

Review for Peacebuilding Fund

Annexes: Final Draft Report

May, 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Annex A: Review of the Peacebuilding Fund 2013 Terms of Reference	3
Annex B. Reference Group Terms of Reference	10
Annex C: List of Key Documents and Websites Consulted	13
Annex D: Country Selection Matrix.....	29
Annex E: Thematic Area Study Matrix	36
Annex F: ToR Questions which are covered in the Thematic Case Studies.....	69
Annex G: The Thematic Areas or Case Study Methodology	73
Annex H: List of Interviewees According to The Clusters	75

Annex A: Review of the Peacebuilding Fund 2013 Terms of Reference

1. Context and justification for the PBF Review

After six years of operation, 2013 offers an opportune moment to review the progress and strategy of the Peacebuilding Fund. The PBF was created in 2005, and has been operational since 2007. A first review was undertaken by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services in 2008. The Fund's core Terms of Reference were revised in 2009, and several donors joined together to commission a management review during the same year. Since then, the Fund has developed and begun implementation of a Business Plan 2011-13 and an associated MSE system anchored around a Performance Management Plan. Application Guidelines to increase understanding and accessibility to the fund were published in 2009, and are currently being updated.

Taking note of the above chronology, United Nations Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) proposed to the Secretary-General's independent Advisory Group for the PBF that a review be undertaken in 2013, which the Advisory Group endorsed. Undertaking a review in 2013 also fulfills a requirement of the Funds Terms of Reference (as revised in 2009), which call for independent evaluations every three years'.

The independent Advisory Group recommended that the purpose of the 2013 PBF Review is to focus on the global strategy and approach of the Fund, The Advisory Group noted that as PBSO has already increased significantly its country level results monitoring and reporting, the attention of a major review is better focused on broader strategic positioning. Country level results — as already gathered through project reports, the growing number of independent country programme evaluations and, Advisory Group and donor visits and, more recently, Joint Steering Committee reports — will provide a data set against which the overall strategy can be assessed.

The 2013 PBF Review will be able to assess the effectiveness of recent steps undertaken by PBSO as the Fund manager to improve performance. Some of the major efforts include: the development of the Business Plan with its associated annual targets and decision to focus on a limited set of priority countries; efforts to focus on 'value for money'; making allocations more performance-based; increasing synergies with the Peacebuilding Commission; clarifying what is meant by the 'catalytic' nature of the Fund; aiming for quick response times; and increasing UN, and more indirectly donor, coherence. Through its own monitoring, PBSO is already collecting and acting upon a number of lessons learned, especially the need to provide more and better assistance during programme design stages at country level, to link allocation decisions more closely to performance and to further empower the monitoring and guidance role of Joint Steering Committees.

Overall, the Secretary-General's Advisory Group has noted an improvement in the performance of the Fund.' A number of bilateral donor reviews have rated the Fund positively in recent years, reflected in an increasing number of multi-annual donor commitments and increasing levels of funding. PBSO's MRE system is viewed as improving in quality and has yielded valuable lessons, many of which are already being taken into account, for example, through the ongoing revision of the application Guidelines. The 2013 PBF Review should serve, however, as an important independent verification of progress and provide clear recommendations on how to sustain and improve Fund performance.

Finally, the Review should also look at the PBF strategy in light of global peacebuilding theory and practice. The Review should consider how the PBF interacts with initiatives such as the International Dialogue and the New Deal, seeks synergies with larger funding sources such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank and other large transition financing instruments, and promotes good practice as identified in major reports on peacebuilding such as of the Secretary-General (2009, 2010, 2012) and the World Development Report (2011).

2. Purpose and scope of the PBF Review

In order to assess the effectiveness of the global strategy and approach of the Fund, the Review will focus on a series of questions under two broad categories.

The first category centers on the **business model** for the Fund, its strengths and weaknesses, and how it can be improved upon. This will include reflection upon the mechanics of the Fund, its two main facilities, the role of the Joint Steering Committee, relations between PBSO management in New York and the field, technical assistance for peacebuilding programme design, and relations with partners, How can the decision-making model — budget approval by HQ; selection of fund users and projects at country level — more effectively generate a response from the UN system to the country demand for assisting in consolidating peacebuilding processes?

The second category centers on the **strategic** positioning of the Fund at both global and national levels (among and within countries). Globally, the Review should explore the appropriateness of the set of countries that the PBF has so far assisted, and the processes that PBSO has put in place to make country eligibility recommendations. At country level, do the activities that the PBF is financing position it as the catalytic actor for peacebuilding that was envisioned by PBF founders? The review should reflect on how PBF activities respond to increasing demand for strong partnerships with national governments, IFIs and civil society organizations all the while ensuring high value for money in an era of scarce resources.

The Review will *not carry out* impact evaluations of country level activities but using for its performance assessment as a major data source the findings of previous independent evaluations of PBF country portfolios'. The establishment of an overall scorecard of the success (impact) of PBF investments — in close cooperation with UN partners — will take into account criteria such as: the quality of strategic results and catalytic effects, the performance of Fund users and the effectiveness of partnerships at country level (g UN, bi- and multilateral agencies, donors etc.) In undertaking selected field government, visits and through its other review activities, the Review will then seek to better understand how the business model and strategic positioning of the PBF has helped contributed to any successes, and/or may benefit from adjustments.

3. Key questions

The Review will center its work around the key questions outlined below.

(1) *The Fund's business model and strategic management:* PBSO's decision making for the

Fund relies on two levels. Budget requests for both instruments — PRF and IRF — are approved at HQ against a set of well defined criteria (relevance for peacebuilding, urgency of funding gaps, risk taking, catalytic effects, '*value for money*'). After the approvals of PRFs (77% of all PBF funds pass through the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility), the selection of fund recipient agencies and project proposals is delegated to the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to ensure best possible national ownership on what should be achieved and how. PBF's overall added value and success at country level depends on the sound decision making of the JSC and the capacities of selected UN agencies to manage the PBF grants — throughout the implementation cycle — to achieve peace relevant '*results*' in the most cost effective way.

The questions listed below serve as a first guidance and can be adjusted by the consultant team as necessary.

Questions for the review:

- **PRF vs IRF:** Do the IRF and PRF modalities provide sufficient flexibility to the PBF to prioritize speed, taking risks and strengthening national commitments for peacebuilding? Is PBSO drawing on the two facilities appropriately? How efficient, timely and risk-taking is IRF for 'kick-starting' the process in consolidating IRF achievements or building on results from existing peace programmes? How effective are IRFs for 'preparing the ground' for PRF follow-up engagements? Does the flexibility of the two Facilities account for some of the PBF country-level successes?
- **Joint Steering Committees:** Is the JSC functioning effectively in partnership with the national government institutions, UN-, multi- and bilateral agencies, and donors? Does the JSC draw sufficiently upon existing mechanisms or duplicate? How has the inclusion of non-state actors worked? What are their capacities in using the Fund for 'taking risks' and managing them most effectively? What would be a 'best case' scenario for a JSC composition that represents key actors for change' and has high potential for building ownership at national and local level? Do country level systems move fast enough to avoid losing momentum for peace building'? Under what conditions are Joint Steering Committees more likely to contribute to the success of PBF investments?
- **HQ and country level alignment-of-purpose and cooperation:** Do actors at country level value the purpose of the PBF — capturing the 'right momentum' for support and / or catalytic funding for peacebuilding — in the same way as PBSO and stakeholders globally'? Do both have the same understanding of how to optimize the Fund's added value within the country specific context, and 'logic of intervention' (*theory of change*)? Are PBF guidelines supportive to align HQ and country level cooperation to improve overall programme effectiveness at 'reasonable' transaction costs?
- **Technical assistance for peacebuilding programming:** How can PBSO provide better support in close coordination with other UN partners to national actors throughout the funding cycle- design, implementation and M& E- to improve its overall effectiveness? Can PBF secretariats in their current form execute support functions, and if not what are conditions to be put in place to improve their efficiency and institutionalize their functions within existing country systems?
- **Recipients and partners:** Does the range of PBF recipients (currently 19 UN

organizations) take full advantage of the Fund's potential added value to national peacebuilding processes'? Are their ways that PBF can motivate and support improved performance of UN agencies- individually and collectively — within post-conflict settings? Should the PBF extend recipients beyond the United Nations, e.g. CS

- **Risk management:** what is the evidence that PBF is engaged mainly in 'highrisk' areas where other funding partners resist to invest? How are upcoming challenges of 'risk taking' managed at HQ (budget approval, results oriented reporting to donors) and country level (risk management strategies during the implementation process at the level of Fund users or JSC).

(2) Strategic positioning

The PBF finances activities in all countries that are on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and accords these countries a strong priority. To date, more than 60% of cumulative PBF allocations have gone to the six countries on the agenda of the PBC. More broadly, the PBF Business Plans calls for the Fund to remain focused on no more than 20 countries with active portfolios at any one time, a limit which has met with broad endorsement from stakeholders to date. As stakeholders have emphasized both the PBF's role to stay focused on post-conflict settings which receive relatively less global attention ('orphans') and to react quickly in post-conflict or post-crisis moments, the Review should reflect on how PBF has achieved these objectives to date. The Review should reflect further on the strategic value of the selection of countries receiving PBF support, as well as on the positioning of PBF support *within* countries and the Fund's comparative advantage in relation to other funding mechanisms.

Questions or the review:

- **PBF positioning geographically:** Have the PBSO processes for identifying eligible countries been effective? Does the set of countries in which the PBF operates maximize peacebuilding relevant change {value for money}? Is the evidence of 'political commitment of national actors' to peacebuilding the right core criteria? What are the best entry points for PBF engagement in countries with high vs. low donor presence? Are regional initiatives opening new space for PBF engagements'? Does the proportion of funding allocated to PBC countries result in the highest global impact of the PBF?
- **PBF collaboration with the UN system:** Is its level of collaboration with the UN system and other partners in New York appropriate and efficient? At the country level, how directive *can* PBF be as an 'inter-agency' Fund within the current business model, and how directive *should* it be in order for the PBF to be successful in filling its strategic niche? How effective is quality assurance?
- **PBF positioning institutionally:** Has the Fund developed a clear and productive relationship with other transition/peacebuilding financing instruments? With other major funding streams {IFI's, big bilaterals)? Are the Fund's systems to interact with other major peacebuilding initiatives {for example g7+/New Deal) appropriate? How can the collaboration be enhanced between the PBF and other funding instruments in areas like e.g. joint conflict analysis, programming and/or MRE? How does the Fund relates to / apply the principles of good 4 This might have implications for PBF business model 2013 PBF Review-RFPS 1806 — Annex 8

- **Quality of country-level peacebuilding strategies:** Does PBF maximize the likelihood that it invests in 'smart' peacebuilding strategy at country level considering as well the prominent role of the UN in areas like e.g. women's active participation in peacebuilding? How consistent are country peacebuilding strategies with PBF priority areas, and if not, do the priority areas need to be aligned donorship and aid effectiveness agenda in fragile states? Is the Fund's profile and global performance visible enough to provide substantive incentives to donors for (multi-) annual budget commitments?
- **M& E and communications:** Have the global M& E system developments, and efforts to improve reporting, knowledge management and communications in recent years been effective? Does streamlined reporting of country programmes against the PMP framework allow for sufficiently comprehensive capture of achievements? How can the substance of reporting and communication be improved? Are M&E data systematically used for strategic reviews (JSC, HQ), and triggering performance improvements? How can PBF systems be aligned to MAR as an emerging standard for donor's joint performance monitoring? Is PBSO managing the visibility of PBF appropriately? What is the potential and/or what are the limits of aligning the Priority Plan as a monitoring framework with other frameworks (such as country-level compacts or national development plan documents)?

4. REVIEW METHODOLOGY

This review will take a phased approach, using a consultative process. The Terms of Reference, inception report and initial findings will be discussed with PBF stakeholders from the UN system (PCG/SPG), Member States and community of practitioners.

As in previous years, PBF will continue in 2013 with independent country evaluations at a large scale as planned since 2011' with reference to the Business Plan, The conduct of these country evaluations will be timely for being able to use their findings for this review as a major data source in measuring the overall effectiveness of PBF country programmes, the achievement of strategic results, risk taking and catalytic effects in strong partnerships with the national government, UN agencies and donors,

4.1 Review Process

Phase I: Desk review and inception report

- Desk-study and data analysis of existing material, including but not limited to: PBSO/PBF policy documents, Business Plan/ PMP 2011-2013; new PBF application guidelines, country evaluations, META-evaluation', donor performance reviews (DFID Multilateral Aid Review, AUSAID), donor consultations / meeting, mission reports from joint donor visits, thematic reviews.
- Preparation and submission of a technical inception report outlining the scope of core areas of the analysis, the key questions, methodology to develop the country scorecards and selection of countries for field visits
- Presentation of inception report with a clear outline of the final report to PBSO and shared with the PBF Advisory Group, donors and PBC members, partner countries, UN Peacebuilding Contact Group.

Phase II: Key informant interviews

- Interviews with PBSO/PBF staff
- Interviews with stakeholders (UN system; donor capitals and partner countries; practitioners);
- Consultative process with PBSO on the preparation of the field work

Phase III: Field work

- Fieldwork together views on and assess efficacy of PBF processes and performance with respect to the two categories of questions, the business model and strategic positioning of the Fund
- The field visits aim for close consultation with national authorities and high level representatives of UN agencies, donors, bi-and multilateral agencies, Fund Recipient Agencies and their implementation partners
- While the Review team will itself determine in consultation with PBSO the final countries to be visited under consideration of the current schedule of on-going clusters of two or three countries will be identified using the following criteria:
 - Country Cluster (1): length of the funding cycle . 3 years, two consecutive phases of PBF support, IRF and IRF and PRF mix, potential for measuring PBC/PBF synergies/ complementarities, potential for a sound comparative analysis; at least one 'New Deal' country.
 - Cluster 2: Length of funding cycle < 18 months with strong focus on iRF projects (hut not exclusive), non PBC, high diversity of funding conditions

Phase IV: Drafting and finalization

- Preparation of key preliminary findings
- Consultation of preliminary findings
- Drafting of final report

4.2 Deliverables and timetable

- INCEPTION REPORT: Taking into account outcomes of desk-study, interviews NY/donor capitals- perspectives on position/purpose of PBF, the future of the PBF and the required business model (what works, and what doesn't, and why?) — construct different theories of change on how PBF will achieve peacebuilding effectiveness, present core areas, key question and methodology of country performance assessment (scorecards) in inception report; Target: June
- FIELD REPORTS: Target: October
- PRELIMINARY FINDINGS: For consultation; Target: November.
- FINAL REPORT: Target: First quarter 2014

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE REVIEW

5.1 Procurement. The review team will be recruited using transparent and competitive UN procedures by the UN Secretariat.

5.2 . Team composition. The review team will include a minimum of one Senior professional with demonstrated expertise in the areas of peacebuilding, programme evaluation and performance assessment of business models and operations within the United Nations

environment. The team will rely on PBSO support in the coordination of the field visits for easy access to relevant parties(JSC, donors, Funding Recipient Organizations etc.) and data material. PBSO provides a first proposal for the country clusters (see Appendix 1).

Appendix 1: List of countries for the selection of country clusters Active: Peacebuilding 8 Recovery Facility (PR

1. Burundi
2. CAR
3. Comoros
4. Cote d'Ivoire
5. DRC
6. Guatemala
7. Guinea
8. Guinea Bissau
9. Liberia
10. Nepal
11. Sierra Leone
12. South Sudan
13. Chad
14. Kyrgyzstan
15. Lebanon
16. Libya
17. Somalia
18. Sudan
19. Yemen
20. Myanmar
21. Niger

Annex B. Reference Group Terms of Reference

DRAFT – 5 July 2013

Background

After six years of operation, 2013 offers an opportune moment to review the progress and strategy of the Peacebuilding Fund. The PBF was created in 2005 and has been operational since 2007. The UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services undertook a first review in 2008. The Fund's core Terms of Reference were revised in 2009, and several donors joined together to commission a management review during the same year. Since then, the Fund has developed and begun implementation of a Business Plan 2011-13 and an associated M&E system anchored around a Performance Management Plan. Application Guidelines to increase understanding and accessibility to the fund were published in 2009, and are currently being updated.

Taking note of the above chronology, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) proposed to the Secretary-General's independent Advisory Group for the PBF that a review be undertaken in 2013, which the Advisory Group endorsed. Undertaking a review in 2013 also fulfills a requirement of the Funds Terms of Reference (as revised in 2009), which call for independent evaluations every three years.

The independent Advisory Group recommended that the purpose of the 2013 PBF Review be to focus on the global strategy and approach of the Fund. The Advisory Group noted that as PBSO has already increased significantly its country level results monitoring and reporting, the attention of a major review is better focused on broader strategic positioning. Country level results – as already gathered through project reports, the growing number of independent country programme evaluations and, Advisory Group and donor visits and, more recently, Joint Steering Committee reports – will provide a data set against which the overall strategy can be assessed.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the global strategy and approach of the Fund, the Review will focus on a series of questions under two broad categories: 1) the Fund's business model – what are its strengths and weaknesses, and how it can be improved upon; and 2) strategic positioning of the Fund at both global and national levels (among and within countries).

