



PBF PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

COUNTRY: SOMALIA
TYPE OF REPORT: FINAL
YEAR OF REPORT: 2022

Project Title: Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway: IRF 00119246			
If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund		Type and name of recipient organizations: UNDP (Convening Agency)	
Name of Recipient Fund: UNDP			
Date of first transfer: 13 December 2019 Project end date: 28 February 2022 (No cost extension was approved for 6 months) Is the current project end date within 6 months? Project ended			
Check if the project falls under one or more PBF priority windows: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project			
Total PBF approved project budget (by recipient organization): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Please enter the total amounts in US dollars allocated to each recipient organization • Please enter the original budget amount, amount transferred to date and estimated expenditure by recipient. • For cross-border projects, group the amounts by agency, even where transfers are made to different country offices. You can provide the detail in the attached budget. 			
Recipient organisation	Budget Allocated (\$)	Amount Transferred to date (\$)	Amount spent to date (\$)
UNDP	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,315,357
TOTAL	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,500,000	\$ 2,315,357
Approximate implementation rate as percentage of total Project budget: 93%			
ATTACH PROJECT EXCEL BUDGET SHOWING CURRENT APPROXIMATE EXPENDITURE The budget templates are available here			
Gender-responsive Budgeting: <i>Indicate what percentage (%) of the budget contributes gender equality or women's empowerment (GEWE)?</i> USD 485,997 and in-kind contribution of USD 174,336 for dedicated time of two Senior Gender Advisors, P5 level, from UNSOM and UNDP, and National Gender Specialists (UNSOM) at FGS and FMS levels. In addition, this Project was informed by and benefitted from a GM3 Project which solely focused on addressing gender differential issues before and during elections. Amount expended on activities focussed on gender equality or women's empowerment: USD 209,954 approx. for Women's Situation Desk (WSD).			
Project Gender Marker: GM2 Project Risk Marker: Low Project PBF focus area: 4.1 Strengthening National Capacity			
Report preparation: Project report prepared by: Anthony Howie, Senior Elections Security Advisor, IESG Project report approved by: Mary Cummins, Deputy Chief Electoral Advisor, IESG Did PBF Secretariat review the report: please select			

NOTES FOR COMPLETING THE REPORT:

- *Avoid acronyms and UN jargon, use general /common language.*
- *Report on what has been achieved in the reporting period, not what the project aims to do.*
- *Be as concrete as possible. Avoid theoretical, vague or conceptual discourse.*
- *Ensure the analysis and project progress assessment is gender and age sensitive.*
- *Please include any COVID-19 related considerations, adjustments and results and respond to section IV.*

PART 1: OVERALL PROJECT PROGRESS

*Briefly outline the **status of the Project** in terms of implementation cycle, including whether preliminary/preparatory activities have been completed (i.e., contracting of partners, staff recruitment, etc.) (1500-character limit):*

Briefly outline the status of the project in terms of implementation cycle, including whether preliminary/preparatory activities have been completed (i.e. contracting of partners, staff recruitment, etc.) (1500-character limit):

The Project Document was signed off in December 2019 for an initial period of 21 months but was granted a six-month extension to try and match the ever-changing timelines for the elections. The Project was managed by UNDP through its joint electoral assistance programme with UNSOM, the IESG, and was completed on 28 February 2022. The Project itself was led by a project team comprising the Senior Election Security Advisor and a National Officer, with the support of a United Kingdom (UK) military officer seconded to the IESG who was rotated every six months. The Project benefited from the direct supervisory support of the IESG Director (UNSOM), Deputy Chief Electoral Advisor (UNDP) and the Chief Electoral Operations Advisor (UNSOM) as well as the IESG Project Manager (UNDP), various Gender Advisors (UNDP/IESG and others) and UNDP Country Office. IESG coordinated the PBF-funded activities within the larger electoral security efforts within Somalia, including those provided by AMISOM and UNPOL. Sweden, Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)¹, provided technical expertise and training to establish a WSD within each JOC. Political disputes delayed the elections for two years, and although the 27 May 2021 agreement anticipated Parliamentary Elections in July-September 2021 and the Presidential Elections in October 2021, the Parliamentary Elections were not completed until 5 May 2022 while of the end of the Project was 28 February 2022.

The Project Board of the UN Joint Electoral Support Programme (which IESG implemented) also served as Project Board for this Project with the addition of the PBF and Ministry of Internal Security representatives. It met quarterly or more frequently as needed. The Board was to provide quality assurance supported by UNDP's Programme Oversight and Quality Assurance Unit for monitoring and oversight.

The Project has been completed but not without significant challenges. The challenges faced by the Project team to deliver the Project overlapped and were unparalleled in recent times for Project delivery. The challenges related to the restrictions imposed by the widespread outbreak of COVID², elevated levels of insecurity and direct attacks on the electoral process³, persistent political disputes between Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) leadership and within the FGS leadership which at times resulted in violence, continual delays with the electoral process, supply chain delays, and the switch from good oversight of elections security by appointed National Elections Security Task Force (NESTF) to poor oversight by the subsequently appointed National Elections Security

¹ <https://fba.se/en/>

² Refer to [The Gravedigger's Truth: Coronavirus hits Somalia](#)

³ 60 people killed in March 2020; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/March_2022_Somalia_attacks.

