Final Evaluation of the Project

“Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao”

A joint Project implemented by UNDP, UNICEF and UN-Women in the Philippines

(Oct 2017-Apr 2019)

**Final Report**

April 2020



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*COVER PAGE PHOTO:*

*Safe Space* for pupils constructed in Ramon Enriquez High School from Labuan, Zamboanga City, Photo Credits @ Labuan Peace Warriors Project Team, May 2019.

Local community matched PBF support valued at 15,000 pesos with 20,000 pesos as its own in-kind and cash contribution towards the construction of the Safe Space corner in the school. This Safe Space promotes the idea of dialogue and moves the pupils away from the streets which is especially important for those at the risk of drop-out.

A total of 72 teachers work **with 65 pupils on average per classroom**, and they conduct classes at the hallways and school parks. Now, instead of going to the street and wandering around between classes, over 2,200 students belonging to Christians, Subanen, Yakan, Samal, Kalibugan, and Tausug have their space to meet, discuss their priorities, and spend time on academic and co-curricular activities.

A team of nine teachers and boys and girls named ***Labuan Peace Warriors*** mobilized their local community to contribute in cash and construction materials towards the construction of this Safe Space in 2019.

**Waiver:**

The attitudes and conclusions here represent the personal views of the Evaluation Team Leader who bears the sole responsibility for this evaluation report. Under no circumstances, UNDP, UN-Women or UNICEF, RCO or any UN agency endorse the opinions expressed herein.

**Acknowledgements**:

The work on the Final Evaluation of the Joint Project "Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao" funded by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is finally completed.

The Evaluation Team remains deeply grateful to the men and women, boys, and girls who have participated in this evaluation and who have often traveled from remote areas to meet the Evaluation Team. The wise and caring peace builders, young women and men, representatives of implementing partners, indigenous women and men, civil society organizations, religious leaders, insider mediators, government officials, volunteers, university's staff, teachers and boys and girls of Mindanao, spoke about their experiences, programming, financial and administrative successes, and challenges. We sincerely hope that their views and hopes for the future of Mindanao and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) will be continuously incorporated by the decision-makers in crafting the agenda for the future of BARMM and the Philippines.

This evaluation would not have been possible without the support of UNDP, UNICEF, UN-Women, UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) and Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) teams based in Manila, and above all, UNDP, UNICEF and UN-Women staff based in Cotabato Field Office. Your dedication and willingness to share your professional and personal knowledge gave me a new perspective on the role and behavior of the UN staff in the development and I admire you for that.

Special thanks go to the UNDP Evaluation Manager, Mr. Nelson Peloton Jr., for his technical and professional guidance, inputs, and above all, for his attitude and willingness to go one step beyond what was possible while planning and carrying out this evaluation process.

The evaluators owe special gratitude to the Evaluation Reference Group members for their constructive feedback on various versions of the Inception Report and the Evaluation Report. Your suggestions and thoughtful questions were crucial in improving the text, and the final report the way it looks today.

In the end, this evaluation process would have been impossible without the professional support and technical expertise of the five-person Evaluation Team. As a peer-evaluator, Ms. Tatjana Obradovic-Tosic made available her unprecedented gender equality and process facilitation expertise. She was the critical data triangulation reference point who critically questioned conclusions and logic from the methodological design to data analyses and the evaluation report finalization and presentation. I remain grateful for her energy, support, and solidarity at times when I felt stuck and exhausted.

Then, I owe my deepest gratitude to my colleagues, the National Evaluation Consultant, Mr. Ombra Imam Ed.D., and our Mindanao-based research team comprised of the three Moro women: Senior Researcher, Ms. Maripaz C. Abas Ed.D., Professor and Dean of a State College in Cotabato City; Ms. Zajarah M. Duma, English language assistant professor; and, Ms. Sharida D. Mandi, licensed social worker and skillful transcriber.

This magic team was crucial in facilitating evaluation logistics, conducting the key informant interviews and focus group discussions, transcription, and translation from Tagalog to English. This team has added value to the methodological insights, collection of bibliographic reference of documents reviewed, quality of data collected, and most importantly, ensured a personal feeling of security and respect among the respondents. This team provided crucial explanation of the peace process within the introduction and overview chapter of the report and has also traveled far and beyond to meet Moro male and female leaders and to engage them in the evaluation process. I appreciate their contribution to the evaluation process and data analyses from Moro men and boys, women and girls' perspective.

In the end, I dedicate this evaluation report to my father, Vlado Radivojevic, who was patient with me and my choices in life and from whom I inherited the passion for mathematics, attention to details, punctuality, and fanatic organizational skills. His faith in me, encouragement and love, kept me going even when the times were tough and when many were not brave enough to take a step forward.

I wish for the Moro leaders in the Philippines, and in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to provide love and support to their daughters and sisters, partners, and female relatives, and to encourage them to continue with their education and carrier aspirations. My father, who was working with military forces as a civilian, not only invested money in my education and in my carrier, but also provided care and guidance to his two grand-daughters from their birth and especially when they lost their own father.

Dear Father, for all your love and support, I remain forever grateful. And proud. Until we meet again, rest in peace.

**Milica Turnic**

26 April 2020

# Project and evaluation information details

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Project/Outcome Information** | | |
| Project/outcome title | PBF-IRF-188: Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao (Philippines) | |
| Project ID | 00106946[[1]](#footnote-2) | |
| Atlas (Output) ID | 00107423 | |
| Corporate outcome and output: | PBF focus areas:  - Three focus areas: 1.4. – Political dialogue; 2.1. – National reconciliation; 2.3. – Conflict prevention/management;  UNDAF for the Philippines 2012-2018, outcome area 3: Democratic governance and related outputs:  - 3.1. Citizens’ participation and oversight  - 3.2. Integrity and accountability  - 3.3. Local development planning and management  - 3.4. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding  - 3.5. Population and development  - 3.6. Women’s empowerment | |
| Country | Philippines | |
| Region | Asia and the Pacific | |
| Date Project document signed | 14 September 2017 | |
| Project dates[[2]](#footnote-3) | Start | End |
| 24 October 2017 | 30 April 2019 |
| Project budget | USD 3,000,000 | |
| Project expenditure at the time of evaluation – 01 Nov 2019 | USD 2,950,000  (remaining USD 50,000 for Project Evaluation) | |
| Funding source | Peacebuilding Fund IRF | |
| Implementing party[[3]](#footnote-4) | Recipient UN Organization(s): UNDP, UNICEF, and UN-Women | |
|  |  | |
| **Evaluation information** | | |
| Evaluation type | Project evaluation | |
| Final/midterm review/ other | Final | |
| Period under evaluation | Start | End |
| 24 October 2017 | 30 April 2019 |
| Evaluators: | Ms. Milica Turnic, Team Leader  Tatjana Obradovic-Tosic, tatjana.obradovic.tosic@gmail.com  Mr. Ombra Imam, National Consultant, dromsimam2010@gmail.com | |
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| Evaluation dates: | Start | Completion |
|  | 27 Aug 2019 | 30 April 2020 |

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AI | Appreciative Inquiry |
| ARMM  ASG | Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  Abu Sayyaf Group |
| BARMM | Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao |
| BBL | Bangsamoro Basic Law |
| BIWAB | Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade |
| BOL | Bangsamoro Organic Law |
| BSG  BTA | Bangsamoro Study Group  Bangsamoro Transition Authority |
| BTC | Bangsamoro Transition Commission |
| CAB | Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro |
| CBCS | Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society |
| CFSI | Community and Family Services International |
| COMELEC | Commission on Elections of the Republic of the Philippines |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organizations |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DPA | UN Department of Political Affairs |
| DepEd | Department of Education |
| DoH | Department of Health |
| DSWD  EM  ERG | Department of Social Welfare and Development  Evaluation Manager  Evaluation Reference Group |
| ETL | Evaluation Team Leader |
| ET | Evaluation Team |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GAD | Gender and Development |
| GRAS | Gender Responsiveness Assessment Scale |
| GPH | Government of the Philippines |
| GSFPDM | Government’s Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao |
| HOR  HRGE | House of Representatives  Human Rights and Gender Equality |
| ICAN  ICM | International Children’s Action Network  Interim Chief Minister |
| IAG | Institute for Autonomy and Governance |
| IM  IMG  IR | Insider Mediators  Insider Mediators Group  Inception Report |
| IRF  ISIS | Immediate Response Facility [of PBF]  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| MARADECA | Maranao People Development Center, Inc. |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MILF | Moro Islamic Liberation Front |
| MNLF | Moro National Liberation Front |
| NAP | National Action Plan |
| OPAPP | Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process |
| OECD | The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development |
| PBF | Peacebuilding Fund |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| PCVE | Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism |
| PNP  Project  ProDoc  PVE  RA | Philippine National Police  “Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao” Project  Original text of the Project proposal approved by the PBF  Prevention of Violent Extremism  Republic Act |
| RCO | United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office |
| RUNOs | Recipient UN Organizations |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender Based Violence |
| SWAP | System Wide Action Plan |
| TBC | To be confirmed |
| TOC | Theory of Change |
| TBD | To be determined |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNSDF | United Nations Sustainable Development Framework |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNVs | United Nations Volunteers |
| UN-Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |
| UN SCR 1325 | United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security |
| UN SCR 2250 | United Nations Security Council Resolution on Youth, Peace, and Security |
| WEAI | Women Empowerment in Agriculture Index |
| WPS | Women, Peace, and Security |
| YPT | Youth Peace Tables |

***“The impact is…***

***there's a bright future,   
there is now a government that will take care of them, […….]***

***that from this we can build a brighter future,***

***that's the legacy,   
that's the impact that we can share with our people,   
that our children will not have to,***

***you know, wage another arms struggle.”****Male, age unknown, Nov 2019*

***Hope this is not the end… more power!***

*Female, age group 36-65, Nov 2019*

***This result happened***

***because of the effective and***

***efficient implementation***

***of the Project***

***that incorporates innovative***

***and***

***transformative approach***

***to the participants.”***

*Female, age group 18-35, Nov 2019*

***“The peace process is a long and enduring one.***

***We need the constant mentoring of experts.”***

*Male, age group 36-65, Nov 2019*

***“”*It should not just be**

**“*I'm … , this is what I'm going to do*”**

**but [it should be]**

**"*This is what is needed in this area,***

***what can I offer***

***and***

***how can I contribute to this world*?"**

**[….] So it's not just limiting to your core competency**

**but trying to find that mixture and balance**

**and**

**make that comprehensive support package**

**instead of working in silos.””**

*Male, age unknown, Nov 2019*

# Executive Summary

### Description

1. UN Country Team and the Government of the Philippines designed jointly "Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao" project and implemented it from 24 October 2017 until 30 April 2019. This undertaking received support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and three agencies jointly implemented it: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (UN-Women). This Project, known among UN Country Team (UNCT) staff as "the second PBF-supported project" or the "phase two project", was developed in continuation of the first PBF peacebuilding effort, which had been implemented in the Philippines by six UN agencies, from January 2015 until May 2016.
2. This extremely ambitious Project was designed at the critical stage of the 17-year-long peacebuilding process after the first PBF supported peacebuilding project[[4]](#footnote-5) finished early in 2016. Unfortunately, Marawi siege massively hindered the attempts to agree on the text of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and caused the need for project alignment to the Government Marawi recovery priorities.
3. The Project goal was to sustain peace in Mindanao by building the capacity of the critical mass of selected political, social and economic stakeholders to facilitate broad and inclusive peace processes and to prevent further alienation and radicalization at the national and local community levels in Muslim Mindanao.
4. Under the first outcome, identified peace actors were capacitated to create a positive environment for the adoption and implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) among the members of the highest representational body in the country, the Senate and the House of Representative (HOR), and among Moro leadership. In addition to enabling dialogue and consensus building in the Philippines on the implementation of the CAB, the Project aimed at facilitating inclusive peace by participation of women and in the peace process. It also aimed at building the capacity of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) to implement Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda into future programs for the prevention of violent extremism (PVE). A number of 15 local peace actors, UN Volunteers were aimed at being positioned in communities and mediating the local conflict drivers.
5. The second Project outcome focused on community-level peace actors: women, youth, and religious leaders (ulama). Selected stakeholders were empowered and capacitated to be engaged with their constituencies and to build the broadest public understanding of the peace process and the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) implementation benefits. Community dialogues were conducted to prevent radicalization and alienation between the government and Moro population and to mitigate the consequences of long-term discrimination and marginalization of Moro women, men, and youth in Mindanao.
6. The Theory of Change (TOC) as indicated in the Project Results Matrix is presented below:

**Table 1:** Project Theory of Change as indicated in the Project Results Matrix[[5]](#footnote-6)

A screenshot of text

Description automatically generated

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

1. A robust TOC is constructed based on project activities and project results framework and it is presented in the Figure 1. The underlining TOC is based on the learning process of individuals and institutions which are engaged in meaningful dialogue around critical questions of their concern.
2. Dialogues are possible only and only if the participants possess appropriate skills and are able to differentiate between policies, positions, and information. With those skills and available space for dialogue, women and men are capable of creating joint actions and efforts which then result in sustainable peace because they eliminate conflict drivers thus preventing large-scale violence.
3. The identified TOC, which encapsulates inter-group interaction and dialogue, is based on complex systems science thinking that small-group interactions occurring in the "complex social systems" (Loode[[6]](#footnote-7), 2011) and those relationships are strengthened through the intergroup dialogue.
4. In the case of this Project, complexity as a factor of success is observed on two levels: Firstly, the Project successfully engaged leadership at the community level, mid-level and the grassroots level and more importantly, that engagement was facilitated by the "insiders" not by any "external" actors. And secondly, the Project's success was due to the simultaneous mobilization of multiple actors pursuing multiple actions and initiatives. A crucial conflict elimination element was that joint efforts reflected the local social needs and allowed participants to reflect on the local realities.

**Figure 1:** Visual presentation of the TOC

A screenshot of a social media post

Description automatically generated

### Purpose, objectives, audience and users of the evaluation

1. The UNDP commissioned this final Project evaluation with the two-fold goal: to evaluate Project results and achievements; and, to consolidate evidence, lessons learned, and best practices for joint programming of peacebuilding projects and interventions in the Philippines and alike fragile contexts.
2. The primary evaluation audience and users are UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEF) and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the lead implementing partner, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP). The evaluation findings will also be useful as reference for other organizations working on peacebuilding programs in other countries.
3. The evaluation represents also an opportunity to engage in dialogues with partners, especially with the academia, informal groups of experts, civil society organizations, women's civil society organizations, youth groups and ulama about the evaluation findings and recommendations.
4. **RECOMMENDATION**: Therefore, it is recommended to follow up on evaluation findings with all relevant stakeholders and to provide feedback on their expressed concerns and recommendations. This establishment of the feedback loop and continuation of dialogue will spur innovative thinking and facilitate the introduction of new and improved procedures and processes in the existing and new partnerships.

### Evaluation approach and methodology

1. The evaluation adopted a participatory methodology and appreciative inquiry (AI) approach with a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. The approach comprised a qualitative data collection which entailed desk review of the Project documents, studies, and reports, and data collection through key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD) and online surveys.
2. Quantitative data collection comprised two online surveys and respondents' quantitative estimates within the proposed numerical scales (between one and 10 and between zero and 100 percent). The grading scales were used to assess the respondents' numerical ratings of the Project relevance and Project contribution to the peace process, as well as to measure the involvement and responsiveness of the Project design to the women's and youth needs and priorities.
3. The KIIs were conducted among the available Project staff of the Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), RCO, OPAPP, and other implementing partners (IP), informal and formal groups of women, youth, religious leaders, academia, and civil society organizations (CSOs). The FGD with the religious leaders, women, insider mediators, women speaker’s bureau participants, youth, teachers, and pupils were conducted in all five cities identified in the Evaluation Terms of reference (TOR).

### Principal findings, conclusions and recommendations

### Evaluation rating scales

1. Evaluation used three scales for the assessment of Project performance: the first is a four-level rating scale assessing performance and achievement of objectives: very good, good, satisfactory and needs improvement or unsatisfactory. (See Table 2)
2. The second scale was the Gender Responsive Assessment Scale (GRAS) indicated in Table 3, to assess gender equality potential of Project indicators and activities as gender-negative, gender-blind, gender-sensitive, gender-responsive and gender-transformative[[7]](#footnote-8).
3. The third scale used for Project evaluation is standard results-based management (RBM) tool: SMART[[8]](#footnote-9) criteria (Table 4) which was used to assess results-based logic and robustness of indicators.

