

**Subject: Cabinet Meeting on Security Sector Reform**

**1. Background.**

In May of 2017, upon the advice and with the support and assistance of international and bilateral partners, Government undertook Security Sector Reform alongside other major initiatives including but not limited to the National Development Plan (NDP), Constitutional Reform, and the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations' Commission (TRRC).

**2. Discussion:**

The UN Peacebuilding Support Fund, the GOTG partnered with the local UNDP Office in a formal agreement on an SSR-Project Titled: Strategic advice and support to the security sector reform and governance in The Gambia. The aims of the project are to provide strategic advice and support to the designing and launching of the national security sector reform process through the deployment of a team led by a Senior SSR Advisor, the project provides the Gambian authorities with strategic and technical support to conduct an assessment of the security sector, design and start implementation of a nationally-led inclusive and participatory SSR process as well as coordinates the support of the international community to the reform process of the security sector.

The SSR Project terms of reference require the establishment and regular use of an SSR Steering Committee to serve as Project Board; membership of the Steering Committee includes the Vice President (Chairperson); Ministers for Justice, Finance and Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Gambians Abroad, Interior and Defence (i.e. Permanent Secretary) and select international partners; namely EU and ECOWAS Heads of Delegations and the UNDP Resident Coordinator. The initial SSR Steering Committee meeting in May 2017 established the SSR Technical Working Group (TWG) comprised of representatives from Ministries, all security institutions, civil society and oversight bodies and directed it to conduct a formal and thorough assessment of the security sector through desktop study; broad countrywide consultation, individual institution assessments and periodic interaction with the Steering Committee. Following incorporation of recommendations made during the November 2017 national validation exercise, the NSA delivered the final SSR Assessment Report to Government.

**3. Action**

The purpose of today's cabinet meeting is to take decisions and actions on the key findings, recommendations and next steps identified in the SSR Assessment Report and the overall SSR project. Reform needs and options for SSR support activities and entry points to enhance integration, effectiveness and accountability fall under the following SSR main Program Lines (PL) derived from Chapter 5 of the report:

- PL-1 The Overarching Frameworks
- PL-2 Specific reform activities relating to the individual institutions
- PL-3 Reform activities to enable the civilian management and oversight bodies
- PL-4 Addressing post-authoritarian legacies



## DRAFT

PL-5 Reform imperatives to address cross-cutting perennial challenges

Sequence of events:

- Review attached project line findings and recommendations from 2017 SSR Assessment Report
- Accept or reject recommendations
- Prioritized tasks with due dates

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**Program Line 1**

**Overarching Frameworks**

**Findings:**

- Probably the most critical deficits that perpetuated the malfunctions of the Gambian security sector was the almost complete absence of institutional policies beyond the Constitutional provisions.
- No holistic assessment exists of the sector or the individual institutions to gauge the capability to respond effectively and efficiently to the security and justice needs of the state and people.
- There is no National Security Policy and/or Strategy to provide the necessary guide to the security institutions to develop their own individual institutional policies.
- There is the absence of the overarching architecture that integrates the system and provides for its command, control, integration and coordination outside of the National Security Council. (Note: Government previously assessed this need agreed to establish a basic architecture on which a more comprehensive structure could be built in due course. It is critical that this effort be supported to ensure that the structure is established and operationalized for proper coordination, command and control of the sector.)

**Recommendations (Short to Medium Term):**

1. Develop a National Security Policy that underpins the centrality of democratic principles of civilian control of the military, rule of law, respect for human rights and gender mainstreaming.
2. Establish a basic national security architecture to reflect the command, control, coordination and integration, governance and oversight of the security sector at national, regional and district levels.
3. Develop a policy for security sector interoperability in times of national emergencies, including natural disasters.
4. Develop a policy to regulate military support of the civilian authority in peace times to prevent misuse especially against the civilian population, as well as their involvement in partisan politics.
5. Seek technical assistance to support the review of the national legal frameworks.
6. Task relevant Ministries to initiate the development of appropriate legal frameworks (Drafting Instructions) that may be required as a result of the emerging changes in the security institutions they oversee, e.g. Ministry of Interior formalizing the oversight and governance structures of Police, Prisons, Immigration Councils etc; including such other mechanisms as Police Complaints Boards.

**Cabinet Decisions:**

- Recommendations accepted/approved
- Recommendations rejected/disapproved
- Prioritized Tasks with due dates:

- Develop National Security Policy. Action: NSA Suspense: October 2018
- Establish a basic national security architecture. Action: NSA. Suspense: October 2018



## DRAFT

- Develop a policy for security sector interoperability during national emergencies/natural disasters. Action: National Disaster Management Agency. Suspense: November 2018
- Develop a policy to regulate military support of the civilian authority in peace times. Action: Ministry of Regional Administration, Ministry of Defense, GAF.
- Seek technical assistance to support the review of the national legal frameworks. Action: National Assembly
- Task relevant Ministries to initiate the development of appropriate legal frameworks (Drafting Instructions) that may be required as a result of the emerging changes in the security institutions they oversee, e.g. Ministry of Interior formalizing the oversight and governance structures of Police, Prisons, Immigration Councils etc; including such other mechanisms as Police Complaints Boards. Action: All.

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**Program Line-2**

**Specific reform activities relating to the individual institutions**

**Findings:**

- Common to all security services is the lack of institutional human resource policies a contributing factor to mismanagement and maladministration. Policies to do with recruitment, training, career development, promotion, were either inadequate or non-existent.
- The personnel turmoil created by perpetual sackings was not only a key factor in degrading institutional memory but also contributed to the inconsistencies in the practices of the various managements.
- Efforts should be made to quickly follow on from the development of a National Security Policy, to support the key security sector institutions to develop their institutional policies reflecting The New Gambia's principles of good governance and accountability of the sector, amongst other things. Associated policies could quickly follow to provide guidance on the management and administration of the sectors.

**Recommendations:**

1. Develop institutional policies, example, the Defense Policy.
2. Seek technical assistance to establish individual Table of organization and equipment (TOE) for the institutions based on the more detailed findings on affordability and sustainability of the new security architecture that may be required to meet the security and justice needs of The Gambia. The TOE prescribes the organizational structure, personnel, equipment and requirements based on their mandate.
3. Conduct full-scale and detailed audits across the security sector institutions, especially the primary forces, with a view to establishing their status relating to ranks, qualification, age, service and pay scale etc.; critically the audit should be within the framework of right-sizing the security institutions to sustainable levels as well as providing the necessary data for future training needs with a view to enhance efficiency, transparency and accountability with respect to public spending in the sector.
4. Regulate the visibility of the army in public to the bearest minimum.
7. Revoke the limited Police Duties of the Republican National Guards.
5. Update/Develop Personnel Policy (Policies for Recruitment, Training, Retention, Promotion and Retirement).
6. Formulate a basic literacy standard for recruits and support staff of the security services.
7. Develop a Standing National Doctrine for the management of national emergencies, spelling out the roles and responsibilities of the various security outfits as well as other relevant actors. (Repeat of recommendation in PL-1)
8. Establish a National Service scheme targetting the youth (18-35years) with a view to inculcating discipline, nationalism, and engender skills acquisition including time management etc before employment.