The PBF Branch of the PBSO will manage an external consultant's implementation of the 2013 Review, to be conducted from July 2013 to January 2014. The objective of the Review will be to address, as systematically and objectively as possible within the resources and time frame allotted, the questions presented within the Review Terms of Reference and refined in the Inception Report.

A Reference Group will be established to provide feedback to the Review team, via a PBF Branch Review manager, on key outputs associated with the Review. Accordingly, the Reference Group will be kept informed of progress on the Review, and will provide critical feedback on key outputs, such as the Inception Report, preliminary findings and Draft Report.

Mandate and Responsibilities of the Reference Group

The mandate of the Reference Group will be to contribute to the quality and utility of the Review by providing substantive feedback on key outputs at several pre-determined junctures of the process (i.e., inception report, presentation of preliminary findings, and draft report). In addition, a key positive by-product of the Reference Group will be a heightened sense of ownership among key fund users within the exercise, coupled with enhanced relevance and credibility of the Review. Taken together, these factors frequently help foster the use of, and follow-up to, findings and recommendations to produce concrete improvements in the achievement of goals.

To this end, the Reference Group will comment and advise, both in writing and during meetings and teleconferences, on key Review outputs. Each Reference Group member will be charged with reviewing and providing written comments on these outputs. Members of the Reference Group will serve in an individual capacity, rather than speaking with a single voice on a consensus basis. At the same time, it is expected and welcomed that individual Group members might wish to present the aggregated institutional comments from their respective offices. In addition, members will serve in an advisory capacity only, helping to inform the independent Review team's analysis from the perspective of their respective area of expertise or institutional affiliation.

In keeping with the independence of the Review and the PBF Branch's role in safeguarding this independence, Reference Group comments made to key outputs will not necessarily be endorsed by the Branch or incorporated by the Review team as independent consultants. However, in the interest of transparency the PBF Branch will ensure that consolidated comments from the Reference Group members are shared with the Group prior to sharing with the Review team. All comments will be addressed in a timely and transparent fashion by the review team, and a rationale provided in a timely and transparent fashion for any comments not taken up. (Further information on this vital aspect of independence can be provided on request.)

The Reference Group will be updated regularly on the Review's implementation and will be able to ask questions to the PBF Branch and propose improvements to the process.

Composition and Governance

The Reference Group's composition will reflect a balanced set of stakeholder perspectives. Membership shall therefore be drawn from a range of stakeholders. In the broadest sense, recruitment for participation in the Reference Group shall be guided by members' fulfilment of one or more of the following criteria:

- knowledge of the Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Commission systems;
- knowledge of peacebuilding approaches more generally;
- experience in evaluation or other evaluative exercises such as reviews;
- credibility and independence;
- absence of conflict of interest; and
- ability to fulfil the required time commitment and participate in meetings.

Reference Group members should thus be recruited first and foremost for their substantive expertise, as well as their breadth of viewpoints and commitment to the integrity of the Review. Gender and geographic balance should also be actively sought.

The Reference Group will be chaired by the Review manager, who will be responsible for ensuring that the exercise is on time, on target and on budget, as well as the on-going relevance of the exercise as rooted in the stakeholder consultation process. The Review manager will also ensure timely submission of outputs to Group members, including ample advance notice of outputs to be delivered and clear notification of feedback deadlines. His/her duties will also include coordination of Reference Group members' comments and presentation of a single consolidated document for the consultants' consideration. Finally, the Review manager will ensure that the independent consultants adequately address the comments provided and, as indicated above, that they provide a rationale for those comments not accepted.

Time Commitment

The duration of the engagement will be from July 2013 to January 2014, and will entail a total of 4-5 days during this period on the part of each Reference Group member. Expedient forms of interaction will be established by the Group, and will most likely entail email exchanges and conference calls, as well as an online platform Reference Group members.

Annex C: List of Key Documents and Websites Consulted

UN General Assembly documents

United Nations, General Assembly, Arrangements for the revision of the terms of reference for the Peacebuilding Fund, Report of the Secretary-General, April 2009

United Nations, Sixty-second session, Agenda item 112 of the provisional agenda*: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 26 July 2007

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 101: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 13 April 2009

United Nations, General Assembly, General Assembly Sixty-third session Item 103 of the provisional agenda*: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 4 August 2008

United Nations, General Assembly, General Assembly, Security Council, Sixty-fourth session, Item 108 of the provisional agenda*: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 3 August 2009

United Nations, General Assembly, General Assembly, Sixty-fourth session, Item 108 of the provisional agenda: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 3 August 2009, Peacebuilding Fund, Business Plan: 2011-2013

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-fifth session, Item 111 of the provisional agenda: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 9 September 2010

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session, Agenda item 111: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 16 January 2012

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-seventh session, Agenda item 107: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 25 January 2013

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-fifth session, Item 111 of the provisional agenda: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 9 September 2010

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-second session Agenda item 112 of the provisional agenda* Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 26 July 2007

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixty-seventh session, Agenda item 107: Report of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund, 25 January 2013

United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, Fifth session, Guinea configuration Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Guinea between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission, 23 September 2011

United Nations, Security Council, Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 12 August 2013

United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission Fourth session, Liberia configuration, 29 October 2010 Statement of mutual commitments on peacebuilding in Liberia, 16 November 2010

PBSO Guidelines and templates

PBF Business Plan: 2011-2013

PBSO/PBF, PART B Template 1 Eligibility Request for countries to access the PBF

PBSO/PBF, PART C Template 2.1 Country Submission Note. for the Immediate Response Facility (IRF)

PBSO/PBF, PART C Template 2.2 IRF Project document.doc

PBSO/PBF, PART C Template 2.3 IRF Revised Project document

PBSO/PBF, PART C Template 2.4 IRF Budget Revision and non cost extension Form

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.1 PRF Priority Plan

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.2 PRF Project document

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.3 Project Transmittal Form (PRF)

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.4 PRF Revised Project document

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.5 PRF Budget Revision and non cost extension Form

PBSO/PBF, PART E Template 4.1 M&E Plan

PBSO/PBF, PART E Template 4.2 JSC Annual Reporting

PBSO/PBF, PART E Template 4.3 RUNO Half year reporting

PBSO/PBF, PART E Template 4.4 RUNO Annual Narrative Programme Reporting

PBSO/PBF, PART E Template 4.5 RUNO Final Narrative Programme Reporting

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.1 How to use PBF Global Results Framework (PMP)

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.2 How programming for catalytic effects

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.3 How to develop TORs for PBF programme evaluation

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.4 How to establish TOR & ROP for JSC

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.5.1 How to establish and report for PBF-IRF project

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.5.2 How to establish and report for PBF-PRF project

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.6 How to make cost or non-cost extension for IRF-PRF projects

PBSO/PBF, PART F Guidance Note 5.7 How to Close a IRF - PRF project

PBSO, PBF Application Guidelines, January 13, 2014

PBSO/PBF, PART C Template 2.3 IRF Revised Project document - updated

PBF, PART C Template 2.4 IRF No Cost revision - updated

PBSO/PBF, PART D Template 3.1 PRF Priority Plan - updated

PBSO/PBF, PART-B-Template-1-Eligibility-Request - updated

PBSO/PBF, PART-C-Template-2.2-IRF-Project-document - updated

PBF, PART-E-Template-4.1-ME-Plan - updated

PBF, PART-E-Template-4.2-JSC-Annual-Reporting - updated

PBF, PART-E-Template-4.4-RUNO-Annual-Reporting – updated

PBSO/PBF, Eligibility Request Template for countries to access the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF)

United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Application Guidelines (*beta version*) 28 March 2013

United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008

PBSO thematic reviews

PBSO Thematic Review on Gender and Peacebuilding, Terms of Reference, July 2013

United Nations, DDR and Peacebuilding, Thematic review of DDR contributions to peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund, November 2011

United Nations, SSR and Peacebuilding, Thematic review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to Peacebuilding and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund, 2012

PBSO, Debriefing and Validation Mission of the PBSO Thematic Review on Gender, New York, February 23-25, 2014, Debriefing Note

PBF evaluations

Bishop, Jo-Anne, Final Evaluation Report, Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of Internally Displaced People (SERC) Project, 2011

Campbell, Susanna Campbell, and Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, Independent External Evaluation Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi 2007 – 2013, final draft evaluation report), 2013

Campbell, Susanna P., avec Leonard Kayobera et Justine Nkurunziza, PBF Projects in Burundi External Evaluation, 2010

Larrabure, Juan Luis, and Edmundo Vaz, Peace Building Fund Programme in Guinea Bissau 2008-2011, 2011

Larrabure, Juan Luis and Ahmed Ouledi, Comoros, Peace Building Fund Programme in the Comoros 2008-2011, 2011

Larrabure, Juan Luis, and Ahmed Ouledi, Final Evaluation Peace Building Fund Programme in the Comoros 2008-2011, Final report, 2011

Larrabure J.L, Momoh H., Koroma A., Sierra Leone, Final Evaluation PBF in Sierra Leone, 2011

Nepal, Independent External Review of the UNPFN, 2011

O' Gorman, Eleanor and Bhojraj Pokharel, Namrata Sharma, Petter Bauck, Pratap Prasad Pradhan, Joint Government/Donor Review of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund External Review Report Final Version, April 16th 2012

ODC Inc., Independent External review of the UN Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN), Final report, August 2011

Quick, Ian D., The Peacebuilding Fund in Guinea, Independent evaluation 2009-12, September 2012, 2012

Vinck, Patrick, and Dimanche Gotoas, Anthony Hubert Yavala, Central African Republic, PBF External Evaluation 2008-2012, 2012

Vinck, Patrick, External Evaluation of the PBF in DRC, August 2013

Wielders, Iris and Lorna Juliet Amutjojo, Final evaluation report of UN Peacebuilding Fund programmes in Acholiland, Northern Uganda, 26 January 2012

Wilson, Scot, Nepal Pvt. Ltd., Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR), External Monitoring of Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), Draft Final Report, January 2013

Zapach, Marla, and Gulnara Ibraeva, Immediate Response Facility (RF1) IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FACILITY (IRF1), Final Evaluation Kyrgyzstan, UN Peacebuilding, 10 May – 30 June 2012

Snellen, Richard, and Oscar Bloh and Julius Togba consultants, Peace Building Fund Liberia, Mid-Term Review March 2010

PBF Advisory Group

Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding, Field Trip to Guinea, Jan 28 – Feb 1 2013, Trip Report, February 2013

A Concept Note for the UNPBF Advisory Group: Final Draft, September 2010

The Advisory Group of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund: Report of the Field Visit to Nepal, 28-31 January 2013

PBSO, The Peacebuilding Fund, A View of Initial Outcomes, Prepared for Advisory Group Meeting, 25 March 2010, New York

PBSO, The Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group Meeting, 12 May 2009, Report of the Fourth Meeting, 17 June 2009

PBSO, The Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group Meeting, 25 March 2010, Report of the Fifth Meeting

PBSO, The Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group Meeting, 29-30 March 2010

UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group, Report to the Secretary General upon completion of two-year mandate, 31 October 2011

Documents from PBSO Cape Town meeting, July 2013

PBSO, Monitoring & Evaluation Systems for Peacebuilding, PBF Training Workshop, Cape Town 11 July 2013

PBSO, PBF requirements for substantive reporting, PBF Training Workshop, Cape Town, 11 July 2013, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, PBF Surge Support, Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, Planning for Peacebuilding Support: Conflict Analysis (A), PBF Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, PBF Support: Key Strategic Lessons Learned from PBF Country Evaluations, PBF Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, PBF Strategic Positioning and Added Value, Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, Synergy between PBC and PBF, PBF Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

PBSO, UN Peacebuilding Architecture, PBF Regional Workshop, Cape Town 9 – 11 July 2013

Other PBSO documents

Otobo, Ejeviome Eloho (PBSO), A UN Architecture to Build Peace in Post Conflict Situations, October 2009

Otobo, Ejeviome Eloho (PBSO), Global Governance Institute, Leading the Peacebuilding Commission: An institutional history in the making, GGI 'Views from Practice' No. 1/2013, March 2013

PBSO, The United Nations peacebuilding architecture, New York, October 2010

United Nations (2009), PBSO Management Letter to the Final Report of the OIOS Independent Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund, 23 January 2009

UN PBSO in cooperation with, OHCHR, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN WOMEN, WFP and WHO, Contributions of administrative and social services to peacebuilding, peace dividends and beyond, 2012.

United Nations, PBSP, UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation, September 2010s

MPTF-O documents

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Partnerships Bureau United Nations Development Programme, First Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2007, PART ONE & PART TWO, 16 June 2008

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Bureau of Management United Nations Development

Programme, Second Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2008, PART ONE, 14 July 2009

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Bureau of Management United Nations Development Programme, Third Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2009, 25 June 2010

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Bureau of Management United Nations Development Programme, Fourth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2010, 31 May 2011

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Bureau of Management United Nations Development Programme, Fifth Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2011, 31 May 2012

Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Bureau of Management United Nations Development Programme, Second Consolidated Annual Progress Report on Activities Implemented under the Peacebuilding Fund Report of the Administrative Agent of the Peacebuilding Fund for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2008
PART ONE, July 2009

Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, Peacebuilding Fund Guidance on Conflict Analysis PBF Regional Workshop 2013 – Concept Note

United Nations, UNDP, Investing in peace, 2012 annual report of the administrative agent of the peacebuilding fund, 2012

Country-level PBF reports

Annual Reporting of the Joint Steering Committee in Liberia on the implementation status of the Priority Plan to PBSO/PBF, 2012

Development Partners Coordination Council, Kyrgyz Republic High Level Development Conference July 10-11, 2013 Deliberations, Challenges Identified, Conclusions and the Way Forward Joint Conference Document (Volume II) A Reform-Based Development Partnership, 2013 – 2017

Fonds de consolidation de la paix (FCP), rapport annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme, Projet d'appui à la mise à la retraite de 4300 militaires de l'armée guinéenne

Fonds de consolidation de la paix (FCP), période du rapport: du 13 mai 2012 au 31 décembre 2012, Appui stratégique à la RSS

Fonds de consolidation de la paix (FCP), Rapport annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme 1er janvier – 31 décembre 2012, Projet d'appui à l'insertion socio-économique des jeunes et des femmes vulnérables à travers les activités d'assainissement

Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix, rapport annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme 1er Janvier – 31 Decembre 2012, Projet de renforcement du contrôle démocratique et civil des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) en Guinée

Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix, rapport annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme 1er Janvier – 31 Decembre 2012, Projet d'appui au recensement biométrique de l'armée

Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix, Rapport Annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme 1er Janvier – 31 Decembre 2012, Appui à la Promotion d'un Dialogue Inclusif et Durable en Guinée

Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix, Rapport Descriptif final du programme 2 période du rapport: DU 1er Janvier AU 31 Décembre 2012, Renforcement des capacités du Secrétariat Permanent du Comité de Pilotage du PBF Guinée- Conakry

Fonds de Consolidation de la Paix, Rapport Descriptif du programme période du rapport: 01.02.2011- 31.12.2012, Réintégration des jeunes associées avec les forces armées et jeunes vulnérables.

