

Annex A: Project Summary




PEACEBUILDING FUND PROJECT SUMMARY

Project Number & Title:	PBF/ Responding to protection needs and supporting resilience in places of detention	
Recipient UN Organization:	UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women	
Implementing Partner(s):	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, NGO partners	
Location:	Yemen	
Approved Project Budget:	USD 3,000,000	
Duration:	Planned Start Date: 1 January 2018	Planned Completion: 30 June 2019
Project Description:	<p>The project is designed, as a pilot, to respond to humanitarian emergencies inside prisons and other places of detention, and improve the resilience of population in these facilities with development support, and support reintegration of women and juvenile offenders. The project will provide urgently needed support to in basic conditions in prisons and other places of detention with additional focus on women and juvenile. This includes improving physical conditions (such as water and sanitation repairs), support the rehabilitation of detainees with psychosocial support, education and vocational training, reintegration support and build knowledge of corrections staff on treatment of prisoners in accordance with human rights principles. At the same time, the project aims to initiate support in corrections as a pilot phase in order to inform the subsequent programming in the coming years.</p>	
PBF Focus Area:	(3.2) Equitable access to social services	
Project Outcome:	Improved basic humanitarian conditions for people in detention, with particular attention to the special needs of women and juveniles, and foundations laid for future engagements to further strengthen the resilience of detainees, their families and communities, and greater access to justice.	
Key Project Activities:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Detailed assessments to identify project sites, humanitarian needs, operational risks and personnel to be trained; - Support the improvement of prison conditions by basic renovations to improve water and sanitation, and separation of female inmates and juveniles from the adult male prison population; - Provide training for corrections personnel on international human rights principles in relation to prison administration. - Facilitate lawyers to access places of detention and provide legal assistance in cases of arbitrary detention, people detained at the conclusion of their sentence etc - Strengthen resilience of women and juvenile detainees through psychosocial support, education and vocational training activities, and support to reintegrate into the community post-release. 	

Annex B: IRF Results Framework

Country name: Yemen
Project Effective Dates: 01/01/2018
Focus Area: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1): (1.2) RoL
<p>Theory of Change: IF The humanitarian crisis inside detention facilities is mitigated AND Basic humanitarian conditions of juveniles, women and accompanying children in detention are upgraded AND Prison personnel are trained to operate in accordance with human rights principles and in compliance with international standards THEN The resilience of the prison population and their families and communities will be strengthened AND The foundations will be prepared for the international community to better engage in promoting human rights inside corrections and the initiation of work to promote peacebuilding among the communities in Yemen</p>

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Milestones
<p>Outcome: Improved basic humanitarian conditions for people in detention, with particular attention to the special needs of women and juveniles, and foundations laid for future engagements to further strengthen the resilience of detainees, their families and communities, and greater access to justice.</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator: Humanitarian conditions (physical and psychological) are improved, as measured by progress against an assessment tool</p> <p>Baseline: TBD based on preliminary assessment</p> <p>Target: Four places of detention</p>		
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2 # of places of detention with improved physical conditions including housing and sanitation</p> <p>Baseline: Conditions of prisons are extremely poor and largely damaged due to the war, risk of health outbreaks such as cholera due to poor conditions and over-crowding. No separate prisons for female inmates.</p> <p>Target: physical conditions improved in four selected places of detention.</p>	<p>Residuals reports</p> <p>Human Rights Reports</p>	<p>2018</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2 # of corrections personnel trained as trainers in human rights principles relating to prison operations</p>	<p>Training reports</p>	<p>Training curriculum approved by a donor</p> <p>Trainers identified</p>

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification	Milestones
		<p>nasliqä. Training modules have been prepared on SOGTA and human rights and have not yet been developed.</p> <p>Targets to be determined in consultation with national authorities.</p> <p>Case indicator: 100%.</p> <p>Percentage of released and wrongfully imprisoned and police prisoners released.</p> <p>Number of habeas corpus applications.</p>	<p>Signed training communication sheets.</p> <p>Police records and files.</p> <p>Case indicator and legal files of habeas corpus.</p>	
	<p>Output 4: Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for detainees are strengthened, with particular attention to the special needs of women and juveniles.</p>	<p>Number of detainees.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed rehabilitation programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed reintegration programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed vocational training programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed psychological counseling programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed family counseling programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed community service programs.</p> <p>Number of detainees who have completed other rehabilitation programs.</p>	<p>Survey reports and case indicator and communication.</p>	<p>Rehabilitation programs are implemented.</p> <p>Reintegration programs are implemented.</p> <p>Vocational training programs are implemented.</p> <p>Psychological counseling programs are implemented.</p> <p>Family counseling programs are implemented.</p> <p>Community service programs are implemented.</p> <p>Other rehabilitation programs are implemented.</p>