## DRAFT

9. Decentralise skills training facilities to minimize rural urban migration among youth as well as provide equal opportunities for all.
10. Provide training and capacity building to the Municipal Council police to complement the function of the law enforcement agencies within the populated urban centres.
11. Support the assessment of the justice sector through auditing of the functioning of courts through the Judicial Services Council and the capacity of existing staff and identification of training needs.
12. Actively seek support to strengthen the School of Law to include infrastructure, equipment, library, management capacity, training programs (initial training, specialised training) methods and material, training of instructors and definition of their status.
13. Seek support to improve general access to Justice. As Gambia has a pluralistic legal system, attention should also be given to supporting those who mainly make recourse to customary legal systems, particularly women and children.
14. Consider attaching trained Oderlies (under police overall supervision) to Office of Chiefs.

### Cabinet Decisions:

- Recommendations accepted/approved
- Recommendations rejected/disapproved
- Prioritized Tasks with due dates:



**Program Line-3      Reform Activities to Enable the Civilian Management and Oversight Bodies**

**Findings:**

- The visible low level of professionalism of the security sector during the Second Republic is partly attributable to either the absence or ineffectiveness of the management/oversight mechanisms due to the lack of the necessary political will to enhance democratic control over the security sector.
- The Office of the Ombudsman scored some successes in reversing a few unfair treatments of service personnel.
- This lack of oversight functions appeared to have been deliberate on the part of the regime, which according to the National Assembly, saw the select committee on Defence and Security becoming very docile as the security sector was viewed as a sensitive no go area.
- With a new dispensation, it will be essential to build the capacity of the National Assembly members to enable them to perform their oversight functions effectively in the greater context of checks and balances of power. Incremental induction courses could be arranged with specialized SSR technical support on oversight mixed with a more practical study-tour type exposure in the sub-region and beyond.

**Recommendations:**

1. Restructure the Ministries of Defense and Interior to reflect a full-scale management structure with both civilian and security complements. In this regard, consideration should be given to divorcing the function of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from the full-time and dedicated Minister of Defence; In similar vein, there is the need to expand the political leadership structure of the Ministry of Interior to enhance its effectiveness and reflect the diverse security services it oversees and controls;
2. Establish and empower the Councils that support executive decisions for their management; e.g. the Defense Council, the Police Council, the Prisons Council, etc.; These need to be properly established including their roles and responsibilities and their relationships with lower or subordinate Management Boards of the institutions.
3. Establish and capacitate the Office of the National Security Adviser on its coordinating functions of the security sector in general and supporting the functions of the National Security Council (NSC) in particular.
4. Seek for support in the planning and implementing of focused training sessions to capacitate key oversight bodies including: the National Assembly (Defense and Security Committee in particular), The Judiciary, Civil Society Organizations, the Office of the Ombudsman, in order to enhance their effective oversight of the security sector.
5. Incorporate necessary legislation in the legal frameworks being developed to ensure accountability and control measures especially against intrusive operations by law enforcement and intelligence institutions.



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6. District authorities (Chiefs) should be voted for, rather than be appointed in order to enhance their independence and tenure and strengthen their legitimacy and integrity of their envisaged role in the oversight mechanisms of the emerging decentralised security architecture.

### **Cabinet Decisions:**

- Recommendations accepted/approved
- Recommendations rejected/disapproved
- Prioritized Tasks with due dates:

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**Program Line-4**

**Addressing post-authoritarian legacies to enhance reforms**

**Findings:**

- A typical characteristic of a post-conflict or post-authoritarian environment is that the incoming regime inherits large quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives, properly stored or not and even loosely held in unauthorized hands meant to entrench the former regime. This kind of a situation is almost always accompanied by challenges of safe and secure storage and management of a dangerous mix of ordinances. Hence the need for appropriate storage facilities and management systems as well as the ratification of relevant international treaties and conventions. Widespread rumors of some proliferation of small arms in the aftermath of the political impasse have been difficult to verify. Nonetheless, in a sub-region where the proliferation of small arms is a prevalent challenge, it cannot be ruled out that some of the close associates of the former Head of State may have some either in their possession or within easy reach.
- Another characteristic of such post-authoritarian environment is the need for Transitional Justice to redress the obvious legacies of human rights abuses. Government has already embarked on this with the support of bilateral and multilateral partners. It would be helpful if the synergy between the Transitional Justice project and the security sector reform effort is enhanced. A government-led joint Coordination committee could be set up for this, probably on the basis of the two Steering Committees now guiding the efforts separately.

**Recommendations:**

1. Mobilize resources to ensure proper storage and management of arms and ammunition in line with international best practices. This may be preceded by a verification and/or recovery exercise.
2. Seek dedicated support to address appropriate and innovative pre-retirement schemes and reintegration/reinsertion programmes for those personnel who may be affected.
3. Support the national transitional justice process, both in the definition of the approach and in its implementation. It is important to manage the high expectations of the public regarding the impact of the process.

**Cabinet Decisions:**

- Recommendations accepted/approved
- Recommendations rejected/disapproved
- Prioritized Tasks with due dates:



**Program Line-5**

**Reform imperatives to address cross-cutting Perennial Challenges**

**Findings:**

- Issues relating to well-being of vulnerable groups receive much less attention than they deserve. The Technical Working Group dedicated time on focused group sessions to delve into these concerns where it became evident, in the regional consultations, that women, for instance, stood not much chance to close the inequality gap in virtually every sphere of communal life. In this regard, there were requests for large scale and sustained sensitization across the country targeting both the community and religious leaders to facilitate quicker understanding and acceptance of the need to invest in the cause of gender advancement.

