent of baseline respondents that said the same thing. A smaller proportion of all endline respondents (72.2 per cent) than baseline respondents (82.7 per cent) also indicated that they sometimes or often worry about resource conflicts in their communities. Qualitative research found that though road blockades and protests do continue to still occur in project chiefdoms, they are less frequent than before the project started. However, it must be noted that most of those interviewed still believe that companies are not addressing or eliminating the main causes of conflict, meaning that he distribution of power and resources has not changed significantly since the project began.

## Efficiency

The endline evaluation found that the project largely met the standards for efficiency. Overhead was 7 per cent, which is in line with corporate standards for many UN agencies. Another 31 per cent of the budget was allocated to personnel expenses, meaning that over 60 per cent of the project budget was dedicated to programming. All budget lines have been fully exhausted. Further, most project funds were used as was planned in the project budget. Where changes were made, appropriate justifications were given and procedures followed. In terms of operational efficiency – how well the intervention was managed – there were some notable delays. For example, activities under Outcome 1 were delayed because the second tranche payment was not made available in time to start activities. Payment delays were also noted under Outcome 2. Late payments after swamp development created inefficiencies. Some of these payment challenges were due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, which made movement to communities difficult and put the project behind schedule. In most cases FBOs continued work despite lack of payment. However, there were instances where funding delays resulted in some delays to swamp development.

## Sustainability

A number of important aspects of sustainability were built directly into the project design. Project implementation built local capacities to ensure effective and long-term management. All stakeholders and beneficiaries from the intervention are local people residing in targeted chiefdoms, thereby helping ensure that the skills and structures needed for resolving conflicts remain within the communities. A key sustainability gain is that capacity strengthening support to the SLEITI contributed toward improving the regulatory framework and promoting its sustainable long-term implementation. Importantly, beneficial ownership transparency implementation, which requires companies to disclose their true and natural owners and not shareholders only, has been included in the *Mining and Minerals Development Act*; this was an important multiplier of the project impact through awareness raised among political stakeholders during the project about issues in the mining industry. In terms of the sustainability of the livelihoods component of the project, irrigated IVS can be used for continuous and sustainable food production without relying on traditional shifting upland agriculture that needs seasonal rainfall. In short, lowland farming is a more sustainable model that upland farming. Further, the project attempted to build the long-term agricultural productivity and sustainability, by supporting smallholder farmers with interventions that increased capacities across different value chain activities, including processing, value addition, and market access support. Building the capacities of farmers groups to the point they could be certified as FBOs, and some became agricultural cooperatives, created a organisational sustainability among beneficiaries, as these groups are now eligible for and linked to support and benefits from the MOA.

Although discussions with the beneficiaries in all four chiefdoms confirmed the need to sustain the key structures established by the project, it will be difficult to keeping these structures functioning without continued financial support for transportation and motivation to attend meetings. The project sought to integrate the MSP platform into the *District Development Plans* and budgeting. As suggested by a key informant at the VPO, similar strategies might be pursued to fund the GRCs and CDCs from national budgets. But at this point it is unclear whether commitments have been made in this regard. Moreover, there may be aspects of the implementation strategy that has impeded capacity transfer; communities largely looked to Fambul Tok for leadership in process of grievance redress, as well as for logistical and organisational support in carrying out these activities. While it is important that disputes were resolved throughout the project lifecycle, greater ownership over mediation would have strengthened the GRCs to a greater degree and helped ensure their sustainability in the long-term.

## Recommendations

Based on the aforementioned conclusions, this endline evaluation suggests the recommendations outlined below:

* *Develop more robust conceptualisation of ‘catalytic peacebuilding’.* Though the project set out some ambitious aims in its theory of change in terms of peacebuilding, recent flare-ups of conflict in project chiefdoms indicate that the underlying dynamics that fuel a conflict – especially in Malen and Lower Banta – have not been meaningfully transformed.
* *Greater emphasis on participation from private sector actors* *in order ensure that peace was linked in broad-based, community-oriented, and long-term development.* Corporate participation and accountability need to be proactively emphasised as a complementary component to efforts made towards non-violent reconciliation by communities.
* *Better inclusion of all relevant stakeholders.* Effective peacebuilding must include all stakeholders. Lack of full inclusion of groups such as MALOA and Green Scenery into project-related processes and activities create an obstacle to long-term security, as the grievances expressed by these groups will remain unresolved and continue to cause social tension.
* *Focus on conflicts with companies and on building capacities of beneficiaries*. Project resources would have been used more efficiently if dispute resolution focused directly on disputes over resources and between communities and companies, rather that secondary issues such as domestic disputes and other interpersonal issues at community and household level. Further, implementation models of subsequent projects of this nature should focus less on implementing partners providing direct grievance redress, and should instead work exclusively in a supporting role to provide technical assistance, capacity building, and systems strengthening to local structures at different levels.
* *Consideration of longer-term timeframe for programming.* A two-year project will be very hard-pressed to enact the type of transformative social change required to resolve deeply embedded mistrust between communities and institutions.
* *Creation of a dedicated Project Coordinator role.* Such a position would allow for more proactive coordination towards collaborative planning and joint implementation in a way that could have better enhance the synergies, complementarity, and coherence of the project.
* *Better sensitisation of communities around project areas.* Greater efforts are needed to sensitise all groups about how and why project funds are going to be distributed as they are, so as not to associate the project with the inequality and corruption that drive the political economies of the settings in which it is being undertaken.

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# List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CDC – Community Development Committee

CDFs – Community Development Funds

CSR – corporate social responsibility

DISEC – District Security Council

FBO – farmer based organisation

FCS – food consumption score

FFA – food for assets

FGD – focus group discussion

FSMS – Food Security Monitoring System

GBP – Great Britain Pounds

GRC – Grievance Redress Committee

GoSL – Government of Sierra Leone

HDI – Human Development Index

IRF – integrated results framework

INGO – international non-governmental organisation

IVS – inland valley swamps

LPPB – Local Police Partnership Board

(MALOA) – Malen Affected Land Owners and Users Association

MOA – Ministry of Agriculture

MSP – Multi-stakeholder Platform

MTNDP – Medium-term National Development Plan

NGO – non-governmental organisation

OECD-DAC – Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee

OVP – Office of the Vice President

PICOT – Partnership in Conflict Transformation

PBF – Peacebuilding Fund

ORC – Office of the Resident Coordinator

rCSI – reduced Coping Strategy Index

SLEITI – Sierra Leone Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative

SLL – Sierra Leonean Leones

SLP – Sierra Leone Police

SPSS – Statistical Package for Social Sciences

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

ToR – terms of reference

TVET – Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UN – United Nations

UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNSDCF – United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

USD – United States dollars

VGGT – Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forestry

WFP – World Food Programme

# Introduction

This report outlines research and analysis conducted as part of an endline evaluation for the project entitled: ‘Mitigating Localised Resource-based Conflicts and Increasing Community Resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts of Sierra Leone’. The intervention was funded by the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP), in partnership with key government partners like: the Office of the Vice President (OVP) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). The aim of the project was to mitigate local conflicts between communities, government, and private companies by building the capacities of institutions and dialogue platforms that promote peaceful relations and the inclusion of women and youth. The project sought to achieve this aim by strengthening the existing regulatory framework on land acquisition and strengthening national, district, chiefdom and community-level mediation and dialogue infrastructure. Support was provided to affected communities to improve agricultural and alternative livelihood sources, including agricultural asset creation activities that empowered women and youth with inputs and skills.

As per the terms of reference (ToR) for the assignment (see Annex A) this endline evaluation has the following outputs:

1. Design and carry out appropriate quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to measure project indicators included in integrated results framework (IRF) and evaluation criteria related to Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) evaluation criteria of: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability.
2. Develop an inception report and share with partners to refine research design and tools.
3. Train and supervise all research assistants involved in the project, as required.
4. Support analysis with project documents, government policies, and other relevant internal and external desk research.
5. Integrate findings from primary research to create actionable recommendations for future programming.
6. Write a detailed report that answers evaluation questions related to indicators and evaluation criteria.

As noted in the first point in the list above, the evaluation assessed the project against the six evaluation criteria outlined by the OECD-DAC; in more detail, these are[[8]](#footnote-8):

1. *Relevance:* The extent to which the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.
2. *Coherence:* the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.
3. *Effectiveness:* the extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups.
4. Impact: the extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to generate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects.
5. *Efficiency:* the extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way.
6. *Sustainability:* the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to continue.

The OECD-DAC evaluation criteria provide a guide to the analysis conducted as part of this evaluation. Following this introduction, this report provides an overview of the project that was evaluated and an outline of the methodology used for the evaluation. Findings are then presented for each evaluation criteria, followed by conclusions and recommendations to inform future programming of this type.

# Project Overview

The PBF project aimed to mitigate local conflicts between communities, government, and private companies by building the capacities of institutions and dialogue platforms that promote peaceful relations and the inclusion of women and youth[[9]](#footnote-9). In particular, it sought to strengthen and operationalise the existing regulatory framework on land acquisition by supporting national, district, chiefdom and community level mediation and dialogue infrastructure. Support was also provided to affected communities to increase agricultural and alternative livelihood sources, including agricultural asset creation activities that empower women and youth with inputs and skills, and technical and vocational training to enable local women and youth to benefit from company employment opportunities. To build the capacity of local institutions, the project provided assistance to the GoSL to strengthen policy frameworks, coordination and reporting on the Sierra Leone Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (SLEITI) and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forestry (VGGT). The professionalism and integrity of the security sector was also to be enhanced through trainings on conflict mediation, human rights and sexual and gender-based violence, in addition to strengthening police and community partnerships. Finally, the capacity of selected private sector company staff in human rights and gender approaches and livelihood programming was also to be enhanced. As per the project IRF[[10]](#footnote-10), it aimed to contribute to the following outcomes and outputs presented in the following table (see Annex B for the project IRF).

Table 1: Project Outcomes and Outputs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Outcomes** | **Outputs** |
| *Outcome 1: Communities in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts benefit from more accountable institutions and mechanisms that promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies* | * Output 1.1: Land acquisition and land use processes are more inclusive and aligned with policy frameworks * Output 1.2: Infrastructure for mediation and dialogue strengthened to manage conflicts within and between communities and companies. * Output 1.3: Strengthen the capacity of government, security sector, local leaders and companies to be more accountable to communities. |
| *Outcome 2: Social tensions reduced by enhancing sustainable livelihoods and food security* | * Output 2.1: Promote climate-smart agriculture practices, agricultural value chain strengthening and livelihood opportunities |

These project outcomes were pursued through the theory of change outlined below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Project Level Theory of Change

**IF** the regulatory environment is improved and implemented in a more transparent and inclusive manner to ensure companies respect their corporate social responsibility (CSR), human rights protection and peacebuilding principles… and

**IF** community members including women, youth and farmers are empowered to participate in regular dialogue with private companies through multi-stakeholder platforms, grievance redress committees and in processes to determine the utilisation of customary and privately leased land and community development funds…and

**IF** communities, especially young men and women are supported to develop sustainable and alternative livelihoods which they themselves identify, design, implement and monitor through inclusive, community driven processes… and

**IF** local governance, security institutions and companies are more transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs of the local population…

**THEN** people and companies in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts will enjoy peace and social cohesion as a result of responsible investments and access to livelihood opportunities, promoting a conducive, peaceful environment and improving food security.

**BECAUSE** large-scale land acquisition that exclude communities, a lack of regular community and company dialogue, non-compliance with human rights standards, the exclusion of community members from determining the utilisation of CSR funds and the destruction of livelihoods are the root cause of localised violent conflict, poverty and food insecurity in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts.

Work towards the aforementioned theory of change was pursued in partnership with GoSL, leveraging the significant experience and capacities of PBF, UNDP, and WFP in Sierra Leone. PBF, UNDP, and WFP are trusted development partners of the GoSL, with established histories and presence in the country. Together, these UN stakeholders were well positioned to build on their respective histories of engagement in Sierra Leone and organisational comparative advantages in while working to contribute to the aforementioned project outcomes. The PBF, for instance, has invested over USD 57 million in Sierra Leone in a wide range of peacebuilding projects[[11]](#footnote-11) since 2007. UNDP has supported the GoSL during key transformative periods, including during and after national elections and the transition from the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone in 2014. The *UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021*[[12]](#footnote-12) outlines a series of signature solutions that define the core work of UNDP. For its part, WFP has contributed to number of important strategic outcomes in Sierra Leone, two of which are particularly relevant to the PBF project: improving nutritional status of vulnerable populations in targeted districts and creating resilient livelihoods for smallholder farmers and communities that better meet their food security and nutrition needs[[13]](#footnote-13).

# Methodology

Endline activities commenced in February 2022, with the bulk of fieldwork taking place 15-24 March 2022[[14]](#footnote-14) and analysis of data and the drafting of this report continued through mid-September 2022. The endline relied on a mixed methods approach, measuring quantitative project indicators, as well as also qualitatively examining the dynamics of conflict between communities and companies, the presence of an effectiveness of mechanisms put in place to prevent and address conflict, the remaining challenges to promoting peace, etc. Using different methods allowed for triangulation of data from a variety of sources and provided richer data through which to contextualise the project indicators.

## Secondary Research

Desk research focused on internal documentation, but also brought in external documents where necessary. Internal project documents included the project proposal and IRF, as well as important means of verification listed in the IRF like: project proposal, *Land Degradation Assessment Report*, training reports, monitoring reports, minutes and attendance lists from meetings of key groups supported by the project, activity reports, etc. Key government policies and reports were also used to determine project alignment with important national development and peacebuilding priorities. Other relevant documents from national and international stakeholders included: research and policy reports from government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and multilateral organisations, as well as news and literature on topics related to natural resource management and conflict (and conflict prevention) between companies and communities; all secondary sources are cited throughout the evaluation report.

## Primary Research

Primary research relied both on quantitative and qualitative methods (see Annexes C and D for the evaluation tools), including: community-based surveys, interviews at the national, district, chiefdom, and community levels, and focus group discussions (FGDs) at the community level. These methods were complementary and mutually reinforcing.

### Quantitative Research

Quantitative methods took the form of an endline survey. The quantitative research design and survey tool were largely based on the design and tools used during the baseline study[[15]](#footnote-15) to help assure comparability of the data. Both surveys were design to capture representative perceptions of people in target communities to gauge:

* Incomes and livelihoods
* Food consumption
* Perceptions of social tensions and trust
* Presence of conflict and tension in communities
* Knowledge and perceptions of local platforms and private sector companies

The endline survey was implemented in each project chiefdom, as much as possible the same project communities were sampled as those chosen for the baseline survey[[16]](#footnote-16), though in those instances where non-project communities were sampled at the time of the baseline they had to be replaced with communities where the project was being implemented. All communities sampled were from the original pool of 29 before additional catalytic funding was provided. In total, 1,400 surveys were carried out – 700 in each district produce representative district-level statistics[[17]](#footnote-17). Four surveys were removed from the sample after data cleaning. Remaining surveys were weighted upwards to meet the sampling requirement just mentioned. Moreover, because of a higher overall number of concession communities in Lower Banta and Malen, these two chiefdoms were each oversampled, with survey numbers weighted to produce a survey distribution of 350 surveys per chiefdom. The result is a representative number of surveys per district[[18]](#footnote-18), with each given equal analytical value for comparisons across chiefdoms.

The second stage of sampling occurred once communities were chosen. Thirty-two surveys were undertaken in each community. Households were selected for surveying with equal probability within each community. Household selection was done by computing a sampling interval based on the approximate number of households in the community, divided by 32, and then selecting a ‘random start’ by drawing a random number between one and the sampling interval. Research assistants were provided with the sampling interval and random start for each community, but were also given the leeway to adjust these based the actual size of each community in the event that suggested survey intervals did not match up with the actual community size. Once a household was randomly selected, a survey was conducted with an individual 18-35 years-of-age[[19]](#footnote-19). If multiple within this age range were present at the time of the survey, a single person was randomly selected for the survey.

The average size among selected survey households was seven, and the average age of all respondents was 27.4 years of age. The following table breaks down the survey by age category.

Table 2: Age Range of Respondents

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Age Range** | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| *18-20* | 9.6% | 8.9% |
| *21-25* | 25.2% | 29.7% |
| *26-30* | 32.2% | 29.7% |
| *31-35* | 33% | 31.7% |

Although this project focuses on women on youth[[20]](#footnote-20), the surveys also included adult men in order to capture their perspectives on social tensions, trust, conflict, etc. This male point-of-view provides a more holistic measure of indicators related to Outcome 1, while also providing a point of comparison for indicators under Outcome 2. Attempts were made to produce a sample was approximately evenly distributed between men and women.

### Qualitative Research

Qualitative methods also profiled the aforementioned areas and was used to understand the underlying causal and explanatory factors affecting progress towards project outcomes and outputs. Qualitative research was used to provide insight into questions around evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability. Qualitative research was be made up of interviews and FGDs. In addition, qualitative research was be used to collect data on the presence and function of: local tensions and conflicts, local groups and dispute mechanisms working in peacebuilding, the inclusivity of these groups, the impact of the project on local governance and livelihoods, etc., as well as the nature of relations and collaboration between private sector companies, local platforms, local authorities and communities. Interviews and/or focus groups were conducted with the following stakeholders:

* Interviews with WFP, UNDP, and the Office of The Resident Coordinator (ORC) in Freetown and in the project districts.
* Interviews with key partners, especially with: OVP, MOA, Namati, and Fambul Tok.
* Interviews with District Administrators, Ward Councillors, District Security Council (DISEC), and representatives of concession-area companies (Community Liaison staff of Socfin, Natural Habitats, Sierra Rutile, and Vimetco) working in project areas.
* Focus groups with representatives of Community Development Committees (CDCs), Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs), Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs), and multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs).
* Focus groups with representatives of community leadership (including section chiefs), women, and youth.

Interviews and FGDs were used to collect qualitative data on the topics covered by surveys – namely: household incomes and livelihoods, food security, perceptions of social tensions and trust, etc. – to understand the underlying causal and explanatory factors affecting them. In addition, qualitative research was to used profile presence and membership of key local structures (CDC, MSP, GRCs, etc.), as well as to profile their activities as they relates to communities local conflict and peacebuliding issues. There were a total of 47 key informant interviews and FGDs carried out as part of the evaluation with a total of 263 participants. All qualitative methods were semi-structured – using: open-ended questions and change case studies – that allowed for follow-up questions in order to develop deep descriptions of community dynamics. This approach allowed qualitative research to be tailored to the knowledge of each participant group, which might not be possible with a rigid format. For focus groups, convenience samples were stratified to ensure heterogeneity of persons sampled. For instance, sex composition was considered so that, as much as possible, representation of both males and females in qualitative data collection. Discussions were generally made up of 6-8 persons and those included as participants were chosen according to a combination of convenience and maximum variation[[21]](#footnote-21) sampling.

## Data Collection, Analysis, and Reporting

In all its activities, the evaluation team followed closely the *United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards[[22]](#footnote-22)* and *Ethical Guidelines[[23]](#footnote-23)* in selecting interviewees, in interacting with them, and in respecting their rights. Quantitative data collection was carried out by sixteen research assistants in the various project communities. Research assistants were trained on the survey objectives and methodology, and were provided technical training on tablets. They also took part in pre-testing activities prior to research. Survey data was captured through tablet devices, after which it was cleaned to check for and eliminate inconsistencies using a number of techniques, including: checks for logic/sequencing and outliers, prevalence of non-response, high error rates, etc. Analysis was conducted using statistical software – SPSS – to produce statistics that are understandable and useful and could serve as broad an audience as possible. Stats were also disaggregated to generate statistics for particular chiefdoms and groups like women and youth, where necessary. Data was compared to that collected during the baseline study in order to understand the extent to which the project activities were successful in meeting outcome and output indicators.

Qualitative research was carried out by the lead research consultant, with the help of a research assistant for the purposes of translation and facilitation logistics on-the-ground. The resultant data was captured through a combination of notetaking and digital recording. Notes were compiled and analysed throughout the research process, while digital recordings were analysed when research is completed, determining continuities and discontinuities in qualitative data in a way that complemented and extended quantitative aspects of the research. Analysis of qualitative data was undertaken through content analysis. Analysis of data involved coding of important issues and using these to determine qualitative trends to complement quantitative data, with a focus on generating a set of clear, forward-looking, and actionable recommendations logically linked to the findings, conclusions, and recommendations outlined below. The final endline findings are compiled in this comprehensive report, initial drafts of which were circulated among relevant partners for feedback. Their recommendations were duly considered and incorporated into analysis and reporting and the final draft of this report.

## Limitations

Overall, the endline was implemented well and faced few challenges and limitations. Those that were faced are noted below here, and should be taken into account when considering the assessment findings. Firstly, a minor methodological limitation is that the research lacks a control group to compare to the treatment group of programme participants. As a result, the study produces measures of change, rather than ‘attributable change’ or ‘impact.’ This means that changes measured in this evaluation do not directly control for external factors, such as cultural and social variables. That being said, every possible effort was made – for example, through interviews and FGDs – to determine if factors external to the project are playing a role in changes to project indicators. A second limitation is that project communities had not been selected at the time of the baseline, not all of the communities included in the baseline where used for the evaluation. Some were exchanged to ensure that only project communities would be surveyed at the time of the endline, which meant that there was not a direct comparison between the two survey points in terms of the communities included. While this does limit the comparability of data between the baseline and endline surveys, findings can still be considered sufficiently representative in order to inform project indicators. Another limitation of the endline was that the IRF did not set targets for indicators, making it difficult to say for certain whether these had been met. Instead analysis this report relied on making comparisons between baseline and endline indicators to determine progress based on changes between the two surveys.