Committee (NESC). These were often desperate times, and the challenges were huge and required innovative ways to deliver the equipment and the training ahead of the ever-changing elections dates. These challenges all affected Project delivery and continuity, and so the progress and results of this Project should be viewed against the backdrop of these significant difficulties.

On 17 September 2020, the FGS and FMS leadership agreed on an indirect electoral model. However, soon after this agreement was reached the relationships proceeded to deteriorate as two FMS, Jubaland and Puntland, refused to participate in taking the elections forward as they objected to issues including how electoral management bodies should be appointed and delegates selected and the perceived incumbent's undue interference on managing the indirect electoral process. As a result, there was little progress with elections security planning and coordination. The Chair of the NESTF announced that he would not visit the regions, he would not hold NESTF meetings, and he would not issue a National Plan for Elections Security until a political agreement to proceed with elections was reached. That agreement was reached on 27 May 2021, with an announcement by the FGS and FMS to proceed with an indirect election based on the 17 September 2020 Agreement largely led this time by the Office of The Prime Minister (OPM). Significantly for the Project, the 27 May agreement confirmed that the number of elections centres would remain at 12, two for each FMS and one for Banadir (Mogadishu) and a National Joint Operations Centre to coordinate security among the 11 JOCs.

This second agreement contained certain new conditions, one of which was the establishment of a new body to manage elections security, the NESC, which comprised nine members including FGS and FMS police commissioners, the AMISOM and the UN police commissioners, and it was chaired by the Prime Minister. The NESTF was effectively made redundant, and it was anticipated that the NESC would carry on the coordination work that the NESTF had been doing and continue to be supported by this project. Up until then, the NESTF Secretariat had hosted four NESTF meetings, had drafted a National Elections Security Plan and budget, had assumed an effective role to coordinate the delivery of JOC equipment to the beneficiaries, and had started to coordinate the plan to train the JOC staff. Subsequently, only two formal NESC meetings were held; the first meeting was on 13-15 July 2021 and the second was held on 2 October 2021 for which no meeting minutes were produced. In effect, the NESC gave responsibility to the Somali Police Force (SPF) and Federal Member State Police Commissioners to undertake their own oversight and coordination. This meant that for most of the Project's timeline, UN project staff worked directly with each JOC and their respective commissioners and appointed Focal Points to handover equipment and deliver the training thereby entering a political environment (FGS v FMS). That this was completed ahead of the elections is a credit to the resilience of the Somali partners as well as the determined efforts of the UN project team, UN Police, AMISOM Police advisors and trainers, and the Somali police trainers.

During the first five months of 2021, the Project continued to provide support to the NESTF Secretariat office by providing some additional office equipment and high-quality internet connections to allow the Secretariat to be fully functioning. With the demise of the NESTF and its Secretariat in May 2021, the same support was offered to the NESC secretariat (two people) within the Office of the Prime Ministers (OPM) and some project support was provided for meetings and related activities through a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the OPM. The LoA was instituted to encourage the NESC to meet regularly, to allow for rapid support to the NESC meetings, and to avoid any suggestion that NESC meetings could not be held due to insufficient resources. As mentioned, the NESC only met twice and so little of the allocated budget was expensed. The NESC issued a Federal Elections Security Plan, and a revised budget for elections security to be funded by candidates' fees and topped up by the FGS. This plan was a very reduced version of the draft National Elections Security Plan prepared by the NESTF in 2021, and in effect resembled more of a statement of intent. The elections security budget was not funded which was a

persistent source of contention for the Somali police who expected some form of allowance for elections security duties. A summary of the key NESTF and NESC meetings and timelines is given below.

NESTF & NESC Meetings & Timeline	
Dates	Event
9 December 2019	Initial NESTF meeting
21 January 2020	Second NESTF meeting
14 – 18 March 2020	Third NESTF meeting. Agreed on NESTF TOR & Draft Concept for voter registration security
17 September 2020	FGS/FMS agreement for indirect elections, then disagreement
	Decision NESTF Chair to suspend NESTF and security planning until political agreement reached
13 – 15 December 2020	Fourth NESTF meeting with 60 participants. Draft National Elections Security Plan and budget prepared
27 May 2021	Political agreement reached for indirect elections led by OPM, with NESC to replace NESTF
13 – 15 July 2021	Initial NESC meeting
Late July 2021	Indirect Elections started
3 – 7 August 2021	Elections Security Committees to NESC
2 October 2021	Second NESC meeting
7 – 10 October 2021	NESC visit to all FMS

The major component of this Project was the provision of equipment to establish 12 Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), one in each elections centre/city, and a national JOC (NJOC). The equipment that was provided included – office furniture, office stationery, computers and accessories including Wi-Fi connections, generators, and tactical radios. Another significant feature of this project was the establishment of a Women’s Situation Desk (WSD) in each JOC. The idea of establishing WSDs was taken up by IESG in 2020 after discussions with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development, which had approached IESG about the possibilities of working together to promote gender sensitive election security planning. In early 2021, FBA and IESG together developed a full concept for the WSDs to be embedded in the JOCs. This concept was further developed, socialised and shared with the NESTF Secretariat and other stakeholders in elections security, and was generally well received. IESG advocated strongly for inclusion of 30% women on the staff allocated to each JOC. FBA developed the training plan with supporting material for WSD staff training and funded and delivered the training to all WSD staff centrally in Mogadishu over 13-10 September 2021 with support and assistance by the IESG project team. It is worth noting that 50% of all the WSD staff in all the JOCs who attended the training were women, and that this was the only training activity that all JOCs were represented together.