**Recommendations:**

1. Direct security institutions to include a reasonable percentage of women in the subsequent phases of the security sector reform process to provide the opportunity for women's views and concerns to be incorporated in the planning, design and development of security sector reform programmes and projects.
2. Adopt an Equal Opportunity Policy to establish directives for equal opportunities to be extended to both men and women in the recruitment, training, career development and promotion based on merit;
3. The NSP to incorporate provisions that respond to the different rights, perspectives and needs of women, girls, men and boys – and in particular provide effective human rights protection, including protection from and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); that such provisions be reflected and practiced within the individual institutions; Give less prominence to the idea of tribal politics in the media and political discourse in general
4. No political dispensation should be allowed to use the Armed and security services to further tribal hegemony and partisan interest

**Cabinet Decisions:**

- Recommendations accepted/approved
- Recommendations rejected/disapproved
- Prioritized Tasks with due dates:



## **NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE GAMBIA**

### **▪ FOREWORD BY THE PRESIDENT**

### **▪ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In the aftermath of The Gambia's December 2016 presidential election and assumption of the presidency by H.E. Adama Barrow there was a clear need for a new people-centered national security policy to address Gambia's glaring security deficit. With support from the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Fund (PBF) Security Sector Reform (SSR) a thorough assessment was undertaken in consultation with the general public and relevant development partners. The resulting Security Sector Assessment Report, December 2017, highlighted the need for a security policy and a civilian-controlled security sector founded on democratic institutions, norms and processes to promote human rights and rule of law. In light of changing domestic and global security landscape where emphasis has now shifted from National to Human Security, Gambia needs a well-crafted and clearly articulated National Security Policy that is predicated on popular participation, and international best practices. In both the First and Second Republics, the sitting President, simultaneously served as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense. Regrettably, the last two decades of authoritarian rule in The Gambia, like colonial times, saw blatant abuse of Gambians and use of the state security apparatus primarily for political repression, self-enrichment. This culminated in a culture of silence and of impunity, which in turn severely eroded public trust and confidence in the security services. The New Face of Gambia's Security Policy seeks to reverse negative public perceptions of the security services to engender confidence and regain public trust in this vital sector.





## **INTRODUCTION:**

**(What is NSP?)** A National Security Policy is a document that serves as an overarching guide on which the transformation and restructuring process should be based in relation to the security institutions, oversight bodies and civil society organizations. It intends to define and enable the justice delivery system and enlighten society about laws, policies and strategies required in order to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of state and all stakeholders in the security sector such that adequate mechanisms are put in place for a democratically run and civilian control security sector. This policy describes how the Government of the Gambia intends to provide security for the country and its citizens, recognizing that national security creates the enabling environment for national development and prosperity of the State.

The policy shall provide the enabling environment conducive for development. It seeks to achieve this by putting together under one comprehensive and cohesive policy document, all the national security consideration of the country and balancing it with its national peace and development perspectives. The Gambia's national security policy therefore identifies the national security priorities based on threats and opportunities that define our values, interests and roles at the national, sub-regional, regional and global levels. It provides a road map for the country's security vision and mission, offers a direction on how to protect our national interests and assign key responsibilities to the security sector for effective and sustainable implementation of the policy.

**(Why NSP?)** This policy seeks to facilitate the functioning of a mature democratic constitutional order, sustainable economic growth, protection of human rights and freedoms, observance of the rule of law, viability of civil society and to make the defense and security sector subordinate to democratically elected civilian authority.

**(Why now)** To achieve the above, there is the need to transform and restructure the security sector of the Gambia, in a bid to develop a democratic governance framework that will ensure a democratically run, accountable and efficient security system that will





help reduce the risk of conflict and create a conducive environment for national development. This would require the establishment of an apolitical, non-partisan and professional security sector that is legitimate, transparent, accountable and responsive to the security needs and aspirations of the Gambian people.

It must be strongly emphasized that the attainment of the envisaged NSP is contingent upon the contribution of civic-minded citizenry, who are determined to enhance their welfare and preparedness by taking ownership of their country's security. The process must be consultative and participatory.

## **Scope**

The end of the Cold-war, (and demise of the Soviet Union) in the early 1990s witnessed the emergence of a "New World Order," and with it came a major shift in the discourse and practice over **national security** issues. In the post-Cold War environment big power security concerns that focused primarily on military readiness to handle threats to national security though still important have by and large been eclipsed by **Human Security** concerns. Rather than use of "hard-power," as an instrument of state-power, "soft power," (diplomacy, economic sanctions) is more often used to resolve conflict. This expanded definition has, likewise, not only shifted priorities of security Sector Reform (SSR) but significantly changed the dynamic of military conflict between major powers- making war between them almost a thing of the past.

It is in the emerging states of Africa, Asia, Middle East, and South America, where conflicts, and wars more frequently occur. Polarization in these countries along economic, ethnic, religious, regional, and other fault lines has often resulted in national disintegration, as was in the Balkans, and now Syria with adverse effects on human, national and global security. The human cost of these conflicts are all too evident in rising numbers of internally "displaced populations," "irregular migration," "human-trafficking," "terrorism," "money-laundering," "organized crime," and other global human security



challenges. Indeed, these represent the new frontiers of national and global security threats and challenges in the first two decades of the Twenty-first Century.

Additionally, economic and cultural globalization and opposition to it by "insurgent," "extremist," or "radicalized" groups and "failed" states have occasioned a violent pushback. This has irreversibly altered the theatre and techniques of conventional war more significantly into non-conventional forms. Thus, perceptions about the utility of force as a technique of conflict resolution has given way to the proposition that constructing sustainable, political and democratic institutions are, in the end, a more enduring basis for peace and development.

Cognizant of these historical and conceptual considerations over **national security**, The Gambia's National Security Policy outlines key security priorities, interests, core values, threats, opportunities and challenges. Accordingly, this document is sub-divided into----- sections. Section one provide definitions of key terms, followed in section two by a historical, political and security analysis of The Gambia to better appreciate how core national values inform public perceptions and subsequent national security policy.



## TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The legacies of the utilization of security instruments during colonial rule, like in many countries in the region, negatively impacted the national security institutions whereby the focus of security was the protection and safeguard of political and economic interests of the elites rather than providing for the security needs of the citizenry. The situation continued in the post-independence Gambia and the first republic, worsening during the second republic.

The main goal of the security system then was designed to intimidate its armless and law-abiding people. In its desperation to protect the regime, The Gambian security forces were less adequately prepared for the real and emerging security challenges associated with the country. When not being used for direct intimidation purposes by the regime, they were merely oriented to execute routine procedures in the barracks. This coupled with under-development and bad governance which was rooted in corruption, rivalry among service/ agency institutions and political patronage during the tenure of the last regime which continued to negatively impact on their integrity, capacity, and professionalism.

In both the First and Second Republics, the President exercised the power of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence (as does the current President of the Third Republic). However, this was more pronounced in the Second Republic where the President appropriated both constitutional and institutional powers making him the sole policy- and decision-maker for the Armed Forces and Security services. Appointments to key positions and elevation to higher ranks were mostly nepotistic.

