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**Inception Report**

**17 July 2020**

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**Final evaluation**

**Engaging Youth  
in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali  
(ENJECCOP)**

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*Since 2012, Mercy Corps' work in Mali has been dedicated to supporting vulnerable and at-risk Malian women, men and youth to cope with food security crises by strengthening their resilience, restoring peace and stability and addressing humanitarian and development structural challenges. From 2012 to 2018, Mercy Corps has implemented twenty-some programs for more than 250,000 people in five regions across Mali.<sup>1</sup>*



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<sup>1</sup> Website Mercy Corps Mali : <https://www.mercycorps.org/where-we-work/mali>

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## Executive Summary

ENJECCOP (Engaging Youth in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali) is a UNPBF funded peace building programme for marginalized youth in 30 communities in Gao, 20 in Timbuktu and 10 in Ménaka, i.e. the northern conflict-ridden regions of Mali. It was implemented over a two-year time span (including a half year extension) from March 2018 to February 2020.

It is a programme that must be seen as part of a plethora of programmes that assist in implementing the Algiers Peace Accord. ENJECCOP focussed on the development of more meaningful and peaceful roles for young people within their communities, in order to prevent them from being recruited by Armed Groups. Often, although not always, these have a connexion with tribal communities where they work as a protective self-defence force.

The ENJECCOP programme, in the communities where it worked, hoped to contribute to 1-the reduction of community conflict and violence by youth, to 2- the social economic reintegration of youth and to 3- the youth's participation in local governance structures.

The evaluation looked at the dimensions of relevance and effectiveness of the programme, while also looking at the mainstreamed subjects of gender, conflict sensitivity, and complementarity and coherence. It moreover made a comparative case study of a specific part of the programme which is called Sports for Change.

### 1 Relevance

The project was planned with the intention to assist the Disarmament Demobilisation and Rehabilitation programme for ex-combatants. The slow national DDR process was a setback for ENJECCOPs relevance in the national peace building context. It adapted its strategy because of it. It was soon decided that it was to focus its activities on prevention (i.e. the main target groups being youth at-risk of recruitment').

Relevance was analysed with attention to several aspects: the original conflict analyses, the projects conflict sensitivity (inclusiveness, and treatment of ethnicity) gender, and complementarity.

In the communities it was found that ENJECCOP was a relevant project also in view of its violence reduction results for youth and in the communities.

Relevance was not the same for all ethnicities, however: the number of Songhai that were served by the project was much higher (also relatively speaking) than the number of Tamashek speakers, (include the Tuareg). Tamashek speakers did not always find the analysis of local tensions sufficient.

The conflict analysis which determined the approach of ENJECCOP gave attention to other aspects than the conflict analyses that were conducted in the communities.

The local conflict analyses hardly included the concern for young combatants and how communities intended to deal with them. Nor was there an update of conflict analyses that treated ethnic community relations.

The relevance of ENJECCOP, with its ambition to assist in implementing the Algiers peace accord, was not extra checked after the change of strategy.

In all project activities their inclusivity was hailed by participants. It was even seen as an achievement of the project. But in the ensuing community activities this enthusiasm went down somewhat. Inclusivity was well managed in ENJECCOP, but it was better handled within directly managed ENJECCOP activities than in the linked community structures.

The treatment of gender, especially the inclusion of women and girls, was positively judged by many participants. Women were especially active in Sports for Change trainings and income generation activities. In certain places women were active in Peace Campaigns and even in local governance. Although not (yet?) active in all events (this was often the case in conflict analysis workshops and in local governance structures) they are identified as a potential force for peace.

Complementarity was taken care of by ENJECCOPs embedding in the national UNPBF funding programme, which manages many peacebuilding programmes all over Mali. However, it was not always easy for ENJECCOP to coordinate with other peacebuilding organisations the enormous delays in the national DDR process. Its natural partners for DDR and MINUSMA in the regions were not the logical coordination points any more. ENJECCOP then tended to focus on its community work and gave its place in national peace building less consideration.

The lesser outreach to nomadic pastoralists, community conflict analyses with little connection to the national context or to motivations for youth to enter armed groups, the quick adjustment of its strategy, the lack of consultation with national partners during the project implementation period, as well as the missing review moments of this change process, insufficient baseline and endline information : they together constituted a substantial risk for ENJECCOPs relevance.

Recommendations for improved relevance:

- 1 Tighter communications (encourage cordial and informal contacts, as well as formal exchanges) to liaise with national and regional peacebuilding partners, even more so in the absence of certain coordination mechanisms
- 2 More built-in review moments and better monitoring during the implementation process, especially after the need for a (strategy) change
- 3 More frequent updates of existing conflict analyses.
- 4 Invest in and create special strategies to reach and include marginalized pastoral groups, possibly using the internet and phone networks
- 5 Special attention for the inclusion of young women in project and community activities and look at possibilities to train them as a special peace force, alongside a force of young men.

## **2 Effectiveness**

ENJECCOP was, during the time that it lasted, an effective project in its contribution to violence reduction and the reintegration of youth.

Internal collaboration between the three implementing partners seems rather smooth, despite the request for better information sharing by Bamako HQ.

Most effective activities for the reduction of community violence were those initiated by the Sports for Change programme, the peace campaigns and the conflict monitoring committees. The latter were seen to be most integrated in the community structure and can be expected to continue for

a while without project funding. Sports for Change is, by far, seen as the most crucial contribution to violence reduction.

Most effective activities for the social economic reintegration were seen the coached groups and the small projects (usually under S4C). Tamashek speakers also saw the community plans as effective instruments for this end.

Although these activities were seen to have contributed the most, certain other activities were seen as the most important. These were almost all related to ENJECCOPs peace building and conflict resolution activities, as well as its strategy for inclusiveness.

The least effective activities are those that seek to enhance the participation of youth in community decision making, although there is some ambivalence about these actions among the marginalised: i.e. the women and the Tamashek. Also, the community action plans are seen as less effective, despite their well-liked contribution to the reintegration of youth by the Tamashek.

Certain, originally ENJECCOP-supported, initiatives are still active today (without its support): the conflict monitoring committees, the sports competitions with their outfits, the vocational tools and skills. Community action plans and the peace campaigns are not mentioned. In one or two communities there are still women active in local governance structures.

Recommendations for improved effectiveness:

- 1 Community plans and youth participation in local governance are seen as less effective, but some informants underlined their importance. They are also part of a necessary set of activities that make life more meaningful and a community more vibrant if these are well care for. Extra thought should go into how to attract the young to participate in local decision making.
- 2 Sports for Change activities are effective, but how long they will last without support is unclear. A longer-term track to monitor the youth in their vocations, sports and peace activities would be useful
- 3 A lobby for longer-term project with the donor community is a necessity.
- 4 Be sure to inform and engage the communities for new (income generation) plans, the type of participants sought, the means available, the changes that sometimes need to be made and for the programme exit. Regular consultative participation in a wider circle than the community leaders could be applied more often. Thereby create anchored community ownership of activities.

### **3 Sports for Change**

The combination of peacebuilding activities (play, campaigns, discussions with other ethnic groups) with the creation concrete income generation opportunities is a very attractive approach in poverty- and conflict-stricken areas. It is seen as the most effective strategy against community conflict and violence.

### **Recommendations for an improved Sports for Change component:**

The recommendations of the above also apply to a new Sports for Change programme: involve minorities, pay extra attention to young women, do regular rounds of consultation and participation, ensure the project's continued relevance, do a longer-term follow-up if possible.

After the appreciation of ex-ENJECCOP staff of the contribution of S4C to socio-economic reintegration of youth, we have one last recommendation:

Do not overrate S4C's economic success and do not neglect the peace building aspect. Keep on doing it in a strategic way. Continue to simultaneously apply various strategies. This is what we learn from the comparison with a Peace and Sport project (P&S) in South Sudan: peace building is an action for the long haul. Hereby some of P&S's lessons that seem to apply to S4C:

- 1 Teamwork and collaboration add value to the realization of peace
- 2 Involvement/commitment of government and security personnel is paramount to the peace building process.
- 3 Structurally engaged and strengthened local leadership in programme management and in peace building, while ensuring the involvement of all layers of a community is essential for the indispensable ownership of a peace process
- 4 Peace can only be a success when communities are committed, and feel ownership of the whole process.
- 5 The importance of inter-communal peace agreements and their follow-up.
- 6 Collaboration and sharing of resources sustain peace.
- 7 Continuous monitoring and containment of peace spoilers
- 8 Regular meetings help to address and harmonize important emerging issues

## Abbreviations

AFP	Agence France-Presse
AG	Armed Groupe
AJDM	Association Jeunesse et Développement de Mali
ARPP	Advanced Reconciliation and Promoting Peace (USAID Programme)
CMA	Coalition de Mouvement d'Azawad
CNDDR	Commission Nationale Désarmement Démobilisation et Réinsertion
CRJ	Conseil Régionale de la Jeunesse
CSA	Comité de Suivi de l'Accord de paix
CSRC	Crisis States Research Centre
CTS	Comité Technique Mixte de Sécurité
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
EIGS	Etat Islamique dans le Grand Sahara
ENJECCOP	Engaging Youth in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali
EU	European Union
FCO	United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FG	Focus Groupe
FP	Foreign Policy
GCERF	The Global Community Engagement for Resilience Fund
GNIM	Groupe de Soutien aux Islam et Musulmans (Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin)
HC	High Commissioner
II	Individual Interview
IP	Implementing Partners
MC	Mercy Corps
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA	Azawad National Liberation Movement
MOC	Operational Coordination Mechanism
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD)
OSC	Organisation de la Société Civile
PBF	(UN) Peace Building Fund
PR	Programme Responsible
RA	Research Assistant
RC	Resident Coordinator
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund



# 1 Context of the ENJECCOP programme


## 1.1 Conflict and context analysis

The conflict in Northern Mali escalated in early 2012 and the North-South perspective was the dominant explanation. The Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) – mainly comprised of Tamashek and Arab combatants supported by terrorist armed groups ousted the Malian national army and declared ‘the independent state of Azawad’, comprising the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao.

This would-be loss of the 3 Northern regions of Mali was facilitated by the political instability (military coup) in March 2012. The separatist northern coalition soon fragmented because the armed groups represented a variety of interests and demands. Since 2015, MNLA and other former separatist groups have broadly made peace with the national government in Bamako, accepting the contents of the peace agreement signed on May 15, 2015.

Despite the signed peace agreement, and the international and regional armed forces intervening in Mali as well as other peace efforts, the conflict in Mali becomes more spread out and intense. It has taken different forms. A political conflict over independence of the North, in which an extremist perspective was introduced that became the main cause of the violence that erupted since 2012, the violent conflict has subsequently spread into Central and Southern of Mali.

Figure 1: Security situation in parts of Central and Northern Mali, June 2018 c AFP



This was enabled by pre-existing inter community and ethnic tensions. Nomad communities - mostly cattle breeders - and sedentary communities - mostly farmers - have a long history of community disputes over the use of land and water. International Islamist armed groups are suspected to manipulate the local rivalries, deepening the rifts.

In the regions of Gao and Timbuktu the Tamashek speakers (mainly consisting of nomadic Tuareg) are an import group that are almost 30% of the population. The other main, and bigger, group consist of the mainly sedentary Songhai: around 55% in Timbuktu and just under 45% in Gao.<sup>2</sup> Between these ethnic groups, and between factions within these groups, disputes over natural resources have traditionally existed.

Citing a recent report of Conflict Management Consulting: "This setting is further complicated by long-term, structural conditions such as climate change, poverty and unemployment, which are leading to disruption of existing livelihood patterns and fragmentation of community cohesion.

Often, historically established social divisions between ethnic groups have become radicalized, with violent extremist movements seizing the opportunities afforded for extending their reach into new areas and communities"<sup>3</sup>

The current situation of Mali is very fragile. Over the last few years corruption and injustice increased in Mali. Many political and elected leaders were sent to jail and subsequently freed on bail, as happened with the mayor of Bamako."<sup>4</sup> In addition, the students of public schools (elementary and secondary) have passed all year outside of their classrooms due to the strike of the trade union of teachers. Finally, the legislative elections in March and June was the latest development that led to deterioration of the political climate in Mali. During these elections, some candidates received majority votes in their communities and, on this basis, were accepted as candidates by the Ministry of Territorial Administration. However, the constitutional court gave unfair preferential treatment of non-majority vote MP candidates. This was admitted at the highest governmental level. However, President Keita dubbed the situation as (paraphrasing): "...a fault which should not be corrected by the injustice of dismissing all MPs and dissolving the parliament". These events deteriorated the country political and security context. This context called into existence a new so-called civil society group led by Imam Mohamoud Dicko, a religious leader, and some former opposition political leaders (CMAS-M5-FRP). This group demands the resignation of the president Keita, the disbandment of the parliament, and the constitutional court. They organized a first march on 5 June 2020, a second one on 19 June 2020 which had a massive turn out of Malian citizens. They demanded the departure of the president. A third march was organized on the 10<sup>th</sup> of July 2020, which caused a serious disruption of city life in Bamako.

## 1.2 Implementation of the Peace Accord<sup>5</sup>

The 2015 Accord "Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process" is not progressing as planned in order to fulfil its promise for national reconciliation. Its main fault is that the Accord only addresses a slice of Mali's instability which is the 2011-2012 separatist rebellion in the north of the country. It failed to address the mounting Islamist violence,

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<sup>2</sup> Secrétariat de Club de Sahel et de l'Afrique de L'Ouest/OECD, 'Les régions maliennes de Gao, Kidal et Timbuktu, Perspectives Nationales et Régionales', dans : [Perspective Maliennes](#), Octobre 2015 p 13

<sup>3</sup> Conflict Management Consulting: Sahel formative review. Draft, March 2020

<sup>4</sup> Speech of the President of the Republic of Mali on July 9, 2020

<sup>5</sup> "Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process", 2015 through: Peace Agreement Access Tool, [www.peaceagreements.org](http://www.peaceagreements.org)

the lethal ethnic tensions, and the resulting persistent insecurity in the country. The actors that currently commit violence in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and central Mali were not involved in the signing of the peace agreement. They have created more victims over the last few years than any of the parties that signed the Algiers Accord<sup>6</sup>. No wonder that many Malians are not convinced by the peace agreement. They do not view the accord as a genuine peace deal, but rather as a sign of weakness of the Malian state and as a form of favouritism for Mali's elites. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies sums it all up in its analysis of ascribing the accord's failings to *"to three interlinked issues: (1) its failure to engage all actors contributing to instability, (2) its limited geographic scope, and (3) limited commitment and political buy-in from its signatories and guarantors"*<sup>7</sup>.

Another problem is the agreement's slow implementation. This can be analysed as a lack of political will and buy-in by the signatories, or *guarantors*, of the Accord. These are: the Malian government, separatist groups in the North; Northern armed groups favouring Malian territorial unity; and the Algeria-headed mediation team. Political will is a pre-condition for the effective implementation of the main pillars of the Accord, such as decentralization and the DDR<sup>8</sup> process of ex-combatants.

The DDR process is far behind schedule while this could help to address problems of Malian youth, which form the greater majority of Mali overall population. Among the root causes for the ongoing violence are frustration and lack of perspective among the youth<sup>9</sup>. As such they are easy recruitment targets for armed groups, whether ethnically based or Islam-extremist. Unfortunately, the youth hardly has a voice in the implementation of the Algiers Accord, i.e. reintegration through an inclusive DDR process.

Similar failings can be observed concerning the possibilities for engagement of women and girls, and youth at large, in the peace process. Despite the agreement's call on both women and youth to "extend their full support to achieving the agreement" (primarily in the context of development and income generation support) women and youth need to "push the doors open" to participate in implementation. We are citing Maître Saran Keita, a member of the Network on Women's Peace and Security in the ECOWAS Region. Keita warned that "the peace agreement is a document of the elites in Mali; an international document with no real local ownership." There is no indication that any of the sparingly few development initiatives have been specifically geared toward women and youth<sup>10</sup>.

Despite this situation, the peace agreement remains a peace deal uniquely recognized by international stakeholders in the Mali peace process. According to the UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres in 2019, "The peace agreement remains the only valid and viable framework"<sup>11</sup>.

### 1.3 DDR process and youth

DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) is a central measure of the Peace Agreement signed in mid-2015 between the Government of Mali and the two coalitions of

<sup>6</sup> See also: HRW, *"How Much More Blood Must be Spilled?: Atrocities Against Civilians in Central Mali"*, 2019

<sup>7</sup> Conflict Management Consulting: Sahel formative review. Draft, March 2020.

<sup>8</sup> DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

<sup>9</sup> *"WE HOPE AND WE FIGHT. Youth, Communities, and Violence in Mali"*, September 2017, ThinkPeace and Mercy Corps

<sup>10</sup> Conflict Management Consulting: Sahel formative review. Draft, March 2020

<sup>11</sup> Why Mali Needs a New Peace Deal, centre for strategic and international Studies, April 15, 2020: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal>

signatory movements; DDR aims to disarm armed groups by integrating ex-combatants into the security and defence forces or by facilitating their return to civilian life.

While DDR should have started 60 days after the signing of the Agreement (September 2015), it only began three years later. One of the more important reasons for the delay were ex-combatants demanding additional guarantees. The "launching" ceremony took place only in November 2018.

When DDR started in 2018, the administrative structures for it had been ready for a long time. The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CNDDR) was set up (appointment of a national coordinator supported by vice-coordinators from armed movements, establishment of regional structures and offices, hiring and training of staff, preparation of strategy). Eight cantonment sites were built in the northern regions of Mali. At the same time, the financial partners mobilized US \$ 21 million through a Trust Fund, administered by MINUSMA whose role in the process is to support to the Malian government: for the removal of weapons from the hands of combatants; taking the combatants out of military structures; and integrating combatants socially and economically into society. In addition to MINUSMA and the International forces (France, ECOWAS, AU and EU) many other donors are supporting directly or indirectly through implementers at the community level the process of DDR and peace in Mali among others, FCO/UK through the conflict, security and stability fund, French Agency for Development, and The Global Community Engagement for Resilience Fund (GCERF).

Also, "confidence-building measures" provided for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and were prerequisites for the DDR process. These were negotiated with the mediation of in Mali deployed international forces between the parties to the Agreement. The measures are overseen by the CSA (Comité de Suivi de l'Accord or Monitoring Committee for the Agreement), the CTS (Technical Security Commission), monitoring their implementation in the field.