Annex C: Number of detainees by Prison location

As at September 2017³⁵

1	Al-Amanah	1780	56	46	1882
2	Al-Hudaydah (central)	762	25	21	808
3	Ibb (central)	1505	21	17	1543
4	Dhamar	836	9	33	878
5	Amran	577	14	27	618
6	Sa'adah	712	5	-	717
7	Rada'	723	-	-	723
8	Hajjah	600	13	24	637
9	Raymah	10	-	-	10
10	Khamar	130	-	-	130
11	Habra	13	-	-	13
12	Al-Alayah	653	-	-	653
13	Al-Malami	239	-	-	239
14	Bajal	241	-	-	241
15	Al-Hudaydah (remand)	278	-	-	278
16	Ibb (remand)	345	-	-	345
17	Amran	79	-	-	79
	TOTAL	9483	143	168	9794

³⁵ Source: PRI "Police, security and criminal justice in Yemen" Presentation at the Dead Sea consultation 27-28 September 2017

Annex D: Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Monitoring Outcomes	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analyzed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs. The quarterly reports will be considered as independent verification reports.	Quarterly, or in the frequency required for each indicative activity.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.
Monitor and manage risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. HRDDP will be one of the key means of verification and it will be informed and analyzed with the support of the Project Advisory Board. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.
Annual project quality assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.
Review and make course corrections Project Report	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making. A progress report will be presented to the Project Board consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	At least annually Annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.
Final report Project Review	A final progress report will be presented to the Project Board consisting of the results achieved against pre-defined targets, lessons learned and any evaluation or review reports. The project board will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Multi-Year Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences	At the end of the project (final report) Six months	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.

Annex E: Yemen Commitments to Relevant International Instruments

Yemen is signatory to a number of international conventions and treaties of relevance to the treatment of prisoners including the following:

- The *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*. Yemen acceded 5 November 1991, via the Republic of Yemen. In December 2015 a revised version of the Standard Minimum Rules were adopted unanimously by the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/70/175, known as the Nelson Mandela Rules.
- The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. Yemen acceded to 9 February 1987, via PDRY, former South Yemen. Article 10 requires anyone deprived of liberty to be treated with dignity and humanity. This applies not just to prisoners, but also to those detained for immigration purposes or psychiatric care. The right complements the Article 7 prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The article also imposes specific obligations around criminal justice, requiring prisoners in pretrial detention to be separated from convicted prisoners, and children to be separated from adults. It requires prisons to be focused on reform and rehabilitation rather than punishment.
- The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs) were initially adopted by the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955, and approved by the UN Economic and Social Council in 1957.
- United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders ('the Bangkok Rules') were adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2010.
- The *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC - 1990). Yemen acceded 1 May 1991 via the Republic of Yemen.

Annex F: Ministry of Justice – Juvenile Justice Technical Working Group - Action Plan (2017)

General Objective: To promote capacity-building for juvenile justice, social welfare agencies, law enforcement officials and civil society organizations. To strengthen the justice system and to provide an environment that protects children in line with international standards.³⁶

Specific objectives:

- Develop Yemeni legislation and policies related to juvenile justice in line with international standards and best practices.
- Develop and strengthen institutional capacity and the promotion of non-custodial alternatives in dealing with children in contact with the law.
- Support the rehabilitation and reintegration of children who lost their freedom.
- Supporting community-based protection and prevention initiatives with the participation of women and children.

Expected Results:

- The establishment of an effective juvenile justice system and stronger protection systems for children, greater respect for the rights of children, better legal and legislative frameworks for children's rights.
- Strengthening the Institutional and administrative capacities of the judiciary, law enforcement officials, civil society institutions, social welfare system, and educational institutions.
- Community-based prevention, protection, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives have been promoted for all children at risk.
- Women's effective participation in service delivery, justice, public prosecution and social action has been achieved.