Such legacies, even long after colonial rule, remained entrenched and founded the favour of mischievous leader, like former President of the second republic, who perpetuated the culture as a tool to entrench grip on power. As a result, and following the recent national polls in December 2016, the political leadership of the country inherited a security apparatus that was not oriented to meet the needs of the people.





In addition, instances of human rights abuse and a culture of impunity perpetrated by elements of the security sector during the past two decades have led to the erosion of public trust and confidence.

During the past two decades of authoritarian rule, the general public had lost confidence in the Security Sector. This is in view of the fact that so many human rights abuses were orchestrated with impunity by the authorities who were supposed to defend and protect the people and act in accordance with the law. However, the inclusion of comprehensive training modules on gender mainstreaming and the international conventions on the Human and People's Rights; and the implementation of an outreach program to enlighten all security personnel will be paramount in changing attitudes towards human rights issues affecting their daily operations.

The Gambia's vibrant national security is contingent upon guaranteed political viability, good governance, sound foreign policy and true democracy. The national security objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a transparent and accountable government.

It is important that the State takes appropriate measures to safeguard its socio-economic security. This includes access to quality education, job creation, improved energy sector, access to justice, food security, viable financial sector, industrialization, infrastructural development, improved public safety and emergency response preparedness, and access to health care service for national development and well-being.

Consequently, to be proficient and effective, the security sector is required to have standard structures, quality personnel, modern equipment and sufficient resources necessary to mitigate and respond to the legitimate security needs of both the state and the individuals and communities that make up the population. Furthermore, the transformation process requires unambiguous and transparent strategy to facilitate smooth interaction, coordination and cooperation between security sector actors in line with their constitutional roles and responsibilities.





On that note, unlike the traditional regime-centric approach to security in the Gambia, the modern concept of security should focus more on human security as the basis for national security.

The development of this NSP covers the following parts:



## **STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

### **GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT**

The Gambia is located on the West Coast of Africa with a total land area of about 11,000 square kilometres. It is surrounded on the North, East and South sides by Senegal, with its Western border delineated by the Atlantic coastline. Consequently, in order to protect national sovereignty, a binding security agreement with Senegal is required to safeguard and protect the common interest of both countries through joint security arrangements, border control and patrol on both land and sea. In addition to enhancing the Gambia's re-export trade, this measure will reduce Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in our waters and other related cross-border crimes.

The Gambia Maritime space covers 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is 200 nautical miles (equivalent to 142000 km<sup>2</sup> and the continental shelf of the Gambia is about 3900 km<sup>2</sup> (equivalent to 14% of the total combined shelf area of The Gambia and Senegal). Therefore, there is an opportunity for the establishment of a common maritime policy between the Gambia and Senegal to collectively lobby for our common and equitable interests in the maritime domain at both regional and global levels. This can help to mitigate current and possible future disputes as regards to our maritime resources and discovered natural resources.

### **SOCIAL CONTEXT**

According to the 2013 Gambia Bureau of Statistics report, the country has a population of approximately 1,882,450 persons of numerous ethnic groups. It gained independence on 18<sup>th</sup> February 1965, with English as its official language. It is predominantly a Muslim nation, but it also has Christians and traditional believers. Therefore, there is a need to cement the existing socio-cultural cohesion across all potential ethnic, religious and political divisions in the interest of national security. This has been a source of our strength in managing socio-political crises in the past. This is evident in the successful



change of government in December 2016. It is therefore important for the government to pursue policies and practices that promote patriotism.

According to the Integrated Household Survey 2015/16 produced by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the proportion of the Gambian population living beneath the poverty line has remained the same. National poverty increased slightly from 48.1 percent in 2010 to 48.6 percent in 2015. While this increase of the poverty rate is considered statistically insignificant, the number of poor increased substantially by 18.2 percent from 0.79 million in 2010 to 0.94 million in 2015.

In spite of favorable conditions for food production to meet the needs of the people in the Gambia, the country is still experiencing food insecurity. Estimations based on the Integrated Household Survey 2015/16 suggest that close to 55 percent of the population cannot meet the daily required minimum calories of 2400 per day per person.

The overall contribution to GDP growth from agriculture has been on the decline since 2010. Furthermore, climate related shocks and their attendant effect on agriculture seems to have been a strong driver of food shortages in recent years. This trend has led to the attendant decrease over this decade, making peasant farmers economically vulnerable. With the current population growth rate of about 3.2 per cent per annum, there is need for crafting of policies that will boost economic growth, and ensure food security for all citizens. In addition, uncontrolled high fertility rates in the country may have stimulated rapid growth in poverty rate. Most families depend on handouts from the well to do citizens.

The above assertion is supported by the UNDP's finding that the country registered high level of unemployment and under-employment, where 40% of women and 20% of men remain unemployed. This has resulted in an increase in vulnerability to crimes, radicalization, gender-based violence, gender inequality, irregular migration and substance abuse. Unequal access to resources such as land for agriculture and construction which favours men perpetuates disparity between men and women.



Compared to other countries, only a fraction of Gambian women hold strategic positions in both the private and public sector, particularly the security sector.

In spite the above negative indices, tourism, construction and telecommunication sectors contribute significantly to the economy, while in 2016 about 22% of the GDP emerged from remittances. There are reports of oil and other natural resource deposits in The Gambia, but the country is yet to benefit from them economically as exploration is yet to commence in commercial quantities.

## **NATIONAL VALUES**

Our context is unique to our entity called The Gambia, defined by who we are as a people and by other such parameters that can hardly be copied elsewhere. We all have a collective role to play when it comes to national security and national interest. Building a security sector that is ready to detect, deter and defeat any eventualities in a nationally inclusive manner is of paramount importance in creating and maintaining an environment that embraces broad issues of social cohesion such as faithful to religion, socialization, empathy, jovial relationship between ethnic groups, respect for extended family values, caring and sharing among others.

Like cultures the world over, Gambians place high premium on several core values that include: (1) faith in God, (2) love of family, (3) peace for the country, community, and self, (4) national unity, and (5) tolerance. It is these shared meanings that form the bedrock of Gambian culture. Yet Gambian culture is not a monolith- it is the sum-total of various sub-cultures. And, in a rapidly changing global security landscape propelled by shifting economic, technological and cultural changes, The Gambia's core national values, as elsewhere are changing at a dizzying pace. These could pose potential threats to national unity

**Aspirational Values, work ethics**





## **NATIONAL SECURITY VISION**

To have a security sector that is highly competent, professional, well equipped, apolitical, that respects human rights and the rule of law and accountable/subordinate to the democratically elected civilian authority, in a new Gambia that is at peace with itself and its neighbors .