Government of Liberia Peacebuilding Office / UNPBF Secretariat, ANNUAL REPORTING of the Joint Steering Committee in Liberia on the implementation status of the Priority Plan to PBSO/PBF, 2012, 31 December 2012

Liberia, Minutes of the Fourth JSC Meeting – 2013 Friday, October 4th, 2013 Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs Conference Room

Mission de la Présidente de la Formation Guinée de la Commission de consolidation de la paix en République de Guinée 4 au 6 septembre 2011

Mission Report of the PBC Guinea Configuration's Chairperson's Visit to Conakry, (17-19 February 2013)

Peacebuilding needs and priorities assessment in the Kyrgyz Republic, Final Report, 2 July 2013

PBF Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan Revised and Extended Flash Appeal – End Report, June 2010 – June 2011

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Union des Comores

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Project to Support the International Mediation in Guinea

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Comité National de Pilotage de la RSS (CNP-RSS)

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Project to strengthen the democratic and civilian control of the Defence Forces and Security (FDS) in Guinea

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Support the Employment of Youth and Women in the agenda of peacebuilding in Guinea "Study opportunities in the mining and agricultural sectors" project

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Urgent support to force election security

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Project to support the retirement of 4300 the Guinean Army soldiers

PBF Guinea, Progress report: January-June 2013, Project Inclusive and Sustainable Dialogue in Guinea

Projet Conjoint d'appui aux victimes de tortures et de violences basées sur le genre, Rapport Annuel sur l'état d'avancement du programme 1er Janvier – 31 Décembre 2012, Projet Conjoint d'appui aux victimes de tortures et de violences basées sur le genre

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Promotion et accompagnement des initiatives de consolidation des acquis éducatifs au profit des jeunes exposées ou en situation de précarité

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Programme d'Appui au renforcement de l'efficacité de la Justice, et au respect des droits humains

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Promotion des conditions économiques et sociales des jeunes, et femmes dans l'île de Mohéli au travers l'appui à l'agriculture

PBF Comoros, Priority Plan PBF in Comoros, December 2008

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Restructuration et renforcement des capacités opérationnelles de la Police Nationale

PBF South Sudan, Stabilization and Early Reintegration Support to Returnees in South Sudan, Project Document Cover Sheet, South Jonglei Youth Literacy & Peace building initiative

PBF South Sudan, Project Document Cover Sheet, Peace-building Fund Secretariat

PBF South Sudan, South Sudan Final programme narrative report reporting period: July 2012 – June 2013

PBF Burundi, Project progress review, Réhabilitation du rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation et de reconstruction communautaire, 1er Janvier - 30 Juin 2009

PBF Burundi, Project progress review, Appui pour une Police Nationale du Burundi de Proximité Opérationnelle, 1 er Janvier au 31 December 2011

PBF Burundi, Consolidation de la paix à travers l'appui à la réintégration socio économique durable en faveur des personnes affectées par le conflit, 1 January - 31 December 2013

PBF CAR, Education à la Citoyenneté et Promotion de la Culture de la Paix pour la Coexistence Pacifique dans les Communautés et les Ecoles, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF CAR, Appui à la relance des activités agro-pastorales à Paoua, Bozoum et Ndélé, 1 January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Chad, Programme conjoint d'appui au Détachement Intégré de Sécurité, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Comoros, Réhabilitation du rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation nationale et de consolidation de la Paix, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Comoros, Renforcement des capacités nationales en matière de consolidation de la paix, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF DRC, Intitulé du Programme: Restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat à l'Est de la RDC, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Ivory Coast, 1000 Micro projets pour la réintégration des ex-combattants et d'ex-miliciens en Côte d'Ivoire, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Ivory Coast, Appui au rétablissement de la sécurité, de l'autorité de l'Etat et de la cohésion sociale en Côte d'Ivoire, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Guatemala, Strengthening of National Capacities for Criminal Investigation, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Guinée, Projet d'appui prioritaire à la Justice et à la sécurité en Guinée, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Guinée, ProConSoGui (Promotion de la Concertation Sociale en Guinée), 1 January to 31 December 2008

PBF Guinea Bissau, Rehabilitation of Military Barracks, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Bissau National PBF Secretariat Support Extension and Second Extension, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Haiti, Renforcement de la sécurité à la prison civile de Port-au-Prince, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Kenya, Emergency Volunteer, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Kenya, Emergency Volunteers Scheme, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Kyrgyzstan, Administration of Justice, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Liberia, Support to the Establishment and Initial Functioning of the LC, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Nepal, Monitoring, reporting and response to conflict related child rights violations, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Nepal, Jobs for Peace 12,500 youth employed and empowered through an integrated Approach, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Sierra Leone, Supporting Gender Capacity, Women's Rights protection and Child protection in Recovery and Peacebuilding, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Sierra Leone, Support to the Implementation of the Sierra Leone Reparations Programme as Part of the Recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Somalia, Peaceful Co-Existence and Conflict Resolution, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Somalia, Quick Impact Police and Public Security Reform Project In the Puntland State of Somalia, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF South Sudan, Strategic Grain Reserve in South Sudan, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Sudan, Tailoring training for FXCs, Southern Kordofan, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Timor Leste, Return, Relocation and Reintegration Support to IDPs and IDP-Affected Communities in Timor-Leste, January 2009 - 31 December 2009

PBF Uganda, Peace building and enhancing protection systems, 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Lebanon, Empowerment of Youth at Risk through Job Creation Programme in Areas of Tensions (Lebanon), 1st January - 31 December 2011

PBF Liberia, Minutes of the Fourth JSC Meeting – 2013, October 4th, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs

PBF Liberia, PBF project half yearly progress update 1 January 2013 – 30 June 2013, Enhancing Access to Security and Justice and the Decentralized Level (UN)

PBF Comoros, Projet conjoint BIT/PNUD/ONUDI/FAO pour le Fond de consolidation, Domaine d'intervention: Reconstruction et consolidation de la paix à travers l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores, Projet: Appui à la pérennisation de la paix par la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes aux Comores (APROJEC), Septembre 2009

PBF Comoros, Document de programme, Appui à l'intégration socio-économique des « femmes et filles associées au conflit » dans le processus de DDR

PBF Comoros, PBF emergency window project document cover sheet, Réhabilitation du rôle de la femme dans le processus de réconciliation nationale et de consolidation de la Paix

Rapport, Mission du « Framework Team » aux Comores, Janvier 14 – 24, 2008

Rapport de mission de consultation, analyse des potentiels etc dynamiques de conflits et des facteurs structurels qui minent la cohésion sociale en Union de Comores, Damir Ben Ali, Kaambi Roubani, Mahamoudou Said, September 2011

Review of progress in the implementation of the statement of mutual commitments on Peacebuilding in Liberia. Third progress report

UN Comoros, Project Renforcement des capacités nationales en matière de consolidation de la paix, 2012

United Nations, Informal meeting of the Guinea Specific Configuration of the PBC, New York, 03 May 2013, 10 May 2013

United Nations Country Team in the Kyrgyz Republic Joint political and conflict analysis Issue 5 April. June 2013

Republic of Liberia, UN, Draft Liberia peacebuilding programme, revised 3rd Draft, 02 May 2011

Visit of H.E. Staffan Tillander, Chair of the PBC Liberia Country, Configuration to Liberia, 15-20 September 2013, Draft Mission Report

Other evaluations and documents

Australian Government, AusAID, United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Australian Multilateral Assessment March 2012

DFID Project Completion Report “UN Peacebuilding Fund”, 2010

ICAF Report, Kyrgyz Republic: focus on Southern Kyrgyzstan, October 2011

Menkhau, Ken, Conflict analysis: Somalia, October 2012

NORAD, Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the World Bank’s State and Peace-Building Fund and UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2011

NORAD “Appraisal of the Peacebuilding Fund” 2012

Norwegian MFA/NORAD, Assessment of the United Nation’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) 2013

OIOS/IED, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Independent Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund, December 2008

Peacenexus Foundation, PBSO, Peacebuilding Programming Guidance and Support for UNCT and Joint Steering Committee in Kyrgyzstan Bishkek, 3-6 September 2013

PBC documents

Paul R. Seger, Chair, Members of the Peacebuilding Commission, Burundi Configuration, United Nations, 15 July 2013

Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on Lessons Learned, “Resource mobilization for peacebuilding priorities and improved coordination among relevant actors”, 6 April 2011
Chairperson’s Summary

Additional documents and resources

Ball, Nicole and Mariska van Beijnum, Review of the Peacebuilding Fund, 2009

Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Challenges and opportunities to peacebuilding: analysis of strategic issues identified by country specific PBF evaluations, Mariska van Beijnum, July 2013

Chapter 9: Is Peacebuilding Changing the United Nations? From National Sovereignty to National Ownership, Michael von der Schulenburg, October 2013

Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Beyond Transitions: UNDP’s role before, during and after UN mission withdrawal, Megan Price, Lina Titulaer, Conflict Research Unit, The Clingendael Institute The Hague, September 2013

Cluster Working Group on Guidance note on Early Recovery in cooperation with the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition, Guidance note on Early Recovery, April 2008

de Coning, Cedric, Clarity, Coherence and Context, Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding, CIPS, NUPI, 2010

Department for International Development, DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM), July 2011

DFID, Funding Peacebuilding and Recovery: A Comparative Review of System-Wide Multi-Donor Trust Funds and other Funding Instruments for Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery, Draft Final Report, 21 May 2010

Docherty, Bonnie, IHRC, Center for Civilian in Conflict, assistance overdue: ongoing needs of civilian victims, of Nepal's armed conflict, 2013

Evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the World Bank's State and Peace-Building Fund and UNDP's Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

International Monetary Fund, Statement at the end of the IMF Mission to Burundi, Communiqué de presse, 21 Juin 2013

IOM, Compendium of Projects in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) March 2012

IOM, Migration Crisis Operational Framework, 101st session, 15 November 2012

IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework Sectors of Assistance, Objectives and Role during different Phases of Crises

International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy For the Democratic Republic of the Congo Quarterly Report, January to March 2011

Jacquand, Marc and Andrea Woodhouse, UNDP and Peacebuilding: a Look Forward, Final report.

Lessons Learned Review of UN Support to Core Public Administration Functions in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, "Study commissioned by the UN Working Group on Public Administration at the request of the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee", New York, January 2013

Lessons Learned Review of UN Support to Core Public Administration Functions in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, Study commissioned by the UN Working Group on Public Administration at the request of the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee, New York, January 2013

McCandless, Erin, In Pursuit of Peacebuilding for Perpetual Peace Where the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture Needs to Go, Cips University of Ottawa, Nupi, 2010,

Meta-evaluation of country-specific PBF evaluations, Mariska van Beijnum, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute, May 2013

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, Denmark's integrated stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world, Copenhagen 2013

OECD (2011), 2011 Report on International Engagement in Fragile States: Republic of Sierra Leone, OECD Publishing

Peace Nexus and PBF, Programming For Catalytic Effects In Peacebuilding. A Guide. September 2012

Scharbatke-Church, Cheyanne, and Susanna Campbell, Julia Doehrn, Philip Thomas, Peter Woodrow, PeaceNexus Foundation for United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund

The African Capacity Building Foundation, Reconstruction and capacity building in post-conflict countries in Africa: a summary of lessons of experience from Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone & Uganda, occasional paper No. 3, 2004

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Contribution by the Government of Sierra Leone, March 2010

Toogood-Luehrs, Kimairis, Office of Conflict Prevention Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

UNDP, UN Volunteers, Report participatory project review Neighbourhood Volunteer Scheme, prepared by Africa Development Alternatives

United Nations, *UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation*, New York, 2010

United Nations, Status Report: Achievements, Challenges, Way Forward, Autumn 2012

United Nations development Group, UNDP, United Nations Development Programme, 2012 ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORTING AND NEW UNDGP REPORTING CATEGORIES, May 2012

United Nations, Monitoring Peace Consolidation United Nations Practitioners', Guide to Benchmarking, 2010

Online resources

www.globalcorps.com/oti.html

www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-pool

www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/internationalengagementinfragilestatescantwedobetter.htm#SLE

mptf.undp.org

www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml

www.unpbf.org/index.shtml

web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/

Annex D: Country Selection Matrix

Country	PBC	IRF/ PRF	First or second generation?	Current PRF/IRF totals (US\$ millions)	Participating orgs (with highest recipient)	Evaluations	Upcoming evaluation?	Comments
Liberia	x	mixed	1 st generation	\$28.5	7 agencies (UNDP \$12 m)	2010, Prosecuting GBV 2011, PPS and community support 2010 mid-term review	NORAD and thematic evaluation (UNDP??)	Taken together with Guinea, the other PBC country being proposed, we have an opportunity to see whether the PBF apparatus differs in 1 st and 2 nd generation countries. Liberia, moreover, has dedicated M&E capacity to strongly support a mission.

Guinea	x	mixed	2 nd generation	\$27.1	7 agencies (UNDP \$18 m)	2012, PBF in Guinea (first phase)	Taken together with Liberia, the other PBC country being proposed, we have an opportunity to see whether the PBF apparatus differs in 1 st and 2 nd generation countries. Guinea and Liberia are the two most recent countries to come on the agenda of the PBC, and came on the agenda when more efforts were being made to develop synergies between the two instruments. Guinea is the only country on the PBC agenda without a Security-Council mandated mission. PBF is working to support the engagement of UNOWA in Guinea, and thereby bring political tools to a “non-Mission” setting.
--------	---	-------	----------------------------	--------	--------------------------	-----------------------------------	--

Kyrgyzstan		mixed	2 nd generation	\$10	8 agencies (UNDP \$3 m)	2012, Final evaluation of first IRF phase		Kyrgyzstan has just recently submitted its Priority Plan (PP) under the new Guidelines, giving an opportunity to review the whole process. Moreover, they are receiving extra support through PBF and sustained support through PeaceNexus, which enables us to see whether this new support modality is paying dividends.
Niger		IRF	2 nd generation			none		Niger would offer an opportunity to see how the PBF works in post-crisis / post-political transition settings that are slightly different from a class post-war scenario. There is only one recently started IRF to review, however.

South Sudan		IRF [Stefan – what is the current status?]	1 st generation	\$6.5	5 agencies (WFP \$1.9 m)		Planned for last quarter 2013/first quarter 2014 – unclear whether it will go forward.	S. Sudan offers an opportunity to assess how the PBF situates itself in countries where the development partner environment is more crowded. S. Sudan had early IRFs (in 2011) and just this year a PRF. It is also the first Peacekeeping Mission with a specific mandate to develop a “peacebuilding support plan”, one of the motivations for PBF engagement.
Yemen		mixed	2 nd generation	\$3	6 agencies (UNDP/UNDPA \$1.3 and 1.1 m)	none	Anticipated end 2013 for 2011 IRF projects – unclear whether it will go forward.	Similar to Kyrgyzstan, Yemen is currently developing a PP using the new Guidelines. They also have received surge support, but through direct PBSO deployments. In Yemen, PBF is working to encourage collaboration between the Special Adviser of the Secretary General and the resident UNCT.

Cote d'Ivoire		mixed	mixed	\$19.5	8 agencies (UNDP \$15 m)		Possible but unlikely portfolio evaluation in late 2013	PBF has supported Cote d'Ivoire before and after the most recent violence (the short but real war of 2011). After the 2011 war, both the IRF and later the PRF were deployed.
Nepal		PRF	1 st generation	\$10.9	7 agencies (UNICEF \$2 m)	2012, peace through justice project 2012, reparations 2011, jobs-for-peace 2011, external review of UNPFN		The only example in the mix of a PRF-only approach. It's been pretty well evaluated, so there is a good amount of evidence to help Channel understand how the process went and how effective the Fund has been. UN leadership in Nepal has received high marks for using the PBF effectively, in terms of being catalytic for peacebuilding, for bringing the UN together, and for using a competitive approach in managing UN priorities.
Sri Lanka		IRF	1 st generation	\$3	2 agencies (UNICEF \$2 m)			closed

DRC		PRF	1 st generation	\$19.35	6 agencies (UNDP \$9.8 m)			
Sudan		PRF	1 st generation	\$19	5 agencies (UNDP \$13 m)			
Timor- Leste		IRF	1 st generation	\$1	2 agencies, joint programme of UNDP/IOM	2011 final evaluation		closed
Uganda		PRF	1 st generation	\$14	8 agencies (UNICEF \$4 m)	2012 final portfolio evaluation		closed
Burundi	x	mixed	1 st generation	\$49.62	6 agencies (UNDP \$37 m)	2010 portfolio evaluation	Second half 2013 there are 3 evaluative exercises being conducted by both the in- country PBF secretariat and PBF HQ	

Comoros		PRF	1 st generation	\$9.4	5 agencies (UNDP \$6 m)	2011 final portfolio evaluation		
Sierra Leone	x	PRF	mixed	\$47	7 agencies (UNDP \$35 m)	2011 portfolio evaluation	Second half 2013 planned PBF HQ- led portfolio evaluation	

Annex E: Thematic Area Study Matrix

1. Preparation and implementation of PBSO's work			
In order to develop an overall approach and support to a country through the PBF, processes and procedures are in place to develop and prepare the PBF country portfolio and the Priority Plan. This also includes cooperation with the government of the host country, as well as consultations with other donors and the civil society. The overall preparation should be based on a solid analysis of the political situation in order to identify the most suitable design and approach for peacebuilding interventions. Regularly, a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) is set up, in charge of developing the Priority Plan. While preparing the overall approach to a country (as reflected in the Priority Plan and other documents), a 15% gender component/spending is targeted as an overall goal for the funds expenditures.			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection ²
<p><u>1.1 Providing Staffing Support to In-Country Programme Development, Implementation and Coordination</u></p> <p>a. by personnel coming from outside of the country (e.g., PBF Headquarters, surge capacity, PeaceNexus, etc.)</p> <p>b. through RC Coordination Units and other coordination support entities in-country</p> <p><u>1.2 Providing Support through the provision of Guidance and other documents</u></p>	<p>PBSO's engagement is critical in ensuring that support in country is appropriately targeted;</p> <p>A solid understanding of the political and conflict situation, as well as a grasp of theories of change (especially in IRF timeframes) help the staff design the most relevant PBF approach for the target country;</p> <p>Support from PBSO personnel in the</p>	<p>Implementing UN agencies</p> <p>PBSO</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review: Country and conflict analysis used during the design phase; updated conflict analyses; correspondences within the UN system between agencies as well as with the host government • Interviews with PBSO staff, as well as with UN agencies in the countries visited • Interviews with other national and international actors • MPTF database (for project reports) • Country evaluations

² The survey will be part of the data collection and can be added to selected themes once the purpose of the survey and target group are clarified.