The NESTF approved the Project’s JOC Equipment Rollout Plan having confirmed that each JOC in the election’s centres had met their obligations to receive the equipment, which included the allocation of office space, assignment of competent staff, and a named Focal Point for each JOC. All JOC equipment (office furniture; computers with Wi-Fi connections; generators; and Motorola tactical radios) was delivered during 2021.

One of the successful aspects of the Project was the acquisition, training, and installation of the two tactical radio systems. Through a Tactical Communications Working Group facilitated by IESG with the support of Motorola and the SPF Director of Communications, the introduction of the two systems proceeded relatively smoothly. The Phase 1 equipment was the handheld radios system. SPF engineers were trained by a Motorola third party⁴, and with the project supporting the SPF. The SPF engineers installed the systems

⁴ <https://bce.systems/>

in all the JOCs except Kismayo, and also trained the radio operators. The Phase 2 equipment is the JOC-to-JOC radio system. Again, training was provided to the SPF engineers who installed the system into each JOC except for Kismayo who declined the installations. The SPF Director of Communications in Mogadishu is holding the Phase 2 for Kismayo equipment until there is political agreement for it to be installed.

Training of the JOC staff commenced in mid-2021 funded by the UNSOM Trust Fund for Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia, once it was realised that the UNSOS budget for AMISOM police to deliver this training had been rescinded. AMISOM Police trainers delivered training to the JOC staff where AMISOM had a presence. Where AMISOM Police trainers were not present, AMISOM Police trained Somali Police trainers (through a Train of Trainers course; endorsed by the Joint Police Program) who in turn trained their JOC staff using the training material shared by AMISOM Police. Sweden, through FBA, funded and provided centralised training for the staff of each of the WSDs supported by IESG project staff. Based on the experience of the initial training and feedback from the JOC staff, additional training was offered and provided and funded by the project. This additional centralised training was provided for the JOC Commanders, and tailored training for intelligence staff within the JOCs was also provided. Not all JOCs benefitted from all of the training but given the challenges already mentioned the training-reach was good. IESG facilitated and supported an elections security lessons learned workshop over 13 – 16 June 2022. A summary of completed JOC training is given below.

Training	Dates	Trainers	Beneficiary JOC	No. staff
SPF Engineers Phase 1 radio equipment	March 2021	Motorola via third party	All JOCs except Kismayo	12
Police Radio Operators	April 2021	SPF Trainers		20
Generic JOC Staff	August – October 2021	AMISOM Police	NJOC & Banadir Garoowe, Bossaso, Baidoa Kismayo	125
	September 2021	Somali Police	Dhuusarmaareb & Galkayo	40
	October – November 2021	Somali Police	Jowhar, Beletweyne and Baraawe	60
WSD staff (50% women)	September 2021	FBA	NJOC & Banadir Garoowe & Bossaso Dhuusarmaareb & Galkayo Jowhar & Beletweyne Baidoa & Baraawe Kismayo & Garbahaarey	48
SPF Engineers Phase 2 radio equipment	November 2021	Motorola via third party	All JOCs except Kismayo	12
Police Radio Operators	November 2021 – February 2022	SPF Trainers	All JOCs except Kismayo as Phase 2 equipment was installed	11
JOC Commanders	November 2021	AMISOM Police	NJOC & Banadir Garoowe & Bossaso Jowhar & Beletweyne Baidoa & Baraawe Kismayo	9
Intelligence Collection, Analysis & Reporting	February 2022	AMISOM Police	Banadir Garoowe & Bossaso Dhuusarmaareb & Galkayo Jowhar & Beletweyne Baidoa & Baraawe Kismayo & Garbahaarey	110

Elections Security Lessons Learned Workshop	13-16 June 22	Facilitated by IESG	All JOCs except NJOC and Banadir JOC OPM AMISOM Police IESG UNPOL UNSOS Motorola	45
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Notes:

1. Because of the political and security challenges in Gedo, no JOC training has been provided to the Garbahaarey JOC staff so far.
2. Kismayo JOC staff installed the Phase 1 radio equipment and declined the SPF engineers to do so. SPF Communications Directorate currently holds the Phase 2 radio equipment for Kismayo. SPF engineers have been trained to install it and can do so once Kismayo authorities agree.

The JOCs are at difference stages of development with some fully operational, some partially operational, and some who are not operational. The reasons for this are linked to the challenges that have been highlighted already but in summary include – a lack of oversight by the NESC; political interference; a lack of local JOC buy-in; changes in JOCs locations; changes in JOC staff; a lack of staff allowances provided by Somali authorities; and persistent security challenges drawing JOC staff to other duties. A summary of the current status of the JOCs is given below.