The Gambia's national security vision rests on the democratic institutionalization of its governance and security structures; protection of fundamental human rights of citizens and all who reside within its borders; peace within the country and between her and neighbors; tolerance of difference (ethnic, religious, etc.); equality of opportunity irrespective of gender, age, ability, and protection of its sovereign borders from internal and external threats.

## **GOALS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Inspired by our national security vision and interests, the objectives of this national security policy are to:

1. Protect The Gambia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and project The Gambia's image and prestige globally.
2. Promote the socio-economic prosperity and interest of The Gambia and her people at home and abroad.
3. Ensure full participation of women in the decision-making processes including at the strategic level.
4. Strengthen the security sector reforms processes to ensure efficient and effective governance and oversight of the security system as well as to engender the cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the sister forces and agencies for seamless interoperability.
5. Participate and contribute to global and regional peace and security



## **NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS**

The Gambia's fundamental national interests lie in the prosperity of the country which is contingent on our political independence, the sovereignty and integrity of our national territory, national security, prestige and the socio-economic prosperity, social cohesion and wellbeing of all Gambians.

Furthermore, to participate and contribute to promote global peace, security, stability and to accelerate the political and socio-economic development and regional integration, the Gambia will pursue a foreign policy that will enhance a peaceful coexistence with its neighbors and community of Nations through peace support operations.

Pursuant to the above, the cardinal imperative of the nation is a strengthened governance and oversight mechanism of the security sector to enhance professionalism, effectiveness, accountability and ensuring that all instruments of national power are effectively utilized to provide an enabling environment for national development. Mindful of our Information & Communications Technology (ICT) vulnerability, it is in the interest of national security to ensure cyber-attack is deterred and diminish in order to safeguard our socio-economic development.

## **THE ANALYSIS OF THE THREATS, RISKS AND CHALLENGES**

The Gambian population is confronted with numerous threats, risks and challenges that have direct impact on security. They include poverty, unemployment, inadequate and uncompetitive wage system, inadequate education system, inadequate health care and access to justice, food insecurity, population bulge and the inability of the private sector to grow or launch business ventures. The worst-case scenario is the combined effects of all these threats coincidentally occurring at the same time and space culminating into community unrest, rendering the public vulnerable to irregular migration and an increase



in crimes such as theft, drug abuse, rape, possession of small arms light weapons and murder .

## **LAND ISSUES DISPUTES**

The increase of land disputes amongst communities in the country is alarming as tensions escalate in various regions in the Gambia. The impact of land dispute is a major threat to seamless cohesion and can lead to destruction of lives and property, civil disorder which has the potential to undermine national security. Competition over access to land due to economic and development activities calls for the need to have proper land use planning policies. There is also the need for regular reviews of the land laws and putting in place effective enforcement mechanisms. Henceforth, this policy directs that all land use activities shall be regulated, planned and coordinated by all relevant stakeholders.

DEMOGRAPHIC – population growth, polygamy, youth management

## **GENDER ISSUES**

The Government of The Gambia recognizes the constitutional requirements of gender mainstreaming and making use of all available talents pursuant to section 28 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, Resolution 1325 of the UN General Assembly also calls for women participation in the maintenance of global peace and security.

Gender issues regarding integration into security institutions that will respond to the different rights, perspectives and needs of women, girl, men and boys were found to be grossly inadequate. In particular the provision of effective human rights protection, including protection from and response to sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), inclusion and participation of differently abled people and other vulnerable groups has not been adequately reflected and practiced within the security sector.



This policy directs that all security institutions adopt gender sensitive policies that would also address issues relating to the differently abled and vulnerable groups.

## **HEALTH**

The occurrence and re-occurrence of infectious disease such as malaria, cholera, child/ Infant and maternal mortality, Ebola and the scourge of HIV/AIDS infections is a great security concern for the state considering the porosity of our borders couple with weak response capacity to contain such potential outbreaks.

The Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) agents in possession of terrorists and the upsurge of life threatening diseases such as cancer, diabetics and hypertension also pose serious security challenge. These health epidemics have a serious negative impact on the country's tourism industry as was evident in 2015 during Ebola outbreak.

Effective control requires strengthening national surveillance and response systems. There is need for the Security sector in collaboration with both local and international health care agencies and research institutions to develop appropriate capacity for intervention.

## **ENVIRONMENTAL**

The indiscriminate cutting down of trees for both economic and domestic use coupled with unregulated and uncontrolled fishing and mining, and bush fires has resulted to the destruction of the environment thus endangering the flora and fauna of the country and human habitation.

These have contributed to Climate Change leading to erratic rainfall patterns that negatively impact on sustainable Agricultural activities, resulting to the scarcity of resources which pose a threat to national security.





There is a global consensus that climate change is occurring and that human activities are the primary drivers. The effect of this change is already impacting the sub-region including the Gambia

Therefore, human activities should be controlled to minimize the destruction of the environment and degradation of the habitat for both flora and fauna and human habitation. The effects of global warming and environmental degradation are the direct consequences of human activities via greenhouse gas emission with the resultant depletion of the ozone layers.

To effectively deal with these threats, there is the urgent need for the government to adopt information strategy to enlighten the public on strict adherence to and enforcement of environmental rules and regulations guiding against deforestation and other activities that are detrimental to the environment.

## **POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL**

A critical challenge is that the highest bodies of governance and oversight organs of the security systems have not yet been fully established and functional. The National Security Council (though not fully established) with its supporting structures and the Defense and Security ministries, is yet to be effectively functional. Significant governance issues also include insufficient human resources/asset/budget, weak management systems, lack of transparency, insufficient internal accountability systems and corruption, coupled with obsolete and insufficient legal and policy frameworks.

Further delays to articulate a vetting policy for those members of the past regime accused of committing atrocities will lead to a sense of extreme grievance amongst some sections of the civil community, not least those who observe alleged perpetrators still actively involved in the security sector. Therefore, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure accountability and justice.



Partisan political threats, including threats of political violence, politicizing of traditional leadership institutions (Seyfoship and Alkaloship) and the risks of former regime supporters mobilizing to destabilize the democratic process by violent means, remain real and need addressing.

The Security Sector remains potentially at risk of political polarization and past patronages could be renewed in the new dispensation. Some security personnel sympathetic to the former president remain unaccounted for, as allegedly do large caches of weapons and ammunition.

Inter-ethnic polarization remains a concern, former practices of patronage and the unfair favors obtained by some tribes and groups are considered extant, most commonly in the West Coast Region.

Disaffected groups may publicly manifest their grievances through acts of public disorder; these acts and the manner in which the security sector manages them, can have serious impacts on national cohesion and perceptions (international and Gambian) of the effective rule of law. With increasing political and social awareness and the opening up of the democratic space, this presents both opportunities and challenges and requires responsible behavior by all Gambians.