Activity Matrix:

- 1- Giving priority to the best interests of the child in all policies, plans and support programs**
 - Support the implementation of the National Strategic Plans including the National Strategy for Childhood and Youth - National Strategy for Early Childhood Development - National Strategy for Human Rights - National Strategy for Basic and Secondary Education - National Plan to Combat Child Trafficking - National Plan to Combat Street Children - National Plan for Harmful Habits - Executive Plan of the National Observatory for Children's Rights - The Executive Plan for the Establishment of an Independent Forensic Commission.
 - Support and advocate with decision-makers and policy makers on the importance of giving first consideration to the best interests of the child at all levels including decisions, policies, administrative, legislative and judicial procedures.
 - Support the funding of child justice systems within the framework of the child protection program during emergency and encourage community alternatives to detention through the support of the protection committees in the governorates.
 - Rehabilitation of the existing child justice institutions and work to secure them if not existent.
 - Building the capacities of staff working with children in contact with the law to work in emergencies, referral, alternative justice and penal system.

³⁶ Activities which are particularly relevant to this proposal are highlighted in yellow

- Support behavioral and psychological programs that help reintegration.
 - Technical support to involve civil society organizations in evaluating policies, plans and programs related to children's rights.
- 2- Develop procedures for the work of juvenile justice organizations**
- Support and advocate for the ratification of the Third Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
 - Completion of the constitutional procedures for the ratification of the Third Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
 - Review and develop internal regulations governing relevant JJS institutions (police, prosecutors, courts, care centers) from a participatory perspective.
 - Support coordination and linkage mechanisms between these institutions and facilitate follow-up and evaluation procedures
 - Operationalize policies, codes of conduct and, procedures with the staff working in JJ and insure implementation.
- 3- Child-friendly services to meet their needs**
- Expanding the work of specializes JJ institutions in 22 governorates (police, prosecutors, courts, care centers)
 - Establishment of a special unit for the administration of Juvenile Justice in the Supreme Judicial Council
 - Establishment of psychological, social and legal support units in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior including prisons.
 - Supporting the provision of child-friendly services in all justice and social processes
 - Support and preparation of social monitoring offices.
 - Supporting the construction of juvenile structures - in the governorates of (Ibb, Dhamar, Hajjah, Abyan).
 - Expanding the provision of specialized services in the other governorates according to standards that ensure proportionality and coordination among institutions.
 - Technical support to develop criteria for the provision of specialized juvenile justice services.
- 4- Reconciliation justice**
- Support the implementation of the recommendations restorative justice
 - Support for reconciliation justice programs
 - Support and develop alternative community support programs for detention
- 5- Prevention Programs**
- Implementation of a training program for workers in care homes and centers with children and parents on children's rights and child protection
 - Organizing a national conference on the prevention and integration of children in contact with the law and integrating it within the framework of welfare policies in Yemen
 - Support community-based protection initiatives with the participation of women and children
 - the development of life skills and peer education for the most vulnerable groups
 - Organizing awareness campaigns with the participation of tribal leaders to eliminate the exploitation of children in cases of revenge and carrying weapons

Organizing educational campaigns including television and radio broadcasts to raise awareness about children's rights, crime prevention, Non-custodial measures for parents, social leaders, Imams, NGOs and school students, including children in the streets.

- Implementing training and educational programs on the prevention of violence against children in schools and peer education
- Supporting religious authorities in implementing education programs on children's rights in Islam

Annex G: References and Resources

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- Yemen Polling Center Survey (2013). "Public Perceptions of the Security Sector and Police Work in Yemen." Available from <http://www.yemenpolling.org>

Movies on Women and Children in Yemeni Prisons
compiled by the Yemen Polling Center

Women

Yemen Polling Center (2017): "YPC - Article 273 of the Criminal Code on "the Act of Public Indecency": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skQZkl4QHjg&t=1545>

Skyland (2014): "Women in Prison: The Abandoned World – Trailer": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOKSLboKx58>

Yemen Red Crescent (2013): "Yemen: Supporting women in prisons" (interview with volunteer Itidal Abdu Nasser Ahmed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PtxA8oMkvY>

ICRC (2006): "The fabric of society: new skills for women prisoners in Yemen": <https://avarchives.icrc.org/Film/1027> or <https://avarchives.icrc.org/Film/1025>

Khadija Al-Salami (2008?): "Amina" (documentary film): <http://wunrn.com/2008/10/yemen-women-in-prison-advocacy-documentary-film/> [only background info available]

