**FINAL EVALUATION report**

**FINAL EVALUATION OF THE BUILDING PEACE WITHIN AND WITH YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN IN SIRTE Project**

Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator (RCO)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

World Food Programme (WFP)

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

TABLE OF CONTENTS ii

[EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii](#_Toc105864033)

[LIST OF Acronyms AND ABBREVIATIONS viii](#_Toc105864034)

[1. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION 1](#_Toc105864035)

[2. POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR THE PROJECT 2](#_Toc105864036)

[3. DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILDING PEACE WITHIN AND WITH YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN IN SIRTE PROJECT 4](#_Toc105864037)

[4. EVALUATION METHODS 4](#_Toc105864038)

[5. KEY FINDINGS 6](#_Toc105864039)

[**Relevance** 7](#_Toc105864040)

[**Coherence** 8](#_Toc105864041)

[**Effectiveness** 11](#_Toc105864042)

[**Efficiency** 25](#_Toc105864043)

[**Sustainability & Ownership** 27](#_Toc105864044)

[**Conflict Sensitivity** 28](#_Toc105864045)

[**Catalytic Effects** 29](#_Toc105864046)

[**Gender-responsiveness/Gender-sensitivity** 30](#_Toc105864047)

[**Risk Tolerance & Innovation** 30](#_Toc105864048)

[6. CONCLUSIONS 31](#_Toc105864049)

[7. LESSONS LEARNED 32](#_Toc105864050)

[8. RECOMMENDATIONS 33](#_Toc105864051)

[ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE FINAL EVALUATION 37](#_Toc105864052)

[ANNEX 2: EVALUATION MATRIX 48](#_Toc105864053)

[ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 53](#_Toc105864054)

[ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 55](#_Toc105864055)

[ANNEX 5: EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS 56](#_Toc105864056)

[ANNEX 6: SIGNED PLEDGE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT 61](#_Toc105864057)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

*Introduction*

The Office of the UN Resident Coordinator (RCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and World Food Programme (WFP) developed the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. The UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) provided the four Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs) with USD 2.95 million to implement the project. The project was designed for 18 months per PBF rules and implemented, including with a six month no-cost extension, from 5 December 2019 to 4 December 2021.

The purpose of the project evaluation is to assess the achievements of the project in Sirte in an inclusive way and to determine its overall added value to peacebuilding in Libya at its completion. The evaluators were asked to answer specific evaluation questions framed under evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and ownership, conflict sensitivity, catalytic effects, gender-responsiveness/gender-sensitivity, and risk-tolerance and innovation.

The Final Evaluation explains why the evaluation was conducted, the background for the project, and the methods used in the evaluation. Findings from the evaluation’s methods are followed by summaries of accumulated findings as conclusions. Conclusions are analysed to make recommendations and draw lessons learned from the project. Annexes include the Terms of Reference for the evaluator, the evaluation matrix, bibliography, list of interviewees, and data collection instruments.

*Political and developmental context for the project*

Libya has both a national governance and security crisis, as well as fragmented and highly localized security and governance crises, as in Sirte. The peacebuilding issues were seen as particularly important for young people, the largest population cohort in the country, as well as especially notable in Sirte which suffered from conflict in the civil war between different sides and then occupation by the Islamic State (IS).

*Description of the project*

The project aimed to addresses vulnerabilities and support resiliencies by promoting the participation of young people in peacebuilding through two outcomes: Young men and women, and adolescents are able to manage psychosocial stress factors and their vulnerability, and to peacefully participate and collaborate in resolving socio-economic challenges with other members of the community in Sirte – and Young people are empowered through the activities and services at the Youth Friendly Safe Space to represent his and her community or constituency, and to actively participate in political forums and meetings with decision makers to ensure that the voices of young people and adolescents are recognized and reflected in local political processes. The Project Document (ProDoc) set a target to reach of approximately 1,000 adolescents and youth for the project, with attention to gender.

*Evaluation methods*

UNDP contracted with a national and an international evaluator to work as a team for the evaluation. The Evaluation Team (ET) developed a draft and then final inception report through the review of documents and consultations with UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and the RCO in January 2022. After revision, and a second round of revision incorporating PBSO comments, the ET implemented the approved plans from the inception report. Fieldwork in February and March 2022 consisted of document review, remote interviews with RUNOs and the RCO by the international evaluator, and a mix of in-person and remote interviews by the national evaluator in Arabic with implementing partners (IPs), stakeholders, and beneficiaries to reach 23 informants.

*Key findings*

*Relevance*: The ProDoc and interviews made a compelling case for the relevance of the project in addressing young people as important actors in conflict and peace. The project remained relevant in its approach and goals as the unanticipated COVID-19 pandemic hit Libya during implementation. The project contributed towards SDGs, although the UN and government in Libya lacked frameworks for these achievements. The project was clearly relevant to the needs and priorities of young people as the beneficiaries.

*Coherence*: Coherence was supported by the four RUNOs working in areas that their agencies focused and specialized on in the coherent UN system. RUNOs used well established methods that their Agencies used elsewhere in Libya and around the world. RUNOs generally did not however coordinate and link their work as the project did not have a UNDP project manager to coordinate the project as anticipated in the ProDoc nor develop the youth center that was planned as the center piece of the project. Sirte stakeholders were involved in the design but were removed from power with the takeover of the city by non-UN recognized entities.

*Effectiveness*: The project reported exceeding or meeting its targets in 12 of the 26 output indicators established in the ProDoc. Another three were almost met and the status of two was not clear. That left eight not met or still in process. While the project achieved many of its outputs, documents and interviews noted that the project was less successful in achieving its overall objectives and strategic vision. Indicators for the project’s six outcomes were not developed or measured with precision. The project reported that two were not met and the evaluation finds that of the other four, the three output 1 indicators were not met while the third outcome 2 measurement was not met/in process. Delays in project start-up were seen by RUNO staff as having negatively affected the credibility of RUNOs and the project with partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. The establishment of a youth-friendly safe space (a youth center) that was at the core of the concept for the joint project was not done, which impeded the effectiveness of work towards the rest of the activities, as did not having a project manager to coordinate the activities of all four RUNOs. The project did not develop ways in its design, implementation, or at closure to have clear targets with measurement methods for the project’s outcome indicators.

*Efficiency*: RUNOs and the RCO noted issues throughout the project with staffing, planning, coordination, and implementing activities and limited coherence and coordination in practice. Not having a project manager was seen as a weakness. The absence of a youth center as envisioned increased costs and reduced efficiencies that were envisioned in the ProDoc.

*Sustainability & Ownership*: Although the partnership with government in the city was weak, RUNOs noted some ways that their activities had support for stakeholders that made some of the work more sustainable. Many activities did not have ways to institutionalize the benefits, which reached individual youth and adolescents.

*Conflict Sensitivity:* Despite working largely from Tripoli and Tunis, project staff and IPs were able to engage with and gain the trust of the intelligence and security agencies in Sirte needed to implement activities. IPs differed on whether concerns about conflict sensitivity drove their activities or beneficiary selection, but at the same time asserted that outreach and selection of beneficiaries made sure to reach all tribes and parts of the city.

*Catalytic Effects:* The project had limited catalytic effects, perhaps since it had limited outputs and outcomes. Peacebuilding and youth funding is also limited for projects in Libya. UNDP suggested that the project did have the effect of stimulate the Libyan government to plan to fund rehabilitation of the youth center, as UNDP did not rehabilitate it as planned through the PBF project. The project has led to a small UNICEF project that extended UNICEF’s activities to additional municipalities. Scaling up has not happened; RUNOs noted continued challenges with resource mobilization for peacebuilding.

*Gender-responsiveness/Gender-sensitivity:* The project recognized the particular effects of conflict on women and girls and the need for both incorporating women and girls into activities in general plus providing special attention to girls.

*Risk Tolerance & Innovation:* The project faced tremendous risks which had many negative consequences for implementation but had few ways to manage or mitigate these risks. The Libyan National Army takeover of Site raised the most prominent risks, which were met by delaying activities as the UN did not recognize the authority of the East-based government, and then avoiding their leaders in Sirte once the UN decided that work in the city was feasible. With Government of National Unity rule, the project was not able to develop relationships with the new authorities – including after the Government of National Unity started to extend its authority to Sirte by April or May 2021 - that could manage key activities in partnership with the government, particularly the renovation of the youth center

*Conclusions*

The Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project was a short-term but relevant initiative by UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP – with the support of the RCO – to enlist PBF funding to work towards elevating the roles of young women and men and adolescents in the challenging context of Libya in crisis. RUNOs chose to work in Sirte as a municipality that had particularly suffered from conflict. The goals, plans in the ProDoc, and activities of the project towards meeting these goals were clearly relevant to the beneficiaries in Sirte, Libyan government priorities, and fit the expertise and experience of UN agencies and the integrated strategic framework that guided UN engagement.

RUNOs had a coherent focus, working on activities that were foci of their agencies worldwide. However RUNOs did not coordinate and link their work in implementation.

The challenging context and challenges with implementation left issues with project effectiveness. The ability of the project to meet outcome targets varied substantially, with many outputs not met, even after a six-month extension. Critically, the youth center designed as the center piece of the project was not rehabilitated. This lacuna impeded the achievement of other indicators and the objectives of the project overall (particularly project outcomes, which were largely not met).

RUNOs expressed frustrations with the implementation and management of the joint project, which set lessons for future joint projects to potentially improve the effectiveness of joint projects and the efficiency and sustainability of these joint projects.

Stakeholders in Sirte were involved to a limited extent in project implementation. Stakeholder engagement was impeded by political and conflict in the municipality and country. This damaged effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and national ownership. Conflict sensitivity in the project was largely how the projected was implemented, as engagement with conflict actors was needed to get the n necessary approvals to operate in Sirte. This risky context for programming led to delays due to conflict and political turmoil.

*Lessons learned*

The experience of the project suggests lessons, including that:

* More intensive, dedicated management is needed to create linkages in joint projects.
* RUNOs need a consistent focus on sustainability.
* Projects need ways to structure and maintain local engagement in planning and implementation.
* Projects designed to work in conflict-affected areas need ways to focus explicitly on conflict and peacebuilding.

*Recommendations* that follow from the conclusions and lessons are directed to RUNOs and the RCO, the PBF, and Libyan stakeholders.

Recommendations for the RUNOs and RCO include:

1. RUNOs and the RCO should establish and use mechanisms to develop and manage a joint project. The Building peace within and with young men and women in Sirte project did not use a dedicated full time project manager or establish regular technical-level ways to coordinate.

2. Projects should develop and use ways to measure outputs and outcomes of projects that go beyond activity-level monitoring. Although this was not a feature of this project, monitoring mechanisms can use joint efforts or dedicated data gathering to collect the data needed to measure output and outcome level indicators.

3. RUNOs and the RCO should develop and maintain a consistent focus on sustainability in project development, implementation, and follow-up. Absent continued emphasis on sustainability, sustainability is likely to be limited, as in this project.

4. RUNOs and the RCO should develop and use ways to structure and maintain local engagement in planning and implementation of projects. Stakeholders needed ways to be continuously involved in project implementation for greater effectiveness and sustainability.

5. RUNOs and the RCO should find more ways to localize projects in Libyan communities given the local specificities and variation across the diverse country.

6. Projects should develop and use explicit peacebuilding approaches adapted to be acceptable the political and conflict context.

Recommendations for the PBF that follow from the experience of the project are:

1. As peacebuilding is a long-term endeavour, the PBF should work with donors to develop funding instruments that support longer-term projects (more than two years).
2. The PBF should consider supporting mechanisms to encourage joint work among RUNOs under joint programmes and provide funding for RUNOs to utilize joint forums to support joint implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. These efforts can be encouraging a single project manager (as was planned in this project but not implemented) or sharing the positive experiences of other UNCTs that have worked well together in joint projects.

The evaluation’s data and analysis did not identify particular geographic foci or specific priority interventions for future peacebuilding interventions in Libya or for concrete linkages with other partners and donor to support peacebuilding.

Recommendations for Libyan stakeholders include:

1. Government stakeholders in Libya should develop mechanisms at the city level to partner effectively with RUNOs and the UN for project development and implementation, and to use project activities to stabilize communities, build peace, and prevent violent extremism. Projects should consider building broad-based advisory or steering committees to link partners and stakeholders for greater effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability in projects.

**LIST OF Acronyms AND ABBREVIATIONS**

CSO Civil Society Organization

CT Counter Terrorism

DAC Development Assistance Committee

EMG Evaluation Management Group

ERG Evaluation Reference Group

ET evaluation team

FLA Field-Level Agreement

GBV gender-based violence

GESI gender equality and social inclusion

IP Implementing Partner

IS Islamic State

KII Key Informant Interview

MHPSS Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

NAP National Action Plan

NEET not in job, education or training

NUNO non-UN organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office

PD Programme Document

PVE Preventing Violent Extremism

RCO Office of the UN Resident Coordinator

RUNO Recipient UN Organization

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

TA Technical Assistance

TBD To be determined

ToC Theory of Change

ToR Terms of Reference

ToT Training of Trainers

TPM third party monitoring

UN United Nations

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEG United Nations Evaluation Group

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNSG United Nations Secretary General

VE Violent Extremism

WFP World Food Programme

WPS Women, Peace and Security

YFPU Young Family Protection Unit

# INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

**Background**

Four United Nations (UN) agencies in Libya - the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator (RCO) developed the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. The USD 2.950 million project 18-month was funded by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). After initial delays in implementation caused by the conflict and governance issues in Sirte compounded by the COVID-19 Pandemic, the RUNOs requested and received a six-month extension for the project. The project was implemented from 5 December 2019 to 4 December 2021 by the four Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs): UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP. The project worked towards two outcomes, the first “Young men and women, and adolescents are able to manage psychosocial stress factors and their vulnerability, and to peacefully participate and collaborate in resolving socio-economic challenges with other members of the community in Sirte” and the second “Young people are empowered through the activities and services at the Youth Friendly Safe Space to represent his and her community or constituency, and to actively participate in political forums and meetings with decision makers to ensure that the voices of young people and adolescents are recognized and reflected in local political processes.”

**Purpose of the Evaluation**

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the international and national evaluators, attached as Annex 1, explains that the purpose of the project evaluation is assess the achievements of the project in Sirte in an inclusive way and to determine its overall added value to peacebuilding in Libya. The evaluation team was tasked with developing methods for an independent project evaluation to meet these purposes.

The evaluation was asked to assess achievements with respect to:

* individuals who have been engaged in armed violence;
* individuals who are considered at-risk and vulnerable to be recruited by the armed groups and smugglers; and
* young women and girls who are subjected to gender-based violence (GBV) and suffer from trauma from the brutalities of armed violence and the occupation of the Islamic State (IS).

In assessing the degree to which the project met its intended peacebuilding objective(s) and results, the evaluation was asked to provide possible lessons about successful peacebuilding approaches and operational practices, as well as highlight areas where the project performed less effectively.