	JOC	Equipment	Training Status	Operational Status
Puntland	Garowe & Bossaso	100% received	JOC Staff training completed WSD training completed	JOCs Operational WSDs Functional
Galmudug	Dhuusarmaareb & Galkayo	100% received	JOC Staff training completed WSD training completed	JOCs Operational WSD partially Functional
Hirshabelle	Jowhar & Beletweyne	100% received	JOC Staff training completed WSD training completed	JOCs Operational WSDs Functional
Southwest	Baidoa & Baraawe	100% received	JOC Staff training completed WSD training completed	Baidoa: JOC & WSD partially operational. Baraawe: Not operational.
Jubaland	Kismayo & Garbahaarey	100% received	JOC Staff training completed for Kismayo only WSD training completed for Kismayo and Garbahaarey staff	Kismayo: JOC Operational WSD: Functional Garbahaarey: Not established. No JOC training conducted.
Banadir	NJOC & Banadir JOC	100% received	JOC Staff training completed WSD training completed	NJOC: Not operational Banadir: Not operational

*Note: A last minute political decision was taken to hold the elections for the Gedo region in El Wak. No time was possible to set up a JOC there using the resources from Garbahaarey.

The reasons for the two Mogadishu based JOCs not being operational are unclear. IESG understands that once the NESTF was replaced by the NESC the latter undertook little in the way of coordination of elections security activities and instead advocated for a decentralised approach. SPF therefor saw no coordination role for a NJOC and declined to operationalise it, and that was after a special request for additional support to renovate the NJOC office space had been actioned by IESG. There has also been some comment by senior police officials that because the allowances budgeted for elections security had not been paid that some JOC commanders and staff had protested and failed to turn up to work in certain JOCs. Because the NJOC was not operational there was little in the way of JOC-to-JOC communications which the project provided for. Operationalising a NJOC offers much potential for FGS-FMS police information sharing, cooperation and collaboration, as was intended by the project.

IESG has conducted two lessons learned activities to enhance the IESG's and the Somali Security Forces' (SSF) ability to support future elections.

Firstly, IESG produced a lesson learned report on 31 May 2021 on the procurement and delivery of the JOC equipment so that other projects can benefit from the lessons; (see attached report on page 19 - *Lessons Learned from Procurement and Rollout of Joint Operations Centres' Equipment*). A summary table of the lessons learned is provided below.

IESG retains sufficient logistics staff/handlers inside AAIA for the configuration and delivery of elections material to elections regions.	An IESG logistics team be accorded a high priority to be stationed in Mogadishu.
Use local vendors, when at all possible, to procure, deliver and install elections material to save time.	Allow realistic timelines to receive and deliver material procured from overseas.
Factor in time for the procurement and delivery of common equipment (office furniture; office stationery; ITS).	For time sensitive delivery of equipment use commercial air transportation, if affordable.
Solutions to shorten the time to procure common items be explored as a matter of urgency.	Define equipment specifications at the outset when submitting requests to UNDP. Consult on the same when beneficiary requests specific items.
Use standardised tables of equipment for similar multiple beneficiaries e.g., JOCs; SEITs	Ensure local vendors have required items in stock before issuance of PO.
Deliver items as and when available to gain the confidence of the beneficiary.	Assign National Staff to doggedly follow up with beneficiary counterparts when they do not respond.
Persistently communicate with Focal Points to ensure no delays.	Refer matters to senior management when response is lacking.
Persistently communicate to confirm names and contacts of Focal Points and locations before engaging suppliers.	For time sensitive delivery of equipment use commercial air transportation, if affordable.
Accept the cost of storage to allow for quick delivery when other issues are sorted out.	Ensure the tax exemption is approved by FGS before the vendor delivers the equipment at port/airport.
Confirm with suppliers on the number of dispatches they will make to avoid redoing tax exemption process.	Keep equipment destined for Puntland and Galkayo by UN delivery in storage until customs clearances are received.
Request dedicated UNDP procurement staff to be assigned to IESG for the elections period.	Proactively tracked and follow up the procurement and delivery.

An equipment rollout plan be developed to manage the delivery of equipment to multiple locations and beneficiaries.	The plan or process to rollout equipment is shared with and endorsed by the appropriate Somali authority.
Factor in time for customs clearances when moving elections material to Puntland and Galkayo.	Keep equipment destined for Puntland and Galkayo in storage until customs clearances are received.
Use UNSOS air transportation if the budget for transportation is limited.	For time sensitive delivery of equipment use commercial air transportation if affordable.
All channels need to be used to stay in contact with MOVCON on dates and times of flights. Such channels to include IESG HQ contact with MOVCON, and IESG FOs contacts with MOVCON colleagues in the regions.	Assign an IESG staff member to reside and work in MOVCON, with UNSOS agreement, to create a new and direct channel, and to anticipate and trouble shoot problems for IESG.
Individual boxes/cartons should be palletted in a way to anticipate that the pallet could be split up by the MOVCON upon deployment (the reasons can be 1) no space for the entire pallet in the aircraft, 2) no equipment to handle the pallet at the point of departure or on arrival or similar).	Each box/carton on the pallet should be documented (CMR) individually i.e., each item should carry the printed CMR, or the details on the destination, consignee, and very importantly number each box of a total number of boxes (e.g., 1 of 6, 5 of 6).
Individual boxes/cartons should be properly closed and secured with adhesive tape and/or plastic film.	When a Somali is the named Focal Point to receive and sign for the equipment, include the regional IESG FOs or another available UN representative as a secondary Focal Point.
A handover note and a packing list should be included (in two copies).	All documentation should be in waterproof packaging.