The main confidence-building measure is the establishment of joint patrols between armed groups and the Malian armed forces, under the unified command of the Operational Coordination Mechanism (MOC), whose responsibility is to restore confidence between the parties, and to secure cantonment sites for DDR. They are dedicated to demobilisation, but not to disarmament. These joint patrols process started in 2018 However, they remain ineffective and are in fact a prime target for many attacks.

## 1.4 Conflict analysis in ENJECCOP

As part of the Engaging Youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali Programme, Mercy Corps and IPs have implemented community-based conflict analysis/mapping and community action planning in the three target regions of the programme. Before the project started Mercy Corps with Think Peace did an elaborate conflict analysis, that focused on the causes for youth to engage in violence called "We Hope and We Fight"<sup>12</sup>. The findings and recommendations of this study are largely the same as those mentioned in ENJECCOPs project proposal<sup>13</sup> and are at the basis for it.

Main causes for youth in violence mentioned by the report, and are rather motivation oriented:

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<sup>12</sup> "WE HOPE AND WE FIGHT. Youth, Communities, and Violence in Mali ", September 2017, ThinkPeace and Mercy Corps

<sup>13</sup> IRF Project Document -NUNO- Template 2.1 Engaging youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali, Last Signed December 2017, Mercy Corps, p6

- Youth engage with armed groups out of a sense of duty towards their communities
- Neglect and failure in service provision by the government fuels anti-government armed group membership
- Injustice, abuse and corruption fuel anti-government armed groups membership
- Youth see armed groups as a steppingstone to stable positions in the army
- High expectation of the peace process easily turning in frustration and violence

Recommendations concern the targeting of not only target youth-at-risk, but the whole community in violence prevention, the work with communities in transparent and inclusive implementation of the peace process that respond to its diverse needs; the work with communities to move from armed group protection to state led security; the improvement of local governance through better service delivery and inclusive community decision making; and finding viable (economic) opportunities for youth so that they do not feel compelled to join armed groups.

The analysis considers economic interests in a limited way. It is more motivation and community-dynamic oriented. The community conflict analyses in the communities, facilitated by ThinkPeace and Mercy Corps somewhat later are different<sup>14</sup>.

In the communities of Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka a series of participatory conflict analyses were conducted by ThinkPeace in preparation of an integrated community approach, the set-up of Comités de Suivi de Conflit and the making of community Action Plans. This approach was to contribute to the solution for the problem of youth engagement in violence.

Here, the main causes for communal conflict mentioned are similar for all three regions and are focussed on economic resources and community security oriented in its descriptions:

- Scarce natural resources
- Land disputes
- Leadership / interpersonal conflicts
- Inter and intra-community conflicts
- Conflicts among youths
- Affiliation of some community members to armed groups
- Sporadic attacks and robbery

The two studies are different in level (communal conflict vs youth in violence) and different in the nature of root cause descriptions (conflict motivation versus conflict interest and effect). The way the various documents read raise questions in the relevance domain. Our evaluation of the relevance dimension will make an effort to trace the relation between the two different conflict analysis results.

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<sup>14</sup> Community Conflict Analyses in Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka, 2018/2019

## 2 Description of the ENJECCOP programme

### 2.1 Donor context

UNPBF, the United Nations Peace Building Fund, is the donor to this 18-month and 1,7 million dollars programme of ENJECCOP. The five-year programme of UNPBF 2014-2018 was evaluated in 2019<sup>15</sup>.

In 2017 ODA funding for peacebuilding projects was substantial in Mali and reached almost 200 million dollars. The UNPBF is in comparison a small donor with about one seventh of this amount to its disposal. Yet, the portfolio is characterized by a high level of diversity in terms of recipient organizations, namely 13 UN agencies, funds and programmes as well as three civil society organizations. Projects are implemented in close collaboration with MINUSMA. The PBF portfolio is overseen by a Steering Committee, co-chaired by the Government of Mali (represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the UN (represented by the DSRSG/RC/HC).

Mercy Corps was funded in the second phase of PBF investments. This phase focussed on the central regions of Mopti and Segou. The evaluation team of the UNPBF programme remarked on the lack of an overarching strategy. Therefore, there is no overall peace building strategy other than the Algiers Peace Accord. This implies that evaluation criteria to judge the complementarity and coherence of ENJECCOP with other projects may lack an overall framework of reference.

### 2.2 Implementation structure

ENJECCOP was executed by three parties: Mercy Corps, Think Peace and AJDM. The conflict analysis part and development of initial action plans is conducted by ThinkPeace, a Malian peace building organisation and thinktank, in conjunction with Mercy Corps. Together these organisations conducted the initial research that led to ENJECCOP the 'We Hope And We Fight' study of 2017. The implementation of activities in the communities is assisted by AJDM (Outcome 2) and Mercy Corps (Outcome 3). And Think Peace Outcome 1 and under Outcome 3 the Peace campaign

AJDM is an organisation focussed on youth and development with ample experience in community work in all three regions. It worked in partnership with Mercy Corps before. Mercy Corps, besides being active in implementing activities, is the lead and administrative coordinator, and is the liaison to the donor UN Peace Building Fund (check project prop, last p)

ENJECCOP is active in three regions in Timbuktu (in twenty municipalités and communes in Gao (in thirty municipalités and communes) and in Ménaka (in 10 municipalités and communes). Ménaka, in particular, has access problems and the evaluation team is not able to access this region. Nevertheless, we were assured that the programme was run there throughout the project period. The criteria for selection of the project sites were (in brief): 1-strong presence of demobilised and former fighters; 2-proximity to cantonment sites; 3-community tensions likely to

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<sup>15</sup> Salif Nimaga, Amagoin Keita, Charles Petrie, 'Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Mali 2014-2018', Final Report, 30 July 2019



worsen under the influence of the DDR process; 4-ongoing community tensions; 5-heightened risk of vulnerability, exclusion and stigmatisation; and 6-security and accessibility.

In practice, ENJECCOP supported communities with a series of activities that helped them plan the assistance to their own youth, youth-at-risk and ex-fighters. The aim is to enable the socio-economic reintegration of the youth in their own communities. At the same time communities are offered possibilities to acquire skills for the prevention and resolution of (violent) conflict and to better understand what cause the outbreaks of violence and tensions between and within communities. These analyses lead to Community Action Plans and to a way to monitor conflicts and conflict risks. The community committees, that do the monitoring are called the *Comités de Suivi de Risques de Conflit (CSRC)*, also develop plans to address conflict drivers.

The second string of activities revolves around the actual community initiative themselves for the integration of youth. ENJECCOP enables both communities and youth to be active in small reintegration projects, policy development and lobby initiatives. Sports for Change activities are included in this series of activities, although it is sometimes presented as a goal in itself.

The third set of activities is organised around the creation of an enabling environment for youth to be more involved in community affairs.

## 2.3 Theory of Change

The ToC diagram seems an orderly set of logically related activities and results. We have a few remarks however,

The connection to the broader context seems a bit chaotic. It is not quite clear how ENJECCOP is linked to other programmes supported by PBF and others. It raises the question of how ENJECCOP fitted in with the lines of action supported by the Algiers accord. Some of these approaches and strategies may have been inherited from previous programmes, such as the ARPP programme of Mercy Corps and ADJM (2018-2019). It influenced the ENJECCOP approach, especially the Sports for Change. The same is true for the conflict monitoring committees, which were taken on board by ENJECCOP from a programme called FANOC. In ARPP and FANOC the complementarity with other programmes and the fitting in in the bigger picture of Malian peacebuilding may have been more articulate. Also, the wider political context in Mali is only briefly touched upon by the analytic documents we have. So, it reinforces the relevance question on complementarity how was this justified and executed in ENJECCOP. This may be due to the focus of the ENJECCOP partners on community-based action, which is seen as complementary to, for instance, the government's and MINUSMA's role in the DDR process. This could have been presented more explicitly.

In ENJECCOP many hinges on the whole-of-community approach (see the numerous green arrows in the diagram). This approach is implicit, but not yet fully developed in the 2017 Hope and Fight study of Mercy Corps. It provided an evidence-base for the project's ToC, i.e. *if* youth are more involved in community decision making, communities -including youth and women- are holistically involved in understanding conflict, *and* in social and economic reintegration, *then* they will reduce the violence committed by youth.

Although in the conflict analyses of the original project plan the presence of demobilised fighters and the DDR process are seen as an important factor for violent youth, they hardly figure in the Theory of Change of ENJECCOP, nor in the formulation of activities. Also, in the community-driven Conflict Analyses in Gao and Timbuktu the DDR process is neither explicitly mentioned as


a threat, nor as an opportunity. This was likely due to the lax implementation of the whole DDR implementation track. If so, then this is ideally reflected in an updated conflict analysis by the ENJECCOP partners and an explicitly presented strategy change.

The formulation of the activities, outputs and outcomes sometimes lack preciseness in the reports. An output could be an activity and an outcome an output (especially when numbers of beneficiaries are cited in outcomes (usually an output level). Another example is found in output or in outcome where 'support received' is mentioned. This is usually a formulation more fitting to the preplanning phase of a project.

The conclusion leads us to the potential unclarity and certain inconsistencies of the change philosophy, project logic, and the multiple levels of conflict analyses that exist in ENJECCOP. More importantly and if possibly confirmed by other data: did potential imperfections in causal thinking had implications for ENJECCOPs final results?



Figure 2: Reconstruction of the changed philosophy of ENJECCOP<sup>16</sup>



<sup>16</sup> Formulations are summarised.

Legend for the ToC diagram:

<p>*Outcome 1 seems to partially repeat with Outcome 2. These are both on reintegration. All activities under 1 contribute to the part of Outcome.1 on conflict drivers</p> <p>**Though not presented as such, this seems to be an objective judged by the formulation of certain activities under Output 1.1</p>	
<p><b>solid green arrows and box = whole-of-community hypothesis</b></p>	<p><b>Box: Light green</b> = Activities under strategy 1</p> <p>A 'whole-of-community' approach to local peace building and good governance:</p>
<p><b>solid blue arrows = based on other hypotheses</b></p>	<p><b>Box: Light orange</b> = Activities under strategy 2</p> <p><u>Coaching/Mentoring to prepare for social and economic activities, including Sports for Change</u></p>
<p><b>solid grey arrows = explains underlying hypothesis.</b></p>	<p><b>Box: Pinkish</b> = Activities under strategy 3</p> <p><u>Support to youth involvement in indigenous community processes (peace building and reintegration)</u></p>

## 2.4 Strategies

The ENJECCOP programme is based on a Mercy Corps research 'We Hope and We Fight' conducted mid-2017. It concluded that successful reintegration of youth and ex-combatants can only work if it is an effort of the whole community. Targeting youth at risk as an isolated group has less chance of succeeding to keep the youth away from the temptations of Armed Groups and their aggressive recruitment tactics. It built a project on what are three said innovative strategies.

- A 'whole-of-community' approach to local peace building and good governance: the whole community is targeted to be involved in conflict resolution, addressing the main conflict drivers and fighting extremism. Men, women, youth, local authorities, religious and ethnic leaders etcetera. All can be targeted and are triggered to become active by ENJECCOP.
- Support to indigenous community processes. Both support and processes are designed by community members. the communities themselves formulate their main problems and gain insight in the causes of conflict. They formulate their own action plans. The youth express their needs and become active, with the community support, to organise their own reintegration and contribution to peace building. One of the peace building approaches here is the organisation of sports and psychosocial activities.
- Sports for Change: the sports element is stressed in ENJECCOP for its unifying and motivating potential. In previous programmes Mercy Corps has used this method and in many countries in Africa where conflict is rife similar programmes are being implemented. It is used to mobilise the youth from different (often opposing) ethnic groups. The youth participates in life skills programmes based on their own formulated needs for improvement of viable livelihood prospects.

## 3 Evaluation Methodology

### 3.1 Key evaluation questions

The evaluation is both meant to serve purposes of donor accountability and as a formative exercise which should help to formulate lessons learnt. It is not an impact evaluation. This was originally desired, but cost considerations and timing, forced Mercy Corps to lower its ambitions.

The choice made is an evaluation that covers two OECD/DAC criteria:

- Relevance
- effectiveness
- observations on the OECD/DAC criteria of efficiency, impact and sustainability will be mentioned but not specifically researched.

Moreover, specific attention was given to:

- **Gender**

To which extent did ENJECCOP make reintegration and non-violent behaviour of youth relevant to gender relations within communities.

- **Coherence and complementarity**

What was the intensity and effectiveness of working relations with other peacebuilding and development programmes in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao?

- **Sports for Change**

A 'lessons learnt' exercise will be conducted for the Sports for Change activities.

We limited the evaluation to the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. Ménaka was not covered due to security and time issues.

#### 3.1.1 Relevance

The concept of relevance raises the question: 'Has the programme done the right things?'

Based on the ENJECCOP change philosophy the key evaluation question on relevance is:

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*In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao did ENJECCOP activities and outputs contribute to its main outcome*

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This includes:

- 9 Community-based addressing of youth engagement in violence
- 10 Socio-economic reintegration of youth-at-risk
- 11 Meaningful community roles by the youth
- 12 Social cohesion, and a more stable and peaceful Mali?

Under relevance<sup>17</sup> we will also look into:

- Conflict Analyses: their design, quality, and dynamic use in the project. Link to Theory of Change
- Conflict Sensitivity: actions to avoid contributing to community tensions (esp. around youth-at-risk and ex-combatants)
- Coherence and Complementarity: knowledge, consultations, cooperation of and alignment with other programmes and approaches in Gao and Timbuktu and at the national level
- Gender: approach and policy, participation and representation, gender strengths, gender change issues, gender in community structures, in DDR and conflict resolution, gender in the programme itself

The relevance of Sports for Change activities is also studied:

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*Did the Sports for Change programme of ENJECCOP contribute to reduction of community violence by youth, to the social and economic reintegration of youth, to meaningful community roles for the youth and to social cohesion and stability in their communities?*

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### 3.1.2 Effectiveness

The concept of effectiveness raises the question: 'To what extent are the planned objectives of the development interventions being achieved? Translated to ENJECCOP:

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*In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, to what extent did the ENJECCOP activities contribute to its foreseen Outcomes i.e.:*

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- 1 The community-based addressing of youth's engagement in violence and communities in violence,
- 2 Community-based socio-economic reintegration of youth-at-risk
- 3 Meaningful community roles by the youth.

The key questions posed in the Terms of Reference for effectiveness: "Were planned peacebuilding outputs and outcomes of the target communities achieved?" is split up. The evaluation treated the perceived contribution of:

- community members' use of tools and capacities provided by ENJECCOP, to reintegration and inclusion of at-risk youth (Outcome 1-first part)
- ENJECCOP activities focused on the addressing by communities of conflict drivers to youth engagement in violence (Outcome 1-second part)
- the Youth's use of support, provided by ENJECCOP, to achieve socio-economic reintegration in their communities (Outcome 2)

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<sup>17</sup> We also studied the relevance of Sports for Change activities but we treat this separately in Chapter 5

- ENJECCOP activities to the active and meaningful role of youth in community decision making and in peacebuilding in their communities (Outcome 3)

Key evaluation question on gender:

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*‘To what extent did the ENJECCOPs gender approach contribute to the addressing of conflict drivers, the reintegration of at-risk youth and community roles of the youth in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu?’*

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Key evaluation question on the effectiveness of the Sports for Change programme:

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*‘To what extent did ENJECCOPs Sports for Change activities contribute to the addressing of conflict drivers, the reintegration of at-risk youth and community roles of the youth in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu?’*

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Key evaluation question on the effectiveness of programme coherence and complementarity:

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*‘To what extent did ENJECCOPs efforts for coherence and complementarity with other programmes enhance the achievement of its foreseen results?’*

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### 3.1.3 Effectiveness touching on impact (and sustainability)

In the terms of reference there are questions for the effectiveness dimension that are more related to Impact than to Effectiveness. These are:

- Which perceived changes at community and individual level the project helped to achieve?
- To which extent have the perceived changes -achieved by the project- influenced the dynamics of peacebuilding at the local, regional and even national levels?

The perceptions of changes seen as a consequence of ENJECCOP will be included in all three types of interviews. A word of caution is warranted, however. The evaluation covers a limited number of people. Therefore, the evaluation can only present opinions, at most a trend or maybe a learning point. It is not a sturdy evidence-base for ENJECCOPs peacebuilding effects.

## 3.2 Tools

This was largely an external qualitative evaluation. Paraphrasing ResearchGate <sup>18</sup>a qualitative evaluation can be defined as basically a ‘directional’ evaluation. The evaluation result provides

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
<sup>18</sup> See: [www.researchgate.net/post/what-is-qualitative-evaluation](http://www.researchgate.net/post/what-is-qualitative-evaluation), downloaded 16 April 2020

direction without quantifying the basis for this direction. This type of evaluation may lead to a concept for further project development or theory building.

However, we used the purely quantitative tele-questionnaire for the quantification of perceptions. Since there was not much time for the execution of this evaluation, we felt this was a necessary step. The results of the tele-questionnaire gave us first of all some sense of 'direction', and secondly it proved useful as a check on the data that are collected in the field. This is called 'triangulation' (see the diagram below). We will present later in this report some remarks on the interpretation of the acquired tele-data.

We used three complementary methods in fact:

*Figure 3: Triangulation of data*



### 3.2.1 Interview training - remote version

We did the interview training session three times: two times online by the team leader with the local expert (for the tele-questionnaire and for the field interviews), two times online by the team leader with the research assistants (again for tele-interview and field interview) and one more time repeated by the local expert with the research assistant a day later. This was necessary because the online connection was not good enough to ensure everything was well understood in both Gao and Timbuktu.

### 3.2.2 Telephonic questionnaires

A swift series of telephonic interview was held with a mix various beneficiaries and active participants in the two regions of Timbuktu and Gao. It was conducted by two persons in Bamako, supervised by the expert in Mali and from a distance by the team leader. The duration of an interview was around 25 minutes for 22 posed questions with only closed response categories.

The questionnaire was designed in Google Forms. The tele-*enquêteur* filled the forms during his verbal interview over the phone. The internet proved no problem. A bigger problem was the telephone connection especially to Gao.

We hoped to reach a diversified group of 80 to 100 people by telephone and we finally reached 94. We received participants lists from the project. We cleaned them up and had a wide audience to select from. The tele-*enquêteurs* were asked to select alternately from different lists in order to ensure a good variety of responses from several beneficiary groups (spread over region, gender, ethnic groups and function). We did 20 interviews to check the same sites the field team would visit, although it proved impossible for the tele-team to reach Gounzoureye in Gao. The long lists we acquired from Mercy Corps proved useful, because many people were not easily reached or convinced to talk to a stranger on the phone. See the Annex on questionnaires for the questions asked.