### Relevance – the rating is VERY GOOD

1. The Project was highly relevant for the political moment and enabled critical and comprehensive peacebuilding and mediation at both national and community levels. Furthermore, the local peace actors claim that the Project resonated with their personal needs and the evaluation noted high level relevance for groups involved in Project activities. The Project actors: insider mediators, youth, women, religious leaders, and civil society members identified high level of relevance towards the national and local community needs.
2. Thanks to the flexibility of the PBF support, the RUNOs were able to adopt approaches and methodologies that led to fast adaptations in the changing context. For example, UN Women adjusted its approach to diaspora communities once their activities were seen as politically engaged by some leaders, the Insider Mediators Group (IMG or simply IMs) analyzed risks and potential for the upcoming plebiscite violence occurrence and deployed mediators in those communities.
3. While the Project mobilized and engaged the youth and women to a significant extent, the gender equality agenda and the needs of young women could have been elaborated more widely and included at all peace tables[[9]](#footnote-10) and at all dialogue’s levels. Apart from UN Women, other RUNOs and partners could have targeted more women and more young women and built their leadership, advocacy, and public speaking skills. This critical mass of female leaders and young female leaders would then take up its space in the new government and would shape the agenda in this highly patriarchal society.
4. Recommendations from the Phase One project evaluation were incorporated in the Project Document (ProDoc) but were not implemented completely leaving significant gaps in the internal coordination, communication, and joint project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. (See details in the Table 11)

### Effectiveness – the rating is GOOD

1. The Project has been successful to a remarkable extent in achieving results along the two desired outcomes even when the Project’s activities were reprogramed and funds redistributed to other priorities of the Implementing Partner (IP). Aside from changes in several activities in two of the total of five Project outputs, which included 17 key activities the Project was very effective in reaching out its objectives. The main Project approach in empowering individuals and then giving them a chance to implement their skills “in practice” was crucial for delivery of Project results.
2. Most importantly, as indicated in the TOC, the Project established a space for dialogue between the institutions and the communities, which is one of the key factors of peace in Mindanao, after years of marginalization and discrimination. Under Outcome 1 spelled out as:

**Outcome 1: Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established**

1. The following results were identified:
   1. A significant political space for political dialogue and public education on the importance and benefits of the BOL was created leading to the actual adoption of BOL. After forging a consensus between Moro leadership and the Senate and HOR on the BOL text, the BOL was signed by the President into Law containing articles formulating and recognizing women and Indigenous People priorities and needs;
   2. The IMG had a crucial role in pushing the process forward and in negotiating the final text of the Law when the political process was stalled. This push was provided, among other methods, by engaging legal consultants who assisted in clarification and fine-tuning of the text to the version acceptable to all parties.
   3. Besides high level political elite, the IMG and CSOs had a direct access to communities and ensured continued and inclusive peace process. For example, an indigenous people representative who is also an insider mediator went down to communities to educate and explain to people the whole context of BOL and meaning of ancestral domain.
   4. Women priorities were identified and female IMG participated in the advocacy for BOL adoption by the Senate and HOR: “*Women were protesting outside*”[[10]](#footnote-11), *Women were everywhere, at least it was fifty-fifty or forty-sixty participation of women”*[[11]](#footnote-12).
   5. Women were engaged as BOL advocates and public education leaders in diaspora communities. The Women Speakers’ Bureau (WSB) was established bringing together 31 and then establishing a group of 22 active women who reached out to 700 women in diaspora communities as resource persons on BOL and the Plebiscite.
   6. After the Inaugural BARMM Women’s Summit took place in Davao City on 28-29 March 2019, a “10-point Women’s Agenda” was designed and handed over to the Bangsamoro Women Commission. The Summit called for spaces to ensure women’s needs were met in laws and policies, pledged for full implementation of the existing Gender and Development Budget, and the creation of a Ministry for Women in the new Bangsamoro Government.
   7. Positive outcomes of the two Bangsamoro Plebiscites, held respectively in January and February 2019, confirmed Moro people understanding of the benefits of BOL and BARMM resulting in the inclusion of a total of 63 North Cotabato barangays in the new autonomous region. The engagement and consultations with 90 Indigenous Women on BOL ratification, Government of the Philippines (GPH)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Process workshop which was held for the Philippine National Police (PNP), the conduct of the Mindanao Indigenous People Youth Assembly gathering 114 young indigenous women and men, and consultations and capacity building of 600 women on livelihood programs, the training of the Philippines police forces as well as the assistance to four Women peace centers in Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu and BARMM Legislative Assembly were the activities which contributed towards the success of the two plebiscites.
   8. Consultation sessions between North Cotabato Barangay Officials and BARMM Ministries were organized and a “Bangsamoro Vision for the future by BARMM” was designed and inaugurated. The consensus on power sharing has been achieved as reflected in the current composition of the 80-member Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). Various sectors are duly represented with the following number of seats (at least) in the parliament: women (11), youth (2), indigenous peoples (2) and settler communities (2)
   9. Nation-wide consultations facilitated participatory design of the **National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP PCVE),** with strong gender components. After consultations, RUNOs have mobilized resources for the NAP finalization and before the Project ended, the plan was endorsed by the Government of the Philippines’ National Anti-Terrorism Council. Some respondents opposed the PBF contribution as the Plan was finalized under a Government of Japan project and the way those consultations were held as “*non-efficient, missing important stakeholders such as private army groups, and hasty*” (Interview, respondent, Nov 2019). However, the major consultations initiated for the NAP PCVE were confirmed to be funded under PBF.
   10. Moro leadership benefited from the capacity building opportunities outside Mindanao and outside the Philippines.
   11. The community dialogues and community grants remain an essential mechanism for building peace and harmony in the communities primarily because of the experience of actors after designing and implementing joint actions.
   12. Lastly, within this outcome, new Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development for the Philippines was developed for 2019-2023 with the GPH.
   13. The capacity building of UNCT and IP on “*Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the role of women in the prevention of violent terrorism”* a training workshop was held on “*Developing an Integrated Risk Assessment System for Early Warning and Response”*.
2. Several indirect effects of the Project Outcome 1 have been identified as follows:
   1. The transition process included nomination and promotion of several IMG members to key government positions and functions in the BARMM.
   2. The IMG was very efficient in both peacebuilding and normalization tracks of the peace process. For example, a number of IMs advocated for speedy implementation of the rehabilitation on conflict affected areas, more particularly Marawi which was a high level priority for local communities and people on the ground.
   3. The IMG has been sustained as an informal group of actors and the IMG experience was shared regionally in a workshop with participants from Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, Fiji, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan and Cambodia.
   4. Women’s Speakers Bureau remains an effective platform to open more spaces of empowering women to play their role in building a gender responsive governance in the Bangsamoro.
3. Under the Outcome 2, which was spelled out as:

**Outcome 2: Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified and capacities to address them developed and implemented**

1. The following results have been identified:
   1. **Ten written Khutbahs**, translated to four dialects and English language, were accepted by the Dawah Committee and rolled out to be used by religious leaders across Mindanao. Religious leaders are now using written sermons during Friday prayer to both women and men in Mindanao.
   2. **Over 100 religious leaders** feel empowered and more confident to engage with their constituencies on sensitive topics, e.g., the role and the peaceful nature of Islam, the meaning of Jihad, the terrorism and how to fight it, the role of media in promoting terrorism, among others. They have developed strong public speaking skills and are better able to manage mosques and to advise and guide communities in solving problems.
   3. **Community dialogues** conducted with local partners and local governments have resulted in an **impressive inventory of community priorities and needs** on child protection and those data are available for policy and decision making and programming of the government resources.
   4. A certain number of **para-social workers** feel now more confident to communicate and approach camp leadership and former combatants living inside and feel empowered to communicate their needs to the barangay officials. This number of para-social workers represent significant social capital and partners have proposed their potential certification and inclusion in the public services labor force. They will be essential to reach out to other vulnerable groups and accompany them to become functional members of the society.
   5. **Peace Education Curriculum** was produced and incorporated in official curriculum of schools in Zamboanga and teachers continue to use it within Cultural Education subject. **Teachers in several schools now** use the new Peace Curriculum; they feel empowered to engage with local communities and mobilize resources among private sector towards improving educational outcomes for youth; Peace corners and online platforms developed during the Project remain maintained by pupils-leaders and teachers on a voluntary basis.
   6. **Boys and girls** who were engaged in **peace camps and school projects** take the ownership for the future of their communities and schools including their peers:
      * They stand up against bulling and can better understand, identify and are able to handle problems in their classrooms, and on social networks, including peer pressure, bullying, and violence.
      * The waste disposal and waste management in schools has improved significantly due to increased awareness of waste management because there is an increased awareness of environment protection among pupils; waste collection and waste recycling corners established in a few schools remain sustainable and generate money and employment for poverty affected pupils.
      * Students are now more aware of solutions and take ownership for leading their communities towards solutions and peace.
   7. The **Youth Peace Tables (YPT)** which gathered 117 key youth leaders (50 males, 67 female) across the Philippines from 76 youth networks (42 school-based, 34 community-based) has launched the Youth Peace Agenda which has substantially contributed to the BARMM's drafting of its Youth Development Transition Agenda particularly its peace and security component.
   8. **U-Report** was accepted by the Office of the Bangsamoro Youth Affairs as a data collection and youth consultation platform; boys and girls trained as U-reporters developed leadership and community organization skills, they feel more confident to speak up and communicate with people, and can now train their peers and facilitate communication with their peers to discuss community problems. Same as it happened for peace camps participants.
   9. **Youth mobilized as U-Reporters** transitioned from **lethargic and angry youth** towards **youth capable and ready to mobilize communities** around solving joint problems. The major reason for this is that opportunities to engage with peers and to travel are rare for these children and above all, they have rarely or never had the opportunity the express opinion, to participate and express their worries and needs.
   10. The consultation process around the **National Youth Peacebuilding Platform** remains a unique experience and a success story considered for replication in other counters as it paved the way for the transposition of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UN SCR) 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in the national level commitments.
   11. **Online platforms** produced during Project implementation remain significant resources for local communities, for example, prevention of cyberbullying for youth and the PossiBOL and YEStoBOL Facebook pages.
   12. **Indigenous youth and indigenous women** platforms for dialogues were established and continue to be sources for leadership and resolution of indigenous people’s priorities.
2. The indirect results identified under Outcome 2 are as follows:
   1. **Dawah committees** has continued to train religious leaders in delivering Khutbahs on ten topics and has initiated collection of the sex disaggregated data on attendees of the Friday sermons.

*[…] the major result that happened is the involvement of the people […] may it be children, young adults, adults that are* ***coming from different religions****.*

*Projects like these are mostly rare to the people […].*

*It helped them [the people] enhance their awareness and knowledge […] and they have become part of the change […] by sharing their thoughts and knowledge that can help resolve the current issues in peace development.*

Female respondent, aged 18-35

* 1. The **Philippine Youth Peace Tables** model and series of dialogues have attracted global YPS coalition to consider the initiative as one of the models of a government organized youth mainstreaming and national action plan/framework formulation and programming. The Philippine experience is being considered as one of the inputs in the global 2020 report on the progress YPS adoption by UN member states to the UN Security Council.

1. The Project stakeholders expressed the significant results in their own words as follows:
2. *Policy makers appreciated shared information and saw the brighter perspective of Islamic Finance - its essence, importance and benefits especially to the growth of Halal Industry and development of Mindanao;*
3. *Indigenous women participated in Peace building mechanism, and produced data that can be used for programming by BARMM;*
4. *New connections among the youth people and their [awaken] strong sense of community and opportunity to get introduced to peacebuilding instead of the norm of fighting; and,*
5. *Creation of social cohesion and familiarization with child rights.*
6. Beside tangible Project outcomes and outputs, the Project achieved significant results by firstly, empowering individuals and then creating a “*a platform for safe and open conversation*”[[12]](#footnote-13) for diverse actors and voices.
7. Creation of this space is specifically important for the youth because it has primarily **empowered individuals to enter into meaningful dialogue on taboos** and tough challenges their communities were facing. This innovative approach was new experience and has stirred participants ownership towards peace. Secondly, and more importantly, the Project established a space for dialogue between the institutions and the communities, which is one of the key factors of peace in Mindanao, after years of marginalization and discrimination.
8. Even if the TOC does not specify each of the Project peace actors, e.g., women or youth, or religious leaders, it captures sufficiently their path towards change and the outcomes identified in the ProDoc. However, despite the established validity of the TOC, the Project results remain fragile for some actors, e.g., for grassroots women and youth, especially young women because of the cultural and social norms and context.

*Young people in BARMM were given a powerful positive pathway to engage in peacebuilding as leaders and agents of change in their communities... as opposed to the norm of fighting for their rights through affiliation to armed groups and violent extremists.”*

Female respondent, aged 36-65

### Efficiency – the rating is GOOD

1. With the total budget of USD 3 million, the Project spurred innovative thinking and served as the seed for the expansion of initiated activities, mostly for the second Project Outcome which identified factors and built the capacities for the prevention of violent terrorism (PVE).
2. The evaluation collected evidence that RUNOs managed to mobilize almost USD 8.5 million or 280% worth of PBF support from the Government of Japan, Australia and European Union. On the other hand, local implementing partners which participated in the evaluation, CSOs and academia, claim not to have received significant support from the other donors.
3. One of the local implementing partners has made a financial contribution towards Project implementation in the form of funding all Project staff salaries during Project implementation. In addition, a small grant awarded to a group of teacher and pupils for their peace corner project in Zamboanga, managed to attract financial and in-kind support from the local businesses. This local potential remains an important sustainability factor for consideration in future programming for both academia, government and CSOs.
4. RUNOs **used different modalities** to implement this ambitious Project. A direct implementation or engagement of consultants was seen as the most effective way to implement highly technical aspects of activities and grant making options were used to engage the local CSOs, academia and government to ensure the best local level solutions. The evaluation observed that the usage of a longer-term MoUs and joint grant making mechanisms to CSOs would have increased not only the efficiency but the impact and sustainability of Project results as well.
5. On the management side of the Project implementation, the project included the costs of project staff up to the amount of USD 422,000 or approximately 14% of the budget. RUNOs used the existing RUNO staff for Project implementation just by adding tasks to their ongoing tasks and workload.
6. Getting additional responsibilities was not warmly received because some staff members expected more timely guidance and support and at least engagement of an on-call or temporary assistance in the Project implementation. This additional burden restricted effective monitoring, evaluation, and reporting aspects and evidence of the Project implementation, which is the key for peacebuilding. Specifically, disaster-prone areas with specific political landscape often require fast adjustments and interventions, which increases the burden on the existing staff, so additional local staff hire is needed and recommended.
7. **RECOMMENDATION**: Considering the changing context during the Project period and the programming adjustments made, the Project monitoring and evaluation data and indicators should have been reviewed and adjusted even if the PBF and the Project Board did not require formal approval. Also, it is the overall impression that the Project Technical Committee, if the one had been formed and functional, could have had a more substantial role, primarily as a mechanism used to bring in the voices of the implementing partners' technical staff and to improve communication and coordination.

*“[…] we are combatants, we are not equipped for governance.*

*The government cannot do it alone.*

*How government in partnership with development partners come into play?*

*It is not just the sole responsibility of one entity – it should be a holistic approach, re-strategize, not business as usual anymore.*

*Let us not work in silos.*

*We cannot afford to fail; we cannot leave the BARMM to work to do things right. It is also our responsibility to make this work.”*

Project After Action Review participant, June 2019

1. For joint programming at the UN level, clear organigram, transparency in decision making, and superior coordination are the key elements for efficient and effective implementation and, thus, the overall Project impact. Project coordination among RUNOs was the weakest point in the execution of activities for a variety of reasons and excuses. Consequently, the absence of coordination among RUNOs has left several CSOs in confusion because different RUNOs contracted them for various aspects of the same Project. In addition, the lack of transparency in decision making has left RUNOs frustrated and without information about Project activities and budget revisions. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that transparency and communication are always two-way streets, and ignoring each other requests and invitations for actions is not the right solution either[[13]](#footnote-14).
2. **RECOMMENDATION**: For any future interventions, it is imperative to improve coordination and transparency at all levels: among RUNOs, their implementing partners, technical and operational level staff. It is also vital that RUNOs facilitate or support coordination mechanisms at the local level among the CSOs, local government, and other social and economic actors.
3. Local-level coordination will enable powerful synergies in the corresponding geographical areas and create a multiplier effect for Project beneficiaries. On the operational level, coordination could mean the establishment of the list of CSOs contracted by different RUNOs and the alignment of the operational interventions via annual projects.

### Sustainability – the rating is GOOD

1. The Project produced sustainable results by creating and enacting the text of the key legislative framework and influencing the content of the national public policy documents by mobilizing grassroots actors to inform the policy and decision-making processes at the national level. These results remain sustainable, and the government and national level actors expressed commitment in giving policies due considerations in government future programming and policymaking.
2. However, one issue is having the will, and the other is having the capacity and resources to ensure implementation. Even if, to a certain extent, some of the implementing partners, e.g., religious leaders or ulama, took over the continuation of the activities, e.g., training more religious leaders and promoting usage of written Sermons, it is essential to support them to expand reach out to their constituencies on other topics and in different geographical areas.
3. The main reason for the necessity of the support of policy implementation now lies in the high expectation of grassroots women and men, and especially youth, to witness quick improvements in their everyday lives. **The expectations refer to a more responsive government and better functioning and broader coverage and delivery of services to all, especially the most vulnerable and far away constituencies**. Evaluation respondents expressed awareness that the new government is responsible together with the UN and, to some extent, them personally, for Project sustainability.
4. For this reason, the project participants expressed as the key peace sustainability component the need that the new interim BARMM government, which was recently established and entrusted with new responsibilities, delivers on practical citizens’ expectations and make them a reality.
5. Lastly, the evaluation finds that the establishment and support of the local coordination and development mechanism via different strategies and under different names, will be the key to sustaining Project results and sustaining peace in Mindanao.
6. To this goal, local CSOs could be established as formal or informal structures, Peace or Local Development Secretariats, or Peace and Development Coordination Centers, which will continue to provide safe space for inter-group dialogues and joint actions among the government, development partners and CSOs.