# Findings

This section presents the main findings of the endline evaluation. It details analysis carried out to assess the six OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability.

## Relevance

**Key Finding 1: The evaluation found that the project was largely relevant to the institutional and country context it was implemented in. It was aligned with key government priorities and policies promoting sustainable economic development, better governance, and more equitable distribution of natural resources as a route towards building peace in project chiefdoms.** Importantly, the project contributed to *Sierra Leone’s Medium-term National Development Plan (MTNDP) 2019-2023* under Goal 3: a society that is peaceful, cohesive, secure, and just[[24]](#footnote-24). Further, the *MTNDP* prioritises private sector led development as a key government strategy to generate economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction. Sierra Leone’s *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* found that consolidating peace and security is essential if the country is to attract the kind of investment necessary to break cycles of poverty[[25]](#footnote-25). Sierra Leone is one of the world’s least developed countries, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.438, and ranks 181st out of 188 nations according to this indicator[[26]](#footnote-26). Given that agriculture is still the backbone of the Sierra Leonean economy, and is responsible for some 54 per cent of total employment in the country[[27]](#footnote-27), supporting this key sector is vital to national and sub-national economic development. What is more, support given to farmers through the project is being implemented in accordance with two priority areas that are central to the mandate of the MOA: rice intensification (first cropping) and diversification (second cropping of vegetables and other crops)[[28]](#footnote-28). Therefore, the project was relevant in supporting the priorities the GoSL has set out in terms of its agricultural economic development. Improving livelihoods can also help address development concerns underlying social tension and conflict. Without oversimplifying and complex topic or stigmatising already marginal youth[[29]](#footnote-29) or exaggerating the potential for a return to civil war[[30]](#footnote-30), it is important to note the links that have been made between lack of economic opportunity and conflict in Sierra Leone[[31]](#footnote-31), with research indicating that the continued lack of sustainable livelihoods amongst youth remains a threat to peacebuilding[[32]](#footnote-32).

Economic development has a positive bi-directional relationship with conflict prevention: just as poverty reduction is essential to peacebuilding, peace also underpins growth. On the other hand, poverty can make nations more prone conflict, which in turn weakens governance and economic performance and further increasing the risk of more violence[[33]](#footnote-33). However, efforts to accelerate growth without attentiveness to how economic benefits and risks are distributed have been noted as a source of instability in Sierra Leone[[34]](#footnote-34), as was the case in the areas of the country the project is focusing on. Concession companies working in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts occupy a considerable share of available arable land, leaving vulnerable farming households deprived of access to their primary livelihoods – agriculture. In response, some communities resorted to violence to express their dissatisfaction and seek for redress. For instance, conflict erupted in Malen Chiefdom between local landowners, chiefdom authorities, and the Socfin[[35]](#footnote-35). As the violence escalated, two people were killed and one policeman was injured[[36]](#footnote-36). The *Report of The Technical Committee on The Malen Chiefdom Land Dispute in Pujehun District* indicated development funds funnelled through the community structures controlled by the Paramount Chief have yield little in terms of tangible benefits for chiefdom communities[[37]](#footnote-37). The report went so far as to label the GRC “dysfunctional” and calls for its replacement[[38]](#footnote-38).

In Moyamba District, strike actions in 2018 by Sierra Rutile staff also commonly stopped work, and also sometimes turn violent[[39]](#footnote-39). Researchers studying protest violence have theorised that unrest of this type is a response to processes of “differentiated citizenship”[[40]](#footnote-40) that distributes rights and privileges differentially among formally equal citizens. Marginalised groups can respond by mobilising a type of ‘insurgent citizenship’ around claims that destabilise the differentiated distribution of these rights and privileges, in “struggles over what it means to be a member of the modern state”[[41]](#footnote-41). If community needs remain unmet over time, violent protest becomes a viable means for making claims on an otherwise unresponsive state, as communities use unrest to agitate for a fairer distribution of job opportunities, housing, education, basic services, etc.[[42]](#footnote-42) Creating functional governance mechanisms that can help articulate and resolve the grievances of local populations can help resolve the tensions that underlie such conflicts. Thus, strengthening local governance institutions in project areas was a relevant focus, in an attempt to work with companies to create conditions for a better corporate response to community needs. Indeed, this dovetails revisions to the way resources are managed under the draft *Mining and Minerals Development Act*[[43]](#footnote-43), which aims to serve as a regulatory and governance tool of the extractive industry to help ensure it accrues benefits to the people of Sierra Leone.

In support of more inclusive and sustainable economic growth and more meaningful development opportunities for communities in concession areas, the project focused giving voice to marginalised groups like youth and women; the HDI of females is particularly low in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leonean females have a HDI of 0.392 compared to 0.451 for males[[44]](#footnote-44)), justifying a particular focus on improving the prospects of this marginalised group. HDI statistics for youth are not available, but there is other data to show the relevance of focusing development efforts on this group. For instance, structural unemployment among youth is estimated at 60 per cent, and Sierra Leone has among the fastest growing numbers of young workers living on less than USD 1.00 per day[[45]](#footnote-45). Although the risk that youth may return to arms in response to the persistence of poverty is overblown exaggerated, high youth unemployment and local resource-based grievances do make them vulnerable to exploitation for political violence[[46]](#footnote-46). Thus, increasing youth employment, and addressing some of Sierra Leone’s other remaining peacebuilding priorities like corruption, unity and cohesion, and natural resource management[[47]](#footnote-47), can help add to overall national stability.

Efforts under this project also directly contributed to improved food security among beneficiary populations. Sierra Leone has been identified for its “serious” levels of hunger and under-nutrition according to the 2021 Global Hunger Index[[48]](#footnote-48). The *State of Food Insecurity in Sierra Leone 2020* report showed that over 900,000 of Sierra Leoneans are severely food insecure and over 3,700,000 are moderately food insecure, without access to a sufficient amount of safe and nutritious food[[49]](#footnote-49). The report also indicates that Moyamba and Pujehun are among the most food insecure districts. Food insecurity have the potential to exacerbate the simmering tensions between concession companies and communities escalated into conflict and conflict in turn can create greater food insecurity[[50]](#footnote-50). Livelihood and income outcomes under the PBF project therefore contributed to a peace dividend, as well as supporting the increased food security and improved livelihoods of disenfranchised farmers in concession areas. Improved livelihoods, incomes, and food security, along with better governance, transparency, and accountability from private sector actors were well integrated as relevant model for joint programming that aimed to reduce social tensions in project areas.

## Coherence

**Key Finding 2: The intervention is externally coherent and compatible with other peacebuilding interventions in project areas. As well, it successfully created internal coherence with other interventions being undertaken by WFP, UNDP, and other agencies to contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Agenda.** Although there were issues around its coordination (as discussed below), the project model and joint programming approach where designed to create coherent programmatic connections along the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus[[51]](#footnote-51). It focused on the inter-linkages between development and peace based on an understanding that development cannot come about in the absence of peace and that equitable sustainable development undergirds any peacebuilding process[[52]](#footnote-52). Both peace and development are in their own ways dependent on addressing the root causes and drivers of crises, violent conflicts, and fragility. In addition, the project is coherently aligned with the global development efforts set by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The most directly applicable Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under the 2030 Agenda is Goal 16, which calls for the creation of just, peaceful, and inclusive societies; under this goal, the PBF project especially contributes to: Target 16.1 (significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere), Target 16.3 (promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all), Target 16.5 (substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms), Target 16.6 (develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels), and Target 16.7 (ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels). Other SDGs the project adds to are Goals: 2, 5, 8, and 17[[53]](#footnote-53). Pursing pro-poor growth by improving the livelihoods of the most disadvantaged populations – the project targeted the most food insecure communities in the chiefdoms it worked in – is aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Agenda’s objective to ‘leave no one behind’[[54]](#footnote-54). Further, the project also aligned coherently with priorities under Sierra Leone’s United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), which defines how collective efforts undertaken by the UN Development System in Sierra Leone can support progress towards the achievement of the SDGs in 2020-2023 and important national goals laid out earlier. Under this framework, the intervention connects to strategic and mutually reinforcing priority areas of: sustainable agriculture, food, and nutritional security; transformational governance; and protection and empowerment of the most vulnerable[[55]](#footnote-55),[[56]](#footnote-56).

In addition, WFP received catalytic funding to scale-up livelihood support under the PBF project, targeting an 29 communities with inland valley swamp (IVS) development, in addition to the 31 communities supported initially. Extra funding was also used to empower eight Mother Support Groups to establish poultry rearing enterprises to produce eggs, economically empower women and contributes to affordable and increased consumption of eggs thus improving maternal and childhood nutrition. As well, catalytic funding empowered twenty farmer based organisations – ten in each district – a with trainings and establishment of village savings and loans schemes, demonstrating the potential of improved economic and income generation and flow in poor rural communities and avert request and utilisation of accumulating distress loans during the lean season. Sixty male youths and women were trained on improved Technical Rice Production Package in coordination with MOA and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

While efforts to create market linkages for the sale of surplus rice from beneficiary communities to concession area companies did not yield sufficient interest from the private sector actors, the project was coherently linked other WFP interventions, creating market opportunities for agricultural outputs. For instance, Governments of Japan and Ireland are also providing market access to supported communities to sell their harvest surplus, which will be distributed under the National School Feeding Programme. Importantly, in Pujehun District market linkages connected farmers to WFP home-grown school feeding (HGSF) pilot projects. Creating these linkages helped bring rice and vegetables to market, in a way that generated inter-linkages and synergies between the projects and the HGSF intervention being carried out by WFP in partnership with the GoSL. Linking farmers to local procurement opportunities in this way supported smallholder farmers in selling their surplus crops at competitive prices, thus bolstering their income, reducing vulnerability, and increasing resilience. Channelling agricultural products into school feeding creates connections between local farmers and local market opportunities to increase household income and support rural development. It is in line with the GoSL’s efforts shift from a school feeding model that relies on a largely import-based approach to one that increasingly sources home-grown commodities produced by smallholders in rural communities[[57]](#footnote-57).

The project is coherent with UNDP’s global focus on poverty and inequality, gender equality, environment, resilience, and governance[[58]](#footnote-58), and its focus in Sierra Leone on inclusive democratic governance, sustainability, and inclusive local economic development, and gender equality and women's empowerment[[59]](#footnote-59). Programming for this project builds on UNDPs expertise in these areas, leverages it experience and capacities in implementing interventions around the project themes. It does so in a way that is consistent with the peacebuilding interventions with other actors in the same context, adding value while avoiding duplication of efforts with projects being undertaken by groups like Caritas and Cordaid. Further, the project bolsters inclusive growth by promoting uptake of SLEITI and VGGT initiatives that encourage the meaningful economic opportunities in project communities, helping to address problems of weak governance of tenure and the growing pressure on natural resources and land. In terms of SLEITI, it is being administered by the Sierra Leone Multi-Stakeholder Group that is hosted by the VPO and chaired by the Minister of State. As well, through its participation in the project, the VPO gained insight into key policy gaps around the extractive sector that could be addressed through the upcoming *Mining and Minerals Development Act*.

## Effectiveness

**Key Finding 3: The project achieved a number of key successes: strengthening local institutions, completing and validating the *Land Degradation Assessment Report*, developing swampland in sixty communities and supporting farmers with training and market linkages.** This outlines those and other achievements in greater detail, noting those activities that were not completed or were amended and then providing an overview of challenges that occurred through the course of implementation.

### Key Project Achievements

In pursuit of Outcome 1, the project supported communities by creating more accountable institutions and mechanisms to promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies. Key achievements under this outcome came under Output 1.1, which sought to make land acquisition and land use processes are more inclusive and aligned with policy frameworks, and Output 1.2, which aimed strengthening institutions and infrastructure for mediation and dialogue to manage conflicts within and between communities and companies. Although the validation of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report* was considerably delayed, which limited its usefulness during the project, the assessment was eventually completed and validated under Activity 1.1.1. The assessment might serve as resource for government and other stakeholders to determine the impact of extractive industries on the availability and quality of arable land for community farmers. In addition, under Activity 1.1.2, awareness raising was conducted for two hundred community stakeholders on land rights, regulatory frameworks, and land acquisition processes through direct consultations, while fourteen community radios discussions in Moyamba and Pujehun Districts where used as educational tools on land acquisition and conflict prevention. Efforts under Activity 1.2.4 also resulted in community trainings and dialogues around conflict resolution, and in particular worked to strengthen the capacities of women groups to engage in community decision-making.

Perhaps the central achievement of the project under Outcome 1 was the work it did to strengthen various local organisations and institutions. One example of this is the support given to grievance redress mechanisms in the various project chiefdoms under Activity 1.2.1. At the time of the baseline for the project, GRCs were not active at all in Upper and Lower Banta Chiefdoms. Therefore, organising and capacitating GRCs in Moyamba was a laudable achievement. While there were groups working on grievance redress in Pujehun District, the project succeeded in strengthening these further. The GRCs in both districts handled some 78 cases on a diverse range of issues that affected individuals and communities; these included: disputes on land, use of community resources, leadership and exclusion, company working conditions, COVID-19 related issues, insecurity, land degradation, marital issues, etc. An estimated 26 disputes were reported as being successfully resolved with the help of the GRCs. Another local group targeted by the project was the district level MSP. Activity 1.2.3 provided supported for MSPs, and was another particularly important successes in this project. MSPs were largely not functioning when this project commenced. For instance, in Moyamba District the MSPs were inactive, while the Pujehun MSP was inconsistent in its activities and unclear about its mission. Therefore, a key project success was building MSP capacities, helping ensure that each was established and had representative membership, as well as a mandate and objectives. As well, through Activity 1.3.2, one hundred members of the LPPBs and SLP were given training in human rights, conflict resolution, and other topics.

Looking now at Outcome 2, the project aimed to reduce social tensions by enhancing sustainable livelihoods and food security. The key programming achievement in this regard was through Output 2.1, and in particular Activity 2.1.2, through which support was provided to communities to establish agricultural livelihoods. The project initially targeted 31 communities (seventeen in Moyamba and fourteen in Pujehun) with support for livelihood activities, later adding another 29 communities (fourteen in Moyamba and fifteen in Pujehun) to bring the total number supported to sixty communities across the two districts. To improve agricultural livelihoods at the community level, the project worked to increase the production of rice and other agricultural commodities by starting production in unproductive swamplands, improving physical infrastructures for rice production in the targeted areas through food for assets (FFA) schemes and reinforcing the capacities of target groups, especially women famers, for maintaining rehabilitated swamplands. IVS participants received conditionalFFA in the form of cash-based transfers[[60]](#footnote-60) to incentivise their participation. A total of 500 hectares of IVS was developed through the project (262 hectares of IVS developed in 2020 and 238 hectares in 2021).

In the 31 communities originally targeted through the project, 1,857 farmers were trained as part of farmer based organisations (FBOs) in: improved cropping techniques, water management practices, and post-harvest techniques for rice production, as well as for other agricultural crops. The sex-disaggregated breakdown was 1,269 males and 588 females[[61]](#footnote-61). Later, another 1,848 farmers, made up of 1,179 males and 669 females[[62]](#footnote-62), were added in the 29 communities supported through catalytic funding. The total for all sixty communities was 3,705 farmers (2,448 males and 1,257 females). Of these, 120 lead farmers (60 male and 60 female) received additional training on post-harvest loss management. An emphasis was placed on empowering female farmers for their inclusion and self-reliance in agricultural activities. In addition to support for rice production, all sites received improved vegetable seeds and corresponding trainings on nutrition sensitive agricultural activities. To backstop all farming activities, 34 high-risk youth trained as community Youth Contractors, offering them training and equipment[[63]](#footnote-63) to technically assist FBOs in their localities. Target groups were also provided support by creating linkages to markets for the sale surplus agricultural goods. As was already mentioned, linkages made to bring agricultural goods to market helped link farmers to local procurement opportunities in this way supported smallholder farmers in selling their surplus crops at competitive prices. WFP used catalytic funding to procure 55 metric tons of locally produced and milled rice in 2021 for its HGSF pilot programme in Pujehun District, later purchasing another 53 metric tons of locally produced rice for HGSF in 2022. In addition, FBOs supplied ten schools in Pujehun with locally grown fresh vegetables, creating more income flows into rural communities.

### Summary of Incomplete/Amended Activities

With a few exceptions, the majority of activities under the outputs outlined in the project IRF were completed (see Annex B for the project IRF with a summary of the project outputs and activities). Activity 1.1.3, Activity 1.1.4, and Activities 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 were not implemented as expected. The following offers a summary of why these activities were not implemented in the way initially intended by the project:

* At the time of the evaluation, Activity 1.1.3 (developing a simplified checklist to guide land acquisition and land use) had been delayed. The partner has committed to finalise it by the end of July 2022, as the activity had already been agreed up and resourced.
* Activity 1.1.4 (promoting lessons learned from the innovative approach of community and private sector partnership) had not been achieved as intended. The activity was revised before initiation based on the advice of RCO and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) due to delays in implementation. Because this activity was delayed, its implementation coincided with the commissioning of this endline project evaluation. Given the similarities between Activity 1.1.4 and the evaluation, funds allocated to the activity were reallocated to be utilised for the publication of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report* (Activity 1.1.1).
* Due to circumstances on the ground, Activities 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 (support communities to diversify and increase their livelihood opportunities) was not pursued through the project. As a result the project also did not aim to achieve Outcome Indicator 2 (b) (percentage of targeted community members who report establishing an alternative, non-agricultural livelihood) or Output Indicator 2.1.3 (percentage of targeted community members reporting non-agricultural livelihoods as their primary source of income). The Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions that the project expected to access were not sufficiently operational to be leveraged by the project to adequately engage in alternate livelihood activities. For instance, the From Mines to Minds project, which was meant to support demand-oriented skills development in Sierra Leone, phased down due to lack of funding, while the Malen Vocational Institutes were not readily accessible to provide entrepreneurship skills to targeted beneficiaries. Funds that had been earmarked for alternative livelihoods activities were reallocated to double down on support for agricultural livelihoods activities under Activity 2.1.2.

### Implementation Challenges

In addition to the activities outlined what follows is a discussion of other areas where the project experienced challenges during implementation. Acknowledging the many successes realised throughout the course of the project, as evidence by the fact that the vast majority of activities were implemented as expected, the focus of this section is on challenges. The rational for this is that these offer the best possibility for learning. Key challenges experienced throughout the project are outlined below.

#### Implementation Challenges Due to COVID-19 Pandemic

Delays caused due to the COVID-19 pandemic were a key reason why project was extended. Both Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 required the bringing together of key project stakeholders and beneficiaries, which was made difficult by pandemic prevention measures applied by the GoSL: restriction of movements, imposition of curfews, and limits on public gatherings. Activities under For instance, Outcome 1 was based on collective work through community discussions and stakeholder meetings. Seasonal time-bound farming activities were also delayed, as agricultural group work in Sierra Leone was strongly discouraged in order to break the transmission of COVID-19. Importantly, restrictions occurred at the beginning of the seasonal farming calendar, which impeded WFP’s ability to get into the field to support the project. But with support from MOA and Youth Contractors, project activities were ultimately implemented successfully. On the basis of the above, the project proposed and received a six-month no-cost Extension to allow completion of outstanding activities.

#### Challenges with Project Coordination

**Key Finding 4: Project coordination proved challenging and needs to be improved for joint interventions undertaken in the future.** Both UNDP and WFP largely worked with different categories of beneficiaries, and beneficiaries often spoke about the agencies (as well as implementing partners) and the outcomes of the project separately, giving off the impression of two individual interventions rather than a properly integrated project. There are a number of reasons for this. For one, implementation of alternative livelihoods activities is seasonal and very time-bound, in a way that does necessarily apply to the other aspects of the project. Agencies also have unique organisational and administrative procedures and rules, governing programming areas such a fund disbursement. Coordinating and aligning these also created delays in the project. Moreover, coordination challenges emerged because the Project Coordinator was in a role that was not dedicated to the project, but was working on other issues. One of those was the emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which required considerable attention as the project was commencing. Joint meetings – both through the Steering Committee and outside of it – were used to improve project coordination at its halfway point, with key implementing partners met to devise strategies around improving joint implementation. However, not enough was done from the outset to identify and plan for the integration of activities and the identification of synergies. Then during the lifecycle of the project joint activities – especially joint monitoring – were not properly prioritised and pursued.