We thank Mercy Corps for making a room available for the tele-*enquêteurs*.

### 3.2.3 Interview format fieldwork: focus group

Focus group interviews were held in the capital and in two communes or *municipalités* in the regions of Timbuktu and Gao. Visited were Timbuktu and Gao '*urbain*' (in several '*quartiers*'), Timbuktu Alafia and Gao Gounzoureye. These interviews concentrated on lessons learned and perceptions relevance and effectiveness. We finally held 8 focus group interviews of which 4 were specifically treated the Sports for Change activities, which was less than we hoped for. It proved difficult to get the right people together, especially because the key people of ENJECCOP, which was terminated by the beginning of March, were for a large part not in the region anymore. Two focus groups in each region were specifically asked about the results of Sports for Change. All focus groups were facilitated by a team of two assistant researchers: 1 writer and 1 interviewer. Results were filled out in Word. Sessions lasted usually just over an hour.

Under Corona rules the size of the focus groups was limited: a maximum of eight persons could be interviewed at any one time. As much as possible focus groups were homogenous. The evaluators feel that diversified groups, with various ethnic, age or gender groups present, might not provide a safe environment for the informants. The necessary openness would have been more difficult to achieve. We feel this tactic was successful, because the frankest answers were obtained from focus group interviews. The groups were based on ethnic groups, gender, and sports for change participants. See the Annex on questionnaires for the questions asked.

### 3.2.4 Interview format fieldwork: Individual Interview

Individual interviews were held with key informants in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu. They were held with mainly local, regional and national authorities, certain key beneficiaries, mentors and coaches, as well as project and policy staff. These semi-structured interviews had a mix of closed and open questions (see the Annex on Questionnaires). An interview might last one to one and half hour. The results are filled out in Excel and data processed in Excel and Tableau a visualisation program.

Part of these interviews were conducted by the local expert, especially in Bamako and the two regional capitals. We reached a total of 37 individual: 22 in Timbuktu, 11 in Gao and 4 in Bamako.



Again, especially in Gao the challenge to find the right people was great and this is reflected in the number of interviews.

### 3.2.5 Some remarks on bias and the analysis method

Bias is 'any tendency which prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question' <sup>6</sup>. In research, this is in principle the same. We wondered if bias may have been a cause for what we will call the 'positivity phenomenon' in evaluation responses. Especially in the tele-questionnaire there was a striking, almost unanimous positivity of responses to evaluation questions on ENJECCOP. A similar tendency can be remarked in the results of the baseline and end line evaluation by ENJECCOP itself. To a lesser extent this was also true for individual and focus groups interviews. The massive emphasis on 'excellent' and 'really wise' in the tele-questionnaire, especially in Gao, and the all-over lack of criticism points to methodological issues to consider. For example, only 4 out of 9 interviewed ENJECCOP staff did not answer the question on 'less fruitful points' of ENJECCOP. What could be an explanation for the responses that seemed not completely frank?

- *Not due to bias:* The positivity is real and must be taken seriously.
- *Cultural bias:* The positivity is caused by a general feeling of impoliteness to talk in a negative way about a project that was for some time 'a hand that fed' to relatively strange evaluators.
- *Dependency bias:* The positivity is caused by a feeling of dependency. All respondents and key informants, who participated in the evaluation, benefitted from the project in some way.
- *Question bias:* The positivity is caused because the questions were culturally inappropriate
- *Unsafe space bias:* The positivity was caused by a lack of sufficient 'safe space' for frankness during discussion and interviews. This often happens in conflict affected societies

The lack of variation in the answers forces the evaluators to adjust their data analysis methods. So, in our data analyses we must deal with this issue. To pick out 'lessons learnt' we followed some guidelines during analysis:

- We decided to compare the different shades of good in the data to distinguish assessment among various groups of respondents. Good then becomes: 'less excellent' and points to a difference in mood or opinion that could be meaningful.
- We compared answers in the tele-questionnaire to focus group discussions. We concluded from the combination of quantified assessments with explanations that we might re-interpret the categories: the 'good' assessment is often accompanied with a remark to learn from, the 'not good, not bad' means that there is a serious point of criticism

We also felt few comments were made on the ENJECCOP strategy, neither by staff or by others (despite questions on complementarity and change of strategy and explanations asked for various issues). By using various sources (including the desk review) some strategic issues have surfaced and we will present them as strategic questions and learning points in the last chapter.

In the report we often make the comparison between individually interviewees, tele-respondents and focus group interview participants. The reasons lie in the different audiences and the, consequently, different questions. The tele-questionnaire was more focussed on ENJECCOP beneficiaries. Twenty of these were held in communities where also the field team had conducted their individual and focus group interviews. The focus groups gathered youthful male and female participants of various ethnic backgrounds in a safe environment where they could speak freely



without any sort of pressure. Half of these group interviews were specifically focussed on Sports for Change. The individual interviews were conducted with key-informants. They have a special knowledge of the project. Over half of them were 'professionals': they are ex-ENJECCOP staff, government officials, community leaders, civil society activists and active ENJECCOP participants. 9 out of the 37 key informants were ex-ENJECCOP staff. Each of these three types of interviewees give another dimension to the evaluation.

## 4 Relevance

Based on an all-of- community approach, ENJECCOP intended to be relevant to youth, specifically ex-combatants and youth at-risk to be recruited by armed groups, by conducting local conflict analyses, sports and small income generation project, peace activities for the community and participation in local politics. Relevance is evaluated on three dimensions: the conflict analysis in the communities and its connections to other ENJECCOP activities, conflict and gender sensitivity, and complementarity and coherence. In our evaluation we tried to check if these activities were relevant vis-a-vis ENJECCOPs main goals and result areas. Below we present the main results of the three questionnaires. Where deemed proper, they are complemented with conclusions from our desk review.

### 4.1 Conflict analysis

#### *Local conflict analysis workshops*

In Timbuktu seven conflict analyses were held by Think Peace in the communes of Tombouctou, Bourem-Inaly, Lafia, Alafia, Rharous et of Diré (representing 20 communities) at the start of ENJECCOP in the last quarter of 2018<sup>19</sup>. These were synthesized into one for the whole region. In Gao a similar process took place starting at approximately the same time. Think Peace organised eleven participatory conflict analysis workshops with communities in Ansongo and Gao cercle<sup>20</sup>, representing 30 communities.

These kick-off workshops for local conflict analyses were well evaluated by 44% of respondents saying they were excellent, in the Gao region even by 86% of respondents. In Timbuktu, this rate was much lower: only 7 to 8 % said it was excellent, though many more (63%) said it was 'good'. All through the tele-questionnaire the answers in Gao were more positive (many more 'excellent'-s, 'contribution cruciale'-s etc.) than in Timbuktu. See the statistic below. Of five aspects of the conflict analysis workshops the moderators were best evaluated with on average (both regions put together) 50% of respondents saying they were excellent. The individually interviewed key informants were broadly of the same opinion, although they were more inclined to use terms such as 'good', sometimes 'not good, not bad', and less 'excellent'-s (see Annex on Statistics and figures; figure 1). There is also agreement between beneficiaries and ENJECCOP-professionals and -activists that the influence of the conflict analysis on the community plans and conflict resolution is 'good', but not as good as the other tested dimensions.

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
<sup>19</sup> ThinkPeace, 'Rapport de la Cartographies Des Conflits et des Facteurs de Risques de Conflit' (Timbuktu) Octobre-Décembre 2018

<sup>20</sup> Rapport de la cartographie des conflits et des facteurs de risques de conflit et d'élaboration des plans d'actions, Région de Gao, Octobre 2018-Janvier 2019

## ENJECCOP Tele-enquete

Nombre des repondants: 92

Séparer par: Region: a. Tombouctou & b. Gao




When looking at the verdict of the conflict analysis workshops per ethnic group, the differences is more telling. There is a notable difference between Tamashek speakers and Songhai. The mood is generally positive but Tamashek speakers are not as generous with the 'excellent' appreciation (between 14% to 26% lower) as the Songhai. Especially the analysis of local tensions is rated less high by the Tamashek: more than a quarter says it is 'not good, not bad'. Songhai are twice as positive on the local conflict analysis as Tamashek speakers. Particularly the questions on the *quality* of the analysis of local tensions and the *influence* on local action plans show a marked difference between Songhai and Tamashek speakers in both regions (see also Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, figure 4).

## ENJECCOP Tele-enquete

Nombre des repondants: 94


Séparer par: Etnie en categories fusionnees: c. Songhai, a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq, d. Autres



Some of the ENJECCOP staff, the evaluators spoke to, were based in Bamako, and some of these never visited a conflict analysis session in the field. However, the ENJECCOP staff that were part of these workshops seem less satisfied with the quality of the local analysis workshops on conflict and tensions than others. They concur with certain Tamashek among the tele-respondents.

Nombre des interviews: 6

Séparer par: Domaine de profession: a. Staff ENJECCOP



Other key informants who commented on these results said that they found the workshops an important and inclusive event. It brought groups together and created trust (it was said in Timbuktu). It was an event where everyone was respected and addressed in their own language in a manner that allowed everyone to participate. Finally, people found that participants were well-chosen through the consultation of local leaders. This despite the fact, that it was sometimes difficult to find enough women participants for conflict analysis sessions. (Except for one case, where there was a majority of women in a conflict analysis session.) All in all, inclusiveness was a much-repeated strong point of the workshops and throughout the great majority of ENJECCOP activities.

One respondent was convinced the workshop had resulted in diminished local conflict. But also, the opposite was said: 'Tensions still exist in Timbuktu today...'.

The conflict analyses were never updated or repeated in a similar workshop cycle with the presence of participants from 'tous les couches'. This was generally seen as a pity 'but there was not enough time'. It was deemed necessary, though, to keep informed of conflict dynamics on the ground. Updates of conflict analyses were done in the 'Comités de Suivi de Conflits', also called the 'comité de surveillance'. This was seen as the best alternative, despite, the evaluators feel, the ENJECCOP (whole-of) community approach suffered.

The conflict analysis dealt with many of the daily conflicts over land, crop destruction, water use and sometimes invading armed groups. These are indeed potential triggers for community violence, as well as potentially for bigger and more even violent conflicts. However, some important themes for more durable stability such as relations with the army, the DDR process, and the growth and importance of - ethnically-based - armed groups were only mentioned ever so slightly, let alone their potential consequences for the communities. Though we realise that the time frame and funding issues make such renewal of activities difficult, a renewed community consultation and analysis round might have been expected, after it became clear that ex-combatants could hardly be included in the project.

#### *Summary of conflict analysis results*

The tele-respondents are all over more positive about ENJECCOP's conflict analysis than key informants, yet the trends are the same everywhere. Generally, the workshops were well conducted, inclusion well managed, but the analysis of local tensions and its influence on follow-up activities and committees is less well evaluated by members of marginalised ethnic groups and ENJECCOP staff.

The desk review revealed that local conflict analysis did not have a complete match with the overall conflict analysis that situated ENJECCOP in the larger Malian context. Certain questions important for the relevance of the project were not treated in-depth in the local workshops, particularly the potential local risks of DDR, the cantonment sites and the return of ex-combatants. Moreover, no widely carried (short) update of the local conflict analyses were done, to support a new strategy that included more ordinary youth and youth at risk, and much less ex-combatants.

## **4.2 Ethnicity and conflict sensitivity**

We measured conflict sensitivity mainly through the participation of the main ethnic groups in ENJECCOP, the way in which consultative participation and inclusiveness was ensured for all relevant ethnic groups, gender and age groups. We asked the questions on effects still felt and

on least successful ENJECCOP efforts, but no hints of damage done by the project surfaced. Possibly this needs to be evaluated in another (more up-close and personal) way.

According to well-founded estimations, the proportion of Songhai in Gao and Timbuktu hovers around 45 to 55%.<sup>21</sup> When counting the ethnicity of participants' lists for the various ENJECCOP activities in Gao and in Timbuktu we arrived at an 80-85% participation of Songhai in ENJECCOP activities. In the end line evaluation, the ratio Songhai-other groups hovered around 75% of respondents. With a weighed selection, in order to assure inclusion of representatives of a variety of minorities, the tele-questionnaire sample had 63% proportion of Songhai tele-respondents: 68% in Gao and 55% in Timbuktu. Of 37 key informants for the individual interviews 24 respondent were Songhai. Of the eight focus groups - ethnically and gender homogenous- five were Songhai.

The most significant other proportion of ethnic groups is that of Tamashek speakers. The people identifying themselves as Tuareg in our sample was very low. In our analyses we decided to include the Tuareg in the Tamashek speaking group. Tamashek is both a language and an ethnicity. The Tuareg are Tamashek speakers (Kel Tamashek), but are often seen as different from the Tamashek ethnicity. Albeit somewhat different, Tamashek and Tuareg both have nomadic lifestyles and they speak the same language. This is opposed to the more sedentary farming lifestyle of the Songhai (and others). We therefore decided to merge the Tamashek and the Tuareg in one ethnic category: the comparison between Songhai and Tamashek speakers is justified and becomes more robust this way. The third group 'Others' include Peuhl, Bambara, Arabs and others. Although it would have been interesting to analyse these separately, their numbers within the sample were too small to make significant categories for data analyses.

The Tamashek speakers are an important minority for the relevance of the project: the groups feel marginalised by the Mali government and betrayed by the state of various non-implemented peace deals on the North. The Tuareg are at the root of the current problems. Youth from these groups are vulnerable to recruitment of armed groups, especially by extremist Muslim groups.

Overall, the Songhai in all respondents' groups, young and old alike, tend to give a more positive evaluation of the project than Tamashek speakers. Also, in Gao the responses were in general significantly more positive than in Timbuktu (with a notable exception, i.e. the observation on women's contributions, see below).

Despite the somewhat lopsided representation of ethnic groups in ENJECCOP and the Tamashek's somewhat lower appreciation of ENJECCOP, there was general consensus that ethnicity was well handled in all ENJECCOP activities (Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, Figure 2).

Both the younger age groups represented in the focus groups and individual key informants confirm the impression that inclusivity questions were well handled in ENJECCOP. Questions of ethnicity were really well handled, they find, and safe space for free discussions adequately cared for (in workshops and trainings). According to the explanations this is especially due to the rigid application of clear criteria by ENJECCOP staff (especially Mercy Corps), the fact that there was consistent translation for both Songhai and Tamashek speakers. The only exceptions were the first conflict analysis workshops in Gao, which were in French and not well understood by many participants. The workshops were done again and improved, which was appreciated. Key


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<sup>21</sup> See : Secrétariat de Club de Sahel et de l'Afrique de L'Ouest/OECD, '*Les régions maliennes de Gao, Kidal et Timbuktu, Perspectives Nationales et Régionales*', dans : *Perspective Maliennes*, Octobre 2015

informants are also generally convinced that *because* the quota for representation were well applied participants were comfortable to talk freely about ethnicity questions. Nevertheless, one young Tamashek had the impression that ENJECCOP treated the 'Tamashek blanc' with preference over the so-called 'Tamashek noir'.<sup>22</sup>

The positive evaluation of the ethnicity aspect in conflict workshops in particular prevailed in both regions for Songhai and Tamashek alike (see Annex 5: Statistics and Figure, figure 3). Opinions among the various ethnic groups are more varied for other activities such as: conflict monitoring committees, socio-economic activities with the youth, and activities for the youth to integrate in community structures.

Tele-questionnaire: ethnic groups on management of ethnicity in ENJECCOP in 5 events



However, especially in the committees for the monitoring of local conflicts, the sense of positiveness among Kel Tamashek shows a lower level than among the Songhai (i.e. they listed far less 'excellent'-s for the treatment of ethnicity in the committees).

So, when activities are under control of ENJECCOP the minority groups perception of ethnicity questions seem positive, but the appreciation of events where ENJECCOP's influence is less (community committees and, though valid to a lesser extent, the governance structure) the perception of these groups grows less positive, whereas the Songhai group seem more positive about the inclusiveness of community structures.

The selection of sites was done in a consultative manner that involved most of the important authorities and community leaders. There was also agreement that the selection of beneficiaries was done correctly. Yes, it was said: these were the right sites and beneficiaries.

However, there is a group that did not feel sufficiently included. This was at the level of governmental regional and local and UN authorities, such as the regional branches of the NCDDR and Minusma. In the beginning - when there was still hope in ENJECCOP that the demobilisation process would accelerate - this contact was better than in later stages. Yet, some of the informants felt that more adequate coordination with these actors might have helped a more relevant implementation of the adapted strategy. (See also the paragraph 4.3 Complementarity and coherence)

With individual interviewees we discussed the change of strategy that was necessary in the first stages of the programme. ENJECCOP intended to help communities with the peaceful socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatant, and at the same time with the prevention of the recruitment of youth-at-risk by armed groups. When the cantonment sites stayed empty, ENJECCOP decided -with the consent of UNPBF- to change its intervention strategy by focussing on prevention. It concentrated on the creation of conditions within communities for youth to see

<sup>22</sup> The Tamashek 'blanc'-s are an elite group among the Tamashek, as opposed to the 'noir'-s, who are within Tamashek society, seen as a lower class.

new perspectives that could replace the attraction of armed groups. Besides UNPBF this change of strategy seems to have stayed little discussed in the communities. Many participants say: we understand, but we do not know how the decision was made.

From the local conflict analysis documents, we gather that the conflict analysis workshops in the communities do not handle in-depth the motives of youth and how to keep them on board in absence of the DDR. It seems rather: a decision for the selection of sites was made and the focus on prevention was the logical, and also the easy choice. It seems no other options were explored.

Often young respondents expressed the wish for the creation of possibilities to enlarge the pool of beneficiaries. This is in itself not a conflict sensitivity issue: any project is faced with the scarcity of its means. However, it may become a question of conflict sensitivity if it is not handled wisely. The selection for qualifying candidates must be really carefully managed and carried by the communities it concerns.

From the focus groups it is clear that participants were aware that the ENJECCOP means were limited. In the beginning, however, it came as a surprise to them that not all those who received training could qualify to receive a professional kit, or the means to put it to good use. That is: they, or their communities, were apparently not widely consulted on this issue. One interviewer summarized one of the focus groups discussions as follows: "..., the project could have done better. It got interesting results, but it was insufficient.' The group mentioned: insufficient financing of sports kits, insufficient number of youth participants, insufficient number of neighbouring villages engaged in the project, there was insufficient time to really learn well the freshly learn skills, the project ended too soon....

#### *Summarizing ethnicity and conflict sensitivity results*

Mostly, people agree that inclusivity was well managed in ENJECCOP. It was better handled, according to certain representatives of minority groups, within ENJECCOP than in the linked community structures.