### Human Rights and Gender Equality – the rating is SATISFACTORY

1. The majority of Project results have been achieved despite the changes in the political context and strong gender biases identified at the individual levels among several Project stakeholders and key decision-makers and even implementing partners’ staff. It is important to note that all the key Project products and documents are gender sensitive but this approach is due to employment of individual consultants: BOL contains gender sensitive articles and the nationwide consultations led to the drafting and the adoption of gender sensitive NAP PCVE, although the latter was the result of the catalytic effect of the PBF, meaning that the PBF funding supported the initial costs of engaging the consultant to lead this process.
2. The elimination of the Women Peace and Security component from the budget and list of project activities remained to be the high-level risk for any future programming interventions of the UNCT in the Philippines, for two reasons.
3. Firstly, the lack of capacity building needs among UNCT and partners staff identified in the problem analyses of the ProDoc remained unanswered, in particular the project identified the need to receive the assistance from the HQ for “cross-cutting issues” but this need has not been responded to. The only capacity was identified within UN-Women and UNICEF.
4. And secondly, the evaluation has found evidence that despite efforts of the all RUNOs, programming approach to gender remains on the level of perpetuation of the existing gender stereotypes and gender-neutral approaches to the activities. In addition, there is a significant difference in the paths of engaging Gender Specialists or gender mainstreaming consultants.
5. The first approach is the ad-hoc solution to engage Gender Specialist to review and mainstream gender in one document. The second is to engage Gender Specialist in the whole process of the nation-wide consultations. This means that longer-term Gender Specialist will sensitize other colleagues to gender and will ensure transformative gender actions by securing the participation of women from CSOs and women and girls from other sectors and with diverse identities.
6. The second approach will result in the public (and coworkers’) education on gender and the role of women, thus resulting in the increased visibility of women’s needs and priorities. The result in both cases are the same: we will have a gender-sensitive document or policy. However, the second process entails longer-term sustainability and transformative gender impact.
7. Furthermore, one of the consequences of the absence of coordination and clear responsibilities lead to a single sided and unclear decision-making process. For example, although UN Women has a clear mandate on the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, the original ProDoc allocated USD 500k to UNDP for capacity building of the UNCT and the government on the WPS.
8. Regrettably for women and Projects’ overall gender marker score, the Project’s activities were reprogramed and instead of the WPS training for the UNCT, a workshop was held on Developing an Integrated Risk Assessment System for Early Warning and Response. Unfortunately, in human behavior theory, absence of information is a strong conflict driver and that is what happened when one RUNO decided to remove capacity building session on WPS.
9. In the end, **the budget** aimed for introducing local intermediaries-volunteers on the grassroots level was redirected towards other activities prioritized at that moment as critical for peace in Mindanao.
10. Although the reasoning behind this reprogramming which occurred on the level of the Outcome 1 sounds to be valid and critical for the peace and the political moment, it is critical for the team to improve transparency and demonstrate a higher level of coordination and communication among RUNOs and partners in decision making process. It is also necessary to demonstrate high level dedication to gender equality and women’s empowerment agenda, because only this part was reprogrammed, and there was no reprogramming of the UNICEF outputs.
11. **RECOMMENDATION: The gender equality skills** for the UN Country Team and implementing partners should be prioritized and Participatory Gender Audit conducted, UNDP Gender Seal[[14]](#footnote-15) introduced and potentially System Wide Action Plan (SWAP) introduced for the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) now called Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development 2019-2023. The next main recommendation is to bring on board HeForShe champions or male Gender Equality champions, including senior members of country leadership to serve as the role model and to advocate in public for true gender equality and human rights agenda. This must be based on data, evidence, and needs of Philippine women and girls of different identities, different abilities, age and religious backgrounds.
12. The absence of age and sex-disaggregated data, including indicators baselines and targets, is noticed and represents a "usual" challenge in gender–insensitive and understaffed M&E system.
13. Furthermore, theusage of the language which identifies women, children, and youth as one group, presents a severe gap and gives an incomplete picture of the role of women, and young women, and girls and boys of different identities and backgrounds in peace and institutions building. This "neutral" language also presents a risk when showing the impact and the Project results for these groups.
14. Consequently, this absence from the data and the Project results will then lead to discrimination and the absence from the policy dialogue for those groups. In the end, if present in the data, Project results and policy dialogue, the chances are high that those groups will remain visible and present not only in the national discourse but also in budget allocations.

### Monitoring and Evaluation – the rating is SATISFACTORY

1. The evaluation finds ample evidence of RUNOs rigorous monitoring processes and tools. The existing best practices in maintaining the database of Insider Mediators Group (IMG) members, which was identified within UNDP, and Friday sermons data collection tools, verified with the UNICEF CSO partner, are cost-effective and straightforward. In addition, both practices could be efficiently elevated to the implementing partners’ and other RUNOs level.
2. Unfortunately, these processes and tools remained locked on the level of individual agencies thus creating unnecessary tensions among the staff and decision-makers. The tension originates from the RUNOs staff being unfamiliar with each other's practices and tools for M&E and consequently questioning the results of other RUNOs. Subsequently this tension and absence of communication and joint planning have prevented greater sharing of Project results, practices and hindered organizational learning.
3. Although the Project monitoring system was thoroughly described in the Project document, besides individual efforts from RUNOs, the evaluation has not found evidence that a “joint” M&E system or Project related M&E system was implemented.
4. The evaluation has not found proofs that the essential methodological notes and tools for indicators, sex and age disaggregated data collection were developed, not to mention that those were put into implementation. This might be the reason for the discrepancy in the reporting on the indicators where the number of ulama trained is reported as 200 while the UNICEF partner confirmed a total of 101 person. It is often the case that due to contextual factors, e.g., translation of Khutbahs which took longer and was more expensive than budgeted, the targets are adjusted but it is important to take note of those adjustments and revise the targets in the results framework. Furthermore, it is important to use implementing partners to collect and present evidence for monitoring systems.
5. With the assistance from partners and short term on-call joint Project monitoring staff, once designed, data collection tools and process can be implemented and replicated to other joint projects or even UNDAF. Consequently, those will preserve institutional memory and ensure knowledge management and capacity building of all current and future staff and consultants.

### Communication and Coordination – the rating is NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

1. Project advocacy campaigns were the key in reaching out critical number of citizens in public education campaigns on the BOL. Capacity building of the critical number of Project target groups like women, youth, and ulama were also used as essential communication channels towards the domicile population and diaspora communities.
2. However, although the efforts were remarkable in terms of the number of people reached, the visibility of the Project could have been better and would promote individuals, role models or leaders (representing the social capital) and results towards the internal and external audiences at national and international level.
3. The evaluation findings show an ample space for the improvement of communication and coordination at all levels. Operational coordination was not very successful - the absence of coordination and One UN approach was evident and negatively impacted beneficiaries in the field who were disconnected from each other.

### Impact – the rating is VERY GOOD

1. The impact of the Project is significant but fragile on the level of individual actors and much still needs to be done for institutions building and provision of services to the citizens of Bangsamoro.
2. The largest impact on individual level was described by the youngest population, young girls and boys who now take ownership and responsibility for their communities and want to be agents of change.
3. The willingness of actors to work with different religious groups is observable among all actors. For example, the community groups reported to have the ownership of the process and the results. People who advocated for BOL adoption, and their counterparts from the outside BARMM areas, reported the feeling of stronger unity and expressed willingness to work together towards peace and elimination of poverty. The Project has initiated spontaneous cooperation between non-Muslims and Muslims on the clarification of the BOL advantages and benefits for the whole region and among youth belonging to different tribes of indigenous peoples.

*“Our community before were just a follower of any given rules, tasks and just be satisfied of what will come, … people [youth] cannot easily demand because only a few hear us”.*

*“It helped transformed the youth to become* ***active*** *in the campaign for the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL).”*

FGD with boys and girls, Nov 2019, Mindanao

1. The Muslim population, both women and men and girls and boys, now feel better because they feel that the narratives have begun to change, and the discrimination is diminishing. Youth groups were the most prominent in defining this changes as the change in the public perception of Muslims and their skills gained to discuss violent terrorism in community space with their leadership.
2. At first, the Muslim women and men expressed their worries and frustration of being portrayed in public spaces (media) as “terrorists” before the Project was initiated. *“All Muslims and Islam were pictured as terrorist”.*[[15]](#footnote-16) This terrorism portrayed in the media has been proven to be as cumbersome on the respondents’ personal level.
3. The respondents claim that it also had consequences in the form of direct discrimination in public life. For example, for some of the respondents residing outside the area which now constitutes the administrative BARMM, it was not possible to get employment in shopping malls. Respondents described cases of laughing out at women and girls for wearing traditional Muslim clothes and hijab in school as frequent events. All this has started to change because discrimination and violent terrorism were discussed only in the privacy of people’s homes before. It is only now that these topics received a proper space to be safely discussed and processed.
4. A significant impact lies in creating the space for dialogue and public education on the importance and benefits of the BOL, the actual adoption of BOL, and the success of the January and February 2019 plebiscites. The community dialogues and community grants remain an essential mechanism for building peace and harmony in the communities.
5. A significant but insufficient number of influential peace actors or decision makers has been built among youth and women, and those represent future leaders and the social capital built on the local and the national level.
6. From precisely 194 IMs trained since the beginning, an active network consists of 78 persons. When comparing this number with other target groups who received high quality and long-term training, mentoring and support to takeover future decision making roles, the numbers are modest: UN Women trained 33 women and confirmed a group of 21 women who remained engaged and who participated in the Women’s Speakers Bureau; and, UNICEF built the capacity of 101 religious leaders, 100 para social workers and 92 youth leaders.

**Figure 2:** Word cloud summary of the key Project impact as described by the youth

A picture containing bottle

Description automatically generated

### Main Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. The main recommendations and conclusions are summarized in the table below. Specific recommendations were made within sections in response to evaluation questions.
2. The identified catalytic effect of the Project is significant and creates a platform for further support necessary for a fragile peace in Mindanao. The innovative solutions such as the IMG, WSB, U-Report, written Khutbah and work with Dawah Committee within technical working groups and community dialogues remain in practice and the methodology is available for replication within the UNCT and consideration and piloting in other countries with similar fragile peace contexts.

***Table 2:*** *Main Findings and Conclusions and Recommendations*

| **Findings and Conclusions (max 10)** | **Recommendations** | **Priority/Actor** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1- Results based management – Monitoring and Evaluation System  Unclear definition of terms, very ambitious load of indicators’, absence of M&E system, methodological notes, data collection tools and lack of organigram and clear reporting lines result in dispersed information among RUNOs and loss of institutional memory and synergies for local actors. | 1. **Strengthen Project’s Results Based Management score**    1. Deploy an on-call or temporary M&E Consultant to support the Project staff to review the TOC and the Project results framework, assess indicators against SMART and GRAS criteria and to develop and implement robust M&E system including indicators, methodological notes, data collection tools and database(s), and sex and age disaggregated data.    2. Build the capacity of interested parties (UNCT staff and implementing partners) in gender sensitive Results-based-management (RBM) including planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting.    3. Establish clear criteria for tracking down gender transformative activities including and implementation of the UN SWAP guidelines: minimum 15% for gender equality and women’s empowerment.    4. Empower CSOs to take over the role of (Peace) Secretariats, (Local Peace) Coordination Bodies and M&E focal points responsible for local action planning project and monitoring. Support their volunteer organizing efforts and enable them to implement based on their familiarity with the local context. | High / RCO and RUNOs |
| 2- Lack of coordination mechanisms resulted in dispersed activities, contracting the same CSO for similar or alike activities by different RUNOs and IP, and lost synergies among target groups, e.g., ulama and youth and ulama and women could have undertaken “joint preventive actions” (*PBF Project Board Meeting minutes, 14 March 2018*).  The process of the overall UN restructuring has caused the misperception of partners on the roles of individual RUNOs. | 1. **Develop clear Project organigram and establish joint planning (annual joint Project work plan) tools and schedule.**    1. Designate Project Team Leader and Project Manager, establish Technical Working Groups inclusive of partners who have the capacity to takeover coordination and later on M&E.    2. Insist on operational alignment by strengthening One UN approach and joint planning and implementation (Joint Annual Work Plan, Procurement Plan, Partners’ List, and joint monitoring) including creating links among the stakeholders and target groups, complementing and promoting each other’s work and plans, e.g., link women with ulama and teachers with ulama and other youth.    3. Plan for additional local level project staff, M&E staff, communication staff to support Project implementation in a fast pace and fragile environment. This builds up social capital in the local communities. | High / RCO and Lead RUNO |
| 3- Gender equality and Human rights  Gender equality and women’s empowerment funds were redirected to “more important” activities leading to the reduction of the quality of the gender equality implementation, reinforcement of stereotypical gender roles and minimization of the Project gender transformative potential.  The gender equality or mainstreaming approach as implemented by all agencies, minimally prescribe number of women that do participate in activities but women’s role in peacebuilding and the Project transformative potential remains weak and invisible. | 1. **Strengthen Gender Equality and Women Empowerment Score – gender marker should be gender transformative and based on written evidence.**    1. Strengthen the capacity of the UNCT and partners for gender analyses, effective gender mainstreaming and applying gender marker tools including tracking down “gender budgets”– by engaging high-level Gender Specialist. Besides UNCT this person should provide support to partners in formulating gender transformative programming and introduce and implement the tools such as: UNDP Gender Equality Seal Certification; ILO Participatory Gender Audit and SWAP report for UNCT.    2. Increase the budget for gender equality beyond the minimal threshold of 15%, by engaging women’s CSO and women networks, and report on gender equality results and gender marker by ensuring robust evidence which is: measuring the participation of women, impact of the dialogue on women’s and girls’ priorities and the direct support to women CSOs.    3. Establish gender as a relevant sustainable development and peace and security topic and include evidence-based advocacy on successes and benefits of gender equality in all agendas and in all dialogues and at all levels. This should be important for all RUNOs especially in the highest political platforms and forums, address to public, and Project Boards, Technical or Steering Committees, and M&E or other working groups.    4. Bring men on board as HeForShe Champions or Gender Equality Champions among senior UN and government and CSOs officials, including IMG, ulama and other stakeholders.    5. Empower women to participate beyond pure presence: engage women in local Peace and Order Councils and acknowledge that women have different perception and definition of security issues like absence of security, lack of safety, lack of livelihoods, absence of privacy, lack of land, displacement, and natural calamities.    6. (Within RBM) Insist on age and sex disaggregated data and different roles and identities of women to be empowered and represented in dialogues and their needs, priorities and roles heard and discussed.    7. Implement PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Scoring (PBSO, 2019) | High/ RCO and Lead RUNO |
| 4- Knowledge management and learning opportunities are so precious within such a disaster and conflict prone context and all the key experiences, recommendations and lessons learnt for peacebuilding need to be preserved | 1. **Establish joint and safe (online) Project platform to store Project data and evidence.**     1. This platform should serve as an evidence and knowledge base which did not fit the “1500 characters long PBF reporting template”. It will also strengthen organizational memory, learning, and more importantly the M&E system evidence, photos and success stories and later on evaluation.    2. Ensure Data Protection policy is designed and implemented because of the increased threat to the protection of project participants personal data (e.g., list of participants at the training session) especially when using cloud for data storage. | High/ PBF, RCO and Lead RUNO |
| 5- Visibility and communication has to be carefully planned and implemented especially among RUNOs’ implementing partners which implement grassroots activities and work directly with communities | 1. **Develop and implement Project Communication Strategy to be used by all UN staff and all implementing partners, including CSOs.**     1. Design Communication Strategy to enable joint and unique narratives about Project goals and to increase Project visibility in social media platforms (twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc.) and on the Project outputs (documents, roll ups, etc.). | Medium/ Lead RUNO |
| 6- Thematic and programmatic (peacebuilding)  The change that took place at the level of individuals and changes in their attitudes and behaviors towards peace, community mobilization and action is remarkable.  It is necessary to design comprehensive package and undertake holistic approach towards actors including operational and geographical alignment of implementation. | 1. **Strengthen operational alignment of RUNOs and support comprehensive service delivery, localization (and implementation) of policies.**    1. Support service delivery and localization of policies, NAPs, and agendas so that citizens witness performance of the government, immediate life improvement and benefits of BARMM. The trauma in the lives of women and men is still present and there is not any support for healing.    2. Advocate, lobby and enter into a dialogue with the strongest pockets of “opponents”, e.g., MILF camp leadership who were opposing the Project successes and “westernization of Islam” and build their capacity for negotiation and experience the benefits of BARMM.    3. Continue to support the innovative mechanism and expand their usage and role with the different actors and IPs (U-Report, Khutbahs, IMG, Women’s Speakers Bureau) for micro towards meso-level empowerment. Support and expand the group of Insider Mediators to reach out towards other, especially vulnerable groups to increase their influence (young women and young men, women leaders from various groups) and enable their empowerment towards taking up space and agenda-making roles in the institutions (formal and informal, with the view of the elections coming up in 2022).    4. It is essential to undertake a holistic approach to target groups and geographical areas and allow actors to undertake joint preventive actions while implementing do-no-harm approach.    5. Violent Extremism is “inappropriate terminology” for communities, it is better to gather people around Local Peace and Order, Public Safety and Security Plans. To this end, it is essential to: (1) use local and indigenous knowledge for early warning; and, (2) cater for unique needs of diverse community women: senior women, women combatants, women non-combatants, Islamized Bangsamoro women, settlers women, women IP, and girls' needs. | High/ RCO and RUNOs |
| 7- Partnership standards implementation and operationalization will bring sustainability to project impact and local stakeholders. | 1. **Expand the network of partners to include and empower local-level stakeholders.**     1. Provide longer term support to CSOs, and include women CSOs, via long term MoU and then specific micro-grant and grant agreements to enable them to act as Secretariats and Coordination bodies on the local level.    2. Continue to involve operations and finance staff to provide guidance to all implementing partners and explain procedures and eligibility of expenditures.    3. Establish Project kick off meetings with the implementing partners and especially the first-time partners to clarify roles, expectations and to explain contractual obligations, deadlines, and more importantly the eligible costs, reporting forms and procedures.    4. Strengthen OneUN approach based on collaborative advantages and remove the competitiveness and antagonism among partners and improve global UN representation towards the partners from all sectors. | Medium/ RUNOs |
| 8- Evaluation management | 1. **Start Evaluation process early enough and extend the timeline for implementation**  (to accommodate the time necessary for Reference Group review and response and mixed methods implementation).    1. Consolidate and produce Evaluation Guidelines for budgeting and implementing monitoring and evaluations within joint PBF projects (PBF)    2. Ensure that M&E system is implemented: kick-off evaluation process early in the Project implementation phase so that the Monitoring team and Evaluation consultant could attend Project review meetings. (this was proposed in the ProDoc, but it was not implemented).    3. Establish knowledge management platform and Project documents archives and explore options for usage of U-Report as a monitoring and evaluation tool among all Project groups.    4. Share evaluation report with all RUNOs, RCO and implementing partners. | Medium/ PBF, RCO and Lead RUNO |