#### Turnover at UNDP

Considerable turnover at UNDP created challenges in terms of sustaining momentum of project activities. Perhaps most importantly, the project saw three different Technical Specialists. There was also significant turnover at the leadership levels of the agency, which presented further challenges to project continuity. Because of high attrition of project staff within UNDP, the coordination and monitoring of project activities were also limited. There were only three monitoring reports for the project. Available monitoring reports at UNDP themselves noted a lack of concrete institutional memory (reports, documents) of the implementation of the project within the office. Partly due to a dearth of project monitoring by UNDP, reporting on the project was not systemically done, and files and documentation that could have helped smooth the transitions between Technical Specialists at the agency were limited. It should be noted that the role of the ORC Peace and Development Adviser helped provide high-level support, project memory, and continuity throughout the lifecycle of the project. This is a good example of how good integration of different UN entities into different areas of the project can provide institutional and implementation support across functions and outcomes. Building on this, better coordination between UNDP and WFP and more joint monitoring could have offered additional safeguards against personnel changes, because programming knowledge would have been better distributed across agencies.

#### Financial Delays

As will be discussed in greater detail below in the section on efficiency, activities under Outcome 1 were delayed up to nine months because the second tranche payment was not made available in time to start activities. Payment delays were also noted under Outcome 2. Some of the payment challenges were due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, which made movement to communities difficult and put the project behind schedule. Delays in disbursement of cash-based transfers by WFP to participating farmers impeded work cohesion, derailed group dynamics, and made it more difficult for FBOs to complete their work efficiently.

#### Challenges with District and Chiefdom Platforms

**Key Finding 5: Although the project successfully established the GRCs, MSPs, and worked with youths, women and CDCs, there were a number of implementation challenges related to: delays in implementation, reports of infrequent meeting, perceived lack of impartiality, and insufficient capacity and self-sufficiency.** To begin with, activities of the MSPs commenced relatively late in the project cycle. The project’s first MSP meeting took place in early August 2020 in Pujehun, bringing out pertinent issues in the targeted chiefdoms. Only two MSP meetings had been held in 2021, one in Moyamba and one ever in Pujehun as opposed to the quarterly plan proposed in the IRF. There are indications that the frequency of MSP meetings increased later in the project. For instance, a key informant in the Pujehun District suggested that “the MSP meets every month for the entire district, and is working hard to solve issues in the communities”. Unfortunately, this could not be verified because notes and minutes of MSP meetings were not routinely kept.

UNDP monitoring reports also suggested that GRCs were not meeting sufficiently often throughout the project and that these were not structured well, and that minutes of the GRC meetings were not available[[64]](#footnote-64). In general meeting minutes were not available throughout the evaluation, but GRC structures reported meeting monthly throughout the project. Further, as will be explained in greater detail in Section 4.4.3, GRCs and CDCs in Malen Chiefdom, were not perceived as being transparent and accountable to communities. Again, monitoring from UNDP noted the same, indicating that “Many representatives of the GRC in Malen seem to be workers at the Socfin company and therefore represented the interest of the company more than the community people and landowners. There is need to review the membership of the GRCs especially if the same trend occurs in the other chiefdoms”[[65]](#footnote-65). The evaluation did not find that the same concerns about transparency and accountability were raised about CDCs and GRCs in other chiefdoms.

The evaluation did find, however, that there was not always a clear understanding among members of those platforms regarding their mission and focus. Members of CDCs, for instance, suggested that their organisation was primarily concerned with the redress of grievances, rather than with the disbursement of development funds in a fair, accountable, and transparent manner. Members of GRCs were much clearer about their roles, with most understanding that their remit was the redress of grievances. However, qualitative research also indicated that community dialogues around peacebuilding that were facilitated through Fambul Tok and GRCs covered with a range of grievances, many of which had little to do with high level peace issues. Grievances addressed through these forums ranged from land disputes and disputes between communities and companies, to the dynamics of interpersonal domestic relationships between a husband and wife and awareness raising about the need to send children to school and to health facilities when they are sick. As one focus group participant stated. There is no doubt that development is related to the peace agenda. Still, issues related to health, education, and domestic relations seem to be considerably outside of the parameters of the project. Taking into account the limited resources of GRCs, the project implementing would have done better to concentrate more specifically on issues that promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies, rather than other concerns outside this agenda.

#### Delays in Validation of the Land Degradation Assessment Report

The *Land Degradation Assessment Report* was an important deliverable of the project. The land conflict degradation assessments conducted by Sierra Leone Agricultural Research Institute in the targeted chiefdoms had been completed by February 2021. However, a validation meeting with the participation of the government and national stakeholders, as well as with private sector, was not completed until approximately a year later. The validation of the land degradation report validation was supposed to occur in 2021 and was supposed to inform aspects of the project. At this point it can only serve as a reference document for other activities carried out by government or development partners. As such, the project has no control over if and how the report will be utilised.

#### Need for Better Sensitisation around Project Areas

**Key Finding 6: Interactions with stakeholders from non-project communities suggested that they were often did not possess a clear overall understanding of how project communities for livelihood activities were chosen.** On a number of occasions local leaders, farmers, or other representatives from non-project communities expressed frustration that their own areas were excluded from the project, even though they to fell within the concession area. Each time they advocated for the project to be expanded to their areas as well, based on the assumption that lobbying a project representative could help them in this regard. Otherwise key informants and focus group discussants would ask if the project could fund the construction of schools, health facilities, roads, and other development efforts far outside its scope. In one instance, a member of a community in Upper Banta visited a FGD location – after learning that the evaluation team would be there – to make the case that project funds be allocated to support farmers in his community too. According to the man, “in our community we blame our councillors for being with WFP when they come into the communities. Because they are always with WFP, so we think that these people are choosing which communities get development”. Only after receiving a clear explanation that development funds are finite in their amount, firmly fixed in their scope, and targeted based on pre-defined vulnerability criteria did he leave. Frustration with lack of development outcomes is fuelled by the perception that the distribution of resources is biased. Development projects such as this one must understand this, and better integrate it into their programming model – in particular when it comes to sensitising local populations about project activities and their rationale.

## Impact

This section presents quantitative and qualitative data relevant to project outcomes and their associated indicators. Analysis focuses on indicators and means of verification detailed in the project IRF, but also includes other quantitative and qualitative data deemed pertinent to the outcomes outlined in the IRF. It should be noted that the IRF for the most part did not sent targets for these indicators, and therefore analysis in this section looks at change against baseline data as an indication of project progress.

### Level of Perceptions that Companies Respond to The Needs of Communities

This section looks at Outcome Indicator 1 (a), which seeks to measure levels level of perceptions in all chiefdoms that believe that companies in their area respond (sometimes or always) to the needs of communities. **Key Finding 7:** Figure 2 **indicates that endline respondents than baseline respondents said that concession companies in their area sometimes or always respond to the needs of communities; at the endline 35.1 per cent of respondents said this, compared to 40.3 per cent at the baseline.** Sex- and age-disaggregated measures show that these beliefs are consistent across different groups. Looking at respondents’ perceptions of individual companies, those surveyed for the endline were more likely to say that Sierra Rutile (80.7 per cent) and Vimetco (78 per cent) never respond to the needs of people in communities in or around their concession areas, compared to 57.4 per cent and 43.7 per cent who said this about Natural Habitats and Sierra Rutile, respectively.

Figure 2: Perception that Companies Responds to The Needs of Communities

The greater overall perceptions that companies do not respond to the needs of communities may represent either a real-world indication that companies did become less responsive to the needs of communities. However, there was no evidence found during the evaluation to suggest this; put differently, there is no indication that companies were less responsive to communities, though there is also little evidence to suggest they were much or any more responsive. More likely, the findings are indicative of a greater awareness among respondents about the rights that community members hold relative to companies. Qualitative research did reveal that beneficiaries held a greater knowledge of their rights relative to the corporations operating in their communities. Therefore, there is a very real possibility that the PBF project raised expectations amongst community people in a way that companies were unable to deliver on. It is important to note that qualitative research carried out in the different project chiefdoms suggested that though social tensions and conflict were being reduced (as discussed in more detail below) most of the grievances that existed at the time of the baseline remained unresolved. As at the time of the baseline, participants indicated that the quantity and quality of employment created by companies was insufficient to make up for lost agricultural livelihoods. While a small percentage of people from each community are generally employed by companies, this usually this amounts to 10-20 people in a community of hundreds people. Their employment is concentrated in unskilled, temporary contract work. Other important problems identified through endline research included: land left unproductive and unused under lease agreement, lack of (or inadequate) community development, insufficient transparency in how development decisions are undertaken, tension between communities and traditional authorities in certain chiefdoms, co-opting of security forces for by companies, etc.

The study also considered other measures of how companies are perceived by the communities in their concession areas. For example, surveys inquired about the levels of community trust that respondents had for Socfin, Natural Habitats, Sierra Rutile, and Vimetco. As per Figure 3 we see that the endline survey also showed that the trust that people have in companies is still generally low. There were some interesting changes to note between the baseline and endline though. For example, somewhat more endline respondents (49.6 per cent) than baseline respondents (46.6 per cent) said that trust between companies and communities is very low. At the same time, more endline respondents also said that trust is very high (5.9 per cent at the endline compared to 0.6 per cent at the baseline) and more respondents at the endline than baseline also said that trust is somewhat high (16.8 at the endline and 10.1 per cent at the baseline). This data shows increasing polarisation in terms of those respondents than trust concession companies and those that do not. Again, disaggregating data across sex and age indicates that trust for companies is low across demographic groups.

Figure 3: Community Trust for Companies in Concession Areas

The measures presented above gauging company-community relations indicate low levels of community trust of companies and the perception that companies do not respond to communities needs. That this is still the case no doubt reflects the fact that PBF programming activities began amid acrimonious relations between communities and companies. As during the baseline, qualitative research indicated that decisions about development are usually made in ways that are not participatory and via processes that are not well understood by community members. Where development does occur, community members accept it – in the form of funding for: wells, court *barrays*, schools, etc. – even if it is not wholly participatory or transparent, reasoning that any benefits are better than none. That similar issues were identified in during baseline research suggests that the situation on the ground remains for the most part unchanged when it comes to the responsiveness of companies to the needs of communities they operate in.

**Key Finding 8: The key benefit of platforms such as the MSP and GRC was that they provided a space for dialogue. As was suggested in a key informant interview with Fambul Tok staff, “it is important that tensions have come down and people now can talk to each other. But most of the successes [from the project] have been symbolic. But there is much work remaining to make the companies more accountable”.** Many other stakeholders shared this feeling, with one GRC member saying also that “before people did not know how to address issues together. Now there is more dialogue and less fighting.” The reduction of tensions is undoubtedly an important project success. But outcome one specifies that “Communities in Pujehun and Moyamba districts benefit from more accountable institutions and mechanisms” as a way of promoting peace. Such accountability necessarily requires redistributive action on the part of private sector companies that benefits communities and community members equally. The *PBF Project Document* for this intervention acknowledges as much, saying that “the project will institute a more systematic and structured approach to selecting community initiatives to ensure that impact is maximised and benefits are shared across communities, and not only by a select few” [[66]](#footnote-66). The implication is that peacebuilding requires more than simply the absence of direct violence, it requires a ‘positive peace’ that is built upon the absence of the indirect and structural forms violence stemming from poverty, insecurity, poor governance, unequal resource distribution, lack of services, etc.[[67]](#footnote-67) Peacebuilding must be action-oriented, redistributing the benefits of development and the power to influence development decisions through mechanisms that hold companies more accountable and make them more responsive to the needs of communities.

**Key Finding 9: However, qualitative research indicated that consultation between communities and companies often has insufficient follow-up in terms of actions taken by companies. Communities regularly bring forward issues and grievances to companies, but corporations are considered to be largely unresponsive to such requests[[68]](#footnote-68).** When companies set up community dialogues and meetings, which are meant to improve communications and relations between these groups, such meetings and dialogues are essentially an airing of grievances to which there is generally little company response. Perhaps the best indication of this dynamic is the construction of inadequate drainage systems by Vimetco in Lower Banta has created considerable problems with flooding in IVSs in a number of project communities. Rather than building appropriate culverts the company has used plastic pipes. These pipes are too small to allow regular water flow, impeding regular water flow and affecting proper irrigation processes. The result was that all IVS sites[[69]](#footnote-69) with culvert structures at the entry of the swamps regularly experienced waterlogged IVS plots with stagnant water. Vimetco was informed about the problem and government partners at MOA and OVP were also notified without any movement on the issue. The company does not deem the repair of the culverts a priority, and pays no attention to the devastating impact the poorly constructed culverts have on the major livelihood sources of the affected communities. That an issue with such wide-ranging and such serious effects on project communities was not resolved, even with the intervention of key government partners, indicates the extent of progress needs to be made in order to make companies more responsive and accountable to beneficiary communities.

From the perspective of companies in concession areas, there can be considerable confusion regarding the obligations that companies have to constituencies in and around their concession. Company representatives indicated that the project was helpful in educating communities about what companies are and are not responsible for when it comes to their corporate social responsibility. The specifics of such obligations are not always well understood by community residents who tend voice frustrations with companies about lack of development, irrespective of whether the areas of development they requesting are the responsibility of the company. Private actors are large and visible actors with considerable power in the chiefdoms they are operating in. So it is unsurprising that they would become targets for community frustration. One company representative said, “people will try their luck and community meetings and the different groups helped sensitisation about what communities can expect, and whose responsibility it is what”. Said another, “the platforms created to better inform the people whose responsibility it is to do different things, like roads, which is the government responsibility. Like this, the people would have been more pacified… So there was good communication and exchange”. Although the project focus was rightfully on articulating community rights, and holding companies to their development responsibilities, it also helped manage the inaccurate expectations of communities that sometimes lead to the frustrations that underpinned social tension and conflict.

### Level of Trust Between Communities and Community Development Committees

Outcome Indicator 1 (b) considers levels of collaboration between communities and CDCs. All project chiefdoms had active CDCs as the time of the baseline. At the time of the endline this was still the case. During the endline survey 52.9 per cent and 43.1 per cent of respondents said they had heard of CDCs and CDFs, respectively. About one-in-nine of those that said they had heard of CDCs and CDFs were able to accurately explain what they are[[70]](#footnote-70), illustrating a generally low level of awareness among community members about both the CDC and CDFs. Further, those that do know of these structures often do not trust them to work in the benefit of community people. Table 3 indicates that respondents were not likely to agree that the CDC represents all interests equally or that it can be trusted. As well, most did not agree that CDFs benefit all people equally or that all people have a say in how CDFs are used. Perceptions of the CDC and CDFs showed very little change between the baseline and the endline, other than perceptions of trust between the CDC and community members, which increased from 30.3 per cent to 38.7 per cent.

Distrust of these platforms is the result of long-term dynamics and long-standing tensions, which have periodically spilled over to conflict in some areas[[71]](#footnote-71). Therefore, it is perhaps somewhat understandable that such distrust continued throughout project implementation. **Key Finding 10: Changing relationships between social actors and improving trust between them is a lengthy undertaking and needs a programming model allows for a significant investment in time and energy to develop community structures, conduct capacity building, and effectively allow intuitions to work to influence company activities. A two-year project, especially with delays caused as a result of funding issues and a global pandemic, will be very hard-pressed to enact the type of transformative social change required to resolve deeply embedded mistrust between communities and institutions that had not always worked in their best interest.** As a key informant from UNDP said, “the design of the project was good, but there was a lot to be included for a very short period of time. Will be able to say that we have implemented all the outputs. It is not certain we can see if there are any impacts from what we have done [before the project ends]”. Even the livelihoods component is in essence social and behavioural change intervention that requires time for farmers to shift away from upland farming by development swaps, to learn and hone technical skills, to form into FBOs, to build social cohesion, and to see the benefits of higher yields in a way that makes the project more likely to be sustainable.

Table 3: Perceptions of The Community Development Committee/Funds

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| The CDC represents the best interests of everybody in this area… | | |
| *Disagree\** | 44.4% | 44.4% |
| *Agree\*\** | 47.3% | 45.1% |
| The level of trust between people in this area and the CDC is… | | |
| *Low\*\*\** | 52.4% | 50.8% |
| *High\*\*\*\** | 30.3% | 38.7% |
| The CDFs benefit all the people in this area equally … | | |
| *Disagree\** | 57.2% | 59% |
| *Agree\*\** | 37.3% | 36.9% |
| All people in this area have a say in how CDFs are used … | | |
| *Disagree\** | 65.5% | 68.5% |
| *Agree\*\** | 29.8% | 28.1% |
| \* Respondents who somewhat or strongly disagree.  \*\* Respondents who somewhat or strongly agree.  \*\*\* Respondents saying somewhat low or very low  \*\*\*\* Respondents saying somewhat high or very high | | |

Although conflict in both chiefdoms was significantly reduced, modalities around funding disbursements remained key sources of frustration throughout the project. As was reported in an UNDP monitoring report[[72]](#footnote-72), “CDCs in all four Chiefdoms are still saddled with many problems including transparency and accountability. There is also, the persistent perception about the Paramount Chiefs manipulating the appointments of CDC members as well as the management of the CDFs”. Similar issues were also reported during the endline evaluation. It is difficult to say the extent to which CDFs were used more fairly in response to community needs, as the project did not monitor disbursement of these funds. It is important to note that in most chiefdoms development funds have been used for important initiatives like: health facilities, markets, wells, pumps, *barrays*, scholarships, etc. However, there are also serious problems in some places. Most problematically, one billion SLL was reportedly misappropriated from development funds for education activities and other development initiatives in Lower Banta. Stakeholders within this project were made aware of the problem and complaints in the matter have been lodged with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. However, at the time of the evaluation there had been no resolution. Focus group participants noted that tensions around the misuse of development funds persist, including demonstrations held by students and women’s groups. While those tensions have not yet spilled over into conflict, there is a belief among some residents of Lower Banta that civil unrest is a real possibility.

### Level of Trust Between Communities and Grievance Redress Committees

When the baseline study for this project was originally carried out it revealed that project chiefdoms in Pujehun District had functioning GRCs[[73]](#footnote-73), whereas those in Moyamba did not. By the endline, GRCs were functioning in all four chiefdoms the project was operating in. Organising these groups and strengthening their capacities was an important project priority. Despite the good work done to get GRCs active, only 31.6 per cent of endline respondents said they had heard of the GRC. Of this group, 92.6 per cent correctly explained what the GRC does, implying that sensitisation activities had effectively reached for those people who were aware of the GRC. Awareness about the GRCs and other project platforms could have been improved through better integration of project activities. For instance, farmers benefiting from alternate livelihoods activities could have been better sensitised about all structures being implemented through the project. Because many beneficiaries of the livelihoods component of the project were not aware of GRCs, these structures received less community buy-in. Also, the emerging issues and concerns of the FBOs were less likely to be brought to GRCs and other platforms.

Table 4: Perceptions of Grievance Redress Committees

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| The GRC represents the best interests of everybody in this area… | | |
| *Disagree\** | 63.5% | 46.2% |
| *Agree\*\** | 26.9% | 45% |
| The level of trust between people in this area and the GRC is… | | |
| *Low\*\*\** | 69.8% | 51.2% |
| *High\*\*\*\** | 11.9% | 37.7% |
| \* Respondents who somewhat or strongly disagree.  \*\* Respondents who somewhat or strongly agree.  \*\*\* Respondents saying somewhat low or very low  \*\*\*\* Respondents saying somewhat high or very high | | |

**Key Finding 11: While few respondents said they had heard of the GRC, Table 4 indicates that those endline respondents that are aware of the GRC are likely to hold more favourable opinions about it than were baseline respondents. In particular, there was a significant shift in perceptions that the GRC represents the best interests of everybody. At the baseline, only 29.9 per cent of all respondents agreed somewhat or strongly agreed with this, which increased to 45 per cent at the endline. Further, the same table also shows that trust of GRCs has generally improved among those that had heard of it.** More than one-third (37.7 per cent) of endline respondents said that trust between people and the GRC in their area is high, compared to 11.9 per cent that said this at the baseline.

Despite these gains, there are still specific challenges when it comes to the functioning of GRCs. The project was largely implemented in an environment where community members believe that power relations are skewed in favour of companies, and in a context where companies are perceived to not be working towards the needs of communities, as mentioned above. Research participants also noted that companies do not hold the GRCs in high esteem, and therefore do not leverage them for dispute resolution. Some companies have established grievance dispute mechanisms, and rely on those instead. Companies have even refused to meet with project-supported GRCs altogether, insisting that these groups are have no authority. One commonly cited excuse is that GRC members lack identification that officially identifies them as representatives of the community structure. Such identification might make little difference in any case. Representatives for some companies hold the opinion that GRCs do not have legitimate authority because they are not formalised organisations because they lack official missions, visions, structures, etc. As mentioned, where dialogue with companies did occur – whether through GRCs or other forums – it usually led to promises, but little in terms tangible development results. Companies usually respond to community demands only with rhetoric, which is intended to allay discontent in the moment, but has no tangible impact. Dialogue can be an effective avenue for addressing community problems only if is linked to tangible improvements in community development.