Students of Sana'a University (2012?): "Prisoners on the Edge of Loss", <http://nationalyemen.com/2012/11/18/yemeni-female-prisoners-featured-in-documentary/> [only background info available]

Children

Arte (2014): "Yemen les enfants dans le couloir de la mort": <http://info.arte.tv/fr/yemen-les-enfants-dans-le-couloir-de-la-mort> or <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t5uLohsAllo>

Journeyman Pictures / SBS Australia (2013): "Death row kids": <https://www.journeyman.tv/film/5774>

ANNEX H: Confidential annex

CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN ³⁷

Caveat: Given rapidly evolving conflict dynamics in late November and early December 2017, parts of the information in the "Current Situation" sections have become somewhat dated.

As of December 2017, after a period of increasing tension for several months between Houthi movement supporters and loyalists of the ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, there is an apparent disintegration of the alliance, with ongoing intense fighting in Sana'a between both forces. Saleh has been engaged in negotiations with the Gulf States and had publicly indicated his willingness to deal with the Saudi coalition, leading to claims that he was betraying the alliance with the Houthis.

As of the date of submission of this proposal, there are as yet unconfirmed reports that ex-President Saleh has been killed in the fighting today.

Introductory comments

- In the 2nd half of the 20th century, the nature of conflict in Yemen has many dimensions from tribal conflicts to civil wars to international interventions in local wars. The current conflict has a wide range of actors contributing to intense and destructive armed conflict which has led to a devastating humanitarian situation.
- The created, but fragile, coalition between the Houthis and GPC presented a de-facto administration over the North part of Yemen. The Houthis are running the state's ministries in Sana'a and in charge of facilitating any required access. The tribes in the surrounding areas of Amanat Al-'Assima (city of Sana'a) have their security arrangements whether with the Houthi militia or GPC's. The Federation of Hashid tribes (Ali Abdulla Saleh's backup) maintained their strong hold on the areas they control such as Sanhan.
- The South presents a different scene, where the movements assumed control over Aden and a number of locations from the Houthis however this didn't bring peace. The current fights in the South are between different militias that have their own loyalties and allegiances. The Salafis are mostly loyal to the UAE part of the Coalition, which doesn't necessarily mean all Salafis agree to this. The Muslim Brotherhood, through the Islah party, are pushing against this, as demonstrated by the fighting taking place in some pockets of Taiz. It is worth noting that the Islahs were pushed out of the North in the early days of the Houthis take over as the basis was sectarian rather than political.
- The ongoing conflict has damaged or destroyed many Government facilities, including police stations, courts and prisons.
- Security and justice officials have been deliberately targeted during the conflict, including the assassination of judges, prosecutors.
- Government disbursements and salaries have remained unpaid or intermittently paid for over 18 months. This contributes to conflict and insecurity in several ways.

³⁷ The political and operational analysis in this annex is sourced from a Report prepared by OSEOSGY, November 02 2017. Corrections related analysis is sourced from interviews and UN staff.

- As people exhaust their available savings, they are vulnerable to adopt negative coping mechanisms, including behaviours which may bring them in contact with the law (e.g. street begging, theft).
- Unpaid police and security forces may undertake predatory behaviour, extracting money from citizens through checkpoints, arbitrary arrests and bribes.
- Unpaid prison officials are vulnerable to bribery and corruption, particularly to smuggling of contraband (including mobile phones) into prisons, or collusion in prison escapes. Prison officials may also seize material intended for detainees (such as food) and sell assets belonging to the prison.
- The erratic flow of funds makes it challenging for prison authorities to purchase items required for prisoner well-being, such as food, medicine and generator fuel for heating.
- The combination of unpaid salaries, risk to personnel safety and appointment of external security forces to the prisons have led to a high proportion of official prison personnel remaining at home and not performing their official duties. While security and militia personnel have taken on some of the operational roles of prison administration, they do not generally have any training in prison administration and they approach prison operations from a security orientation.
- The majority of prison guards are male, with relatively few female guards appointed and working. The combination of few female guards, and poor facilities to separate women and juveniles from male prisoners, leaves female and juvenile detainees at risk of sexual abuse and exploitation by both guards and fellow prisoners.
- In common with other conflict affected countries, many of those in prison are reportedly poor people who could not afford to bribe police or authorities to be released, or in some cases, make compensation payments to relatives of victims in order for them to withdraw charges. The majority of female prisoners and a significant proportion of male prisoners are also reportedly from marginalized communities (*muhamasheen*).
- It is difficult, sensitive and potentially dangerous to obtain information on the Corrections sector and other security related topics. The international community has little or no access to some central prisons, particularly facilities in South Yemen which are controlled by the Saudi-led Coalition. Some interlocutors were reluctant to seek or provide information on prisons, which could be perceived as spying or preparing for a prison breakout. The project will need to request supplementary information through official channels.