Specific objectives of the evaluation listed in the ToR were to:

* Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of: 1) addressing key drivers of conflict (including external parties influence over oil fields, regional powers, national level competition over political influence, local level inter-communal tensions, fears of marginalization) and the most relevant peacebuilding issues; 2) whether the project capitalized on the UN’s added value in Sirte, Libya and 3) the degree to which the project contributed to conflict prevention in Libya;
* Assess to what extent the PBF project has made a concrete contribution to reducing a conflict factor in Libya, namely conflict prevention and management. With respect to PBF’s contribution, the evaluation will also evaluate whether the project helped to advance achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 5, 11 and 16;
* Evaluate the project’s efficiency, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money;
* Assess whether the support provided by the PBF has promoted the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), allowed a specific focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding processes, and whether it was accountable to gender equality;
* Assess the impact for youth; recalling the continued proliferation of armed groups and human trafficking in Sirte, project aimed to support youth and adolescents with skills and opportunities to positively contribute to the communities.
* Assess whether the project has been implemented through a conflict-sensitive approach;
* Document good practices, innovations and lessons emerging from the project; and
* Provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

The ToR provided a list of evaluation questions organized through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) revised evaluation criteria of Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability and Ownership, plus additional PBF-specific criteria on whether and how the project was conflict sensitive, catalytic, gender-responsive/gender-sensitive, and risk-tolerant and innovative. These criteria and questions were used to develop a draft and final inception report with plans to collect valid and reliable data to evaluate the project by the evaluation team (ET) through document review and interviews. After RUNO and RCO approval of the inception report, the plans were implemented by the ET.

# POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT FOR THE PROJECT

A decade of political crisis and conflict has had a devastating impact on Libya and its people. Protests during the Arab Spring led to the overthrow of the repressive regime, but Libyan leaders and civil society have not been able to successfully reconstitute a single political system for the country. Political crisis, conflict, and economic turmoil has fragmented the country, with control of key cities and economic assets in the energy sector shifting through armed conflicts by militias that are heavily influenced by international intervention by other states. When the project was drafted, much of the country was divided between a UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) based in the capital Tripoli, and a rival administration, led by the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) General, Khalifa Haftar, sometimes with armed conflict between the two - plus with other groups having local control.

The population of Libya is very youthful, with as the ProDoc noted, 53% of the population under age 24. Many young people, particularly over the last decade, have negative experiences of stress, anxiety, the trauma of violent conflict and war, and the accompanying displacement of communities and families. The ProDoc argued that this dislocation is particularly difficult for youth and adolescents at the stage of life when they develop skills, identities, and their fit into society, the economy, and politics. Youth, despite being at the forefront of the revolution in Libya and its aftermath, have often been politically, socially, and economically marginalized, particularly in more traditional areas of the country. Young women face additional challenges and are especially marginalized in more traditional and conservative communities. The experience of conflict and war has marginalized women even more, with high levels of gender-based violence further restricting their freedom. The ProDoc noted that youth unemployment is a major concern, and that the situation in Sirte was worse than that in the country as a whole. Unemployment and the lack of youth empowerment is thought to prompt some young men to join armed groups for money and inclusion. Young men and women face difficulties in becoming independent, marrying and establishing a family due to unemployment and uncertainty about the future.

Sirte is distinctive as the city that was the final major stronghold of loyalists of former dictator Moammar el Gaddafi in the civil war. The city had a population of 130,000 made up of people from over 20 tribes. There were several phases of conflict in Sirte starting with the 2011 conflict between pro-revolution forces and pro-Gaddafi regime forces. Later conflicts expanded the number of groups that fought, including different loose constellations of armed groups and tribal divisions. This conflict and dislocation enabled the Islamic State (IS) to take Sirte in May 2015, with most of the population fleeing the city. IS controlled Sirte until it was driven out in December 2016 after prolonged combat with al-Bunyan al-Marsous, a coalition of armed groups aligned with the GNA

IS rule, the ProDoc noted, had particularly negative consequences for Sirte. IS occupation accelerated the erosion of tribal authority, upended social norms, and caused widespread displacement, psychosocial distress and trauma. The IS banned cultural activities in Sirte that nurtured critical or creative thinking, with particularly negative effects on adolescents and youth. And liberation from IS did not bring the restoration or reformation of community and cultural institutions that could rebuild the community. This again particularly affected young people, who the ProDoc noted, need cultural activities.

Sirte suffered as control of the city shifted in years of political crisis and conflict. As the ProDoc noted, Armed conflict has left the city in ruins with the infrastructure severely damaged. Public services (policing, justice, health and education) have been severely disrupted and were often non-existent. Tribal divisions have been exacerbated by the conflict and crisis, and radical ideologies and brainwashing as noted in the ProDoc remain problematic, particularly among young people.

Through the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project, the RUNOs aimed to promote the resilience of Libya’s young people to violent narratives through assistance to partners in a strategic city that has played important political, economic, and social roles in the country. Sirte is considered to have suffered the most damage of any Libyan city during the civil war and through post-revolution violence, including through occupation by IS. This history and the proliferation of armed groups and human trafficking in the city, the project ProDoc argued, made for a critical and timely need for the UN to support youth and adolescents with skills and opportunities to thrive in a peaceful society and economy instead of the war economy and militias. That way, young people could positively contribute to their community rather than contribute to problems or simply leave.

The UN has supported meeting the urgent humanitarian needs of the Libyan people, stabilization to overcome the political crises and conflicts, as well as reconstituting the governance framework and starting the transition from relief to development. The UN supported the formation of a Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in 2015 to overcome the division of the country and move towards electing a democratic government and rebuilding state capacity. However, parts of the country remained under the control of armed groups that did not recognize the GNA, including the LNA in the east. In 2021, with a major push from the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and key UN members, a new Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in an effort to unite the disparate political interests that control Libya and move towards elections.

Continued security issues across Libya have left UN agencies managing and working from different locations in Libya and abroad. Some UN agencies and staff have continued to work on Libya from Tunis in Tunisia, with some staff in Tripoli and other cities in areas controlled by the GNA and then GNU and other staff in Benghazi to work in areas not under GNU/GNA control.

These context issues contributed to major challenges for RUNOs in working in Sirte. Immediately after the launch of the project, the Libyan National Army (LNA) made a push to take over more of the county and took control of Sirte from the GNA by force of arms. The interim government of Libya in the east then removed the local council and mayor that RUNOs had worked with in developing the project and replaced them with an appointed steering committee that was not recognized by the GNA. The GNA requested that the UN suspend projects and activities in Sirte under these conditions, a request which was respected by the UN. After some months and extensive consultations with the GNA, the UN reached accord on restarting the project with some distance from political developments in Sirte through work with technical departments of the government and civil society. Then, close to the time that the project was originally due to end, in March 2021 a new Government of National Unity was approved that was designed to overcome these factional differences. The GNU started to extend its authority to Sirte by April or May 2021 as the project was extended for 6 months by the PBF at RUNOs request.

Also, after March 2020, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide and in Libya, restrictions on bringing people together as well as travel and movement restrictions inhibited the development, launch, and implementation of project activities.

# DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILDING PEACE WITHIN AND WITH YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN IN SIRTE PROJECT

The project aimed to addresses vulnerabilities and support resiliencies by promoting the participation of young people in peacebuilding. UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP and RCO, came together from September 2018 to jointly design the project, which was signed in December 2019.

Implementation began in January 2020. The project was implemented until 5 December 2021, including through a six-month no cost extension. The project had a total budget US$ 2,950,705 funded by the PBF. The main local partners are the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Affairs and the Municipality (the mayor and municipal council members) of Sirte. Each RUNO developed the work with implementing partners in civil society and government.

The Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project aimed to achieve two outcomes:

Outcome 1: Young men and women, and adolescents are able to manage psychosocial stress factors and their vulnerability, and to peacefully participate and collaborate in resolving socio-economic challenges with other members of the community in Sirte.

Outcome 2: Young people are empowered through the activities and services at the Youth Friendly Safe Space to represent his and her community or constituency, and to actively participate in political forums and meetings with decision makers to ensure that the voices of young people and adolescents are recognized and reflected in local political processes.

The ProDoc set a target of approximately 1,000 adolescents and youth for the project, with a gender balance in engaging three groups of vulnerable youth and adolescents who (i) have engaged in armed violence; (ii) are considered at-risk and vulnerable to be recruited by armed groups and smugglers; or (iii) are young women and girls who were subjected to gender-based violence (GBV) and suffer from trauma from the brutalities of armed violence and the occupation of the IS.

The issues around the LNA takeover of Sirte delayed the implementation of the project, as did addressing COVID-19. RUNOs and IPs had to make changes in their planning and implementing activities in ways that were appropriate given the need for physical distancing and efforts to reduce the spread of the epidemic.

# EVALUATION METHODS

The ET developed a draft inception report and methodologies for a transparent, participatory evaluation process to assess the development, implementation, and results of the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. The final project evaluation, per the ToR for the evaluators, focused on capturing the lessons learned in design and implementation, assessing the achievements of results at output level, and providing forward-looking recommendations to support future UN and partner approaches.

The ET developed a draft inception report including an evaluation matrix through the review of documents and consultations and discussions with the management and project management staff four RUNOs plus staff of the RCO. The draft was then reviewed and commented on by the RCO and RUNOs, after which the ET revised the draft. A second round of revisions to the draft incorporated comments from the PBSO led to the inclusion of a detailed fieldwork plan for the national evaluator for data collection in Sirte. The final evaluation matrix developed in the inception report is attached as Annex 2. The ET then implemented the plans of the approved final inception report.

The ET conducted a desk review of relevant documents and data such as project and programme documents, progress reports, financial records, meeting minutes and monitoring reports towards answering the evaluation questions and purpose of the evaluation. The ET also conducted remote semi-structured interviews with RUNO and RCO staff. The national evaluator then conducted a mix of remote and in-person interviews with project partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries. Explicit informed consent was solicited and obtained for all interviews (see Annex 5 Introduction) that made it clear that all interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis, all information provided in discussions and interviews would not be linked to any specific person, and that all information provided would be kept confidential.

As made clear in the inception report, because of the additional ethical challenges and issues in engaging with people under the age of 18 in fieldwork, interviews only sought out beneficiaries over the age of 18 and excluded adolescents.

The project had challenges with engaging stakeholders in Sirte. The evaluation’s methodologies also had limited stakeholder engagement. Efforts by the national evaluator to interview municipal authorities were not successful in attaining an interview.

The national evaluator faced difficulties and challenges finding the right beneficiaries to participate in the interviews from the lists of IPs provided by RUNOs and from the lists of participants provided by IPs. There were challenges with wrong phone numbers and phone numbers not matching the right person; in the context of Sirte, it seems as if many people do not answer، calls from unknown numbers. Some people, after several attempts were reached but after starting an interview, were not interested in continuing the interview or avoided being involved and engaged in answering (simply hanging on the line but not saying anything of responding to interview questions). Interviews with women were particularly challenging due to the prevalence of traditional cultures and strict families that limited women in Sirte.

As part of being gender-responsive/gender-sensitive in the evaluation’s design and fieldwork, as well as to examine the extent to which the project was gender-responsive/gender-sensitive, when possible, the evaluation has considered and analyzed whether and how women or men interviewed in the fieldwork or discussed in the project’s written materials have similar or different perspectives.

The ET has triangulated findings from different data sources to maximize the validity and reliability of findings and the ET’s conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations based on their analysis. The draft report aims to answer all of the specific evaluation question from the ToR. In addition to the questions, the Evaluation has used the OECD-DAC criteria and definitions plus the added PBF-criteria with the set of specific evaluation questions from the ToR to organize the report.

Steps for the evaluation included:

1. Remote introductions and discussions with RUNO and RCO staff to develop the ET’s understanding of the project and develop the plans to evaluate it through the inception report;
2. Desk review of documents from project reporting and planning;
3. Data collection through remote interviews with RCO and RUNO and project staff
4. Data collection through in person and remote interviews with partners, stakeholders, and selected beneficiaries;
5. Analysis and triangulation of these data to distil findings, conclusions, best practices and lessons learned, and recommendations; and
6. Drafting this draft evaluation report.

The evaluation was conducted January – March 2022, with fieldwork largely during for the three-week period 13 March to 31 March. Remote English-language interviews and work from the international evaluator combined with remote and in-person interviews in Arabic by the national consultant have gathered interview data from the list of 23 informants in Annex 4: 10 from RUNOs, 2 from the RCO, 6 implementing partners, 4 beneficiaries, and 1 stakeholder.

The ToR set out four deliverables for the ET to deliver to meet the purpose and objectives of the evaluation. As the first deliverable, the ET delivered a final inception report, following review of the draft inception report, 13 March 2022. The second deliverable, a report on collected data, was submitted 17 April 2022. This was followed by a draft evaluation report submitted 26 April and this evaluation report with revisions integrating all comments on the draft.

The evaluation had conventional limitations to the methodologies, data collection plan, and analysis plan for this evaluation. The ET’s ways to manage these limitations were also common ways to manage these risks to evaluation processes and the validity and reliability of data collection, analysis, and causal inferences. These limitations were limited resources, limited ability to make casual inferences, evaluating activities in process or only recently ended, recall bias, acquiescence bias, and challenges locating informants. Limitations were managed by focusing on the most important interviewees, assessing contributions rather than causation, asking about expectations for sustainability and longer-term outcomes, asking about older events in the project’s history explicitly in follow-up questions, asking follow-up questions that dug deeper into challenges faced by the project, and repeatedly calling target interviewees. The limitations were managed to obtain a comprehensive understanding of how the project was been implemented and its achievements so that ET can respond to the purposes of the evaluation.

In an additional limitation, evaluation guidance and requirements from regional managers was only delivered to the ET in late May 2022, which would have informed the design of the evaluation, fieldwork, and structure of the draft report if available earlier. Revising the final report to meet these points revealed some additional limitations, such as not considering disability in the evaluation (as not a part of the ToR or subsequent steps in the evaluation to meet the ToR). Not covering disability thus might be considered an additional limitation of the evaluation.

The ToR also did not ask about the effectiveness of budget implementation or for financial analysis. Thus, no evaluation questions in interviews focused on the budget. And no financial data was made available on spending at the end of the project. This may be considered another limitation of the evaluation.

The Final Project Evaluation Report is a synthesis of the evaluation team’s analysis drawn from many documents as well as interviews and the focus groups. Any quotations included to highlight particular issues do not include names or any other detailed descriptive information that could plausibly be used to infer the source of the remarks.

# KEY FINDINGS

Key findings are organized through the OECD DAC revised evaluation criteria and additional PBF-specific criteria, as well as in answering all of the questions under these criteria from the ToR for the evaluators. Definitions for the categories are drawn from the criteria.[[1]](#footnote-2) Questions answered are below in italics.

Like the project, the evaluation uses the term ‘youth’ to describe all persons between the ages of 18 to

29 years old, ‘adolescents’ to refers to people between the ages of 10 to 17 years old, and ‘young people’ for both categories together.

**Relevance**

Relevance is the extent to which the project objectives and design respond to beneficiaries, regional, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change. The ToR has four specific questions to be answered.

*Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers & factors for peace identified in a conflict analysis?*

The ProDoc made a compelling case for the relevance of the project to Libya and Sirte in its detailed discussion of the peacebuilding context and rationale for PBF support. The 2021 Common Country Analysis done by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) came after the ProDoc. The ProDoc asserted that “UNDP has continued its support to local peace structures and conflict management capacity in Sirte, with the local citizens conducting conflict analyses, monitoring and social peace initiatives to help stabilize Sirte” without explaining what these structures were or their analysis. The ProDoc noted that informal consultations were held by the Office of the DRSG/RC/HC with the members of the Sirte Municipality Board that supported the project and agreed on the importance of reaching the most vulnerable youth through the project. Conditions on the ground changed shortly after the signature of the ProDoc with the seizure of the city by the LNA, which changed the conflict and governance situation in Sirte and environment for the project. WFP and UNFPA reportedly did a conflict sensitivity assessment through their project staff on the ground in Sirte in summer 2020. Staff developed questions and shared its development with UNDP, UNICEF and RCO, and then implemented the questionnaire with focal points in Sirte. The findings of the interviews with these sensitive questions were then discussed in meetings between WFP and UNFPA. The analysis of this changed situation for the project was a constant part of attempting to implement the project as RUNOs chose to not work with non-GNU entities.

RUNOs, the RCO, and IPs interviewed felt the project was clearly relevant to the context of Sirte and the needs of young people and adolescents in the “front-line” city.

*With Covid-19 implications and movement restrictions that impacted in-class trainings, supply chain logistics, did the project goals and approach remain relevant?*

The relevance of the project remained with COVID-19; the issues that made young people and adolescents vulnerable were amplified by the crisis and international, national, and local responses to COVID-19. Support for young people during the pandemic was seen as even more important by RUNOs and IPs interviewed. The project’s design from the outset depended on a wide range of Libyan IPs being able to operate in Sirte. IPs and RUNOs noted in documents and interviews that their activities were made more difficult by COVID but their activities remained relevant to meeting the needs of beneficiaries. WFP and UNICEF adjusted programming modalities, including through making a turn to online trainings, to overcome movement restrictions and comply with national and international precautionary measures against COVID spread.

*Evaluate contribution of this project to the UNDAF outcome: Democratic Governance; and Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable and resilience cities and communities) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions).*

The UN in Libya operated under an integrated strategic framework at the time of the project’s development and implementation. Libya under those and current conditions did not have a national development framework nor the governance system that was able to generate a shared framework for a strategy towards SDG achievement as the evaluation done of the UNSF 2019-2022 for Libya demonstrated.[[2]](#footnote-3) Thus there was not UNDAF or similar instrument to link UN agency goals and objectives for Libya. Nevertheless, the activities of the project were seen by RUNO staff as clearly relevant to pillars 1 and 2 as well as SDGs 5, 11, and 16. Activities targeted working on GEWE in ways consistent with contributing to SDG 5, supporting the resilience of young people and adolescents in Sirte consistent with contributing to SDG 11, and building and strengthening institutions to build peace and change mentalities in Sirte consistent with contributing to SDG 16.

*Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?*

The ProDoc, IP reporting, and project reporting to the PBF noted the needs and priorities of young people and how the project design and activities helped meet these needs and address these priorities. RUNO and IP interviews affirmed that young people needed and prioritized these goods and services as well as capacities and opportunities to be more economically, socially, and politically active in Sirte. Beneficiaries interviewed noted the relevance of the project to their needs and priorities. The destruction of the physical infrastructure as well as ties and bonds between different people in the community damaged Sirte, making activities to bring people back together important and relevant in general and for young people that benefitted directly from engagement in the project’s activities in particular. The lack of different sports clubs or other institutions for youth was noted in interviews with beneficiaries. Young people interviewed also emphasized that these institutions for youth were needed. Entrepreneurship support was seen as relevant as the economy of Sirte offered few opportunities for young people.

The lack of awareness of psychological issues and the absence of psychological services in Sirte was noted and recognized as an issue by RUNOs and the IP that worked in this area. Without awareness of issues of psychological disorders during pregnancy and after childbirth, women in Sirte that needed services would not be served. The lack of trained psychologists and social workers in the field of mental health in the community in Sirte meant that people did not have opportunities to get services and those few people that did understand they needed psychosocial support had to go to Tripoli or Benghazi for these services prior to the project’s work. This absence was seen as having broader effects of diminishing people’s confidence and comfort in their city.

**Coherence**

Coherence is the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.

*To what extent did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially other UN actors?*

The ProDoc noted that the four RUNOs would work in areas that their agencies focused on though well-established methods that UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP use around the world to address agency priorities and specializations. RUNOs designed the project and their activities to take advantage of the comparative advantages and mandates of their organizations and how these mandates fit together. RUNOs also had complementary ways of working through partnerships with CSOs via grants. In most cases, RUNOs turned to IPs that they already partnered with for identical or similar activities in other locations in Libya to implement the project.

UNDP as the convening agency chaired information sharing meetings in the first year of project implementation. The DRR Programme chaired these meetings, which were to be monthly. In the second year of the project, as RUNOs and the RCO sought more coordination, the RCO office called and organized monthly coordination meetings. However RUNO staff in interviews noted that sharing information did not lead to implementing jointly and reported frustrated about meetings that did not in the views of many participants lead to stronger implementation. The ProDoc planned for a project manager through UNDP; the hiring process however did not recruit a new full time project manager as envisioned. The absence of a full-time manager was seen as a weakness by RUNOs and IPs that did not strengthen integration of activities or implementation more broadly. RUNOs did not tightly coordinate their work and links between Agencies. For example, UNICEF youth education work with adolescents in school did not link up with the UNFPA work targeting the 19-24 age group out of school. So as adolescents that worked with UNICEF and its IPs reached this age group, they would not necessarily know about potential support for them as youth from UNFPA and its IPs as could be done in a coordinated project.

The other RUNOs supported UNDP’s budgetary and activity revision to allocate more UNDP funding under the project to support the rehabilitation of the youth center after the effort grew more costly following the conflict in Sirte. Other RUNOs did support this effort and coherence, as did the RCO.

Other RUNO staff expressed frustration with UNDP’s work coordinating the project. In the second year of implementation, the RCO picked up their engagement and sought to coordinate the project in the absence of integration through the convening agency and the lack of a project manager. Some RUNO staff interviewed noted that RCO engagement “saved the project.” RCO engagement focused on pushing for better implementation and more effectiveness for the project by bringing together the staff implementing the project for each RUNO to share information as well as push for faster implementation, including to get sufficient implementation to get the second tranche of the award funding from the PBF (which required that each RUNO reach commitment targets in utilization of the first tranche). RCO staff noted that the RUNOs in Libya did not have much of a history or experience in implementing joint projects, and that the RCO had limited visibility on agency project implementation. RUNOs interviewed noted that the project manager was meant to provide technical-level coordination and integration in the design of the project. The absence of this manager left minimal technical cooperation across RUNOs.

Limited evidence emerged for collaboration or complementarities in implementation between RUNOs. UNDP reportedly held monthly meetings in the initial months of the project for information sharing, but then these became less frequent. The RCO introduced monthly coordination meetings in early 2021. At that point, the three agencies with training components (UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP) actively shared information to ensure complementarities in their different and coordinated of timelines for training events.

*How were stakeholders involved in the project’s design and implementation?*

Interviews with UNDP and the ProDoc note that the Sirte Municipal Council and Mayor were involved in the design when the GNA controlled Sirte. However then the fall of the city to the LNA left these stakeholders not in control of the city administration. The interim government in the east appointed a steering committee to manage Sirte; the RUNOs decided together to not engage with these new political authorities. Initially RUNOs halted project implementation, but then decided to only not implement with the local government. Thus after this pause, project implementation continued to work through civil society to reach youth in Sirte. And once the GNU was appointed in March 2021, the partners that were “supposed to be on the steering committee (SC) disappeared”, as one informant put it. No mechanism to bring key stakeholders together to support project implementation and sustainability was developed by the project or the new authorities. UNDP did reengage with the local authorities and Ministry of Youth, but at this point in late 2021, the government decided to fund the rehabilitation of youth center themselves. Interviewees attributed this decision to different motives; some interviewees asserted that the government had lost confidence that UNDP would rehabilitate the center so chose to do it themselves. Others interviewees noted that the government planned a more ambitious, larger rehabilitation that was more than UNDP would have been able to support through the project, and felt the government turned to this plan because they had grown to understand the importance of a bigger youth center for Sirte. As of June 2022, the Centre has not yet been rehabilitated.

RUNOs had issues reaching stakeholders in Libya and Sirte based on security and safety and UN procedures; international staff were never able to go to Sirte. Libyan staff had limited engagement on the ground there. Each RUNO had different ways of managing the challenges of working in Sirte. RUNOs did share updates and their information on the ground from Sirte in monthly meetings. This reportedly included a conflict-sensitivity assessment by WFP of Sirte. These efforts still left limitations for RUNOs with a limited understanding of the local context and how it evolved over the course of the project. RUNO staff reported that sharing picked up after the RCO managed monthly meetings in 2021.

IPs of some RUNOs noted that the RUNO they worked with coordinated their activities with those of this RUNO’s other partners working in Sirte. But IPs noted that there was no coordination at the IP level between them and other IP partners of the RUNO they worked with - or the other IP of the project in Sirte itself that were supported by other RUNOs. Some other IPs noted that there was no coordination at all with anyone. Other IPs had partnerships with more than one RUNO for their work in Sirte. However, there was not extra coordination by virtue of working on the PBF-funded project together provided for the IPs by these RUNOs.

The lack of coordination was seen as a problem by some IPs. IPs had understood that the youth center would be available and used for activities. A UNICEF partner for example interpreted this to mean that would be responsible for logistics and cover training expenses to support their activities under the Sirte project, which would have enabled the IP to expend less in this activity and reach more beneficiaries. The design was to reach more young people at lower cost through use of the premises of the rehabilitated youth center. However, the IP reported that “unfortunately that didn't happen” so possible efficiencies were not achieved. RUNOs and other IPs noted that not having a common location of the youth center for activities made coordination more difficult for RUNOs, IPs, and beneficiaries.

IPs did note that coordination with the municipal council and relevant government ministries in Sirte, including the Office of the Civil Society Commission that is needed for permits, was a feature of their work. This was a regular practice that CSOs were required to do in order to work in Libya and Sirte. UNFPA IPs did some additional coordination through the project with the CSC and the municipal council particularly to enlist as participants youth who were working for state institutions. This included, UNFPA interviews noted, inviting the CSC and municipal council to activities to kickstart these activities.

Beneficiaries interviewed knew and saw only the activities that they participated in; they provided no information about how the project did or did not link beneficiaries and connect them to other activities of RUNOs that together could reinforce project benefits for them and overall effectiveness. UNFPA noted that activities always provided information about the full extent of the project to participants so that people would know the full extent of the project. UNFPA also did more general outreach to raise awareness of the project in Sirte, including through discussing the project on local radio. While the city was under LNA control, efforts with lower visibility were used as there were concerns that high visibility could have negative consequences for the project at this time.

**Effectiveness**

Effectivenessis the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups.

*To what extent did the project achieve its intended objectives and contribute to the strategic vision?*

While the project achieved many of its outputs, documents and interviews noted that the project was less successful in achieving its overall objectives and strategic vision. Some informants noted that their activities went well, while others were troubled. Few interviewees had a view of the whole project. Of those that did, interviewees noted the absence of links across activities. As one informant summed it up - the project was “simply four projects under one roof.” Some RUNOs noted that this was an effect of not having a project manager as planned.

Activities that partnered with the government at the municipality or national level were less successful. UNDP was not able to rehabilitate the youth center with the Sirte Municipal Council and Mayor, which was designed as a centerpiece of the project. The government eventually decided to rehabilitate the center using their own resources instead in November 2021 after UNDP had not yet rehabilitated the center as foreseen in the project. This left no youth center to use in project implementation throughout the project which had cascading negative effects on many other activities as discussed below in effectiveness and in efficiency (and above in coherence). UNDP was also thus not able to furnish the rehabilitated youth center as envisioned (as the center was not rehabilitated). UNICEF was not able to get the Young Family Protection Unit (YFPU) up and running, which was designed as the centerpiece of Output 1.3.

RUNO staff reported continued frustrations with UNDP over the youth center rehabilitation. UNDP solicited the support of other RUNOs for reallocating resources under UNDP’s activities to as the costs rehabilitating the center grew. RUNOs supported this reallocation. UNDP shifted the funding that had not been used to recruit an international project manager towards rehabilitating the youth center. The revised ProDoc, submitted to the PBSO and approved as part of the extension of the project, validated this plan and a schedule to have the center fully operational and equipped in Q3 2021. UNDP was not able to successfully work with stakeholders to rehabilitate the center and the government then decided in November 2021 that it would fund the rehabilitation of the youth center themselves. This resulted in the project reverting the funding back to the PBF that was allocated for the rehabilitation (at the larger revised cost). RUNOs noted that the municipality appeared to have no confidence that UNDP would rehabilitate the center in 2021. This led the municipality asking the Ministry of Youth to rehabilitate the center. UNDP reported that the contracting has been done for USD 100,000 in project funds to support the refurbishment of the youth center once rehabilitation is completed by the government; these funds will thus not be returned to the PBF but retained to execute the purchase orders once the center itself has been rehabilitated by the government.

RUNOs also noted that UNDP did not compete or execute the grants with CSOs envisioned in the ProDoc as part of the UNDP activities in the project as UNDP shifted the funding towards its plans for the youth center. UNDP reported shifting these funds initially towards the youth center rehabilitation as costs rose, but then to support the rehabilitation of a school in Sirte as the government reported that they would take the responsibility for youth center rehabilitation near the end of the project in November 2021. UNFPA reported objecting to using these funds for school rehabilitation as needing PBF approval to do so – while there was not time to secure this approval. RCO commented on draft reports to note that these funds for school rehabilitation were from a different project.

Table 1 below assesses output achievements by indicator.