<p>a. Provided by PBF-Headquarters, or other external sources (e.g., global Conflict Analysis tools, etc.) <u>Discuss: How does the prioritisation of Programme areas take place?</u></p> <p><u>How does the selection of concept notes and project proposals in country take place, including the funding levels for each?</u></p> <p>b. Generated in-country (e.g., using national Peace and Development Plans, etc)</p> <p><u>1.3 Specific engagement by PBF branch in needs assessments, conflict analysis, Priority plans, concept notes, project proposals, including who gets how much funding.</u> <u>(This includes reviewing the steps, they key issues in each of them, discussing cross cutting issues and what the roles are of HQ and the field). This sections should also discuss the role of technical experts groups who review</u></p>	<p>preparation phase is key to ensuring quality and a PBF approach; the UNCT structure and RC leadership and relationships also affect the PBF process</p>		
---	--	--	--

<p><u>concept notes</u></p> <p>How can PBSO provide better support in close coordination with other UN partners to national actors throughout the funding cycle- design, implementation and M& E- to improve its overall effectiveness?</p> <p>Does PBF maximize the likelihood that it invests in relevant and 'smart' (specific, measurable, acceptable, realistic and time bound) peacebuilding strategy at country level considering as well the prominent role of the UN in areas like e.g. women's active participation in peacebuilding? What tools do staff have to facilitate this task?</p> <p>How consistent are country peacebuilding strategies with PBF priority areas, and if not, do the priority areas need to be aligned (recognizing that national and UN priorities are political, do not always address conflict analysis and involve a Theory of Change that needs to be tested)?</p> <p>How useful have been the</p>			
---	--	--	--

<p>changes in the PBF guidelines that are sent to the field? What areas might be given further attention? What added value can the PBF have in promoting coordination and ensuring that everyone comes together around conflict analyses?</p> <p>What are the key bottlenecks that slow any of the Programme Processes, and how might they be addressed?</p> <p>How can the PBF promote consistent and strong leadership and responsibility on the ground (RC's? Govt? UN Agencies?) from the beginning of the preparation phase through the implementation and evaluation phase? What model works?</p>			
<p><u>1.4 PBSO's human and financial capacities</u></p> <p>At the country level, how directive can PBF be as an 'inter-agency' Fund within the current business model, and how directive should it be in order for the PBF to be successful in filling its strategic niche?</p>	<p>More direct PBSO engagement in-country, and PBSO becoming more operational in terms of its support to UN country teams, will have an impact on its capacity and mandate, can yield improvements in process</p>	<p>UN agencies in country</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with PBSO staff, as well as with UN agencies in the countries visited • Interviews with donors

<p><i>Sub question:</i> how much can PBF actually direct and be involved in designing projects and approaches when the implementation is up to the UN agencies</p> <p>Does the PBSO have adequate staffing, and funding/mechanisms for such staffing, to do its work?</p> <p>How can it work / be represented at country level and how does it cater for such overhead costs</p>	<p>and products, yet bears risks</p>		
<p>1.5 <u>JSC role and work</u></p> <p><u>What needs to be discussed here is:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>composition of JSC</u> • <u>use of alternative mechanism that stand alone?</u> • <u>a critique of JSC</u> <p>Is the JSC functioning effectively in partnership with the national government institutions, UN-, multi- and bilateral agencies, and donors'? Are the relevant</p>	<p>The JSC is the central mechanism to generate a Priority Plan and “local ownership” of PBF support and action; the risk is that a complicated and at times additional mechanism is setup for a relatively small amount of money, and possibly bypassing existing coordination mechanisms. In reality, local involvement (both government and civil society) might be limited while in practice UN agencies drive the JSC</p>	<p>JSC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document review: planning documents for setting-up the JSC; correspondences within the UN system and with the host government; documents relating to the work of the JSC (minutes of meetings etc.) • Interviews with JSC members (UN agencies, host government, donors, civil society representatives) • Interviews with non-JSC members: excluded donors and civil society organisations, members of other coordinating mechanisms

<p>ministries and other governmental bodies sufficiently represented?</p> <p>How has the inclusion of non-state actors worked?</p> <p>Does the JSC draw sufficiently upon existing mechanisms or duplicate?</p> <p>Can JSC in their current form execute support functions, and if not what are conditions to be put in place to improve their efficiency and institutionalize their functions within existing country systems?</p> <p>What role can PBSO play to improve their functioning?</p> <p>Is the JSC considering value for money principles; how and with what results? What incentives are provided by PBSO and the MPTF-O to do so? Is the JSC also ensuring that appropriate national and international anti-corruption efforts are respected and followed?</p> <p>What would be a 'best case' scenario for a JSC composition</p>			
--	--	--	--

<p>that represents 'key actors for change' and has high potential for building ownership at national and local level?</p> <p>Under what conditions are Joint Steering Committees more likely to contribute to the success of PBF investments?</p> <p>How coherent are HQ intervention strategies and the decision making/vision of JSC? <i>Sub question:</i> Is PBF's decision-making in line with its business plan?</p>			
<p><u>1.6 Light foot print of the PBSO versus quality assurance</u></p> <p>How can the PBSO³ ensure a light footprint while also providing quality assurance and tending towards more operational activities?</p> <p>How effective is quality assurance?</p>	<p>Because the PBF is not operational, its main involvement in the implementation of projects should end the moment the Priority Plan is finalised, because at that moment, projects are implemented through UN agencies following their own procedures.</p> <p>The role of the PBSO in</p>	<p>PBSO Advisory Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with PBSO staff • Interviews with UN agencies in-country • Interviews with members of the Advisory Group • Interviews with donors

³ The PBF is not operational

	terms of providing light footprint quality support is limited. The M&E function might play a role in programme implementation		
<p><u>1.7 PBSO coordination with Non PBSO entities</u></p> <p>How relevant are the PBSO HQ mechanisms for working with non-PBSO entities in New York, such as the Contact Group, Senior PB Group, etc.?</p> <p>How effectively coordinates PBF with DPA, DPKO and UNDP/BCPR?</p> <p>How effectively does PBF related to its donors and other MS in NY?</p>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •

2 Headquarters Decisions on Programme Parameters

Key decisions are made by PBF/PBSO at headquarters regarding countries to be provided with PBF funds, as well as the size of the “funding envelope” for each country. Headquarters also plays key roles in approving or modifying the priority funding areas for each PBF country, and regarding the amount of funds for each of these funding areas, and each RA. Attention is also needed regarding other cross-cutting programme parameters that are set by Headquarter-level processes, such as the size of projects, expanding the range of types of organizations that can be Recipient Agencies, flexibility for addressing truly immediate needs, and the number of countries with active PBF portfolios that can be running at the same time.

Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<p><u>2.1 Selection of a Country for Funding</u></p> <p>What criteria is the PBSO as manager of the PBF meant to use to select countries for PBF funding? Are these criteria being used in practice? Are they appropriate for this purpose?</p> <p>Do other factors play a significant role in country selection? What countries were considered but not selected, and what were the reasons for this non-selection? What was the impact effect of the non-selection on peacebuilding in the country concerned?</p> <p>How should PBF engage with countries with high versus low</p>	<p>Country selection is based on PBF criteria plus some political pressure, with difficulty to discern the consequences of non-selection.</p>	<p>Head of PBSO PBC Committee UN Peacebuilding Contact Group</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews at HQ with PBSO ASG, PBSO staff • Interviews with Chairs of the relevant PBC Configuration members • Interviews during the six country missions • Prior country evaluations • Any available documents on the processes and criteria of country selection

<p>donor presence? Are regional initiatives opening space for PBF engagements?</p> <p>Are the selection criteria and related factors different between PBC and non-PBC countries? Are these differences appropriate?</p> <p>How transparent are the above-mentioned decisions and how are donors informed about decisions, processes and plans at every critical juncture?</p>			
<p><u>2.2 Size of the country funding envelope, and of the funding for its priority areas and RA's</u></p> <p>Who is involved, and through what formal and informal processes, in the decision about how much funds will be sought, and approved, for a PBF country programme?</p> <p>What criteria and factors are involved?</p> <p>What are the answers to the two</p>	<p>Decisions on these key aspects of a PBF country programme are taken through both formal and informal consultations, and have sufficient clarity on the criteria and factors involved.</p>	<p>ASG of PBSO</p> <p>Senior officials of Financing for Peacebuilding Branch</p> <p>Senior UN Official in-country (SRSG, RC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with ASG, relevant PBSO and PBC Support Branch staff • Interviews with current and former RCs, SRSGs, • Interviews in-country with JSC members, others • Have previous studies addressed this question? • MPTF Office?

questions above as applied to the amount of funding for each priority area, and funding for each RA, within a PBF country funding request?			
<p><u>2.3 Systemic Issues Regarding Project Size</u></p> <p>Should PBF concentrate on fewer, but larger projects?</p> <p>Is some indicative “critical mass” of country programme funding needed, e.g., to create a funding catalytic effect?</p> <p>Has the plan for PBF to provide approximately 1/3 of its funds to small, medium and large projects been implemented in practice? If so, with what results?</p> <p>Do the UN agencies have adequate capacity to design and implement PB projects of the type funded by PBF? What might be done to fill gaps in this regard?</p> <p><u>Discuss also: Possible expanding the field of RAs (e.g., including</u></p>	<p>While having larger projects, and thus reducing their number, might reduce transaction costs, they would not necessarily have a relatively greater impact, value-added, and catalytic effect than the same level of funds utilized through smaller projects.</p>	<p>ASG of PBSO PBF Senior Staff</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASG of PBSO • Senior staff of PBSO • PBC Support Branch senior staff • Country visits, including interviews with JSC members, government officials, RC/SRSGs, UN agencies • Country evaluations, and thematic evaluations

<u>INGO); Ceiling on the number of active PBF countries</u>			
<p><u>2.4 Limiting the number of PBF Countries (including PBC)</u></p> <p>What has been the impact of the decision to limit PBF to a ceiling of 20 countries with active portfolios at any point in time?</p>	<p>This limitation has motivated PBF to move some country programmes to closure, and has provided adequate room to take on new countries (which have in practice been minimal in the past year).</p>	<p>Countries that have been declared eligible, and those that have been considered but not selected</p> <p>Decision making patterns</p> <p>Availability of funds</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPTF Office • FPB interviews and documentation on such decisions • Country visits

3 Immediate Response Facility and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility			
There are issues concerning the extent to which each of these two mechanisms is operating as planned, the evolution of the PRF into the dominant funding mechanism, with a focus on medium and longer term assistance, and the complementarity between these two facilities.			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<p><u>3.1 – IRF Issues (ceiling, independent of UNDAF, speed, etc)</u></p> <p>Is the IRF adequately fast (e.g., in taking funding decision, and providing funds), flexible, and risk-taking? Have there been any problems with reduced quality of projects due to emphasis on speed?</p> <p>What have been the implications of costs and PBSO staff time on IRF?</p>	<p>The IRF has maintained its usefulness through continuing to be fast, flexible and risk-taking, and might be usefully expanded in terms of funding channeled through it.</p>	<p>Individual IRF programmes from 2010, in particular in-country experience and perceptions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with PBSO staff, UN agency, and PBC officials at Headquarters. • Review of PBSO evaluations of individual countries. • Interviews in the field visit countries with current or previous IRF programmes, including with Government and UN officials, and those engaged directly in the respective IRF programmes.

<p><i>Sub question: is IRF more or less labour intensive in comparison to PRF taking into account that for a IRF no JSC is needed?</i></p> <p>To what extent does the IRF take into account that there is limited ownership for its intervention?</p> <p>Sub question: “Does the IRF modality involve less national ownership than the PRF. If so, is this a problem? Can it be mitigated?”</p>			
<p><u>3.2 PRF- an evolving concept, primarily for medium and longer term assistance</u></p> <p>Given that the decided majority of PBF funds go through the PRF, what accounts for this difference? Should PBF seek to shift this balance? (see also Section 7 –PBC)</p> <p>Are the PRF and the government still utilizing the various PBF ‘funding’ criteria (linked with Theme #4 also)?</p> <p>What should be the niche of the</p>	<p>The context of PBF programming, including the longer term nature of peacebuilding and the typical recurrence of political, security and other crises over this period, have called for a corresponding lengthening in the duration of PBF funding. The rationale and criteria for such a model is clarified in each country.</p>	<p>Trends in the longevity of PRF funding</p> <p>Trends in the decision making process and criteria to continue funding</p> <p>Perceptions of the value-added of such medium and longer term</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field studies, including interviews with PBF stakeholders in-- country, and those in the broader PB field in these countries. • Donor representatives internationally, and PBC Configuration Chairs • PBSO staff

PRF? (linked with Section 4) Are there other factors that play a significant role in the longevity of PRF programmes? (see also Section 7)		funding	
<u>3.3 Complementarity of the modalities IRF/PRF</u> Does the IRF consistently lay the ground for useful PRF subsequent funding? Is PBF making appropriate use of the two facilities? Are there perceptible changes in the distinctive nature and substantive focus of PB actions funded within the two facilities?	PRF funding often follows IRF funding in the same country, but both fundings have a distinct profile and play a distinct role in each particular context.	Decision-makers regarding IRF and PRF programme funding and programme design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior PBSO staff/management • Country evaluations • Field interviews with in-country stakeholders

4 Strategic position, comparative advantage, PBF niche			
PBF stakeholders are especially interested in the extent to which PBF has identified and is filling particular niches, and shows overall comparative advantage, within the global peacebuilding framework of actors. This includes reviewing the extent to which PBF's criteria for its own operations and the actions it funds are still useful and are still met, and the extent to which it has value-added in comparison with other relevant funders. Attention is also needed regarding the extent to which PBF has clear and viable niches within the substantive areas it focuses on, and the extent to which PBF strengthens its functioning and provides wider value-added through working in partnership with other key peacebuilding actors.			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<u>4.0 General Observations on the Performance of PBF</u>	<u>USE THIS LOCATION TO PLACE MORE GENERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT HOW WELL PBF IS DOING, WHETHER IT IS IMPROVING, ETC. (AS WE WERE ASKED TO ADDRESS THESE POINTS BY THE ADVISORY GROUP)</u>		
	PBF has in general met its	The content	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with PBSO staff

<p><u>4.1 PBF meeting its own criteria and developing new ones.</u></p> <p>To what extent are PBF projects adequately focusing on peacebuilding? How does PBF define peacebuilding? Should PBF focus on conflict prevention</p> <p>Should PBF work on “Conflict Prevention” (and what does this term mean?)? Should PBF work in countries that have serious risk of conflict but have not yet exploded?</p> <p>What are the main criteria on which PBF operations and funding are meant to be based, e.g., transparent, fast, flexible, funding higher risk actions, national political commitment, accountable, strategic, effective, filling key funding gaps, etc.?</p> <p>Note: this section needs to identify the full list of such existing criteria.</p> <p>Are these criteria being followed in practice, e.g., are they applied to PBF concept note/project selection, and project</p>	<p>internal criteria, and usefully developed newer ones. However, PBF funds have sometimes been used in-country to provide part of the overall funding needs of particular programmes without having a particular PBF substantive or programmatic niche.</p> <p>PBF and its in-country partners are having some success at mitigating the risks they are undertaking.</p>	<p>and functioning of individual country programmes.</p> <p>The processes and criteria used to determine the programme proposals, and the decision to fund them.</p> <p>The usefulness of the criteria for Peacebuilding in-country</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF guidance and related documents which state its special criteria. • The programme proposals and descriptions for the six field visit countries. • Evaluations of specific countries. • Interviews in-country, including with relevant UN officials and government officials.
--	---	---	--

<p>implementation?</p> <p>Are these criteria important in the field?</p> <p>Are the new criteria (e.g., gender focus, inclusiveness, etc.) proving useful and viable?</p> <p>What efforts are being made in-country to mitigate the risks taken in PBF programming?</p> <p>What is the status of National Ownership in the field? Are there factors that should be considered in considering the optimal extent of National Ownership? In what ways might National Ownership be extended beyond Government?</p> <p>Should other PBF criteria be considered? This includes whether PBF should undertake funding in countries experiencing problems, but below the level of major conflict or crisis? Should PBF engage in “conflict prevention” funding?</p> <p>What are the JSC’s capacities in using the Fund for 'taking risks' and managing them most</p>			
--	--	--	--

effectively? Do country level systems move fast enough to avoid losing momentum for peacebuilding'? Has PBF a visible profile in-country ? Does it matter?			
<u>Specific to the Niche:</u> Are the PBF criteria being applied? And should they be modified, and should others be added? (These criteria collectively, and in some cases individually, are seen as defining the “special nature” of PBF)			•
<u>4.2 PBF’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis other Peacebuilding funds</u> Approximately how many other funders are there of peacebuilding actions? What main categories can they be sorted into? Who are the main/best comparators for the PBF amongst these entities? Why? What were considered the main comparative advantages of PBF, relevant to other funders, when it	In an evolving peacebuilding landscape with both practical and theoretical advances, the PBF needs to stay abreast of these developments, and evolve itself, in order to continue to provide value-added through filling a relatively special niche.	PBF’s contribution to PB in country Strengths and weaknesses of PBF’s main comparators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with IFIs, other funding mechanisms • Donor capital visits • Government, UN, and donors in the six countries visited • Studies that have compared PBF and relevant other funding mechanisms • Interviews with donors that have not (yet) contributed to the Peacebuilding Fund, such as the EU

<p>was established?</p> <p>Has PBF retained these particular comparative advantages through the past several years? To the extent to which these PBF comparative advantages have reduced, or increased, how much of this has been the result of changes in the other institutions versus changes within PBF itself?</p> <p>How does PBF relate to Government-led peacebuilding funds in-country?</p> <p>Why have some donors financing peacebuilding, such as the EU, not yet contributed to the PBF?</p> <p>What are PBF's comparative advantages in comparison with other relevant funds?</p>			
<p><u>4.3 Evolution of the PBF Four Priority Areas</u></p> <p>How were the four Priority Areas of the PBF originally selected? What other possible peacebuilding needs were considered but rejected?</p>	<p>The four Priority Areas and their sub-categories remain important substantive areas of intervention for Peacebuilding, but they do not represent special PBF niches per se.</p> <p>There is a general agreement</p>	<p>Key decision makers on programme design – at PBSO and in-country</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MPTF Office • M&E data, including evaluation reports, both country and Thematic (e.g., on Security Sector Reform) • Interviews with senior PBSO staff • Field interviews, including with relevant government and senior UN (including UNCT) officials • Historical documents on discussions concerning the creation of the PBF, and persons with institutional memory of this period.