Southern governorates' security situation

- Southern Yemen politics have witnessed a major transformation since the start of the current conflict, which has had a devastating impact in several southern governorates. President Hadi and a number of Ministers in his Cabinet are not in country, mostly in Riyadh with conflicting news about their choice to return or if they are in exile. Pro-secessionist and anti-GoY sentiment has increased markedly due to the widespread perception among the Southerners of both the conflict and activities of extremist groups as a result of "northern issues". The inconsistent presence of GoY ministers in Aden, unreliable salary payments and basic services, and widespread corruption have fueled resentment towards the GoY.
- Several new southern-armed groups have emerged to fight H-GPC forces and extremist groups since 2015, while the influence of GoY forces in the South faded. This led to an increased sense among the Southerners of "ownership over their land". New southern political leaderships have also emerged, replacing the older generation of Al-Hirak leaders. There has been considerable friction in Aden between southern-armed groups and forces loyal to the President.

- Despite political concerns regarding the Southern Transitional Council (STC), its military influence is still strong. The STC Chair, Al-Zubaidi, has considerable support from the Southern Resistance and the Military Police in Aden and Al-Dale' Governorates, as well as the west coast of Taiz. The Deputy Chair, Hani bin Breik, is the leader of the Salafi Security Belt forces, which dominate in the outskirts of Aden and in Abyan, Lahj and Al-Dale'. However, the STC's military influence in Shabwa, Hadhramout and Al-Mahra is very limited.
- The Chief of Police Shallal controls security in Aden and in principle reports to the MOI of IRGY. However, in practice the Chief Police does not fully cooperate with the IRGY and usually coordinates with the UAE officials. He celebrated the inauguration of a newly established/renovated prison in Aden with resources from UAE. Reports state that most of arrests and torture are committed outside the state's premises, and the UN and international actors have little or no access to these Non-State places of detention.
- As for the South, generally the newly established 'elite' group providing security in a number of locations with alleged support of UAE providers further complexity to the scene as it adds to the current fights. There is a strong push to have these elite forces assuming policing roles and diminish the power of 'hirk' movement or any Islah/Muslim Brotherhood-likely forces.

Aden Prison facilities and detention centers:

- There are two state prisons in Aden. The central prison is in Al-Mansoura District and has a capacity of 400 inmates, it was damaged during the fighting but has been able to reopen after construction support from the coalition. The female prisoner wing in the central prison however has been destroyed. A relatively low number of women are reportedly held in temporary detention centers, which are unsuitable for long term occupation, and expose women to abuse and harassment.
- The remand prison has a capacity of 50 inmates. Aden also used to have a juvenile reformatory, but it was destroyed during the conflict and has not yet been restored. Juveniles are reportedly commonly detained arbitrarily or for minor public order offences, including newly arrived migrants.
- The general conditions at the central prison are poor with inadequate provision for fundamental needs, exacerbated due to overcrowding which limits direct provision to vulnerable groups, proper separation and categorization among inmates, and rehabilitation activities. Prison staff are not properly trained on how to operate a prison, nor on how to treat inmates in line with human rights standards.
- The international community currently has little to no access to central prisons in Southern Yemen, which are operated by the Coalition. There is a likelihood of greater access to remand facilities and police CID detention facilities. Given the fluid situation, it is foreseeable that entry points will expand and contract during the 18-month implementation period of the project. There are reports on fights between the local security (security belt) and AQAP close to CID detention during November. It is not clear yet the amount of damage in the facility due to these fights.

Taiz

- Description: There are two major theatres of operations in Taiz: Taiz City and the Taiz Governorate. The Taiz City theatre includes the following fronts: Western (incl. Jabal Han, Brigade 35/old airport, Beer Basha), Northern (incl. Road 60, Al-Zunuj HQ, Sofitel), Eastern (incl. the presidential palace, Tashrifat, Alda'wa HQ), South Eastern (incl. Jabal Saber, Cairo Castle, Salah), Southern (Al-Salo, Hifan), and Southwestern (Al-Dabab). The Taiz Governorate theatre includes the western/coastal front: Al-Mokha (Yakhtal, Muwze', camp Khaled), Al-Kadha, Dhubab and the Southern front on the borders with Lahj: Kahbub, Al-Waz'iyyah, Kerch and Al-Turban.