**Table 1: Summary of Output Achievements by Indicator**

| **Outputs** | **Indicators** | **Targets** | **Reported** | **Evaluation** | **Explanation** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.1 Youth Friendly Space is established in Sirte for critical youth-led activities | 1.1.1  Number of Focus Group Discussions with youth | 1 | 4 | Exceeded | UNFPA organized two additional FGDs with young people in Sirte on adolescent’s health. |
| 1.1.2  An agreement exists about rehabilitation priorities. | Municipality agrees on the space to be rehabilitated. | Signed agreement | Met | However agreement was not implemented and the center has not yet been rehabilitated as of June 2022. |
| 1.1.3  The facility is rehabilitated. | Youth Friendly space is rehabilitated | 0 | Not met | Activity cancelled; November 2021 decision to have Ministry of Youth rehabilitate the youth center |
| 1.1.4  Equipment is available to be used at the facility. | Youth friendly space is equipped. | 0 | Not met/in process | UNDP has contracted for the refurbishment of the youth center; purchase orders are to be executed once the government has rehabilitated the youth center. |
| 1.2  Young men and women, and adolescents in Sirte have gained skills and commitment to be resilient and seek non-violent options for resolving challenges. | 1.2.1 Number of adolescents engaged in life-skills training, and 50 % are female adolescents. | 400 (50% female adolescents) | 400 (50% female) | Met |  |
| 1.2.2  Number of adolescents engaged in non- competitive sports, arts and media, and 50 % are female adolescents. | 400 (50% female adolescents) | 690 (50% female) | Exceeded | Municipal officials asked UNICEF to include an additional 250 youth in the activities of the sports, arts and journalism clubs. |
| 1.2.3  Number of young men and women engaged in life-skills training, and 50% are women. | 900 (50% young women) | 832 | Almost met | UNFPA reached 93% of the target. but only 20% of the participants were female |
| 1.2.4  Number of local CSOs supported through micro- grants | UNFPA 4 UNDP 5 | UNFPA 7 | Almost met | UNFPA exceeded its target. UNDP reallocated these funds towards Youth Center rehabilitation as costs were higher than anticipated and then as the government committed to rehabilitating the center, UNDP reallocated these funds to supporting the rehabilitation of a school in Sirte |
| 1.2.5  Number of young people who have completed the training course with food incentives. | 900 | 500 | Not met | High costs led to reaching a smaller number of beneficiaries |
| 1.3  Young Family Protection Unit (FYPU) is established in Sirte to support young men and women, and adolescents and their families, and to address family violence, which includes other aspects of violence than street and war violence. | 1.3.1  Functional FYPU | Yes | No | Met | UNICEF reported yes based on a minimum set of supplies provided to the FCPO and Sirte FYPU |
| 1.3.2  Number of trained officials. | 20 | 44 | Exceeded | UNFPA trained 44 health providers (doctors at public hospitals) and social workers |
| 1.3.3  Number of trained officials to manage referrals. | 5 | 109 | Exceeded | UNFPA trained 48 social workers on case management of which 44 were female  UNICEF trained 61Municipal level social workers, PSS Counselors and HCC officials (51 women and 10 male staff) on safe identification and referrals on child protection issues |
| 1.3.4  Number of adolescents engaged in psychosocial support and play activities, and 50 % are female adolescents | Target: 200 (50% female adolescents) | 169 | Not met | Implemented only in late 2021 through Libyan Scouts; no outreach to female adolescents through activity |
| 1.3.5  Number of young people who have been provided psychosocial support | 30 | 35 | Exceeded | Implemented only in late 2021; All 35 young women |
| Output 1.4  Youth have gained skills and capacity to develop and manage initiatives and social enterprises. | 1.4.1  Number of young people benefited from social entrepreneurship trainings. | 30 | 89 | Exceeded | UNFPA organized additional trainings due high demand |
| 1.4.2  Number of sustainable social enterprises supported through seed grants | 5 | 11 | Exceeded | UNFPA |
| 1.4.3  Number of young people who have completed the training course with food incentives. | 900 | 445 | Not met | High costs led to reaching a smaller number of beneficiaries |
| Output 2.1  Young leaders have gained knowledge, skills, confidence, commitment and readiness to participate in political processes in Sirte. | 2.1.1 Assessment on conflict risks and peace opportunities (vulnerability and resilience). | yes | yes | Met | UNFPA recruited a team of young people that conducted this assessment at the end of the project |
| 2.1.2 Awareness and understanding among youth and adolescents about what are the underlying conflict risks and drivers (vulnerability and resilience), and builds social cohesion and peace | yes | yes | Not met | UNFPA reported that high sensitivities around these issues in Sirte made awareness raising inadvisable. Final submission from UNFPA noted “Given the sensitivities around these issues, UNFPA used the training on peacebuilding and conflict resolution as an opportunities to raise awareness and increase understanding; however, UNFPA couldn’t do it publicly nor dive deep into the specifics as this could have exposed the participants and the IPs lives to high risk” Thus evaluation finding is not met. |
| 2.1.3 Number of young people who benefited from leadership and debate training | yes | 56 | unclear | Target not numerical so hard to evaluate with number |
| Output 2.2  Young leaders have learned how to plan and develop campaigns to engage youth and local policy-makers to promote social cohesion and peace in Sirte. | 1.1  Young people and adolescents apply gained skills and capabilities that reinforce their resilience to factors of joining or associating themselves with armed groups or smugglers and have developed resilient attitudes and are engaged in rebuilding their community and promote meaningful non-violent options for civic engagement and social change | 5 | 6 | Exceeded | UNFPA made 6 awards for youth-led initiatives |
| 1.2  Young people and adolescents, and particularly women and girls use tools from counselling to manage psychological distress, trauma and GBV; as well as are engaged in supporting other women and girls.. | 5000 | 40000 | Almost met | two videos had more than 40,000 total views  Video is less than a awareness raising campaign. |
| 1.3  Youth-led initiatives and social enterprises have enabled the creation of job opportunities for young men and women who have participated in the trainings and activities at the Youth Friendly Safe Space | 5 | 0 | Not met | RUNOs could not engage with non-authorized entities. And Municipal council does not appear to have responded. UNDP reported “Completed” based on “The platform was officially launched by the end of November, and its administration rights were handed over to MOE branch in Sirte and the administration of the targeted schools in Sirte. The reports will done by the young students under the supervision of the school administration.” |
| Output 2.3  Young leaders and local decision-makers participate in dialogue meetings to learn about concerns and needs and develop mechanisms for incorporating youth views into municipal strategy. | 2.3.1 Youth participation mechanism for political processes is developed. | yes | Yes | Unclear | UNDP reported “yes” and “completed” with the explanation that “Delay occurred due to the political and security implications followed by COVID-19. However, an indirect mechanism has already been developed – networks that emerged during the different training workshops throughout the project empowered the CSOs/youths to participate in political processes.” Not clear evidence presented that networks emerged from training workshops or found in evaluation fieldwork |
| 2.3.2 Decision-makers and youth meet regularly in meetings. | quarterly meetings, or on request. | 1 | Not met | UNDP reported “the first meeting was held in mid-November 2021. Further meetings took place after the end of this project..” |
| 2.3.3 Intersectoral cooperation and coordination within the municipality about youth and women issues. | yes | 0 | Not met | Final reporting on outputs reported that “public sector officials who participated in the trainings as either participants (if they are young) or guest had opportunities to improve their awareness of youth and women’s issues.” |

The project was designed around the rehabilitation of the youth center, which was not accomplished. All interviewees expressed frustrations with the processes around the non-rehabilitation of the youth center. UNDP reported that the initial plan reached with the GNA-supported authorities ‘did not survive” the LNA control of Sirte. The delay with the LNA take over meant that a new agreement was needed once the decision was made after the pause to reengage and manage implementation in Sirte while under the interim government from the East. Once there was accord on where to establish the center, UNDP reported that COVID restrictions cut access to Sirte for months, which meant engineers could not visit do generate the technical specifications needed to advertise for contractors. UNDP then found that the amount allocated for rehabilitating the center was not enough and that UNDP required additional funding from the project to rehabilitate the center. The funding for the project manager was reallocated for this purpose. Then UNDP asked RUNOs for a second revision and reallocation of funds as costs for the center continued to rise, Other RUNOs reported that they felt UNDP should have been able to manage these challenges as the center was critical to the project’s design and success.

Not rehabilitating the youth center, and reallocating financial resources in the course of the project by UNDP from the resources originally intended for the project manager position and CSO awards by UNDP left not all of the budget of the project expended. UNDP was in the process of returning the remaining funds to the PBF during the period of the evaluation’s fieldwork. Other RUNOs reported expending their budgets. As discussed in efficiency below, RUNOs did find it a challenge to access the second tranche of funding by reaching 75% level of expenditures for the first, larger tranche of the PBF funds. RUNOs worked hard to reach this target, as having any one RUNO not hit the target meant the PBF would not release the second tranche of funds to any of the RUNOs.

The project developed, measured, and reported on output indicators that were developed in the ProDoc. Based on final project reporting and interviews, while many of these output indicators have been achieved, a large number were not met. Per Table 1 above, it appears that of the 26 output indicators planned, often used and largely measured by the project, eight were exceeded and four met. Three were almost met and two unclear whether they have been met. That left the remaining eight output indicators not met. This presents a mixed picture overall, with almost as many not met and unclear as exceeded/met together. UNDP did not meet indicators around the youth center after the initial one about whether an agreement on the center existed or its targets for CSO support. As Table 1 notes, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP also had some indicators that they did not meet.

While the project did not ask detailed questions about the M&E framework in the ToR, the use of the initial results framework (RF) in the ProDoc for the evaluation clarified that the RF did not develop clear indicators for the outcomes anticipated and for some of the output indicators of the project. Project management by individual RUNO did not seem to use some of these output indicators, and no reporting focused on or used the outcome indicators until the end of the project. This reporting at the end of the project, as revised by the project team, was left unable to adequately measure the outcomes of the project as they were not specified well at the outset in the Pro Doc, not revised, not used in implementation, and thus no data was possible to use to measure four of these six outcomes (with the other two outcomes noted by RUNOs in reporting as cancelled, so not met).

In outcomes, the project did not develop ways in design, implementation, or at close to have clear targets with measurement methods for most of the outcome indicators that are meant to assess the overall influence of the project on the target issues as the project ends. Outcome indicators are summarized in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: Summary of Outcome Achievements by Indicator**

| **Outcomes** | **Indicators** | **Targets** | **Reported** | **Evaluation** | **Explanation** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1:** Young men and women, and adolescents are able to manage psychosocial stress factors and their vulnerability, and to peacefully participate and collaborate in resolving socio- economic challenges with other members of the community in Sirte. | 1.1  Young people and adolescents apply gained skills and capabilities that reinforce their resilience to factors of joining or associating themselves with armed groups or smugglers and have developed resilient attitudes and are engaged in rebuilding their community and promote meaningful non-violent options for civic engagement and social change | 1 | 1  completed | Not clear | Outcome not developed in M&E system nor measured, so not clear |
| 1.2  Young people and adolescents, and particularly women and girls use tools from counselling to manage psychological distress, trauma and GBV; as well as are engaged in supporting other women and girls. | 1 | 1 completed | Not clear | Outcome not developed in M&E system nor measured, so not clear |
| 1.3  Youth-led initiatives and social enterprises have enabled the creation of job opportunities for young men and women who have participated in the trainings and activities at the Youth Friendly Safe Space | 1 | 17  completed | Not clear | UNFPA supported 17 youth-led initiates and enterprises (output-level indicator and measurement). Outcome not developed in M&E system nor measured, so not clear |
| **2:** Young people are empowered through the activities and services at the Youth Friendly Safe Space to represent his and her community or constituency, and to actively participate in political forums and meetings with decision makers to ensure that the voices of young people and adolescents are recognized and reflected in local political processes | 2.1  A strategy for the inclusion of young men and women in democratic processes at the municipal level in Sirte is developed | 1 | - | Not met | UNDP reported cancelled as working with local authorities was made difficult when the democratically elected council was forcibly replaced |
| 2.2  A commitment by decision-makers to promote and respect the strategy in relation to peace processes. | 1 | - | Not met | UNDP reported cancelled as working with local authorities was made difficult when the democratically elected council was forcibly replaced |
| 2.3  Adolescents and young people are active participants in political and peacebuilding processes | Yes | Yes | Not met/In process | No method developed to measure indicator with precision; modest evidence in fieldwork and output indicator achievement for active participation of adolescents and young people in Sirte to date (with little time for actual implementation of joint project activities) |

The data on these six outcome indicators and analysis of findings demonstrate that these outcomes are difficult to identify as have not been measured by the project’s M&E system or RUNOs with precision. The outcome indicators clarify and restate key aspects of what the project aimed to achieve, which is not straightforward to measure. The project then did not measure most of these indicators.

For two of these Outcome 1 indicators (Indicator 1.1.”Young people and adolescents apply gained skills and capabilities that reinforce their resilience to factors of joining or associating themselves with armed groups or smugglers and have developed resilient attitudes and are engaged in rebuilding their community and promote meaningful non-violent options for civic engagement and social change” and Indicator 1.2: Young people and adolescents, and particularly women and girls use tools from counselling to manage psychological distress, trauma and GBV; as well as are engaged in supporting other women and girls”), the indicator table simply presents a 0 for a baseline, a target of 1, and 1 for achievement with no explanation. The project did not endeavour to report on these indicators to measure these outcomes. The evaluation also did not identify straightforward ways to connect outputs to these outcomes for measurement. Hence the evaluation finds that as the outcomes were not clearly measurable or measured, and that correspondingly it is not clear that they have been achieved.

Indicator 1.3: “Youth-led initiatives and social enterprises have enabled the creation of job opportunities for young men and women who have participated in the trainings and activities at the Youth Friendly Safe Space,” was measured and reported on as 17 in the final report to PBF, far exceeding the target of 1, based on the number of UNFPA initiatives and enterprises supported. This measurement however proposes what is an output of the project’s activities to measure what ought to be an outcome – how these engagements with youth leads to job creation. UNFPA’s work supporting entrepreneurship was seen by RUNO and IP interviewees as relatively successful as less political and with high demand from youth, including from young women. However the indicator was not developed in the M&E system to properly measure the concept nor measured. Hence the evaluation finds the that the extent to which the project met the outcome to be not clear.

The first two indicators from Outcome 2 are more straightforward, while the third faces similar issues to the third outcome 1 indicator above. For the first two outcome indicators (2.1: “A strategy for the inclusion of young men and women in democratic processes at the municipal level in Sirte is developed”, and 2.2: “A commitment by decision-makers to promote and respect the strategy in relation to peace processes”), UNDP reports that the two were “cancelled” as UNDP did not work on the strategy or with decision-makers through the project. Thus the evaluation measures these two outcomes as not met.

Outcome indicator 2.3, Adolescents and young people are active participants in political and peacebuilding processes, is not developed with precision to be measured, nor are measurements proposed (other than asserting “yes”. Without developing in the M&E system what active participation is and how to measure it – or actually measuring active participation – the evaluation concludes the outcome is not met, but in process as some progress in the engagement and participation of adolescents and young people is evident in output indicators of the project.

Delays in project start-up were seen by RUNO staff as having negatively affected the credibility of RUNOs and the project with partners, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. According to RUNO staff interviewed, not delivering as planned hurt the credibility with beneficiaries, stakeholders, and partners that the project could deliver on time. Then RUNOs faced issues with funding as they could not access the second tranche of PBF funding as not every RUNO had committed enough of the funding from the larger first tranche of funding to receive the second tranche; reaching the 75% expenditure level threshold was particularly affected by UNDP not using the allocated funding for the project manager or for the youth center. This threshold problem delayed activities and further negatively affected credibility.

RUNOs noted that the politics of having different governments in the East and the West as well as how that affected Sirte had many different negative effects on project implementation. One RUNO staff person noted that in this situation, some young people in Sirte want to be distant from government institutions. As political fighting has discredited governance, people sought and preferred activities that were not related to the governance of the city. This they reported led to a preference for engaging in activities like vocational training and sport that did not engage the municipal government. WFP reported that it approached the challenges of working in the divided area by selecting two different IPs to consider this difference, choosing one from the west and one from the east. The expectation was also that the partner from the east would be and was able to start implementing during LNA control of Sirte. While this was recognized to be less efficient, it made sense in the uncertainties of Sirte and the need to make sure WFP could operate there.

Some IPs reported that the lack of coherence between RUNOs affected effectiveness. As one IP put it, UNDP had asserted to them that UNDP will be responsible for logistics and cover training expenses for their activity, but unfortunately that didn't happen. This left the partner late in starting as they didn’t find anything on the ground in terms of implementation. The IP thus faced the “challenge of changing our plan. It happened that the youth center did not exist as UNDP promised they will build it and make it ready, as if it was planned in advance that we will conduct training in the youth center after construction and preparation.” Changing modes of delivery to cope with the lack of a youth center was seen as an impediment to effectiveness and efficiency. Some beneficiaries noted that the locations IPs chose and used for some activities were suboptimal, as far outside the city and costly to reach with no public transportation possibilities. Or some noted that the place activities were held was too small, which sometimes left participants standing without a place to sit. Technical needs for training were sometimes problematic; for example one beneficiary reported that without a generator, cooking training had to be ended when electricity cut out. The lack of air conditioning was also seen as a problem for this training site used by an IP.