<p>Are these areas too broad to help target programming. On the other hand, should other priority areas be considered?</p> <p>What particular substantive areas does PBF focus on? Within them, what particular subjects and/or approaches does it promote? (The Four Priorities are meant to define the PBF substantive focus within the larger PB field, and the specific areas within these to help define a “special focus”.)</p> <p>Should PBF funding seek to address the root causes of the conflict? To help provide “peace dividends”?</p> <p>Should PBF support residual conflict issues?</p> <p>What could be considered the particular niches and value-added of PBF contributions within these four Priority Areas?</p> <p>How were the sub-categories (e.g., SSR) within each of the Priority Areas selected? On what basis? What sub-categories were considered but rejected?</p>	<p>on the need to increase funding for Priorities 3 and 4 (especially 4) but it is not clear if that has translated into actual increased funds.</p>		
--	--	--	--

<p>Within these sub-categories, are there particular actions or types programmes or approaches that are considered priorities for PBF funding? If so, what are they?</p> <p>Should other special issues or topics be considered as possible PBF specialties? E.g., should in-country peacebuilding research, training, and/or advocacy by supported, or creation of government “transition strategies”, or promoting national dialogue on sensitive issues?</p> <p>What explains the current relative balance of PBF funding across the four Priority Areas, and to the sub-categories within them?</p> <p>Are there efforts under way to increase funding to Priorities 3 and 4 in particular? If so, why? What are the constraints to increasing such funding, and how might they be overcome?</p> <p>Can PBF fund a project model to provide a pool of funds for a project to use on a discretionary basis for immediate (i.e., same week) needs of approved</p>			
---	--	--	--

categories of action, e.g., to “unblock” peace mediation or negotiation processes?			
<p><u>4.4 Strengthening Partnerships</u></p> <p>What is the nature of its partnership and relationship with other key actors, and key PB initiatives? (PBF’s relationships help define its strategic positioning, and contribute to its special nature as a promoter and catalyst for improvements in the PB field)</p> <p>Is PBF strengthening its support to DPA and its Special Missions? To DPKO, including or optimal use of its sizable resources for peacebuilding? To both Departments to strengthen their capacity to implement PBF funding?</p> <p>Is the current capacity of the UN system, including the UN agencies, adequate for developing and implementing PBF projects? What might be done to strengthen both the collective and individual capacity of UN entities (including headquarters support units)?</p> <p>Is the PBF promoting joint UN</p>	<p>PBF is strengthening its partnerships at the international level, but is more uneven regarding its linkages with national and local actors in-country beyond the government.</p>	<p>The partnership efforts that PBF has systematically undertaken in country and globally</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country visits • Survey • Interviews with UN Secretariat and Agency staff • Interviews with WB/AfDB other IFIs, and with relevant NGOS (such as Peace Nexus) • Interviews with recipient governments • Donor capital visits • Interviews with key leaders of the New Deal, post-2015 UN Agenda, and other PB-relevant agendas

<p>programming in the field? Is this joint programming approach proving viable and useful?</p> <p>Is PBF collaborating with the World Bank and other PB funders, e.g., on practical coordination and actions in the field, including in the design phase, and in evaluation?</p> <p>Is PBF helping to strengthen government capacities in-country, e.g. for PB strategic planning, for programme design and management, and for maximizing strong national ownership?</p> <p>Should PBF strengthen its relationship with NGOs and CSOs, not just as RAs, but also in terms of further utilizing their expertise, links with the affected population, and advocacy capacity? Note: the question of NGOs and CSOs as possible RA's is also discussed in Section 2.</p> <p>Should PBF expand the type of organizations that can be RAs, e.g., to NGOs, and to CSOs?</p> <p>What are the optimal roles for PBF in supporting and benefiting from</p>			
---	--	--	--

<p>global initiatives such as the New Deal for Fragile States, and the post-2015 UN agenda? From regional initiatives?</p> <p>How can the PBF promote better UN coordination and coherence? Why does it do better this in some situations than in others?</p> <p>Is PBSO managing the visibility of PBF appropriately?</p>			
--	--	--	--

5 Catalytic effect			
Among the range of criteria that collectively are meant to give PBF a special niche in the peacebuilding community, of special importance is its purported “catalytic” effect. This term has evolved to include types of catalytic actions beyond successfully promoting additional and sustainable funding, to include others, such as funding programmes that enable a peace process to become unblocked, or create a larger or longer-term peacebuilding change.			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<p>5.1 <u>Being Catalytic Regarding Additional and Sustainable Funding</u></p> <p>In what ways does PBF seek to promote additional funding, and project sustainability, through its funding and related actions? This includes cost-sharing by the government (e.g., with funds, staff, use of infrastructure, etc.)</p>	While PBF and its partners (especially those in-country) generally do seek such catalytic effects, the results are mixed as to whether they occur. This is sometimes due to the higher level of risk which PBF is often incurring, and political and other events outside of its control.	Extent to which such catalytic funding has occurred. The contribution of such catalytic funding to PB processes in country Leverage of	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews during country visits, especially government, donor, and senior UN officials Survey Interviews with PBSO staff, and with PBC Configuration Chairs Interviews with donors, UN agencies

<p>To what extent does such funding actually occur in practice? What are the factors that seem to determine whether this happens?</p> <p>What is the impact of such catalytic funding, when it has occurred? What has been the impact when it has not?</p>		<p>funds for follow up in country</p>	
<p>5.2 Other Current or Potential catalytic effects</p> <p>Beyond securing additional and sustainable funding, what is the range of other catalytic effects that are now sought via PBF funding?</p> <p>What is the evidence for each of these types of catalytic effects actually occurring, and with what value-added?</p> <p>Should any additional possible catalytic effects be considered for promotion by PBF?</p> <p>Should PBF concentrate on fewer, but larger projects?</p> <p>Is some indicative “critical mass” of country programme funding needed, e.g., to create a funding</p>	<p>The broadening of this category has increased the value-added of PBF funding in a number of important ways.</p> <p>While having larger projects, and thus reducing their number, might reduce transaction costs, they would not necessarily have a relatively greater impact, value-added, and catalytic effect than the same level of</p>	<p>Decision-makers on inclusion of PBF catalytic effects Viability and impact of these catalytic effects</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country visits • Survey • Interviews with PBSO staff, and PBC Configuration Chairs

catalytic effect?	funds utilized through smaller projects.		
-------------------	--	--	--

6 Exit strategies for PBF support to countries

The PBSO has not undertaken any work yet that clarifies how countries that are supported by the PBF could exit the Fund. There are no criteria or procedures that assist facilitation to graduate from the Fund. At the same time an exit strategy should be gradual and supported by all stakeholders involved. An exit strategy would contribute to: i) demonstrating that the Fund's contributions are no longer necessary; ii) making resources available for other countries in need; and iii) avoiding prolonged assistance from the Fund that undermines its purpose. Another issue related to this is that in PBC countries UN missions may come to an end which provide an opportunity to take stock of the broader range of relevant "crisis points", as this concept is a major addition to that of "post-conflict" regarding the appropriate timing for PBF funding to continue or stop.

Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<p><u>6.1 Exit strategy for non PBC countries</u></p> <p>Should PBF could have clear benchmarks for when it is time to exit a country?</p>	<p>If a clear exit strategy is developed the PBSO it will be in a better position to hand over or ensure continued support for the country it supports</p>	<p>Joint Steering Committees</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The extent to which the topic has been explored by different stakeholders. • The survey which could indicate the relevance and need for exit strategies and what they could consist of • Review of documents (minutes, CT minutes) in which such issues were discussed. Notes from different advisors to the PBSO • Survey • Interviews • Documents, including Sierra Leone evaluation,
<p><u>6.2 Managing the Consequences of "exit strategies" for PBF and PBC countries</u></p> <p>How can the PBSO include the PBC in preparing for an exit strategy in PBC countries?</p> <p>How can the PBSO prepare and</p>	<p>An exit strategy for PBSO in PBF countries which are also PBC countries leads to a dilemma: PBC countries have by definition access to PBF funding. If the PBSO were to articulate an approach to slowly reduce support if the situation is opportune, all</p>	<p>Country studies in PBC countries Sierra Leone Country Study Chairs of the configurations for PBC countries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examples where exit strategies have been discussed (Burundi and Sierra Leone) • Evidence that activities can be continued by other donors and that PBF has reached its catalytic limit. • Evidence based on interviews with IFI's on PBSO's comparative advantage • Study how other funds prepare for exit strategies • Survey • Capital visits to the donors • Interviews • PBC configuration chairs

coordinate an exit in countries with a UN missions and when these are preparing to scale down or end their activities?	stakeholders agree and the Fund could responsibly prepare to leave. Then it could use its resources for other countries in need. Taking the presence of UN missions and their exit strategies into account and developing synergies can strengthen the PBF's exit strategy		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interviews with Working Group on Lessons learned and PBC Organisational Committee
<u>6.3 Criteria, analysis and political setting</u> What are the criteria, other tools and instruments that would constitute a minimum requirement for determining an exit strategy and which principles stakeholders should be included in coming to an agreed exit strategy?	If the PBSO can develop an approach that demonstrates how and on what bases it prepares for an exit strategy, it will contribute to demonstrating its results.	Sierra Leone Thematic Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examples of PBF exiting or handing over to other donors Evidence that the PBF is no longer providing a catalytic effect in the 4 areas of the Business Plan Any piloting or other experiments that may have been undertaken PNC Configuration chairs Governments Survey Advisory Group Donors that have and donors that have not contributed to the PBF yet, such as the EU
<u>6.4 Suspension of country support for unlimited time; restarting PBF activities after suspension</u> What is the most effective approach for the PBF in suspending and restarting its activities in countries that relapse	If the PBSO can clarify how the PBSO appreciates country's commitment to peace building and by whom - during or after conflict - it will gain a stronger position in negotiating and targeting its support and reach consensus	Joint Steering Committees PBSO staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PBC Configuration chairs Interviews with Working Group on Lessons learned and PBC Organisational Committee

into conflict?	among all stakeholders.		
----------------	-------------------------	--	--

7 Peacebuilding Commission/Peacebuilding Fund			
<p>The PBF and the PBC have increased their synergies over the past few years but challenges remain. Among the issues that are recurrent are the PBFs relatively high contributions (about 60of total PBF funding to PBC countries; the political environments in which they both operate but from different perspectives; the eligibility to access PBF funds for PBC countries and the collaboration among the three different Branches in the PBSO [Should the Policy Branch be discussed here or in Section 8? Would suggest the latter and keep the focus here on PBC]. The PBC Branch also serves as the Secretariat to the PBC.</p>			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
<p><u>7.1 Synergy and challenges</u></p> <p>Have the recent efforts to increase systematic PBF collaboration with the PBC been effective? Are they sufficient or need to be improved? What can each partner — the PBF and the PBC — do to improve synergies?</p>	<p>If the PBC and PBF synergies continue to improve, their collaboration and support to the PBC countries will increase effectiveness, including the rationale for PBF funding and the volume of support</p>	<p>The extent to which they collaborate and in which areas and with what results</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO interviews • PBC configuration chairs • Country visits
<p><u>7.2 Allocation and size and duration for PBC and PBF countries</u></p> <p>Are the resource envelopes based on adequate and demonstrated political commitment for PBF to support PBC countries? What drives the envelop limits</p>	<p>A clear demonstration of political commitment and a solid MoU or other means can increase PBF’s effectiveness and demonstrate its catalytic effect.</p> <p>A phased approach to financing activities in country and based on performance</p>	<p>Strategic ranking vs financial allocations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO interviews • PBC configuration chairs • MPTF data and trends over time • PBC Country visits and government officials • PBSO Head

<p>decisions? Who takes these decisions? (see also Section 2)</p> <p>Why do PBC countries typically receive PBF funding for a longer time than non-PBC countries? What implications does this have for PBF?</p> <p>What opportunities are there to introduce performance budgeting for PBC countries given that they tend to benefit longer from the PBF modalities?</p>	<p>will increase the Fund's effectiveness. It will assist in demonstrating to all stakeholders and to donors in particular what it has achieved and it can be held accountable for results.</p>		
<p><u>7.3 Political environment in which PBC and PBF operate</u></p> <p>Is PBF's aim to promote more coherence amongst country-level stakeholders interested in peacebuilding more successful in countries on the PBC agenda? Both the PBC and PBF work in highly politicised environments: do they share the same tools and approaches to increase synergies?</p>	<p>If the PBC and PBF increase synergies and cooperation, they will have a stronger strategic position and could influence and shape the peacebuilding agenda(s) of stakeholders in country.</p>	JSC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO interviews • PBC configuration chairs • JSC • RC • External observers from • G 77 interviews/ Non traditional donors • Interviews with Working Group on Lessons learned and PBC Organisational Committee
<p><u>7.4 Synergy among the three branches and the Peacebuilding Commission</u></p>	<p>If collaboration among the branches further improves the implementation of the</p>	<p>The extent to which they collaborate and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO interviews • PBC configuration chairs • Staff interviews PBSO/financial branches. • Interviews with Working Group on Lessons learned and PBC

<p>How well are the three branches cooperating and does, for example, the shared staff model work and could that be expanded?</p> <p>Can the Lessons Learned Working Group be of greater support to PBF?</p> <p>To what extent are PBF and PBC seen as the same entity by those in the field, and with what implications for PBF?</p> <p>How are three Branches jointly supporting the implementation of the PBF business plan?</p>	<p>business plan will be enhanced. Making its collaboration more explicit and including their products in the M&E will increase the PBF's performance and visibility.</p>	<p>in which areas and how</p>	<p>Organisational Committee</p>
---	---	-------------------------------	---------------------------------

8. M&E and Learning			
<p>Since 2010, the PBF has developed an M&E system for its work. Its purpose is to improve the design, implementation and evaluation of current, and future PBF activities and to provide solid evidence for the achievements of the PBF. All PBSO staff as well as staff implementing PBF projects are required to possess a minimum knowledge about M&E within the PBF. Country-level evaluations are taking place on a regular basis and a single meta-evaluation was undertaken, comparing and summarizing the country-level evaluations. As part of the reporting, the UN implementing agencies regularly report back to MPTF-O</p>			
Thematic Area Questions	Theoretical Proposition	Unit of Analysis	Evidence/Data Collection
8.0	<p>The full range of types of M and E inputs – evaluations, assessments, lessons learned, policy analysis, thematic reviews, etc. need to be listed/discussed. WE are not only looking at the function of M&E but also the institutional set-up at</p>		

	<p>PBF/ country level and the need to capture and report on results</p> <p>We are not only looking at M&E but also at:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. PBF's Monitoring and Evaluation at Headquarters, and its M and E and reporting from the field, reports from MPTF, strengthening synergies and support from the PBSP Policy Branch and the PBC Lessons Learned Unit, and others; 3. Looking at a range of users and issues, both within PBF (especially in strengthening its processes and impacts in the field), and across the peacebuilding field, including strengthening the PB capacity of the UN agencies and other actors. 		
<p>8.1 <u>Process and criteria for assessing four levels: project, priority area, country and global levels</u></p> <p>Have the global M& E system developments, and efforts to improve reporting, knowledge management and communications in recent years been effective?</p> <p>How does the PBF monitor and evaluate its activities and overall approach at the project, country and global level, as well as within the four priority areas?</p> <p>How are M&E activities and staff funded?</p> <p>Is PBSO staff as well as staff of UN implementing agencies and partners sufficiently informed</p>	<p>If solid M&E and learning procedures are in place and followed and sufficient funding is secured, the PBSO will be able to assess its own work, progress, achievements and impact. This will also support accountability towards donors and possibly increase resource mobilization for the PBF</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO • Implementing UN agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review: MPTF-O reports of projects; evaluation reports • Interview with PBSO staff (especially the two senior M&E officers) • Interviews with M&E staff of implementing UN agencies • Interviews with previous external evaluators