- Developments: Since the beginning of the year, hostilities have escalated and caused an increase in civilian casualties. GoY forces have retaken areas in the south west of Taiz, including the Republican Palace and continue to advance northwards. They also seized the coastline of Taiz Governorate and pushed east towards Mokha town, which they eventually captured. On 3 August, GoY forces seized the primary junction in eastern Mokha district from H-GPC. The intersection links Al-Mokha port with roads towards Taiz city and Al-Hodaydah port. GoY announced the intention to capture the latter with air and maritime support but so far this has been delayed under a heavy pressure from the International Community fearing an exacerbation of the humanitarian situation in Yemen should the flow of aid through Al-Hodaydah be stopped. Heavy fighting continues on multiple fronts. Saudi-led airstrikes on Taiz have intensified since the start of Operation Golden Spear (7 January) aiming to retake the western coast from H-GPC forces.
- Current situation: Intermittent attacks, fighting and exchange of fire on the Taiz governorate coastal fronts. Occasional clashes and shelling on Taiz city fronts. In a recent statement (October 2017), the ex-president Saleh acknowledged, "Mokha has fallen into their hands" admitting the H-GPC defeat in the theater of the Golden Spear.

Ta'iz Prison facilities and detention centers:

The central prison had a capacity of 750 inmates. Although it was destroyed in 2016, a recent report from OHCHR states that it is now operating. However, it is unclear how well it is functioning. The central prison is entirely operated and staffed by the Houthis through their popular committees.

Al-Hodaydah

- As Operation Golden Spear continues, Al-Hodaydah, currently under the control of H-GPC forces, has seen extensive airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition. GoY forces with the support of the Saudi-led coalition are seeking to capture the city, and critically its port, through which around 70 percent of the country's imports are received. On 14 September, the Houthi movement leader, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi threatened to attack Saudi oil tankers if the Saudi-led coalition attacks the port

Al-Hodaydah Prison facilities and detention centers:

Al-Hodaydah central prison has reportedly received assistance from the international community, including ICRC and PRI. Assistance has included material goods, generators and establishment of a medical clinic to treat prisoners.

Ma'rib (east of Sana'a):

- Description: Ma'rib includes two major fronts (Nahm and Sirwah), and some other separate fronts (Al-A'bdiyya, Al-Wahbiya, Harib Bihan). Nahm is a district of Sana'a Governorate about 40 km away from the city. It includes fronts at Furdet Nahm, Wadi Meleh, Harib Nahm, Salab and Harib Al-Garamiyeh. Sirwah is about 70 km of Sana'a and south of Nahm. It includes fronts at Najdel Oshk, Al-Makhdara, Hilan, Al-Muchjeh and Sirwah city. Ma'rib enjoys strategic importance for tribal/political, geographical (close to Sana'a and Al-Wadia' border crossing with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - KSA), economic (oil,

electricity, natural gas) reasons. Ma'rib has complex topography, composed of a series of mountain chains limiting the maneuverability of military forces.

- **Developments:** GoY forces have been gaining ground in Ma'rib since fighting re-escalated in the area at the end of April 2017. H-GPC forces are trying to prevent GoY from advancing west toward Sana'a and are launching their own attacks against GoY security posts.
- **Current situation:** intermittent to extensive attacks and exchange of shelling are ongoing without achieving any significant progress.

Hajjah (north-west of Sana'a, and west of Sa'adah, on the Red Sea coast and bordering KSA):

- **Description:** At the beginning of 2017, in response to H-GPC attacks on Jizan in the KSA, GoY forces, supported by Saudi air force and navy, advanced from the Red Sea and KSA borders and took over part of Midi and Harad districts on the far north west of Hajjah. The area from there to the east is mountainous which complicates the operations. The importance of Hajjah fronts is their proximity to the KSA border and a location allowing forming a bridgehead for attacks towards Sa'adah and Amran in the east, or Al-Hodaydah in the south. While it is unlikely for GoY to advance to the east, with adequate support they might threaten H-GPC positions in Al-Hodaydah.
- **Developments:** GoY forces captured the city of Midi in July 2017, but the district remains contested. On 3 August, GoY forces seized supply routes leading into the southern Midi district. Taking control of the district would strengthen the security of the Saudi's southwestern border and increase a possibility of surrounding Sana'a. Despite the stalling of the operation Golden Spear in coordination with which the Hajjah operations were conducted, the GoY continues its effort with a short- to medium-term objective of capturing Midi and Abs districts.
- **Current situation:** Intermittent clashes, exchange of fire and shelling on the borders of Jizan. No major attacks.