In an environment stricken by poverty and scarcity, oftentimes people show a kind of 'gluttony' ('gourmandise,' in French) in the proximity of a project. People want more benefits in all types of domains. If a project is really thinly spread and decides to do numerous activities with relatively few means, it may result in two things: it could prove a trigger, even a catalyst, for new initiatives after the project ends (this is quite rare), or within many it raises expectations, but in the end these are only realised for a happy few (this is more common). This is a certain cause for frustration and must be handled well. It can only be solved by wide, well handled, participative consultation with the communities. In ENJECCOP there was some dissatisfaction in this respect, but -as far as we know- it did not lead to major conflict. Yet, we conclude that consultative participation at the community level, as a preventative, conflict sensitive management tool, might have been used more often.

However, the Songhai in our tele-sample show a greater satisfaction with the way ethnicity is treated in ENJECCOP, than the Tamashek speakers. Conflict analysis workshops and their influence are less well evaluated by Tamashek speakers. Nevertheless, some Songhai in Timbuktu are more critical than Tamashek respondents of the quality of conflict analyses and its usefulness for community plans seen the 'ni bonne, ni mal' scores.



### 4.3 Gender and age

In a project with a whole-of-community approach that deals with armed groups and their attraction for youths, gender is an important subject matter. This is true, even and possibly more so, if most of the youth-at-risk and (ex-)combatants are usually young men. In conflict and crisis, it is important to deal with questions such as: who decides, who supports, who influences, who provides? In the management of these issues, women and gender in *all* societies - including the more traditional ones - *always* play an important role. These issues immediately touch on women's (and men's) roles in violent conflict and war. And it is safe to say: the roles of women in times of conflict remain systematically underestimated and overlooked. ENJECCOP recognizes this and has the engagement of women and girls as an explicit objective. Was the project relevant to women as well as to men?


From the participation sheets in ENJECCOP activities we estimate women and girls to take around half the participation level of that of men and boys. This is according to ENJECCOP's formulated ambitions. Respondents in the tele-questionnaire have the impression that women's participation rate in ENJECCOP was somewhat higher in local conflict analysis workshops and in Sports for Change activities, and lower in community committees and in local government and community structures. Of course, this may have varied per site.

In our sample, the most *active* participation of women (respondents said women participated 'crucially' or 'well enough') was estimated in the conflict and in the coached support groups.

#### Perceived contribution of women to ENJECCOP activities

##### ENJECCOP Tele-enquete


Nombre des repondants: 83 to 90  
Séparer par: <Sans>:



Key informants are of the same opinion and even more so than the tele-respondents: the overwhelming majority feel the greatest contribution of women in ENJECCOP was to the coached groups and small socio-economic projects. In both regions the assessment shows that three quarters to two thirds of the key respondents think this way:

Nombre des interviews: 30

Séparer par: Domaine de profession: a. Staff ENJECCOP, b. Administration gouvernementale, d. Leader Communautaire and 4 more





Generally speaking, women are slightly more positive about their own contribution to activities than men: more men than women say women only participated '*un peu*'. (See Annex 5: Statistics and Figures, figure 6)

Both young women and men think women were most active in the coached groups and small projects. This tendency will become even clearer when we will look at the Sports for Change activities later. Remarkably, men -more than women- think women have more actively participated in Peace Campaigns. (Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, figures 5 and 6)

In all analyses governmental structure work is seen as having the lowest level of participation of women, also by women themselves.

When we look at the way women's roles in the project are valued by the main ethnic groups, the Songhai are, on the one hand, most positive about the extent and contribution of participation by women in ENJECCOP's activities, and on the other hand, also most negative. Tamashek speakers more often have a middle of the road opinion on the quality of women's contribution.

Gao and Timbuktu show opposite tendencies. Gao-men are much more positive (crucial contribution) than those in Timbuktu. Yet in Gao there is a sizeable minority of male responses saying women 'did not contribute at all'. And even more remarkable: more than three quarters of these answers come from Songhai men (see Annex 5: Statistics and figures, figure 7)

Overall, in all categories analysed (especially ethnicity, gender and region) everyone is the least positive about the contribution of the participation of women in governmental and administrative structures. Then again, overall, the results for the participation in government structures and decision making are the least valued when compared to other ENJECCOP activities, by men and women alike. Yet, the contribution of women to this less appreciated domain of local political participation by youth remains at a low level. Women themselves are least convinced of their contribution to this domain (also many 'I do not know'-s here).

All ethnic, gender, and regional groups in our sample are most positive about women's contribution in the coached support groupes. We will come back to this under the Sports for Change activities.

Women, more than men, are convinced of their own positive contribution to the diminishing of violence by youth and in the communities. It is the opposite when it concerns their contribution to socio-economic reintegration of youth: women seem more critical of their contribution than men. ENJECCOP staff (all men in our census) are unanimous in saying that it is in this domain where women participated the most effectively. Two reasons were given: it is the criteria set by ENJECCOP for women's quota that were well kept to, and secondly -and most importantly- the activities of the coached groups were seen by these men to have a low accessibility threshold for women and girls: not too difficult, well adapted to social cultural and socio-economic circumstances and good fun : 'this attracts women'. Others, who were active in Sports for Change, where coaching of groups was a central activity, mentioned that the activities were well adapted to the needs of women. In the tele-questionnaire the women's contribution is also valued in coached groups, but this is not standing out from other activities. Here there was rather a tendency to credit women for their participation in violence reduction activities. Among the individual interviewees this takes a modest second place.

The enthusiasm in the youthful eight focus groups (in particular in the three groups that consisted of women only) for the way women were treated by ENJECCOP was great. The young women, on average just over 20 years old, were active, asked for more lessons on life skills, found the education cycle offered by ENJECCOP too short. At the same time, they laud the possibilities that

were opened up to them e.g. in learning how to speak, in the opportunities to start a skilled profession that is fit to their needs and existing capacities. They take their roles as sensitizers very seriously. This is mentioned both by men and women.

Male youth are seen as the least productive contributors to violence reduction activities, a logical conclusion knowing that they are also the most active users of violence. However, there is a sign of hope in the end line evaluation shows progress (from 57% to 84%) in *'the percentage of young men and women who recognize that they are appreciated for their contribution to safe and productive societies'*.

#### *Summarising gender sensitivity*

Although women did not actively participate in the promotion of local political decision making, according to both male and female respondents, women's role in violence reduction is valued, foremost by women themselves, but also by men. Men see this role especially in the Peace campaigns. Professionals see the greatest contribution of (young women) mainly in small projects. Remarkably: a sizeable proportion of 15 % of Songhai men, especially in Gao, are quite radical in the overall rejection of women's contributions to any of ENJECCOP's activities.

Young women appreciate the lessons in the support groups the most. Women are the most active participants in these support groups and benefit from them with their own follow up activities. Their contribution to the conflict analysis workshop is not everywhere valued, some women confirm this.

In conclusion, ENJECCOP has encouraged young women to participate in peace building and reintegration, and this proved a relevant activity for the women and for peacebuilding activities. Women, especially young women, felt encouraged by ENJECCOPs educational activities, and are active contributors to violence reduction and small projects. They long to be involved in these domains, but in some cultural settings there seems to be a conservative force against their contribution. Women feel uncertain about their role in local governance, but welcome every encouragement. In certain communities this has resulted in their innovative participation in community structures.

## **4.4 Complementarity and coherence**

Complementarity and coherence are both questions of effectiveness and of relevance. Our conclusions mostly affect the relevance domains and this is why we treat it here. Coherence and collaboration were commented on by individual interviewees, especially by the 9 ex-ENJECCOP staff. Sometimes other key informants commented upon it from their point of view as relative outsiders. The comments were delivered at 4 levels:

- National structures and UN bodies usually related to the DDR 'process', such as the National Commission on DDR (CNDDR), MINUSMA and the donor UNPBF
- Regional coordinative structures and state administrations, such as UN clusters for Social Cohesion, and regional branches of national ministries (local branches of the Ministry of Social Development), and UN organs for instance, or the local offices of MINUSMA)
- Local authorities and leaders for the *cercles* with its Mayors and the *communes*, traditional leaders, Civil Society Leaders, Youth and Women's organisations etcetera.

- Collaboration within the ENJECCOP consortium between the main stakeholders of Think Peace Mercy Corps and AJDM.

### **At national level**

UNPBF is positive about the collaboration with Mercy Corps, despite the delay at the start. The programme is seen as worthwhile, even fundable for another period.

The partnerships with MINUSMA, the CNDDR or the MOC were all exercised at a low level. At national level it only existed at the beginning. An ENJECCOP staff said: “The partnership did not materialise, but nevertheless the meetings helped us to understand the direction in which to steer the programme, and also on how to align it to their intentions.” It does not mean that Mercy Corps or ENJECCOP did not have an eye for coordination. Mercy Corps has been at the cradle of a national NGO platform for the coordination of peace building activities.

### **At regional level**

Regionally the cooperation varied quite a bit. In Timbuktu a Minusma key informant claimed to never have heard of the ENJECCOP project, although he knew of ThinkPeace and Mercy Corps in his region. In itself he saw a big role for NGOs in preparing the ground for returning ex-combatants and for the prevention of recruitment in armed groups at community level. “A fighter originates from a community and returns to a community”. Minusma initiates small projects with local NGOs for that purpose, and participates in the coordination structure of UNOCHA (the ‘clusters’) to avoid duplication. Ex-ENJECCOP staff mentioned that the cluster system in Timbuktu did not work well: the social cohesion cluster did not meet and the second in the one on protection participating partners could not agree on implementation strategies. There was no fruitful collaboration. Informal information sharing was a challenge.

In Gao this was different. Coordination at the cluster levels was bi-weekly and ENJECCOP staff participated. Ex-ENJECCOP staff mentioned it here as a strong point. Programme complementarity, including Minusma, was achieved through UNOCHAs active coordination. ENJECCOP itself was also active in inviting other organisations to their activities.

Even after the decision not to work with ex-combatants due to the slow operations of the CNDDR and the MOC, or due to the non-functioning of a regional cluster system, the hampered communication and coordination between ENJECCOP and Minusma Timbuktu and Bamako seems a missed opportunity. It could have been a strategic strong point.

### **At local level**

At the community level complementarity was noticed: existing local surveillance committees and oversight committees smoothly took on some of the new roles ENJECCOP asked them to do. At the local level people sometimes asked for more responsibility in the project. Youth councils requested of Mercy Corps to be used as direct implementation partners instead of ThinkPeace and AJDM.

The community leaders (the mayors, youth and women leaders) all spoke well of the implication of local structures. Except for one complaint: the sharing of information by ENJECCOP and communications and consultations concerning their plans. We heard this at several levels, but certainly also at the local level: “The weak point is the lack of information provided to the communities. They were confused and did not get clarity about the roles of the three ENJECCOP partners. The effect was that people only knew the organisations and not what the project envisaged to do in their communities.”

We more often noticed that the project was not by all seen as a whole: ThinkPeace, AJDM and Mercy Corps were only seen as specialists in their fields, not as representatives of a coherent project. Also, some respondents - often, but not just, representatives of women's organisations - only saw their own work and results for their own target group, and hardly their contribution to the overall results of the project. This points to a communications deficit. The project used local partnerships (mayors, community leaders, local councils of Women and Youth) who efficiently contacted people in their communities and implemented the project.

Another point -only mentioned once, yet potentially important - is linked to the work with local structures and participation. "Sometimes", one ENJECCOP staff in Gao said, "the role of the Association of Chefs *de Quartier* in the beneficiary selection resulted in them imposing their choice of a beneficiary." It may be difficult to control these unfair preferential mechanisms. Yet it is important while looking for social cohesion in communities that such behaviour is somehow checked and balanced by the community.

#### **At ENJECCOP level**

The internal collaboration between the three partners was well evaluated. There was 'synergy', especially in the field, and the different roles and types of expertise complemented each other. Regular coordination meetings were held and appreciated. Again, the sharing of information and reports within the consortium were seen as a weak point. Also, the lack of the presence of certain senior staff in the field was noted with regret by ex-ENJECCOP staff in the regions.

#### *Summarising complementarity and coherence*

At national and regional level ENJECCOP faced problems: the National commission for the DDR process (CNDDR) did not make any process and its succeeding mechanism of the MOC was also slow. This was a setback for ENJECCOPs relevance in the national peace building context. IN Timbuktu the UNOCHA coordination of the social cohesion and the protection cluster did not function. After these events ENJECCOP did not seek complementarity with e.g. MINUSMA in Timbuktu and other actors.

Cordial and informal consultation with other stakeholders in the peace building field, e.g. seeking a longer-term collaboration with DDR-concerned institutions in the regions may not have been used enough. This might have helped to better ensure the continued relevance of ENJECCOP.

Internal collaboration was good. Some coordination functions, such as sharing of programme information and monitoring visits to the field by Senior programme officers were sometimes lacking.

## **4.5 Overall conclusion of relevance**

### **Result areas**

- Application of tools by communities: The use of the conflict analysis tool is used in communities, but its influence on the work of conflict monitoring committees is not the best

valued among the five aspects evaluated<sup>23</sup>. It has had apparently more influence on community action plans.

- The application of conflict analysis by ENJECCOP might have been more relevant if findings of previous conflict analysis workshops would have been taken into account and if the subject would have been steered more towards the role of communities and youth in violence.
- Addressing conflict drivers: relevance could have improved if 1- the local conflict analysis workshop was repeated when the strategy needed to change, and 2- would have been focussed more on the conflict drivers to youth engagement in violence. 3- The quality of the analysis of local tensions was the least valued in many cases (though still considered 'good') especially by Tamashek speakers
- The Songhai are overrepresented in the project, Tamashek speakers underrepresented. The latter are mostly nomadic pastoralists and particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. Active efforts to involve them more would have been important for ENJECCOP's relevance.
- Use of support to achieve socio-economic reintegration: very positively evaluated by all groups. Also see the Sports for Change chapter.
- Youth participation in community decision making structures are seen as the least visible result of ENJECCOP. Peacebuilding was more often mentioned, but also not as evident as other (socio-economic) domains

### **Mainstreamed subjects**

- Conflict sensitivity: inclusiveness was generally seen as good to excellent: for youth, for ethnic groups, for women.
- Conflict sensitivity: consultative participation of the community and cordial and informal consultation of certain governmental organisations in the field of DDR might have had more consideration for the improvement of ENJECCOPS continued relevance in Mali's peace building context.
- Strategy change: the change of the programme strategy at the beginning might have been more thoroughly considered, after consultation of communities and DDR stakeholders, and a review of conflict analyses
- Gender: ENJECCOP is relevant to gender, and the roles of women in peace building. Women feel encouraged by the support groups, not just because these are 'good fun', but because here they find opportunities for development, and meaningful community roles.
- Gender: Women's contribution to the conflict analysis workshops is not everywhere valued, some women confirm this. It may be true (although not verified) that the safe space for all ethnicities to speak was well managed, but that for women this was not everywhere the case.
- Gender and age: Male youth are still not seen as great contributors to violence reduction activities, despite their observed improvement in this field.
- Complementarity and Coherence: Continued collaboration with national DDR committee and MINUSMA was seen as weak by key informants. In Timbuktu regional collaboration with other organisations in OCHA's clusters and again with MINUSMA did not function.

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<sup>23</sup> Other aspects being: overall impression, quality of moderators, quality of the analyses, influence on community plans influence on conflict management.

Active compensation for the lack of coordination was hardly sought. Better collaboration might have led to a better argued choice for a relevant implementation strategy.

- Complementarity and Coherence: ENJECCOP might have created more mobilisation power, consensus and support by enhancing its communications at the local and at regional level. This goes hand in hand with the earlier noticed possible lack of consultative participation. Both better communications and complementarity with other programmes might have improved ENJECCOPs relevance.

## 5 Effectiveness

### 5.1 Contribution to domains of violence reduction and reintegration of youth

In this chapter we ask the overall question for effectiveness: 'To what extent are the planned peacebuilding objectives for target communities achieved in Gao and Timbuktu in the domains of : addressing violence by youth and in the communities; community-based socio-economic reintegration of youth-at-risk; and meaningful community roles by the youth. We trace which activity contributed to what domain in the eyes of participants and other stakeholders. We look at which activities contributed the most and we look at coherence and complementarity.

We measured effectiveness by gathering data on how the contribution of certain activities to ENJECCOP result areas are viewed. We asked about the contribution of various types of activities to the three main result areas.

We moreover studied reports on community plans, and small projects to see how the various activities were linked, how they met community needs and how this compares to our findings from the questionnaires. These results can be found in a separate attachment.


In the tele-questionnaire all in all, we posed 13 so-called 'contribution questions' on effectiveness. The two selected domains to contribute to were: 1- reduced violence in the communities, and 2- socio-economic reintegration of youth. And besides other activities, how, in particular, was the contribution of Sports 4 Change activities to these domains seen by participants and coaches?

#### Contribution to violence reduction

Of the five type of activities the peace campaigns are seen as having contributed the most to the addressing of violence reduction in the communities and 'participation of youth in government structures' the least. Even if split up in various categories, the lowest opinion on youth in government structures remains the same among all groups.

Nombre des répondants: 94

Séparer par: <Sans>



However, for the activities that contributed most there is a noticeable difference in perceptions between Songhai and Tamashek (although almost all opinions are in the range of 'good' to 'excellent'). The Songhai are most taken by the contribution of the Conflict monitoring committees (almost three quarters of Songhai see this as the main contributor to non-violence), whereas among the Tamashek speakers barely 50% share this assessment. Apart from the Peace



Campaigns they are more convinced of the contribution by community action plans. (see Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, figure 8).

Women are most impressed by the contribution of peace campaigns and the conflict monitoring committees to tackling of community violence. Men's opinions are evenly distributed over all five activity types (see Annex).

On the other hand, Sports-for-Change (which entails similar activities) is all over seen as more crucially contributing to the reduction of violence, even more so than to the socio-economic reintegration of youth. We will come back to this in the Sports for Change chapter.

### Contribution to socio-economic reintegration of youth


Again, when it concerns the management of social economic reintegration it is the activities for youth in community decision making that is seen as having the lowest impact. Otherwise the scores are evenly divided. As in the former question the number of people that say they 'do not know' is quite high.

This may be a sign that people felt uncertain when responding to the questions on contribution. Often many grey 'do not know'-s are combined with more 'red' i.e. 'did not contribute at all'-s. The variations in the answers increase.