IPs reported working with officials from Sirte as needed to build trust among the population in the community as well as get people to turnout for activities by IPs. Working with and through local government was seen as especially important by CSO IPs that were not based in Sirte, who needed the support of local authorities to build the trust of the community in their organization and plans. This view is not in accord with other assertions above that people in the community sought to avoid government ties. Fieldwork did not identify ways to disentangle these different viewpoints in findings.

Beneficiaries also said that they want IP staff that they know and trust. In the wake of the conflict, beneficiaries noted that people are mistrustful and do not trust unknown people from outside the city. This is the case if they are providing a training for free. Some noted that staff from Tripoli were not trusted by many people in Sirte with the division of the governments and that “most of them” follow the government of the Eastern region. Sirte-based organizations did not have the civil society organization capacity needed to partner with RUNOs. RUNOs thus brought in specialized IPs from both the West and East to make sure they could implement whichever side was in control of Sirte.

Beneficiaries appreciated that project support through partners was used to build and encourage spaces to bring people of Sirte back together in the city. They noted in particular activities such as volleyball courts and games that created or recreated community. Beneficiaries of this activity asserted that the community benefitted as planned as the court did bring people together and cross various lines of division. COVID-19 pandemic risks were managed in this activity through social distancing and masking/sanitization.

Bringing young people together in one place and supporting community peace through sports, dialogue in sport and fair competition among community members was seen as effective by RUNOs, IPs and beneficiaries. In addition, male youth were observed to have moved away from the language of violence with the project. As one interviewee put it, “Now they do sports instead of joining militia battalions and fighting.” UNFPA saw support for entrepreneurship as particularly successful, as the area was not sensitive since all stakeholders want to see businesses set up and supported.

Areas that raised sensitivities of security agencies, such as initiatives of UNFPA with civil society and the media that focused on dialogue on peace and conflict (particularly when the LNA was in control), were seen by UNFPA as more difficult for partners to implement.

The ways IPs coordinated with and through RUNOs sometimes was a negative for effectiveness. For example, one IP noted coordinating with their RUNO in implementation as well as with another RUNO that in turn promised to support the IP’s training to increase the number trained – but then noted “that this did not happen unfortunately.” This was seen as hurting the reputation of the IP, and as providing fewer benefits than expected from the project – thus reduced effectiveness (as well as lower efficiency).

Some RUNOs felt that reaching more age groups would boost effectiveness; reaching larger populations and being more inclusive, they felt, would make for more effective programming. WFP training reached age groups above youth, reportedly up to 50 years of age.

Some IPs noted ways to measure the effectiveness of their approaches under the project. For example, one IP asserted that they did pre and post- tests on knowledge and skills before and after skills training. An IP also reported using and monitoring Facebook posts of participants to see whether and how trainees had learned or not.

Several interviewees argued that trainings needed to be more in-depth. Their argument, based on their experience, was that the basics of just about everything is already now available on the internet and can be accessed that way. Going more deeply into the content of training and practices on entrepreneurship was thought to be more useful. An IP also noted that having more connections between vocational training programming and local businesses, who could support and hire the youth after the completion of vocational training.

Some beneficiaries sought training and sessions that directly addressed the topics of peacebuilding challenges and methods, as conflicts are common in Libya, but there are few tools to manage conflict that are well known. Most often, tools to manage conflict are not used.

*To what extent did the PBF project substantively mainstream gender and support gender- responsive peacebuilding?*

Each RUNOs implemented activities under the project. UNDP reported reaching an agreement on the youth center with the authorities in Sirte as the one activity the RUNO completed of its outputs under the project; UNDP did not report on how gender was considered in developing this accord in semi-annual reports. UNDP staff noted in interviews that the process of reaching agreement on the specifications for the youth center explicitly considered how the space would be appropriate for women and girls within the parameters of the conservative culture that prevails in Sirte. Other RUNOs noted developing a gender-sensitive plan for using the planned youth center. RUNOs agreed that once rehabilitated, two days a week would be assigned as female only to facilitate the participation of women. UNICEF implemented the PBF project in Sirte through the Youth Education and Child Protection sections, which both had substantial experience and practices with gender mainstreaming in activities. Without the youth center to implement activities in, the youth education team fell back on the schools as sites in part because even conservative communities always provide opportunities for girls to access education. Gender was thus a key consideration in how UNICEF implemented and adjusted activities.

Istishari, UNFPA’s IP, raised awareness of women in Sirte of psychological disorders during pregnancy and after childbirth and made training psychologists and social workers in the field of mental health available in the community in Sirte to provide these heretofore unprovided services in Sirte. This was seen as a critical unmet service in the community for women. And travel to obtain these services was recognized as having additional difficulties for women, who face more limited opportunities for travel compared to men in conservative communities.

One IP noted that more could be done on gender, including rotating the use of facilities and sewing machines by gender. That way both men and women could train and develop tailoring skills with the same infrastructure, just a different times to accord with conservative preferences for separating the education and training of women and men.

**Efficiency**

Efficiency is the extent to which the project delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way.

*How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?*

RUNOs and the RCO noted issues throughout the project with staffing, planning, coordination, and implementing. The ProDoc envisioned at the project would be managed by an international P4 project manager, who would be the single face of the project with stakeholders. The position was later changed to a national one. RUNOs felt that having one manager to represent the project, explain its objectives and activities, and be the point of contact to manage challenges could have avoided “all” or “a lot” of problems with the project. UNDP reported delays in hiring a project manager were due to the LNA take over and COVID. Other RUNOs felt UNDP should have done more faster to hire. After a year without a project manager, UNDP obtained RUNOs agreement to recruit a national project manager instead – as the only way feasible with a year left in implementation as well as to make it easier for the manager to travel to Sirte and be in direct communication and interactions with local stakeholders. UNDP reported having two recruitments that did not identify a candidate that could meet the requirements (including passing medical clearance that is a requirement for UNDP/Libya). This left this position unfilled. The result was that UNDP used a staff person hired under a different project towards managing the project in Sirte to help when needed; this was recognized to be a challenge by UNDP, the other RUNOs, and the RCO as the person tasked with managing was occupied with the work of their full-time position on their other projects. The project did not adapt to address some of the coordination roles originally envisioned for a project manager.

Not constructing the youth center, which was envisioned as the locus of the project’s activities for RUNOs and their partners, was also noted by RUNO interviewees as raising costs and reducing the benefits yielded from activity implementation. Not having the center also left RUNOs without the on-the-ground coordination that could have come from operating out of the same space. The premise of the project was that costs would be low or non-existent for RUNOs and their partners to deliver project activities on the site of the youth center, which would also more easily reach the same beneficiaries with multiple activities and benefits. Instead, IPs incurred costs hiring facilities for activities and it appears as if few beneficiaries benefitted from more than one activity – both of which were seen as inefficient practices.

*How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?*

The project ambitiously combined activities from 4 RUNOs, but then did little coordination in implementation, which was observed by RUNOs to impede efficiency. RUNOs felt that had the project had a project manager as designed, implementation could have been coordinated and been more efficient.

RUNOs did note that it was efficient for them to have identified, competitively procured, and contracted with many partners for the project that they had already used and had established relationships with through other projects and sites in Libya. This for example was the case with UNFPA with partners Track and Lifemakers.

UNDP and then the RCO developed practices of holding monthly technical meetings bringing together RUNO staff working on the project; meetings were held in 2020, but especially in 2021 towards accelerating project implementation. Substantial work was needed to get all RUNOs to the level of funds utilization required for the final, second disbursement of funds by PBSO. RUNOs and the RCO noted that these meetings were critical in accelerating project implementation and getting the second tranche of funding.

RUNOs and the RCO only came to understand by fall 2021 that the rehabilitation of the youth center was unlikely. Waiting for the youth center had made it difficult for other RUNOs to expedite project delivery. UNDP was not able to deliver on its initial plans or the revised plans and thus will have to return funds to PBF at the end of the project. UNFPA and UNICEF spent more than intended of tranche 1 to the whole project to reach the required 75% level of expenditure for PBF to release the second tranche of funding, which was only received in August 2021, with less than 4 months to go before project completion. Per PBF rules, all RUNOs had to have reached 75% for distribution of the second tranche. Thus one RUNO lagging delayed disbursement to all.

The issues throughout the project with UNDP support for the youth centre impeded efficiency; RUNOs and IPs that had planned to conduct activities at the centre had to make adjustments and incur costs for alternative locations for program implementation.

Some RUNOs did capacity building trainings themselves under the project; UNFPA noted that the alternative of contracting with established partners was are more cost-efficient way to deliver trainings, which were more costly to deliver under UNFPA rules and regulations than they would have been through IPs. This was seen as not an efficient practice.

RUNOs UNDP and UNICEF hired some project staff from Sirte to work in Sirte. This was seen as a good practice that helped with effectiveness as well as efficiency, as these staff could better monitor and manage activities by IPs.

Implementing partners interviewed noted procurement practices of RUNOs as efficient. They noted that they applied for solicitations that were open and competitive; IPs believed that they were selected on competitive bids to maximize efficiency as well as effectiveness. RUNO staff noted selecting IPs based on set criteria, as well as selecting IPs that they already had positive relationships and past experience working with in Libya, as efficient practices.

IPs identified beneficiaries to work with through various methods. Social media was used to solicit invitations as well as to target and invite particular potential participants by some IPs. IP’s also identified participants through other work, such as the Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic run by Istishari. Some participants were invited by personal oral invitations. These strategies focused on identifying participants that would benefit greatly with low costs to IPs in the selection process, which is efficient. Some IPs noted that potential beneficiaries were sometimes suspicious of organizations if not known in Sirte, seeing them as “foreign” organizations that they did not want to deal with or cooperate with.

Some IPs noted challenges to efficiency as trainers for their organization were hesitant to work on international projects for reputational reasons. Some IPs and beneficiaries felt that specific trainings needed to be more compelling as well as localised to fit Sirte to resonate better among young people. An IP felt something more useful than a lecture was needed to be attractive to young people in Sirte, who instead wanted more practical, hands-on training rather than a lecture. One interviewee objected to the use of lectures like used in Europe with English-language words that did not fit the city or English-language knowledge of trainees. Stakeholders too felt that targeting adolescents meant that courses had to be simpler and more practical, as most youth in Sirte were not continuing or finishing school.

The absence of coordination and collaboration between IPs was noted as an impediment to efficiency. One IP reported that they had secured the commitment for UNDP to fund additional trainings, but that the needed logistical support for this “didn’t happen” and that this “was a big problem for us.” This led instead to the IP selecting schools to work with instead of working through the youth centre; the IP made this shift as the youth centre that UNDP planned to support through the project was not developed and did not become an entity that the IP could partner with. This hesitancy posed challenges for effectiveness and efficiency.

Reports to the PBF noted third party monitoring (TPM) by UNICEF of its activities. IPs noted monitoring activities themselves and that some RUNOs monitored activities. UNFPA was reported to have used a WhatsApp group for one activity to follow and monitor trainings and the activity. Attendance sheets were routinely used by IPs to record attendance and absences.

One IP noted doing a monthly assessment of their activities to support tracking these activities. This IP noted having a larger number of beneficiaries of the project than planned, as well as more benefits to these beneficiaries than planned, which demonstrated efficiency as activities yielded more benefits than anticipated.

Managing COVID risks on the other hand limited efficiencies. The size of different food for training sessions were reduce to add greater physical distancing between participants, which cut the level of participation per course/

**Sustainability & Ownership**

Sustainability is the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue after completion of the project.

Ownership covers the extent to which “programming is accomplished in consultation with relevant stakeholders and national partners, who are engaged throughout the programming cycle in decision-making, implementation and monitoring.”

*How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially support to youth and adolescents at the time of peace fragility, conflict and violence, women’s participation in decision making processes, supported under PBF Project?*

Although the partnership with government in the city was weak, RUNOs noted some ways that their activities had support for stakeholders that made the work more sustainable. For example, UNICEF Youth Education partnered with schools as this was sustainable going forward. The training of trainers also left sustainable skills with them, as the trainers were Sirte-based. Limited coherence that limited the links between IPs and between activities and stakeholders was recognized as having also impeded ownership by IPs. IPs noted that plans to work and partner with activities did not work out as planned, which impeded sustainability as well as ownership. UNICEF also committed modest funds of their own for 2022 to keep the adolescent advisory boards functioning for the year.

The short time period of actual implementation of activities and limited connections with CSOs and the government in Sirte meant that RUNOs, IPs, and beneficiaries saw sustainability of general benefits from the project as well as particular benefits of specific activities usually as limited. The existence and plans of the project initially raised expectations among beneficiaries, some IPs reported, that when not met, discouraged the sustainability as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of activities. Plans for the government to rehabilitiate the youth center, as it was not done by UNDP under the project, were thought to support sustainability through the engagement of the Ministry of Youth and engagement of and advocacy from the local government for funding the youth center. This allocation decision was seen as demonstrating the commitment of the municipality to the youth, which made sustainability more likely, by some interviewees.

Some things were seen as more sustainable. For example, beneficiaries noted that the volleyball court and playground had been maintained after its construction; thus it continued to provide benefits and was sustainable.

Other activities were seen as less sustainable. For example, occupational training in food service and cooking was held in a rented space without some attributes that beneficiaries saw as needed (generator, air conditioning). These challenges were expected to worsen after the project. Stakeholders were seen as having the power to stop project activities and kill sustainability. That left the project with important responsibilities to make sure, as one IP put it, that “all stakeholders had awareness of the project.” The IP went on to note that the municipality and civil society committee, even if not helpful, can stop activities.”

The project did not emphasize sustainability or have an explicit exit strategy.

**Conflict Sensitivity**

Conflict sensitivity is whether and how the project took approaches that considered how aid interacts with conflict in a particular context, to mitigate unintended negative effects, and to influence conflict positively wherever possible, through humanitarian, development and/or peacebuilding interventions.

*Were RUNOs and NUNOs’ internal capacities adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach?*

Project management was largely outside Sirte. RUNO staff noted that to implement the project, their staff had to engage with and gain the trust of the intelligence and security agencies managing Sirte. Meetings of staff and IP staff were important to help them win the trust of the local authorities in order to implement activities. Unified messaging of RUNOs and with RUNOs and their IPs were seen by RUNOs as facilitating successes in this trust building.

Some IPs noted that their identification of beneficiaries was driven by conflict sensitivity; youth were chosen because the category of young people was seen as more at risk of joining militias and contributing to conflict. Other IPs noted their projects selected by criteria, not whether some individuals were perhaps more susceptible to recruitment into militias. Other IPs did not note that conflict sensitivity drove their activities or the beneficiaries, but at the same time asserted that their outreach and selection of beneficiaries made sure to reach all tribes and all components of the city. IPs did not think that there was monitoring of unintended impacts.

Activity design, beneficiaries felt, was driven by an understanding of the conflict. In Sirte, the lack of opportunities was seen as a risk and potentially leading to negative behaviours. So sports had positive benefits by bringing people together rather than finding ways to disagree. The need was clear to RUNO staff and IPs for “more capacity building in civil society, to involve more people in making peace and have them understand what peace building is, and for them to accept the other side of political division and to know about dialogue and practice.”