# Introduction and Overview

1. The peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under former President Benigno S. Aquino III’s administration gained momentum by the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) on 27 March 2014, which concluded the 17-year hard negotiation.
2. As a final peace agreement, CAB is prominent for having strong provisions on women’s rights[[16]](#footnote-17) and for having 33 percent of women negotiators and 25 percent of women in the total peace agreement signatories. Prof. Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, political scientist and professor, remains the one- and-only-woman chief negotiator in history to sign a major peace accord.[[17]](#footnote-18)
3. In December 2012, President Aquino issued Executive Order No.120 creating the 15-member Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) that drafted the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). Nearly four months after the CAB signing, BTC submitted its second BBL draft to President Aquino who handed it over to the leadership of both Houses of Congress in September 2014.
4. While the deliberation of BBL was ongoing in Congress, the tragic Mamasapano encounter between the MILF and government forces happened on 25 January 2015, in pursuit of international terrorist Marwan who was hiding in the MILF controlled area. The encounter resulted in the killing of 44 members of the Philippine National Police Special Action Force. This incident generated a loud national outcry against the MILF.
5. In the aftermath of this incident, congressional deliberation on BBL was suspended and national attention was turned to several investigations of the Mamasapano incident. The 16th Congress adjourned without passing the BBL. Despite support from various groups, the seemingly passive intervention of President Aquino in the BBL deliberation and the Mamasapano debacle were seen as critical political and security factors that shelved the proposed BBL. Consequently, the failure of the Aquino administration to deliver the BBL had frustrated a group of disgruntled MILF members in Lanao Del Sur led by the Maute Brothers, who eventually formed a separate faction called the Maute Group. Later, the group established an alliance with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
6. During his campaign for the presidency, the then-Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte promised to address historical injustices against the Moro people by continuing the talks with the MILF and passing the BBL. When he won the presidency, President Duterte was true to his campaign promise.
7. On 10 February 2017, he appointed a new 24-member expanded BTC that drafted a new version of BBL. While BBL deliberation was running smoothly in Congress, the combined Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf penetrated and amassed their strength in Marawi City, which triggered a months-long conventional war between the government forces and ISIS-inspired groups. The armed conflict made President Duterte declare Martial Law on the whole island of Mindanao on 23 March 2017. Although the so-called Marawi siege gained victory by the death of the Maute Brothers and top Abu Sayyaf leaders, as well as the arrest of the Maute family and their supporters, it pulverized the socio-economic, cultural, educational, and demographic landscape of Marawi City.
8. Authorities claimed that the human casualties of the conflict included 920 militants, 165 government troops and at least 45 civilians, and forced more than 300,000 people to flee the city. Some peace advocates lamented that the Marawi siege and Martial Law could be used as another circumstance to sabotage the passage of BBL. While President Duterte's security team was managing to contain the possible spillover effect of the Marawi siege, his peace team, the BTC team, CSOs, youth and women sectors, the academic community, and international non-government organizations were making parallel efforts to continue and support the excellent momentum of BBL both at the grassroots level and in Congress.
9. Heeding the national call to fast-track the passage of BBL, President Duterte certified BBL as an urgent bill in May 2018, which facilitated the drastic move in both Houses of Congress. Eventually, two different BBL versions were passed by the Senate and House of Representatives (HOR), which required a bicameral conference. Such BBL versions also called for an intervention of President Duterte to come up with an acceptable BBL version to the MILF without compromising the constitutionality issue. In July 2018, the bicameral report creating the Organic Law for Bangsamoro Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM or BOL) was finally ratified by the Senate and HOR on 23 and 24 July, respectively. President Duterte signed it into law as Republic Act 11054 or widely known as the BOL. With the strong political will of President Duterte and widespread support from various friends and stakeholders of the peace process, BOL was ratified by the Bangsamoro people in two plebiscites conducted on 21 January and 25 February 2019.
10. The preparations for the plebiscite and passage of the BOL are essential milestones that affected the program delivery. For instance, UN Women had to cancel its round of conversation in the Visayas because some communities perceived them as too political for a United Nations entity.
11. The ratification of BOL, as declared by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) National Board of Canvassers on 25 January 2019, paved the way for the abolition of ARMM and the establishment of a new political entity called the BARMM. On 22 February 2019, Duterte led the oath-taking of the 80 members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) and named MILF Chairman Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim as the Interim Chief Minister (ICM). A month after the BOL ratification, then ARMM Regional Governor, Mujiv Hataman, turned over the power to ICM Ebrahim publicly opting not to join the new government. Although this move officially cut short his term of office, he and the rest of the elected ARMM officials were part of BTA until their elective term of office expired on 30 June 2019.
12. In an internationally broadcast historic event, President Duterte, while expressing his extreme happiness, personally witnessed the much-celebrated BARMM inauguration on 29 March 2019. Chief Minister Ebrahim led the moral governance oath-taking of the first set of his cabinet ministers and other members of the Bangsamoro parliament.
13. Many analysts and observers believed that the establishment of the Bangsamoro government would provide drastic social, economic, political, and security impact in the region. New institutions are expected to be established to address poor health, education, and social services. The much bigger allocation for BARMM starting 2020 would provide more economic activities in the region and address economic inequalities that invite the marginalized sector to violent extremism.
14. Along with the implementation of the political component of the GPH-MILF peace process with the establishment of the Bangsamoro government, President Duterte witnessed the second phase of the normalization component on 7 September 2019, which decommissioned 1,060 former MILF combatants including their 920 high-powered weapons.
15. International donor agencies are focusing on supporting institutional building in BARMM, the passage of priority legislation and strategic development plans, programs, and projects, while the successful implementation of normalization track of the GPH-MILF peace is believed to be a critical factor in stabilizing the security situation. In effect, the MILF has now become a partner of the government forces in running after the remaining lawless elements and curtailing the spread of violent extremism in the region and the whole country.
16. Although violent extremism is a feature of several political and religious movements and groups, not only Muslims, several “push” and “pull” factors driving radicalization and extremism in Mindanao have been identified (ProDoc, p.7).
17. Drivers of conflict in the southern Philippines are multilayered and multidimensional with a long history[[18]](#footnote-19): poverty, lack of opportunities, the heavy military approach of the state in responding to violent extremism, historical land grievances against the national government, including loss of “ancestral homelands” of indigenous people or indigenous Muslims – to name just a few. Together with the abovementioned factors, the economic and social deprivation and discrimination were identified as the key factors boosting the feeling of historical injustice and marginalization of the Mindanao people.
18. Hence, the Project focused on addressing the most prominent factors such as cultural and political isolation and alienation of youth, which are particularly vulnerable to extremism and alienation from traditional Moro leadership. The Project put specific responsibility towards women and religious leaders as the “adults” who could influence youth alienation. These factors could be under the control of the Project intervention.
19. To this end, the Project aimed at strengthening the dialogue between relevant stakeholders and building their capacity to maintain positive influence among their constituencies while creating an environment conducive to Islamic values and the absence of the need for destructive heroic defense of Islam “purity."
20. As one of the most disaster-prone areas, the Philippines, especially Mindanao, is vulnerable to a multitude of political, socio-economic, and environmental factors that affect and impoverish the population that already feels discriminated and marginalized.

# Description of the intervention being evaluated

1. The “Building Capacities for Sustaining Peace in Mindanao” Project was designed after implementation and evaluation of the first PBF support took place in the Philippines. The first phase was implemented by six UN agencies[[19]](#footnote-20) from January 2015 until May 2016. The Project under evaluation is so-called “Phase Two” or the “second PBF support” and it was developed and implemented by three RUNOs: UNDP, UNICEF and UN-Women from 24 October 2017 until 30 April 2019.
2. An 18-month long intervention valued USD 3 million was implemented with partners and their work spread across Manila, diaspora islands and Mindanao: Zamboanga, Marawi, Davao City and Cotabato City.
3. In addition to delay in the implementation of activities, part of the Project was reprogrammed but remained to contribute to achieving two inter-linked outcomes:

**Outcome 1:** Enabling an environment for successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established,

and

**Outcome 2:** Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified, and capacities to address them developed and implemented.

1. The transition of the staff of the key government counterpart and changes in the political context as well as the UN restructuring processes (RCO and UNDP) have caused delays in the activity’s implementation. However, due to the nature of the context and PBF flexibility, an unofficial no-cost extension was implemented to enable finalization of the already approved activities which were supposed to kick off in early 2019.
2. For detailed outcomes, outputs and key activities please check Chapter 10.2 Effectiveness. and TOC depicted in the Table 1.

# Evaluation Scope and Objectives

## Evaluation scope

1. The evaluation was designed to cover 18 months of Project implementation and the additional period of no-cost extension by 30 April 2019. The Project evaluation started with the participatory After-Action Review Workshop in June 2019, when the Evaluation Team recruitment process started.
2. The evaluation process was delayed a bit due to the political transition processes during the establishment of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), and the National Evaluation Consultant recruitment was delayed until late October 2019. Fieldwork was conducted from 01-29 November 2019, and two weeks were spent in Mindanao cities of Cotabato, Zamboanga, Marawi and Davao.

***Table 3:*** *The Evaluation field visits timeline*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Timeline** | **New date** |
| Fieldwork and data collection | 04-29 Nov |
| * Interviews in Manila | 04-08 Nov |
| * Fieldwork: Cotabato, Zamboanga, Marawi, Davao City | 11-22 Nov |
| * Manila: additional interviews: OPAPP, UNDP RR, RCO debriefing | 25-27 Nov |
| Presentation of mission highlights, Manila | 29 Nov 2019 |
| Additional interviews – PBF and additional UN-Women respondents | 02-06 Dec 2019 |

1. The Evaluation Team conducted field visits to Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, and Marawi City, including a trip to North Cotabato to meet and talk to 108 persons (51 women and 57 men) in total. Also, 42 persons completed two different online surveys, which targeted the assessment of Project results (25 responses) and capacity building activities (17 replies). Even though 20 women and 22 men participated in the online surveying process, one survey was not fully completed resulting in 41 complete online reviews.
2. Despite the numerical calculation that the total number of persons interviewed is 150 (women and men), it is essential to emphasize that because of the anonymity of the online survey, there could be duplication. At the same time, one person could have been a part of the FGD or KII and an online survey respondent.

|  |
| --- |
| A close up of a map  Description automatically generated |
| **Figure 3:** Map of the Philippines with green diamonds marking the evaluation venues: Manila, Cotabato City, Davao City, Marawi City and Zamboanga City |

## Evaluation objectives

1. The primary objectives of this final Project evaluation are multifaceted: firstly, to assess Project results and achievements and secondly, to collect lessons learned and recommendations that will inform future peacebuilding interventions in the Philippines/Mindanao, which are gender and human rights sensitive.
2. The fragility of Mindanao is multidimensional because it is a highly disaster-prone area characterized by the fragile peace achieved after lengthy negotiations among diverse actors and the marginalized population who are burdened by the history of violent terrorist events, bombings, and kidnapping. Therefore, the evaluation also needs to inform peacebuilding programming in similar fragile contexts.
3. An indirect effect of this evaluation should be to facilitate learning and to stir change management in the organizational approaches to joint programming, joint monitoring, and joint reporting in similar peacebuilding projects. The lessons from Project implementation and experiences acquired will apply not only to peacebuilding projects but to all projects and Project evaluations designed and implemented in the Philippines and other contexts.
4. Therefore, the last objective of this evaluation report is to share knowledge and experience and to enhance capacities for joint evaluations. To this end, as participants noted it is of the utmost importance to ensure feedback loop to communities where research and dialogues took place by the government or relevant development stakeholders otherwise the trust in peace and the trust in participation will be lost.

## Evaluation criteria and questions

1. The evaluation was guided the UNDP programming principles and standard Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) criteria, which entail relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and human rights and gender equality. Since the OECD/DAC criteria has been revised in January 2020 to include coherence criteria[[20]](#footnote-21) an additional effort was made to analyze and present coherence and to apply the OECD/DAC criteria for evaluations in the context of conflict and fragility. However, this effort was not without limitations due to ambitious Evaluation TOR burdened with 26 evaluation questions, 7 evaluation aims and five areas for recommendations.
2. Project performance and management were assessed in terms of team communication, Project coordination and implementation efficiency, more specifically, the attainment of Project results and indicators. For gender equality, Project indicators are assessed against Gender Responsive Assessment Scale (GRAS). The evaluation has also identified a catalytic effect of PBF funding, valuable lessons learned, and innovative approaches in peacebuilding.
3. It has made a closer look into the risk management and mitigation strategies deployed during Project implementation and identified gaps and the best practices in interagency coordination. Finally, it tried to capture the impact based on the personal statements on the observed change as identified by various Project stakeholders.

***Table 4:*** *The Performance Rating Scale used in the Evaluation*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Color/ Rank** | **Percentage** | **Meaning** |
| Red - Needs improvement (0) | 0-25% | Indicators/Targets/Outputs are not met, and the expected results are not achieved/ missing. |
| Orange – Satisfactory (1) | 25.1-50% | Indicators and targets are partially met with some minimal elements of progress made. The expected results are not yet achieved, or the process of achieving them was put on hold or was delayed. |
| Yellow – Good (2) | 50.1-75% | Indicators and targets are satisfactorily but partially met. The expected results are not yet achieved, or the process of achieving them is still ongoing. |
| Green - Very good (3) | 75.1-100% | Indicators and Targets are successfully met, and the results are fully achieved with elements of lessons learned, innovation, and (potentially) overachievement. |

1. Gender Responsive Assessment Scale[[21]](#footnote-22) (GRAS) was used to assess if gender norms, roles, and stereotypes are affected at the results framework and related indicators:

***Table 5****: GRAS criteria for the assessment of the transformative gender actions*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Criteria** |
| Gender-Negative  -1 | Inequalities are reinforced to achieve the desired development outcomes through the use of gender norms, roles, and stereotypes. |
| Gender-Blind:  0 | Gender is not considered relevant to the development outcome. Gender norms, roles, and relations are not affected (worsened or improved). |
| Gender-Sensitive:  1 | Gender is a means to reach set development goals. Addressing gender norms, roles, and access to resources insofar as needed to reach the Project goals. |
| Gender- Responsive:  2 | Gender is central to achieving positive development outcomes. Changing gender norms, roles, and access to resources a key component of Project outcomes. |
| Gender-Transformative:  3 | Gender is central to achieving positive development outcomes. The Project is transforming unequal gender relations to promote shared power, control of resources, decision- making, and support for women's empowerment[[22]](#footnote-23). |

1. Lastly, SMART Criteria was used to assess the Project indicators as S-specific, M-measurable, A-achievable, R-reliable and T-time bound.

**Table 6:** SMART Criteria used to assess Project indicators

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| S- specific | Specific to Project objectives and activities. |
| M- measurable | Defined and precise and unambiguous so that we have reasonable resources (time, people and tools) to measure it and two different people understand on what and how to measure it. |
| A- achievable | Attainable within the specified time and with specified resources |
| R- relevant | Relevant to our objectives and easy to collect, aligned to available budget. |
| T- time bound | With values or milestones set in precise time during Project timeframe. |

# Evaluation Approach and Methods

## 8.1. Evaluation approach

1. The main aim of this summative and utilization-focused evaluation was to estimate the extent to which the Project outcomes have been achieved and to identify processes or components that contributed or in any way hindered Project results.
2. This evaluation used participation and the Appreciative Inquiry (AI) approach as the most appropriate to be applied in a post-conflict setting because those establish the elements of success and the ways to replicate or potentially expand results in the future[[23]](#footnote-24) (MacCoy, 2014). The AI approach in evaluation and research spurs innovative and creative thinking by way of focusing on the formulation of positive questions[[24]](#footnote-25).