Secondly, IESG facilitated and supported an elections security lessons learned workshop over 13 – 16 June 2022. Participants numbered 55 and included police representatives from each electoral region (except NJOC and Banadir) as well from OPM, ATMIS⁵, IESG, UNPOL, and UNSOS. The workshop focused on the preparation, coordination, resourcing and delivery of security to the elections to capture lessons for future elections. One full day was allocated to lessons related to the JOCs and the WSDs. A summary of the draft main lessons learned is provided below, which is drawn from the many lessons that each group presented on. Note that the final report from the workshop is still being consulted on and finalised.

- Security for national elections to have a national elections security plan and budget. Security for state and regional elections to also have security plans and budgets.
- Threat assessments to be conducted well ahead of elections to inform the selection of voter registration and polling locations.
- Locations for voter registration and for polling centres need to be identified and publicised early with sufficient capacity to accommodate the anticipated numbers of people.
- Registration and polling locations need to be mapped and the security plans for them need to include all available security forces.
- JOCs to be permanent and remain operational even between elections to support and coordinate security for local policing, other special events, and state and national elections.
- The JOCs with WSDs need to have permanent staff with more capacity building and training.
- Increased co-operation is needed between government, JOC and WSD staff, and civil society with increased public awareness.
- High speed internet connections with free hotlines to be available for people to contact the JOCs.

⁵ The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) replaced AMISOM effective 1 April 2022. <https://atmis-au.org/>

- Training ahead of elections should include:
 - Mentoring by partners who have experience with elections security planning and coordination in a similar environment.
 - Selected staff to do exchanges in countries where local elections are taking place to gain experience.
 - Recruit and train staff well ahead of elections including on human rights.
- Specialist help is needed for disabled people, elderly & pregnant women to access polling locations.
- Secure and regain control of areas under AS control well ahead of 1P1V.
- Disarmament activities to be undertaken to reduce the number of illicit weapons ahead of elections.

Please indicate any significant project-related events anticipated in the next six months, i.e., national dialogues, youth congresses, film screenings, etc. (1000-character limit):

The implementation of the indirect Parliamentary Elections was not completed until 5 May 2022 but the Project was completed on 28 February 2022 with all equipment handed over, a significant amount of training completed and a reasonable level of JOC operationalisation.

FOR PROJECTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF COMPLETION: summarize the main structural, institutional or societal level change the project has contributed to. This is not anecdotal evidence or a list of individual outputs, but a description of progress made toward the main purpose of the project. (1500 – character limit):

The (indirect) elections commenced in late July 2021 and were expected to be completed by the end of 2021. In fact, the elections for the House of the People Members of Parliament were not completed until 5 May 2022 following a number of missed deadlines and by which time this Project had closed on 28 February 2022. By the conclusion of this Project all 12 JOCs have been provided with new capacity to plan and coordinate elections security to better prevent and manage electoral violence. This capacity is expected to remain in place within the security institutions, and as staff expertise develops it will contribute to improved planning and coordination of other security operations besides elections including routine security operations, disaster relief operations, and joint operations with other security forces around the country. The Project also introduced a new focus on the protection of women by the security forces for the elections which is essential for other security operations as well as for future regional and national elections. It has introduced, for the first time, a WSD in each JOC to ensure that reports and complaints of violence against women are received and properly responded to by security forces in a timely manner and to help to sensitise the importance of community policing to de-escalate and prevent electoral violence. This needs to be regarded as an enduring and challenging endeavour noting that this Project is helping to build awareness on the importance of addressing violence against women during elections. The Project has enhanced and modernised the communications capacity of the Somali police to enable improved command and control of the Somali police. All of this bodes well for reforming and modernising Somali police for ongoing security operations including for future national and sub-national elections.

PART II: RESULT PROGRESS BY PROJECT OUTCOME

Describe overall progress under each Outcome made during the reporting period (for June reports: January – June; for November reports: January – November; for final reports: full project duration). Do not list individual activities. If the Project is starting to make/have made a difference at the outcome level, provide specific evidence for the progress (quantitative and qualitative) and explain how it impacts the broader political and peacebuilding context.

- “On track” refers to the timely completion of outputs as indicated in the workplan.

- *“On track with peacebuilding results” refers to higher-level changes in the conflict or peace factors that the Project is meant to contribute to. These effects are more likely in mature projects than in newer ones.*

If your Project has more than four outcomes, contact PBSO for template modification.

Outcome 1: The delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020/2021

Rate the current status of the outcome progress: Completed

Progress summary: (3000 – character limit)

With the demise of the NESTF and its Secretariat in May 2021, the same support was offered to the NESC secretariat (two people) within the OPM, and some Project support was provided for meetings and related activities through a Letter of Agreement (LoA) with the OPM. The LoA was instituted to encourage the NESC to meet regularly, to allow for rapid support to the NESC meetings, and to avoid any suggestion that NESC meetings could not be held due to insufficient resources. The NESC met only twice, on 13-15 July and virtually on 2 October 2021. UN police and AMISOM police commissioners were invited to attend the meetings to ensure international partner coordination and support. The NESC issued a Federal Elections Security Plan and a revised budget for elections security, however the budget was not funded. FMSs and Banadir prepared their operational security plans for the elections and deployed their security forces. Despite significant challenges, all of the JOC equipment was procured and delivered to the JOC beneficiaries. The beneficiary Somali police appointed a named Focal Point for each JOC to receive and sign for the JOC equipment. JOCS were set up with staff assigned. Training of JOC staff was completed by AMISOM and Somali police trainers for all JOCs except Garbahaarey/El Wak. Project support was provided to AMISOM to translate and print AMISOM training manuals and SOPs in Somali. AMISOM shared an Elections Security Training Manual and the training materials that enabled Somali trainers to deliver JOC training where AMISOM was not present. Additional training was offered and delivered by AMISOM police in the main, funded by the project. A summary of the training is given on pages 7 & 8.