## **HARD SECURITY**

The unclear delineation and demarcation of the Senegambia borders that were inherited at Independence pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. According to the Security Sector Assessment Report, The Gambia and Senegal have had tensions over border issues for decades. Inhabitants of the affected areas repeatedly have disagreements over land ownership and possession rights. Over the years, bilateral diplomatic efforts have been made to resolve this issue, which led to the establishment



of the 'Senegalo-Gambia Boundary Commission' under the auspices of the 'Senegalo-Gambian Secretariat'. This commission has already conducted preliminary assessment aimed at finding a permanent solution. However, their recommendations are yet to be implemented. If the situation is not duly addressed, it could create renewed tensions between the border communities of the two countries in the near future thus undermining the required harmony between the neighbouring countries.

The vast border line between the two countries, coupled with the lack of capacity within the security sector to effectively secure same is increasing crime rates, such as armed banditry, sanctuary for dissident groups, robbery and wide spread cultivation and supply of cannabis. The Casamance insurgency along the border line could spill over into the border communities that may provoke pursuit of these insurgents into the Gambia by the Senegalese security forces.

Transnational organized crimes like terrorism, human and drug trafficking, smuggling and money laundering within the African continent are emerging challenges for the Gambian security. The recent attacks by terror groups in the region make terrorism and insurgency a real threat to the country's security. Although, the country has not experienced a terror attack, it continues to pose a security challenge to the tourism sector in the Gambia as it has potentials of discouraging tourists and investors. These threats are aggravated by the vast porous borders which makes entry and exits of individuals very easy without proper control.

There is the need for a Joint Security Pact between the Gambia and Senegal to mitigate and curb cross-border criminal activities and addressed the right of hot pursuit.

## **CYBERSECURITY AND MISINFORMATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA**

Information technology, web-based communication and use of electronic devices for data storage purposes exposes or predisposes confidential government information to





organized cyber-attacks which can undermine state security. Also, the misuse of social media poses security threat since it can be used by subversive elements to undermine the security of the country.

The security sector in collaboration with the Ministry of Information and Communication Infrastructure must develop appropriate capacity and institute measures to safeguard information systems and infrastructure.

## **OPPORTUNITIES**

Despite the aforementioned threats and challenges, the Gambia has a number of opportunities, which if properly harnessed and utilized can register positive gains for the nation.

### **The Political Will**

The new government espousing the culture of true democracy, good governance, and respect for the rule of law and human rights, shows prospects for the country's future and demonstrate a commitment on part of the government which could attract expanded goodwill from international development partners.

### **Youth Mobilization**

More than half of the Gambian population is youths under the age of 25. This population represents a huge potential human resource to better involve in the development of the country. It will be prudent and expedient to effectively utilize this great potential.





## **NATIONAL PRIORITIES**

### **The Role of the Civil Society Organizations**

In the spirit of the objectives and principles of the constitutive Act of the African Union and the Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and indeed acknowledging the importance of CSOs in national development. The Government of the Gambia remains committed to ensure the participation of CSOs in the needs assessment, formulation, adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector.

The civil society organizations (CSOs), if properly harnessed, can address structural violence and promote human security through development, human rights monitoring and prevent environmental degradation.

In this regard, government encourages CSOs to play a positive role in enhancing security sector responsiveness to the security and justice needs of the state within the ambit of the law. Furthermore, they contribute to alleviate social tensions and conflict facilitates dialogue, promote tolerance and the culture of peace.

### **Natural Resources**

The Gambia is endowed with natural resources some of which, are yet to be tapped, and they represent a great potential for the socio-economic development of the country. The resources, if properly harnessed and managed, will go a long to address the economic challenges of the country.

### **The Gambia - Senegal Relationship**

Gambia, being contiguous to Senegal on all sides except the west coast, provides ample opportunity for security cooperation and socio-economic development of both countries.



## **International Support and Assistance**

The support of the international community to the security sector reform and the transitional justice process, offer viable opportunities for the country to establish a strong national cohesion, unity, peace and security upon which national development could be anchored. This is an invaluable opportunity that would be effectively exploited.



## **LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY**

The implementation of this policy lies on the effective and efficient establishment of a framework that comprises the governance, the oversight and the specific mandates of the security sector institutions.

## **GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

The implementation of The Gambia's National Security Policy and conduct of her international relations shall be guided by the following principles:

- a) Protect national sovereignty and independence
  - b) Engender the promotion of human security that is responsive to the security and justice needs of The Gambian people
  - c) Promote democratic principles of good governance, accountability and the rule of law.
  - d) Respect for Human rights and mainstreaming gender issues in all aspects of governance including the recruitment, retention, full participation decision-making and training curriculum of all security institutions.
  - e) Foster national unity and integration by developing a security sector which is fully representative of all Gambian ethnic and regional groups and promote the welfare and prosperity of all persons in The Gambia.
  - f) Promote and protect the interest of The Gambia within the comity of nations.
  - g) Subordinate the security sector under democratic control of civilian authority, fully respectful for human rights and the rule of law.
- 
- h) Foster respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
  - i) Guided by the principles and goals of international and regional organizations of which The Gambia is a signatory.
  - j) Guided by international principles of transparency and inclusiveness.



- k) Guided by Public Finance Management (PFM) principles, as well as within the overall principle of affordability to the State.

## **INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER**

The Gambia's national powers are dictated by our national interests. The national powers will serve as vehicle to achieve our national interest in both our internal and external engagements with other states and organizations. The identified national powers are assessed as follows; diplomacy, economy, national cohesion, information communication and military/security.

The ability of the Gambia to advance its national interest is dependent on the effectiveness of the government of the Gambia to the above-mentioned instruments of National Power to achieve National Strategic objectives.

### **Diplomacy**

This is the tool that Gambia uses actively to manage its international relations through the country's representatives overseas.

It is the principal instrument that The Gambia uses to engage with other states or foreign bodies to advance her values, interests and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for socio-economic advancement.

Considering its national interest for peace and security within the state and outside its borders, the Gambian government will primarily use diplomacy to settle any dispute through negotiation and other peaceful means. The Gambia government through diplomacy will promote mutual respect and cooperation between states to reduce tension and potentials for conflict in our region and the world at large.





## **Economic Resources**

Like all other states, the Gambia operates within the global economic system which is primarily market system dependent on the forces of demand and supply. Being a country where most economic behavior is determined by private multinational organizations, the Gambia cannot directly control economic behavior.