Qualitative research also indicated specific concern about the transparency of the GRC in Malen Chiefdom, the membership of which is believed to be largely patronage-based, with its members and decisions-making connected to the Paramount Chief, despite the requirement that these should be impartial. Indeed, many of individuals from Malen that participated in this evaluation study sat on numerous platforms, implying that power is concentrated among them. The endline survey indicated that 31.3 per cent of respondents in Malen agreed (27.1 per cent somewhat agreed and 4.2 per cent strongly agreed) that the GRC represents everybody in their area equally – significantly lower than the 45 per cent average among all respondents. As well, a lower than average proportion of respondents in Malen stated that they trust the GRC. Only 25.6 per cent of all respondents in Malen believe that trust between the GRC in their chiefdom and communities is high (21.3 per cent somewhat high and 4.3 per cent very high), compared to the project average of 37.7 per cent. Moreover, there have been reports of intimidation, harassment, and criminalisation of Malen Affected Land Owners and Users Association (MALOA) members in Malen, with Chiefdom authorities targeting groups protesting the certification of Socfin[[74]](#footnote-74). Indeed, many representatives of the GRC, CDC, and LPPB in Malen who were interviewed for this evaluation held an outwardly antagonistic attitude towards MALOA, insisting the landowners group is largely disruptive entity with little popular support among residents of Malen Chiefdom. These focus group participants instead back a competing landowners group called HOPANDA, which Socfin has also supported with office space, motorbikes, and other supplies.

The evaluation was unable to conduct a full or exact assessment of how much support the two landowners groups have among the population of the chiefdom. While Chiefdom Authorities were adamant that the membership of MALOA is small and diminishing, focus groups with farmers and local leaders indicated that in fact many chiefdom residents are members of MALOA, actively support MALOA, or at the very least perceive the group favourably. Interviews with other key informants also indicated that MALOA is a key actor in the chiefdom with sizeable support. Although chiefdom authorities dispute that MALOA has widespread support[[75]](#footnote-75), the landowners group is still undoubtedly a key actor in the land issues in Malen Chiefdom and therefore should have been included actively included in all peacebuilding activities. That MALOA was largely excluded form participation in project-supported structures and activities works contrary to the likelihood that a long-lasting peace in the chiefdom can only be achieved. Such peace is possible only if all stakeholders are brought to the table in an inclusive and participatory process that attempts to understand and reconcile discord between all parties. This necessarily must include those groups that hold view and positions that are in opposition to each other. This sentiment can be succinctly summarised in the words of one key informant, who stated that: “you do not [after all] make peace with your friends. You make peace with your enemies”.

#### Level of Trust in Multi-stakeholder Platform

**Key Finding 12: Taking into consideration that MSPs were largely not functioning when the project commenced, the PBF project was successful in building MSP capacities, helping ensure that each MSP has an established and representative membership, as well as the capacity it needs to operate towards its mandate and objectives.** As mentioned, there were delays in commencing MSP activities. When MSPs did take place, they considered a number of important issues: social tensions, transparency of CDFs, late payment of surface rents, etc. Further, key informants included in the evaluation indicated that the MSP created a space where companies and various stakeholders could meet to discuss problems in a way that was structured, proactive, and peaceful. The potential of MSPs to promote the application of fairer land practices has already noted in other countries, especially in their ability to play a key role in enabling dialogue between governments, private sector, and civil society[[76]](#footnote-76). This makes the MSP a potentially useful district level mechanism for working on land issues around company-community relations. Within this project, high-level issues that cannot be addressed through GRCs are brought up to the MSP. Qualitative research suggests that the creation of MSPs has created an environment for a broader cross-section of stakeholders to participate in dialogue around resource issues[[77]](#footnote-77). **Key Finding 13: However, key groups were not included in the MSP, undermining its utility as a peacebuilding instrument. Most importantly, Green Scenery was only included in the design stages of the project. But later on the organisation was not actively engaged in the MSP. Given that Green Scenery has valuable experience dealing with land issues in Pujehun District, in general, and in Malen Chiefdom, in particular, their absence from a key project platform is an important omission. Moreover, that they work closely with aggrieved groups in Malen their participation in any peacebuilding process is essential if that process is to be inclusive, impactful, and sustainable.**

#### Level of Trust in Police

The evaluation also gauged people’s perceptions of the SLP, and other policing structures like the LPPB. The table below indicates that the proportion of respondents disagreeing that police can be trust has increased a little from the baseline. The same is true for the proportion of respondents who believe police are working for all people equally. Still, the majority of people believe that SLP are not working for them, but are actually an instrument for government to suppress legitimate expressions of discontent and protest. Peacebuilding defined mostly by the absence of protest violence is superficial, and requires the changing the conditions and relationships that underpin those protests to become sustainable. Interviews and focus group discussions further indicate that most people generally also indicated that people have little trust for the police, and most believe that SLP works on behalf of companies rather than communities. Such beliefs were found across chiefdoms, but were strongest in Malen and Lower Banta. For instance a participant in one focus group in Lower Banta stated that “whenever issues arise, the company will contact the police and the police favour the company in their investigations rather than the communities”. Others in Malen said that, “we [the community people] are afraid [to go to the police]. We are poor, and when you contact the police you need to spend money. The company has money, so they use the police to take advantage of them”, and that “if somebody steals from a farm and the aggrieved farmer carries the case then there will be no action taken. But if somebody is accused of theft from the company they will jail you right away”. In Malen Chiefdom, especially, there were reports of police arresting people without due process[[78]](#footnote-78). This was often done based on the suspicion that they had stolen palm fruits from the company. In a few instances focus group participants related personal stories of having been detained in this way, only to be released after they had paid significant fines.

Table 5: Perceptions of Police Trust and Fairness

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| Police in this area can be trusted… | | |
| *Disagree\** | 56.1% | 59.8% |
| *Agree\*\** | 33.7% | 33.8% |
| Police in this area are working for all people equally… | | |
| *Disagree\** | 61.8% | 65.8% |
| *Agree\*\** | 28.3% | 26.8% |
| \* Respondents who somewhat or strongly disagree.  \*\* Respondents who somewhat or strongly agree. | | |

**Key Finding 14: While people’s impression of SLP officers was generally unfavourable, many more expressed a positive opinion of LPPBs, which were present and functioning in all of the project chiefdoms. The LPPB plays an important role in liaising between the community and security forces.** “They are from the community, so they understand our problems. Come to resolve all sorts of different disputes between community people”, said one key informant, in a statement that was representative of those made by others. Both members of the LPPB and communities themselves cited a number of examples during which the resolved disputes and de-escalated unrest. However, it was reported that de-escalation generally does not result in the underlying grievances related to unrest and protest being addressed. For instance, in Lower Banta where traffic accidents involving Sierra Rutile and Vimetco trucks are a serious problem, the LPPB might be called in to calm community tension following traffic-related death or injury. Usually this follows a formula whereby the board and a company representative make promises to the aggrieved parties in an effort to restore calm, without following through later with compensation or any other form of redress. Again, the practical notion of ‘peace’ enacted here is the absence of conflict, without ensuring that the benefits of economic development are felt more widely. The end goal of improved governance efforts – which security system participates in – should be to transform the relationship between the companies and the people, knowing that the latter has a disproportionate amount of economic power relative to the latter. Creating space for dialogue within local platforms is the only the beginning of this.

### Community Members Reporting Increased Incomes

This section considers Outcome Indicator 2 (a), which measures the percentage of targeted community members who report increased incomes. Both the endline and baseline studies used household expenditure as a proxy for monthly income, asking respondents to report on food and non-food purchases per month, as well as average monthly purchases of education, clothing, utilities, etc. **Key Finding 15: the endline shows that total monthly expenditures per household increased from SLL 984,775[[79]](#footnote-79),[[80]](#footnote-80) at the baseline to SLL 1,063,948[[81]](#footnote-81) at the endline, for a modest 8 per cent increase in income during the project period. Farmers also reported higher incomes during qualitative research, with research participants across project chiefdoms indicating increased incomes from rice farming, vegetable production, and other agricultural commodities.** “Before were only harvesting once. Now we can do one cropping and then harvesting vegetables. So there is more income, and especially for the women in the household”, explained one focus group member. Another said that “we women can harvest vegetables, and can make more [income] like this. We put this towards our household and children now”. Research participants also indicated that youth were sharing in the benefits of increased income. “Youth have worked in the swamps with us and they in the FBOs. Before the youth were idle”, reported on focus group member. Said another focus group respondent: “youth are employed on the farms and also there is extra money in household, so children [and youth] benefit like that too. The money [the family] get after the harvest can pay for school fees and school items for the kids”. Private companies working in project areas also acknowledged that improved farming practices benefited FBOs in project communities. One said, for instance, that “the communities that have IVS are better off than other communities… The job that we [the company] should have done for them, WFP is doing. It’s better there, in terms of food livelihoods”.

Figure 4: Proportion of Household Expenditure on Food

The endline also measured food expenditure, an important indicator of household food security. The higher the share of food expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure among poor and very poor households, the more likely these households will be forced to choose between spending on food or on non-food items. Looking at the percentage of household expenditure spent on food, Figure 4 indicates that almost half of endline respondents (46.8 per cent) can be classified as very poor according to this measure[[82]](#footnote-82). These households spend at least 75 per cent of their monthly budget on food. This is up from 34.4 per cent at the time of the baseline. Another 27.5 per cent devote between 65 per cent and 75 per cent of expenditures on food items, and can be considered poor – down from 37.3 per cent at the baseline. **Key Finding 16: Given that incomes increased modestly between the baseline and endline periods, a lower percentage of household budgets should be going to food. It is possible though that rising food prices[[83]](#footnote-83) – due to steeply increasing fuel costs, global supply chain issues, food shortage, etc. – are the reason that food expenditures as a percentage of income are rising. The soaring prices of food, fuel, and other commodities were noted throughout the evaluation as an emerging problem – a trend that was already being noted in 2021[[84]](#footnote-84) when the depreciation of the local currency was driving up the prices of imported products and local commodities[[85]](#footnote-85).** According to the Sierra *Leone Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) Report, February 2022*, local rice reportedly a price increase of 17 per cent (imported rice increased 25 per cent), while cassava reportedly experienced a price increase of 27 per cent[[86]](#footnote-86). The rising prices of foodstuffs was also cited as an important issue both in Pujehun and in Moyamba Districts throughout qualitative research.

### Community Members Reporting Alternative, Non-Agricultural Livelihoods

Although the project ultimately did not pursue Activities 2.1.1 and 2.1.3, which was related to supporting communities to diversify and increase their livelihood opportunities, this section still looks at some data related to the percentage of targeted community members who report establishing an alternative, non-agricultural livelihood (Outcome Indicator 2 (c)). The figure below indicates that almost half of endline survey respondents (45.2 per cent) reported that there were two or more people in their household earning an income, as compared to about one-third (35.7 per cent) who said the same around the baseline. These findings suggest that beneficiary households were able to expand the sources of income in their households since the project commenced.

Figure 5: Number of People Earning Incomes within Households

Figure 6 shows that the number of livelihoods within beneficiary households also increased the between the baseline and endline. At the time of the baseline 19.1 per cent of respondents said that they had two or more livelihoods sources within their households. This went up to 29.8 per cent at the endline.

Figure 6: Number of Livelihoods Sources within Households

Looking at Table 6, we see that small-scale agriculture production is still the key source of household livelihoods in most cases. It is the primary livelihood for one-third (33.4 per cent) of households, with a total of 38.3.8 per cent of respondents indicating that it is one of their top-three livelihoods sources.

Table 6: Household Livelihood Sources

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | |  | **Endline** | |
|  | **Primary livelihood** | **Top-three livelihoods** |  | **Primary livelihood** | **Top-three livelihoods** |
| *Production and sale of food crops* | 39.7% | 43.8% | Small-scale agriculture production including livestock (own land/livestock) | 33.4% | 38.3% |
| *Salaries, wages (employees, longer-term)* | 20.9% | 21.2% | Wage labour (unskilled/casual/agriculture) | 18.2% | 22.9% |
| *Unskilled wage labour (agriculture)* | 10.6% | 11.8% | Medium/large agriculture production including livestock (own land/livestock) | 16.9% | 17.2% |
| *Petty trading* | 7.7% | 14.3% | Wage labour (unskilled/casual/non-agriculture) | 9.2% | 12% |
| *Unskilled wage labour (non-agriculture)* | 5.4% | 6.5% | Small trade (own business) | 5.6% | 9.1% |
| *Skilled wage labour* | 4.6% | 6.6% | Wage labour (skilled) | 4.2% | 6.1% |
| *Mining of minerals* | 2.2% | 2.7% | Petty trade/selling on streets | 3.4% | 11.7% |
| *Trading and selling* | 1.8% | 2.4% | Medium/large trade (own business) | 2.6% | 3.4% |
| *Handicrafts and artisans* | 1.3% | 1.5% | Wage labour (professional) | 2.4% | 2.9% |
| *Other* | 5.5% | 9.7% | Other | 4.1% | 7.6% |
| \* Categories have changed between the baseline and endline for standardised measures of livelihood types, making direct comparison more difficult. | | | | | |

While the livelihood categories analysed at the baseline were slightly different than those analysed at the endline[[87]](#footnote-87) (due to WFP changing aspects of its standardised monitoring in this area), comparison of the two surveys was still possible. This comparative analysis reveals that a higher number of respondents (39.7 per cent) reported that the production and sale of food crops was their primary livelihood source, while 43.9 per cent said that production and sale of food crops was one of the top-three livelihood sources in their households. The next two most important primary sources of livelihood reported through the endline survey were: wage labour and medium/large agricultural production. If medium/large agricultural production is considered together with small-scale production the share respondents reporting an agricultural livelihood in their household increases considerably, with 50.3 per cent reporting one of these two categories as a primary household livelihood and 55.5 per cent reporting them among their three highest ranked household livelihoods. Adding unskilled, causal or agricultural wage labour increases the share of agriculture-related household livelihoods to 68.4 per cent of primary livelihoods and 78.4 per cent of the three highest-ranked livelihoods.

### Reduction in Perceptions of Social Tensions

Outcome Indicator 2 (c) focuses on the perceived level of the reduction in social tensions as a result of targeted livelihood support. To this end, the endline study collected data on community perceptions of, and experiences with, conflicts[[88]](#footnote-88) and disputes. For example, surveys gauged respondents’ perceptions of the prevalence of resource conflict and land disputes in their communities. In this regard, the figure below indicates that 59.9 per cent of survey respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that their communities have many resource conflicts. Though the proportion of people who agreed that there are many resource conflicts in their communities remains high, a smaller percentage of respondents strongly agreed that this is the case when compared to the baseline – 15.6 per cent at the endline compared to 26.7 per cent at the baseline. As well, endline respondents (20 per cent) were more likely to strongly disagree than were baseline respondents (15.3 per cent) with the same question, indicating that there is a perception that resource conflicts are lower now than at the start of the project.

Figure 7: Perceptions That Community Has Many Resource Conflicts

Figure 8 illustrates that a smaller proportion of all endline respondents (72.2 per cent) than baseline respondents (82.7 per cent) said that they sometimes or often worry about resource conflicts. The change is mostly due to the fact that the proportion of those that worry often about such conflicts had also fallen from 16.3 per cent at the baseline to 11.5 per cent at the endline. This is further evidence that people’s perception is that resource conflicts in their communities are decreasing.

Figure 8: Frequency of Worry about Resource Conflicts in Community

As with the preceding figures, Figure 9 indicates people think that resource conflicts are decreasing. Before the project began, 37.4 per cent of respondents believed that compared to the previous year resource conflicts in their community are increasing somewhat or a lot. Only 20.3 said this at the endline. Importantly the percentage that believed that such conflicts are increasing a lot fell from 18.3 per cent to 4.1 per cent.

Figure 9: Perceptions of Change in Resource Conflicts in Community in Last Year

**Key Finding 17: Only 4.2 per cent said of endline respondents they had been involved in a dispute in the past two years, compared to 12.2 per cent of baseline respondents that said the same thing. This is a notable decrease.** Qualitative research also found that though road blockades and protests do continue to still occur in project chiefdoms, they are less frequent than before the project started. Interviews and focus groups suggest that there are three key reasons that conflict has decreased. First, the project as created a space for grievances to be discussed, and especially for communities to voice their concerns to local government and to company representatives. “Particularly in Malen and Lower Banta there have been protests and blockades. But the project came in to begin to address these issues, by allowing people to discuss with each other rather than fight with each other”, said one government key informant. One community stakeholder added: “I see this project having an impact on peace, because of how creates a space for people to talk about their problems and express them to the companies here”. Indeed, many people expressed similar beliefs across interviews and focus groups. The second key mechanism by which conflict has been reduced is that local actors – GRCs, LPPBs, and others – are able to intervene before tensions escalate into violence. For example, one person said: “if there are issues between the youth and stakeholders or chief in the community, they can go to the GRC members to explain their case, and GRC can come here to intervene”. “There was an incident between a family and company here, where a youth was killed by a truck. The [GRC and LPPB] stakeholders came here and settled the people before they could riot”, said on other focus group participant. The third mechanism promoting peace is livelihood activities. “We do not want to fight anymore, just work the farm. That has calmed things. You can see how people want to upscale and do more IVS”, one farmer noted, voicing a belief shared by others. “Whenever there is hunger in the community, you expect conflict at all times. Even though we are not food secure they have more food now, and that’s reduced people’s tension with each other”, another farmer stated.

Taking into consideration the successes noted above, many people also suggested that the impact of the project was limited, because companies largely did not respond to the concerns expressed during dialogue. Most of those interviewed still believe that it is not addressing or eliminating the causes of conflict. The distribution of power and resources has not changed significantly since the project began. One key informant suggested that “most of what we have achieved is that we’ve provided space for the people to meet. The problems have not been resolved, but have created a mechanism to speak between companies and communities”. This was a widely shared sentiment among those interviewed. In fact, in the case just shared involving the GRC and LPPBs intervention to quell a riot, the offending company promised to pay funeral expenses for the bereaved family, but never did so. This case is a microcosm of how many disputes were resolved through the project: dialogue brought tensions under control – often through promises of action on the part of companies – but with little actual action occurring following an initial decrease in tensions.

Looking specifically at land disputes, almost two-thirds endline survey respondents (65.1 per cent) believe that the frequency of land disputes in their communities is either somewhat low or very low. This is a notable change from the baseline, at which point only about one-third (34.1 per cent) held this opinion, as shown in Figure 10, below.

Figure 10: Perceptions of Frequency of Land Disputes

From Table 7, below, we see that traditional leaders are generally the most seen as the most important group in solving land disputes. On average, about two-in-five respondents said this during both the baseline and endline. What is notable is the increase in number of endline respondents that said that government and the GRC are important in this regard as well.

Table 7: Groups Perceived to Be Most Important in Solving Land Disputes

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| *Traditional leaders* | 42.6% | 40% |
| *Government* | 8.9% | 25.9% |
| *GRC* | 3% | 17.8% |
| *Youth leaders* | 5.2% | 8.9% |
| *Other community leaders* | 10.1% | 3% |
| *NGO* | 8.1% | 1.4% |
| *Women's leaders* | 0.1% | 1% |
| *Neighbours* | 18.8% | 0.6% |
| *CDC* | 0.2% | 0.1% |
| *Other* | 2.9% | 1.3% |

Though there were only sixteen land disputes noted through the survey, these cases give some indication as to where people went for resolution. Table 8 shows that traditional leaders were by far the stakeholder that people turned to most frequently to resolve land disputes. This is not surprising, given that there is considerable trust in community and community-based institution compared to other platforms at the chiefdom and district level (see Table 3 and Table 4 above); 60.7 per cent of endline respondents said they somewhat or strongly agreed that traditional leaders are working for all people equally. Traditional leaders are central to chiefdom governance. There exists an overwhelming tendency to express community needs and grievances upwards through traditional leadership – through town chiefs, who then are expected to communicate these to higher authorises. As per the following table, government, GRCs, and other community leaders were also noted as a group that people went to help with dispute resolution.

Table 8: Groups that Solved Land Disputes

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Number** | **Percentage** |
| *Traditional leaders* | 14 | 87.5% |
| *Government* | 7 | 43.8% |
| *Other community leaders* | 4 | 25% |
| *GRC* | 4 | 25% |
| *Women's leaders* | 2 | 12.5% |
| *Police* | 2 | 12.5% |
| *Neighbours or people in this community generally* | 1 | 6.3% |
| *CDC* | 1 | 6.3% |

Of those that had a land dispute, 28.1 per cent of endline respondents said it was peacefully resolved, compared to 42.9 per cent of baseline respondents who said the same.

Table 9: Perceived Fairness of Conflict Resolution

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| *Very unfairly* | 14.4% | 0% |
| *Somewhat unfairly* | 2.1% | 12.6% |
| *No opinion* | 0% | 0% |
| *Somewhat fairly* | 50.4% | 44.3% |
| *Very fairly* | 33.1% | 43.1% |

Table 9 above shows that of the sixteen land disputes reported during the endline, 87.4 per cent were reported to be resolved either somewhat fairly or very fairly.

### Food Consumption Score

The evaluation also measured household food security through the FCS, as required by outcome Indicator 2 (d). Looking at FCSs across all survey responses, we can see from Figure 11 that above one-third (14.2 per cent) of households have a FCS[[89]](#footnote-89) that is poor, while over one-half (56.7 per cent) have a borderline score and only 29.7 per cent of households have a score is considered acceptable. Both the number of households reporting acceptable and borderline food consumption increased from the baseline[[90]](#footnote-90). These findings are largely in line with the February 2022 FSMS, which puts the proportion of Sierra Leonean households consuming poor, borderline, and acceptable diets at 15 per cent, 56 per cent, and 29 per cent, respectively[[91]](#footnote-91).