The JOCs are at different stages of development with some fully operational, some partially operational, and some who are not operational. The reasons for this are linked to the challenges that have been highlighted above. A summary of the status of the JOCs is given on page 8. In Garbahaarey the political and security tensions prevented agreement for final location for the elections and for the training to proceed, and the AMISOM police trainers did not want to deploy there until the situation was resolved. The situation remained unresolved until the last minute when a political decision was taken to hold the elections in neighbouring El Wak and the suddenness of this decision coupled with a lack of capacity prevented the JOC resources in Garbahaarey being relocated to El Wak. However, staff from Garbahaarey and El Wak attended WSD and intelligence training.

Indicate any additional analysis on how Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment and/or Youth Inclusion and Responsiveness has been ensured under this Outcome: (1000-character limit).

IESG advocated for the inclusion of 30% women on the staff for each of the JOCs. The JOC staff lists indicated that four JOCs have 30% or more women, seven JOCs have 20-25% women, and one has 15%. It is worth noting that all WSDs in each JOC have 50% or more women.

A significant feature of this Project has been the establishment of a WSD in each JOC. The idea of establishing WSDs was taken up by IESG in 2020 after discussions with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development, which had approached IESG

about the possibilities of working together to promote gender sensitive election security planning. In early 2021, FBA and IESG together developed a full concept for the WSDs to be embedded in the JOCs. This concept was further developed, socialised and shared with the NESTF Secretariat and other stakeholders in elections security, and has been generally well received. FBA developed the training plan with supporting material for WSD staff training and delivered the training to all WSD staff centrally in Mogadishu over 13-10 September 2021 supported and assisted by IESG project staff. FBA has advised that it will continue to support, train and develop WSDs after the elections in the operational JOCs starting in Puntland.

PART III: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

<p><u>Monitoring:</u> Please list monitoring activities undertaken in the reporting period (1000-character limit)</p> <p>UNDP has contracted a Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) firm to conduct monitoring and evaluation of various projects. The TPM exercise for Q1 and Q2 has been completed and a report received.</p>	<p>Do outcome indicators have baselines? Yes Has the project launched perception surveys or other community-based data collection? No</p>
<p><u>Evaluation:</u> Has an evaluation been conducted during the reporting period? Yes</p>	<p>Evaluation budget (response required): USD 30,000. Concept and Terms of Reference for the Evaluator were prepared and an Evaluator appointed. The project Evaluation Report has been received and shared with PBF.</p>
<p>If project will end in next six months, describe the evaluation preparations (1500-character limit): A Plan has been submitted to UNDP and PBF for M&E for Q3 of 2021.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p><u>Catalytic effects (financial):</u> Indicate name of funding agent and amount of additional non-PBF funding support that has been leveraged by the project.</p>	<p>Name of funder: UNSOM Trust Fund for Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia Amount: USD\$148,649</p>
<p><u>Other:</u> Are there any other issues concerning project implementation that you want to share, including any capacity needs of the recipient organizations? (1500-character limit)</p>	<p>The JOC is a new capability for the Somali police and represents a big step towards modernisation. JOC staff will require further training and development after the elections to realise the potential that the JOCs offer. IESG has proposed donor support for ongoing support through the Joint Police Program (JPP). FBA funded and led the WSD training which was attended by WSD staff from every JOC. FBA intends to continue to support the training and development of WSD staff starting with Puntland where the JOCs are fully operational and the WSDs have been active. FBA will support WSDs in other JOCs as those JOCs demonstrate good functionality and a willingness to receive such support.</p>

PART IV: COVID-19

Please respond to these questions if the project underwent any monetary or non-monetary adjustments due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

1) Monetary adjustments: Please indicate the total amount in USD of adjustments due to COVID-19:
Nil

2) **Non-monetary adjustments: Please indicate any adjustments to the project which did not have any financial implications:**