Sana'a Prison and detention facilities

- There are five state prisons in Sana'a - one central prison and four remand prisons. While they are all operated and staffed by the Prison Authority, the Houthi presence is apparent in all those facilities,³⁸ with generally a high degree of operational control. In common with other Government employees, salaries for prison officials have remained unpaid for over 18 months.

Sa'adah/Al-Buqa (northeast of Ketaf district) and Mandaba (north of Baqem district):

- **Description:** Al-Buqa is a village by the KSA border with a now-closed border crossing. The topography around Al-Buqa and to the east is flat (desert, part of Rub' Al-Khali), while to the west it is mountainous, hindering military maneuverability and attack, and facilitating defense. Mandaba is close to O'lb border crossing, part of a mountainous area, which makes it hard to maneuver and advance while facilitating infiltration and guerrilla warfare thus providing advantage to H-GPC. The main goal of GoY attacks and attempts to advance on Al-Buqa and Mandaba areas was to open a new front near the KSA borders, and

³⁸ Interviews, February 2017. Interviewees noted that all decisions have to be cleared by the Houthis.

to reduce H-GPC pressure against Asir and Najran. Considering the limited resources and complicated topography, GoY forces do not pose as significant a threat to Sa'adah as they claim to.

- **Developments:** On Al-Buqa front, east of Sa'adah Governorate, GoY forces, supported by fighter jets from the Saudi-led coalition, stormed in July and August 2017 several caves in Al-Buqa Mountains and seized arms and ammunition. The assault began when government forces broke through H-GPC lines and managed to enter H-GPC weapon caches in the caves. In late 2016, GoY had made a major military breakthrough inside Sa'adah Governorate, when troops regained control of two border crossings with Saudi Arabia and thrust deeper into the Governorate. GoY forces slowed their advance when they reached rugged and heavily mined mountains.
- **Current situation:** Fighting, exchange of fire and shelling, intermittent attacks. GoY forces are bringing additional reinforcements to the front. The focus of fighting now is Al Buqa, east of Sa'adah, and Baqoum, north of the Governorate. It is believed that Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, is hiding somewhere in Sa'adah.

Al-Bayda, Al-Dale', and Shabwa (south of Sana'a and bordering the governorates of Lahj and Abyan):

- **Description:** H-GPC hold the highlands. Common characteristics: (i) large distance separating forces, (ii) no defined front lines, (iii) hit-and-run operations, and (iv) role of the tribal element. Hot spots include: (i) Al-Bayda: Al-Zaher, Dhi Naem, Kayfah, Kuraycha, Mekeyras and Alsawma'; (ii) Al-Dale': Muriys-Damet, Hamak and Nakil Alkhashaba and (iii) Shabwa: Assafra, A'seylan and Alsakk. AQAP has significant presence in Al-Bayda (mainly Al-Sawma' and Mekeyras). These fronts are low priority, as they do not directly affect the key governorates of Sa'adah, Amran, Sana'a, Ta'iz or Al-Hodaydah. The situation there is not expected to change.
- **Developments:** Clashes between AQAP, who are aligning with tribal militias in the south of Al-Bayda, and H-GPC forces take place on a regular basis, as AQAP seeks to seize territory. The USA has conducted a significant number of drone and airstrikes in the area against AQAP targets. ISIS is also active in the area and this may be increasing: ISIS claimed more attacks in July and August than in previous months. ISIS fighters have taken part in some AQAP and local militias' operations against H-GPC since late July. Absence of the Saudi-led coalition in the area seems to facilitate this growth in extremist elements.
- **Current situation:** Security Belt forces are currently engaged in an offensive against AQAP in Abyan Governorate in southern Yemen. Backed by the Saudi-led coalition, namely the UAE, they conducted several raids targeting AQAP militants reportedly fleeing from Shabwa since early August as a joint US-UAE offensive against AQAP secured major population centers and energy infrastructure there. Previously, the Security Belt forces had withdrawn from northern parts of Abyan governorate (early 2017), citing a lack of government support while facing a high rate of AQAP attacks. This withdrawal granted AQAP freedom of movement in the area.