Figure 11: Household Food Consumption Score

The consumption based coping strategy index, also known as the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI), was calculated to assess the level of stress faced by a household due to a food shortage. **Key Finding 18: The average rCSI for the overall endline study was 11.7, which was up from 9.7 at the point of the baseline. Disaggregating the average endline rCSIs by district indicates clear differences between districts. The average rCSI in Pujehun was 9.1, while the Moyamba rCSI was 14.32. These findings are consistent with the most recent FSMS, which indicates the highest national score in Moyamba[[92]](#footnote-92).**

Table 10: Short-term Coping Strategies Adopted by Households

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline** | **Endline** |
| *Ate less preferred food* | 85.6% | 95.2% |
| *Borrowed food* | 49.1% | 69.8% |
| *Reduced meal size* | 85% | 89.8% |
| *Restricted adult consumption* | 39.5% | 45.4% |
| *Reduced meal number* | 70.9% | 82.4% |

Table 10 shows that the most all short-term strategies increased between the endline and baseline surveys. The most relied-upon coping strategies were to eat less preferred food, reduce meal size, and reduce meal numbers.

Figure 12: Long-term Coping Strategies

As illustrated in Figure 12, the most-used long-term coping strategies reported by respondents were to: spend savings, borrow money, or purchase food on credit. Modest income increases set against large price increases in food may have led households to cope by seeking other forms of financing for food purchases, which may help explain why actual food security (as calculated by the FCS) has increased during the same time period.

## Efficiency

**Key Finding 19: The endline evaluation found that the project largely met the standards for efficiency. Overhead – know as indirect support costs – was 7 per cent, which is in line with corporate standards for many UN agencies. Another 31 per cent of the budget was allocated to personnel expenses, meaning that over 60 per cent of the project budget was dedicated to programming. All budget lines have been fully exhausted. Further, project funds were used as was planned in the project budget, with a few exceptions. Where changes were made, appropriate justifications were given and procedures followed.** As was already mentioned above, given the similarities between the lessons learned exercise under Activity 1.1.4 and this endline evaluation, funds allocated to analysing and documenting lessons learned were utilised instead for the publication of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report.* Doing so created efficiencies by avoiding duplication of project activities. Similarly, alternative livelihoods activities under Activities 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 were not undertaken largely due to an inability to source proper partnerships with partners who could undertake vocational training. The project budget was then amended to move funds from the alternative livelihoods to supporting agricultural livelihoods under Activity 2.1.2. Given that WFP’s organisational strength is in the support of agricultural livelihoods, it is reasonable to expect that the aforementioned amendment yielded programming efficiencies. As well, scaling up livelihood support through additional funding for another thirty communities with IVS development and six poultry rearing enterprises offered an opportunity earn economies of scale by spreading these activities over existing project overhead. With better coordination and integration of the project could have perhaps even better realised efficiencies throughout the lifecycle of the joint programme. By creating better linkages between project outcomes WFP and UNDP could have leveraged synergies across governance and livelihoods components of the project through collaborative action between these sectors, in a way that shared expertise and produced positive results through shared domains of technical expertise.

In terms of operational efficiency – how well the intervention was managed – there were some notable delays. For example, activities under Outcome 1 were delayed because the second tranche payment was not made available in time to start activities. Implementing partners noted that these delays in funding were a key challenge, which required some pre-financing on their part. In the end, project implementation was delayed up to nine months. The first disbursement did not occur until June 2021 (from October of 2020, which meant that for the first three quarters of the project there was no funding, creating considerable delays in implementation. Payment delays were also noted under Outcome 2. Late payments after swamp development created inefficiencies. Some of the payment challenges were due to COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, which made movement to communities difficult and put the project behind schedule. In most cases FBOs continued work despite lack of payment. However, there were instances when funding delays resulted in some delays to swamp development. The most prevalent problem in this regard was that some beneficiaries withdrew from FBOs – something that was pretty consistently reported across project sites. FBOs responded by replacing some of those that dropped out of the project and by restructuring their executives to account for members that left. Some FBOs developed internal by-laws to suggest a minimum number of days members were required to spend working on their farms, as a way of preventing attrition. Others saw attrition as an advantage, indicating that through adversity their remaining membership grew stronger. Those that are left still continue to work because their incentive is higher yields and more food and added income from vegetable sales. As well, there were payment delays from WFP to farmers for rice purchased from them. For instance, FBOs in Moyamba District aggregated all rice in a community store, but did not receive payment until more than six months later. In addition, some farmers experience delays receiving vegetable seedlings as part of the project. Finally, farmers in Makpele also noted difficulties accessing funds from banks in Pujehun Town. Notably, the cost of transportation was at that point said to be 200,000 SLL for a round trip. FBOs suggested that transferring cash to a bank in Zimmi would be more efficient and more convenient.

## Sustainability

A key sustainability gain is that capacity strengthening support to the SLEITI contributed toward strengthening the regulatory framework and promoting its sustainable long-term implementation. Importantly, beneficial ownership transparency implementation, which requires companies to disclose their true and natural owners and not shareholders only, has been included in the *Mining and Minerals Development Act* and is before Parliament for enactment. This is important for various reasons including: preventing conflict of interest, tax evasion, money laundering, etc. Legislation of the SLEITI process has been initiated and on-going. Though it this started during the last administration but stalled due to continuous changes of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Moreover, a number of important aspects of sustainability were built directly into key elements of the project design. Project implementation built local capacities to ensure effective and long-term management. All stakeholders and beneficiaries from the intervention are local people residing in targeted chiefdoms – local authorities, landowners, youth, women, the police and the LPPB, and MSP, CDC, and GRC members – thereby helping ensure that the skills and structures needed for resolving conflicts remains within the communities. Embedding MSPs in District Councils and connecting them to other key government stakeholders might also help with the sustainability of these platforms. It must be said though that these measures might not be enough to guarantee the sustainability of the different elements of the project. Nor is it inevitable that “As the long-term function of these platforms is in the best interests of the communities themselves, this will provide an in-built sustainability mechanism”, as indicated in the *PBF Project Document*[[93]](#footnote-93). When the incentives created for different stakeholders to participate in project activities are taken away, there exists the very real possibility to that so to will their participation. There are already indications that this is occurring in some respects.

Discussions with the beneficiaries in all four chiefdoms confirmed the need to sustain the key structures established by the project: the MSPs, GRCs, and CDCs. The evaluation also found that it will be difficult to keeping these structures functioning without continued financial support for transportation to undertake their operations. GRCs and other groups also noted that at the time of the evaluation they had not been informed of any exit plan for the project. That stakeholders generally understood that the project was ending, but not how or when indicates insufficient attention to the implementation of an exit strategy and/or sustainability plan. For instance, at the time of the evaluation there was already an indication that a number of the GRC groups had not met regularly for a few months, suggesting that meetings had previously been coordinated and incentivised by Fambul Tok. A member of one of these groups said, “we meet monthly, but the last time we met was January [2022]. Fambul Tok has always been coordinating these meeting, but we have not heard from Fambul Tok since January so we have met”. A member of the CDC indicated, “Fambul Tok needs to stay here and advocate on our behalf. We want Fambul Tok to come back an advocate on behalf of the community and educate the [company] that there is this [CDC] group working for the development of the community”. Both comments suggest that at the time of fieldwork for the evaluation a project exit strategy for elements of Outcome 1 had not been effectively implemented.

Even if an exit plan was implemented afterwards, the gap reported in activities by many of the platforms supported by the project – many did meet between January and the end of March – suggests that these groups still need support to be sustainable. In other words, after two years of support through the project, these groups should be expected to continue their activities even without direct engagement with and motivation from Fambol Tok. Moreover, qualitative research suggested that community members often considered the Fambol Tok as the key mediating actor in their chiefdoms, saying that “we know if we have problems we can take them to Fambol Tok to help us”, or “since Fambol Tok came to us the community knows that if there are issues we can get them to resolve these for us”. **Key Finding 20: Community members often believed that it was the implementing partner, and not the GRC, that were responsible for redressing grievances in their areas. What is more, GRC members themselves indicated that in many cases Fambol Tok actively led the redress process, as opposed to building the capacities of the GRCs to take the lead in doing this. While it is important that disputes were resolved throughout the project lifecycle – even if this was sometimes outside the scope of project itself, as mentioned above – greater ownership over mediation would have strengthened GRCs to a greater degree and helped ensure their sustainability in the long-term.** As it stands, they largely look to Fambul Tok for leadership in process of grievance redress, as well as for logistical and organisational support in carrying out these activities.

**Key Finding 21: In order to help ensure the sustainability of the MSP, the project sought to integrate the platform into the *District Development Plans* and budgeting to financially contribute toward the long-term functionality of MSPs after the project has finished. As suggested by a key informant at the VPO, similar strategies might be pursued to fund the GRCs and CDCs from national budgets. But at this point it is unclear whether commitments have been made in this regard.** There are some consideration that might impede the sustainable funding of the platforms developed by the project. In terms of the MSP, it will likely be difficult to fund it as a stand- alone platform, as district governments have recently established District Development Coordination Committees (DDCCs) through the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. There are headed by District Officers and are connected to the Office of National Security. Setting up the MSP would create a duplicate structure, and there are indications that MSPs might be instead included in DDCCs. Another threat to project sustainability is the presence of parallel grievance structures at company level. Sierra Rutile, Natural Habitats, and Vimetco currently have existing grievance committees. Where internal grievance platforms exist, companies are more likely to rely on these when addressing issues that arise. For example, representatives at Sierra Rutile suggested that they prefer to rely on their own structures and – apart form two community meetings called by Fambul Tok – have had little contact with the GRC in their area. The existence of these parallel structures also makes it less likely that companies will help sustain the GRCs with funding.

In terms of the sustainability of the livelihoods component of the project, irrigated IVS can be used for continuous and sustainable food production without relying on traditional shifting upland agriculture that relies upon seasonal rainfall – a key driver of food insecurity in Sierra Leone. Whereas upland cultivation is limited to one one-cropping season, low yields, and environmental degradation, farmers cultivating via IVS can crop up to three times and produce diverse crops throughout the year. Further, the project attempted to build the long-term agricultural productivity and sustainability, by supporting smallholder farmers with interventions that increased the productivity across different value chain activities, including processing, value addition, and market access support. Building the capacities of farmers groups to the point they could be certified as FBOs. Doing so solidifies their organisational structures and makes it more likely these groups will remain durable after the project closes. Certification as FBOs as qualifies those groups for additional support from MOA, which would not have been available to them otherwise. MOA has been working closely with these FBOs throughout the project and has committed to further strengthening and supporting these groups, in collaboration with their executives and the Youth Contractors assigned to them.

As an indication of community ownership over their own agricultural development, some FBOs – approximately ten – have constructed their own dry stores and drying floors. Thirteen FBOs in Lower Banta Chiefdom also established and registered as an Agricultural Business Centre through which they do consolidated marketing. In addition, an opportunity emerged to create market linkages Sierra Leone’s National School Feeding Programme, which offers a long-term stable market outlet for farmer groups targeted under this project. To sustainably augment community-level implementation capacities, the project capacitated community Youth Contractors – skilled young residents from project communities – to provide technical backstopping to their peers and encourage youth participation in agriculture. Youth Contractors not only provided an effective community-level delivery mechanism to implement agricultural livelihood activities, but also contributed toward transforming perceptions of the role of youth in agriculture. Youth Contractors benefited from all the trainings provided to FBOs, as well they received motorbikes and phones to assist them in their activities. However, it was noted that some did no “live up to expectations” and required additional support form MOA personnel. Although many Youth Contractors did perform very well, they will still likely require continued support to maintain their engagement in FBOs. This might come by including them in the FBOs themselves. Otherwise, motivation and support might be provided through MOA in connection to extension services provided by the ministry. While the project advocated for the retention of Youth Contractors by respective private companies to support agricultural livelihoods after the project for long-term sustainability, there was no indication at the time of the evaluation companies would take up this request.

Overall, the project sought to create meaningful change quickly, there is some question whether a two-year period is sufficient to achieve meaningful “catalytic” peacebuilding effects, as called for in the Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund: 2020-2024 Strategy[[94]](#footnote-94). There is no single agreed upon definition of the term ‘catalytic’ in the context of peacebuilding. However, a study that examined the concept of catalytic programming for the PBF notes that a programme can be considered “catalytic if it enables a peace process to become unblocked or creates a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change to occur”[[95]](#footnote-95). The paper goes on to say that catalytic programming does not just reduce a root cause of conflict or defuse a trigger of violence, but instead sets up the conditions for the underlying dynamics that fuel a conflict to be transformed. This has many similarities to the notion of ‘positive peace’ noted above, which requires that peacebuilding address the underlying structural issues that bring social tension and conflict about.[[96]](#footnote-96) The project set out some ambitious aims in its theory of change (see: Figure 1), which included: improving the regulatory environment governing companies and making it more transparent and inclusive, creating dialogue to improve the utilisation of customary and privately leased land and CDF, and making local governance, security institutions, and companies are more transparent, accountable, and responsive to the needs of local populations. **Key Finding 22: Even if the project had not experienced funding delays, had not had additional delays due to the pandemic and had not encountered coordination challenges, it would have been difficult to catalytically alter conflict dynamics base don longstanding social tensions and deeply rooted distrust between communities, local governance structures, institutional platforms, and companies in concession areas. Ensuring that project activities are not just impactful in the short-term, but also meaningfully sustainable in the long-term likely needs a longer programming period, one that accounts for both the complexity of the intervention and the potential for obstacles and challenges that delay its implementation.**

# Conclusions

The analysis above presents research findings from the endline evaluation for the project entitled: ‘Mitigating Localised Resource-based Conflicts and Increasing Community Resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba Districts of Sierra Leone’. It outlines the successes and challenges experienced under the project, which set as its two outcomes: firstly, creating more accountable institutions and mechanisms that promote peaceful company-community relations, and secondly, decreasing social tensions by enhancing sustainable livelihoods and food security. These outcomes are relevant to key government priorities related to the promotion of sustainable economic development and better governance and support for more equitable distribution of natural resources as a route towards building peace in project chiefdoms. The intervention is also externally coherent and compatible with other peacebuilding interventions in project areas, and is internally coherent with other interventions being undertaken by WFP and UNDP, within the context of the SDGs and the UNSDCF.

The project achieved a number of key successes: strengthening local institutions, completing and validating the *Land Degradation Assessment Report*, developing swampland in sixty communities and supporting farmers with training and market linkages. With a few exceptions, the majority of activities under the outputs outlined in the project IRF were completed. This endline also noted a number of challenges. Notably, project coordination proved difficult and needs to be improved for joint peacebuilding interventions undertaken between UN agencies in future. As well, there were a number of challenges with activities related to strengthen GRCs, MSPs, and CDCs, including: delays in implementation, reports of infrequent meeting, perceived lack of impartiality, and insufficient capacity and autonomy. Other implementation challenges experienced during the project included: delays due to COVID-19 pandemic, considerable turnover at UNDP, delays in the disbursement of finances, delays in validation of the *Land Degradation Assessment Report*, and the need for better sensitisation regarding project activities around implementation areas.

The endline evaluation found that the project largely met the standards for efficiency. Overhead was in line with corporate among many UN agencies and most of the project budget was dedicated to programming. Further, project funds were used as was planned in the project budget, with a few exceptions. As well, scaling up livelihood support through additional funding for another thirty communities with IVS development and six poultry rearing enterprises offered an opportunity earn economies of scale by spreading these activities over existing project overhead. There were a few instances where project efficiency could have been improved. In terms of operational efficiency there were some notable delays related to the disbursement of funds. With better coordination and integration of the project could have perhaps even better realised efficiencies throughout the lifecycle of the joint programme.

In terms of the intended project impacts, it aimed to alleviate tensions and decrease conflict between communities, government, and private sector actors in select areas in the chiefdoms of Lower Banta, Upper Banta, Malen, and Makpele. It was widely reported by survey respondents and during interviews and focus groups that protests in project chiefdoms have decreased, even if occasional road blockades and protests do continue to still occur in project chiefdoms. The decrease in social tensions and conflict is attributable to a number of factors. Key among these was the modest increase in household incomes between the baseline and the endline, a quantitative finding that was supported by qualitative research. However, rampant food inflation meant that the percentage of income spend on food rose. Another reason that tension and conflict decreased was the fact that platforms like MSPs and GRCs are creating space for dialogue between communities and companies. Before the project, MSPs and GRCs were very inconsistent in their presence and function in project chiefdoms. That the intervention was able to build the organisational capacities of theses structures is an important success. However, corporations are still considered to be largely unresponsive to community needs. Many of the grievances that were present at the time of the baseline are still present today. Indeed, endline survey respondents do not generally believe that private companies are responsive to their needs. The unresolved culvert issue between Vimetco and a number of project communities in Lower Banta is the most notable evidence of this. Therefore, despite decreasing the level of protest activity in the chiefdoms it was operating in, the project was not sufficiently impactful in improving companies’ responsiveness to the development needs and requests of local communities. Sustainable peacebuilding requires shifts to the real power imbalances that remain between companies and communities in the programming context.

Worryingly, there are indications that the issues underlying tensions present in project areas are still simmering under the surface, occasionally boiling over into more serious incidents. For instance, shortly after the fieldwork for this evaluation concluded Lower Banta Chiefdom experienced an onset of violence related to the election of their CDC Chairperson. There was a feeling among community members that one candidate was being primed for this position by a Senior Section Chief, in part inciting the youth to set fire to this individual’s *barray* in April 2022[[97]](#footnote-97). That such protest violence occurred is significant in itself. That it was related to the election of a structure closely related to the implementation of this project model demonstrates that local platforms like the CDC are still not adequately promoting transparency, accountability, and peace. As mentioned above, there are also persistent reports of intimidation, harassment, and criminalisation of MALOA members and citizens in Malen Chiefdom. Many local platforms created through the project remain largely antagonistic towards MALOA, and landowners group has not been actively included in this intervention. Remaining tensions in Malen are partly symptomatic of peacebuilding process in the chiefdom that has not been sufficiently inclusive, which seems like a lost opportunity to bridge the gap between the chiefdom authorities and MALOA. Peacebuilding must include all key stakeholders if it is to be effective. That Green Scenery – with its long history and considerable capacities of working with local groups in the chiefdom – was not more actively engaged in project-supported platforms like the MSP is another missed opportunity. Future peacebuilding projects must place more emphasis on the participatory aspects of peace, building it from the ground up based on a realignment of power relationships between those with economic and political power to this that lack it, as is the case with the farming communities in Pujehun and Moyamba districts. With this approach, projects like this one can more successfully and sustainably meet ambitious objectives, which are implemented in difficult programming environments, in the wake of historical tensions in the communities it was working in. While the project did have important successes, it also experienced many challenges that undermined its overall objectives.

# Recommendations

Based on the aforementioned conclusions, this endline evaluation suggests the recommendations outlined below, which can be considered for subsequent joint programmes between agencies implementing across the development-peacebuilding nexus in interventions like the one evaluated in this report.

## Develop More Robust Conceptualisation of Catalytic Peacebuilding

This project serves as an example that peacebuilding projects of this variety require a well-developed common understanding of what ‘catalytic peacebuilding’ is, and what is required to achieve catalytic peacebuilding outcomes. The reduction of tensions within project chiefdoms was undoubtedly an important short-term project success. However, sustainable peacebuilding requires more of an emphasis on creating sustainable peace that extends beyond diminishing tension and protests in the short-term. Indeed, the definition[[98]](#footnote-98) of ‘catalytic’ offered above suggests that peacebuilding can only be defined as such if it enables peace processes to become unblocked or if it creates larger or longer-term peacebuilding changes to occur. Creating spaces for open dialogue through MSPs and GRCs is a significant step towards unblocking processes that support peace. But achieving a ‘positive peace’ in the context of this project would have required grater impacts in redistributing the benefits of development and the power to influence development decisions towards communities. Though the project set out some ambitious aims in its theory of change in this regard, recent flare-ups of conflict indicate that the underlying dynamics that fuel a conflict – especially in Malen and Lower Banta – have not been meaningfully transformed. Effectively connecting development to peace in away that sustainably decreases tension and violence invariably requires a corresponding increase of people’s rights, benefits, and privileges, in support of the UN’s normative agenda that of ‘no one is left behind’ among the most marginalised groups[[99]](#footnote-99). The livelihoods component of the project offered some impact in this regard. Of course, livelihood activities could not realistically be made available to all communities and all people due to budgetary constraints. Therefore, more was required to encourage action from private sector actors, in order ensure that peace was linked in broad-based, community-oriented, and long-term development.

## Greater Emphasis on Participation from Private Sector Actors

The project often emphasised the building of peace by focusing on the actions of communities, insisting that decreases in protest action would yield greater development benefits. These promises were largely unrealised due to continue inaction from private sector actors. Greater emphasis was needed on securing buy-in and meaningful participation from companies in concession areas. In fact, the project was well positioned to leverage its high level partnership with VPO for this purpose, to actively encourage proactive partnership with concession area companies as part of the project. At the very least this requires that subsequent projects encourage private actors to actively engage in grievance redress mechanisms. For those corporations that have their own mechanisms of this type, buy-in can be demonstrated by orienting away from their internal mechanisms and towards those created at chiefdom/community level, or by having the two types of mechanisms work in concert with each other. Financial contributions from companies to support GRCs, MSP, and CDCs would also indicate the companies’ investment in community-centred peace, while at the same time helping ensure sustainability of project impacts beyond its timeframe. These are only some examples of actions that might be taken to create private sector participation in the project. The larger point is that corporate participation and accountability needs to be proactively emphasised as a complementary component to efforts made towards non-violent reconciliation by communities.