<p>about M&E procedures and requirements? How can the substance of reporting and communication be improved?</p> <p>Does streamlined reporting of country programmes against the PMP framework allow for sufficiently comprehensive capture of achievements?</p>			
<p><u>8.2 Use of evaluations and learning</u></p> <p>How is the PBF using evaluations of its activities, both internal and external, for policy, programming and accountability purposes? Are learning cycles and procedures in place that inform future PBF activities?</p> <p>Is the quality of evaluations sufficient and related to their utility?</p>	<p>Intermediate and end-of engagement evaluations should be systematically integrated into PBF's work and future design of PBF activities, in order to learn from previous positive and negative evaluation findings, as well as for accountability reasons</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBSO • Implementing UN agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review: MPTF-O reports of projects; evaluation reports • Interview with PBSO staff (especially the two senior M&E officers) • Interviews with M&E staff of implementing UN agencies
<p><u>8.3 Entry points for M&E at local and global level</u> <u>(complementarity and efficiency)</u></p>	<p>A robust M&E systems and procedures at the design phase that serve INDAF/CPAP monitoring in country while</p>	<p>Performance Management Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews PBSO M&E staff, • UN agencies in country • PMP plan and current M&E practices • Existing Theories of Change

What are appropriate entry points for M&E at country at global level for PBF to monitor results and the performance plan without putting too much of a burden on JSC's or UN agencies?	also assisting PBF global M&E		
<u>8.4 Systemic framework to help the PBF move forward (routine monitoring)</u> Are M&E data systematically used for strategic reviews (JSC, HQ), and triggering performance improvements?	A minimum of one Annual Report for all branches will increase transparency and consistency of measuring results	Annual Reports of PBSO.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews PBSO M&E staff • Annual reports since 2010 • MPTF Office interviews and gateway analysis of data
<u>8.5 M&E in design phase</u> How can PBF systems be aligned to MAR emerging standard for donor's joint performance monitoring? What is the potential and/or what are the limits of aligning the Priority Plan as a monitoring framework with other frameworks (such as country-level compacts or national development plan documents)?	A solid monitoring system is only possible, if careful and sufficient consideration is given to it during the design phase of PBF activities.	PBSO Implementing UN agency Programme Evaluators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Review: MPTF-O reports of projects; evaluation reports • Interview with PBSO staff (especially the two senior M&E officers) • Interviews with M&E staff of implementing UN agencies • Interviews with previous external evaluators
<u>8.6 PBF support to the strengthening of the peacebuilding field's Knowledge</u>	<u>Discuss here: working on subjects such as helping to clarify whether there are "clusters" in the PB field such as are being effectively used in the Humanitarian field to help define both who works programmatically in each area, and to help develop KM and training programmes (as already exists around SSR for example, in the PB field). Further examples would include greater generation and dissemination of lessons learned, practice advice to</u>		

<p><u>Management and training capacity and delivery.</u></p> <p>How can PBF better help drive the strengthening of the peacebuilding field's Knowledge Management and training capacity and delivery. What special comparative advantages does PBF have in this regard? (links to 4.4 "niche")</p> <p>How can PBF strengthen its KM capacity to further develop such internal PBF tools such as guidelines, applied policy studies, lessons learned, etc.?</p> <p>How PBF could more effectively utilize and work with the Policy Branch, and the Lessons Learned Unit of PBC, as well as further partnerships with non-UN entities, following the pilot PeaceNexus partnership</p>	<p><u>outside-of-PBF actors on programme design and implementation, possible development of stronger "communities of practice", mutual support for HQ entities and persons providing TA to those in the field, etc. This would overlap with the "capacity development</u></p>
<p>8.7 Further development of PBF tools such as guidelines, applied policy studies, lessons learned, etc. within a much strengthened Knowledge Management capacity and delivery for PBF itself.</p>	<p>This is a companion piece to 8.6 as many of the actions would be related, including the actors generating the KM products, but the specific products would emphasize practical tools for PBF and its partners, and getting greater support from the other two Branches of PBSO in doing so.</p>

Annex F: ToR Questions which are covered in the Thematic Case Studies

The Fund Business Model and Strategic Management

Terms of Reference questions	Location of the question in the thematic case studies
Do the IRF and PRF modalities provide sufficient flexibility to the PBF to prioritize speed, taking risks and strengthening national commitments for peacebuilding?	Theme 3
Is PBSO drawing on the two facilities appropriately?	Theme 3
How efficient, timely and risk-taking is IRF for 'kick-starting' the process in consolidating IRF achievements or building on results from existing peace programmes?	Theme 3
How effective are IRFs for 'preparing the ground' for PRF follow-up engagements?	Theme 3
Does the flexibility of the two Facilities account for some of the PBF country-level successes?	Theme 3
Joint Steering Committees:	
Is the JSC functioning effectively in partnership with the national government institutions, UN-, multi- and bilateral agencies, and donors'?	Theme 1
Does the JSC draw sufficiently upon existing mechanisms or duplicate? How has the inclusion of non-state actors worked?	Theme 1
What are their capacities in using the Fund for 'taking risks' and managing them most effectively?	Theme 1
What would be a 'best case' scenario for a JSC composition that represents 'key actors for change' and has high potential for building ownership at national and local level?	Theme 1
Do country level systems move fast enough to avoid losing momentum for peace building'?	Theme 1 and 4
Under what conditions are Joint Steering Committees more likely to contribute to the success of PBF investments?	Theme 1
HQ and country level alignment-of-purpose and cooperation:	
Do actors at country level value the purpose of the PBF — capturing the 'right momentum' for support and / or catalytic funding for peacebuilding — in the same way as PBSO and stakeholders globally'?	Theme 5
Do both have the same understanding of how to optimize the Fund's added value within the country specific context, and 'logic of intervention' (<i>theory of change</i>)?	Theme 1 and 4
Are PBF guidelines supportive to align HQ and country level	Theme 4 and 2

cooperation to improve overall programme effectiveness at 'reasonable' transaction costs?	
Technical assistance for peacebuilding programming:	
How can PBSO provide better support in close coordination with other UN partners to national actors throughout the funding cycle design, implementation and M& E- to improve its overall effectiveness?	Theme 1 and 8
Can PBF 'secretariats' in their current form execute support functions, and if not what are conditions to be put in place to improve their efficiency and institutionalize their functions within existing country systems?	Theme 1
Recipients and partners:	
Does the range of PBF recipients (currently 19 UN organizations) take full advantage of the Fund's potential added value to national peacebuilding processes?	Theme 1 and 2
Are their ways that PBF can motivate and support improved performance of UN agencies individually and collectively — within post-conflict settings?	Theme 4
Should the PBF extend recipients beyond the United Nations, e.g. CSOs?	Theme 2
Risk management	
What is the evidence that PBF is engaged mainly in 'high risk' areas where other funding partners resist investing?	Theme 3
How are upcoming challenges of 'risk taking' managed at HQ (budget approval, results oriented reporting to donors) and country level (risk management strategies during the implementation process at the level of Fund users or JSC)	Theme 3 and 5

Strategic Positioning

Terms of Reference questions	Location of the question in the thematic case studies
PBSO position geographically:	
Have the PBSO processes for identifying eligible countries been effective?	Theme 2
Does the set of countries in which the PBF operates maximize peacebuilding relevant change {value for money}?	Theme 2
Is the evidence of 'political commitment of national actors' to peacebuilding the right core criteria?	Theme 2
What are the best entry points for PBF engagement in countries with high vs. low donor presence?	Theme 4
Are regional initiatives opening new space for PBF engagements'?	Theme 4

Does the proportion of funding allocated to PBC countries result in the highest global impact of the PBF?	Theme 3
Quality of country-level peacebuilding strategies:	
Does PBF maximize the likelihood that it invests in 'smart' peacebuilding strategy at country level considering as well the prominent role of the UN in areas like e.g. women's active participation in peacebuilding?	Theme 1
How consistent are country peacebuilding strategies with PBF priority areas, and if not, do the priority areas need to be aligned?	Theme 1
PBF/PBC synergies:	
Have the recent efforts to increase systematic collaboration with the PBC been effective?	Theme 7
Are they sufficient or need to be improved?	Theme 7
What can each partner — the PBF and the PBC — do to improve synergies?	Theme 7
Is PBF's aim to promote more coherence amongst country-level stakeholders interested in peacebuilding more successful in countries on the PBC agenda?	Theme 7
PBF collaboration with the UN system:	
Is its level of collaboration with the UN system and other partners in New York appropriate and efficient?	Theme 4
At the country level, how directive <i>can</i> PBF be as an 'inter-agency' Fund within the current business model, and how directive <i>should</i> it be in order for the PBF to be successful in filling its strategic niche?	Theme 1 and 4
How effective is quality assurance?	Theme 8
PBF positioning institutionally:	
Has the Fund developed a clear and productive relationship with other transition/peacebuilding financing instruments?	Theme 4
With other major funding streams {IFI's, big bilaterals)?	Theme 4
Are the Fund's systems to interact with other major peacebuilding initiatives {for example g7+/New Deal) appropriate?	Theme 4
How can the collaboration be enhanced between the PBF and other funding instruments in areas like e.g. joint conflict analysis, programming and/or M&E?	Theme 4 and 8
How does the Fund relates to / apply the principles of good donorship and aid effectiveness agenda in fragile states?	Theme 1 and 4
Is the Fund's profile and global performance visible enough to provide substantive incentives to donors for (multi-) annual budget commitments?	Theme 4 and 8
M& E and communications:	
Have the global M& E system developments, and efforts to	Theme 8

improve reporting, knowledge management and communications in recent years been effective?	
Does streamlined reporting of country programmes against the PMP framework allow for sufficiently comprehensive capture of achievements?	Theme 8
How can the substance of reporting and communication be improved?	Theme 1 and 8
Are M&E data systematically used for strategic reviews (JSC, HQ), and triggering performance improvements?	Theme 8
How can PBF systems be aligned to MAR as an emerging standard for donor's joint performance monitoring?	Theme 8
Is PBSO managing the visibility of PBF appropriately?	Theme 4 and 8
What is the potential and/or what are the limits of aligning the Priority Plan as a monitoring framework with other frameworks (such as country-level compacts or national development plan documents)?	Theme 8

Annex G: The Thematic Areas or Case Study Methodology⁴

Based on the Team's experience, a Case Study approach, based on the eight themes, appears to be best suited for this review. There are a number of reasons why. A Case Study approach copes with situations with multiple variables, as is the case with the PBF, the PBSO and the PBSO financing for peacebuilding Branch. The PBF and PBSO operate in a complex web with multiple actors at various levels within its organization and across the globe and in-country. Case Studies appear to be the best way to obtain good generalisation from specific evidence.

The team selected these themes/case studies at the end of the New York Inception visit with a view to include all ToR questions or transform them into more specific questions based on document review and the interviews. The team conducted several exercises in the course of the week to detect which themes appeared most relevant in responding to the Terms of Reference as well as in meeting requests by the interviewees from PBSO, in particular that the review could help in further guiding and clarifying questions that had evolved since the implementation of the Business Plan. Case studies also allow for in depth questioning and refining questions as the case develops and different data sets emerge.

Case Studies include the development of a theoretical proposition or hypotheses which guide data collection and analysis, and the Team can rely on multiple sources of evidence that enable triangulation on findings. Given the high number of ToR questions, the themes that have been developed cover the ToR questions (either directly or imbedded in other questions) and allow the Team – based on the Inception Mission - to develop additional ones. The results of the Case Studies will allow us to generalize and prepare findings in relation to the two key topics identified for this review.

It should be pointed that the theoretical propositions are designed not as a view that the team has elaborated, but rather as working hypotheses, in other words hypotheses that guide the information collection and which will inevitably be revised the evaluation process advances. As such the theoretical propositions serve two purposes: provide enough cogency for the evaluation to be able to streamline the mass of information, and to capture views and priorities expressed in the inception stage of the assessment.

⁴ A Case Study is an empirical (evidence based) inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident

The theoretical propositions for example will allow the team to analyse how the various stakeholders have contributed to and benefitted from the Fund's support, including taking gender and human rights into account. The Case Studies are treated as representative and supportive evidence. This detailed examination will generate a number of findings which will be checked in documents, interviews and through the results of the country visits and survey. This will then lead to the drafting of the findings. There will be country reports for each country visit and a single report at the end of this exercise.

Case Studies have 5 main applications:

1. Explain causal links when the situation is too complex for surveys
2. Describe interventions in their context
3. Illustrate selected topics within evaluations
4. Explore "failures" or puzzles in evaluated interventions
5. Can rely on several other evaluation studies

A weakness in the Case Study methodology is that the hypotheses would point to certain typologies and contrasts while the short period of time for document review and the inception visit to New York has meant that we have not collected all the information required to clarify those typologies. The link between the hypotheses and the evidence required is not limiting, however, and the Team will try and collect evidence wherever it can. As a result, the Team remains open to changes in the case studies, as long as this is based on information we did not have up to now.

Annex H: List of Interviewees According to The Clusters

No	NAME	ORGANISATION
1	Ambassador Knutsson	Chair of the PBF Advisory Group
2	Judy Cheng-Hopkins	ASG Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)
3	Brian Williams	PBF Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch (FPB), PBSO
4	Patrice Chiwota	Senior Programme Advisor, FPB/PBSO
5	Vesna Vukic	Senior Programme Officer, FPB/PBSO
6	Tammy Smith	Senior M&E Advisor, FPB/PBSO
7	Alessandra Pellizzaria	Programme Officer, FPB/PBSO
8	Markus Boullion	Special Assistant to the ASG, PBSO
9	Bautista Logioco	PBF Programme Officer for Liberia and Guatemala
10	Ricardo Rizzo	First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN
11	Vikram Parekh	Policy Officer, PPAB/PBSO
12	Usui Masato	Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
13	Osaka Okai	Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
14	Gianluca Ramula	Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
15	Jim Rogan	Peacebuilding and Recovery Section Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF
16	Gay Rosenblum-Kumar	Head of Secretariat, UN Framework Team

17	Jordan Ryan	Assistant Administrator UNDP/BCPR
18	Dimitry Titov	ASG Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO
19	Yannick Glemarec	Executive Coordinator Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF-O)
20	Fiona Bayat-Renoux	Portfolio manager, MPTF-O
21	Mitsy Jean-Louis	Programme Associate, MPTF-O
22	Ejeviome Otobo	Director and Deputy Head of PBSO
23	Ihab Moustafa	Senior Officer PBC Support Branch (PSB),PBSO
24	Vincent Kayijuka	Peacebuilding Officer, PSB/PBSO
25	Philip Helmingier	Peacebuilding Officer PSB/PBSO
26	Paolo Fontana	Peacebuilding Officer, PSB/PBSO
27	Henk-Jan Brinkman	Chief; Policy, Planning and Application Branch (PPAB), PBSO
28	Gerald Pachoud	Senior Policy Advisor PPAB/PBSO
29	Enrique Sanchez	Policy Officer PPAB/PBSO
30	Cecile Mazzacurati	Policy Officer (Youth & Gender), PPAB/PBSO
31	Frances Claret	PPV/DPA
32	Roja Rajadhyaksha	DPET/DPKO-DFS
33	Anja Bille Bahncke	UN DOCO
34	Michael H Lund	BCPR/UNDP
35	Greta Zeender	OCHA
36	Christina Hajdu	UN Framework Team for Preventive Action
37	Tatyana Titeneva	UN Women

38	Sarah Douglas	Programme Manager, Peace and Security Section, UN Women
39	Anne Marie Goetz	Head, Peace and Security Section, UN Women
40	Paul Seger	Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN and chair of the Burundi Configuration
41	Luca Nicola	Advisor, Political Affairs. Mission of Switzerland to the UN
42	Sofia Carrondo	Civilian Capacity Programme
43	Stan Nkwain	Chief, Policy Branch BCPR/UNDP
44	Robert Pulver	Chief, Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Services DPKO
45	Oliver Ulich	Head, Partnerships Team; Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, DPKO—DFS
46	Robert Piper	Former RCs, DSRSGs, SRSGs (Currently Regional Coordinator for West Africa for OCHA, and interviewed as former RC for Nepal)
47	Carolyn McAskie	Former RCs, DSRSGs, SRSGs
48	Janet Lim	UNHCR, Ass HC for Operations
49	Axel Bisschop	Head, Humanitarian Financing and Field Support Section, UNHCR
50	Monika Brulhart	Snr. Donor Relations Officer (HFFS), UNHCR
51	Betsy Lippman	Head, Operations Solutions and Transition Section, UNHCR

52	Melanie Khanna	Snr. Donor Relations Officer (Transition & Development Funding), UNHCR
53	Surendra Panda	Snr. Desk Officer (Kyrgyzstan) UNHCR
54	Nai Jit Lam	Snr. Desk Officer (Myanmar), UNHCR
55	Homayoun Alizadeh	Chief, Peace Missions Support & Rapid Response Section (PMSRRS); Field Operations & Technical Cooperation Division (FOTCD), UNHCHR
56	Raky Cane	ILO, ILO/CODEV (cooperation and development)
57	Julian Schweitzer	ILO/CRISIS
58	Donato Kiniger Passigli	ILO/CRISIS
59	Alfredo Lazarte Hoyle	ILO, Director ILO/CRISIS; International Programme on Crisis Response, Recovery and Reconstruction
60	Federico Negro	ILO/CRISIS
61	Jay Frere-Harvey	Manager National Security and Peacebuilding Section AusAID
62	Caroline Mulas	Manager National Security and Peacebuilding Section AusAID
63	Yannick Glenmore	Head, MPTF-O
64	Sasha Pichler	Policy and Planning Team, DPA