Since the start of the reporting period all stakeholders have had to deal with the challenges and constraints imposed by COVID-19, supply chain interruptions, security threats and political delays in holding the indirect elections. The challenges for this Project in particular have been significant. The challenges relating to COVID, supply chain delays and security restrictions have been mentioned already. These slowed the project's delivery; refer to the attached report on page 19 - *Lessons Learned from Procurement and Rollout of Joint Operations Centres' Equipment*. The political disagreements, delays in holding elections dragged on for months from 2020 into 2021 and then into 2022 and caused security threats including elections related violence on the streets of Mogadishu which saw SSF personnel engaged in armed conflict against each other in the interests of their clans. There has been interclan fighting in some of the FMS; in Galmudug fierce fighting occurred between Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama and FGS and FMS security forces with significant loss of life⁶. There were direct attacks on the electoral process. In March 2022 alone such attacks killed 60 people⁷. These set back elections and elections security preparations. However, having eventually agreed on the indirect elections model, the Upper House electoral process took three and a half months in 2021 to elect 54 seats through a simple process of voting in each FMS parliament for allocated seats. These delays impacted the project as the beneficiary Somali police were not willing and/or not permitted to engage in elections security planning and coordination until agreements were reached and progress was evident. Then, with political agreements on elections having been reached, some police officials refused to allow aspects of the project to proceed until they were persuaded that the project was about technical support with no political connotation. The changes and delays in the electoral process also strained the level of buy-in of some of the beneficiary Somali police to project support, to planned and funded elections security training, and to the preparation of operational security plans for each electoral centre. One consequence of this was that some police commanders were slow if not reluctant to commit the named and trained staff to operationalise the JOCs. IESG undertook a specific strategy to urge and encourage police commanders to operationalise their JOCs. The UN mission too needed to adjust its work policies in the interests of staff safety and security, which challenged the procurement process and the rollout of the JOC equipment. Innovative solutions were applied, and lessons were learned which have been shared and a copy of the report is attached⁸. The various stakeholders embraced the use of virtual meetings to keep the momentum of the work going and a focus on elections security preparations. The project provided zoom licences to the NESTF and the JOCs for this purpose. The project procured a radio communications enhancement to allow for JOC-to-JOC communications (Phase 2 equipment) that complements the Phase 1 tactical radio equipment. Because the NJOC was not operational there was little in the way of JOC-to-JOC communications which the project has provided for. Operationalising a National JOC offers much potential for FGS-FMS police information sharing, cooperation and collaboration, as was intended by the project.

⁶ [ASWJ and FGS forces clash October 2021](#)

⁷ Reports on [March 2022 attacks](#).

⁸ IESG project team developed and shared - *Lessons Learned from Procurement and Rollout of Joint Operations Centers' Equipment*. May 2021

3) Please select all categories which describe the adjustments made to the project (*and include details in general sections of this report*):

- Reinforce crisis management capacities and communications
- Ensure inclusive and equitable response and recovery
- Strengthen inter-community social cohesion and border management
- Counter hate speech and stigmatization and address trauma
- Support the SG's call for a global ceasefire
- Other (please describe):

If relevant, please share a COVID-19 success story of this project (*i.e. how adjustments of this project made a difference and contributed to a positive response to the pandemic/prevented tensions or violence related to the pandemic etc.*).

A significant feature of this Project was the establishment of a Women's Situation Desk (WSD) in each JOC. The idea of establishing WSDs was taken up by IESG in 2020 after discussions with the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development, which had approached IESG about the possibilities of working together to promote gender sensitive election security planning. In early 2021, FBA and IESG together developed a full concept for the WSDs to be embedded in the JOCs. This concept was further developed, socialised and shared with the NESTF Secretariat and other stakeholders in elections security, and has been generally well received. FBA developed the training plan with supporting material for WSD staff training and funded and delivered the training to all WSD staff centrally in Mogadishu over 13-10 September 2021 supported and assisted by IESG. FBA intends to continue to support, train and develop WSDs after the elections in the operational JOCs starting in Puntland. This bodes well for the protection of women for future regional and national elections.

The procurement and rollout of JOC equipment was undertaken during the period of considerable constraints caused by COVID-19, supply chain challenges, a worsening security situation and heightened political tensions. These constraints curtailed staff movement to undertake routine tasks to inspect, package, and handover project-funded equipment. This left few people available to undertake the manual labour, and a special mention goes to the UK military officers assigned to work with IESG who checked, documented, and packed all the overseas-sourced and other JOC equipment, and arranged for it to be delivered to UN air movement control agency (MOVCON) to transport it to the beneficiaries. Thereafter, the project staff were very active in liaising with counterpart Somali beneficiaries, through virtual meetings and only a few face-to-face meetings, to ensure equipment delivery and accountability, and coordinate the training.

Virtual meetings became necessary and have been successfully undertaken to avoid face-to-face meetings which the stakeholders have embraced well and are now routine. While the international partners were used to virtual meetings, they represented a new experience for many Somali counterparts who slowly and progressively became more adept. This will enhance future stakeholder engagement and meetings where insecurity and other constraints prevent face-to-face meetings.

Another successful aspect of the project was the acquisition, training, and installation of the two modern tactical radio systems within a constrained environment. Under the leadership of Brig Gen Abdikarim the SPF Director of Communications, and with the support of Motorola and the IESG project team, the introduction of the two systems proceeds relatively smoothly. The Phase 1 equipment was the handheld radio system. SPF engineers were trained by Motorola and funded by our project, and the SPF engineers

then installed the systems in all the JOCs less Kismayo, and Gen Abdikarim also trained the radio operators. The Phase 2 equipment is the JOC-to-JOC radio system. Again, training was provided to the SPF engineers who installed the system into each JOC except for Kismayo who declined both installations for political reasons. Gen Abdikarim is holding their Phase 2 equipment until there is agreement for it to be installed. The Phase 2 system has not been used due to the decentralised nature of these elections. Nevertheless, it offers much potential for FGS-FMS police information sharing and operational coordination, and it is our fervent hope that it will start to be used in the near future.