## Better Inclusion of All Relevant Stakeholders

As well, catalytic peacebuilding must include all stakeholders. Lack of sufficient inclusion of groups such as MALOA and Green Scenery into project-related processes and activities create an obstacle to long-term security, as the grievances expressed by these groups will remain unresolved and continue to cause social tension. In the case of MALOA, in Malen, there are instances of outright antagonism to their participation in chiefdom structures and processes. Ultimately, subsequent projects should take on a more expansive and inclusive notion of peacebuilding, and ensure that all implementation efforts are undertaken to transform the underlying dynamics that fuel tension and conflict in an effort to build sustainable partnerships towards sustainable peace.

## Focus on Conflicts with Companies and on Building Capacities of Beneficiaries

The endline evaluation found that many activities around dispute settlement and grievance redress were oriented towards issues that were not directly consequential to the social tensions caused by resource-based conflict. Though community dialogues and GRCs did frequently target disputes over land and resource allocation, or on grievances between communities and companies, they also frequently dealt with matters peripheral to the project. This included domestic matters taking place within households, or on quarrels between family members, or on sensitising communities about general development issues, or aspects of sensitisation about COVID-19.. It is true that development and peace are related in many different, and social tensions can have many causes. Nevertheless, project resources would have been used more efficiently if dispute resolution focused directly on disputes over resources and between communities and companies. This is especially true taking into account the short project timeframe and its finite resources. Subsequent projects will require a better focus on key peacebuilding issues – related to the point above regarding a definition of peacebuilding – and better agreement and closer monitoring of whether implementing partners are targeting these issues when conducting peace awareness raising and education.

Additionally, the evaluation found that the implementing partner Fambul Tok frequently took a direct role and even the lead in resolving disputes. While this likely proved a more effective strategy for solving disputes in project areas in the short-term, it also created a perception among community stakeholders that it is the role of Fambul Tok – not GRCs – to assist with grievance redress at community level. It also seemed to create a dependency among platforms like the GRC for the support of Fambul Tok in carrying out their activities. The implementation models of subsequent projects of this nature should focus less on direct implementation work, and much more on focused technical assistance, capacity building, and systems strengthening, while local mechanisms themselves do the heavy lifting of direct dispute resolution. Local groups like GRC greatly benefit from technical capacity building to reinforce their organisational capacities, but only if the GRCs are better mentored to directly address community grievances, instead of relying on outside parties to do so. This approach can better localise peacebuilding and development efforts aimed at promoting the SDGs. Local actors have the knowledge, experience, and access to beneficiaries much more than UN entities or their implementing partners. Moreover, local platforms will continue to work with the same group of beneficiaries in long term even beyond the project duration, creating benefits in terms of long-term programming impacts. Subsequent peacebuilding projects must also include strong monitoring mechanisms whereby UN agencies closely oversee and manage the activities of implementing partners to ensure that they are adequately carrying out their supportive functions through the best possible modalities.

## Consideration of Longer-term Timeframe for Programming

A two-year project will be very hard-pressed to enact the type of transformative social change required to resolve deeply embedded mistrust between communities and institutions that had not always worked in their best interest. This is especially true when considering the fact that joint implementation is a process that requires considerable time to be spent on coordination, integration, communication, monitoring, etc., not to mention the inevitable likelihood of other programming obstacles and delays. An extended programming period could be useful, for instance, to help integrated and help resolve differences between competing groups to integrate all stakeholders into an inclusive peace that is built from the ground up. Both peacebuilding and development are processes that are long-term and emergent. Greater security and non-violence emerge endogenously over time through changing localised conditions as development is distributed, institutions are made more transparent and accountable, and trust and cohesion are built. Even high-profile interventions, which have been recognised as relatively successful in eliminating the sources of violence and insecurity, can have a short shelf life, with insecurity quickly returning to pre-reform levels as soon as projects conclude[[100]](#footnote-100). A longer-term approach to peacebuilding allows for more time to build a peace process that takes its time to become participatory and collaborative, each of which are much more likely to create long-term impacts.

## Creation of A Dedicated Project Coordinator Role

This intervention rightly looked to promote linkages along the Development-Peace Nexus, since collaboration between development and peace programming should be driven by “collective outcomes” [[101]](#footnote-101). But coordination challenges created obstacles towards collaborative planning and joint implementation in a way that inhibited synergies and complementarity. A dedicated project coordination role is required for initiatives of this type, to allow a single individual to undertake more proactive coordination on a daily basis. This role would make joint peacebuilding projects like this one more effective, efficient, and impactful, under the UN imperative to ‘deliver as one’[[102]](#footnote-102). A dedicated project coordinator role can, from the beginning of the project, be tasked with identifying and planning for the integration of activities and the identification of synergies between the project outcomes. Creating better linkages between project outcomes WFP and UNDP could have leveraged synergies across governance and livelihoods components of the project through collaborative action between these sectors, in a way that shared expertise and produced positive results through shared domains of technical expertise. Further, better sensitisation across beneficiaries about the integrated nature of the project could have, for instance, raised awareness about GRCs, MSPs, CDCs, and LPPBs among farmers. More participation of WFP in the MSP process would have also helped integrate the two project outcomes. Finally, a dedicated coordinator role could be a focal point for facilitating joint workplans that underpin joint accountability for common results and co-ownership across all project activities. Joint monitoring during future intervention will be central to assessing and adapting collective outcomes[[103]](#footnote-103).

## Better Sensitisation of Communities around Project Areas

There are considerable programming challenges for projects in contexts where the governance of resources is an issue. In setting like this, interventions must be conducted in a way where the programming design, sensitisation, and implementation that does not contribute – or even be seen as contributing to – the toxic political economies where the project will be operating. Community engagement and communication is key to this, in order to adequately relay project objectives and processes – not only to beneficiaries, but also to non-beneficiaries. Greater efforts are needed to sensitise all groups about how and why project funds are going to be distributed as they are, so as not to be perceived as an extension of on-going inequality and corruption that drive the political economies of the settings in which the project was undertaken. Indeed, it was also frequently noted during the baseline that communities were unclear about the purpose and scope of development initiatives, and that inadequate communication with beneficiaries and neighbouring non-beneficiaries can increase perceptions of unfairness, thus adding to the resentment that fuels social tensions and conflict. Addressing these concerns requires a more encompassing definition of peacebuilding programming, which considers not just project communities, but also the wider socio-political ecosystem within which these communities are situated.

# Annex A: Terms of Reference for Endline Evaluation

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| --- |
| **Terms of Reference**  **Consultant for United Nations Peace Building Fund End line Project Evaluation Assessment** |
| 1. **Position Information** | | |
| **Job Code Title:** Engaging the service of a consultant to undertake end line survey for project “*Mitigating localised resource-based conflicts and increasing community resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba districts of Sierra Leone*”  **Project Location(s):** Moyamba and Pujehun districts, Sierra Leone  **Contract Modality**: Work as employed  **Duration**: 44 days | | |
| 1. **Background** | | |
| **Endline evaluation/assessment for “Mitigating localised resource-based conflicts and increasing community resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba districts of Sierra Leone”**  UNDP and WFP are jointly implementing PBF funded project: “*Mitigating localised resource-based conflicts and increasing community resilience in Pujehun and Moyamba districts of Sierra Leone*” with the aim to mitigate local conflicts between communities, government and private companies by building the capacities and inclusivity of institutions and dialogue platforms that promote peaceful relations and building resilient livelihoods. This will be achieved by strengthening the existing regulatory framework on land acquisition and operationalising this through the establishment and strengthening of national, district, chiefdom and community-level mediation and dialogue infrastructure, while also providing livelihood support to the most vulnerable affected populations to reduce social tension and mitigate local conflicts.  The project focuses on achieving the following outcomes and outputs;  **Outcome 1: Communities in Pujehun and Moyamba districts benefit from more accountable institutions and mechanisms that promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies.**  Outcome 1 has the following outputs:   1. Output 1.1 Land acquisition and land use processes are more inclusive and aligned with policy frameworks. 2. Output 1.2 Infrastructure for mediation and dialogue is strengthened to manage conflicts within and between communities and companies. 3. Output 1.3: Strengthen the capacity of government, particularly security sector, local leaders and companies to be more accountable to communities.   **Outcome 2: Social tensions reduced by enhancing sustainable livelihoods of women and youth and improving food security.**  Outcome 2 has the following outputs:   1. Output 2.1: Promote climate-smart agriculture practices, agricultural value chain strengthening and livelihood opportunities.   The consultant will undertake an end line/final evaluation of the project using a mixed method approach aligned with the methodology and tools used during the initial baseline assessment.  **Overview of the assignment**  WFP is recruiting the services of an individual consultant to conduct an:   1. **End line Project evaluation :**  * Collect quantitative and qualitative data to define end line indicators for each project outcome and output to finalise the Integrated Results Framework (IRF) of the approved project document. * In addition to collecting quantitative and qualitative data, the evaluation should focus on assessing the perception of stakeholders and beneficiaries on issues of trust between communities and companies, the level of women’s’ participation, accountability, inclusivity of local dialogues and financial probity of the community development committees and the conflict medication mechanisms. * Assess the linkage(s) and integration of the various components (governance and livelihood) and visibility of the project. The evaluation should also assess the usefulness of the livelihood support in mediating and resolving conflicts in the targeted communities. * Collect and document lessons learned on the innovative approach between communities and companies, and success stories that can be used in future interventions. * Formulate a final report documenting methodology and findings for review by WFP and UNDP, finalising based upon feedback provided.   The individual consultant is expected to carry out the end line project evaluation in close collaboration with the WFP Project Coordinator,UNDP Technical Specialist and the Office of the Vice President.  **Objective of the assignment**  The general objective of this assignment is to formulate a final end line project evaluation report for the ongoing project.  **Scope of work and expected outputs**  Undertaking the end line evaluation/assessment requires a mixed method approach to:   1. Design and carryout appropriate quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to establish relevant project indicators relative to IRF. 2. Develop inception reports and share with technical teams to refine approach. 3. Train and supervise all research assistants involved in the project, as required. 4. Support findings with project proposal and current literature, including gray literature, government, and non-governmental documents where available. 5. Work, as needed, with WFP to ensure accurate representation and interpretation of the project outcomes and outputs. 6. Advise, as needed, on the project outcomes, outputs, indicators, and activities, for the purposes of organisational learning. 7. Develop datasheets to inform future monitoring and reporting, as well as evaluation. 8. Write detailed reports that describes project profile and design as well as outcomes, outputs, and activities.    * + - 1. **Evaluation Questions**   The following key questions will guide the end of project evaluation:   1. **Relevance** – (The extent to which the objectives of the intervention are still consistent with beneficiaries’ needs and partners' and donor's policies.)  * Does the project presently respond to the needs of the target groups? * Did the project adequately adapt to the changing situation/needs of target groups? * Have the activities of other actors such as government and donors changed the needs and priorities of the target groups? * From the target groups' perspective, is the project addressing the highest priority needs?  1. **Efficiency** – (A measure of how economically (in terms of quality, quantity and time) resources/inputs are converted to outputs.)  * To what extent are inputs and resources provided/available on time from all partners involved to implement activities? * Are inputs monitored regularly, and by whom, to encourage cost-effective implementation of activities, in in a transparent and accountable manner? * Is monitoring used to take corrective action? * Have the outputs been produced/ delivered in a cost-efficient manner?  1. **Coherence** – (A measure of compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.)  * How well does the project co-ordinate with other, similar interventions (if any) for synergy and in order to avoid overlaps? * Are the outputs delivered as planned and in a coherent manner e.g. logical sequence? * Do donor coherence, complementarity and coordination encourage synergies and/or improve the potential impact of the project?  1. **Effectiveness** - (The extent to which the intervention's objectives - on outcome and project purpose level, are/or are expected to be achieved.)  * Have the expected outcomes been achieved to date? * What is the quality of the outcomes? * Do all target groups (and everybody in the target group) benefit from the operation as expected? * To what extent has the project purpose been achieved so far? Is this measurable through the indicators or is there other evidence for this? * Given the achievement and quality of outcomes so far, what can be said about the likelihood of achieving the project purpose within the timeline of the operation? * To what extent has the project adapted to changing external conditions (risks and assumptions) in order to ensure the achievement of the outcomes and the project purpose?   5. **Sustainability to date** (Likelihood of the continuation of benefits of an intervention after its completion).   * Is there a viable financial sustainability plan in place and is it being implemented? i.e. if the benefits have to be supported after the project’s end, will funds be available? If so, by whom? By the partner government/project authority? Or is continued donor support required? If so, is it likely to be available? * Are there any external factors that might jeopardise the sustainability of benefits, and if so, have appropriate measures been taken to forestall this? * Are the target groups and/or relevant local authorities/institutions able to afford the maintenance or replacement of the technologies/services/outputs introduced by the project? * Do the target groups plan to continue assuming their role in ensuring continued outputs and outcomes? If so, are they likely to materialise? * How far is the project embedded in institutional structures that are likely to function beyond the life of the operation?   **6. Impact to date** (Likelihood of positive and negative, medium to long-term effects of an intervention, both direct and indirect, intended and unintended).   * Are there any changes on the level of the Overall Objective which can be observed (through indicators) so far? Can the project be assessed as having contributed to these changes? * Given the progress so far, what direct impacts appear likely by the end of the project? * Are any external factors likely to jeopardise the operation’s direct impact? * Is there any unplanned positive/negative impact on the final beneficiaries? Did the project take timely measures to mitigate negative impact? * Are there any observable or expected spill-over effects? Are there any indications that elements/aspects of the project will be rolled out to or taken up by other parties? * What are the likely environmental, social, cultural, gender and economic long-term effects? | | |
| 1. **EXPECTED OUTPUTS and RESULTS** | | |
| The individual consultant will be contracted for a period of 44 days to undertake the end line assessment and formulate the final report. Once drafted, the report will be shared with respective project teams for review and feedback. The consultant will have time to incorporate feedback and finalise the reports.   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | No. | **Outputs** | **# of days** | | **ENDLINE ASSESSMENT FOR PBF PROJECT** | | | | 1 | Desk and literature review (home-based) | 3 | | 2 | Consultations with Resident Coordinator’s Office, WFP and UNDP | 2 | | 3 | Consultations with national stakeholders (Office of the Vice President, Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry and Local Government and Rural Development, etc.,) | 2 | | 4 | Review of data collection tools and formulation of inception report | 2 | | 5 | Training of enumerators | 2 | | 6 | Pre-testing of tools (field based) | 1 | | 7 | Field data collection in four target chiefdoms (field based) | 14 | | 8 | Formulation of project baseline report and finalisation of IRF (home-based) | 15 | | 9 | Finalisation of report based on feedback from WFP and UNDP (home-based) | 3 | |  | **Total days** | **44** |   **5. DURATION OF ASSIGNMENT**  The overall timeframe of the assignment is 44 working days; the Start date for the assignment is 01 February 2022.  In case of default on the part of the individual consultant carrying out the assessment, the WFP Project Manager shall be entitled to employ and pay other consultants / firms to carry out the same and all expenses consequent thereon or incidental thereto shall be borne by the consultant and shall be recoverable by WFP and may be deducted by WFP from any money due or which may become due.  **6. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT**  The individual consultant will coordinate closely with the respective project teams.  ***a) Roles and Responsibilities of the engaged individual consultant***   * Allocate the proper and needed skilled personnel to undertake end line assessment * Ensuring that end line information is collected and reported in a sensitive manner strictly adhering to appropriate research ethics and *do no harm* principles * Submit high quality end line reports in a timely manner   ***b) Role of WFP***   * Support, as required, administration of contract including: travel, visa, etc. * Support arrangement of meeting with project implementation team and national stakeholders * Provide field coordination support * Follow up, monitor and evaluate the progress of implementation of the various activities, ensuring their smooth implementation and manage potential risks * Review and provide feedback on the draft end line report in a timely manner. | | |
| 1. **Payment Modalities** | | |
| Flights and visa arrangements will be made by WFP. Payment will be made monthly contingent on the achievement of deliverables as per section 9. | | |
| 1. **Qualifications** | | |
| Interested individual consultants / consultancy firm must should meet the following requirement:  ***a) Experience:***  The study shall be conducted by an experienced consultant specialising in monitoring and evaluation with proven experience implementing assessments and formulating high quality reports. The ideal candidate will have:   * Minimum master’s degree in social sciences; agriculture, and development studies or any other related field * Ten years of experience conducting research and monitoring and evaluation * Proven experience implementing assessments and research using quantitative and qualitative methodologies Experience researching issues related to peacebuilding, conflict, violence, or any other related field * Significant experience conducting research and monitoring and evaluation in West Africa, and preferably in Sierra Leone * Excellent written English skills * Fluency in spoken and written English required. | | |

# Annex B: Updated Post-baseline Integrated Results Framework

| **Outcomes** | **Outputs** | **Indicators** | **Means of Verification** | **Milestones** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome 1:**  ***Communities in Pujehun and Moyamba districts benefit from more accountable institutions and mechanisms that promote peaceful relations between communities and private companies*** |  | **Outcome Indicator 1 (a)**: **Level of perceptions in all chiefdoms that believe that companies in their area respond (always or sometimes) to the needs of communities.**  **Baseline:** 45 per cent of baseline survey respondents in all chiefdoms that believe that companies in their area always (4 per cent) or sometimes (41 per cent) respond to the needs of communities.  **Target:** TBD after consultation on baseline data | Baseline and endline survey including focus group discussions and interview |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 1 (b)**: **Level of trust between communities and Community Development Committees**  **Baseline:** 30.3 per cent of survey respondents said that trust between people in their area and the Community Development Committee is either very high (5 per cent) or somewhat high (25.3 per cent).  **Target:** TBD after consultation on baseline data | Baseline and endline survey including focus group discussions and interview |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 1 (c)**: **Level of trust between communities and GRCs**  **Baseline:** 11.9 per cent of survey respondents said that trust between people in their area and the GRC is either very high (0.6 per cent) or somewhat high (11.3 per cent).  **Target:** TBD after consultation on baseline data | Baseline and endline survey including focus group discussions and interview |  |
| **Output 1.1:**  Land acquisition and land use processes are more inclusive and aligned with policy frameworks  **List of activities under this output**:  1.1.1: Land conflict analysis and land degradation assessments in four chiefdoms.  1.1.2: Educating community stakeholders on the existing regulatory framework and advocating to government institutions to apply  1.1.3: Developing a simplified checklist to guide land acquisitions  1.1.4: Promoting Lesson Learned from this Innovative approach of Community and Private sector Partnership | **Output Indicator 1.1.1**: Land conflict and degradation analyses for 4 targeted chiefdoms completed to identify common ground for dialogue  **Baseline:** land conflict analysis (Malen Chiefdom)  **Target**: 4 conflict and land degradation analyses completed | Conflict analysis and land degradation report produced, and recommendations implemented |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.2:** Number of community stakeholders (disaggregated by gender and age) trained on existing regulatory framework on land acquisition.  **Baseline**: unknown (baseline data to be collected January 2020)  **Target**: TBD after consultation on baseline data  **Output Indicator 1.1.3a**: Simplified checklist developed  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 2 simplified checklists developed and operationalised  **Output Indicator 1.1.3b**: Number of community members trained on use of simplified checklist (disaggregated by gender)  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 200 | Training reports indicating # of community stakeholders trained  Simplified checklist produced. |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.4:** Number of policy initiatives for SLEITI and VGGT adopted based on international best practices  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 2 | Reports produced from VGGT and SLEITI platforms |  |
| **Output 1.2:**  Infrastructure for mediation and dialogue strengthened to manage conflicts within and between communities and companies.  **Activities implemented under this output:**  1.2.1: Strengthening Grievance Redress mechanism.  1.2.2: Strengthening mechanisms to increase transparency and accountability of community development funds  1.2.3: Supporting District Level Multi-Stakeholder Platform.  1.2.4: Strengthening Capacity of Women Groups to engage in community decision making | **Output Indicator 1.2.1:** Percentage of community members that had a conflict in the last two years felt that it was resolved very fairly  **Baseline**: 33.1 per cent per cent of survey respondents who had been in a land dispute in the last two years believed that was the resolution to the dispute was very fair.  **Target**: TBD after consultation on baseline data | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.2:** Percentage of local platforms (CDCs, GRCs, and MSPs) with inclusive membership (minimum of 30 per cent women)  **Baseline**: variable across CDCs, GRCs, and MSPs  **Target**: 75 per cent of CDCs, GRCs, and MSPs have membership of 30 per cent women | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.3:** # of district-level MSPs meetings held on quarterly basis  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 6 MSP meetings | Desk review of meeting minutes |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.4:** Percentage of women and youth attending MSP meetings  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 30 per cent women of youth attend MSP meetings | Attendance lists |  |
| **Output 1.3:** Strengthen the capacity of government, security sector, local leaders and companies to be more accountable to communities:  **Activities implemented under this output:**  1.3.1: Strengthen the capacity of SLEITI and VGGT  1.3.2: Building accountability of Security Sector through Strengthened Partnership with Communities  1.3.3: Strengthening capacity of companies to address local grievances and respond to community needs | **Output Indicator 1.3.1:** Number of SLEITI and VGGT coordination meetings held  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 8  **Output Indicator 1.3.2:** Percentage of Local Police Partnership Board meetings held on a monthly basis  **Baseline**: unknown (baseline data to be collected January 2020)  **Target**: 60 per cent  **Output Indicator 1.3.3:** Number of company staff from respective company community relations units trained in conflict mediation (disaggregated by gender).  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 20 | Official OVP reports, meeting minutes and attendance lists  Meeting minutes and attendance lists  Ex-ante and poste testing of company staff |  |
| ***Outcome 2: Social tensions reduced by enhancing sustainable livelihoods and food security*** |  | **Outcome Indicator 2 (a):** Percentage of targeted community members who report increased incomes  **Baseline:** The average total monthly expenditures per household of baseline survey respondents was SLL 984,775  **Target:** TBD | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 2 (b):** Percentage of targeted community members who report establishing an alternative, non-agricultural livelihood  **Baseline:** 66.2 per cent of survey respondents indicated that their households relied on non-agricultural activities for their top three livelihoods  **Target:** TBD | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 2 (c):** Level of perception of the reduction of resource-based disputes  **Baseline:** 57.8 per cent of survey respondents reported that they believe that the level of resource conflicts in their communities is either very high (26.7 per cent) or somewhat high (31.1 per cent).  **Target:** TBD | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
|  | **Outcome Indicator 2 (d):** Food Consumption Score, disaggregated by sex of household head  **Baseline:** Measures of the FCS captured by the baseline survey were 12.6 per cent with poor FCS and 65.8 per cent with borderline FCS in Moyamba and 57.2 per cent with poor FCS and 37.8 per cent with borderline FCS in Pujehun District.  **Target:** Reduction of both poor and borderline FCS in both districts by 80 per cent | Baseline and endline surveys |  |
| **Output 2.1:** Promote climate-smart agriculture practices, agricultural value chain strengthening and livelihood opportunities  **Activities implemented under this output:**  2.1.1: Community-Based Participatory Planning  2.1.2: Support communities to establish agricultural livelihoods  2.1.3: Support communities to diversify and increase their livelihood opportunities  . | **Output Indicator 2.1.1:**  Percentage of community action plans developed with participation of women  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 100% community action plans developed with minimum of 50 per cent female representation | Attendance lists from Community Based Participatory Planning |  |
| **Output Indicator 2.1.2b:** Number of farmers trained in climate-smart agriculture practices (disaggregated by gender)  **Baseline**: 0  **Target**: 800 | Training reports |  |
| **Output Indicator 2.1.3:** Percentage of targeted community members reporting non-agricultural livelihoods as their primary source of income  **Baseline**: 60.3 per cent of survey respondents indicated that their households relied on non-agricultural livelihoods as their primary source of income  **Target**: 80 per cent | Baseline and endline surveys |  |