*“By focusing on positive experiences, stakeholders are engaged and focus on visioning for the future and repeating successes. Using Appreciative Inquiry as an overarching philosophy, approach, or method for evaluation may provide meaningful and useful results.”*

*Coghlan et all (2003, p. 20)*

1. This approach is also recommended by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidance[[25]](#footnote-26) as one which is appropriate for the human rights and gender equality (HRGE) approach.
2. A gender-responsive evaluation methodology was applied in line with UN Women guidelines[[26]](#footnote-27) and UNEG participatory approaches ensuring the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders and especially vulnerable and the most marginalized women and groups.
3. Since neither the quantitative nor qualitative method alone were sufficient to understand the Project and assess its results fully, the evaluation used the mixed-method of research at all stages of the evaluation process to the extent possible: formulation of hypotheses/TOC and assumptions, sample design, evaluation design, instruments design, data collection, data triangulation and data analyses and interpretation.
4. A mixed-method study addressed the evaluation and performance of direct Project results as perceived by the Project staff and grassroots Project beneficiaries. In the beginning, a basic explanatory sequential design[[27]](#footnote-28) was envisaged to be applied (Creswell, 2016) but had to be revised and adjusted to convergent mixed method design (Ibid, p.9). In practice, this means that the quantitative and qualitative data were collected in parallel, analyzed separately, and then merged to formulate findings and recommendations.
5. In addition, this method implies setting up a theory and evaluation questions first, which was part of the TOR and the Inception Report. In the next step, qualitative data were commissioned via KII and FGD separately from the quantitative data, which were obtained via two online surveys. The last step was the interpretation of qualitative and quantitative data separately, and as the last step, the evaluation looked at how qualitative data explains quantitative and vice versa. Those two processes were performed in parallel, depending on the availability of the selected respondents. In this way, the obtained responses were compared, and convergent or divergent responses interpreted to answer evaluation questions effectively.
6. A mixed-method approach increased the reliability and validity of the evaluation findings and helped to explore whether different stakeholder groups benefited differently and why. This approach reflects the pragmatism as a philosophical approach to evaluation and feminist approach to power transformation.
7. Commonly used mixed data collection methods were deployed: desk review of Project-related literature and other relevant documents, participatory workshops, online surveys, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and observations.
8. Finally, data were triangulated against various sources and types of information, and expressed opinions, because it was necessary to verify or reject results obtained from quantitative data using qualitative data and vice versa.
9. Triangulation enabled a comparison of which stakeholders’ opinions are prominently different: extremely good or bad. This approach compensated for a reduced sample size with no randomization options due to limited resources (time and budget) allocated to the evaluation process and anemic and scattered monitoring systems and data.
10. In conclusion, the quantitative results support qualitative findings. Online data analyses are presented wherever appropriate.

## Human Rights and Gender Equality (HRGE)

1. In compliance with the TOR and UNEG Guidance, this evaluation applied AI as the most recommended approach to evaluations in fragile and conflict-affected settings. In addition, human rights and gender-sensitive evaluation implementation was fulfilled via the following strategies:
   1. Stakeholder analyses and the identification of the extent to which different actors, especially vulnerable populations, were included in the development of the Project intervention.
   2. Collection of sex and age disaggregated data for all participants.
   3. Attention to differences of female and male experiences among the same group of stakeholders e.g., students, youth, Inside Mediators, or Ulama.
   4. Following the questions as defined in the TOR on the stakeholder's opinion about the level of engagement of youth and women in the Project design, activities implementation, and decision making.
   5. The observation was made, and expressions used and noted that defined the participants' attitudes towards women, youth, or diverse other groups whose human rights might have been fragile in the specific context.
   6. Empowering participants to define the most vulnerable groups in the community or the groups who were left behind or should have been included more or more effectively in the Project activities.

## Data sources, sample and sampling frame

1. The Evaluation Team established an **online platform** to collect, store, and analyze relevant national and Project documents and data.
2. However, the process of supplying documents from agencies was slow and hindered by the staff fluctuation, and misunderstanding of who should participate in the interviews. In addition, delayed recruitment of the national staff member to the Evaluation Team who was supposed to provide firm support to the Evaluation Manager and absence of Project organigram with transparent reporting and communication lines, slowed down the evaluation process.
3. All those factors hindered access to and direct communication with the key Project stakeholders and Project staff including senior management so some of the staff did not feel sufficiently **included nor informed** about the evaluation process.
4. These facts, besides time and cost limitations, influenced the sampling process and a purposive or deliberate sampling was implemented, on one side. On the other side, a snowball sampling was deployed relying on the direct Project beneficiaries and Project staff who were engaged in Project activities.
5. An additional challenge faced by the Evaluation Team was that some RUNOs considered their Project beneficiaries’ databases protected under their data protection policy and those were not shared with the Evaluation Team.
6. The Evaluation Team understood the fear of the RUNOs staff to share beneficiaries’ database with the Evaluation Team due to staff previous negative experience and complaints and the Evaluation Team did not insist on random sampling. Instead, in alignment with the do-no-harm policy the Evaluation Team accepted suggestions from the agencies on who is within reach and available to be interviewed.
7. Hence, reduced sampling frame or absence of it for some Project beneficiaries was mitigated by deploying **purposive sampling**. In addition, a **snowball sampling** was applied easily because the Project beneficiaries were willing to share the information about other Project colleagues who could offer additional information on Project successes.
8. Some CSOs, who were implementing partners, have also expressed concerns and were to some extent a bit reluctant to share their Project beneficiaries’ databases for random sampling. Therefore, the respondents have been deliberately selected from those available and easy to reach women, men, girls and boys.
9. Some of the CSOs did not receive a timely and appropriate announcement for the evaluation process, and the Evaluation Team invested additional efforts to clarify the roles and process. In addition, the evaluation has not insisted on reviewing written evidence on the total number of people reached out because the evaluation is not an audit, and the statements from respondents confirmed information collected during the desk review.
10. It is the overall assumption of the Evaluation Team that above-mentioned Project beneficiaries’ databases with RUNOs and with CSOs do exist in whatever the agencies consider appropriate form. However, the Evaluation Team had not seen any evidence on any guidelines on Project beneficiaries’, Project trainees’ databases maintenance and data protection on the field. Data protection remains to be the highest concern in the new age of internet security and personal data protection.
11. Lastly, it is important to notice that the UNDP database of IMG, a total of 194 persons who have been trained during the last five years, since 2015, is an example of a good practice which could be further recommended to be replicated and implemented across other PBF projects. The most important recommendations are to strengthen the database by introducing age and sex disaggregated data in accordance to the age groups acceptable to all RUNOs and the field for monitoring persons activity and level of responsiveness. The database track down the actual activity responsiveness of the participants so it is easy to track down the “most active” and the most responsive participants. Similar example is the UNICEF database of the youth training participants which contains sex disaggregated data about the participants.

## Data-collection procedures and instruments

1. Interview questions and protocols were developed, and the Evaluation Team Leader decided on the reduction of the Evaluation Matrix questions that covered highly ambitious TOR areas which did not take into consideration the respondents’ fatigue and efficiency of the process. Instruments are available in the Evaluation Inception Report as relevant Annexes.
2. Separate instruments were developed for different actors and adjusted to various stakeholders through KII, FGD and workshops.
3. All respondents were informed about voluntary will to respond to questions and to withdraw from the process at any time or at any question they felt uncomfortable to respond to or if they felt that their privacy or rights had been breached at any point of time. Therefore, to reduce the stress of the respondents, no written statements were obtained because the verbal approval obtained was considered sufficient and is mostly available with most recordings. In addition, Chatham House Rule was explained, meaning that no names would be revealed in the report: “quoting statements and not quoting resources” and process of lodging a complaint was explained in detail.
4. In Zamboanga, due to travel arrangements and security context, focus groups protocols had to be revised and narrowed down to an Evaluation Team leader facilitation experience and the team had to split and conduct individual focus groups with selected respondents. Only one focus group had to be “repeated” because women and girls felt more confident to interact with a local researcher and to speak in local language.

## Stakeholder participation

1. Stakeholders mapping took place in the inception phase and the team has identified four types of stakeholders:
   1. Level One – duty bearers with visible Project decision making authority based in Manila;
   2. Level Two – secondary duty bearers with direct responsibility over Project implementation;
   3. Level Three – right holders who are the beneficiaries of Project activities and their informal and formal networks (IMG, WSB, Ulama, youth, teachers etc.).
   4. Level Four – development partners and other peacebuilding stakeholders. The last group was purposefully left out from the evaluation because of the other ongoing Project and resource mobilization efforts and negotiations with RUNOs.
2. Evaluation Team collected quantitative and qualitative sex and age disaggregated data and used mixed evaluation methods. A total of 108 persons were interviewed[[28]](#footnote-29), 51 women and 57 men which represents 47% and 53% of all participants, respectively. A total of 37% of interviewees were young people, aged between 18-35 and 50% were adult women (21%) and men (29%) above 35.
3. There were 13% of boys (7%) and girls (6%) who were interviewed and who were below 18. All minors who consented to participate in the focus group, were interviewed in the presence of the adults who were their careers – either activity coordinators or para-social workers or their peer- supervisors.
4. Thirteen percent (13%) of respondents were reached out in Manila and above 81% outside Manila e.g., 35% in Cotabato and 25% in Zamboanga. Only 3% or exactly three persons were reached via Skype.

**Table 7:** Respondents profiles (FGD and KII) - sex and age disaggregated data on women and men reached

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Age group/ sex of the interviewees | Female | Male | Grand Total |
| < 18 | 8 | 6 | 14 |
| 18-35 | 20 | 20 | 40 |
| > 35 | 23 | 31 | 54 |
| Grand Total | **51** | **57** | **108** |

**Figure 4:** Number of women and men reached with KII and FGD disaggregated by age group

**Table 8:** Respondents profile – in percentages

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Age and sex disaggregated  data on the interviewees: | Female | Male | Grand Total |
| Above 35 | 21% | 29% | 50% |
| Between 18-35 | 19% | 19% | 37% |
| Below 18 | 7% | 6% | 13% |
| Total | **47%** | **53%** | **100%** |

1. Two online surveys[[29]](#footnote-30) targeting separately the Project staff and beneficiaries of capacity building activities were created, resulting in only 26 and 19 responses collected respectively[[30]](#footnote-31). The assumption is that those two surveys were completed mostly by women and men who have participated in the KII and FGD to complement and provide in-depth data for different evaluation criteria. This is the main reason why those 45 responses were not added to the total of 108 interviewed persons. The results are not statistically significant but in a mixed method evaluation online survey response complement qualitative data and were used as part of data triangulation process to identify any extremes or challenges not captured within face to face interviews. Lack of internet access was stated as one of the key challenges in accessing surveys.
2. The TOC Reconstruction Workshop was not held due to time constrains and a full schedule and staff and IP obligations to attend to other events and other Project activities, including ongoing emergency responses: measles outbreak and earthquake in Mindanao. The Evaluation Team adjusted protocols and identified pieces of the TOC as voiced out by the respondents among IP and Project staff.
3. As part of qualitative data collection, a total of 37 persons (18f, 19m) participated in 29 key informant interviews and 71 persons (35w, 36m) participated in 15 focus group discussions.
4. The qualitative data collection reached out to multiple types of respondents, from the most diverse types of stakeholders, and elicited detailed explanations and narratives about the Project activities and results.
5. The interviews engaged 10 Insider Mediators (3w,7m), 10 government representatives including four para-social and social workers, five (5) disengaged girls, 23 youth representatives, four (4) teachers (2w, 2m), 10 religious leaders (3w, 7m) and two (2) women from Women’s Speakers Bureau and 32 representatives of various civil society organizations and youth groups. Almost an equal number of men and women were interviewed across both evaluation methods with men being slightly more represented: 71 persons via FGD and 37 via KII.

|  |
| --- |
| **Figure 5:** Sex disaggregated data per KII and FGD |

1. Almost equal number of women and men were reached via KII and FGD – 108 in total.
2. Almost equal number of women and men in the KII and FGD were reached within the groups below 18 and in the 18-35 age group.
3. Slightly more “adult” men participated in the KII and FGD.

**Figure 6:** Respondents per Agency, disaggregated by sex

A close up of a map

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1. Only one third of UNDP interviewees were female, while UN-Women did not have any male respondents. UNICEF respondents were almost equally girls and boys but no disengaged boys were reached out.

## Ethical considerations:

1. The Evaluation Team committed to respecting protection and confidentiality of participants as recommended by UNEG[[31]](#footnote-32) Guidelines and related Code of Conduct[[32]](#footnote-33) for evaluation in the UN system and OECD/DAC recommendations on evaluation in a fragile context.
2. The UNEG ethical criteria was applied throughout the evaluation process, and the inclusion of women, individuals, and groups who are marginalized or discriminated is respected. The Evaluation Team adhered to the: fair representation, confidentiality, do-no-harm approach, respect for dignity and diversity of participants, right to self-determination and the right to withdraw from the process, compliance with code of conduct with vulnerable groups and minors, and the option for a redress in case of breach of privacy.
3. The data on participants is disaggregated by sex, age, and geographical location and participant cannot be identified by their name.
4. In the beginning of all interviews or focus groups, all beneficiaries were informed about the evaluation process, how data would be processed, their voluntary contribution, confidentiality, and the right to withdraw from the process. All participants were treated with respect and dignity.
5. Stakeholders with different power, interest and influence were interviewed separately e.g., teachers and pupils separately, youth separately from adults, girls and women separately from boys and men wherever possible (U-Reporters), and CSO youth groups separately from adults.
6. The list of participants is kept separately from other data and only one UNDP staff member has had access to the online platform where audio recordings, transcripts, interview translations and data analyses are kept. The online access will expire, and the respondents will not be able to be identified.

## Evaluation Team composition and background

1. The Evaluation Team comprised of five team members: Milica Turnic (Team Leader), Tatjana Obradovic-Tosic (Peer-review Evaluator), Ombra A. Imam (National Consultant), Maripaz C. Abas (Senior Researcher), Zajarah M. Duma and Sharida D. Mandi. Detailed biographies are available under Annex 14.2. Biographies of the Evaluation Team Members.

## Major limitations

1. The Evaluation Team had encountered several barriers that hindered the evaluation process and had had the potential to influence methodology negatively and, consequently, the evaluation findings, but all those were successfully overcome.
2. The barriers were: fragile security context, weak infrastructure, vast geographical spread of the Project partners and Project sites, absence of joint Project level documents repository platform including beneficiaries database, absence of means of verification and reports and studies listed in the Project document and Project reports, short timeline of the evaluation implementation, limited reach-out to hard-to reach areas and beneficiaries including the most vulnerable groups such as women or girls or men and boys with disability, indigenous people, the response bias, and short notice given to beneficiaries to attend interviews and focus groups. Lastly, the access to internet limited the availability and access to online surveys for majority of the participants and has therefore weakened the number of responses collected and their statistical significance.
3. In addition, it was not clear what was the exact Project duration and how the official or unofficial extension was communicated from the donor and/or within the Project team – this was only clarified by the donor in the final key informant interview.
4. CSO partners were not clear on who the Project donor was because some agencies implemented agency relevant annual plans or frameworks and it was not clear to what extent some of the activities were funded by PBF. This took additional time to clarify. On the other hand, this flexibility to immediately respond to funding gaps for urgently identified interventions for which there were no other sources was the major advantage of PBF approach and remains highly appreciated by RUNOs.
5. Fragile security context and disaster-prone context and infrastructure at Mindanao limit movement, travel, and accessibility of the population living in cities with a recent history of violent terrorism events e.g., Marawi and Zamboanga. This influenced the available time for conducting the interviews, the depth of the conversations, the timeline of the evaluation, and the availability of participants located in hard to reach areas.
6. Selection and response bias were characteristic of interviews and focus groups because the Evaluation Team did not have any control over who decided to participate and who decided not to participate.
7. Some of the female participants among adults and youth were traditionally unwilling to speak up and discuss the issues or topics they found sensitive in front of a foreigner, the International Evaluation Team member, albeit it was a woman. In addition, those groups, especially young women and young girls were less willing to talk on or discuss topics in front of the adult community members. This was overcome by introducing the national team members early on in the interviews and FGD so that respondents could feel more confident in terms of the trust to their national counterparts with whom they were able to speak in their native, Tagalog language, too. On the contrary, on another occasion, the beneficiaries from the same target group, young women and girls, were very eloquent in voicing out their needs, priorities, and recommendations when in the group of peers, with the female foreigner and without the presence of “local” adults. The issue of power is important to be noted here as it could represent a serious obstacle during dialogues and data collection phase.
8. Limited responses and limited number of responses to online surveys has made an impact and has partially disabled application of statistical quantitative methods.
9. Postponing the start of the evaluation due to changes in National Consultant selection process made an impact and influenced the possibility to properly orient, instruct and train local team on the evaluation process. It consequently influenced the timeline of the deliverables as some of them requested more time than anticipated.
10. The evaluation limitations were mitigated with the following approaches:
11. Safe environment for respondents: introducing the national team members early on during the interviews, to facilitate opening of the respondents toward their national counterparts and to spur their willingness to speak in their native language.
12. Methodology adjustment: Team Leader allowed for focus groups and interviews adjustments in terms of coverage of the most important topics when the time did not allow to observe the full KII and FGD protocol. This allowed for reaching-out to all scheduled beneficiaries.
13. Timeframe adjustment: Team leader accepted sharing of the Project documentation from the UN Agencies and desk analysis even during field visits and while returning from the duty station in order to obtain as much data as possible and enable Evaluation Team to make analysis of data and evidence based as possible.
14. Geographic coverage: The expansion of the Evaluation Team with peer-review evaluator, the senior researcher, and two national team members tasked with translations and transcriptions allowed coverage of multiple sites and Project target groups, e.g., Davao City and Zamboanga City at the same time.
15. Leave No One Behind (LNOB): Separate groups were organized for the youth who are traditionally limited to speak in front of the adults and elders. The feeling of unease in women and young girls to speak up in front of a foreigner was overcome with the presence of a national Evaluation Team member (male).
16. **RECOMMENDATION** to UN Agencies: Expand timeline for evaluation planning, preparation and management:
17. Planning of the evaluation should be implemented well ahead of time and as a joint effort among UN agencies. It is recommended to budget enough time for joint evaluation planning and implementation and invest enough time in joint decision-making regarding sampling techniques and beneficiaries reach out.
18. Plan enough time for the field visit with time allocated for sessions to orient and train the national Evaluation Team and held post-interviews and post-FGD debriefing sessions.
19. Design and maintain Project’s staff and all partners’ database with all contact details during Project implementation so that sampling and planning is efficient.
20. **RECOMMENDATION** to PBF: similar to PBF Gender Marker Scoring Guidance[[33]](#footnote-34), it is essential to consolidate and produce Evaluation Guidelines for budgeting and implementing monitoring and evaluations within joint PBF projects. Consolidated guidelines are necessary for sufficient and efficient evaluation planning, preparation, and evaluation implementation should be prioritized because it influences findings, lessons learned and misses a huge opportunity for national-level capacity building at national level.
21. This is the crucial recommendation for future PBF evaluations because the evaluation process is an essential exercise with the massive potential for capacity building and empowerment of grassroots women and men and boys and girls.