Some IPs felt that continued conflict analysis was necessary. This analysis would assess and capture information about whether and if relationships between government agencies (or across levels of governance) changed over implementation. For one IP, there was an issue in coordination with the presence of two parties for social affairs, one party that belongs to the Ministry of Labor, and the other party follows the municipality. And there was a conflict between them, so we had to coordinate with the both of them in order to overcome the conflict sensitivity. The social affairs from the Municipality was more active on the ground. The IP suggested they would have benefitted from more conflict analysis.

IPs did not note negative side effects of their activities that might stimulate rather than retard conflict. Instead, IPs noted that they used the media to spread positive stories to have a bigger influence on conflict prevention in Sirte.

**Catalytic Effects**

Catalytic effects are whether and how the project has stimulated additional funding or programmaticefforts – or is likely to do so in the future.

*Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?*

The UNICEF Youth Education team considered their work under the project as a pilot, and developed and obtained European Union (EU) funding for a modest-sized 4 month project to replicate their activities in Sirte in three other municipalities from February 2022 under this EU award.

Although UNDP did not renovate and furnish the youth center in Sirte as planned, the Libyan government committed to rehabilitating the youth center in Sirte. The project not implementing its activities in this area could be seen as having led to this plan for funding critical youth needs through government resources. However, to date the youth center has not been rehabilitated.

*Has PBF funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding?*

The 16 November 2021 AR to the PBF did not note scaling up activities or any catalytic funding leveraged by the project. One IP reported that they did not find that their work led to additional programs or additional funding. There was not a scaling up of their work based on this experience.

**Gender-responsiveness/Gender-sensitivity**

Gender-responsive/gender-sensitive is the extent to which the project analysed, considered and responded to the needs of women and men, girls and boys in the design and implementation of the project. The ToR posed one specific question under this criterion.

*Did the project consider the different challenges, opportunities, constraints and capacities of women, men, girls and boys in project design (including within the conflict analysis, outcome statements and results frameworks) and implementation?*

The approaches of the project recognized the particular effects of conflict on women and girls and the need for both incorporating women and girls into activities in general as well as the need for special attention to do so under the conditions in Libya and Sirte for GEWE. This approach, targeting percentages of beneficiaries for many activities that should be women and girls, led to an estimate in the original ProDoc that half of the budget would directly pursue GEWE, which was reduced in the revised ProDoc to USD 711 thousand of the total USD 2.95 million for a focus on GEWE; the final report counted expenditures as slightly higher USD 761 thousand (25.8% of the total project budget).

RUNOs reported working on the issues faced by women and girls, as well as being challenged by these issues. RUNOs did not note working together across agencies on these issues.

Some IPs noted a focus on women and girls per their specialization and the design of their activities, such as for psychosocial support and gynaecological services

Approaches to gender among beneficiaries of the project differed. Some local beneficiaries reported and appeared to have not tried to address women, for example in sport and volleyball, “because of the sensitivity and culture of the community.” Some IPs reported that there were no negative impacts of their work, only positive ones.

Some activities of the project focused on young men and boys, such as supporting different occupational and skills trainings for them seen as appropriate in the current gendered economy of Sirte and Libya. RUNOs and IPs noted this made sense given the context and met the needs of beneficiaries.

**Risk Tolerance & Innovation**

Risk-tolerance and innovation is how the project considered, monitored, and addressed if necessary risks and potential risks – and innovation is whether and how the project took and brought new approaches to UN agencies, their partners, and/or stakeholders. Three specific questions are answered below.

*How novel or innovative was the project approach? Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?*

RUNOs noted that they have limited experience working together in joint project in Libya. Thus the PBF project was somewhat innovative as a joint project. The implementation of the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project demonstrates the importance of developing coordination and collaboration mechanisms to link RUNOs and support the implementation of joint projects which was not done under this project. Other UNCTs with more experience with joint programming have experience and positive lessons to share on modalities and experiences of collaboration in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of joint projects, including in peacebuilding with PBF funding. Examples in this regard can be Tajikistan and Liberia.

Working in Sirte was seen as the innovation of the project by some interviewees. The city was important as between East and West in Libya but had not had much UN engagement when the project was designed and early into implementation.

Activity level lessons from the project can potentially be extended to other sites and projects in Libya. IPs report successful implementation of important heretofore not met services in Sirte, such as psychosocial support. RUNOs should be prepared to extend and modify programming from Sirte under this project to other areas that have been as conflict-affected when and if there is an appropriate governance framework, level of security, and engagement with the United Nations in other areas of Libya not under GNU control. PBF comments expressed an interest in hearing from RUNOs on any plans to do so, including on interest from the authorities and from partners and donors.

RUNOs and the RCO reported learning from this experience and plans to use this learning for future engagement with the PBF for the development of future peacebuilding projects for Libya.

*What types of implementation issues have emerged, and how can they be addressed in the future?*

As detailed in the effectiveness and efficiency sections above, the project as a whole and the RUNOs faced numerous issues in implementation. One implementation issue that led to innovation was the shift to LNA control of Sirte from GNA control, which led RUNOs to pause and then adapt activities once the decision was made to work in Sirte under appointed authorities of the east-based government. UNICEF Youth Education continued to be committed to encouraging youth participation in decision making at the local level, but under this situation, needed to change how to not put the children at risk or risk doing harm. UNICEF adapted to establish advisory boards in five schools and provide leadership training for adolescents through an IP, which then led to the election of adolescents to advisory boards for their schools, rather than implementing as planned with the local government as a whole.

The experience suggests the importance of context monitoring and updating, as well as the continued use of coordination mechanisms among RUNOs and IPs to develop, implement, monitor, and report on programming in cities where they have limited experience – and since they have limited experience in joint programming.

*What new ideas are emerging that can be tried out and tested with other projects?*

The ideas, programming, and IPs in the project were not new ones. IPs used tested ideas and programming that they already implemented elsewhere in Libya, but now brought these proven methods to a new city. Sirte was seen as a difficult and risky environment for activities by some CSO partners, who noted that many people in the community were not convinced of the merits of CSOs or their activities.

COVID led to innovations in activity delivery, doing more work on line such as the training of trainers. Some IPs noted that the content of their trainings was innovative in the context of Sirte, where there had not been attention to the mental health of young women.

# CONCLUSIONS

The Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project was a short-term but relevant initiative by UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP – with the support of the RCO – to enlist PBF funding to work towards elevating the roles of young women and men and adolescents in the challenging context of Libya in crisis. RUNOs chose to work in Sirte as a municipality that had particularly suffered from conflict. The goals, plans in the ProDoc, and activities of the project towards meeting these goals were clearly relevant to the beneficiaries in Sirte, Libyan government priorities, and fit the expertise and experience of UN agencies and the integrated strategic framework that guided UN engagement.

RUNOs had a coherent focus, working on activities that were foci of their agencies worldwide. However RUNOs did not coordinate and link their work in implementation.

The challenging context and challenges with implementation left issues with project effectiveness. The ability of the project to met outcome targets varied substantially, with many outputs not met, even after a six month extension. Critically, the youth center designed as the center piece of the project was not rehabilitated. This lacuna impeded the achievement of other indicators and the objectives of the project overall (particularly project outcomes, which were largely not met).

RUNOs expressed frustrations with the implementation and management of the joint project, which set lessons for future joint projects to potentially improve the effectiveness of joint projects and the efficiency and sustainability of these joint projects.

Stakeholders in Sirte were involved to a limited extent in project implementation. Stakeholder engagement was impeded by political and conflict in the municipality and country. This damaged effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and national ownership. Conflict sensitivity in the project was largely how the projected was implemented, as engagement with conflict actors was needed to get the n necessary approvals to operate in Sirte. This risky context for programming led to delays due to conflict and political turmoil.

# LESSONS LEARNED

The conclusions of the evaluation suggest some lessons learned by RUNOs, the RCO, and implementing partners from the experience of the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. Lessons learned suggested by interviewees are also included below when supported by the ET’s analysis of findings.

*More intensive, dedicated management is needed to create linkages in joint projects*

Joint programming is challenging in the contexts the RUNOs face in Libya and their limited experience with joint projects in the country – and for complicated locations like Sirte where UN staff have limited ability to engage with stakeholders. The experience of the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project suggests that there is a need for RUNOs and the RCO to establish and use mechanisms to not only share information but also push shared interests in the design, development, and implementation of joint projects. Without a dedicated full-time project manager to focus on joint implementation, the experience of this project was that the four RUNOs implemented their own activities and did not produce any benefits from jointness. Instead, the benefits that RUNOs expected to flow from one RUNO’s activities to another were not realized. The absence of the youth center led to the lack of expected connections in the project, with negative implications for activities. There was limited information and realism about the prospects for the youth center which negatively affected the other RUNOs. This suggests the merits of a manager or management mechanism that could link RUNOs to positive effects by not only sharing information but also pushing for coordination between RUNOs with similar activities or links between their activities under a joint project.

*RUNOs need a consistent focus on sustainability*

Libya’s problems after a decade of turmoil are long-term; RUNOs need to focus on building sustainable ways to help Libyans move forward and retain this focus on sustainability from the beginning of project development through implementation. Without integration and joint management and ways to maintain a focus on sustainability in the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project, the prospects for sustainability seem small from the different activities. Sustainability should be fostered through multiple mechanisms, including work with government authorities and institutions, sustained engagement with civil society organizations, and also through repeated engagement with young people and adolescents.

*Projects need ways to structure and maintain local engagement in planning and implementation*

The Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project’s SC does not seem to have had an influence on project implementation and was not replaced by other forums that could build local support for and input into the project. The findings suggest the beneficiaries and stakeholders wanted more engagement to tailor the project in a variety of ways to their specific needs in Sirte. And having local support would have the potential to avoid or minimize some of the difficulties that ensued with limited local engagement in the project. Local engagement can also be used to minimize risks of raising expectations that risk not being met. Local engagement should be inclusive and go beyond simply using local government structures to reach into civil society as well.

*Projects designed to work in conflict-affected areas need ways to focus explicitly on conflict and peacebuilding*

The Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project developed plans to work with conflict-affected adolescents and youth in their context. This engagement worked to support them in these conditions and help them move past the conflict themselves, without appearing to work on helping them understand and address the roots of the conflict and its manifestations in Sirte. The project did not develop or use activities that directly focused on peacebuilding challenges and opportunities or understanding the conflict that could be used to address issues in Sirte and other communities in Libya.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions of the evaluation suggest some potential recommendations based on the experience of the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. Recommendations suggested by interviewees are also included in the recommendations here when supported by the ET’s analysis of findings.

***Recommendations for UN Agencies and the RCO in Libya***

1. **RUNOs and the RCO should establish and use mechanisms to develop and manage a joint project**

To make a joint project more than one that simply has activities implemented independently by different RUNOs within a nominally joint project, structures should be created and used towards encouraging RUNOs to work together to develop a project and joint ways to work together at the technical level in implementation. These mechanisms should focus on finding ways to compound the effects of activities and benefits of a joint project. The Libya UNCT has limited experience with the development and implementation joint projects. The country team should learn from the experience of other countries where the UN has more joint projects that work more jointly, and extend this experience to develop and institutionalize their own modalities for the development and implementation of joint projects. These modalities should make it easier to collaborate across RUNOs to greater effect. If the plan is to manage through a single project manager across RUNOs, it should be implemented. The efforts of the RCO over 2021 were able to support information sharing but not able to attain activity-level cooperation and collaboration across RUNOs.

These measures also need ways to connect implementing partners and stakeholders in the joint project.

Some specific ways joint mechanisms can be used include:

* Developing a joint implementation plan, which was not done under this project
* to ensure consistent, coordinated attention through project implementation on reaching women and girls in support of GEWE in relevant ways that can further these goals in the context of Libya in conflict.
* To develop and use a joint risk management plan to ensure the monitoring and consideration of risks, as well as clear conversations about mitigation throughout project implementation.
* Developing a joint communications plan to share and support project results and reporting.

1. **Projects should develop and use ways to measure outputs and outcomes of projects that go beyond activity-level monitoring.**

Results-based management approaches should not only focus on activity-level implementation but also identify, gather, and use data to assess and manage for progress towards higher-level outputs and outcomes. When the aim is to support a shift in mind-sets, attitudes and behaviours of youth and adolescents, these outcomes should be tracked at the outset and measured at the end among targets of interventions. Project level monitoring mechanisms can use joint efforts or dedicated data gathering to collect the data needed to measure output and outcome level indicators.

1. **RUNOs and the RCO should develop and maintain a consistent focus on sustainability in project development, implementation, and follow-up**

Projects have a short time period to support change. The PBF project was designed for 18 months, and extended only to two years (the maximum for this type of PBF mechanism). This suggests that the emphasis from the start needs to be on how the project can have enduring effects rather than phase out after promoting skills and some individual youth and structures as in the Sirte project. A focus on sustainability may be even more needed after a decade of conflict and dislocation and with a youthful population as in Libya. A two year project cycle does not provide much time for this effort. Thus the effort needs to be focused and intensive. Activities should be few, targeted and easily accomplished in the life frame of the project. A focus on sustainability should include mechanisms to engage people from the community that leave the community (either due to conflict or to prospects elsewhere) as well as ways to reach wider groups of beneficiaries (such as age groups above youth). Absent continued emphasis on sustainability, sustainability is likely to be limited, as in this project

1. **RUNOs and the RCO should develop and use ways to structure and maintain local engagement in planning and implementation of projects**

Post-conflict societies are challenging to understand and work in. RUNOs and the RCO need ways to conduct and keep updated a realistic view and inclusive understanding of the communities in which they work, including the dynamics of intervention in these communities by outside actors. Strong engagement in local communities is needed to provide this inclusive engagement through Steering Committees for example. RUNOs and the RCO should develop and use ways to structure and maintain local engagement as stakeholders need ways to be continuously involved in project implementation for greater effectiveness and sustainability.

1. **RUNOs and the RCO should find more ways to localize projects in Libyan communities**

Like many communities around the world, Libyans appear to prefer engagements that use trusted local community actors to work in their own communities. This may especially be the case in communities like Sirte that have particularly suffered from conflict and dislocation. If local partners are more trusted, RUNOs should consider how to best work with and build up the capacity of these partners as needed to help meet the needs of all members of the community. Limited access by outsiders makes it even more important to learn from and gain from the local knowledge of different stakeholders in the community, especially those that may be less visible (such as women and marginalized groups). Civil wars are divisive; divided communities need more local engagement and participation to support healing and to reach diverse groups within the community. RUNOs can support more local engagement by hiring local staff, using local partners, and using inclusive local advisory boards as better for effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, ownership and conflict sensitivity as these individuals and organizations know their communities, are likely to be sustained and have a continued presence in their communities.

1. **Projects should develop and use explicit peacebuilding approaches**

Libyan stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries need knowledge and strategies for peacebuilding to address the challenges of peace and conflict in their communities. Projects should consider an explicit focus on working on the conflicts in divided communities in order to support the whole community move forward together. While work in peacebuilding can be controversial, it is necessary. Peacebuilding approaches can be adapted to be acceptable to different political and conflict contexts as in Sirte and used to bring key constituencies together in ways that support rebuilding community cohesion and peace.