# Annex C: Quantitative Tools

Hello. My name is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ and I am working with World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international organisations working in Sierra Leone. We are conducting a survey in this district about life in this area and about some of the groups here. We would very much appreciate your participation in this survey.

This information will help our organisation, and the government plan to deliver programmes and services in communities like this. The survey usually takes between 20 and 30 minutes to complete. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will not be shown to other persons and we will not link your name to any answers.

We cannot provide you with any direct benefits for your household, or promise any specific development for your community. But we are gathering data to better understand the situation in your community and in this district. We will make sure that what you tell us today will be communicated to WFP, UNDP, and its partners so that they can try to help communities such as this one.

Participation is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any individual question you find very personal or all of the questions. However, we hope that you will participate in this survey since your views are important.

At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey?

(After answering any questions). Do we have your consent to begin now? (Get consent).

Yes (Skip to Q 1)

No (Comments Q 6)

## Identifier Information

Q 1

Please enter the Questionnaire ID

Q1a) Questionnaire ID (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q 2

Please enter the Enumerator ID

Q2a) Enumerator ID (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q 3

Please select Chiefdom

1) Upper Banta

2) Lower Banta

3) Malen

4) Makpele

Q 4

Please select the community name

Q4a) Community name (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q 5

Q5a) Date (captured automatically by tablet)

## Respondent Characteristics

A 1

Sex of respondent

0) Male

1) Female

A 2

Age of respondent

A2a) Age (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A 3

Number of household members

A3a) Children (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A3b) Adults (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A 4

What is the sex of the head of your household?

0) Male

1) Female

A 5

What is the age of the head of your household?

A5a) Age (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A 6

Did you participate in livelihood activities supported by WFP in this area (i.e., inland valley swamp development, training, supplies and tools, etc.)

1) Yes

0) No

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

## Income and Livelihoods

(I’m now going to ask you some questions about incomes and livelihoods in this household)

B 1

“During the **last 3 months,** how many household members were contributing to household income?”

0) None

1) Number of adults (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

B 2

“What are your main sources of income?” (Please indicate the primary income sources using the codes given below, using proportional piling method: 1 Food crop production (including home gardening), 2 Cash crop production, 3 Livestock rearing and or Selling, 4 Salt Extraction, 5 Fishing, 6 Hunting/gathering, 7 Mining, 8 Petty trade/street vending, 9 Unskilled/casual labour (“contract”) – agriculture, 10 Unskilled/casual labour (“contract”) – non – agriculture, 11 Skilled labour/handicraft, 12 Regular salary from employer, 13 Shop-owner, commerce/trade, 14 Charcoal production, 15 Rubber tapping, 16 Palm oil production, 17 Palm wine production and selling, 18 Rents, 19 Support from abroad, 20 Support from within the country, 21 Pension, 96 Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ )

B2a) MAIN source of income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, Percentage of total income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_%

B2b) SECOND source of income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, Percentage of total income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_%

B2c) THIRD source of income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, Percentage of total income: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_%

B 3

“During the **last 1 month**, how much money have you spent on each of the following items or service for the household? (If some of the goods were not purchased (gift, exchange, or own production), what is its estimated value?)”

BCA) Cereals (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCb) Roots and Tubers (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

Lentils (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCc) Green Leaf (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCd) Other Vegetables (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCe) Fruits (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCf) Milk and milk products (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCg) Meat (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCh) Fish and Sea food (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCi) Eggs (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCj) Oils and Fats (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCk) Sweets (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCl) Condiments (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCm) Alcohol (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le and (specify) value gifted:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCn Soap /soap powder / detergents (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCo) Transport (fuel, taxi, okada, bus) (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCp) Firewood/char-coal (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCq) Kerosene (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCr) Drinks (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCs) Phone credit/ phone charge (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

BCt) Internet browsing (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B 4

“During the **last 6 months**, how much money have you spent to acquire each of the following?”

B4a) Agricultural/farming equipment, tools, seeds (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4b) Fishing tools (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4c) Hiring labour (group and individual) (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4d) Medical expenses, health care (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4e) Education: fees, uniform, material (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4f) Other clothing, shoes (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4g) Celebrations, social events, funerals, weddings, etc. (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4h) Utilities (electricity, gas, water, fuel) (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4i) Payment of interest rates (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4j) Housing (repairs, construction, maintenance) (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4k) Housing rent (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B4l) Other long term expenses (specify) value spent:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Le

B 5

“During the **past month**, did anyone in your household have to engage in any of the following activities because there was not enough food or money to buy food? If so, what coping strategy did you use, and how many days did you use it?” (If coping strategy not used, put '0’)

B5a) “Sold household goods (radio, furniture, refrigerator, television, jewellery, etc...)?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5b) “Sold productive assets or means of transport (sewing machine, wheelbarrow, bicycle, car, etc...)?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5c) “Reduced essential non-food expenditures such as education, health?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5d) “Spent savings?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5e) “Borrowed money / food from a formal lender/ bank?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5f) “Sold house or land?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5g) “Withdrew children from school?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5h) Illegal income activities (theft, prostitution)?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

B5i) “Sent an adult household member sought work elsewhere?” (regardless of the usual seasonal migration) Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

## Food Consumption

(I’m now going to ask you some questions about the food that is consumed in this household)

C 1

“How many days over the **last 7 days**, did members of your household eat the following food items, prepared and/or consumed at home, and what was their source?”

(Number of days eaten in past 7 days, How was this food acquired?: 1 = Own production, 2 = Fishing / Hunting, 3 = Gathering, 4 = Loan, 5 = market (credit), 6 = market (cash), 7= beg for food, 8 = exchange, 9= gift, and 10 = food aid)

C1a) Rice (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1b) Non-rice cereals, grains, roots and tubers: pasta, bread, sorghum, millet, maize, fonio, potato, yam, cassava, white sweet potato (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1c) Legumes / nuts : beans, cowpeas, peanuts, lentils, nut, soy, pigeon pea, Benny seed and / or other nuts (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1d) Milk and other dairy products: fresh milk / sour, yogurt, cheese, other dairy products (Exclude margarine / butter or small amounts of milk for tea / coffee) (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1e) Meat, fish and eggs: goat, beef, chicken, pork, blood, fish, including canned tuna, escargot, and / or other seafood, eggs (meat and fish consumed in large quantities and not as a condiment) (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1f) Vegetables and leaves: spinach, onion, tomatoes, carrots, peppers, green beans, lettuce, etc (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1g) Fruits: banana, apple, lemon, mango, papaya, apricot, peach, etc (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1h) Oil / fat / butter: vegetable oil, palm oil, shea butter, margarine, other fats / oil (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1i) Sugar, or sweet: sugar, honey, jam, cakes, candy, cookies, pastries, cakes and other sweet (sugary drinks) (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C1j) Condiments / Spices: tea, coffee / cocoa, salt, garlic, spices, yeast / baking powder, lanwin, tomato / sauce, meat or fish as a condiment, condiments including small amount of milk / tea coffee. (specify) Number of days eaten in past 7 days (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_; (specify) How was this food acquired \_\_\_\_\_\_

C 2

“**Yesterday**, how many meals did each person in the household eat?”

C2a) Adults (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C2b) Children (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C 3

“During the **past 7 days**, were there times when you did not have food or enough money to buy food?”

1) Yes

0) No

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

C 4

“If so, what coping strategy did you use, and how many days did you use it?” (If coping strategy not used, put '0’)

C4a) “Rely on less preferred and less expensive food?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C4a) “Borrow food, or rely on help from a friend or relative?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C4a) “Limit portion size at mealtime?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C4a) “Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

C4a) “Reduce number of meals eaten in a day?” Number of days coping strategy used (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

## Social Trust and Tensions

(I will now read you a number of statements about this community. Please select the response on this scale that best describes your opinion of each situation below. The scale is: strongly Agree, somewhat agree, no opinion, disagree, and strongly Disagree. Read the scale out loud for each statement.)

D 1

'People in this area can be trusted." (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 2

“People in this community are able to work together to solve problems they have.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 3

“Police in this area can be trusted." (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 4

“Police in this area are working for all people equally." (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 5

“Local government officials are working for all people equally.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 6

“Traditional leaders in this community are working for all people equally.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 7

“This community has many disputes and conflicts.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 8

“How often do you worry about conflicts or disputes in this community?” (Read scale)

1) Often

2) All the time

3) Sometimes

4) Never or almost never

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 9

“Compared to **1 year ago**, would you say that conflicts or disputes in this community are…?” (Read scale)

1) Increasing a lot

2) Increasing somewhat

3) Staying the same

4) Decreasing somewhat

5) Decreasing a lot

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

D 10

“Can you think of there are any groups that are helping make this community more peaceful?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to E 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to E 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to E 1)

D 11

“What are the groups that are helping make this community more peaceful?” (Select all that apply)

1) Youth

2) Women’s leaders

3) Traditional leaders

4) Other community leaders

5) Government

6) GRC

7) Community Development Committee

8) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

9) NGO

10) INGO

11) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

## Perceptions about Company

(Now I’m going to ask you some questions about <<Company Name>>)

E 1

Have you ever heard of <<Company Name>>?

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to F 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to F 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to F 1)

E 2

“Please explain in your own words what <<Company Name>> does. (Did the respondent give the correct explanation?)”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to )

98) Don't know (Skip to )

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to )

E 3

“In your opinion, the level of trust between people in this community and <<Company Name>> is…” (Read scale)

1) Very high

2) Somewhat high

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat low

5) Very low

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

E 4

“The people that work for <<Company Name>> cannot be trusted.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

E 5

“The presence of <<Company Name>> is placing a strain on resources (like: land, water, etc.) in this community.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

E 6

“If I have a problem with <<Company Name>>, I know who I can go to for help.”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to E 8)

98) Don't know (Skip to E 8)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to E 8)

E 7

“If yes, what group or groups would you go to for help?” (Select all that apply)

1) Youth leaders

2) Women’s leaders

3) Traditional leaders

4) Other community leaders

5) Government

6) GRC

7) Community Development Committee

8) <<Company Name>>

9) NGO

10) INGO

11) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

E 8

“In terms of the benefits that <<Company Name>> brings to people in this community, would you say they are…?” (Read scale)

1) Many benefits

2) Some benefits

3) Few benefits

4) No benefits (Skip to E 10)

98) Don’t know (Skip to E 10)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to E 10)

E 9

“What are the main benefits <<Company Name>> brings to this community?” (List all responses given).

E9a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

E 10

“Are there problems <<Company Name>> brings to people in this community?”

1) Many problems

2) Some problems

3) Few problems

4) No problems (Skip to E 12)

98) Don’t know (Skip to E 12)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to E 12)

E 11

“What are the main problems <<Company Name>> brings to this community?” (List all responses given).

E11a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

E 12

“Has anybody you know totally lost their work, business, or occupation because <<Company Name>> is in your community now?”

1) Yes

0) No

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

E 13

“Has anybody you know lost only some their work, business, or occupation (but not all of it) because <<Company Name>> is in your community now?”

1) Yes

0) No

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

E 14

“<<Company Name>> is doing well to respond to the needs of people in this community.” (Read scale)

1) Always

2) Sometime of the time

3) Seldom or never

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

E 15

“<<Company Name>> considers the needs of all the people of this community”. (Read scale)

1) Always

2) Sometime of the time

3) Seldom

4) Never

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

## Perceptions about Community Development Committee

(Now I’m going to ask you some questions about the Community Development Committee and Community Development Funds)

F 1

“Have you ever heard of something called the Community Development Committee?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to G 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to G 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 1)

F 2

“Please explain in your own words what Community Development Committee is.” (Did the respondent give the correct explanation?)

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to G 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to G 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 1)

F 3

“The Community Development Committee represents the best interests of everybody in this community.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

F 4

“In terms of the benefits that the Community Development Committee brings to people in this community, would you say they are…?” (Read scale)

1) Many benefits

2) Some benefits

3) Few benefits

4) No benefits (Skip to F 6)

98) Don’t know (Skip to F 6)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to F 6)

F 5

“What are the main benefits the Community Development Committee brings to this community?”

F5a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

F 6

“In terms of the problems that the Community Development Committee brings to people in this community, would you say they are…?” (Read scale)

1) Many problems

2) Some problems

3) Few problems

4) No problems (Skip to F 8)

98) Don’t know (Skip to F 8)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to F 8

F 7

“What are the main problems the Community Development Committee brings to this community?”

F7a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

F 8

“In your opinion, the level of trust between people in this community and the Community Development Committee is…”

1) Very high

2) Somewhat high

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat low

5) Very low

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

F 9

“In your opinion, the relationship between people in this community and the Community Development Committee is…” (Read scale)

1) Very good

2) Somewhat good

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat bad

5) Very bad

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

F 10

“Now we are talking about something called Community Development Funds. Have you ever heard of something called the Community Development Funds?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to G 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to G 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 1)

F 11

“Please explain in your own words what Community Development Funds are.” (Did the respondent give the correct explanation?)

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to G 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to G 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 1)

F 12

“The Community Development Funds benefit all the people in this community equally.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

F 13

“All people in this community have a say in how Community Development Funds are used.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

## Perceptions about GRC

(Now I’m going to ask you some questions about the GRC)

G 1

“Have you ever heard of something called GRC?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to H 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to H 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to H 1)

G 2

“Please explain in your own words what the GRC is.” (Did the respondent give the correct explanation?)

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to H 1)

98) Don't know (Skip to H 1)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to H 1)

G 3

“The GRC represents the best interests of everybody in this community.” (Read scale)

1) Strongly agree

2) Somewhat agree

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat disagree

5) Strongly disagree

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

G 4

“In terms of the benefits that GRC brings to people in this community, would you say they are…?” (Read scale)

1) Many benefits

2) Some benefits

3) Few benefits

4) No benefits (Skip to G 6)

98) Don’t know (Skip to G 6)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 6)

G 5

“What are the main benefits the GRC brings to this community?”

G5a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

G 6

“In terms of the problems that GRC brings to people in this community, would you say they are…?” (Read scale)

1) Many problems

2) Some problems

3) Few problems

4) No problems (Skip to G 8)

98) Don’t know (Skip to G 8)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to G 8)

G 7

“What are the main problems the GRC brings to this community?”

G7a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_

G 8

“In your opinion, the level of trust between people in this community and the GRC is…” (Read scale)

1) Very high

2) Somewhat high

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat low

5) Very low

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

G 9

“In your opinion, the relationship between people in this community and the GRC is…” (Read scale)

1) Very good

2) Somewhat good

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat bad

5) Very bad

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

## Conflict and Disputes

(Now I’m going to ask you some questions about conflict and disputes in this community)

H 1

“Would you say that the level of disputes or conflicts in this community is…” (Read scale)

1) Very high

2) High

3) No opinion

4) Low

5) Very low (Skip to H 5)

98) Don’t know (Skip to H 5)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to H 5)

H 2

“What are the main reasons for disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select all that apply)

1) Too few jobs

2) Too little land

3) Lack of movement

4) No government services

5) Unequal distribution of surface rents

6) Unequal distribution of community development funds

7) Unequal distribution of all other resources

96) Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

H 3

“Which are the important groups causing disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select all that apply)

1) Neighbours or people in this community generally

2) Youth

3) Women’s leaders

4) Traditional leaders

5) Other community leaders

6) Government

7) GRC

8) Community Development Committee

9) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

10) NGO

11) INGO

12) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 4

“Which is the most important group in causing disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select only one)

1) Neighbours or people in this community generally

2) Youth

3) Women’s leaders

4) Traditional leaders

5) Other community leaders

6) Government

7) GRC

8) Community Development Committee

9) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

10) NGO

11) INGO

12) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 5

“Which are important groups that can solve disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select all that apply)

1) Youth leaders

2) Women’s leaders

3) Traditional leaders

4) Other community leaders

5) Government

6) GRC

7) Community Development Committee

8) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

9) NGO

10) INGO

11) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 6

“Which is the most important group in solving disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select only one)

1) Youth leaders

2) Women’s leaders

3) Traditional leaders

4) Other community leaders

5) Government

6) GRC

7) Community Development Committee

8) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

9) NGO

10) INGO

11) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 7

“Would you say that the level of land disputes or conflicts in this community is…” (Read scale)

1) Very high

2) High

3) No opinion

4) Low

5) Very low (Skip to H 9)

98) Don’t know (Skip to H 9)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to H 9)

H 8

“In your opinion, what are the most common causes of land disputes or conflicts in this community?” (Select only one)

1) Trespassing on people’s land

2) Land taken away from you without consent or compensation

3) Unauthorised use of resources on people’s land

4) Destruction of land and resources

5) Contamination of people’s land and resources

6) Unfair eviction

98) Do not know

99) Refuse to answer

H 9

“In the last **2 years**, have you ever been ever been involved in any form of land disputes or conflicts in your area?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to Comments

Q 6)

98) Don't know (Skip to Comments Q 6)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to Comments Q 6)

H 10

“For the last land conflict you were involved in, please explain in your own words what was the dispute or conflict about?”

H8a) Specify: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

H 11

“Who was the conflict with?” (Select all that apply)

1) Neighbours or people in this community generally

2) Youth

3) Women’s leaders

4) Traditional leaders

5) Other community leaders

6) Government

7) GRC

8) Community Development Committee

9) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

10) NGO

11) INGO

12) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 12

“Was the dispute or conflict peacefully resolved?”

1) Yes

0) No (Skip to Comments Q 6)

98) Don't know (Skip to Comments Q 6)

99) Refuse to answer (Skip to Comments Q 6)

H 13

“If the dispute or conflict was peacefully resolved, which dispute or conflict resolution system did you or the person use?” (Select all that apply)

1) Youth leaders

2) Women’s leaders

3) Traditional leaders

4) Other community leaders

5) Government

6) GRC

7) Community Development Committee

8) Private company: (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

9) NGO

10) INGO

11) Police

96) Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

98) Don't know

99) Refuse to answer

H 14

“How fair do you think was the resolution to the dispute or conflict? (Read scale)

1) Very fair

2) Somewhat fair

3) No opinion

4) Somewhat unfair

5) Very unfair

98) Don’t know

99) Refuse to answer

H 15

**“**Thank you for speaking with me today. The interview has now been completed. Do you have any questions regarding the interview?”