Differences between ethnic groups are more telling. Among tele-respondents the greatest consensus (i.e. the *least* 'don't know'-s, and 'did not contribute at all'-s; the *most* 'crucial' and

Nombre des répondants: 94

Séparer par: Etnie en catégories fusionnées: c. Songhai, a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq, d. Autres



'well enough' contributions) exists in the contribution of community action plans and that of peace campaigns to the reintegration of youth. The least consensus exists on the contribution of youth in community decision making structures. Women, men, the regions all show the same tendencies. However, one aspect is striking: the Tamashek speakers have markedly less high confidence in the effectiveness of peace campaigns for the reintegration of youth then the Songhai and others. This is especially the case in Timbuktu.

### Domains of violence reduction and reintegration of youth compared

Highlighting the age groups in the respect of effectiveness in both domains of violence reduction and reintegration: the groups from 26 to 35 of age is the biggest age group among respondents: around 42%. Standing out in this group is the variety of views, ambivalence may be, on the contribution of youth participation in community structures to both the handling of violence reduction and reintegration of youth.


Below a figure is shown for both domains of violence reduction and reintegration. The extent of uncertainty on how to value it seems similar. Conclusion: the youth is ambivalent, lacks confidence maybe, when it concerns their participation to local governance. Following some individual interviewees: youth participation (of both men and women) in governance structures is



stressed by some individuals as an important and crucial subject, but more work needs to be done to make youth integrate in local governance. In some communities the women and have made more progress than men.

Nombre des repondants: 94

Separer par: Age: a. moins de 18, b. 18-25, c. 26-35 and 2 more




All staff agrees that the project and its activities, except in the beginning, was executed as planned and on time. It is important to know this, because it is an important foundation for the effectiveness of the executed activities.

In general, key informants are more nuanced, compared to the tele-questionnaire: we find fewer 'excellent'-s and more 'good's, also fewer 'disastrous'-s or 'not at all contributed'-s. Therefore, it is remarkable that there is almost a consensus that the greatest contribution to the reintegration of the youth comes from the support groups, sports activities and small projects. See response to question 36 below. 'More nuanced' does not necessarily mean: 'more varied'.

Nombre des interviews: 35


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The coached support group activities are also seen as the most important contributor to the management of violence reduction (responses to question 34 in the same diagram above). The opinions of ENJECCOP staff are also quite remarkable in this respect: there was complete unanimity that the support groupes contributed most to the socio-economic reintegration efforts for the youth.

Nombre des interviews: 8

Separer par: Domaine de profession: a. Staff ENJECCOP



From the comments it is clear that the peace campaigns are seen as less effective especially by some former ENJECCOP staff. In particular in Tombouctou the activity was not seen as a great success. According to one ENJECCOP staff: 'There was less enthusiasm for the Peace Campaign work. It was explained that this might be due to the hiring of a service organisation that did not understand the realities of fieldwork and which had no field agent available. So, these activities were not well adapted to the realities of the field.' Yet, the peace campaigns were by many of the tele-respondents perceived as effective, both in its contribution to violence reduction and to the reintegration of youth. (See Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, figure 10). When other key informants were asked what in their view was the most successful activity, they often came up with aspects for peace building work (conflict monitoring committee, conflict cartography: 'This is really what the communities needed here').

Remarkably, an often-mentioned element was related to the inclusiveness of the project: the possibility that women and girls, youth, and entire communities were given the opportunity to participate. So, these informants saw as ENJECCOPs greatest result a programme strategy, rather than an activity.

Socio-economic activities, small projects, sports one time, were also cited as favourite elements of ENJECCOP. However, these do not figure as dominantly as one might expect after the analysis of the tele-responses. This showed a rather extreme positive perception of the contribution of socio-economic and sports activities to both violence reduction and socio-economic reintegration.

A - much lower number of - responses for least successful aspects of ENJECCOP youth participation in local governance was most often mentioned. This clearly coincides data presented earlier.

Sports, although not often alluded as the most successful aspect of ENJECCOP, were positively associated both socio-economic reintegration, and, in particular, the reduction of violence. Sports were able '.... to mobilise the youth in the communities and this reduced violence in the communities.' The coached economic (income generating) activities '...makes the youth independent', it helped, because: 'the economic fabric is engulfed in the conflict and the youth is searching to find a living and some education. It really took their mind off violent activities'.

The great majority of the youth represented in the focus groups felt that the activities that affected their lives most were to connected to learning a skill and getting the opportunity to set up a small business. They liked the learning sessions and the play, but most useful were the economic skills (hairdressing and braiding, vegetable growing, sowing, and a kit to start up business). Also mentioned was the work done for the protection of their village (in one case a dyke was jointly built to stop flooding during the rainy season)

#### *Summarising effectiveness of activities*

The main conclusion to be drawn is, that general respondents feel that ENJECCOP was, during the time that it lasted, an effective project in its contribution to violence reduction and the reintegration of youth. The most effective in their contribution to the management of violence reduction in the communities are Sports for Change activities, peace campaigns and conflict monitoring committees.

If seen over all interviewed groups the *most effective* contributing activity to socio-economic reintegration are the coached groups and small projects. Seen as the *most important* are ENJECCOPs peace building activities, and its programme strategy of inclusivity. Among tele-

respondents Tamashek speakers perceived the community action plans as the most effective contribution to socio-economic reintegration

The least valued in this respect is the participation of youth in community decision making. The greatest variety of views concerning this aspect is found among the groups that might be most affected by non-inclusive community governance: youth of the age from 26-35, Tamashek speakers and women.

## 5.2 Effectiveness touching on Impact

In the explanations of contribution questions or of what individual interviewees liked best or least of ENJECCOP, sometimes remarks surfaced that hinge on potential impact and sustainability. Here we have ordered these remarks.

The most mentioned important effect of ENJECCOP that still continues today are the income generating activities, 'les metiers', by the youth. This effect is mentioned in over half of the interviews. Often accompanied by the remark: 'These have reduced violence in our communities, because it gives the youth something useful to do.' Secondly, and not far behind is the work of the conflict monitoring committees. Where the Sports for Change were active, often the sports competitions continue, teams still exist and use the material (the shirts and the shoes). Other remarks concerned the diminished drugs abuse and the existence of sustainable community projects (a dyke, a community centre). A last impact that was mentioned was, remarkably enough, the participation of girls and women in local governance structures: 'ENJECCOP has activated many women and today we see quite a few girls who are active in local decision making. As if a new world opened up to them'

It is not always clear which of these so-called impacts might be attributed to ENJECCOP. For most of the income generation this is clear. But the connection made to violence reduction is probably not always (solely) due to the fact that the youth (only a few in each participating community) have found new activities, that keeps them out of mischief. In the sense of time management ENJECCOP is a real achievement, but it also means that impact is more difficult to ensure. As the UNPBF evaluators mentioned: among NGOs there is '...frustration with the 18-month project duration, which is considered as insufficient to realistically effect peacebuilding change.'<sup>24</sup> This seems a realistic complaint.

It would be interesting to know if these effects are still visible after, say, one year. The deputy commissioner of Timbuktu says quite clearly: "The conflict analysis workshop was good and other activities are going on, but: insecurity still reigns."

Explanations from individual interviewees on what is best or least liked of ENJECCOP, sometimes remarks surfaced that hinge on potential impact and sustainability. Here we have ordered these remarks.

The most mentioned important effect of ENJECCOP that still continues today are the income generating activities, 'les metiers', by the youth. This effect is mentioned in over half of the interviews. Often accompanied by the remark: 'These have reduced violence in our communities, because it gives the youth something useful to do.'

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<sup>24</sup> 'UNPBF Mali evaluation', 2018

Secondly, with numbers that score close to the economic activities, the work of the Conflict Monitoring Committees is often mentioned. These were pre-existing structures (even from before ARPP) that communities in the Timbuktu and Gao regions gradually seems to have adopted and integrated their organisation of community work.

A third set of activities regularly mentioned are the sports activities: sports competitions continue and teams still exist. The provided materials (the shirts and the shoes) are still used when playing.

Other remarks concerned diminished drugs abuse and the effects of enduring community projects (a dyke, a community centre).

A last impact that was mentioned, remarkably enough, was the participation of girls and women in local governance structures: 'ENJECCOP has activated many women to take part in community meeting and such. Today we see quite a few girls who are active in local decision making. A new world opened up to them.'

It is not always clear which of these perceived impacts might be attributed to ENJECCOP. For most of the income generation activities this is quite believable. However, this must be seen in perspective. First of all, ENJECCOPs economic impulses may only be tangible in the short-term. Secondly, the number of youths touched by ENJECCOP are only a small part of the total number of young men and women who would ideally benefit from such investments.

The perceived effect on violence reduction is more difficult to attribute. There are many factors that influence the levels of violence. One of them is the prevailing security situation, which was in many cases a reason for ENJECCOP *not* to enter communities and start with activities there. Other aspects to factor in, could be active recruitment efforts of armed groups, the reigning level of frustration with the government, and the extent to which communities feel threatened. Therefore, an observed reduction in local violence in and between communities is probably not solely due to newly found ENJECCOP activities that kept the youth out of mischief.

It would be interesting to know if the effects that are currently remarked upon would still be visible after, say, one year. Not everyone among the individual interviews believes in the enduring impact of a short-term project like ENJECCOP. The deputy commissioner of Timbuktu says quite clearly: "The conflict analysis workshop was good and other activities are going on, but: insecurity still reigns."

If we would want to be surer of ENJECCOPs reintegration and violence reduction effects, another type of evaluation would be needed: first a proper reconstruction of violence levels before ENJECCOPs time would have had to be done. This would then have to be connected to proper local conflict analyses. Finally, violence levels would have to be measured after ENJECCOP left. The baseline study and the local conflict analyses were not designed for this purpose. They might have been used for it, but then both the baseline study and the local conflict analyses would have needed a much broader set-up and, thus, more time investment. It would have been difficult to fit this into the assigned 18-months period.

Overall, seen its duration, ENJECCOP is an achievement. Yet the short implementation period made it for ENJECCOP also difficult to better ensure impact. As the UNPBF evaluators mentioned: among NGOs there is '...frustration with the 18-month project duration, which is

considered as insufficient to realistically effect peacebuilding change.’<sup>25</sup> To the evaluators this seems a realistic complaint.

*Summarising effectiveness touching on impact*

ENJECCOP has a real short-term impact on the economic reintegration of youth, for the longer term this remains uncertain. For the short term also ENJECCOPs effect on violence reduction is perceived as positive, but it is difficult to attribute such an effect to one single project. The short implementation period hinders the proper anchoring of positive effects.

### 5.3 Conclusions on Effectiveness

The key questions posed in the Terms of Reference for effectiveness was: “Were planned peacebuilding outputs and outcomes of the target communities achieved?”. We posed questions on which activity contributed to which domain, and we asked questions on what was the most and the least successful activity according to respondents. These were the basis for conclusions on the following aspects of the evaluation:

- 1 Community members’ use of tools and capacities provided by ENJECCOP, to reintegration and inclusion of at-risk youth
  - When looking at the influence of community action plans on reintegration of at risk youth this is more valued by Tamashek speakers than Songhai, who for this purpose value the contribution of local conflict analyses higher. However, everywhere the conflict monitoring committees were seen to work as rather effectively. Community action plans are felt to be somewhat less important, despite some notable exceptions among Tamashek speakers. Community plans are, moreover, not mentioned as a tool that is still used today. It seems doubtful that community leaders and committees will continue to use it. Maybe in Tamashek communities a demand for its use will remain.
- 2 The community-based addressing of youth’s engagement in violence and communities in violence
  - From the tele-questionnaire it appears that Sports for Change activities, peace campaigns and conflict monitoring committees (especially women and Songhai respondents) contribute most to violence reduction. Women are seen as the most effective in their contribution to the management of violence reduction in the communities. This coincides with the fact that women seem impressed by the contribution of peace campaigns and the conflict monitoring committees to tackling of community violence.
  - There is a constant returning sense that Tamashek speakers (for example in Timbuktu) are more convinced of the contribution of community action plans to violence reduction than others. Songhai (especially in Gao) are more convinced of the effectiveness of conflict analysis workshops.
  - Sports-for-Change is all over seen as the most crucially contributing to the reduction of violence, even more so than to the socio-economic reintegration of youth (see also chapter 6).

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<sup>25</sup> ‘UNPBF Mali evaluation’, 2018

### 3 The youth's participation in support to achieve socio-economic reintegration

- Individual interviewees and focus groups convincingly cite the contribution of coached groups and small projects to socio-economic reintegration
- The participation of youth in community decision making is seen as contributing the least to socio-economic reintegration.
- The groups that might be most affected by non-inclusive governance (youth of the age between 26-35 years old, Tamashek speakers and women) are ambivalent about it.

The greatest overall success of the programme is not seen in the socio-economic sphere (as may have been expected). If directly asked for the most valued activities, individual respondents mention the conflict management activities (the workshop and the monitoring committee), and - NB!- ENJECCOPs programme strategy on inclusivity. Please distinguish here between a most valued activity from the effectively contributing activity.

#### *Effectiveness touching on impact*

- The most mentioned important effect of ENJECCOP that still continues today are the income generating activities, because, it was most often said, they help reduce violence in the communities.
- Also seen as important was the continued work of conflict monitoring committees and their effect on violence reduction.
- A perceived impact to be noted is the participation of girls and women in local governance structures

#### *Internal cooperation*

Ex-ENJECCOP staff were satisfied with the way collaboration took place in the regions. The role division was seen as natural and complementary, the willingness to cooperate was and was effective. Sharing of information by ENJECCOP management in Bamako was seen as one of the weakest points in ENJECCOP.

## 6 Sports for Change

The Sports for Change Project as it is embedded in the ENJECCOP programme occupied a place of its own. The evaluators were asked to explore lessons learned for this component. Lessons learned are defined by OECD/DAC as: ‘generalizations based on evaluation experiences of projects [...] that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations...’<sup>26</sup> We will do the following: First a description of Sports for Change within ENJECCOP, secondly the main evaluative points by some key informants and focus groups and, finally, the comparison with a case in South Sudan where sports were developed and applied to create peace. Of neither programme formal evaluations exist. However, both have short descriptions of lessons learned that were deduced in an earlier period.

### 6.1 Description of Sports for Change

Sports for Change is an approach that uses sports as a point of entry to reach the youth of various ethnicities, ages and genders in conflict-affected zones and brings them together. This is a programme that builds on the experiences of previous programmes and is adapted by Mercy Corps every time it is implemented in another context.

Although suggested by its slogan, S4C is not solely about sports. Around the sports trainings and matches an education programme is set up on life skills: 8 modules in 16 weeks. Broadly speaking subjects of the education programme revolve around elements necessary for personal democratic leadership and conflict management, skills easily connected to good sportsmanship. It builds up personal resilience. The youth follow the trainings in multi-ethnic teams, or support groups, that each have two coaches originating from their area. Before MC applied the approach in ENJECCOP, potential project communities were studied and conflict dynamics analysed in the local conflict analysis workshops. The selection of communities was conducted with the help of local leaders and authorities. In 60 communities (30 in Gao, 20 in Timbuktu, and 10 in Ménaka) the programme staff together with local leaders, other respected community members, and leaders of youth and women’s associations and councils, shaped the sports programme through the following elements:

- The identification of sports disciplines important to the youth;
- the identification of candidate coaches for the Sports for Change sessions; the final number will be 120 coaches (for 60 groups) of whom 50% women. They taught and guided a total of 1800 youths for the sports and the life skills programme;
- the identification of 1800 potential members of support groups or clubs were selected through local structures and the help of leaders,
- training of the selected coaches by AJDM officers in the modules, that are developed for the Sport for Change. The newly appointed coaches learn the S4C pedagogical tools for conducting the trainings and are, among others, made aware of MCs human centred approach to the trainings;

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<sup>26</sup> See Rick Davies, August 2009: ‘Expectations about identifying and documenting ‘Lessons learnt’, DRAFT



- the creation by the new members of the support groups of at least 60 sports clubs (at least one per selected community), each club can hold up to 30 members;
- the curriculum that was conducted by the coaches entailed a series of sessions that lasts 16 weeks; members of the support group and sports clubs acquired capacities and means for personal resilience, development and leadership.
- The guiding of the coaches by AJDM and the way in which they conducted the sessions in the full extent of the zone where ENJECCOP was implemented.
- A vocational training programme in a profession of the candidates' preference, which included an internship that was arranged by community members. This programme was available to 600 participants, for whom a part could access an internship.
- A professional kit (e.g. a sewing machine, a tool set for a car mechanic or for forgery, tools for a hair salon etc.), would be made available so the youth to start-up their proper business
- The support groups would conduct supplementary activities. The meetings for sports matches and trainings (shirts and shoed for football were made available) were accompanied with sessions for discussions on community matters. Also, activities to serve the community were planned: peace campaigns, communal activities such as the repair of a community centre or the building of a dyke, preparing for participation in community decision making.

The coaches and members were selected by the communities on the basis of certain criteria. The coaches were somewhat older (often between 26 and 30 years old), could read and write well, had experience with a sport of interest, enjoyed respect in the community, had certain leadership qualities and skills to manage conflicts.

The youth that participate were between 15 to 30 years old, of all possible ethnicities, and economically vulnerable. They would be either demobilised or non-demobilised ex-combatants, or at risk of being or becoming implied in violence, were without employment or in a constant state of poverty. Also, other youth affected by the conflict could become a member.


The programme that used this approach before ENJECCOP was called ARPP (Advancing Reconciliation and Promoting Peace). The communities touched by ENJECCOP partially overlapped with the ARPP communities, thereby using an existing infrastructure for project implementation.

## 6.2 Effectiveness of Sports for Change

For reasons discussed earlier, not many ex-combatants have participated in the S4C programme. The criteria for selected vulnerable youth from various communities were widely formulated, but were seen by many as appropriate. It seems almost all unemployed youth in the rural areas and in the *quartiers* of urban Gao and urban Timbuktu are seen as a security risk for communities. So often, as if speaking with a sigh of relief, the remark was uttered: 'At least, Sports for Change kept the youth from the streets, they had no time for mischief and banditism!'

The effectiveness of Sports for Change was separately treated in the three types of questionnaires. When tele-respondents were asked to which domains the youth contributed most, the answers were very evenly distributed over the three domains of violence reduction, reintegration of the youth and for participation in local governance.


Nombre des repondants: 94  
Separer par: <Sans>



But when the different age groups were asked, the picture shows differences. The over fifties have an overall lower confidence in the contribution of youth to these domains, although for them the contribution of the youth in local governance is more visible then for the other domains.

The age group from 18 to 25 the majority of the S4C participants is quite positive for all domains, but especially for the reduction of violence. The around-thirty group shows more diversity of opinions.