***Recommendations for the PBF***

Recommendations for the PBF that follow from the experience of the project are:

1. **As peacebuilding is a long-term endeavour, the PBF should work with donors to develop funding instruments that support longer-term projects (more than two years).**

A country like Libya with more than a decade of conflict and turmoil will take substantial time to turn to peace. And there appear to be few other sources of funding beyond the PBF for UN agency peacebuilding projects in Libya. Plus the Libyan context poses difficult challenges for sustainability. All of these features suggest considering a longer-term approach to supporting peacebuilding in the country, or in communities in Libya.

1. **The PBF should consider supporting mechanisms to encourage joint work among RUNOs under joint programmes and providing funding for RUNOs to utilize joint forums to support joint implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation.**

Joint programming is difficult for UNCTs and RUNOs. Many UNCTs and RUNO staff have limited experience with joint projects. And peacebuilding is a challenging area for work, with difficult traumatized stakeholders and limited capacity in project areas. These issues suggest that the PBF should make it clear to UNCTs and RUNOs that resources can and should be used to enable strong project development, management, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. The PBF could consider mandating the creation and use of structures for joint project implementation and actively monitor their use themselves from the PBF. The PBF should consider additional ways to share positive experiences on joint PBF-funded project design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation across UNCTs.

The evaluation’s data and analysis did not identify particular geographic foci or specific priority interventions for future peacebuilding interventions in Libya or for concrete linkages with other partners and donor to support peacebuilding.

***Recommendations for Libyan stakeholders***

The experience of the project also suggest implications for government stakeholders.

1. Government stakeholders in Libya should develop mechanisms at the city level to partner effectively with RUNOs and the UN for project development and implementation, and to use project activities to stabilize communities, build peace, and prevent violent extremism. Projects should consider establishing or encouraging broad-based advisory or steering committees to link partners and stakeholders for greater effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. These committees need to have wide enough membership in government and civil society, including of women and marginalized communities.

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# ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE FINAL EVALUATION

**INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT**

**Third Party Consultant (CTG) – Independent Project Evaluation**

**DATE: 20 November 2021**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Project title / Post Title:** | **Peace Building Fund Project: BUILDING PEACE WITHIN AND WITH YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN IN SIRTE / Project Evaluator, National Consultant** |
| **Location:** | **Sirte, Libya or Home Based** |
| **Type of Appointment:** | **Third Party Consultant** |
| **Starting date of assignment:** | **15 December 2021** |
| **Duration of the contract:** | **Up to 28 February 2022** |
| **Payment arrangement:**  **Grade/Level:** | **Daily basis**  **Level 2** |
| **Selection method:** | **Competitive** |

1. **BACKGROUND AND PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

After the post-revolution violence and the occupation of the Islamic State, young people in Sirte have the opportunity to contribute to the development of a culture of peace and social cohesion. Sirte continues to play a strategic political and social role in Libya, with oil exploitation nearby. It was the capital of Libya as Tripoli's successor after the Fall of Tripoli from 1 September 2011 to 20 October 2011; and was considered to have been subjected to the most damage of any Libyan city during the civil war. Recalling the continued proliferation of armed groups and human trafficking in Sirte, there is a critical and timely need to support youth and adolescents at this juncture with skills and opportunities to positively contribute to their community. This project focuses on the vulnerability and resilience of young people by addressing some of the key sources of vulnerability and promoting the participation of young people in peacebuilding.

Although youth and adolescents are all victims of the civil war and the atrocities taking place in Sirte, this project aims to reach out to the most vulnerable youth and adolescents. This is a very difficult and challenging task that can only be achieved through close local partnership and collaboration with community organizations, and innovative tools and methods such as using media (TV, radio, and social media). The project uses a social network approach and builds on existing local structures and initiatives that have proved effective in accessing youth and adolescents and selecting the participants for the project. The project also aims empowering youth with new life-skills and mind-sets that allow them to engage constructively in the community and society, and enable them to gain an employment or start their own small scale businesses. It was expected that project will also contribute to a transformation from marginalization to collaboration with others in developing youth-led projects that will benefit the broader community and society in Sirte, working through local partnerships with local knowledge of the social landscape, actors and relations in Sirte, and reaching out a significant number of individuals participating in a range of activities, and thus contribute to peace and social cohesion in Sirte.

Based on detailed assessments of the current context and capabilities, and in consultation with Libyan stakeholders, the project aims to achieve two outcomes:

**Outcome 1:** Young men and women, and adolescents are able to manage psychosocial stress factors and their vulnerability, and to peacefully participate and collaborate in resolving socio-economic challenges with other members of the community in Sirte.

**Outcome 2:** Young people are empowered through the activities and services at the Youth Friendly Safe Space to represent his and her community or constituency, and to actively participate in political forums and meetings with decision makers to ensure that the voices of young people and adolescents are recognized and reflected in local political processes.

Since September 2018, extensive consultations have been held between UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, under the close oversight by the RCO, to jointly design the project and ensure a collective development and implementation of the project. The project was implemented between December 2019 to December 2021 with a total budget US$ 2,950,705. The main local partners are Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Social Affairs and The Municipality (Mayor and municipal council members) and others.

In this context, UNDP Libya is seeking suitable national consultant to support the independent evaluator (team leader) to undertake the evaluation of the joint project.

1. **PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION**

Purpose:

This project evaluation presents an opportunity to assess the achievements of the project in Sirte in an inclusive way and to determine its overall added value to peacebuilding in Libya, in the areas of (i) individuals who have been engaged in armed violence; (ii) individuals who are considered at-risk and vulnerable to be recruited by the armed groups and smugglers; and (iii) young women and girls who are subjected to gender-based violence (GBV) and suffer from trauma from the brutalities of armed violence and the occupation of the IS. In assessing the degree to which the project met its intended peacebuilding objective(s) and results, the evaluation will provide key lessons about successful peacebuilding approaches and operational practices, as well as highlight areas where the project performed less effectively than anticipated. In that sense, this project evaluation is equally about accountability as well as learning.

Objectives of the evaluation:

* Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of: 1) addressing key drivers of conflict (including external parties influence over oil fields, regional powers, national level competition over political influence, local level inter-communal tensions, fears of marginalization) and the most relevant peacebuilding issues; 2) whether the project capitalized on the UN’s added value in Sirte, Libya and 3) the degree to which the project contributed to the conflict prevention in Libya;
* Assess to what extent the PBF project has made a concrete contribution to reducing a conflict factor in Libya, namely conflict prevention and management. With respect to PBF’s contribution, the evaluation will also evaluate whether the project helped to advance achievement of the SDGs, namely SDG 11 and SDG 16;
* Evaluate the project’s efficiency, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money;

Assess whether the support provided by the PBF has promoted the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), allowed a specific focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding processes, and whether it was accountable to gender equality;

Assess the impact for youth; recalling the continued proliferation of armed groups and human trafficking in Sirte, project aimed to support youth and adolescents with skills and opportunities to positively contribute to the communities.

* Assess whether the project has been implemented through a conflict-sensitive approach;
* Document good practices, innovations and lessons emerging from the project;
* Provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

1. **SCOPE OF THE PROJECT EVALUATION**

This evaluation will examine the project’s implementation process and peacebuilding results, drawing upon the project’s results framework as well as other monitoring data collected on the project outputs and outcomes as well as context.

Evaluators should take care to ensure that evaluation of the peacebuilding result is the main line of inquiry. Peacebuilding projects frequently employ approaches that work through thematic areas that overlap with development or humanitarian goals. An evaluation of peacebuilding projects, however, must include not only reflection on progress within the thematic area but the degree to which such progress may or may not have contributed to addressing a relevant conflict factor.

The broad questions to be answered are based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria and the UN Evaluation Group standards (including those on gender mainstreaming), which have been adapted to the context at hand as follows:

*Relevance:*

* Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers and factors for peace identified in a conflict analysis? With Covid-19 implications and movement restrictions that impacted in-class trainings, supply chain logistics, did the project goals and approach remain relevant?
* Evaluate contribution of this project to the UNDAF outcome: Democratic Governance; and Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable and resilience cities and communities) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)
* Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

*Efficiency:*

* How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?
* How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?

*Effectiveness:*

* To what extent did the PBF project achieve its intended objectives and contribute to the project’s strategic vision?
* To what extent did the PBF project substantively mainstream a gender and support gender- responsive peacebuilding?

*Sustainability & Ownership:*

* How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially support to youth and adolescents at the time of peace fragility, conflict and violence, women’s participation in decision making processes, supported under PBF Project?

*Coherence:*

* To what extent did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors?
* How were stakeholders involved in the project’s design and implementation?

*Conflict-sensitivity:*

* Were RUNOs and NUNOs’ internal capacities adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach?

**In addition to the above standard OECD/DAC criteria, the following additional PBF specific evaluation criteria should also be assessed by the evaluation:**

*Catalytic:*

* Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?
* Has PBF funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding?

*Gender-responsive/gender-sensitive:*

* Did the project consider the different challenges, opportunities, constraints and capacities of women, men, girls and boys in project design (including within the conflict analysis, outcome statements and results frameworks) and implementation?

*Risk-tolerance and innovation:*

* How novel or innovative was the project approach? Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?
* What types of implementation issues have emerged, and how can they be addressed in the future?
* What new ideas are emerging that can be tried out and tested with other projects?

1. **METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

The evaluation will be summative, and will employ, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/ verify the substance of the findings. Proposals should outline a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information.

Evaluators should review any theories of change that either explicitly or implicitly framed the programming logic of the Priority Plan and its projects. Proposals should be clear on the specific role each of the various methodological approaches plays in helping to address each of the evaluation questions.

The methodologies for data collection may include but not necessarily be limited to:

* Desk review of key documents (such as project document, annual reports, updates from Agencies)
* Key informant interviews and focus group discussions facilitated by consultant through virtual Microsoft Team/Zoom on-line meetings, as appropriate, with all major stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in Libya (including UN agencies, implementing agencies, the Government, beneficiary institutions). Beneficiaries will represent diverse groups, including women from different ethnic groups.
* The international evaluator would be supported by a local evaluator on the ground
* Survey of key stakeholders, if relevant.
* Systematic review of monitoring data from the Recipient UN Organizations or other key sources of data;

1. **DELIVERABLES**

**1. Inception Report:** The expert(s) will prepare an Inception Report to further refine the evaluation questions and detail the methodological approach, including data collection instruments, in consultation with the PBF technical team. The Inception report must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF prior to commencement of data collection in the field. The inception report should include the following key elements:

- Overall approach and methodology

- Key lines of inquiry, linking refined evaluation questions to data collection instruments

- Data collection instruments and mechanisms

- Proposed list of interviewees

- A work plan and timelines to be agreed with relevant PBF focal points

**2. Presentation/validation of preliminary findings to relevant in-country stakeholders and PBF HQ**

**3. Final evaluation report:** The expert(s) will prepare the final evaluation report based on PBF’s evaluation report template. The first draft of the final report will be shared with an Evaluation Reference Group, composed of representatives of all direct fund recipients and the PBF (at a minimum), for their comments. The final accepted version of the report will reflect ERG’s comments. The Final Report must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF.

1. **TIMEFRAME AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Deliverable:** | **Content:** | **Number of Working Days:** | **Percentage of Payment** |
| Inception Report | The inception report will have a maximum of 20 pages, including annexes and include:  - the evaluation team’s understanding of the TORs and any data or other concerns arising from the provided materials and initial meetings/ interviews and strategies for how to address perceived shortcomings;  - key evaluation questions and methodological tools for answering each question;  - list of key risks and risk management strategies for the evaluation;  - stakeholder analysis | 13 days |  |
| Data collection | Report on the collected data | Up to 20 days |  |
| Draft Report | The draft report will have a maximum of 40 pages, inclusive of an Executive Summary and annexes. The draft report will be reviewed by the PBSO and the Reference Group. PBSO will provide a consolidated matrix of comments which should be formally addressed in the final report | 12 days |  |
| Validation and integrating comments into the Final Report | The Team Leader will be responsible for ensuring that comments from the PBSO and the Reference Group and formally addressed. The final report will include all the annexes, including project evaluation summaries. It will also have a five-page Executive Summary outlining key findings on successes and ‘challenges of PBF support, and recommendations, which can be used as a stand-alone document. The final report will be evidence based and will respond to all the questions in the Inception Report with clear and succinct lessons learned and targeted recommendations.  The PBSO will approve the final report, following consultation with the Reference Group.  Following acceptance of the final report, PBSO will coordinate a management response to the evaluation report as a separate document. | 5 days |  |

1. **INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**
2. **Responsibilities of evaluators**

* The **International Consultant will**
* Lead the entire evaluation process, including communicating all required information with the Evaluation Manager
* Finalize the research design and questions based on the feedback and complete inception report
* Conduct of data gathering activities: desk review, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions etc. No travel by consultant is involved due to security considerations, on-going travel restrictions and time-limits, to be done by consultant remotely with support of in-country counterpart and a local evaluator
* Data analysis, draft and final report preparation, consolidation and submission, and presenting the findings
* Submit draft evaluation report
* Address PBF HQ and UNDP feedback and adjust first final report draft
* Submit final evaluation report revised
* Have/bring their laptops, and other relevant software/equipment
* Use their own mobile and personal email address during the consultancy period

1. **The National Consultant will:**

* Be primarily responsible for data gathering in Libya that is requested by the Team Leader, to fully support administrative matters of international consultant.
* Support the Team Leader in coordinating, planning and ensuring implementation of FGDs, Key Informant Interviews (KII), and contacts with key stakeholders (national and local level).
* Contribute to the preparation of the evaluation draft, presentations and final submission under the direct guidance of the Team Leader.
* Have/bring personal laptop, and other relevant software/equipment
* Use own mobile and personal email address during the consultancy period, including when in-country

1. **Responsibilities of UNDP**

The project Evaluation is commissioned by the UNDP Libya Deputy Resident Representative. The International Consultant will work with the project team for conducting the evaluation, who will be responsible for the provision of documents and data as requested and support the overall evaluation.

1. **Evaluation ethics.**

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners. A code of conduct must be signed by the evaluator (s).

1. **Evaluation Criteria / Qualification requirements for National Consultant**

**Education:**

• Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in in sociology, development studies, political science, statistics or a related field.

**Experience:**

• At least 5 years of demonstrated relevant work experience at the national level in monitoring, evaluation, reporting, or research is required.

• Demonstrated ability to prepare and follow interview/focus groups protocols and other data collection tools is required.

• Experience in using participatory techniques in data collection, including gender-sensitive and youth-friendly approaches, is required.

• Deep knowledge of the peacebuilding and political context in the country is required.

• Knowledge of and experience with social cohesion, youth empowerment, gender equality is required.

• Familiarity or previous work experience with the UN system is a strong asset.

**Language skills**:

• Fluency in oral and written Arabic is required.