Agriculture, marine and tourism are key contributors towards the Gambia's economy. These three sectors if properly harnessed and managed, coupled with the effective exploitation of the untapped natural resources will not only have the potential to enhance employment opportunities but could also help to propel economic growth and development. It will also improve the countries competitiveness through foreign direct investment and this reduces the dependency on foreign aids and donors.

Given that the major economic decisions are made by the state, the country can draw its power primarily through sound economic policies that would develop and strengthen our export including taxes and tariff incentives.

## **National cohesion**

This is the willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper. Social cohesion and economic advancement of our people are vital national objectives as the yardsticks of national security.

The existing religious tolerance and ethnic harmony have contributed positively and continue to serve as a mechanism for the maintenance of peace and security in the country as evident in the country's ability to manage the conflict during the political impasse following the December 2016 elections.

It is appropriate and vital to foster and strengthen the relationship between the ethnic, political and religious groups within the Gambia and in diaspora by showcasing our peaceful nationalism contribute to maintain peace and security in the country.



## **Information and Communication**

This includes all the processes used to handle telecommunications, broadcast media, and intelligence building management systems, audio visual processing and transmission systems, and network-based control and monitoring functions. Given the growing consensus that information and communication technologies (ICTs) particularly internet is providing huge opportunities for economic and social developments.

It is therefore critical for the Gambia to be at pace with these global innovations in the information and communication technology for national security.

The Gambia would enhance and implement an effective information and communication system as a fundamental instrument along with the other five instruments and use same it as a primary force to project and rebrand our good image in the global arena.

We would also use it to shape events and strategies for the country's advancement.

## **Defence and Security**

This instrument of national power refers to the defense and security posture capable to successfully resist hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

This instrument of the Gambia's national power is obviously not limited to the Armed Forces. It refers to the Armed and Security Services of The Gambia and their use for both domestic situations such as responding to internal threats and dealing with eminent and emerging affronts to our national interest. A well-structured and managed defence and security sector will contribute to the achievement of peace and security as part of the national interest.

In addition to their primary constitutional mandate, the Gambia will use its Armed and security institutions to strengthen the country's participation in the UN, AU, and ECOWAS Peace Support Operations in parts of the World through defense agreements and international conventional obligations. It is believed if this is adequately exploited could give the Gambia leverage to advance its interest at the international platforms.





## **MANDATES OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

The Gambia has seven (or eight) security institutions, all of which have their primary and secondary mandates to maintain peace, security and the territorial integrity of the country. Without prejudice to the under-mentioned mandates which they currently have, there is need to review the existing legal framework and align them to the current realities of the Gambian national security needs.

Hence the need for a cultural change in the security sector requires shifting its attention from the traditional regime-centric approach to the modern concept of security in the Gambia which focuses on human security as the basis for national security. The quality of training for the security sector will ultimately determine the output, behavior and level of professionalism of personnel towards work and society. In as much as it is essential that the personnel are exposed to organizational cultures and practices in the security sector, their work must not be dependent on human intelligence and man-power alone but should be equipped and maintained with the necessary equipment and infrastructures to effectively serve their purpose of establishment.

To effectively implement this policy and consistent with the AU/ECOWAS policy framework, all security sector institutions shall establish an SSR section that is fully capacitated to do so.

### **The Gambia Armed Forces (GAF)**

According to the 1997 Constitution, Section 186, the Armed Forces of the Gambia consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by an Act of the National Assembly.

According to section 187 of the 1997 constitution, the principal functions of GAF are:

- a) To preserve and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of The Gambia;
- b) To aid the civil authority at their request, in emergencies and in case of natural disasters; and;



c) To engage at the request of civil authorities, in productive activities such as agriculture, engineering, health, and education for the development of the Gambia  
There is need for amendments for existing legal provisions that allows for the establishment of security forces.

### **The Gambia Police Force (GPF)**

The GPF was established under section 178 of The 1997 Constitution which defines the powers of the police as follows:

- a) The preservation of law and order;
- b) Protection of property;
- c) The prevention and detection of crime;
- d) The apprehension of offenders and;
- e) The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged with.

### **State Intelligence Service (SIS)**

The State Intelligence Service, (former National Intelligence Agency) should be responsible for

- a) information gathering (data collection)
- b) collating, processing and analysing of information to intelligence
- c) detect and deter threats to national security in collaboration sister forces such as GPF, DLEAG, GID, etc.
- d) collaborate with international partners to counter major threats like terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking, etc.
- e) timely dissemination of intelligence to prospective users (consumers)



## **The Gambia Immigration Department (GID)**

GID, which was established under the Immigration Act 1965, would be mandated to:

- a) Facilitate, control, monitor and regulate entry, residence and exit of persons at entry points and localities within the country.
- b) Control and regulate residency through issuance of residence and work permits and prescribed in the immigration act and other international legal instruments relating to migration;

The department is also mandated to carry out the following function;

- Interprets and enforce the Citizenship and Naturalisation Act 1965 and its amendment
- interprets and enforce the Aliens Registration Act 1977 and its Amendment
- Issuance of Passport, Identity Card and other Travel Documents
- Enforce the Refugee Act 2008
- Interprets and Implement bilateral, multilateral and international conventions such as the ECOWAS framework on free movement of persons and goods
- Deploy officers to visa sections of various Embassies and Consular offices of the Gambia to enhance accurate visa issuance.

## **Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG)**

Drug Law Enforcement Agency, The Gambia (DLEAG) is the lead Government Security outfit legally mandated to regulate and control Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and related activities by enforcing the Drug Control Act 2003 and all international protocols and conventions relative to drugs signed and ratified by The Gambia.

### **Functions of the Agency**

The functions of the Agency are to -

1. Enforce all laws, rules, regulations and policies regulating or controlling the abuse and trafficking of illicit drugs.



2. Advice government through the ministry on drug related matters.
3. Control the abuse and misuse of controlled drugs.
4. Sensitize the general public particularly the youth on the dangers of drug abuse

### **The Gambia Fire and Rescue Services (GFRS)**

The Gambia Fire Service Act No. 19 of 1948. The mandate of the Fire and Rescue Service should be to:

- a) Perform the function of saving life in fire and other disasters,
- b) Protecting life and property from destruction and catastrophe (Manmade or natural),
- c) Render humanitarian services, and;
- d) Assist in the protection of the environment.

### **The Gambia Prison Services (GPS)**

The GPS is established under Section 182 of the constitution with the mandate to:

- a) Maintain the safety of inmates under custody which includes their welfare, shelter and food and
- b) To reform and rehabilitate.
- c) To reintegrate inmate back to the society

## **RESOURCE GENERATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

Over the years, National Treasury has been the major source of funds for security activities, the resource allocation must therefore, be use prudently. The wellbeing of the country depend on how the country is protected, hence the Gambian people expect returns in form of delivery of defense and protection. However, 14% of the GDP allocated



to the security sector is considered high therefore government needs to strategize for sustainable financial spending to the security institutions to merge the standard within the sub region.