## Comments

Q 6

Q6a) COMMENTS ABOUT SURVEY, IF NOT COMPLETED: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q6b) COMMENTS ABOUT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Q6c) OTHER COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

*END*

# Annex D: Qualitative Tools

## Officer of the Resident Coordinator

Relevance:

1. Did the project address the most important underlying peacebuilding issues in the project communities? Are there any key peacebuilding issues that remain unaddressed?
2. Have the relevant peacebuilding issues changed throughout the lifecycle of the project (especially with COVID-19)? If so, did the project adequately change with the evolving situation?
3. How well aligned is the project with Sierra Leone’s cooperation framework?

Coherence:

1. Is the project well-integrated into other peacebuilding projects/programmes in the districts it is working in? Are there any notable redundancies/overlaps relative other programmes?

Effectiveness:

1. What were the main successes during implementation?
2. What were the main challenges during implementation?

Impact:

1. What were the main impacts on peacebuilding from the project?
2. Were there any unintended impacts – positive or negative? If so, what were these and how did the project manage them?

Efficiency:

1. Were all project activities undertaken in the most cost-effective manner? Were there any project activities that could have benefited from greater efficiency?
2. Did the project promote synergies according to the respective comparative advantages of UNDP and WFP to help achieve greater value for money than if the work been done individually? Where were synergies from joint programming created where they otherwise would not have been if the two agencies had implemented their respective project components separately?

Sustainability:

1. How sustainable are the peacebuilding effects of the project? Are there any that might not be sustained?
2. What key programming lessons (positive or negative) came out of the project that might be scalable or transferable to other projects?

Conclusion:

1. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## World Food Programme / United Nations Development Programme

Relevance:

1. Did the project address the most important underlying conflict issues in the project communities? Were there any key peacebuilding issues that remain unaddressed still?
2. Have the peacebuilding issues changed throughout the lifecycle of the project? How and why? If so, did the project adequately change with the evolving situation?

Coherence:

1. How does the project reflect the comparative advantage of WFP/UNDP in peacekeeping? Are there ways that the project can better reflect the agency’s comparative advantage in this area?
2. Is the project integrated coherently into other WFP/UNDP projects/programmes in Sierra Leone? How does it complement those programmes? Does it create redundancies/overlaps relative other projects?

Effectiveness:

1. Have all the expected outputs been achieved to date? Are there any outputs that have been missed (especially with the COVID-19 pandemic)? If so, why?
2. How did the project design seek to benefit the most vulnerable, disadvantaged, and marginalised populations?
3. How did the project design incorporate principles of human rights to strengthen its contribution to national development results?
4. How did the project design incorporate principles of environmental sustainability to strengthen its contribution to national development results?

Impact:

1. What were the main impacts of the project? Did all target groups (and everybody in the target groups) benefit from the impacts as expected? Were there any groups left behind?
2. Were there any unintended impacts? If so, what were these and how did the project manage them?
3. How did the COVID-19 pandemic or other external forces affect the project impacts?

Efficiency:

1. Were project activities funded in adequately and in a timely way? Were there any programming areas that were not adequately funded, or where funding delayed programming?
2. Were all project activities undertaken in the most cost-effective manner? Were there any project activities that could have benefited from greater efficiency?
3. Did the project promote synergies according to the respective comparative advantages of UNDP and WFP to help achieve greater value for money than if the work been done individually? Where were synergies from joint programming created where they otherwise would not have been if the two agencies had implemented their respective project components separately?

Sustainability:

1. What is the likelihood that progress towards the project outcomes/outputs sustained by national partners and stakeholders over time (i.e., has the project made long-lasting and societal changes in communities)? What achievements are likely/unlikely to continue beyond the project period?
2. Have key stakeholders (e.g., government, CSO, companies, or communities) made commitments (especially financial commitments) to sustain the project after its completion?
3. What factors could undermine the sustainability of the project?
4. What key programming lessons (positive or negative) came out of the project that might be scalable or transferable to other projects?

Conclusion:

1. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Office of The Vice President

Relevance:

1. Did the project address the most important underlying peacebuilding issues in the project communities? Are there any key peacebuilding issues that remain unaddressed?
2. Have the relevant peacebuilding issues changed throughout the lifecycle of the project (especially with COVID-19)? If so, did the project adequately change with the evolving situation?
3. How well aligned is the project with Sierra Leone’s key peacebuilding priorities (as well as any relevant policies/plans)?

Coherence:

1. Is the project well-integrated into other peacebuilding projects/programmes in the districts it is working in? Are there any notable redundancies/overlaps relative other programmes?

Effectiveness:

1. What were the main successes during implementation?
2. What were the main challenges during implementation?

Impact:

1. What were the main impacts on peacebuilding from the project?
2. Were there any unintended impacts – positive or negative? If so, what were these and how did the project manage them?

Efficiency:

1. Were all project activities undertaken in the most cost-effective manner? Were there any project activities that could have benefited from greater efficiency?
2. Did funding requirements change due to changing priorities (especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic)? Was project funding adapted appropriately? Was the rationale for the funding changes transparent and accountable?
3. Did the project promote synergies according to the respective comparative advantages of UNDP and WFP to help achieve greater value for money than if the work been done individually? Where were synergies from joint programming created where they otherwise would not have been if the two agencies had implemented their respective project components separately?

Sustainability:

1. How sustainable are the peacebuilding effects of the project? Are there any that might not be sustained?
2. What commitments has the GoSL made (at central, district, and chiefdom level) to ensure the sustainability of the project?
3. What key programming lessons (positive or negative) came out of the project that might be scalable or transferable to other projects?

Conclusion:

1. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Namati, Fambul Tok, and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Relevance:

1. Did the project address the most important underlying conflict issues in the project communities? Were there any key peacebuilding issues that remain unaddressed still?
2. Have the peacebuilding issues changed throughout the lifecycle of the project? How and why? If so, did the project adequately change with the evolving situation?

Coherence:

1. Is the project integrated coherently into other peacebuilding/development initiatives in the districts/chiefdoms it is working in?

Effectiveness:

1. Have all the expected outputs been achieved to date? Are there any outputs that have been missed (especially with the COVID-19 pandemic)? If so, why?
2. How did the project design seek to benefit the most vulnerable, disadvantaged, and marginalised populations?

Impact:

1. What were the main impacts of the project? Did all target groups (and everybody in the target groups) benefit from the impacts as expected? Were there any groups left behind?
2. Were there any unintended impacts? If so, what were these and how did the project manage them?
3. How did the COVID-19 pandemic or other external forces affect the project impacts?

Efficiency:

1. Were project activities funded in adequately and in a timely way? Were there any programming areas that were not adequately funded, or where funding delayed programming?
2. Were all project activities undertaken in the most cost-effective manner? Were there any project activities that could have benefited from greater efficiency?

Sustainability:

1. What is the likelihood that progress towards the project outcomes/outputs sustained by national partners and stakeholders over time (i.e., has the project made long-lasting and societal changes in communities)? What achievements are likely/unlikely to continue beyond the project period?
2. Have key stakeholders (e.g., government, CSO, companies, or communities) made commitments (especially financial commitments) to sustain the project after its completion?
3. What key programming lessons (positive or negative) came out of the project that might be scalable or transferable to other projects?

Conclusion:

1. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## District Councils and Ward Councillors

1. What are the main social tensions in this district? How have concessions affected these?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. Do concession companies in this area respond to the needs of communities?
4. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
5. What are the key local groups/platforms (probe for: GRC, CDCs, MSPs, LPPB, etc.) in this district working to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? How active is each group?
6. What have been then main successes of these groups in the last one year in preventing or managing (disputes, protests, or conflicts)? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
7. What is the level of trust between communities and these various structures (especially CDCs and GRC)? Are these mechanisms accountable to communities?
8. In the last year, have communities’ relationships with the company change (e.g., improved, no change, or worsened)? Why? What still needs to be done to improve the relationship between the company and communities?
9. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Grievance Redress Committees

1. How many members does the GRC have? How many of those members are women/youth? How many of those members are youth? How many times does the group meet each month? How many times in the last month? Does the group have a budget?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
4. In the last year one year, what were the different actions the GRC took in this area to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? What were the main successes of these? Who did they benefit? Are these captured in a register or meeting minutes?
5. Do communities in this area trust this group? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the group and communities?
6. Is this group accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the group and communities?
7. Are there any ways that this group is working with the concession company? Have relations between the concession company and communities become better, stayed the same, or worse? Have these changes affected everybody in this community the same (e.g., youth and women)?
8. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Community Development Committees

1. How many members does the CDC have? How many of those members are women/youth? How many of those members are youth? How many times does the group meet each month? How many times in the last month? Does the group have a budget?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
4. In the last year one year, what were the different actions the CDC took in this area to promote development or to prevent tension in this area? What were the main successes of these? Who did they benefit? Are these captured in a register or meeting minutes?
5. Do communities in this area trust this group? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the group and communities?
6. Is this group accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the group and communities?
7. Are there any ways that this group is working with the concession company? Have relations between the concession company and communities become better, stayed the same, or worse? Have these changes affected everybody in this community the same (e.g., youth and women)?
8. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Local Police Partnership Boards

1. How many members does the LBBP have? How many of those members are women/youth? How many of those members are youth? How many times does the group meet each month? How many times in the last month? Does the group have a budget?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
4. In the last year one year, what were the different actions the LBBP took in this area to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? What were the main successes of these? Who did they benefit? Are these captured in a register or meeting minutes?
5. Do communities in this area trust this group? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the group and communities?
6. Is this group accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the group and communities?
7. Are there any ways that this group is working with the concession company? Have relations between the concession company and communities become better, stayed the same, or worse? Have these changes affected everybody in this community the same (e.g., youth and women)?
8. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Multi-Stakeholder Platforms

1. How many members does the MSP have? How many of those members are women/youth? How many of those members are youth? How many times does the group meet each month? How many times in the last month? Does the group have a budget?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
4. In the last year one year, what were the different actions the MSP took in this area to help manage natural resources or prevent tension in this area? What were the main successes of these? Who did they benefit? Are these captured in a register or meeting minutes?
5. In the last year, has the MSP taken steps to promote/implement VGGT/SLEITI?
6. Do communities in this area trust this group? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the group and communities?
7. Is this group accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the group and communities?
8. Are there any ways that this group is working with the concession company? Have relations between the concession company and communities become better, stayed the same, or worse? Have these changes affected everybody in this community the same (e.g., youth and women)?
9. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Concession Companies

1. How does the company benefit the communities in the concession area? Give examples of initiatives or projects through which the company has benefited communities. How does the company benefit women and youth specifically?
2. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
3. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
4. What are the key local groups/platforms (probe for: GRC, CDCs, MSPs, LPPB, etc.) this company is working with in this area prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts?
5. What have been then main successes in the last one year of working with these groups to prevent or manage (disputes, protests, or conflicts)? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
6. How was the relationship between the company and communities changed in the last one year?
7. Do communities in this area trust this company? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the company and communities?
8. Is this company accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the company and communities?
9. What can still be done to improve collaboration between the company and communities? To make it more effective? More inclusive?
10. In the last one year, what steps has the company taken to implement VGGT/SLEITI?
11. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Community Leaders

1. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
2. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
3. Are communities in this area included in decision-making about how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed? Are there instances where communities are still excluded from decision-making about natural resources (especially land)?
4. In the last year, has communities’ inclusion in how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed?
5. In the last one year, have livelihoods of people in this community become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the main reasons for this? How has this affected social tensions (disputes, protests, or conflicts)?
6. What are the key local groups/platforms (probe for: GRC, CDCs, MSPs, LPPB, etc.) in this area that work with community leaders to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? How active is each group in including the voices of communities?
7. What have been then main successes of these groups in the last one year in preventing or managing (disputes, protests, or conflicts)? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
8. Do communities in this area trust the concession company? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the company and communities?
9. Is the concession company accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the company and communities?
10. Are there any ways that the concession company has benefited communities in this area? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
11. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Women

1. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
2. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
3. Are women in this area included in decision-making about how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed? Are there instances where women are still excluded from decision-making about natural resources (especially land)?
4. In the last year, has women’s inclusion in how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed?
5. In the last one year, have livelihoods of people in this community become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the main reasons for this? How has this affected social tensions (disputes, protests, or conflicts)?
6. What are the key local groups/platforms (probe for: GRC, CDCs, MSPs, LPPB, etc.) in this area that work with women to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? How active is each group in including the voices of women?
7. What have been then main successes of these groups in the last one year in preventing or managing (disputes, protests, or conflicts)? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
8. Do communities in this area trust the concession company? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the company and communities?
9. Is the concession company accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the company and communities?
10. Are there any ways that the concession company has benefited communities in this area? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
11. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

## Youth

1. Have any protests, disputes, or conflicts related to the natural resources (especially land) occurred in the last year? What were the issues underlying these? Were they resolved? If so, what were the key groups helped resolve the conflict?
2. In the last one year, have disputes, protests, or conflicts become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the reasons for this?
3. Are youth in this area included in decision-making about how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed? Are there instances where youth are still excluded from decision-making about natural resources (especially land)?
4. In the last year, has youth’s inclusion in how natural resources (especially land) are managed or distributed?
5. In the last one year, have livelihoods of people in this community become better, stayed the same, or worse? What are the main reasons for this? How has this affected social tensions (disputes, protests, or conflicts)?
6. What are the key local groups/platforms (probe for: GRC, CDCs, MSPs, LPPB, etc.) in this area that work with youth to prevent or manage disputes, protests, or conflicts? How active is each group in including the voices of youth?
7. What have been then main successes of these groups in the last one year in preventing or managing (disputes, protests, or conflicts)? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
8. Do communities in this area trust the concession company? What are examples of this trust (or lack of it)? How can trust still be improved between the company and communities?
9. Is the concession company accountable to communities in this area? What are examples of this accountability (or lack thereof)? How can accountability still be improved between the company and communities?
10. Are there any ways that the concession company has benefited communities in this area? Were the benefits of the successes shared by everybody (e.g., youth, women, etc.)?
11. Based on our discussion here, is there anything else that you would like to add, highlight, or explain in greater detail?

1. von Grebmer, Klaus, et al., 2021, *2021 Global Hunger Index: Hunger and Food Systems in Conflict Settings*, Report published for Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide, pp. 16-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Herbert M’cleod, Herbert, and Brian Ganson, 2018, *The Underlying Causes of Fragility and Instability in Sierra Leone*, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Oxfam, 2019, *The Humanitarian-Development Peace Nexus: What does it mean for multi-mandated organizations?,* Oxfam Discussion Paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. UNDP, “UNDP Sierra Leone”, <https://www.undp.org/> (6 July 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Green Scenery, 2022, “Arbitrary Harassment and Criminalization of Land Activists in Malen Chiefdom, Peacefully Objecting to The RSPO Certification of SOCFIN”, 6 May. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. At the time of writing the endline, 1,000,000 SLL was approximately USD 75.93. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In April 2022, food inflation in Sierra Leone was reported at a staggering 23 per cent over the same month last year; see, Trading Economics, “Sierra Leone Food Inflation”, <https://tradingeconomics.com/sierra-leone/food-inflation#:~:text=Food%20Inflation%20in%20Sierra%20Leone,percent%20in%20November%20of%202019>. (4 July 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. OECD-DAC, “Evaluation Criteria”, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> (27 June 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. UNDP and WFP, 2019, *PBF Project Document*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. UNDP and WFP, 2019, *PBF IRF (final)*, 25 November. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. UN Peacebuilding Support Office, *The PBF in Sierra Leone*. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. UN, 2017, *UNDP Strategic Plan, 2018-2021*, 28 November, DP/2017/38, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. WFP, 2019, *Draft Sierra Leone Country Strategic Plan (2020–2024)*, 29 August 2019 WFP/EB.2/2019/8-A/7/DRAFT\*, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Baseline activities commenced in November of 2019, with fieldwork taking place in late December of the same year. The report was drafted and finalised in April 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Fieldwork for the baseline study was carried out November-December 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The baseline survey used a two-stage sampling design. In the first stage, communities were selected with probability proportional to their population relative to the district they are in. The sampling design was based on collated community and population lists collected through local partners. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Calculations were made using an unknown prevalence rate of perceptions, using a confidence interval of +/- 5 and a 95 per cent level of confidence. Further adjustments were made to account for the cluster sampling methodology using a design effect of two; as is typical for surveys using this type of methodology. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Calculations were made using an unknown prevalence rate of perceptions, using a confidence interval of +/- 5 and a 95 per cent level of confidence. Further adjustments were made to account for the cluster sampling methodology using a design effect of two; as is typical for surveys using this type of methodology. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Sierra Leone’s *National Youth Policy and the National Youth Commission Act 2010* defines youth in the country as those between 15 and 35 years of age. The survey used this definition as a starting point, but chose to increase the lower threshold of research participants to eighteen years-of-age in order to avoid conducting research with minors. Conducting research with this cohort requires extensive practical and ethical training. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Youth will be defined by as those persons up to 35 years-of-age; as per Sierra Leone’s *National Youth Policy* and the *National Youth Commission Act 2010* youth are defined as those 15-35 years old. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Using 6-12 persons per discussions is standard practice when conducting FGDs. The lower end of this spectrum was chosen to allow for a deeper analysis of the project through discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
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60. Cash-based transfers were approximately USD 2.90 per day, for sixty days. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Moyamba District had 1,165 participants (757males and 408 females) and Pujehun District had 692 participants (453 males and 239 females). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Moyamba District had 1,094 participants (692 males and 402 females) and Pujehun District had 742 participants (487 males and 267 females). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
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68. There were some exceptions to the general rule that companies are generally unresponsive to communities. One tangible example of a company responding to community needs was that noted by Natural Habitats, the company that seemed most actively engaged in GRCs. In an interview with a company representative it was noted that the venue important resolving the non-payment of leases in 2020. Specifically the GRC provided a forum where the company and community could meet in order to work towards a resolution to pay two years worth of leases in 2021, and to help ensure that subsequent leases would be paid on time. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. These are: Senehun, Kpanga Kpolowahun, Mokonneh, Magboyor, and Madina. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Ninety per cent properly explained what CDC is and 88.8 per cent correctly explained what CDFs are and what they can be used for. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
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72. UNDP, 2021, “To Collect Data/Information and Monitor Progress Made in Project Implementation for The Second Annual Reporting in Moyamba and Pujehun Districts”, *Back to Office Report*, 1 November. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. In Malen, the group was named the ‘Social and GRC’, but is closely aligned with the Chiefdom Council and seems to take on functions of an ad hoc CDC. In Makepele it was known as the Chiefdom Developmetn and Grievance Redress Committee, taking on the functions of both the GRC and CDC. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
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75. According to a press release from the Office of The Paramount Chief, the petition circulated to protest the certification of Socfin was “was shrouded in controversy and disagreement as 95% of the names that was published in the social media pages of Green Scenery was faulty and defective thereby exposing the deep-rooted hatred and malice Green Scenery and FIAN-Belgium for the agricultural company in Sahn-Malen Chiefdom”. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Committee on World Food Security, *SE134 Responsible Land Investment for Sustainable Food Systems: Taking Stock of Lessons from Pilots, Partnerships and Multi-stakeholder Platforms with Governments, CSOs and Business to Implement The VGGT*, http://www.fao.org/cfs/home/plenary/cfs46/cfs46se/se134/en/ (5 July 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Neither the baseline nor the endline surveys provided quantitative measures of the effectiveness of the MSPs. MSPs exist at the district level, and qualitative research suggests there is very little awareness of this structure or its functions at among Sierra Leoneans living in project communities. Therefore measuring perceptions among community members of MSP effectiveness would accurately reflect the outcome of the MSPs work. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. In Malen Chiefdom, research participants suggested that arrests without due process were exacerbated by Socfin, which reportedly pays private security on the fruit farm SLL 1 milllion for apprehending anybody they deem has stolen palm fruits. Further, the company reportedly has SLP officers stationed directly on the land (the only chiefdom where this was said to be so), further encouraging the perception that police favour the interests of the company over nearby communities. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Lowest 25 and highest 25 total expenditures were removed from the data set as part of cleaning, in order to eliminate extreme entries. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. At the time of writing the endline, 1,000,000 SLL was approximately USD 75.93. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Lowest 25 and highest 25 total expenditures were removed from the data set as part of cleaning, in order to eliminate extreme entries. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Those households that spend 75 per cent or more of their budget on food are considered very poor; those that spend 65 and 75 per cent of their budget on food are considered poor; those that spend between 50 and 65 per cent of their budget on food are considered borderline; and those that spend equal to, or less than, 50 per cent of their budget on food are considered acceptable. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
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87. This is due to changes in WFP’s standard measurements of the livelihood sources. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
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89. Those households with a FCS of 0-21 are considered poor, while those with a score of 21-35 or 35 or more are considered borderline or acceptable, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. At the baseline there were 34.9 per cent of respondents that reported poor food consumption, and 51.8 per cent and 13.3 per cent that fell into the borderline and acceptable categories, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
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