Nombre des repondants: 94  
Separer par: Age: a. moins de 18, b. 18-25, c. 26-35 and 2 more




There is a marked difference between the perception of women and men (See Annex 5 Statistics and Figures: figure 11). The women are really positive about the programmes, but are at the same time less pronounced on the whole issue of contribution: they score up to 40 percent of 'I do not know'-s. They have the least confidence in the contribution of the youth to local governance. Men, however, score quite a lot of 'did not contribute at all'-s: 17% in youths at risk and ex-combatants' contribution to violence reduction. And over 20 percent say they do not know whether they contributed to this domain. Again, it is interesting to see that, like the over-fifties above, men are most positive about the youth's contribution to local governance. It is remarkable, because this domain scored overall lowest on effectiveness.

When looking at the contribution of Sports 4 Change to the three domains (addressing violence reduction, reintegration of youth and, governance) there is a clear trend to credit it with an important contribution to the addressing of violence reduction (See Annex 5 Statistics and Figures, figure 12).

In the individual interviews the youth was seen to have the largest contribution to the management of the socio-economic reintegration of youth.

Nombre des interviews: 37

Separer par: <Sans>



Reponse

Pas de reponse

c. De la participation des jeunes a la gouvernance locale

b. Du traitement communautaire de la réinsertion sociale et économique des jeunes


a. Du traitement communautaire de la diminution de la violence des jeunes

An enormous majority of key say that Sports for Change contributed the most to violence reduction. However, the ex-staff of ENJECCOP is the only group among individual interviewees that finds the most important contribution of Sports for Change is to the domain of socio-economic reintegration. It was accompanied by comments such as: 'The youth really lauded this initiative and it captured their interest most.' And: 'The youth were the brains of these activities.'

We have seen before that programme staff have different perceptions of ENJECCOPs effectiveness and impact than the other respondents. In general (like above), their views seem more oriented to the socio-economic domain.

Nombre des interviews: 37

Separer par: Domaine de profession: All



Reponse

Pas de reponse

b. La réinsertion sociale et économique des jeunes

a. La diminution de la violence des jeunes

There was clear enthusiasm among the youth for the learnt skills, the internships and the sports ("it dispels boredom, and thoughts about going back to violence and fighting"), and for the still felt positive effects after the end of the project.

However, in the focus groups complaints were voiced: sports material was not fitting, the supply could never meet the demand and this was not well communicated, lack of internships and their short duration, the learning cycle was too short, the coaches sometimes did not have enough knowledge of the subject matter, a football field was not fenced, leaders of community based groups dictated the selection of participants etc.

### Summarising

Sports for Change is generally perceived as the most effective activity of ENJECCOP.

The selection of youth was generally perceived as just.

It is overall seen as the greatest contributor to addressing violence reduction in the communities and to social economic reintegration of youth in particular. The distinction between youth and youth-at-risk was usually not made.

Women feel stimulated by the S4C, but have doubts about S4C effectiveness in the various domains, especially in the field of local governance. All participants agree that the organisation of activities around sports has brought communities together and opened the possibility for frank discussions. An important part of older men appreciate the contribution of S4C-youth to local governance. Since local politics are dominated by older men, this could be interpreted as an encouragement.

Nevertheless, in Sports for Change is similar to the rest of the programme: there was room for improvement particularly in the way (consultative) participation was organized with the communities, and in the way ENJECCOP communicated with S4C participants.

The causal chain for the effectiveness of S4C (or: the observed Theory of Change) among participants and people in the communities is seemingly perceived as follows:

- 1 Youth were chiefly concerned with the Sports for Change >
- 2 S4C were executed in the domain of socio-economic reintegration >
- 3 Youth contributed most to socio-economic reintegration activities (sports, economic initiatives and community peace work) >
- 4 They are the chief contributors to reduction of violence and conflict in communities.

Ex-staff of ENJECCOP and some persons in governance express their views slightly differently. In their perception, socio-economic activities do not contribute most to the reduction of violence ('insecurity is still there'...). These rather contribute to socio-economic reintegration, and then, in their Theory of Change, the flow-through to violence reduction gets stuck. Their assessment cautiously sticks to the most directly affected domain: socio-economic reintegration. The ex-staff and some administrators may not sufficiently realize that in the communities diminished violence levels are perceived as a result of the socio-economic reintegration activities. And this the end goal of S4C. If S4C's peace building potential is not sufficiently recognized by staff and they would emphasize the success of economic and sports activities mostly, the link between socio-economic activities and peacebuilding may be lost in the all-of-community projects in conflict zones in Mali. We do not say this is already happening. It is merely an early warning.

### 6.3 Comparison to Peace and Sports, South Sudan

The case study that we treat here briefly, took place in South Sudan between 2006 to 2017. We make the comparison with S4C in Mali to put to learn from the differences. We will take a rough look at differences and communalities, and the way in which local people perceived the results of the project. We will compare these too.

The programme is called Peace and Sports and was implemented over various project cycles in the border region with Uganda and Kenya. Here various cattle herding tribes - with little perspective for development and often in conflict with each other over natural resources - have age group systems in which young men protect the tribe as warriors and cattle keepers. These young men are fixed in a deadly game of cattle rustling accompanied by a cycle of revenge cattle rustling and revenge killing. They, moreover, live in a highly unstable environment where the South Sudanese army and the police are corrupt and abusive of the population. In this environment, weapons are easy to come by, and easily used, especially in cattle raids.

The S4C process as described above is comparable to that in South Sudan: the establishment of coached groups; coaches are respected community people and are from the area; sports competition and teams are organised by the communities themselves; sports events and trainings are accompanied with educational sessions. On big difference: in South Sudan there is no leadup to vocational training and the start-up of professions.

	Sports for Change Mali (2016-2020 ARPP + ENJECCOP)	Peace and Sports South Sudan (2005 to 2017)
<b>context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Youth recruited in armed groups to protect their communities</li> <li>– Embedded in the broader context of UNPBF funding for implementation of the peace accord. Also embedded in ENJECCOP, which includes INGO Mercy Corps and two local NGOs, AJDM and ThinkPeace</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Cattle raiding warriors (young men) from opposing ethnic groups in the South Sudanese border areas with Uganda and Kenya. Use of increasing numbers of guns causing heightened levels of violence</li> <li>– Embedded in a wider peace programme with local leaders, the local catholic church and international INGO PAX Netherlands</li> </ul>
<b>objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Protect youth at risk from recruitment by armed groups</li> <li>– Diminish violence in (and between) communities and by youth</li> <li>– Integrate youth at risk and ex-combatants socially and economically</li> <li>– Increase youth participation in community development and community structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Bring together hostile communities</li> <li>– Increase youth participation in community development</li> <li>– Gain access to public services and adequate use of public space</li> </ul>
<b>activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Sports events</li> <li>– Confidence building and peacebuilding skills</li> <li>– Vocational and entrepreneurial skills</li> <li>– S4C applied with other project activities:</li> <li>– ARPP: Early Warning/set up of surveillance committees</li> <li>– Youth participation in community governance/lobby (ENJECCOP)</li> <li>– Community Conflict Analysis (ENJECCOP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Sports events</li> <li>– Capacity building of life skills / peace building / negotiating</li> <li>– Peace conferences</li> <li>– After revision 2009/11 more emphasis on so-called peace dividends – economic skills</li> <li>– Lobby and participation in community development</li> </ul>
<b>participants</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Older youth as coaches</li> <li>– Youth at risk</li> <li>– Ex-combatants</li> <li>– Women</li> <li>– ENJECCOP: community leaders, elders, sometimes government officials</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Youth warriors</li> <li>– Kraal leaders (kraal = cattle camp)</li> <li>– Diviners</li> <li>– Women</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Mentors (elderly youth) monitoring</li> <li>– Coaches and coaches (for sports)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– ToTs esp. kraal leaders</li> <li>– trainers</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Majority from Songhai groups (farmers),</li> <li>– Nomadic minorities: Tamashek speakers (incl. Tuareg), in Ménaka: Peuhl</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– From 6 or 7 different nomadic pastoralist groups</li> <li>– (fighting each other over water, pasture and cattle)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– (fighting each other over water, pasture and political differences through ethnic based liaisons to armed groups)</li> </ul>	
<b>organisers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– ARRP and ENJECCOP programme consortia</li> <li>– Esp. partner LNGO: AJDM and INGO: Mercy Corps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– INGOs (PAX NL)</li> <li>– Big role LNGOs and CBOs</li> <li>– Church</li> </ul>
<b>different emphases</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Emphasis on the socioeconomic aspect</li> <li>– Lack of meaningful livelihoods for the youth</li> <li>– Serious roles of youth in their communities</li> <li>– Short term investments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Emphasis on breaking the cycle of violence</li> <li>– improvement of peacebuilding skills</li> <li>– Long term investments: 'in it for the long haul'<sup>27</sup></li> </ul>
<b>results</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Decrease of youth group rivalries and violence in the communities (ARPP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Relative peace was achieved</li> <li>– Local peace accords</li> <li>– Opening up of marketplaces</li> <li>– Collaboration and communication between opposing groups</li> </ul>
<b><u>Lessons Learnt</u></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– More communication on the progress of the Peace Accord implementation is necessary for the communities' buy-in in the process</li> <li>– Canalisation of emotions and relevant education through S4C help to diminish rivalries between youth groups</li> <li>– The identification of more economic opportunities for youth is a challenge, but necessary to be effective</li> <li>– Work with community leaders already engaged in community conflict resolution, to ensure more sustainability<sup>28</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Teamwork and collaboration add value to the realization of peace</li> <li>– Involvement/ and commitment of government and security personnel is paramount to the peace building process</li> <li>– Peace can only be a success when communities are committed, and feel ownership of the whole process.</li> <li>– The importance of intercommunal peace agreements and their follow up.</li> <li>– Collaboration and sharing of resources sustain peace.</li> <li>– Continuous monitoring and containment of peace spoilers</li> <li>– Regular meetings help to address and harmonize important emerging issues.<sup>29</sup></li> </ul>

## 6.4 Conclusion Sports for Change

- Sports for change is seen as ENJECCOP greatest success.
- Sports for Change and its youthful participants contribute to socioeconomic reintegration and this contributes to violence reduction. In their turn its socioeconomic reintegration activities, accompanied by sports and community peace work, contributed to the reduction of violence and conflict according to community members. S4C is perceived as an income generating, as well as a peace building, programme and is locally perceived as having results in both domains.

<sup>27</sup> 'In it for the long haul? Lessons on Peacebuilding in South Sudan' Christian aid, 2017

<sup>28</sup> ARPP final report, Mercy Corps, 2018

<sup>29</sup> Sustaining Relative Peace, PAX 2016

- Staff of ENJECCOP does not seem to sufficiently recognize that in the communities diminished violence levels are perceived as a direct result of the socioeconomic reintegration, which have as a chief contributor Sports for Change activities.
- Even within S4C there is room for improvement in the way (consultative) participation is organized and the way in which communications are handled in the relations with communities and participants.
- There is enthusiasm among the youth for this programme, especially among the girls.

*Lessons Learnt from South Sudan:*

- Within Mercy Corps and other Ex-ENJECCOP staff there is a tendency to see S4C as a mere economic programme. Putting it so crudely does not do justice to the peace building work that was also done by ENJECCOP. Yet, the tendency seems to exist. Communities generally view ENJECCOP as a two-pronged project: peace building stands at par with socioeconomic reintegration. The local political domain is less stressed. It would be good if Mercy Corps will continue to pay attention to, and even enhance the peace building part of the programme. Possibly the peace building lessons learnt from the Peace and Sports programme in South Sudan could help. We feel that many of the lessons learnt in the South Sudanese programme are applicable to the whole of ENJECCOP.
- The great difference with the South Sudan programme is that in South Sudan local peace building gets the greatest emphasis, while so-called *peace dividend* activities, i.e. small economic projects, are less profiled.
- Further peace building work in combination with S4C could be capacity building for community leader's negotiation skills, organisation skills and local support for local peace conferences. Continuation of intercommunity contacts made at the sports field.



## 7 Conclusions and recommendations

Conclusions	Recommendations
Relevance	
<i>Conflict analysis</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Conflict sensitivity workshops were well conducted.</li> <li>2. The use of the conflict analysis tool is used in communities, but its influence on the work of conflict monitoring committees is not the best valued among the five aspects evaluated. It has had apparently more influence on community action plans.</li> <li>3. Local relevance was good, but not as well evaluated as e.g. inclusion. Minority groups were less enthusiastic about the analysis of local tensions and its influence on follow-up activities</li> <li>4. The desk review revealed that local conflict analysis did not have a complete match with the overall conflict analysis that situated ENJECCOP in the larger Malian context. E.g. certain central issues of demobilisation were not treated in-depth in the local workshops, particularly the potential local risks of DDR, the cantonment sites and the return of ex-combatants.</li> <li>5. No widely carried (short) update of the local conflict analyses were done (they were done in the conflict monitoring committees), to support a new strategy that would include more ordinary youth and youth at risk, and much less ex-combatants</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Relevance will improve if conflict analyses would be more directly addressing conflict drivers: 1- focus on youth engagement in violence; 2 focus on local tensions with a better ear for the inclusion of Tamashek concerns; 3- repetition of local conflict analysis workshops (even at a smaller scale) for a better grounding of the strategy change; 4- build more explicitly with workshop participants on results of former local conflict analyses and update them when relevant.</li> <li>2. Continued contextualisation of programme activities is necessary in order to remain a peace building programme, not solely an income generating programme in conflict affected areas.</li> </ol>
<i>Ethnicity and conflict sensitivity results</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Inclusivity was well managed in ENJECCOP. It was better handled within directly managed ENJECCOP activities than in linked community structures.</li> <li>4. Nevertheless, inclusion was not complete: the majority of Songhai in the project is too large and the attention to nomadic pastoralists too little. Active efforts to involve Tamashek speaker more would have been important for ENJECCOP's relevance.</li> <li>5. Community communication was good with leaders, but less with the affected</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Consultative participation at the community level, as a preventive, conflict sensitive management tool, could be used more often</li> <li>2. Extra efforts must be made to create (separate) strategies to sufficiently incorporate minority groups. They are most relevant in the conflict context of Mali. It is difficult because some of these groups reside in the most insecure areas. A special internet or telephone liaison programme for these areas could be considered. Explore</li> </ol>

<p>community members and project participants. An example is the way ENJECCOPs limited means was to be distributed. Preventing frustration over this requires widely shared, and well handled, participative consultation with the communities. ENJECCOP did not always do this, but as far as we know it did not lead to major conflict.</p> <p>6. The change of the programme strategy at the beginning might have been more thoroughly thought through, after consultation of communities and DDR stakeholders, and a review of conflict analyses</p>	<p>possibilities for more intensive exchange between and with remote communities.</p> <p>3. Community participation in the programme may be improved, for instance by being more elaborate in sharing information on developments and changes in the programme. Also, updates on the implementation of the Algiers Peace Accord could be useful for more effective community participation.</p>
<p><b>Gender sensitivity</b></p>	
<p>1. A sizeable proportion of 15 % of Songhai men, especially in Gao, are quite radical in the overall rejection of women's contributions to any of ENJECCOP's activities.</p> <p>2. ENJECCOP has encouraged young women to participate in peace building and reintegration, and this proved a relevant activity for the women and for peacebuilding activities. Women are seen as the most effective in their contribution to the management of violence reduction in the communities</p> <p>3. ENJECCOP is relevant to gender, and the roles of women in peace building. Women feel encouraged by the support groups, not just because these are 'good fun', but because here they find opportunities for personal development, and meaningful community roles.</p> <p>4. Women, especially young women, felt encouraged by ENJECCOPs educational activities, and are active contributors to violence reduction and small projects.</p> <p>5. Women long to be involved in these domains, but in certain cultural settings (e.g. Songhai in the Gao region) there seems to be a conservative force against their contribution.</p> <p>6. Women's contribution to the conflict analysis workshops and their role in local governance was not everywhere visible. It may be true (although not verified) that the safe space for all ethnicities to speak was well managed, but that for women this was not everywhere the case.</p> <p>7. Women welcome every encouragement in any field. In certain communities this has</p>	<p>1. Continue to encourage women to participate in programmes such as ENJECCOP.</p> <p>2. When time and means allows develop a group of women with special talents for different areas: local governance, sensitization, peace building and income generation.</p> <p>3. When time allows develop a monitoring track for the longer term for both men and women, who are involved in income generation and sports.</p>

<p>resulted in their innovative participation in community structures.</p> <p>8. Male youth are still not seen as great contributors to violence reduction activities, despite their observed improvement in this field. In a project such as ENJECCOP this must change.</p> <p>9. Youth participation in community decision making structures are seen as the least visible result of ENJECCOP. Peacebuilding was more often mentioned, but also not as evident as other (socioeconomic) domains</p>	
<p><b>Complementarity and Coherence</b></p>	
<p>1. The slow national DDR process was a setback for ENJECCOPs relevance in the national peace building context. It adapted its strategy because of it.</p> <p>2. Continued collaboration with national DDR committee and MINUSMA was seen as weak by key informants. In Timbuktu regional collaboration with other organisations in OCHA's clusters and again with MINUSMA did not function. Active compensation for the lack of coordination was hardly sought. Better collaboration might have led to a better argued choice for a relevant implementation strategy</p> <p>3. Cordial and informal consultation with other stakeholders in the peace building field, e.g. seeking a longer-term collaboration with DDR concerned institutions in the regions was not sought enough, despite its importance for better ensuring the continued relevance of ENJECCOP.</p> <p>4. Internal collaboration between the three consortium partners was good. Some coordination functions, such as sharing of programme information and monitoring visits to the field by Senior programme officers were sometimes lacking.</p>	<p>1. Intensify collaboration with other actors in the national peace building field.</p> <p>2. In the absence of formal exchange mechanisms intensify more cordial and informal exchange and consultation with certain governmental, UN organisations in the field of DDR, and International peace building NGOs. It ensures complementarity and also a more focussed work towards the end goals of the programme.</p>
<p><b>Effectiveness</b></p>	
<p><b>Summarising Effectiveness of activities</b></p>	
<p>1. ENJECCOP was, during the time that it lasted, an effective project in its contribution to violence reduction and the reintegration of youth.</p> <p>2. For the management of violence reduction in the communities the Sports for Change activities, peace campaigns and conflict</p>	<p>1. Continue to apply the simultaneous application of strategies and activities in a single site. It works well.</p> <p>2. Do not give up on a type of activity because its effectiveness is seen as somewhat lagging. Rather evaluate and improve it.</p>