Fight against AQAP

- AQAP are controlling a vast area in the South, particularly in Abyan, Hadhramout, Shabwa and Al-Bayda governorates. Since the beginning of 2017, USA increased their operations against AQAP (drone attacks and raids mainly in Abyan, Shabwa and Al-Bayda). In parallel, the GoY forces, mainly the Security Belt and elite forces, backed by the coalition, launched major ground attacks and expelled AQAP from areas in Abyan, Mukalla/Hadhramout and Shabwa.

KSA-Yemen borders:

- **Description:** There are four Yemeni Governorates on the borders with KSA; Hadhramout in the east, Al-Jawf in the center and Sa'adah and Hajjah in the west. Hostilities across the borders are ongoing only across the borders of Sa'adah and Hajjah, which are under H-GPC control. Sa'adah shares the border with Najran, Asir and Jizan while Hajjah shares the border only with Jizan. The border with Sa'adah and Hajjah is ca. 450 km long with high mountains complicating military operations.
- **Developments:** The H-GPC forces launched ballistic missiles more frequently and deeper into Saudi Arabia than before. The missile components are likely smuggled in small shipments from Iran into Yemen, where weapons experts assist the H-GPC forces with modifying and improving their current stock. H-GPC forces are also targeting Saudi-led coalition ships with a combination of remote-controlled explosive boats and surface-to-ship missiles at an increased rate. The faction almost certainly lacks the ability to develop these capabilities without external assistance. Sources reported that Iran moves materiel and funds by smuggling boats. H-GPC fired in average three ballistic missiles a month in 2017.
- **Current situation:** H-GPC have used ballistic missiles to achieve strategic goals in Yemen. For instance, on 22 February 2017, a missile attack killed the GoY forces' Deputy Chief of Staff participating in offensive operations near Mokha. Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, threatened in September 2017 to attack the UAE for the first time, indicating a possible advancement in the H-GPC ballistic missile capabilities. H-GPC forces will continue to use ballistic missiles to slow the Saudi-led coalition's offensive along Yemen's western coast.

Red Sea tensions

- H-GPC forces regularly claim attacks on Saudi-led coalition warships off the western coast. On 16 April, GoY announced the start of the 'Operation Naval Arrow', which aims to remove naval mines planted by H-GPC elements along the western coast, starting from the northwest of Hajjah governorate proceeding southwards.
- H-GPC mines have been found between the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the port of Mokha, a strategic area through which 30% of the global oil trade passes.

Analysis and conclusions:

- H-GPC managed to hit several high-value military targets and achieved media attention because of launching missiles well into the Saudi territory thus demonstrating increased missile capabilities. H-GPC forces have long been working on developing their own long-range ballistic missiles called the Burkan (Volcano) H-2 with a range of nearly 900 miles. However, this coalition started to collapse with the killing of Ali Abdulla Saleh on the basis of the triggered incident in the last week of November, when the late ex-president called for an uprising against the Houthis.
- It is still unclear whether the GoY forces will be able to hold and defend their gains achieved by the Operation Golden Spear especially when air support by the Coalition will decrease. Irrespective of the GoY advances, and since H-GPC forces are still controlling the highland, the latter can still build up their capabilities and launch a counter attack from Kahbub Mountains towards Bab Al-Mandeb and potentially surround the GoY forces in Zubab.

- For the GoY, offensives along the western coast towards Al-Hodaydah from Midi and Harad in the north and from Al-Mokha in the south as well as attack from the sea towards coast locations would require a considerable number of forces, huge resources, and significant naval and air support.
- While such support could come from a superpower, currently the presence of USA, UK or any other warships in the region is primarily for defensive purposes to ensure the freedom of navigation and to intercept arms and weapons smuggled for H-GPC.
- It seems at this point, however, that the parties continue to believe in military solution and are not ready for the renewal of CoH. The trust between the parties' remains at its very low, which means that both sides believe that the other will exploit the CoH to its tactical benefit. Instead, preparations for further military operations seem to be under way.
- Continued conflict in Yemen also fuels the regional Saudi-Iranian show of force and risks giving both sides excuses to escalate it. The conflict also prevents serious efforts to address the massive humanitarian crisis, which is setting conditions for extreme and long-term damage to Yemeni society.