65	Cedric de Coning	Member of the Advisory Group on behalf of South Africa
66	Louise Anten	AG member
67	Nao Kawaguchi	Advisor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
68	Luke Brown	Advisor, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN
69	Patrick Travers	Senior political and Public Affairs Officer, Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN
70	Stephan Salewicz	Director, International Humanitarian Assistance
71	Lisa Fry	Senior Programme Officer of CIDA/Multilateral and Global Programmes Branch
72	Darren Brunk	Senior Specialist, Peacebuilding; Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START)
73	Stefan Tillander	Configuration Chair for Liberia
74	Daniel Petersen	First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN
75	Joao Francisco Pereira	Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN
76	Felipe Garcia Lande	Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN
77	Joerg Schmidt	First Secretary Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN
78	Jun Imanishi	Japan Mission to the UN
79	Filip van den Bulcke	EU Delegation
80	Giunluca Rampola	DPA

81	Alison Chartress	Development Counsellor, Australia Mission to the UN
82	H.E. Guillermo Rishchynski	The Chairman for the configuration Sierra Leone
83	H.E. Sylvie Lucas	The Chairman for the configuration Guinea (Conakry)
84	H.E Staffan Tillander	The Chairman for the configuration Liberia
85	Harish Dutt	Focus on finance: recent transition of finance to PBF, Fragile States and Conflict Group, Department for International Development DFID
86	David Gordon-Macleod	Former Attaché for FCO in Liberia, London
87	Ash Shetty	Peace Building and Stabilisation, Head, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London
88	Adam Forbes	Conflict advisor CHASE, DFID
89	Juliet Wattebot O'Brien	Conflict Advisor Private Sector Department, DFID, London
90	Theowen Gilmour	Peace Building and Stabilisation Desk Officer, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London
91	Sigrún Rawet	MFA, Deputy Director
92	Jannie Lilja	MFA, Desk Officer, Conflict Division; Security Policy Department
93	Masatoshi Sato	Senior Coordinator United Nations Policy Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
94	Osaka Okai	Minister Counsellor; Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN

95	Vladimir Drobnjak	Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Croatia to the UN
96	Luc Dockendorf	First Secretary, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Permanent Mission to the UN
97	Anna Salovaara	First Secretary, Political Sector, Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN
98	Gjermund Saether	Coordinator UN Security Council Issues/UN and Peacebuilding, Section for UN policy and Gender Equality, Norwegian MFA
99	Sarah Hearn	Former Seconded to PBSO from DFID, UK; Associate Director and Senior Fellow; Center on International Cooperation, New York University
100	Changwei Zhang	First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People's republic of China to the United Nations
101	Tania Schimmell	MFA Denmark
102	Joost van der Zwan	Former conflict advisor DPKO UN
103	Corinne van der Laan	Head, Direction Stability and Humanitarian Aid, MFA the Netherlands
104	Tim Goudsmit	Direction Stability and Humanitarian Aid, Stability and Rule of Law, MFA the Netherlands
105	Maged A. Abdelaziz	Under-Secretary-General Special Adviser on Africa
106	Patricia Macauley	Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians (NEWMAP), Sierra Leone

107	Henry Allieu	Centre for Coordination of Youth Activities, Sierra Leone
108	Mabinty Kamara	Local Councils Association of Sierra Leone (LOCASL), Sierra Leone
109	Charles B. Vandj	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's, Sierra Leone
110	Sahr Moigua	Local Council Association, Sierra Leone
111	Emma Vincent	UN Women, Sierra Leone
112	Melrose Kargbo	UN Women, Sierra Leone
113	Bai John Conteh	Commissioner North - National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Sierra Leone
114	Abubakar H. Kargbo	Chairman of National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Sierra Leone
115	Mustapha Fofana	Programmes Manager, National Commission for Democracy (NCD), Sierra Leone
116	Ambrose James	Director at Search for Common Ground, Sierra Leone
117	Hassan Jalloh	Project Manager, Media Development, UNDP, Sierra Leone
118	Ibriss G. Mansaray	ADDO Caritas Freetown, Sierra Leone
119	Augustine A. Garmoh	Commissioner, Independent Media Commission, Sierra Leone
120	Yusuf S. Kamara	Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, National Youth Commission, Sierra Leone

121	Michael Thompson	Monitoring, Evaluation and Youth Coordinator, at Advocacy Movement Network, Sierra Leone
122	Linda I. Koroma	Deputy Secretary General, Mano River Union, Sierra Leone
123	Simeon M.B. Moribah	Deputy Secretary General, Secetaire General Adjoint, Mano River Union, Sierra Leone
124	D.E. Imabibo	Nigeria High Commission, Sierra Leone
125	Rüdiger John	Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Sierra Leone
126	Lothar Jaschke	Head of Political, Press & Information Section, Delegation of the EU, Sierra Leone
127	Samura M.W. Kamara	Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, Sierra Leone
128	Edward R Jombla	WANEP/CSPEC, Sierra Leone
129	Saskia Marijnissen	Programme Manager, UNDP, Sierra Leone
130	Mohamed Abchir	Deputy Country Director (Programmes), Sierra Leone
131	Phil Evans	Head of DFID Sierra Leone & Liberia
132	Berhanemeskel Nega	Deputy Head of Mission, Chief Political Affairs, Sierra Leone
133	Lesley Beaton	Deputy High Commissioner, H.M. Consul, Sierra Leone
134	J.J. Macham	Administrative Attaché, Nigeria High Commission, Sierra Leone

135	Oluyele O. Onafalujo	Minister/Head of Chancery, Economic/Political, Nigeria High Commission, Sierra Leone
136	Sudipto Mukerjee	Country Director, UNDP, Sierra Leone
137	Obi Buya-Kamara	Director of Reparations, National Commission for Social Action, Sierra Leone
138	Patrick Buse	Civil Affairs Officer, UN Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL), Sierra Leone
139	Michael S. Owen	Ambassador, Embassy of the USA, Sierra Leone
140	Eyo Asuquo	High Commissioner, Nigeria High Commission, Sierra Leone
141	Dennis K.Vandi	Senior Deputy Financial Secretary, Fiscal Operations, Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Sierra Leone
142	Paul Kaplan Kargbo	Programme Coordinator, IOM, Sierra Leone
143	Sanusi Savage	Head of Office, IOM, Sierra Leone
144	Mangesh Sesay	Programme Coordinator, IOM, Sierra Leone
145	Brian Jones	Head of International Security Advisory Team (ISAT), Sierra Leone
146	Alwin Nijholt	M&E Advisor, PBO/Secretariat of the UN PBF Liberia
147	Karin Landgren	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Liberia
148	Tamrat Samuel	Deputy Special Representative of the SG for Rule of Law, UN, Liberia

149	Morris M. Dukuly	Minister, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Liberia
150	Julia M. Duncan-Cassell	Minister, Ministry of Gender & Development, Liberia
151	Robert G. Miller	Associate Peace Building Officer, Office of D/SRSG, R&G (RC), UN, Liberia
152	Christian de Angelis	Political/Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Monrovia, Liberia
153	Lisa Ljungström	First Secretary, SSR Coordinator, Embassy of Sweden, Liberia
154	Prosper Nii Nortey Addo	Senior Political/Humanitarian Affairs Officer, African Union LO, Liberia
155	Aeneas C. Chuma	Deputy Special Representative of the SG for Consolidation of Democratic Governance, UN, Liberia
156	Sarah Callaghan	Peacebuilding Adviser, Liberia and Sierra Leone/Australian Civilian Corps, AusAID, Liberia
157	James Suah Shilue	Director, Platform for Dialogue and Peace, Liberia
158	J. Hezekiah Siakor	Manager, Gbarnga Regional Hub, UN GOL Justice&Security Joint Program, Liberia
159	Sofia Strand	Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden, Liberia
160	Wilfred Gray-Johnson	Executive Director, Liberia PBO
161	Edward Mulbah	PBO Liberia, Liberia
162	Christiana Solomon	Civil Affairs Officer, Liberia
163	Linnea Lindberg	Legal Analyst ODSRSG RoL, Liberia
164	Margaret Kingara	Admin. Assistant (OSRSG), Liberia

165	Gilbert Ngesu/ Negheset Hagos	CSOs, Liberia
166	Ellen Margrethe Loej	Former ERSG Liberia and Danish Ambassador
167	Elisabeth Moorsmith	Head of Office, UN Habitat, Liberia
168	Juan Gaitan	Project Manager, UNOPS, Liberia
169	Nelson Mbu	Programme Manager, UNDP, Liberia
170	Nessie Golakai	Programme Manager, UNDP, Liberia
171	Michelle Washington	Rule of Law Adviser, Liberia
172	Catherine Barley	Senior Policy Adviser, ODSRSG RoL, UNMIL, Liberia
173	Ghoma Karloweah	UN Women, Liberia
174	Michael Page	SSR Adviser, UNMIL, Liberia
175	Bart Laan	Senior Police Reform Adviser, UNMIL,
176	Boma Jack	Head, Access to Justice and Security Unit, UNMIL, Liberia
177	Lucy Gachie	Head, Training and Mentoring Unit, UNMIL, Liberia
178	Marjo Callaghan	Head, Corrections Advisory Unit, UNMIL, Liberia
179	Daniel Mensah-Brandé	Head of Field Office, Bong county, UNMIL, Liberia
180	Christiana Tah	Minister of Justice, Republic of Liberia
181	Joyce Frankfort	MoJ, Programme Manager Justice and Security Joint Programme, Liberia
182	Robert Nyahn	MoJ, Deputy Programme Manager, Justice and Security Joint Programme, Liberia

183	Cecil T.O Brandy	Chairman Land Commission, Liberia
184	Boakai Dukuly	OiC, Independent National Human Rights Commission, Liberia
185	Belen Calvo Uyarra	EU, Liberia
186	Prosper Addo	AU, Liberia
187	Coleen Littlejohn	World Bank, Liberia
188	Alain Pierre	AfDB, Liberia
189	Carine Gachen	Irish Aid, Liberia
190	Daniel Towlid	Vice chairman of the National Civil Society Council of Liberia
191	Christopher Toe	Secretary General Rev. Christopher Toe of the National Civil Society Council of Liberia
192	Jamie Mc Goldrick	United Nations Resident Coordinator, Nepal
193	Lach Fergusson	UN, Peace and Development Advisor, Nepal
194	Silla Ristimaki	Programme Specialist UN Peace Fund for Nepal, UN RCO
195	Hemlata Rai	Programme Analyst, UN Peace Fund for Nepal, UN RCO,
196	Massimo Diana	Head of UN RCO / Strategic Planning Advisor, Nepal
197	Tek Tamata	Programme Analyst Justice and Human Rights, Nepal
198	Abdul Hameed Omar	International Programme Manager UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, Nepal
199	Lluis Navarro	Head of Cooperation, Delegation of the European Union to Nepal

200	Shiva D. Bhandari	Senior Programme Manager, Delegation of the European Union to Nepal
201	Dirk Steffes-enn	First Secretary (Development), Embassy of Germany, Nepal
202	Ben Reese	Head of Post, Australian Agency for International Development, Nepal
203	Jan Moller Hansen	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Denmark, Nepal
204	Thomas Thomson	Team leader PFM, EU Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Nepal
205	Edward Bell	Conflict and Peace Building Advisor, DFID, Nepal
206	Anine Hageman	First Secretary, Embassy of Denmark, Nepal
207	Marinanne Kujala-Garcia	Counsellor, Embassy of Finland, Nepal
208	Sadhu Ram Sapkota	Director, of the NPTF Peace Fund Secretariat, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Government of Nepal
209	Sama Shrestha	Unit Manager, Peace and Security, UN Women
210	Mie Roesdahl	Conflict Transformation and Human Rights Advisor, Danida HUGOU
211	Ziad Sheikh	Representative, UN Women
212	Dominic de Ville	Country Manager, International Alert
213	Ranjana Thapa	Human Rights Analyst, UN RCO
214	Afra Alawi Al-Ahmadi	Senior Human Development Specialist, World Bank, Nepal
215	Jasmine Rajbhandary	Social Protection Specialist, World Bank, Nepal

216	Heidi Gutsche	Programme Coordinator, Support to the Peace Process, GIZ, Nepal
217	Leena Rikkila Tamang	International IDEA, Nepal
218	Caroline Bates	Nepal Programme Officer, International Commission of Jurists, Nepal
219	Anil Poudel	Project Coordinator, Saferworld, Nepal
220	Braste Pradhan	M&E Advisor GIZ-NPTF, Nepal
221	Munni Sharma	Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Advisor, USAID – NPTF PFS, Nepal
222	Apekchya Rana	Cluster Focal Officer, NPTF PFS/EU, Nepal
223	Dpenbra Purush Dhaka	TC Pool Fund Manager, NPTF PFS/GIZ, Nepal
224	Laxmi Kalauni	Under Secretary M&E, NPTF PFS, Nepal
225	Binod Acharya	Under Secretary Programme Management, NPTF PFS, Nepal
226	Santosh Bishi	Deputy Programme Manager, GIZ – NPTF PFS, v
227	Shova Saha	Women’s Development Officer, Nepal
228	Ram Gautam	UNICEF Programme Officer, Nepal
229	Bal Krishna Acharya	Headmaster, Nepal
230	Mada Thap	Assistant Headmaster, Nepal
231	Kumar Bhandari	Coordinator, Beautiful Nepal
232	Mahima Chaudhary	Recipient, Vocational Training, Nepal
233	Kamala Chaudhary	Recipient, Gender Support, Nepal
234	Dilli Chaudhary	Recipient, Electrical Training, Nepal

235	Shiv Fishwakarma	Programme Officer, WFP, Nepal
236	Prem Awasthi	UN RCO Field Coordination Officer, Nepal
237	Tara Prashad Khatri	Secretary, Local Peace Committee (LPC), Banke Nepal
238	Prakash Upadhyay	LPC Member, Banke, Nepal
239	EK Maya	LPC Member, Conflict Victim Banke, Nepal
240	Chandra Kala Upreti	LPC Member, Conflict Victim, Nepal
241	Jayantri Khatri KC	Conflict Victim, Banke, Nepal
242	M Kumari Kati Magar	Conflict Victim, Banke, Nepal
243	Banilal Tharu	Coordinator, Nepal
244	Jasbir Oad	Chair, Land Rights Forum, Nepal
245	Lok Narayan Pokharel	Center for Social Development and Research in Nepal
246	Kiran Dhakal	Himalayan Human Rights Monitors (Youth), Nepal
247	Tulasa Lata Amatya	Community Action Center - Nepal
248	Shobha Gautam	Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal (IHRICON), Nepal
249	Babita Basnet	Media Advocacy Group, Nepal
250	Pinky Singh Rana	Samanta, Nepal
251	Samjhana	Sathi, Nepal
252	Nita Dhungana	Legal Aid & Consultancy Centre (LACC), Nepal
253	Ram Sharan Sedhai	Sancharika Samuha, Nepal
254	Seeta Gautam Acharya	World Vision Advocacy Forum, Nepal
255	Sujana Maharjan	Transitional Justice Resource Centre, Nepal
256	Namuna Khadka	DidiBahini, Nepal

257	Laxmi Neupane	National Alliance of Women Human Rights Defenders (NAWHRD), Nepal
258	Nir Lama	INSEC, Nepal
259	Sushil Pyakurel-	Accountability Watch Committee, Nepal
260	Sophie Hodgson.	ICTJ, Nepal
261	Raju Prasad Chapagain	JURI Nepal, Nepal
262	Bhabes Labh	Terai Human Rights Defenders Alliance, Nepal
263	Kamal Pathak	Advocacy Forum, Nepal
264	Suman Adhikary	Conflict Victim, Nepal
265	Gyanendra Aran	Conflict Victim, Nepal
266	Anita Gyanli	Conflict Victim, Nepal
267	Rama Dahal	Conflict Victim, Nepal
268	Dev Bahadur Maharjan	Conflict Victim, Nepal
269	Hilda Johnson	SRSG, UNMISS, South Sudan
270	Raisedon Zenanga	Deputy SRSG/UNMISS, South Sudan
271	Toby Lanzer	Deputy SRSG/UNMISS, South Sudan
272	Van Nguyen	Head, SSRF/PBF Secretariat, South Sudan
273	Diane de Guzman	Deputy Director, Civil Affairs Division, UNMISS, South Sudan
274	Hiruy Amanuel	Chief, Political Affairs Division, South Sudan
275	Richard Kuuire	Chief, Corrections Advisory Section, UNMISS, South Sudan