<p>monitoring committees were the most effective.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. The conflict monitoring committees were seen to work as rather effectively and will probably continue for some time even without support.</li> <li>4. A difference is made in the perception of effectiveness and the perception of importance:             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. For the socioeconomic reintegration, the coached groups and small projects are the most effective., although Tamashek speakers perceived the community action plans as the most effective contribution to socioeconomic reintegration</li> <li>b. For both the reduction of violence and socioeconomic reintegration ENJECCOPs peace building activities, and its programme strategy of inclusivity are generally seen as the most important.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. The simultaneous application of the activities boosts the communities and works.</li> <li>6. The least effective is the participation of youth in community decision making. The greatest variety of views concerning this aspect is found among the groups that might be most affected by non-inclusive community governance: youth of the age from 2635, Tamashek speakers and women.</li> <li>7. Community action plans are felt to be somewhat less important, despite some notable exceptions among Tamashek speakers. Community plans are, moreover, not mentioned as a tool that is still used today. It seems doubtful that community leaders and committees will continue to use it. Maybe in Tamashek communities a demand for its application will remain.</li> <li>8. Sports for Change including the coached groups and small projects, is all over seen as the most crucially contributing to the reduction of violence, even more so than to the socio-economic reintegration of youth.</li> <li>9. Internally the collaboration in ENJECCOP was seen as natural and complementary, the willingness to cooperate was good.</li> <li>10. Sharing of information by ENJECCOP management in Bamako was seen as a weak point within the consortium.</li> <li>11. Baseline and endline studies did not work well as programme steering tools.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. It is worth to rethink the and intensify the strategy for the participation of youth in local governance and community decision making (e.g. the community plans, conflict monitoring committees). Currently its effectiveness is comparatively low, but it is found an important domain.</li> <li>4. Do not spread means too thinly over communities. Strive to reach a critical mass of participants per community.</li> <li>5. Mercy Corps, when it is in the coordinating role, to try and improve its communications and monitoring, both outside and inside consortia. Communication needs to become more systematic and dependable.</li> <li>6. Furthermore: see the extra document on the effectiveness of small projects</li> </ol>
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<i>Summarising effectiveness touching on impact</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. ENJECCOP has a real short-term impact on the economic reintegration of youth, for the longer term this remains uncertain.</li> <li>2. For the short term also ENJECCOPs effect on violence reduction is perceived as positive, but it is difficult to attribute such an effect to one single project.</li> <li>3. The short implementation period hinders the proper anchoring of positive effects.</li> <li>4. The most mentioned important effect of ENJECCOP that still continues today are the income generating activities, because, it was most often said, they help reduce violence in the communities.</li> <li>5. Also seen as important was the continued work of conflict monitoring committees and their effect on violence reduction.</li> <li>6. A perceived impact to be noted is the participation of girls and women in local governance structures</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. It is good to have a continued lobby with the donor community to try 1 to lengthen the implementation periods of programmes and projects connected to peacebuilding and development, 2 or to ensure that consecutive programmes are implemented in the same regions (as was done with ARPP and ENJECCOP).</li> <li>2. If possible: do an impact study of the income generation projects on violence reduction in the communities.</li> <li>3. Encourage women and girls even more and develop their proper talents for income generation, sensitization, peace building and governance. They are eager and can soon become effective and change agents in their environments.</li> </ol>
<b>SPORTS for Change (S4C)</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sports for Change is generally perceived as the most effective activity of ENJECCOP. It is overall seen as the greatest contributor to addressing violence reduction in the communities and to social economic reintegration of youth in particular</li> <li>2. The selection of youth was generally perceived as just. The distinction between youth and youth at risk was usually not made.</li> <li>3. All participants agree that the organisation of activities around sports has brought communities together and opened the possibility for frank discussions.</li> <li>4. An important part of older men appreciates the contribution of S4C youth to local governance. Since local politics are dominated by older men, this could be interpreted as an encouragement.</li> <li>5. In Sports for Change there was room for improvement of (consultative) participation with the communities,</li> <li>6. In Sports for Change there was room for improvement in the way ENJECCOP communicated with S4C participants.</li> <li>7. Ex-Staff emphasize the success of S4C's economic and sports activities, its peace building potential seems sometimes not sufficiently recognized by staff, there is a</li> </ol>	SEE POINTS BELOW

<p>danger that if the trend continues the link between socioeconomic activities and peacebuilding may gradually be lost in the all-of-community projects in conflict zones in Mali.</p>	
<p><b><i>Lessons Learnt following the comparison of S4C to South Sudan case</i></b></p>	
<p><i>Peace and Sports (applicable to S4C)</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Teamwork and collaboration add value to the realization of peace</li> <li>2. Involvement/ and commitment of government and security personnel is paramount to the peace building process</li> <li>3. Peace can only be a success when communities are committed, and feel ownership of the whole process.</li> <li>4. The intercommunal peace agreements and their follow-up are important.</li> <li>5. Collaboration and sharing of resources sustain peace.</li> <li>6. Continuous monitoring and containment of peace spoilers</li> <li>7. Regular meetings help to address and harmonize important emerging issues.</li> </ol>	<p><b>S4C</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. More communication on the progress of the Algiers Peace Accord implementation and of the programmes is necessary for the communities' buy-in in the project process.</li> <li>2. Canalisation of emotions and relevant education through S4C help to diminish rivalries between youth groups (lesson learnt from ARRP)</li> <li>3. The identification of more economic opportunities for youth is a challenge, but necessary to be effective (lesson learnt from ARRP)</li> <li>4. While maintaining a strong position in the socio-economic field it is important to continue and monitor the success of peacebuilding activities</li> <li>5. Peace building is an exercise of trust building and continuous work with communities to prevent conflict or to prevent that conflict worsen. It must be allowed time (2 - 3 years is not enough)</li> <li>6. Involve government officials and security agents and liaise with them on a regular basis</li> <li>7. Invest in, and do capacity building tracks with community leaders already engaged in community conflict resolution, to ensure more sustainability (also a lesson learnt from ARRP)</li> <li>8. With the leaders strengthen the whole of community approach and involve the communities (not only the leaders), more in decision making on the project and on peacebuilding with other communities</li> <li>9. Support the communications between communities to stay in touch with each other, also during difficult times</li> <li>10. Make an extra effort, brainstorm on alternative strategies to reach the insecure areas and marginalized and nomadic populations.</li> </ol>

<i>Remote Evaluation</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Evaluation proved a challenge: respondents in the North of Mali are inclined to politeness and positive answers. For the evaluators it makes it more difficult to learn lessons from the responses.</li> <li>2. As a control and trend tracing mechanism, the tele-questionnaire worked well, although instruction and supervision of research assistants, and approach of respondents needs improvement and further brainstorming on how to do better.</li> <li>3. Focus groups brought out the most and richest information</li> <li>4. Remote evaluation demands more time for more intensive communication</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. We recommend that Mercy Corps with AJDM and ThinkPeace (and possibly other implementing partners) do a well facilitated, elaborate, and large scale 'internal' lessons learnt exercise, inspired by evaluations previously conducted either externally or internally. Bring staff, participants and stakeholders together (to the extent possible in these COVID stricken times) to really think through old and new programme strategies and implementation modalities.</li> <li>2. In remote evaluation the evaluators and participants in evaluations need to be prepared for intensive and repeated exchanges (more so than in a less remote evaluation)</li> </ol>



## 8 Annexes

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## Annex 1 Terms of Reference

### I- Background

#### I-1 About project implementation background

Since 2012, Mali has been going through a complex security and political crisis. The causes of this crisis are deep and deeply linked to social upheavals fueled by complaints of marginalization of the northern regions, poor governance, corruption, lack of development and social services, and vested by economic interests, both legal and illegal. Since then, Mali has seen a proliferation of armed groups in northern and central regions, including violent extremist organizations, which exploit the security and governance vacuum to operate over much of Mali's territory. The crisis has contributed to the displacement and repatriation of more than 311,000 people in the center and north of the country, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Mali (OCHA).

#### I-2 About Mercy Corps and its implementing partners

##### **Mercy Corps**

Mercy Corps is an international humanitarian and development organization that helps people affected by crises transform their situations into opportunities to realize their potential. Mercy Corps started operations in northern Mali in 2012 to provide emergency assistance to populations affected by the crisis and food shortages. This presence has contributed enormously to forging its notoriety and acceptance in the northern part of the country (Gao, Ansongo, Gourma Rharous and Timbuktu). From its inception to the present day, Mercy Corps has implemented about 20 programs reaching more than 250,000 people in 5 regions of Mali.

##### **Mali Youth and Development Association (AJDM)**

Created in 1995, AJDM strengthens the role of young people in policy-making and development in Mali, particularly Timbuktu. In 2014, AJDM supported social cohesion and peaceful coexistence by providing psychosocial support and conducting inter-ethnic dialogues. AJDM has also set up recreational and theatrical activities to help women and teenagers recover from violence and sexual abuse.

##### **Think Peace**

Think Peace is a think tank and action-research group that intervenes in research-action / action-research on issues of peace, security including community conflict prevention and resolution, prevention against radicalization and violent extremism, and governance with the involvement of local actors in decision-making at the local level. Think Peace is present in most of the northern and central regions of Mali and is extending its actions to Burkina and Niger through its focal points.

### II- Scope of the evaluation

#### II-1 Project overview

With the support of the United Nations (in this case the Peacebuilding Fund - UNPBF), the project "Engaging Youth in Building Peaceful Communities in Mali"-ENJECCOP was initiated to help communities identify and address the main factors of conflict; provide comprehensive support for the reintegration of young people who have participated in armed groups or are at risk of recruitment; and facilitate the participation of young people in local advocacy and development activities. Mercy Corps implemented the project with two local

partners, Think Peace and the "Association de Jeunesse et Développement du Mali (AJDM)". The overall objective is to promote the implementation of the Algiers 2015 peace agreement through an inclusive, "whole community" approach to conflict prevention, mitigation and management and a reduction in the involvement of youth in violence. This objective is consistent with the work of the UNPBF in Mali, which aims to increase support for the peace process, including a central focus on inclusive governance. This project complements and enhances the work of previous UNPBF projects aimed at placing women and youth at the center of the peace process; strengthening social cohesion and establishing links with local authorities. The summary details of the project are as follows:

*In summary, the project foresees the following numerical results:*



- **60 communities develop and implement conflict mitigation action plans**
- **1800 young people take part in support groups and Sport for Change actions**
- **600 young people identified as being at risk receive intensive mentoring and livelihood development support**
- **300 community leaders and 120 youth leaders are working together for the inclusion of youth in decision-making processes and economic development projects at the community level.**

Project Title	Engaging youth in building peaceful communities in Mali
Implementation period	From 06 February 2018 to 05 February 2020
Areas of intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gao region: Communes of Gao, Gounzoureye de Soni Ali Ber (Gao circle); communes of Ansongo, Bourra, Ouatagouna, Tessit (Ansongo circle) ;</li> <li>- Ménaka region<sup>1</sup>: Municipalities of Ménaka (Ménaka circle), Municipality of Tidermene (Tidermen circle), Municipality of Anderamboukane (Anderamboukane circle);</li> <li>- Timbuktu region: Municipalities of Sarayamou, Tienkour, Tinguereguif-Gari, Kondi (Diré circle); municipalities of Alafia, Lafia, Bourem Inaly and Timbuktu (Timbuktu circle); municipalities of Rharous, Banikane (Gourma-Rharous circle).</li> </ul>
Implementing Partners	Mercy Corps, AJDM, Think Peace
Target Group	Young men, young women, communities, youth associations and groups, community leaders and local authorities
Project Budget	1,700,000 US dollars.

Purpose of the project	Support communities to address the factors of conflict and youth engagement in violence and to promote their inclusion.
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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that at this time (January 2020), the group of international NGOs has announced a suspension of activities in the Ménaka region for an indefinite period of time. This can have a negative effect on the latest activities underway and even data collection related to the evaluation (Mercy Corps is currently evaluating the types of activities that can be implemented during this time).

Expected results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outcome 1: 60 communities in Timbuktu, Gao and Menaka are equipped to support the social and economic (re)integration and inclusion of at-risk youth in their communities – including demobilized combatants - and to address conflict drivers that contribute to youth engagement in violence.</li> <li>- Outcome 2: 600 male and female youth – including former fighters - receive holistic social and economic support for social and economic(re)integration into their communities.</li> <li>- Result 3: Youth in 60 communities play an active and meaningful role in community decision-making and promoting peace within their communities.</li> </ul>
Main activities carried out	<p><b>For result 1:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participatory conflict mapping for 60 communities</li> <li>- 60 community action plans carried out to reduce tensions and mitigate risk factors related to the peace and DDR processes</li> <li>- Organizing networking events/activities between community leaders to share experiences and successes/failures</li> <li>- Monitoring and sharing recommendations with local, regional and national authorities, MINUSMA and other stakeholders based on community experiences, concerns and priorities to influence the design and implementation of the peace process and DDR</li> <li>- 60 conflict risk oversight committees created and sustained</li> </ul> <p><b>For result 2:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Creation and support of 60 support groups for socio-economic reintegration composed of 1,800 young people.</li> <li>- Animation of the sport for change activities by 120 coaches for the 60 support groups.</li> <li>- Organization of additional group activities according to the needs and priorities identified by the members of the group</li> <li>- Individual coaching and mentoring of 600 young people to undertake trainings / livelihoods based on their personal action plan</li> </ul> <p><b>For result 3:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training of at least 300 local authorities for the inclusion of young people in the decision-making process</li> <li>- Mapping of 329 groups of young men and women within each target community to understand their goals, strengths, needs and capacities.</li> <li>- Preparing young people to identify their needs and advocate for those needs to local authorities</li> <li>- Organizing meetings for young people to express their needs and for community leaders to take into account and respond to them Technical and financial support to youth associations for the development of 120 micro-projects of an economic and social nature.</li> <li>- Support for young people in planning peace campaigns, including media, theatre groups, music groups, educational sessions on the peace process, sports tournaments</li> <li>- Training of 120 young people on local governance and support for their involvement in decision-making structures.</li> </ul>

## II-2 Purpose of the evaluation

In accordance with UNPBF guidelines, this evaluation is commissioned by Mercy Corps at the end of the project to meet the dual objectives of learning and accountability to project stakeholders. Thus, the purpose of this evaluation is to report to donors, local and administrative authorities and target communities on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the project, while allowing for learning from the processes developed that have enabled communities and youth to engage positively in peacebuilding. It is expected that the findings of this evaluation will enable Mercy Corps and its partners not only to better adjust their future interventions but also to strengthen their positioning on the challenges they have committed to addressing with Malian communities.

## III- Objectives of the evaluation

### III-1 Specific objectives of the evaluation

The specific objectives of this evaluation revolve around the consideration of the evaluation criteria of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the consideration of the cross-cutting theme of gender as well as the consideration of a learning subject (sport for change).

#### DAC evaluation criteria

In view of the time and budget allocated to this evaluation, only the following criteria will be examined in depth by the evaluation team. Other criteria such as efficiency, impact, coherence and sustainability can be examined in summary form in addition to the analysis of the selected criteria.

- **Relevance:** Question the project's theory of change and determine whether the proposed activities meet the real needs of the target communities, particularly young men and women? In analyzing the relevance of the project, the evaluation team should have a deep understanding of conflict as a basis for their work. The evaluation team will need to review the conflict analysis carried out by the project and assess its quality and relevance at the beginning of the program. The evaluation team will need to determine whether the conflict analysis (explicit or implicit) was sufficient and accurate, whether it was effectively translated into relevant strategies and objectives, and whether it was adapted to the situation of conflict and fragility over time. In addition, analyze the project's coherence with national and United Nations peacebuilding priorities in Mali; and examine its complementarity with other ongoing initiatives in the area.
- **Effectiveness:** Examine the extent to which the planned peacebuilding outputs and outcomes of the target communities have been achieved. Identify the changes at the community and individual level that the project has helped to achieve. Examine the extent to which the changes achieved by the project have influenced the dynamics of peacebuilding at the local, regional and even national levels.

### III-2 Evaluation questions according to the selected criteria

To guide the evaluation team on the priority areas to be examined for each evaluation criterion, the following table was developed. The questions represent the important aspects that the evaluation team should consider for each criterion. However, during the inception phase of the evaluation, joint work will be carried



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out between the selected evaluation team and the steering committee to limit the number of questions to be considered according to the financial resource and time available.

Evaluation Criteria	Key evaluation questions
Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did the project sufficiently and continuously analyze the context of the conflict? and has the project sufficiently adapted its actions to the changes observed - in other words - what was the relevance of the project in relation to the causes identified in the conflict analysis?</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has the intervention achieved its stated (or implicit) objective or is it in the process of doing so on the basis of the outputs and outcomes achieved?</li> <li>- What major factors contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?</li> <li>- To what extent have the changes obtained by the project influenced the dynamics of peacebuilding at local, regional or even national level?</li> <li>- Did the intervention address or reduce the conflict factors and the main tensions identified at the start / during the project? Has a change in behavior / perception been identified?</li> <li>- Did the project take sufficient account of and / or avoid generating negative effects (environment, economy, security, etc.)?</li> <li>- Did the project contribute to increasing the capacity of communities to respond to conflict crises?</li> </ul>
Gender mainstreaming and women's capacity building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did the intervention produce different results for women and men and boys and girls?</li> <li>- To what extent has the project taken into account and addressed gender issues?</li> <li>- To what extent has the project taken into account gender equality criteria in its daily management?</li> </ul>
Learning Topic: Sport for Change	<p>Carry out a critical analysis of the Sport for Change approach implemented by the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is this approach relevant?</li> <li>- Is it effective? Did it strengthen young people's resilience to conflict and violent extremism</li> <li>- Has it been well implemented? What difficulties encountered? What lessons learned?</li> <li>- Is the approach replicable? If yes, what are the conditionalities?</li> </ul>

## IV- Evaluation methodology

### IV-1 Data Collection method

This evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants specialized in the evaluation of humanitarian and / or development programs. Considering that this evaluation is not an impact evaluation



and will rely mainly on qualitative approach, the evaluation team will propose a consistent methodology that will answer the evaluation questions mentioned above. The methodology should describe tools, the actors to be involved in the collection as well as the sampling method to select these actors. Usually, an induction phase is planned to allow the evaluation team to pre-collect and analyze conflicts and then propose a more detailed collection methodology. However, due to the short time and delays, this phase of induction will be shortened as much as possible. The evaluation team will also have to take into account the results of the baseline, mid-term and endline studies carried out by the Mercy Corps monitoring and evaluation team to mainly inform the indicators of the logical framework. That said, this evaluation will not have the objective, nor the activity, of informing the project indicators which make it possible to assess the performance of the project. However, the evaluation team can, if they wish, carry out an analysis of the quality of the data / studies carried out to decide whether they can use the results or not. In all cases, the evaluation team will use triangulation methods to ensure the reliability of any available information.