# Data Analyses

1. Having in mind the limitations explained in the previous chapter, the section below illuminates the procedures used to analyze the data, steps and stages of the analyses, as well as the steps to confirm the accuracy and results for different stakeholders' groups.
2. The Evaluation Team had a brief timespan to conduct the evaluation and had limited access to Project documents, dispersed across agencies. Desk analyses of the documents was conducted and the KII and FGD transcripts were translated to facilitate content and thematic analyses. Quantitative data was collected and analyzed because the participants were asked to rank the Project relevance on the scale from 1-10.
3. Triangulation of data was applied so that different data sources were analyzed, and different evaluators were engaged to confirm or oppose the conclusions of each other.
4. The two online surveys were used to complement the data collected via KII and FGD because the same interviewed people completed the same surveys, and the attempts to obtain feedback from other stakeholders to populate the surveys were not efficient.
5. Before leaving Manila, Mission Highlights Workshop was delivered, and preliminary impressions were presented to the three RUNOs' staff and one RUNO's representative leader.
6. The First draft of the Evaluation Report was shared with the RUNO staff and implementing partners' staff and allowed a two-week timespan for comments on the factual omissions or errors via consolidated Audit Form. After this, the Evaluation Report was finalized and sent to the Evaluation Manager for the Final Evaluation Reference Groups' approval and formulation of the Management Response.
7. The overall impression is that the Project Results Matrix is crowded with indicators that in some cases, are too many, not defined in a unified way, and they measure multiple elements. Many contain unclear definitions of terms, and some of them are missing several elements of the SMART[[34]](#footnote-35) criteria.
8. A thorough analysis of the indicators and targets performance assessment is presented in the Annex 10-5, and visual representation of the Project performance per activity is presented in the Chapter 10.2. Effectiveness. Then, the narrative explains the reasoning behind the given marks and colors. The overall Project evaluation scores are given below.

***Table 9:*** *Final score per evaluation area on the scale from 1-4[[35]](#footnote-36)*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | **Final score per evaluation area** | **Rating (1-4)** |
| 1 | Achievement of Project results | 3 |
| 2 | Relevance | 4 |
| 3 | Effectiveness | 3 |
| 4 | Efficiency | 3 |
| 5 | Sustainability | 3 |
| 6 | Catalytic effect | 4 |
| 7 | Human Rights and Gender Equality | 2 |
| 8 | Monitoring and Evaluation | 2 |
| 9 | Innovation | 4 |
| 10 | Risk Mitigation and Management | 3 |
| 11 | Interagency Coordination, Communication and Management | 1 |
| 12 | Visibility | 1 |
| 13 | Inclusive planning | 3 |
| 14 | Impact | 3 |

**Figure 7:** Visual presentation of evaluation results

1. The level of achievement of output indicators and gender equality potential was measured through the GRAS scale indicating the following scores: gender negative (-1), gender blind (0), gender sensitive (1); gender positive or responsive (2) and gender transformative (3). The five level GRAS scale was merged to fit the four level color coding scale that illustrates the assessment results. For this purpose, the ratings were: gender negative/red, gender bling/orange, gender sensitive or gender positive/ yellow and gender transformative/green.
2. SMART – specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, time-bound are measured from 0 to five whereas each of the criteria contributes one point to the total score. The result zero represents absence of any of the SMART criteria.
3. The Results Framework lacks the key elements of the RBM and that is the definition of key terms and methodological explanations of the calculations, both of which should be given in the methodological notes which are part of the M&E System.

# Findings and Conclusions

1. Visual representation of findings and conclusion is presented below and detailed explanations, discussion and evidence are provided under relevant subheadings. In the beginning of each evaluation criteria we have listed the evaluation questions as specified in the TOR. The numbers indicated in the beginning of some paragraphs in parentheses e.g., [2] indicate the number of the evaluation questions to which the paragraph refers to.

**Table 10:** Summary presentation of evaluation findings

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions** | **Rating** | **Mark** |
| 1. Achievements of Project results | Good | 3 |
| 1. Relevance to the peace process | Very good | 4 |
| * 1. Contribution to the BOL plebiscite results from individuals' perception | Very good | 4 |
| 1. Effectiveness - This measures the extent to which the Project achieved its results (including intended and unintended, positive or negative). | Good | 3 |
| 1. Efficiency - This measures the extent of responsiveness of the PBF initiative in supporting peacebuilding priorities. | Good | 3 |
| 1. Sustainability | Good | 3 |
| 1. Catalytic effect | Very good | 4 |
| 1. Human Rights and Gender Equality | Satisfactory | 2 |
| 1. Monitoring and Evaluation | Satisfactory | 2 |
| 1. Innovation | Very good | 4 |
| 1. Risk mitigation and management | Good | 3 |
| 1. Inter-agency coordination, communication and management (however, it has significantly improved in comparison to Phase one of PBF support) | Needs improvement | 1 |
| 1. Visibility | Needs improvement | 1 |
| 1. Inclusive planning | Good | 3 |
| 1. Impact | Good | 3 |

1. Visual representation of the findings is available below and is followed by the detailed explanation:

***Figure 8:*** *Assessment of SMART, GRAS and Target achievement status for Project indicators*

*A screenshot of a cell phone

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## Relevance - rating is GOOD

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions** | **Rating**[[36]](#footnote-37) |
| 1. How relevant was the design of initiatives supported by the Project to the its key objectives and those of peacebuilding in the Philippines? | Very Good |
| 1. How relevant were the results of supported initiatives to the key objectives of the Project and peacebuilding in the Philippines? | Very Good |
| 1. To what extent did the supported initiatives respond to the urgent funding requirements and/or Bangsamoro transition-relevant gaps? | Good  (a, b) |
| 1. To what extent were the supported initiatives relevant to the needs and role of women and young people with regards to peacebuilding and Bangsamoro transition? | Good  (a, b) |
| 1. Was the Project able to accommodate the emerging challenges during the implementation period? | Good  (a) |
| 1. Did the design of this Project consider any pertinent recommendations for the evaluation of the previous phase of PBF support to the Philippines? | Satisfactory |
| Evaluation Note: (a) However, the decision-making process has to be more transparent, participatory, collegial and inclusive of all RUNOs. (b) Bangsamoro transition took place later, after the Project closure. | |

1. [1][[37]](#footnote-38) The design of the initiatives **that Project supported** was relevant to key Project objectives and peacebuilding objectives in the Philippines. The Project was based on the key national peacebuilding priorities specified in the Philippine Development Plan[[38]](#footnote-39) (2017-2022), more specifically *The Chapter 17: Attaining Just and Lasting Peace* and guiding national policy documents and was established after consultations with stakeholders. The Project also supports the United Nations Development Assistance Framework[[39]](#footnote-40) (2012-2017) and the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and is relevant to Mindanao Strategic Development Framework[[40]](#footnote-41) (2010-2020).
2. UN Women staff claim that this RUNO took the lead in mobilizing the UNCT to design this Project and has guided the initial Project development process. All three RUNOs confirmed widest possible consultation processes with their partners and stakeholders. Because of the nature of the evaluation process, which is not an audit, the Evaluation Team did not insist on the documentary evidence on the consultations held with the Project stakeholders in preparations of this Project back in 2016 or 2017. However, the field data collection and respondents have confirmed the consultative nature of Project design. Nevertheless, the consultations were based on the individual RUNOs’ activities or planning and consulting sessions with different actors, including the government and civil society.
3. Each of the RUNOs had a different approach in terms of planning sessions with the government while the UNICEF approach of joint planning on five year country priorities framework was identified as the most efficient and the most participatory. This approach sparked all the way down to the local level and enabled the long-term interest and willingness of the local government to respond to partnership. The UNCT now hopes that the new UN Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF) will be the bases for joint planning in the next five-year period.
4. [2] The stakeholders appraised the Project as “very relevant” to peacebuilding priorities in Mindanao and their needs. They ranked the Project marking it with ranks between 5 and 10 on the scale from 1 to 10. The lowest marks the Project received in two cases were 2 and 5 from two beneficiary group members.
5. Those two groups explained their low-level marks by their specific Project level experience: last-minute invitation to join and an invitation to conduct a minor level Project activity. This two exceptions actually confirm the rule of the Project relevance by all other project stakeholders.
6. Several other partners did report delays in financial and administrative issues and immense implementation pressure but have not assigned low relevance ranking. When assigning “lower” ranking scores to the Project relevance, the Insider Mediators Group (IMG) members and para-social workers for example explained the missing gap by the unfinished nature of the peace efforts in Mindanao.
7. The online survey respondents estimated that the Project was 75% relevant in addressing the drivers of conflict and the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) which indicates not only national level relevance but also high level relevant to community level and personal priorities of beneficiaries.
8. The approach to transformation of ARMM to BARMM and lobbying and advocacy for BOL were stressed out as relevant contributors to the peace process. In addition, community dialogues were relevant mechanisms because they enabled public education, advocacy and participatory approach to peace process and ensured equal representation and contribution to the peace process of all interested sides.
9. However, community dialogues were conducted by individual RUNOs and could have created stronger impact if diverse stakeholders were linked under OneUN umbrella.
10. [3] Bangsamoro Transition Gaps were supported by supporting the development of the Bangsamoro Vision for the Future which paved the way from ARMM to BARMM. In addition, consultations sessions between North Cotabato Barangay Officials and BARMM Ministries were held and the new Partnership framework for Sustainable development was developed for 2019- 2023 with the Government of the Philippines. (GPH). Some of the IMs report of organizing listening sessions with the Bangsamoro women, the wives and mothers of the combatants and the youth, because they are very vulnerable and it was needed to sustain the relationship with the grassroots. (IM, w/o age data, Nov 2019)
11. [4] The supported initiatives were responsive to the needs of women and youth. The needs of women were not taken fully into account due to the limited budget allocated to the UN-Women which chose a direct implementation strategy that also encompassed usage of consultants and absence of work with women CSOs. A larger group of women could have been supported to takeover decision making roles and not just be a number or a percentage of the participants. Also, an opportunity to strengthen gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and the role of women in peacebuilding process were missed in the capacity building of the UNCT staff, and more importantly, the Insider Mediators’ Group, ulama, and the youth.
12. The Project has responded to the needs of youth in a very innovative way and the youth found it very relevant and necessary to the context of their needs.

“*It is really relevant that everyone should advocate peace so that we can have a world where we can live freely”*

*“I felt ~~important~~ useful, because we were able to plan a project that helped our school…[...] And also because we were invited.”*

Youth group, Mindanao, Nov 2019

1. Although the quantitative sample for capacity building survey was relatively small, only 42 responses and only 17 on capacity building opportunities implemented within the Project, it brought out significant insights because of the anonymity of the responses. In this case, the online survey findings resonate with qualitative findings obtained from KII and FGD. More precisely, the participants evaluated the capacity building opportunities as “highly relevant” to their personal needs, and “completely relevant” or “relevant to some extent” to the peacebuilding process in the Philippines and on the scale from 1-5 ranked them as 4.47 which is significant indicator for relevance.
2. Going deeper into the online survey, participants’ estimate on average that the Project contribution towards Bangsamoro peacebuilding process is over 36% while other donors contribution is estimated slightly higher: up to 47%. Although the two online surveys represent statistically insignificant but qualitatively important responses on Project results, relevance and contribution, even if they provide anonymous responses, the statistic should be taken with caution.
3. Almost all participants, or precisely 94% of the respondents did fully (35%) or to some extent (59%) initiated actions following the training, including: conducting focus group discussions and advocating for Youth Peace and Security SC Resolution 2250 and WPS 1325, sharing U-Report as a platform for peace with other youth in their respective and far away communities and schools, advocating for education for children and abolishment of child labor. **The major value of those events for youth was that they filled in the gap in opportunities to learn, to socialize and meet peers, and travel.**

*“[…] I cannot afford to do these things alone [,] I need my friends in islands of BARMM as part of it. Our initiatives and actions depend on how my friends work together.”*

Anonymous, male respondent, 18-35 age group

1. Moreover, the Project has transformed youth leaders from different groups to embrace peace, contribute to peace initiatives, and rally behind adult leaders to win peace in Mindanao through passage and ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
2. The Project deployed innovative methodology, e.g., social media to influence youth as a specific advocacy target group and to prepare information that will serve people outside the Project.
3. On the other hand, the youth has expressed the need to expand the Project to other provinces, other schools and to engage more youth. They also emphasized the need for youth to be further supported by “supportive adults”, such as religious leaders and local government officials, when conducting community meetings, in order to gain trust from the citizens, displaced, and other vulnerable group. The possible explanation for youth crying out for this support lies in a deeply patriarchal society in which youth, especially young women, neither articulate nor voice out their needs in the presence of adults, elderly or senior officials.
4. If “supportive adults” e.g., from other Project components, were included in community meetings, young women and young men felt that they would gain the necessary legitimacy to interact and advocate for child’s rights. Youth is also claiming the highest hopes for the extension of livelihood opportunities and emphasize those as the key for peace sustainability.
5. A specific group of youth leaders expressed alarm at continuing displacement of tens of thousands of victims of Marawi siege in 2017. The continuing disenfranchisement of these people from their ancestral homes is a threat to economic, political, social, and spiritual stability which can be capitalized by extremist groups to destroy the gains of peace process. These youth leaders also emphasized that the immediate return of displaced people to ground zero was the key to sustainable peace in the area.
6. The Project relevance is highly visible in the change that took place at the level of individuals and changes in their attitudes and behaviors towards peace, community mobilization and action, and individual responsibility for peacebuilding. This momentum should be maintained and expanded towards the youth and women rights, too.
7. Specifically, the Project relevance is well manifested in the change of rebels’ mindset from having their children carry guns to having those children carry paper and pen. The Project facilitated the children of rebels to be disengaged and gave them their basic children’s rights: education, play, and safe environment.
8. [5] Because of the flexible and responsive nature of the PBF support, the three RUNOs were able to quickly adjust to the rapidly changing context and to adjust Project interventions to newly emerging challenges. For example, Project activities were organized in a responsive manner towards the events which were crucial milestones in the peacebuilding process: congressional hearings, bicameral conference, CSO and women groups’ campaigns and plebiscite for the ratification of BOL, and the engagement of youth in the normalization process. Project was also responsive to the Marawi recovery needs responding to the RBM challenges in monitoring and evaluation framework.
9. During changes in the operating context and the Bangsamoro transition process, which reduced the availability and performance of staff of the key implementing partners and government, additional efforts had to be made to orient the new management structures and to re-program Project activities. This was successfully conducted with a few gaps in the internal transparency and information sharing.
10. [6] The Evaluation Report of the Project Phase One was finalized and presented to the UNCT in December 2017. Several agencies’ as well as partners’ staff, reported to have not been introduced to the text of the Evaluation of the Phase One Project or to have received them thanks to their private associations with the evaluator. Those claims sounded reasonable because the Project document for the Phase Two Project had already been approved and signed by PBF in September 2017 long before the actual evaluation findings were compiled.
11. Several factors have been identified as the reasons behind this omission in information sharing. Firstly, due to the complex political context, several senior staff members from various stakeholders have moved on in their career, presumably leaving their supervisees without the necessary information and data. Secondly, there was no any joint program platform for data sharing or knowledge management which would facilitate data exchange and organizational memory and learning. However, it is worth noting that the recommendations of the Phase One evaluation were incorporated in the Phase Two Project document to some extent but those were not actually implemented.
12. For example, the recommendation was made to engage an M&E Advisor in the evaluation process, but this did not materialize in either of the phases although it was described in the ProDoc that UNDP and UNICEF M&E teams would be “responsible for close and regular monitoring” (ProDoc, p.23). There is no doubt that this was implemented but in silos by each individual RUNO.
13. The missed opportunities for mutual learning and absence of the strategic coherence identified in the Phase One of PBF support Evaluation report remains to be a challenge of agencies working in silos, the situation that was repeated in the Phase Two.
14. For example, there was a recommendation for a **dedicated program manager or coordinator** to be introduced or announced and coordination meetings to take place that will stir Project implementation and provide guidance to the field staff or the technical people. However, although this was the case in the beginning of the Project implementation, it did not follow through until the Project closure. Due to the global UN transition which resulted in the rotation of staff from the Resident Coordinator’s Office to UNDP and because of the absence of written and officially endorsed **Project Organigram**, this transition created tensions among the existing and new staff who were later brought on board.
15. It was noted that in this limbo situation, field staff continued to refer to the same person who changed the position and moved from RCO to UNDP office, while other senior staff had increased expectations from the PBF to send additional human resource to assist with Project reprogramming and implementation finalization.
16. **Conclusion**: Project is relevant to peacebuilding priorities at the national level, community level and personal level of the peace actors.
17. **RECOMMENDATION**: However, there is a need to substantively improve relevance for women at the community level and to support youth efforts to express and further take over ownership of the peace process. More importantly, it is essential to engage RBM or gender sensitive M&E Advisor to assist the Project RBM, to coordinate monitoring, reporting and knowledge management and assist RBM efforts of IPs, too. This will significantly lift the burden from the field staff who is essentially responsible for Project implementation and monitoring which is difficult in such a fluctuating context.
18. It is essential to clarify the roles, communication and reporting lines, with a clear Project Organigram, and to clearly assign Project Manager/Coordinator role.