It must be understood that security capabilities and preparedness are tied up to the availability of resources. This should call for a regular review of the financial and material resources management that will enhance effective and efficient service delivery by the security sector.

The mobilization strategy should explore an expanded range of sources both locally, sub-regionally and regionally and the wider international sources; focusing on deepening relations with existing donor partners and diversifying donor base to new funding streams.

## **RESPONSE TO THREATS AND CHALLENGES**

In pursuance of its aspirations to enhance professional competence, effectiveness and collaboration, this policy directs the establishment and implementation of flagship programs as follows:

### **Upholding National Core Values:**

In our drive as a people to create and maintain an enabling environment for all, we need to uphold our core values through:

- Empowering and Strengthening the National Council for Civic Education
- The introduction of moral lessons in school curriculum
- Establishing a regulatory framework to encourage good parenting
- Respecting the rule of law and cultural diversities
- Fighting against corruption as Gambians.





### **Joint Human Resource Development center**

This human resource development center provides for a joint and holistic capacity development facility for service personnel of the Security Institutions.

The focus of this joint facility shall be;

- To attract and retain quality personnel
- To enhance the professionalism of security personnel
- To enhance inter-operability of the security sector
- To enhance the judicious use of resources

### **Security Heads:**

The Gambia needs a defense minister for proper checks and balance

Appointment and dismissal of the National Security Adviser (NSA), Deputy NSA and the head of security institutions must follow due process:

- Nominations of qualify candidates by the president
- Nominees to face parliament for vetting

### **Joint Medical Facility**

This provides for the establishment of a joint medical facility to cater for all the service personnel of the security institutions.

## **COMMUNICATION**

A comprehensive Communication strategy is vital to incorporate the media outfits, Internet services and satellite/cable television channels, think tanks, civil society organizations and other platforms as a mechanism for information sharing, innovation and feedback to key security issues with national and international dimensions.



This will address the need to inform the people of the concerns and security challenges affecting their well-being, livelihood and their future and thereby foster cooperation to ensure safety and help restore public trust in the security sector.

Therefore, this policy directs that the government devotes the required resources to efficiently manage the information and effectively communicate its message to the public at all times. This policy directs that all security institutions comply fully with the above requirements.

## **OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW MECHANISMS**

An effective oversight body will help to deter corruption, promote independent and unbiased monitoring and investigation and ensure that public officials correctly exercise the power conferred upon them. In other words, a proficient oversight will also help to reduce incidents of human rights violations by members of the security sector and foster better relationship between them and the civilian population.

The priority of the oversight framework is to ensure that the security sector bodies do conform to laws, policies, rules and regulations that govern them.

### **The Executive**

The Gambia's political and institutional systems are based on a separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. The 1997 Constitution adequately stipulates the authority of executive oversight of the security sector. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the constitutional mandate to oversee the security services. In keeping with good governance principles, the executive should ensure that all institutions establish internal checks and balances or internal monitoring mechanisms.



## **Legislature**

The role of Parliament with respect to the security sector resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions. According to the 1997 Constitution, “no person shall raise any police service except by and under the authority of an Act of Parliament.” A subsequent article makes a similar statement concerning raising an armed force the key mandate of the standing committee on Security is to provide parliamentary oversight to ensure accountability and transparency in the Security sector.

## **Judicial Control and oversight**

The Judiciary controls and oversees the security sector by ensuring that the uses of intrusive powers without constitutional and legislative justification are curtailed. The judiciary will also support the prohibition of the limitation of the rights and freedoms of the citizens through the use of intrusive operational methods

## **Independent oversight by designated civil institutions**

In keeping with the spirit of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which, among other things, underscores the need for peace, security, stability and human rights based on people’s participation, inclusion and ownership of democratic processes, empowers the office of the ombudsman as a designated civil institution to investigate complaints from the public and service members, and to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

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**(The section below was moved from previous location after “legislative framework of the security sector” and before “guiding principles of the security architecture”).**



## **GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR IN THE GAMBIA**

A critical requirement for the implementation of this policy is a functional democratic control and enhanced oversight mechanisms that are effective and efficient through a legitimate governance framework or architecture. This will facilitate the creation of a highly professional and law-abiding security sector that is responsive to the security needs of the people and subordinate to civilian authority, by adhering to the principles of human right and committed to the rule of law.

Hence the need to ensure that there is separation of powers, a participatory and inclusive approach involving citizens (male and female) through their legally and regularly chosen representatives in decision-making processes, management and control of State activities and functions in the Security Sector. The legal framework should take into account a policy process that is based on accountability, participation and a culture of inclusivity with an emphasis on transparency, proficiency and ownership.

(Placeholder for national security architecture diagram).

The governance structure includes the national Security Council and its supporting institutions and the relevant ministries.

### **The National Security Council (NSC)**

The NSC, chaired by the president, is the highest authority for providing strategic guidance and direction in national security issues. To make it more effective, the composition of the NSC should include the membership of the policy makers of all institutions of the instruments of National power, such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Finance. These are supported by professional heads from the Armed Forces and the Police Force, with a National Security Adviser (NSA) providing secretarial service for the NSC. This will enhance stakeholder involvement and consolidate the oversight function of the NSC.





## The NSC Statutory Ministries

The next layer in the governance of the security sector shall be at the ministerial level. The ministries of Defence, Interior have the primary responsibility to manage and administer the defense and security institutions and hence should be established with the requisite administrative, technical and operational competence. Each ministry should be able to develop and review policies/strategies for military defence and internal security. As the national Security Policy is an overarching concept encompassing the national defence and internal security as related strategies, the ministry of defence will define the national defence strategy related to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and all the related missions given to the Armed Forces. The Ministry of interior will establish the internal security concept and strategy for Law Enforcement, protection of lives and property and related issues.

In this regard, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will manage the **Defence Council** and define relevant strategies, whilst the Ministry of Interior (MoI) manages internal security issues and strategies within the established councils appropriate for the respective security institutions. Consequently, this policy directs the establishment of a **Law Enforcement Council** which provides for the governance and oversight of the security and justice institutions of the sector. This will entail that extant security governing councils meant for single services, like the Police Council, will henceforth be subsumed in the overarching Council for all the law enforcement, security and justice institutions (less GAF) of the security sector.

The other statutory ministries of the NSC, namely Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Justice, perform significant role in pursuit of national security.

These five (5) Ministries will constitute the first level of civil authority over national security matters. All other ministries in government are to ensure that their policies and activities are consistent with the pursuit of national interests.