Finally, it is important to remember that the evaluation team will have to propose a methodology for an in-depth conflict analysis that will serve as the basis for all stages of the evaluation process.

## IV-2 Actors to be involved in the evaluation process

The following actors were involved in the implementation of the project (non-exhaustive list). It is up to the evaluation team to select and justify the choice of stakeholders to be involved in the evaluation process.

Actors	Role
Bailleur de fond (UNPBF) – PBF secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Funded the project</li> <li>- Participated actively in the coordination and overall monitoring of the project</li> <li>- Provided guidance for compliance with the evaluation principles and rules.</li> </ul>
Mercy Corps, Think Peace and AJDM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implemented the project through a diverse team in the field</li> <li>- Sponsored the evaluation</li> </ul>
Technical Services / Relevant Ministries / Clusters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provided an additional layer of activity monitoring and training support</li> <li>- Coordination between technical and financial partners in the area, information sharing and synergies between ongoing peace initiatives</li> </ul>
Local and customary authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participated in the dialogues and training activities</li> <li>- Participated in the awareness-raising activities</li> <li>- Participated in community mobilization</li> </ul>
Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Especially young people and women have benefited from the project's actions.</li> </ul>
Youth Associations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Have benefited from the project and participated in the mobilization of young people</li> </ul>

## V- Principles and values

The selected evaluation team will implement evaluation activities in accordance with Mercy Corps' ethics and code of conduct. Mercy Corps values ethics, transparency, discretion and independence, which are key principles of the International Standards for Evaluation (OECD).

The selected consultant will strongly adhere to the UNPBF evaluation policy (will be annexed to the contract as well as the Mercy Corps Code of Conduct).

The evaluation team should involve local stakeholders and beneficiaries in the evaluation, taking into account their views.

Due to safety issues in the field, the evaluation team must comply with the applicable safety regulations put in place by Mercy Corps.

## VI- Conducting the evaluation

### VI-1 Evaluation Steering Committee

A steering committee is set up to coordinate the execution of this evaluation activity. The members are as follows:

- One representative from each implementing structure (Mercy Corps, AJDM, Think Peace) and, if possible, the donor;
- Mercy Corps Mali's monitoring-evaluation and learning advisor;
- A staff member from the Operations Department of Mercy Corps Mali.

The main functions of the committee are:

- The development and validation of the terms of reference;
- The choice of the evaluation team (based on a scoring grid of financial and technical proposal submitted);
- Follow-up - quality assurance of the evaluation team (validation of the inception report, mission report, preliminary report)
- Review, discussion and validation of the final report

The committee will use the quality assessment grid for an evaluation report to control and validate the report provided.

### VI-2 Evaluation Team

The evaluation team should include expertise in both conflict analysis and evaluation as well as project specific thematic areas. Consultants should have a strong background in evaluating the effectiveness of programmes in the context of the Sahel and/or peacebuilding. The evaluation team must include at least one female team member, in accordance with gender and inclusion requirements.

Ideally, the team should be composed of a team leader (20-22 days) with solid international experience in project evaluation (at least two), particularly in conflict contexts; and a national consultant (15-18 days) specialized in peacebuilding with a solid knowledge of the two regions of intervention (Tombouctou and Gao). The evaluation team may use other profiles such as data collectors, etc.

### VI-3 Timeline of the valuation

Due to time constraints, the data collection phase should start as soon as possible and be completed by **April 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020** at the latest. The final report of the evaluation is due by **May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020**.

It is the responsibility of the evaluation team to propose a detailed timetable that respects the abovementioned deadlines.

### VI-4 Logistics

It will be the responsibility of the evaluation team to handle all logistical aspects of the evaluation activity. However, for the briefing and debriefing phases as well as for making contact with participants in the field, Mercy Corps will assist.

### VI-5 Expected Deliverables

In addition to the approved technical and financial offer, the selected evaluation team will provide at least the following deliverables:

- An inception report after the short inception phase specifying the methodology following the in-depth conflict analysis; the evaluation team will also include data collection and analysis methods in its inception report;
- An interim report and a possible brief for mission feedback;
- Final report, including an executive summary (mandatory).

The steering committee may limit the number of pages for each deliverable. This will be discussed with the evaluation team at the start of the evaluation activity.

## Annex 2 List of Stakeholders

N°	Name organization / Service	Status	Key informants needed	Enqu'r	Method <sup>30</sup>	Done =x
01	United Nations PBF	Donor	The programme Manager for MC	Yaya	II	x
02	Peace building cluster in the UN system``	Donor coordination mechanism	Coordinator of the cluster in Mali	Yaya	II	x
03	MINUSMA Peace Building and stabilization Unit	UN Mission	ENJECCOP focal point in the Unit	Yaya	II	x
04	Mercy Corps	Progr. Resp.	Country Director ENJECCOP Programme ManagerM&E Manager	Yaya	II	x
05	Think Peace	IP	Country Director ENJECCOP Programme ManagerM&E Manager	Yaya	II	x
06	AJDM	IP	Country Director ENJECCOP Programme ManagerM&E Manager	Yaya	II	x
07	Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme	Yaya	II	x
08	Ministry of Youth and Sport	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme	Yaya	II	
09	Follow up committee of Peace Accord	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme/MC/Implementers	Yaya	II	x
10	National Coordination of Youth in Mali	Civil Society	Focal point MC ENJECCOP Programme/Implementers	Yaya	II	
12	Tombouctou Regional Direction of the Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme/MC/Implementers	Yaya	II	
14	Tombouctou Regional Direction of the Ministry of Youth and Sport	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme (MC/IPs)	Yaya	II	
16	Tombouctou Regional Direction of the Ministry of Women and Family	Gov. Partner	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme (MC/IPs)	Yaya	II	x
18	Tombouctou Regional Youth coordination (CRJ)	Civil Society	Focal point of ENJECCOP Programme (MC/IPs)	Yaya	II	x
20	Regional office of Mercy Corps in Tombouctou	PR	Regional Coordinator/ Program Manager	Yaya, / RAs	II	x
22	Regional Office of Think Peace in Tombouctou	IP	Regional Coordinator and Program Manager	Yaya, / RAs	II	x
24	Regional Office of AJDM in Tombouctou	IP	Regional Coordinator and Program Manager	Yaya,	II	

<sup>30</sup> Method legend: **Tele-I** / **I-Indiv** / **FG**

N°	Name organization / Service	Status	Key informants needed	Enqu'r	Method <sup>30</sup>	Done =x
				/ RAs		
	Chambre de Commerce?		Représentant	Yaya	II	
	Communauté Arabe 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	
	Communauté Touareg 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	
	Communauté Séd Noire 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	
	Gr. Femmes Communauté 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	x
	Gr. Femmes Communauté 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	x
	Gr. Jeunes Communauté 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	
	Gr. Jeunes Communauté 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	x
	Militaires/Police	Stakeh/Benef	Commandant	RAs	FG	
	CMA Bourem Inaly/Gatja	Stakeh/Benef	Commandants/Leaders de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	GNIM	Stakeh/Benef	Commandant/Leader de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	EIGS	Stakeh/Benef	Commandants/Leaders de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	Communes Autorits pol/admin 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leader (e.g. Mayor)	RA	II or small FG	x
	Communes Autorits pol/admin 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leader (e.g. Mayor)	RA	II or small FG	x
	Gestion sites de Cantonnement pour le DDR	Stakeh/Benef	Responsable	RA/Yaya	II	
	Sports for Change	Stakeh/Benef	participants	RA	FG	x
	Sports for Change	Stakeh/Benef	Coach	RA/Yaya	II	x
	Gao Regional Direction of the Ministry of Youth and Sport	Gov. P	Focal point ENJECCOP (MC or IP)	Yaya	II	x
	Gao Regional Direction of the Ministry of Women and Family	Gov. P	Focal point ENJECCOP (MC or IP)	Yaya	II	
	Gao Regional Youth Coordination (CRJ)	OSC	Focal point ENJECCOP (MC or IP)	Yaya	II	x
	Regional office of Mercy Corps in Gao	IP	Regional Coordinator and Program Manager	Yaya, Also meet with RAs	II	
	Regional Office of Think Peace in Gao	IP	Regional Coordinator and Program Manager	Yaya,	II	x

N°	Name organization / Service	Status	Key informants needed	Enqu'r	Method <sup>30</sup>	Done =x
				Also meet with RAs		
	Regional Office of AJDM in Gao	IP	Regional Coordinator and Program Manager	Yaya, Also meet with RAs	II	x
	Communauté ..... 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	x
	Communauté .... 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	
	Communauté ..... 1 ou 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts	RAs	FG	
	Gr. Femmes Communauté 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	x
	Gr. Femmes Communauté 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	
	Gr. Jeunes Communauté 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	x
	Gr. Jeunes Communauté 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leaders/Réprésntnts / OSC	RAs	FG	
	Militaires/Police	Stakeh/Benef	Commandant	RAs	FG	x
	Important AG in the region of Gao (CMA? )	Stakeh/Benef	Commandants/Leaders de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	Important AG in the region of Gao (GNIM ?)	Stakeh/Benef	Commandant/Leader de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	Important AG in the region of Gao (EIGS ?)	Stakeh/Benef	Commandants/Leaders de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	Important AG in the region of Gao (other?)	Stakeh/Benef	Commandants/Leaders de GAs	RA	II or small FG	
	Communes Autorits pol/admin 1	Stakeh/Benef	Leader (e.g. Mayor)	RA	II or small FG	x
	Communes Autorits pol/admin 2	Stakeh/Benef	Leader (e.g. Mayor)	RA	II or small FG	
	Gestion sites de Cantonnement pour le DDR	Stakeh/Benef	Responsable	RA/Yaya	II	
	Sports for Change	Stakeh/Benef	Participants	RA	FG	x
	Sports for Change	Stakeh/Benef	Coach	RA/Yaya	II	x
	Communal coordination of Youth	Beneficiaries	Focal points of the programme	FG	RAs	
	Communes of the programme in Tombouctou and Gao regions	Beneficiaries	Mayors and focal points at the mayors offices	FG	RAs	
	Youth associations beneficiaries in Tombouctou and Gao region	Beneficiaries	Focal points of the programme	FG	RAs	x

N°	Name organization / Service	Status	Key informants needed	Enqu'r	Method <sup>30</sup>	Done =x
	Ex Combatants Groups in Tombouctou and Gao regions	Beneficiaries	Focal points in Ex Combattants Groups in Tombouctou and Gao Region	FG	RAs	
	Women Groups beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Focal points of all the women Group in Tombouctou and Gao Regions	FG	RAs	x
	Sport Clubs	Beneficiaries	Coaches in Gao and Tombouctou regions	II	RAs	x
	Individual beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	List of 400 individual beneficiaries			x





## **Annex 3    Tele-questionnaire: Quantified Results**

## **Annex 4 Individual Questionnaire: Quantified Results**

## Annex 5 Statistics and Figures

### Figures Chapter 4 Relevance:

Figure 1 Individual interviews: impressions of conflict analyses on 5 dimensions

Nombre des interviews: 26  
Séparer par: <Sans>




Figure 2 Management of ethnic groups in ENJECCOP in 5 events (tele-questionnaire)

Nombre des repondants: 84 to 90  
Séparer par: <Sans>





Figure 3 Ethnic groups per region on management of ethnic groups in ENJECCOP's conflict analysis workshops (tele-questionnaire)

Nombre des repondants: 87

Question 1: 12.1 Impression Gestion Participation Groupes Ethniques : 1. Les ateliers d'analyse de conflits locaux.

Question 2: 5b. Etnie en categories fusionnees - c. Songhai, a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq, d. Autres

Question 3: 4. Region



NB: For clarities' sake we took out the 'je ne sais pas' response category for question 12.1, for the Region we took out 'Autres' and 'Bamako'

**Figure 4a Assessment of quality of analysis of local tensions per ethnicity in two regions (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: **81**

Question 1: **5b. Etnie en categories fusionnees**

Question 2: **4. Region - a. Tombouctou & b. Gao**

Question 3: **10.3 Impression Atelier Analyse Conflit Local : 3. La qualite de l'analyse des tensions locaux.**

Question 2	Question 3	a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq				Question 1 c. Songhai			
a. Tombouctou	c. Ni bonne ni mal	7 (39%)				11 (61%)			
	d. Bonne	9 (43%)				12 (57%)			
	e. Excellent	1 (50%)				1 (50%)			
b. Gao	d. Bonne	3 (60%)				2 (40%)			
	e. Excellent	5 (14%)				30 (86%)			

**Figure 4b Assessment of influence of conflict analysis on community action plans per ethnicity in two regions (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: **81**

Question 1: **5b. Etnie en categories fusionnees**

Question 2: **4. Region - a. Tombouctou & b. Gao**

Question 3: **10.4 Impression Atelier Analyse Conflit Local : 4. L'Influence sur les plans d'action de communaut.**

Question 2	Question 3	a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq				Question 1 c. Songhai			
a. Tombouctou	c. Ni bonne ni mal	7 (47%)				8 (53%)			
	d. Bonne	9 (38%)				15 (63%)			
	e. Excellent					2 (100%)			
b. Gao	d. Bonne	2 (50%)				2 (50%)			
	e. Excellent	6 (17%)				30 (83%)			

NB: For clarities' sake we took out the 'desastreuse' and 'un peu decéante' response categories (these had no scores) for question 10.3 and 10.4, the 'Autres' response category for Ethnicity and for the Region 'Autres' and 'Bamako'. For full insight in the numbers please look at the Annex Figures and Statistics

**Figure 5 Men and women's impression of women's participation in ENJECCOP (tele-questionnaire)**


Nombre des repondants: **83 to 90**

Separer par: **Genre: a. Feminin & b. Masculin**


Question, avec sous-question

11.1 Impression Participation Femmes Analyse Conflit Locale :

1. Les ateliers d'analyse de conflits locaux.



**Figure 6 Young people's impression of women's participation in ENJECCOP (tele-questionnaire)**




**Figure 7 Impression of Female participation in ENJECCOP in Conflict monitoring committees per ethnicity and gender (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: 82

Question 1: 2. Genre

Question 2: 5b. Etnie en categories fusionnees - c. Songhai & a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq

Question 3: 11.2 Impression Participation Femmes Analyse Conflit Locale : 2. Les Comites de Suivi des Conflit .




NB For clarity's sake we left out the region of Bamako and those who said 'I do not know'.

## Figures for: Chapter 5 Effectiveness

**Figure 8 Perceived contribution of activities to 'addressing violence by youth and in the communities' (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: 84

Separer par: Etnie en categories fusionnees: c. Songhai & a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq




To emphasize the difference of perception between Songhai and Tamashek speakers the 'Autres' category was not included here.

**Figure 9 Perceived contribution of activities to 'managing the socioeconomic reintegration of youth' (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: 94

Separer par: <Sans>




**Figure 10 Perceived contribution per ethnic groups and per region of the coached groups to management of violence reduction (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des repondants: 81

Question 1: 4. Region

Question 2: 5b. Etnie en categories fusionnees - c. Songhai, a. Touareg & b. Kel Tamasheq, d. Autres

Question 3: 13.3 Contribution Activites Traitement Violence Jeunes et Communauté : 3. Les groupes mentore d'appui des jeunes




**Figures for Chapter 6: Sports for Change**



**Figure 11 Perceived S4C contribution to three domains for men and women (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des répondants: 94


Séparer par: Genre: a. Féminin & b. Masculin



**Figure 12 Perceived S4C contribution to three domains (tele-questionnaire)**

Nombre des répondants: 94

Séparer par: <Sans>



## Annex 6 Consulted literature / web sites

### Consulted documents

“Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process”, 2015 through: Peace Agreement Access Tool, [www.peaceagreements.org](http://www.peaceagreements.org)

ARPP final report, Mercy Corps, 2018

Christian Aid, ‘In it for the long haul? Lessons on Peacebuilding in South Sudan’, 2017

Conflict Management Consulting: Sahel formative review. Draft, March 2020

Conflict Management Consulting: Sahel formative review. Draft, March 2020.

IRF Project Document NUNO Template 2.1 Engaging Youth to Build Peaceful Communities in Mali, Last Signed December 2017, Mercy Corps, p6HRW, “[How Much ENJECCOP: Community Conflict Analyses in Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka, 2018/2019](#)”

[More Blood Must be Spilled? Atrocities Against Civilians in Central Mali](#)”, 2019

Rapport de la cartographie des conflits et des facteurs de risques de conflit et d’élaboration des plans d’actions, Région de Gao, Octobre 2018/Janvier 2019

Rick Davies, August 2009: ‘Expectations about identifying and documenting ‘Lessons learnt’, DRAFT

Secrétariat de Club de Sahel et de l’Afrique de L’Ouest/OECD, ‘Les regions maliennes de Gao, Kidal et Timbuktu, Perspectives Nationales et Régionales’, dans : Perspective Maliennes, Octobre 2015

PAX, Ketelaar, S; Gerritse, E.: ‘Sustaining Relative Peace and the crossborder peace network’s support for human security among pastoralist communities in the borderlands of Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda’, 2017

RFI, Speech of the President of the Republic of Mali, July 9, 2020

Salif Nimaga, Amagoin Keita, Charles Petrie, ‘Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Mali 2014/2018’, Final Report, 30 July 2019

ThinkPeace, ‘Rapport de la Cartographies Des Conflits et des Facteurs de Risques de Conflit’ (Timbuktu) Octobre/Décembre 2018

ThinkPeace and Mercy Corps “WE HOPE AND WE FIGHT. Youth, Communities, and Violence in Mali”, September 2017

Why Mali Needs a New Peace Deal, centre for strategic and international Studies, April 15,

### Consulted Websites

AJDM Mali <http://www.ongajdm.org/>

CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/whymalineedsnewpeacedeal>

Mercy Corps Mali: <https://www.mercycorps.org/wherewework/mali>

MINUSMA <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>

Research gate: [www.researchgate.net/post/what-is-qualitative-evaluation](http://www.researchgate.net/post/what-is-qualitative-evaluation), 160420

RFI: <https://www.rfi.fr/en/tag/mali/>

Think Peace Mali: <https://www.thinkpeacesahel.org>

UNPBF [https:// www.un.org > peacebuilding > fund > documents > evaluations](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund/documents/evaluations)

UNOCHA Mali <https://www.unocha.org/mali>