INDICATOR BASED PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Using the Project Results Framework as per the approved project document or any amendments- provide an update on the achievement of key indicators at both the outcome and output level in the table below (if your Project has more indicators than provided in the table, select the most relevant ones with most relevant progress to highlight). Where it has not been possible to collect data on indicators, state this and provide any explanation. Provide gender and age disaggregated data. (300 characters max per entry)

	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of Project Indicator Target	Indicator Milestone	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)
Outcome 1 The delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020/2021	Indicator 1.1 Annual Workplan + Budget Trained staff with TORs Agendas + Minutes of meetings A functioning Secretariat to support the NESTF, supported by a UN Project team	No previous or current Secretariat or Project team	Functioning Secretariat with 100% staff (min.30% women)	Annual Work Plan. TORs Regular meetings with agendas and recorded minutes	Annual Work Plan completed. Four NESTF meetings held and two NESC meetings held with recorded minutes. Refer to table on page 5. Federal Elections Security Plan and budget issued by NESC.	The Project experienced significant delays due mainly to the deteriorated relationships between the FGS and the FMSs leaders that existed from 2020 and into 2022. As a result, there were periods of inactivity and a lack of progress by Somali security authorities with elections security planning and coordination. An Agreement to proceed with elections was reached on 27 May 2021. Then, the pressure was on security preparations to remain ahead of the elections. This was achieved as electoral timelines slipped.
Output 1.1 Functional Secretariat supporting NESTF in place and operational	Indicator 1.1.1 # Staff appointed and resources as per plan # Issued as per plan	0	100% (30% women)	Staff and office allocated to NESTF Secretariat. Office equipped to function. National elections security Plan. Election security budget.	9 staff including 4 women (33%) allocated to NESTF with office space in Police HQ. Office furniture, stationery & computers provided. Secretariat functioned well hosting 4 NESTF meetings with minutes issued and drafted a National Elections security Plan and budget. NESC with existing staff (2) replaced NESTF Secretariat. Hosted two meetings and issued a Federal Elections Security Plan and revised budget.	The NESTF was established, and the Secretariat equipped with technical and logistical support provided by the Project and was functioning well. Following a decision of the National Consultative Council, it was replaced by the NESC with a two-person Secretariat. The NESC issued a Federal Elections Security Plan and a revised budget for elections security to be funded by candidates' fees and topped up by the FGS. This plan was a very reduced version of the draft National Elections Security Plan prepared by the NESTF. When the NESC replaced the NESTF it issued a shorter plan and budget.

	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	End of Project Indicator Target	Indicator Milestone	Current indicator progress	Reasons for Variance/ Delay (if any)
	Indicator 1.1.2 # Training material developed	NA	100% material developed	Training manuals; SOPs; other products.	Seven training documents produced, translated and shared with stakeholders	Support was provided to AMISOM to print and share training manuals and SOPs in Somali. AMISOM has shared an Elections Security Training Manual and the training materials that enable Somali trainers to deliver training where AMISOM was not present.
Output 1.2 Establish and Support the NJOC	Indicator 1.2.1 NJOC is staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function.	No experience of a NJOC	A functioning NJOC	NJOC office space allocated and resourced. Staff assigned. Staff trained.	Procurement action completed and all items handed over. Staff assigned. Staff trained.	IESG developed and implemented a JOC Equipment Rollout Plan that was approved by the NESTF Secretariat. NJOC has allocated office space which was also refurbished by IESG as an additional support activity and to encourage the SPF to operationalize the NJOC. Staff were assigned and a Focal Point received and signed for their JOC equipment. The tactical radio system was installed. Initial JOC staff training completed but NJOC did not participate in additional training.
Output 1.3 Establish and support the SJOCs (6)	Indicator 1.3.1 SJOC are staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function.	No experience of SJOCs	6 functioning SJOC	SJOCs office space allocated and resourced. Staff assigned. Staff trained.	As above	IESG developed and implemented a SJOC Equipment Rollout Plan approved by the NESTF Secretariat. SJOCs allocated office space, staff were assigned, and Focal Points received and signed for their JOC equipment. The tactical radio systems were installed except in Kismayo. SJOC staff training has been completed.
Output 1.4 Establish and support the RJOCs (5)	Indicator 1.4.1 Establish and support the RJOCs (5)	RJOC are staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function.	6 Functioning RJOC.	RJOCs office space allocated and resourced. Staff assigned. Staff trained.	As above	IESG developed and implemented a RJOC Equipment Rollout Plan approved by the NESTF secretariat. RJOCs allocated office space, staff were assigned, and Focal Points received and signed for their JOC equipment. The tactical radio systems were installed. RJOC staff training has been completed except for Garbahaarey; refer to page 7.

Montage of Project Photos




A functioning JOC with WSD staff hard at work in Dhusamareb, Galmudug. Civil society visitors are present to understand how the JOC operates and how to connect with it.



SPF Communications engineers receive training on the tactical radio systems



SPF communications engineers install antennae for the tactical radio system in a JOC



Somali police attending the Train of Trainers course by AMISOM police. The police officers trained their colleagues in regions where AMISOM was not present



Swedish police officers lead Women's Situation Desk staff training in Mogadishu



Police staff from the National JOC undertake JOC training led by AMISOM police trainers, in Mogadishu