• Working proficiency in oral and written English is desirable.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Criteria** | **Score** |
| **Education** | **15** |
| Bachelor’s degree or equivalent in in sociology, development studies, political science, statistics or a related field. | 15 |
| **Technical Competencies** | **50** |
| At least 5 years of demonstrated relevant work experience at the national level in monitoring, evaluation, reporting, or research is required. | 20 |
| Demonstrated ability to prepare and follow interview/focus groups protocols and other data collection tools | 15 |
| Experience in using participatory techniques in data collection, including gender-sensitive and youth-friendly approaches | 10 |
| Deep knowledge of the peacebuilding and political context in the country | 5 |
| **Language** | **5** |
| Working proficiency in oral and written English | 5 |
| **Overall Technical Score:** | **70** |
| **Financial Evaluation** | **30** |
| Candidates obtaining a minimum of 49 points over 70 points would be considered for the Financial Evaluation - 30 points  Lowest Price will be qualified with the maximum of 30 points. Higher prices will be qualified according the following calculation:  **FE = LFP x 30**  **FPi**  FE= Financial Evaluation  LFP = Lowest Financial Proposal  FPi= Financial Poposal of bidder i |  |
| **FINAL EVALUATION: TECHNICAL + FINANCIAL** | **100** |

1. **Risks and challenges**

There are several risks which are envisaged. Foremost is the COVID-19 pandemic and response, and the restrictions that go along with it. With the current limitations in movement, travel, meetings, face-to-face interviews or site visits are not possible due security reasons. The urgency and severity of the pandemic within this constrained context also means many of the stakeholders and potential users of the evaluation will have as their principle responsibility the response to the pandemic and its effects. This in turn means the conducting primary data collection, even using remote methods, runs the risk of low response rates, if at all possible.

# ANNEX 2: EVALUATION MATRIX

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions** | **Indicators/Performance Measures** | **Data Sources (primary and secondary)** | **Data Collection Tools** | **Data Analysis Plans** |
| **Relevance** |  |  |  |  |
| Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers and factors for peace identified in a conflict analysis? With Covid-19 implications and movement restrictions that impacted in-class trainings, supply chain logistics, did the project goals and approach remain relevant?  Evaluate contribution of this project to the UNDAF outcome: Democratic Governance; and Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable and resilience cities and communities) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)  Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? | RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of relevance to conflict drivers and factors for peace  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of continued relevance as context changed  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of contributions to UNDAF outcome and SDGs  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of relevance of project for target groups and beneficiaries | Project Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  RUNO, RCO, partner staff, beneficiaries, and stakeholders  Country and UN planning documents (e.g. UNDAF) | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison  Trend analysis of change over time |
| **Coherence** |  |  |  |  |
| To what extent did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors?  How were stakeholders involved in the project’s design and implementation? | RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of complementarity of project with other UN and other work  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder evidence for involvement in design and implementation | Project Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  RUNO, RCO, partner staff, beneficiaries, and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison  Trend analysis of change over time |
| **Effectiveness** |  |  |  |  |
| To what extent did the PBF project achieve its intended objectives and contribute to the project’s strategic vision?  What types of implementation issues have emerged, and how can they be addressed in the future? | RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of and evidence for key results from project-supported activities (types, places, people) and extent met objectives/strategic vision  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of and evidence for gender mainstreaming and support for gender- responsive peacebuilding | Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, the RCO, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison  Trend analysis of change over time |
| **Efficiency** |  |  |  |  |
| How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?  How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities? | RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of and evidence on project management  Specific examples of implementation approaches, attention to costs, attention to maximizing results, and coordinating | Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, RCO, and partner staff, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison  Trend analysis of change over time |
| **Sustainability** |  |  |  |  |
| How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially support to youth and adolescents at the time of peace fragility, conflict and violence, women’s participation in decision making processes, supported under PBF Project? | RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder expectations about the commitment of stakeholders and the government to the sustainability of results for   * Youth * Adolescent s * Women’s participation in decision-making processes   Evidence for or plans to continue project initiatives | Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  Interviews with UNDP, partner, and donor staff, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison |
| **Conflict sensitivity** |  |  |  |  |
| Were RUNOs and NUNOs’ internal capacities adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach? Was an ongoing process of context monitoring and a monitoring system that allows for monitoring of unintended impacts established? | Evidence for explicit attention to conflict sensitivity  Evidence for RUNO’s systems for reviews of project with attention to conflict sensitivity  RUNO, RCO, partner, beneficiary, and stakeholder perceptions of monitoring systems  Evidence for a process/system of monitoring of unintended impacts by RUNOs/RCO/Partners | Project Documents (Project planning and implementation materials, project reporting, other project documentation)  RUNO, RCO, partner staff, beneficiaries, and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison  Trend analysis of change over time |
| **Catalytic effects** |  |  |  |  |
| Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?  Has PBF funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding? | Evidence that RUNOs, partners, stakeholders, and/or beneficiaries have been able to or are planning to generate additional resources and activities towards the aims or using the approaches of the project  Evidence for scaling up or broader influence of the project on peacebuilding | Documents (Project implementation materials, project and partner reporting, other project and partner documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, project staff, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison |
| **Gender-responsive/**  **Gender-sensitive** |  |  |  |  |
| Did the project consider the different challenges, opportunities, constraints and capacities of women, men, girls and boys in project design (including within the conflict analysis, outcome statements and results frameworks) and implementation? | Evidence that gender considered in project design and implementation | Documents (Project implementation materials, project and partner reporting, other project and partner documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, project staff, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison |
| **Risk-tolerance and innovation** |  |  |  |  |
| How novel or innovative was the project approach?  Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?  What new ideas are emerging that can be tried out and tested with other projects? | RUNO, RCO, partner, stakeholder, and beneficiary perceptions of innovativeness of approach  RUNO, RCO, partner, stakeholder, and beneficiary suggested lessons learned with relevance elsewhere | Documents (Project implementation materials, project and partner reporting, other project and partner documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, project staff, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison |
| **Best Practices & Lessons Learned** |  |  |  |  |
| What do RUNO and project staff, partners, beneficiaries, and stakeholders see as best practices from their experience with the project project’s design, implementation, and results?  What do RUNO and project staff, partners, beneficiaries, and stakeholders see as Lessons Learned from their experience with the project project’s design, implementation, and results? | Best practices suggested/evidence that these practices produced results  Perceptions of lessons learned based on experiences with the project | Documents (Project implementation materials, project and partner reporting, other project and partner documentation)  Interviews with RUNOs, project staff, partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders | Document review  Semi-structured interview guide and questions  Focus group discussion guide and questions | Content and thematic analysis and comparison |

# ANNEX 3: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

**United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)** **Documents**

Standards for Evaluation in the UN System: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/22](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/22)

Norms for Evaluation in the UN System: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/21](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/21)

Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – towards UNEG Guidance: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/980](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/980)

UNEG Guidance Integrating Human Rights and Gender into Evaluation: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/1616](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1616)

UN SWAP Evaluation Performance Indicator: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/1452](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/1452)

UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports: [www.uneval.org/document/detail/607](http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/607)

UNEG Ethical Guidelines: [www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102](http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102)

UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN: [www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100](http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100)

**Project Documents**

1 August 2019. Project Document. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/25233>

5 May 2021. Project Document (No-cost extension). <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/28254>

30 June 2020. Semi-Annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/24693>

15 November 2020. Workplan and Budget, Semi-annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/26075>

31 December 2020. Annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/26074>

30 June 2021. Semi-Annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/27565>

16 November 2021. Workplan & Budget, Semi-Annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/28657>

31 December 2021. Annual Progress Report. <https://mptf.undp.org/document/download/28656>

**United Nations Documents**

October 2021. UNSF 2019-2022 –Libya: Evaluation Report. <https://minio.dev.devqube.io/uninfo-production-main/0e0fab08-3573-46d9-a96e-d175d888c1de_UNSF_Final_Evaluation_Report_final.pdf>

n.d. Common Country Analysis: Libya, 2021. <https://minio.dev.devqube.io/uninfo-production-main/0a793d44-0215-48f3-9331-66cdd05cfa6d_United_Nations_Libya_Common_Country_Analysis_2021.pdf>

n.d.. United Nations Strategic Framework for Libya. <https://archive.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/events/files/session_4_libya_planning_strategic_framework.pdf>

**UNICEF Documents**

Programme Document, ALMOBADR Organization For Development and Capacity Building, 24 March 2020

Almobadr, Programme & Report overview, Quarter 1, 8 June 2021

Almobadr, Programme & Report overview, Quarter 2, 8 June 2021

Almobadr, Programme & Report overview, Quarter 3, 10 June 2021

Almobadr, Programme & Report overview, Quarter 4, 31 October 2021

Almobadr, Programme & Report overview, Quarter 5, 30 November 2021

**WFP Documents**

Agreement between the World Food Programme and Kaafa Development Foundation (FLA), 15 February 2021

FLA Amendment #1 (Asayra), 9 February 2021

Asayra Weekly Reports

Sirte Round 1&2 Vocational Trainings Weekly reports

Sirte Round 2 Registration

Sirte Soft Skills Evaluation

Training center location\_Sirt\_Kafaa

Market assessment - Sirte\_16\_12\_2020

Participants list- Kafaa

registration list Volume 1- Asarya

registration list Volume 2 – Asarya

Sirte Narrative Report

Sirte Short Report

[Approval from Sirte TC]

[Approval letter for PBF, Sirte]

[Letter to Town Council of Sirte -signed]

Food Distribution tracking sheet

# ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

**UNDP**

Byashim Byashimov

Algaddafi -Salem-Saleh Alpotte

**UNICEF**

Farah Ogbi, Youth and Education

Yuko Osowa, Child Protection

Yosra Benlamin

**WFP**

Samer Abdul Jaber, Head of Mission

Yukinori Hibi

Mohamed Aghnayah

Craig Browne, Programme Policy Officer, Resilience

**UNFPA**

Mohamed Elmagbri

**Office of the UN Resident Coordinator**

Zainab Hasan Awadh Basiuni

Naeun Choi

**Implementing partners**

*WFP*

Naji Albakay, Kafaa

Suliman Albarassi, Asarya,

*UNFPA*

Marwa Aznad, Alistishari

Ebtesam Alqusbi, Tracks

Ali Sarief – Life makers Association

*UNICEF*

Sayf Alhangary, President, Al Mobadr Organization for Development and Capacity Building

**Beneficiaries**

male, Lifemakers

male, Kafaa

male, Kafaa

male, Tracks

**Stakeholders**

Ali Emmiesh, Youth Centre Manager

# ANNEX 5: EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

The introduction and consent note introduce the evaluators, the evaluation, and methods to participants in the evaluation to gather the explicit consent of people with participating in the evaluation. The evaluators will recite the following to all prospective interviewees and get their explicit oral consent to participate*.*

**Introduction and Informed Consent**

Thank you for talking with me today.

My name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am working independently for the United Nations to conduct an evaluation of the work conducted by the UN and its partners through the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project. The goal of the review is to learn about what has been accomplished through the project, what has worked well, and what has not worked as well. Lessons from this review will used to help the UN and its partners in future work in Libya and around the world.

The information collected today will only be used for the review. We will not use this information in a way that identifies you as an individual in the report.

I would also like to clarify that this interview is entirely voluntary and that you have the right **to withdraw** from interview at any point without consequence.

We hope to learn from you from your knowledge and experience with the project and its activities. Are you willing to participate in this study? [Ensure that participant(s) verbally agree to participate]

Do you have any questions for me before we begin with a short list of questions to learn about the ways that you or your organisation may have worked with the project?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

[NOTE THAT NOT ALL QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED TO IN ALL INTERVIEWS; INTERVIEWS WILL FOCUS ON THE AREAS AND QUESTIONS MOST RELEVANT TO INFORMANT’S KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROJECT]

**Background**

How did you learn about the opportunity to work with/benefit from the Building peace within and with young women and men in Sirte project?

What have you done with the project?

**Relevance**

How do you see the relevance of the project for Sirte, your organization, and your stakeholders and beneficiaries?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers and factors for peace in Sirte? Where these factors identified in a conflict analysis?

Did the project remain relevant with the conditions that prevailed in the Covid-19 pandemic?

UN staff only - Did and how did the project contribute to UNDAF outcomes? [Democratic Governance; and Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable and resilience cities and communities) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)]

Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?

**Coherence**

What did your organisation do under the project to have the components of the project fit together?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

How did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors?

How were stakeholders involved in the project’s design and implementation?

**Effectiveness**

What do you see as the key results and changes attained for young men, women and vulnerable groups as a result of the project?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

Do you know the objectives of the project? If YES - To what extent did the PBF project achieve its intended objectives? What serves as evidence towards achieving these objectives?

How and to what extent did the PBF project mainstream gender into its design and implementation and support gender- responsive peacebuilding?

**Efficiency**

Was the project management structure appropriate and efficient in working with your organization to generate the expected results?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

How efficient was the staffing of the project?

How efficient was the planning and coordination within the project (including between the implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?

How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?

**Sustainability**

How did the project work to support the sustainability of project achievements, so that project results can continue after the end of the project?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of support to youth and adolescents?

How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of support for women’s participation in decision making processes?

**Conflict sensitivity**

How did your organization work to have a conflict-sensitive approach in the changing context of Sirte?

FOLLOW UP WITH …

How did UN agencies address conflict in the ways they approached the project and its activities in Sirte?

Did and how did UN agencies and partners develop and implement processes of context monitoring?

Was a monitoring system that allows for monitoring of unintended impacts established? If so, how?

**Catalytic effects**

Has the project led to additional finance for programs or the development of follow on projects to support peacebuilding and youth? If so, what are these programs/sources of finance?

Has project support led to scaling-up other peacebuilding work in Sirte or Libya?

Has project support helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding in Sirte or Libya?

**Gender-responsive/Gender-sensitive**

Did and how did the project consider the different challenges, opportunities, constraints and capacities of women and men – and girls and boys - in project design and implementation?

**Risk-tolerance and innovation**

Would you say the project was innovative? If innovative, what did the project do that was new?

What types of implementation issues did the project have?

What would you suggest for how these implementation issues could be addressed in future projects?

Are there new ideas that are emerging from the project’s work in Sirte? If so, what are these new ideas? Can these ideas be tried out and tested with other projects?

**Best Practices & Lessons Learned**

What do you see as best practices from your experience with the project project’s design, implementation, and results that should be expanded on or replicated?

What do you see as any key Lessons Learned for future project development and implementation from your experience with the project project’s design, implementation, and results?

**Recommendations**

What do you recommend for future support for building peace based on your experience with the project?

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

[NOTE THAT NOT ALL QUESTIONS WILL BE ASKED IN ALL FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS; FGDS WILL FOCUS ON THE AREAS AND QUESTIONS MOST RELEVANT TO GROUPS’ KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROJECT]

***To be developed based on particular activities and their beneficiaries***

What was the goal of the activity that you participated in, \_\_\_\_\_\_ [name of activity that they know]?

Why was this activity with you supported by the United Nations?

What would you say worked particularly well with the activity you were engaged in? Why did these practices work well?

Are there things that did not work as well in the activity you engaged in? Why did these practices not work as well?

How sustainable do you think the results of the activity you participated in are? Why are the results more or less sustainable?

Would you say that the work of the project had an effect on building peace in Sirte? Why or why not?

What do you recommend based on your experience with the project to support future progress towards the goal of the activity?

What would you recommend so support peace building in Sirte in the future?

# ANNEX 6: SIGNED PLEDGE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

Text

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Lawrence R. Robertson, 11 June 2022

1. OECD DAC. December 2019. Better Criteria for Better Evaluation Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation, at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/revised-evaluation-criteria-dec-2019.pdf> (accessed 28 December 2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. October 2021. UNSF 2019-2022 –Libya: Evaluation Report. <https://minio.dev.devqube.io/uninfo-production-main/0e0fab08-3573-46d9-a96e-d175d888c1de_UNSF_Final_Evaluation_Report_final.pdf> (accessed 28 March 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)