**Table 11:** Phase One Evaluation Findings implementation Status – the status is SATISFACTORY

| **PBF 1 Project evaluation findings** | **Incorporated in the**  **PBF 2 ProDoc** | **Status implemented**  **within PBF 2** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Organize a “dedicated” Project Management Team (PMT) | Yes | Yes, but the team did not function. |
| 1. Create more synergy among a diverse sub-projects through the establishment and conceptualization of the platform for sharing lessons, insights and challenges on the ground as well as best practices | Yes | No |
| 1. Strengthen local institutions where sub-projects are implemented | Yes | No data on local institutions / No for local CSOs |
| 1. Organize more formal and structured organizations on the ground to promote peace, especially localized peace. | Yes | Yes |
| 1. Crafting of a communications plan that will popularize the goals of the projects and promote better understanding of the rationale behind the peace processes in the Bangsamoro. | No | To some extent: there is no evidence of the project communication plan design and implementation. |
| However, methodologically yes, community dialogues were used to widely promote the peace process. |
| 1. Conceptualize a comprehensive and holistic and strategic peace framework in the Bangsamoro, that is the result of wide consultations and workshops. | Yes | Yes,  Vision for Bangsamoro created |
| 1. Continues education program for those who have committed to be part of political parties, including those organized by women in the Bangsamoro | Political parties  (no data)  Gender mainstreaming component | No data  Yes, Women’s Speakers Bureau |
| 1. Regular monitoring and evaluation can be included in the task of a dedicated PMT | Yes, however,  only UNICEF and UNDP are explicitly mentioned in the ProDoc. | No |

## Effectiveness – rating is GOOD

1. The Project has been successful to a remarkable extent in achieving results under the two project outcomes while leaving space for adaptations that occurred due to a context specific changes. The overall assessment of the implementation of Project outputs is presented on Figure 9 in accordance with the adopted performance assessment scale[[41]](#footnote-42).
2. The following scale and color coding was used: 1- needs improvement/red (achievement of 0-25%), 2- satisfactory/orange (achievement 25-50%), 3-Good/yellow (50-75%) and 4-Very Good / green (fully achieved 75-100%).

**Figure 9:** Visual representation of the performance status of Project

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1. The outputs marked in red have been reprogramed and other outputs were achieved, which were considered more relevant at that particular time, e.g., risk management training instead of WPS training for UNCT and IP staff. However, the nature of the decision-making process on this reprogramming raised red flags which have been indicated here in red, too.
2. The idea on local volunteer intermediaries was abandoned and replaced with more effective and possibly cheaper U-Report campaign, community dialogues on child rights and engagement with the Youth Networks across BARMM.
3. Finally, the evaluation did not find any written evidence on flexible learning opportunities or educational opportunities for disengaged children apart from the peacebuilding training delivered to 92 girls (47%) and boys (53%) by UNICEF.
4. The Activity 2.2.4. dedicated to Project M&E system was directed to the OPAPP as crucial for the development of the M&E framework for the Marawi recovery process monitoring.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions – Effectiveness** | **Mark** |
| * + 1. To what extent did supported initiatives achieve their intended outcomes and what is the evidence? | Good |
| * + 1. To what extent did supported initiatives help address **women’s/girls’** concerns or attitudes regarding the peace process and Bangsamoro transition, and  did the **TOC address gender equality concerns**? | Satisfactory  Yes, indirectly |
| * + 1. To what extent did supported initiatives help address specific concerns or attitudes **of youth** with respect to the Bangsamoro peace and the peace process, and   did the **TOC address the youth concerns**? | Very good  Yes, indirectly |
| * + 1. To what extent did the Project activities complement each other and have a strategic **coherence**[[42]](#footnote-43) of approach? | Satisfactory |
| * + 1. To what extent did the Project activities contribute to any broader strategic goals of the peace process between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF? | Very good |

1. Aside from changes in several activities in two of the totals of five Project outputs covering 17 key activities, the Project was very effective in reaching out its objectives. The main Project approach in empowering individuals (IMG, women, ulama, teachers, pupils) and then giving them a chance to implement their skills “in practice” was crucial for delivery of Project results. The achieved results and activities conducted under Project Outputs are assessed as follows:

|  |
| --- |
| **Outcome 1:**  **Enabling environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established.** |

1. Under Outcome 1, the ProDoc focused towards the achievement of three outputs and the set of 10 activities, respectively (4+ 2+4) for each of the three outputs.

**Output 1.1: (4 activities)**

Platform for intra-Moro dialogue developed and implemented, including to achieve consensus on Bangsamoro legislation; Moro positions with regard to federalism; and on the constitution of the autonomous Bangsamoro government, including the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority; and special autonomy for Bangsamoro integrated into the process for the development of a new federal dispensation for the Philippines.

1. Indicated activities in the ProDoc were the following:

* Activity 1.1.1. Assistance for the initiatives of the “insider mediators” [to converge the peace agreements…]
* Activity 1.1.2. Support the development and implementation of a platform for Bangsamoro-wide multi-stakeholder dialogue
* Activity 1.1.3. Facilitation of the development and implementation of a dialogue between Congressional leaders and the Moro leadership [around the guaranteeing…]
* Activity 1.1.4. Advocacy for special autonomy for Bangsamoro with leaders of the Congress and the wider national political spectrum by eminent persons including those mobilized through the high-level Friends of Peace Group

The following outputs have been identified:

* Training on Negotiation and Mediation techniques for Insider Mediators Group (IMG) members
* IMG planning meeting
* Support for IMG Assessment/Planning Sessions and Lobbying Work before and during Bicameral Conference
* Support for the BBL Advocacy of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)
* Engagement of legal consultants to support the BTC during Congressional processes for the enactment of the BBL
* Learning Exchange for selected Moro Islamic Liberation Front representatives on developing strategies for Political Transition, Reintegration and Prevention of Violent Extremism
* Bangsamoro Visioning Workshop
* Reporting post-conflict transitions: From ARMM to BARMM
* National Experiences on Insider Mediation in Asia-Pacific: Enhancing Skills, Knowledge and Collaboration (5 participants)
* IMG in the Bangsamoro Transition: Assessment and Planning Exercise

**Output 1.2: (2 activities)**

Roles of women, youth, and indigenous persons in supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro enhanced.

1. The following two activities were designed:

* Activity 1.2.1. Assistance to new thematic peace tables featuring women, youth, indigenous persona and other constituencies at the national and Bangsamoro level supported the OPAPP and the Implementing panels for the CAB
* Activity 1.2.2. Strengthening of women’s leadership toward greater participation in the peace process and transition infrastructure

1. Women were engaged as BOL advocates and public education leaders in diaspora communities. Within the first outcome, Women Speakers’ Bureau was established bringing together 31 and then establishing a group of 22 women who reached out to 700 women in diaspora communities as resource persons on BOL and plebiscite.
2. After the Inaugural BARMM Women’s Summit took place in Davao City on 28-29 March 2019, a “10-point Women’s Agenda” was designed and handed over to the Bangsamoro Women Commission. The Summit called for spaces to ensure women’s needs were met in laws and policies, pledged for full implementation of the existing Gender and Development Budget, and the creation of a Ministry for Women in the new Bangsamoro Government.
3. The “10-point Bangsamoro Women Agenda” identified the following priorities for women and girls in BARMM: creation of the transitional justice mechanism in the BARMM, implementation of the Magna Carta for Women, Operationalization of Gender and Development Budget to ensure new BARMM government addresses gender issues in the BARMM, establishment of Women’s machinery, set-up of programs to address differential impact of conflict and threats to women and children, engagement of women in dialogue on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of communities, harnessing women’s knowledge on conflict prevention, create sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities for women and the youth, promoting significant number of women in the BARMM government, and building gender responsive environment to ensure meaningful involvement of women in development.
4. National peace tables for women and youth were started to be convened by the OPAPP but later on, the political landscape diverted activities from women peace tables towards BOL advocacy and plebiscites scheduled for January and February 2019.
5. The average age of youth who participated in three rounds of youth peace tables and trainings was 21. This consultations not only mobilized youth but have also paved the way to the global recognition of the Project methodology in drafting and implementing NAP on UN SCR 2250 on youth and peacebuilding.
6. The list of activities which took place are as follows:

* Luzon-Visayas-Mindanao Youth Peace Table Trainings-Workshops
* National Youth Peace Tables Summit
* Interagency Workshop on the Roadmap to Philippines National Action Plan on Youth, Peace and Security (NAP on UNSCR 2250 and 2419)
* Indigenous Peoples Legislative Assembly in the Cordillera Administrative Region
* Advocacy for Peace, Security and Development in Mindanao
* IEC Campaign Series on the Government of the Philippines- MILF Peace Process for the Philippines National Police (PNP)
* Workshop on Normalization
* Youth, Peace and Security Consultations in the BARMM gathered 117 key youth (50 males, 67 female) across the Philippines with 76 youth networks (42 school-based, 34 community-based) linking with each other and with OPAPP and its partners
* Mindanao Indigenous People (IP) Youth Assembly
* A consultation with 90 indigenous women in the ARMM held on 05-06 March 2018 in Cotabato City resulted in the IP women’s recommendation to intensify the information, education, and communication (IEC) campaign of the BBL in IP communities, which would play a critical role in the BBL’s ratification
* Around 600 women stakeholders in the ARMM participated in a consultation on 14-15 March 2018 in Cotabato City that resulted in capacity-building on leadership for Moro women leaders and provision of livelihood program that included skills training and startup facilities and equipment. (indicated as funded under the Government of Japan project)
* Four (4) Women Peace Centers in Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and ARMM are now providing assistance to their respective communities, particularly for women and children

**Output 1.3: (4 activities, 3 activities have been reprogrammed)**

Support from the UN Country Team for the finalization and implementation of the Government’s Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in Mindanao provided in an integrated and coordinated manner, including in partnership with the World Bank

1. The following four activities were identified in the ProDoc:

* Activity 1.3.1. The UN Country Team’s integrated programmatic offer in support of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peace and Development in coordination with the World Bank
* Activity 1.3.2. The financing facility for implementing the Strategic Framework, successfully implemented with initial secretariat from the UN RCO
* Activity 1.3.2. The UNCT capacity to integrate issues pertaining to women, peace and security into programs related to peacebuilding and to the prevention of violent extremism, and implementation monitored
* Activity 1.3.4. The implementation of PBF support for the Philippines, effectively assessed, monitored, evaluated, and re-aligned with emerging risks and opportunities during the course of this project

1. The outputs achieved:

*“This result happened because of*

*the effective and*

*efficient implementation*

*of the Project*

*that incorporates innovative*

*and*

*transformative approach*

*to the participants”*

Anonymous, Female, age group 18-35

* Senior Advisor to lead the nation-wide consultations, design and the adoption of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Terrorism engaged to lead the consultations
* UNCT Workshop: Developing an integrated Risk Assessment System for Early Warning and Response
* Bangsamoro Transition and Normalization: learning missions on interfaith dialogue, religious cooperation, political transition and transition management (repeated under Output 2.1.)
* Roundtable Discussion: School for Peace and Democracy
* Consultations session between North Cotabato Barangay Officials and BARMM Ministries
* The Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development (PFSD) 2019-2023 finalized with the GPH
* Monitoring missions’ conducted by individual agencies
* Project Review Meeting held in Davao for all RUNOs and implementing partners staff including IMG
* PBF Project Board Meeting held on 14 March 2018
* PBF Project Board Meeting held 5 October 2018

1. Regrettably for women and gender equality marker, the Project’s activities were reprogramed and instead of the WPS training for the UNCT, a workshop was held on Developing an Integrated Risk Assessment System for Early Warning and Response. Unfortunately, in human behavior theory, absence of information is a strong conflict driver and that is what happened when one RUNO decided to remove capacity building session on WPS.
2. The WPS agenda is under UN-Women mandate as it drives global efforts in this area of the extreme importance for Mindanao and the region. However, under this Project, the activity was budgeted under UNDP outputs. It would have been good if at least some communication and negotiations took place, instead, tensions have rose and in the absence of Project Annual Work Plan communication and coordination between the three RUNOs and the RCO hindered even greater Project impact.

|  |
| --- |
| **Outcome 2:**  **Factors driving alienation, radicalization, and violent extremism identified and capacities to address them developed and implemented.** |

1. The second outcome focused towards two outputs aimed to be achieved via the total of seven activities, 4 + 3 per outcome respectively.

|  |
| --- |
| **Output 2.1**  Role of women, youth and faith based leadership in preventing violent extremism enhanced, including through the development and dissemination of positive narratives in social media |

* Activity 2.1.1. Assistance for faith-based leadership in Muslim Mindanao, including for MILF religious leaders, and for leaders of women’s and youth groups, to use social media and other creative means to generate new narratives
* Activity 2.1.2. Support for civic representatives, with a prior on women, youth and faith-based leadership, from Philippines and the wider SE Asian region to engage government counterparts in a dialogue on the implementation of the Manila Declaration on the Prevention of Violent Extremism
* Activity 2.1.3. Assistance with systematic and visible inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, as well as outreach by the MILF to minorities and religious and civic leaderships
* Activity 2.1.4. Engaging women and youth to prevent violent extremism

1. Outputs produced:

* Mission on the Indonesian President Special Envoy on interfaith Dialogue and Religious Cooperation in the Philippines
* Bangsamoro Transition and Normalization: learning missions on interfaith dialogue, religious cooperation, political transition and transition management (repetition form the output 1.3.)
* Mindanao Ako, Filipino Ako – Engaging Youth People in National Building: Leadership and Peacebuilding Camp, Peace Education Module Updating and Rapid Assessment on Violent Extremism
* Say YES to Bangsamoro Organic Las (BOL): Training and Advocacy Work on the BOL and the Plebiscite
* Consultations on the Framework for Integrated System to Address Land and Property Claims and Disputes in Marawi.
* Community engagement for child rights through community dialogues (CFSI-Cotabato, CBCS-Cotabato, Maranao People Development Center-Marawi City, Synergiea Foundation-Makati City, International Children’s Action Network-Cotabato City)
* Youth engagement and Networks Strengthening for the Bangsamoro (YES Bangsamoro), promoting life skills for adolescents and youth (VSI- Davao City, Representatives of Youth Networks and U-Reporters-Across BARMM, Bangsamoro Youth Commission/ Office on the Bangsamoro Youth Affairs-Cotabato)

1. Under the second outcome, the National Action Plan (NAP) on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) was developed but unfortunately the contribution of the PBF is not acknowledged nor visible on the hardcovers of the document. The document hardcovers indicate that partners involved in the production of this document are: The Government of Japan, UN-Women, UNICEF, UNODC, UNOCT, UNDP and UN RCO.

|  |
| --- |
| **Output 2.2**  Children and youth at risk of association or re-association with armed groups through dialogue, counseling, enhances life skills and educational alternatives |

* Activity 2.2.1. Assistance for the development of an appropriately trained and capacitated, and credible, group of local intermediaries
* Activity 2.2.2. Support for dialogue initiatives facilitated by credible intermediaries (see key activity 1 above) to better understand the grievances behind alienation and radicalization; re-engage disaffected youth; and, identify youth-led and viable alternatives for political and economic empowerment
* Activity 2.2.3. Support for strengthened capacities for services for at-risk children and youth as well as their families, including for case follow-up/counseling, education options (including alternative learning systems), enhanced life-skills, e.g., “adolescent peace-builders”, as well as for health and nutrition services to their communities

1. The outputs achieved:

* Religious leadership on positive struggles for peace and development
* Ten new Khutbahs developed and translated into five dialects
* A total of 101 Religious leaders trained in delivering khutbah and rolled out the sermons across Mindanao
* Community dialogues on child rights conducted
* Follow up support of disengaged children and their families including the provision of psychosocial and life skill services for children (CFSI, Cotabato)
* Total of 100 para-social workers trained to deliver social work services to families

1. The idea on local volunteer intermediaries was abandoned and replaced with more effective and possibly cheaper U-Report campaign, community dialogues on child rights and engagement with the Youth Networks across BARMM. Finally, the evaluation did not find any written evidence on educational opportunities for disengaged children apart from the peacebuilding training delivered to 92 girls (47%) and boys (53%) by UNICEF.
2. [2 and 3] Unfortunately, the TOC has not explicitly addressed the women’s needs and gender equality concerns, nor youth needs and priorities. In addition, there is an evident absence of gender analyses in the background section of the ProDoc and there is no any reference to women and girl’s situation or their needs or status in the political processes in BARMM or Muslim Mindanao. However, despite the fact that the TOC has not specified either women or youth as change agents it remains sufficiently wide to accommodate their activities and impact and to address their needs. The Project implementation has reached out to significant number of youths and to a bit smaller number of women.
3. The TOC specified in the ProDoc has proven to be validated by the evaluation and the experience of the respondents. It remains valid and applicable for each of the individual actors engaged in the Project implementation: government, Moro leadership, civil society, women, youth, and academia representatives.
4. On the other hand, despite the validity of the TOC, the Project results remain fragile for some actors, e.g., for grassroots women and youth, especially young women. The main reason for this fragility is that those have been empowered at micro or personal level[[43]](#footnote-44) only and remain without further support to operate in the environment with strong patriarchal attitudes and behaviors. This is especially the case for young women and girls and young men and boys. the Evaluation Team argues that the observed changes in this Project occurred on the first dimension or micro-level and that further empowerment work is needed to enable three-fold empowerment to take place.
5. Furthermore, it depends on the type and timing of the intervention, which empowerment level will take place. For example, the IMG empowerment is observed in the reverse order then mentioned above. It has started at the personal and is completed fully at the macro level, or their group empowerment. The same empowerment circle is recommended to happen for all Project targeted actors, especially young women and girls. For a detailed analyses of the TOC see Chapter 1.21.
6. In terms of considering youth as a non-monolithic category of population, it is evident that RUNOs did make significant efforts to address the needs of young girls and women and to include them in Project activities. Although Youth Peace Agenda was identified as one of the key outputs of this Project, by an online survey respondent, the Evaluation Team witnessed that the impact of the Project interventions specifically on the young girls and young women remained to be fragile and needed support to advance to the next level of empowerment.
7. Additionally, in terms of the traditional topic and nominal representation, it is important to emphasize that there are areas in which girls and women are prominent in leadership and decision making. But there are other areas of activities, with higher political weight and roles, where women and girls need to take up more space and time, and to participate in a more meaningful way.
8. While patriarchal society made it clear that youth were not eligible to talk and enter dialogue in the presence of adults, elderly or decision makers, specific steps were made to empower the youth to speak up at the regional policy level, e.g., in the Parliament. However, this remains to be a single case and a role model and practice that could be replicated. Increasingly the youth feel empowered to engage and take up space they need to influence decision making and implementation especially at the local level.
9. **[4] COHERENCE**[[44]](#footnote-45): The Project activities and the TOC are ambitiously designed and in the ProDoc the coherence of the approach is evaluated as complex and comprehensive but very holistic.
10. However, the strategic coherence of approach could have been improved in Project implementation phase and it is evaluated as satisfactory with the space for improvement of approach. There were infrequent Project implementation discussions or official meetings and the three agencies largely acted independently in their respective implementations.
11. According to Coning and Karsten, in the context of international peace and stability operations, coherence can be observed at different actors, levels and various dimensions[[45]](#footnote-46). They establish a new comprehensive framework which institutes four levels of coherence and six types of relations among peace and stabilization actors.
12. The four levels of coherence are observed as the following: intra-agency coherence (within a single agency), whole-of-government coherence, **inter-agency coherence** and lastly, an international-local coherence or alignment[[46]](#footnote-47).
13. Interestingly, among the six potential relationships between the actors which are aiming to achieve coherence, there are also additional factors influencing the relationships: perceived roles and responsibilities, legitimacy, credibility and mandates.
14. However, the six types of relations range on a six-level scale from unity to competition, and those are:

(1) actors are united,

(2) actors are integrated,

(3) actors cooperate,

(4) actors coordinate,

(5) actors coexist, and

(6) actors compete.