276	Robert Leggat	Prison Programmes Section, South Sudan
277	Mary Yak	Deputy Minister of Finance, Ministry of Finance, South Sudan
278	Philip Ajack Boldit	Director-General, Ministry of Finance, South Sudan
279	Elizabeth Carriere	Head, DFID, South Sudan
280	Paul Tholen	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Netherlands, South Sudan
281	Alicia Dinerstein	Deputy Mission Director, USAID, South Sudan
282	Kristen Joplin	Team Leader, Office of Transition and Conflict Management, USAID
283	Luca Bandiera	Senior Economist, World Bank, South Sudan
284	Firas Gharaibeh	Deputy Country Representative, UN Women, South Sudan
285	Salah Khaled	Representative, UNESCO, South Sudan
286	Amanda Serumaga	Deputy Country Director, UNDP, South Sudan
287	Anne Martinussen	Consultant, Stakeholder Engagement, UNDP, South Sudan
288	Amanuel Gebremedhin	Team Leader and Senior Post-Conflict Expert, UNDP, South Sudan
289	Pelucy Ntambirweki	Deputy Representative, UNICEF, South Sudan
290	Jairus Ligoo	Youth and Adolescent Development, UNICEF, South Sudan
291	Teliki Beatrice Josia	Youth and Adolescent Specialist, UNICEF, South Sudan

292	Sher Hussaini	Project Manager, UNOPS, South Sudan
293	Fitsumberhan Weldelibanos	Project Manager, UNOPS, South Sudan
294	Adebisi Odegbile	Programme Officer, UNOPS, South Sudan
295	Matt Huber	Programme Manager, Transition and Recover, IOM, South Sudan
296	Joanna Dabao	Programme Coordinator, IOM, South Sudan
297	Mariko Hattori	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, IOM, South Sudan
298	Hafeez Ali Wani	National NGO Focal Point, South Sudan NGO Forum
299	Steven Luga Wani	Programme Director, South Sudan Development Organization
300	Ivor Morgan	Policy Focal Point, South Sudan NGO Forum
301	Mayumi Yamada	RCO, South Sudan
302	Job Wani	ILO, South Sudan
303	Christian Lotz	BCPR, UNDP, South Sudan
304	Gerard McDonnell	Officer-in-Charge, UNOPS, South Sudan
305	Sam Muhumure	Project Manager, UNDP, South Sudan
306	Nicolai von Hoyningen Huene	RCO, South Sudan
307	Anthony, Kwaku, Ohemeng-Boamah	CR and Humanitarian Coordinator, the UN in Guinea
308	Bakary Fofana	President, INEC, Guinea
309	Graham Styles	UK Ambassador to Guinea Conakry

310	Pr. Dr Diélman Osman Kouyaté	Policy Advisor of the Ministry of National Defense, President of the Technical Commission Monitoring SSR Guinea
311	Edwige Adekambi Domingo	Resident Representative, UNFPA, Guinea
312	Magassouba Lancine	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Human Rights and Civil Rights, Guinea
313	Nicolas Dextreit	Advisor Cooperation and Cultural Action, Director of the Institute of French Guinea
314	Beatriz Betegon Ramiro	Responsible for Economics & Governance, EU, Guinea
315	Christophe Casas	Programme Officer, EU, Guinea
316	Kpana Emmanuel Bamba	President, LIGUIDHO, Guinea
317	Felix Acebo	Representant Adjoin, UNICEF, Guinea
318	Diaby Gassana Kalifa	Minister for Human Rights and Civil Liberties, Guinea
319	Cheick Abdoul kadri dit Sékou Diakite	Director of Programmes / Monitoring and Evaluation, IFES-Guinea
320	Prof I. Balde	Founder, Mother & Child Centre, Guinea
321	Guilleramo Ardizzone	Ambassador, Embassy of Spain to Guinea
322	Louis-Marie Bouka	Representative Guinea, OHCHR
323	Condé Yamori	Secretary General, MPAD, Guinea

324	Sény Damba	National Director, Ministry of Youth, Youth Employment and Sports, Guinea
325	Bafotigui Sako	Representative for Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, UNIDO
326	Corinne Delphine N'Daw	Strategic Planner/Head of Office, Office of the UN RC in Guinea
327	Paul Ndaitouroum	Représentat UNHCR, Guinée
328	Sényba Touré	UNIDO, Guinea
329	Cherif Karamo	Expert BCPR, UNDP, Guinea
330	Eucher Eklou	Focal Point HCDH
331	Thierno Diaouné	PBF National Coordinator, Guinea
332	Mahamane Ousmane	Expert RSS PNUD
333	Alexander Avnessov	UN Resident Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative, UNFPA Representative, Kyrgyzstan
334	Mira Karybaeva	JSC vice Co-Chair, Head of Department for ethnic, religious issues and interaction with civil society of the President's Office, Kyrgyzstan
335	Takayuki Koike	Ambassador of Japan to Kyrgyzstan
336	Kanybek Mamataliev	Head of Division, State Commission of Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, National Expert for work with religious organizations, a JSC Member
337	Elisabeth da Costa	Deputy Regional Representative, OHCHR ROCA, Kyrgyzstan
338	Dinara Rakhmanova	FAO Deputy Representativ, Kyrgyzstan e

339	Joerg Stahlhut	UNDP Peacebuilding Advisor, Kyrgyzstan
340	Erkin Alymbekov	Member of Parliament, Chairman of the Committee of Human Rights, Constitutional law and Government Structure of Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic
341	Judith Margaret Farnworth	UK Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan
342	Aida Akmatolieva	DFID Representative, Kyrgyzstan
343	Sabine Machl (Dr)	UN Women Representative, Kyrgyzstan
344	Gerald Günther	UN Women Peace and Security Specialist, Kyrgyzstan
345	Claudia Hock	Political Advisor, EU Delegation, Kyrgyzstan
346	Ognyan Champoev	Political Officer, EU Delegation, Kyrgyzstan
347	Jonathan Veitch	UNICEF Representative, Kyrgyzstan
348	Tattu Mambetalieva	Director of Public Foundation Civic Initiative of Internet Policy, a UNDP partner, Kyrgyzstan
349	MZulfia Kochorbaeva	Director, Social Technologies Agency, JSC member, leader of women's NGO, Kyrgyzstan
350	Gulnara Baimambetova	Head of the Women Entrepreneurs' Support Association (WESA), Kyrgyzstan
351	Marina Glushkova	Ministry of Education of the Kyrgyz Republic, Programme Director at the Center for Social Integrations, Kyrgyzstan
352	Gulnara Ibraeva	Executive Director of Innovative Solution Inc., IRF Evaluation report co-author, Kyrgyzstan

353	Anara Eginalieva	Foundation For Tolerance International (FTI) Vice-President, Kyrgyzstan
354	Laurent Guye	Swiss Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan
355	Naken Kasiev	Head of the State Agency on local administration and interethnic relationships under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, a JSC member
356	Richard W. Haselwood	USAID/OTI Country Representative, Kyrgyzstan
357	Alexander Kremer	Country Manager, The World Bank , Kyrgyzstan
358	Erlan Karypbai	Coordinator / Rural Development Fund (RDF), Kyrgyzstan
359	Jomart Ormonbekov	Programme Officer, Chair of Technical Expert Group, UNRCCA, Kyrgyzstan
360	Murataly Uchkempirov	Head of Division, Ministry of Labor, Migration and Youth, a UNICEF partner, Kyrgyzstan
361	Pradeep Sharma	UNDP Deputy Resident Representative, Kyrgyzstan
362	Erkinbek Kasybekov	UNDP Assistant Resident Representative, Kyrgyzstan
363	Ross Brown	Political Officer, OSCE, Kyrgyzstan
364	Andrey Bitsman	OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
365	Djamilia Moldakhmatova	National Program Officer, Swiss Confederation Office, Kyrgyzstan
366	Roy Wilson	Regional Political Affairs and Conflict Prevention Adviser, British Embassy, Kyrgyzstan

367	Nadiia Iusupova	Expert, department of ethics, religious policies and interaction with civil society, President's Office, Kyrgyzstan
368	Hiroshi Sato	Third Secretary, Embassy of Japan
369	Asel Abdurahmanova	UN Coordination Officer, Kyrgyzstan
370	Ulan Omuraliev	Technical Expert, Kyrgyzstan -UN Joint Steering Committee Secretariat, for UN PBF
371	Bahtiarjan A. Fattahov	Deputy Director, State Personnel Service of the Kyrgyz Republic
372	Natalya Seitmuratova	Human Rights Officer, Regional Office for Central Asia, ONCHR, Kyrgyzstan
373	Michael von der Schulenburg	Former ERSG Sierra Leone and Head of UNIPSIL
374	Douglas Casson Coutts	CR/RR, Comoros
375	Réunion de débriefing avec l'UNCT	Head of Agency: WHO / UNICEF / UNFPA / UNDP, Comoros
376	Abdallah Ahmed Soilihi	Expert National Technical Secretariat PBF Comoros
377	Youssef Mbechezi	UNDP focal points, Comoros
378	Djamaliddine Mohamed	UNFPA focal point, Comoros
379	Imaël Saadi	UNICEF focal point, Comoros
380	Zoubeirt Mohamed	ILO Focal Point, Comoros

381	Aboubakari Boina	UNESCO Focal Point, Comoros
382	Ibrahim Salim	Deputy Chief of Army, Moroni
383	Bouchrati AbdoulHalim	Commissioner General for Solidarity and Promotion of Gender and Social Cohesion
384	Colonel Halid Charif	Director of the National School of the Armed Forces and the Gendarmerie (ENFAG)
385	Colonel Said Hamza	Commander of the Coast Guard
386	Taoufik Boura	Physician Military Hospital - Moroni
387	Fatouma Hadji	National Director at Solidarity
388	Philippe Lacoste	Ambassador of France
389	Siti Kassim	Minister of Employment, Labour; Spokesperson of the Government
390	Camilla Campisi	UN Representative Quaker UN Office
391	Kristina Mader	Program Associate NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security
392	Mavic Cabrera-Balleza	International Coordinator The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders
393	Vanessa Wyeth	Formerly with IPI, now OECD; Peace and Conflict Advisor Governance for Development and Peace (G4DP) Global Partnerships and Policy Division, OECD-DCD
394	Jorgen Lissner	Co-Director, Dundex
395	Susanna Cambell	Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

396	Dan Smith	Secretary General of International Alert. In his personal function (not as International Alert), DFID appointed him to the Advisory Group of the PBF earlier and in 2010-2011 he chaired the AG
397	Mariska van Beinum	Clingendael, The Hague
398	Nicole Ball	Co-leader, 2009 PBF Review
399	Catriona Gourlay	PN, Deputy
400	Anne Gloor	PeaceNexus founder

Annex I: JSC Structure

country	co-chairs of the JSC (including post/title)	# of UN organizations (indicate which ones)	# of government representatives (indicate which ones)	# of civil society representatives (indicate which ones)	Was civil society "self-selected" for JSC membership (y/n)	# of technical committees	Are technical committees by theme? (y/n)	Is JSC stand-alone, or integrated into another governance structure? (y/n)
BDI	DSRSG; Minister (not yet nominated) (JSC being currently set up for the third phase of PBF support)	4 (UNDP, UNHABITAT, UNFPA, OHCHR)	4 (not yet nominated)	2 (not yet nominated)	n/a	depending on demand		meant to be integrated but not yet
C.I.	DRSG (Babacar Cisse); Minister for Planning (Dr Marbri)	UNDP, UNWOMEN, UNHCR; FAO; OHCHR; UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOCI	Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Internal Affairs;	1 (national association of CSO)	Y	depending on demand	Y	stand alone
COM	RC and gov representatives							
DRC	Prime Minister & SRSG	2 (rotational basis)	variable (depending on issue)	none	n/a	n/a		Stabilisation Funding Board plays the role of JSC
GUA	DRC andf MIN of Inte Affaires	?	?	y	?	?		stand alone

GUI	Prime Minister and RC	2 on rotational basis	7 (Médiateur de la République; l'Action Sociale, de la Promotion Féminine, et de l'Enfance; Le Ministre d'État, Ministre de la Justice, de garde des sceaux; Jeunesse et de l'Emploi des Jeunes; Conseiller chargé de la réforme de la sécurité; Ministère d'État, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de Guinéens de l'étranger; Le Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation)	3	?	3	yes	stand alone	
GUI-Bissau (until the suspension)	Minister of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and SRSG	1 (RC/ResRep)	8 (Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Communities; Defense; Interior; Economy, Planning and Regional Integration; Justice; Finance; 2 Representatives of the Republic Presidency	4 (Chamber of Commerce; West African Network for Peacebuilding; Women's Group Network of African Women Ministers and Parliamentarians; Network of Women Peacebuilders)	?	?	?		* p em es, ECO , W and
GUI-Bissau (after re-engagement)	not yet								

KYR	RC and Head of Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic	6	<p>15 (1. Member of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs</p> <p>2. Member of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) of the Kyrgyz Republic, Chairman of the Committee of Human Rights, Constitutional law and Government Structure</p> <p>3. Deputy Head of the Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Head of the Department of financial and economic analysis and monitoring on the development</p> <p>4. Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Head of the Department on Ethnic, Religious Policy and Interaction with the civil society</p> <p>5. Office of the Prime-Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, Head of the Department for Social Development</p> <p>6. Head of the State Agency on Local Administration and Interethnic Relationships under</p>	<p>5 (1. NGO "House of Peace"</p> <p>2. Public Fund "Coalition for civil society and democracy"</p> <p>3. Public Fund "Dostoyaniye Respubliki"</p> <p>4. The Community Fund "Alga"</p> <p>5. Agency of Social Technologies</p>	n	6	y	stand alone
-----	---	---	--	--	---	---	---	-------------

		<p>the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>7. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>8. Deputy Minister of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>9. Deputy Minister of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>10. Deputy Minister of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>11. State Secretary of the Ministry of Labor, Migration and Youth of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>12. Chairman of the National Commission on State Language under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>13. Head of the Department for Legal Issues, Personnel Service of the State Commission on Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>14. The National Institute for</p>					
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

			Strategic Studies of the Kyrgyz Republic 15. Chairman of the People's Assembly of the Kyrgyz Republic					
LIB	DRSG and Min of Fin and Min of IA	4 (UNDP, UNHABITAT, UNWOMEN, UNICEF)	??	1	??	2 but not reporting to JSC	y	stand alone
Nep	Excom: 1 RC/ 1 Director	1	1	n	N	depending on # of PA	y	fully integrated in gov structures
PNG	RC, Chief Secretary of National Government & President of Autonomous Region of Bougainville	1 (rotational)	2	2	N	1	n	stand-alone
SL	Dismantled JSC							DEPAC
SOM	not yet							will be fully integrated
S-SUD	Deputy Minister of Finance, Chair , RC Co-Chair	1 (UNAIDS)	Ministry of Finance > Ministry of Labour > Ministry of Water Resources > All at Under Secretary level	NGO Forum	N	2	Yes (to cover 2 deliverables funded by PBF)	Integrated with South Sudan Recovery Fund SSRF
Yemen		IOM, UNDP, UNHCR	Minister of Finance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary General of the Prime Minister Office	International NGOs and Yemeni CSO	Y			stand-alone

Source: PBF

Annex J: PBF Support to Countries

country	# of visits (two weeks or less)				# of medium-term surge missions				# of partner tech assistance missions				# of VTC workshops by PBSO				did country have pre-secretariat project (y/n)
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2011	2012	2013	2014	2011	2012	2013	2014	2011	2012	2013	2014	
BDI			1 (JZ)	1 (JZ & MPTFO)													n
Bosnia			1 (BJW)														n/a
C.I.	1 (BJW)		2 (SRS)														n
DRC	1 Wille mijn	3 (AP & GP; BJW)		1 (JZ & MPTFO)													n
CAR	1	1															n

Comment

Plus Vincent we
lot; makes a big
difference; not
accompany Cha
of PBC Config b
also on DPA-lec
Strategic
Assessment
Missions, for
example
Done jointly wi
DPA

BJW accompan

	Wille mijn	(BJW)																
GUA			2 (BL; TAS)														n	
GUI	2 (BJW ; AP)	1 (AP; SRS; VK)	1	1 (AP)						1 (Staff colleg e)							n	
GUI-BIS	1 (AP)			1 (JCH+A P)													n	
KYR			3 (VV, TAS, JCH)								4 (Peac eNex us; Dan Smith ; Staff Colle ge)					3	y	
Lebano n			1 (VV)							1 (CA)							n	
Liberia	2 (SRS; BJW)	2 (TS; BL)	4 (BL; BJW)														n	
Mali				1 (AP)								1 (Peac eN)						

Chair of PBC Co

BJW (& Vincent
led UN agency
group in May 2
followed later b
AP

One of Vesna's
accompanied J

?? I think Confl
Analysis thing v
2010 or 2011?
w Kristina Koch
Avan)

BJW took Advise
Group in 2011;
BJW went w/ C
Tillander in 201

Myanmar		2 (JCH; BJW)	1 (BJW)														n/a
Nepal		1 (PC)	1 (PC)														n
Niger		1 (AP)	1 (AP; JCH)							1 (PeaceN)	1 (PeaceN)						y
PNG			1 (JZ & Inter peace)								1 (Inter peace for CA - 2 ppl)						y
Sierra Leone																	
S-SUD						1 (VP)											n
Somalia								1 (PC)									
Uganda			1 (PC)														
Yemen		1 (AP)					1 (VP)									3	n
	8	12	20	5	0	1	1	1	0	3	6	1	0	0	3	3	

PC took Advisory Group in 2013

mostly covered by PBC staff

Sum

Totals: 2011 8
2012 16
2013 30
2014 10

Source: PBF