1. This typology can be used to observe and the trace improvements or deterioration or the improvement of the relationship among specific set of actors in a given time and space, regardless of their missions and agendas. The last “coexistence and competition” cases are the worst case relationship scenarios among actors who usually have opposing missions and agendas, which is not the case for RUNOs because their missions and agendas are closely linked. However, looking at the critical relations among RUNOs this is the mirror of their collaboration.
2. The overall rating of the coherence within RUNOsin the case of this Project evaluation on the scale from one to six is evaluated as **needs improvement**. However, even in this circumstances, the complex and comprehensive Project scope has helped in creating important results scattered across stakeholders and topics each leading towards peace in Mindanao.
3. The reasons for the absence of coherence might be deeper than it looks, it could be impossible to resolve them quickly nor those could easily be improved with the establishment of ad-hoc or new coordination bodies, practices or quarterly meetings. The obstacle to the coherence cannot be ignored but need to be critically assessed and resolved in order to enhance coherence-building efforts and coherence results for future PBF support to Mindanao and the Philippines.
4. The Project **coherence** and effectiveness would have been significantly better if the horizontal and vertical links were created among the target groups e.g., between women and ulama, ulama and youth, IMG and women and across issues. However, given the short Project implementation timespan this assumption would not have been possible but, it could have made a significant difference with at least two identified places and multiple partners.
5. **RECOMMENDATION:** Enable RUNOs to: (a) adopt a more coherent approach and to provide a comprehensive package of support to selected areas and selected topics/agendas by linking and working with different actors in alignment with RUNOs’ comparative advantages; and,  
   (b) identify realistic points of joint actions leading towards more substantial impact and push RUNOs and partners towards joint implementation instead of exercising pure co-existence.

## Efficiency – rating is GOOD

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation Questions** | **Rating** |
| 1. Were the selected implementation modalities (i.e., direct implementation, engagement of implementing partners) the most efficient way to implement the Project initiatives? | Satisfactory |
| 1. How efficient was the implementation of the Project activities and how significant were the transaction costs? | Satisfactory  Data on transaction costs were not available/not evaluated |
| 1. How fast and responsive has the Project been in supporting the transition and peacebuilding priorities? | Very good but with significant gaps in transparency in the decision-making process |
| 1. To what extent did the Project take risks to achieve the transition and peacebuilding objectives, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so? | Very good |
| 1. How effective were the Project coordination and responsiveness mechanisms including between the implementing agencies, with the Project Board, with the government and with other Project stakeholders/ beneficiaries? | Satisfactory |
| 1. How clear and effective were the Project targeting criteria? | Good |
| 1. How well did the Project complement any other initiatives existing in the same area and what efforts did the Project make to identify such initiatives and strengthen synergies? | Satisfactory |
| 1. How effective were the Project’s monitoring and evaluation mechanisms? | Satisfactory with ample space for improvement of RBM and joint approach |

1. Three million united stated dollars were allocated to three RUNOs so that 63% or USD 1,878,920 USD were allocated to UNDP, 27% or USD 821,040 to UNICEF and USD 300,040 or 10% to UN-Women.
2. The budget was split among two outcomes within a total of five outputs and 17 activities. The first outcome has three ambitious outputs and 10 key activities, and the second outcome had two outputs and seven key activities. The last key activity was added later, as a result of the negotiations with the government and reprogramming of the budget and Project activities.
3. Having in mind that UN-Women colleagues claimed to be pushing forward the development and consultations with the stakeholders in the early phase of the development of this Project, it remains vague how did the UN-Women or transformative gender actions ended up with only the 10% of allocated resources.
4. Even if all three RUNOs have ensured systematic gender mainstreaming, the allocated amount of 10 percent does not approach requirements for “women specific needs, gender equality advancement and women’s empowerment” as stipulated in the 7-Point Action Plan of the UN Secretary-General([[47]](#footnote-48).
5. Besides UN Women work with Women’s Speakers Bureau and individual gender consultants, the evaluation has not found evidence that the UN entities have assisted in the establishment and direct financial support to women’s CSO.
6. The budget for activities targeting support to women-transformative interventions remained limited and some of the female participants from non-UN Women activities, murmured that they had been forced to use their own money for some of the activities when there were shortfalls in the allocated budget for women’s organizations. There is no any evidence that any of the RUNOs supported women’s organizations and UN-Women implemented its women-transformative activities through the help of the consultants.
7. The UNV component has not been implemented in the form the Project described but it was shaped differently. The same is valid for the Training on WPS Agenda and the role of women in prevention of violent extremism as well as the M&E system for which funds were allocated to the IP.
8. The figure below represents the Project budget allocations per output and RUNOs as presented in the Project Document.

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Description automatically generatedFigure 10:** Project Budget Allocation per Project Output and RUNOs

1. From the available final Project Financial reports and KII interviews, it was noted that risk analyses was performed with IMG on the potential election-related, plebiscite-related violence and the IMG and CSOS were engaged strategically to be “a part of bridging that possible divide” (KII, Nov, 2019). In addition, based on the strategic risk assessment and risk management needs (Marawi), and Government priorities, decisions were made, and resources were shifted between allocated outputs as presented on the table below.

***Table 12:*** *Budget overview as per resources re-allocations*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Output** | **Total budgeted**  **per output** | **Total reported**  **per output** |
| output 1.1. | $ 235,000 | 235,000 |
| output 1.2. | $ 450,500 | 591,340 |
| output 1.3. | $ 500,000 | 500,000 |
| output 2.1. | $ 530,840 | 407,732 |
| output 2.2. | $ 1,087,267 | 920,478 |
| output 2.3. | $ - | 149,117 |
| GMS - 7% | $ 196,393 | 196,333 |
|  | $ 3,000,000 | $ 3,000,000 |

***Figure 11:*** *Total expenditures per agency and reporting period*

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1. It is worth noticing the amount of the expenditures in the last quarter and the challenges the lead agency met in working with the transition of the staff of the Implementing partner (OPAPP). Additional efforts had to be invested in the orientation of the new OPAPP leadership and negotiations on the last budget tranche expenditures.

***Figure 12:*** *Total expenditures reported per agency and reporting period*

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1. The OPAPP staff emphasized the need to receive a clear guidance and proper support towards contracting modalities, eligible procedures, and acceptable expenditures. Other grantees expressed their tolerant dissatisfaction with being engaged for short-term contracts, which should be implemented in a short time span, by different RUNOs. **Only because of the dedicated and passionate RUNOs field Project staff, the grantees received adequate support to execute the activities fully and to achieve Project results. Some of the partners had shorter, and some had longer commitments.**
2. Yet, RUNOs should discuss and agree at the programmatic and operational levels, about the most appropriate options for longer-term memorandum of understanding (MoUs) and short term and quick-response Project initiatives for grassroots organizations, governmental partners, and women and youth CSOs. This is especially important for the actors and partners working in the same geographical zones or reaching out to the same geographic areas.
3. Operational and geographic alignment is achievable with the assistance from operations and finances staff who should be able to provide an overview, database or the listing of all project contracts details (duration, theme, area etc.) Although other donors were supporting similar or alike advocacy activities in the same geographic areas, all activities, especially women and youth related activities with teachers and schools were appropriate because of the specific target group e.g., youth or women who other donors did not target to engage with.

*It is important because it … […]*

*…. helped us identify some of the prominent problems in our schools*

*…. helped us manage problems in our school and com[community]. It made us think that it is important to have peace in order to have a progressive community. “*

Youth group, Mindanao, Nov 2019

1. It was evident that all CSOs and government partners were passionate and dedicated to project implementation and apart from this one, the second key ingredient to project results and impact was equally passionate and dedicated field project staff.
2. This confirms the assumption that besides **team building for project staff, a joint Annual and procurement plan could be RBM tool used to strengthen transparency,** information sharing and tension removal among the RCO and RUNOs teams and above all, more efficient use of resources.
3. What the above two examples demonstrate is that the Project was successful in supporting activities which other donors were not interested to support e.g., youth initiatives and consultations. A male responded, aged 18-35 described: “*They [other donors] were working with traditional leaders and the elderly here in Zamboanga, nobody works with youth*”.
4. RUNOs used different modalities to implement this ambitious and holistic project. A direct implementation or engagement of consultants was seen as the most effective way to implement highly technical aspects of activities and micro-grant and grant-agreements were used to engage local Civil Society Organizations, and academia as implementing partners. Both ways are legitimate ways for partnership and project implementation whereas engaging the CSOs has a longer-term impact and results. The engagement of consultants is also a good option as long as it includes capacity building and skills transfer for partners and institutions.
5. The evaluation noted the RECOMMENDATION from the CSO that usage of longer-term MoU and joint (RUNOs) grant making mechanisms to CSOs would be a far better option for CSOs sustainability and impact, not only for project efficiency and CSOs sustainability.
6. Due to the above-mentioned challenge, the agreement aimed to support previously agreed peacebuilding and transition priorities of the OPAPP, had to be extended until mid-July 2019. The evaluation has not found written evidence that this extension of Project activities was communicated to PBF or other RUNOs. Fortunately, the grant was directed towards one of the most efficient and capable partners, Ateneo de Zamboanga University, which has even provided financial contribution to the Project and has self-funded its Project management fees.
7. However, spending and organizing the last package of nationwide youth and Indigenous women and men events and consultations worth USD 150,000 was a challenge this team met with a huge success. The evidence described in the partners final Project report is impressive and the evaluation recommended this partner as a significant local resource for future programming.

*“This project was just thrown at us…”*

KII, Nov 2019

1. The last reporting period expenditures also included the organization and sharing of the IMG experience at the regional level. The Workshop facilitated by UNDP HQ and Clingendael Institute was organized in Bangkok in Dec 2018 and was attended by 46 stakeholders composed of UNDP, government and NGO representatives from Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, Fiji, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan and Cambodia. Although the practice of sharing information, learning and scaling up the initiatives is important for regional level, it is **recommended to share the information** first with other RUNOs, whose staff felt uninformed and dissatisfied for not knowing that this was a PBF supported activity. The evaluation assumes that the Lead RUNO thinking might be that other RUNOS’ staff or actors’ participation was irrelevant or that their expenses could not have been covered from UNDP funds.
2. In addition, there was an observed **overlap in usage of CSOs** whereas the evaluation observed at least two gaps in project implementation. Firstly, the same CSOs was engaged in the same or similar timeframe by different RUNOs to implement different aspects of PBF supported project. This resulted in absence of CSOs understanding about the holistic picture of the overall intervention. In addition, two same CSOs, operating in the same geographical area, were implementing two different components of the project under PBF funded by two different RUNOs. While operating independently those groups missed the opportunity to create synergies at the local level.
3. Having in mind the fluctuating political context and transition processes, the selected implementation modalities were very appropriate and almost the only way to push forward Project implementation and the achievement of Project results. The Project was very expeditious to support the transition and peacebuilding priorities, but the selected modalities were not very efficient options, at least not for all the selected Implementing partners (IP). The evaluation respondents identified timeliness of information, respect for deadlines, short-term implementation options, timely response of the UN to their proposals, and absence of timely orientation and procedures explanations as the major conditions necessary for Project performance and efficiency.
4. This exemplifies the necessity for operational alignment and stronger project coordination, planning and implementation.
5. On the management side of project implementation, RUNO used the existing staff for Project implementation just by simply adding tasks to their existing “loads” which was often the practice but not necessarily a request from PBF. Although dedicated RUNOs staff did not complain of getting additional responsibilities they expected timely guidance and support and at least engaging on-call or temporary assistance in Project implementation. The coordination and cooperation among the field staff were good but colleagues were aware that “there were differences” among the senior leadership in Manila.
6. [5] For joint project at the UN level, **clear organigram, transparency in decision making and strong coordination** were the key to efficient and effective implementation and, thus, the overall Project impact. Due to a specific political landscape and fragility of peace and transition process, the coordination was not prioritized and therefore it was the weakest points in the execution of activities. This not only left RUNOs frustrated and without information from each other about the Project and budget revisions, Project events, activities and partners but also left several CSOs in confusion.
7. On the other side, the staff who had had a longer history of work with RUNOs, more specifically, those who had been engaged with Project One, claimed that coordination improved. The evaluation found out that this claim had been made because of the After-Action Review Workshop held in Davao City in June 2019 which the evaluation process started with. Contrary to the field staff, the higher one went up the strategic leadership level, the higher the “coordination anxiety” was. RUNOs staff was praised by the respondents for their availability and responsiveness at all times, especially when issues needed to be solved in communities (KII, female, Nov 2019).
8. Another example was the UNDP and UN Women coordination in the production of the NAP PCVE whereas each of the agencies provided inputs in alignment with its collaborative advantage. The result was a gender sensitive NAP PCVE adopted by the government.
9. **RECOMMENDATION**: For any future interventions, it is imperative to build on the seeds of the established examples of good coordination and transparency at all levels: among RUNOs, their implementing partners, technical and operational level staff, local partners. One of the already established mechanisms was the organization of joint team retreat, or joint meetings for the Project and partner staff.
10. It is also vital that RUNOs support coordination mechanisms at the local level among CSOs, local government, and other social and economic actors. Local-level coordination will enable powerful synergies in the corresponding geographical areas and create a multiplier effect for Project beneficiaries. It will also promote local CSOs as Peace Secretariats or Peace Coordination mechanisms which will facilitate a holistic approach to the beneficiaries' needs and it will eliminate conflict drivers (anti-government) which is still strong in some communities and among the MILF leadership in camps.
11. On the **operational level, coordination** would mean the establishment of a list of CSOs contracted by different RUNOs and the alignment of the operational interventions via an annual Project plan.
12. Because of the mentioned context and staff transition, it was difficult for the Project Board to meet more than twice and to make decisions necessary for Project implementation. However, the Project Technical Working Group could be used as a platform for non-political decision making and once established to be functional and operational, it will greatly increase RUNOs efficiency.
13. While the Evaluation Team understands the complexity of the operational environment and actors, and political sensitivity of the process and actors, it remains unclear why the Project missed the opportunity to revise the results framework and adjust indicators’ targets once the reprogramming took place, due to legitimate contextual factors.
14. [6] The evaluation found an ample evidence on the Project design consultations conducted with partners and Project stakeholders. Project implementing partners were selected based on their existing competence, “stability of operations”[[48]](#footnote-49) and access to target groups, e.g., youth networks and on their capacity to utilize the funds.
15. On the other hand, the criteria for choosing insider mediators were not completely clear and was said to be based “on recommendations”. To some extent, the non-written rule for the selection of IMs was based on the “selection, who among these groups would or which individuals have the capacity to represent their organization, who has the command and respect of the leadership, the trust and confidence of the leadership, but is open to engage with those on the other side of the fence… […]it is only later on where we expanded into religious leaders, members of the government agencies, representatives from the security sector.” (KII, Nov 2019).
16. **RECOMMENDATION**: Because the work with the IMG represents a replicable model to many other countries, it will be good to elaborate on the methodology of the IMG selection as well as the selection or targeting of other groups: youth, women speakers bureau members and para social workers for example.
17. [7] Despite the absence of development partners from the evaluation process, the respondents confirmed that “no other donors provided support towards this goal” at least not to government priorities. On the other hand, the local CSOs reported intensive engagement of donors in advocacy initiatives towards BOL plebiscite.
18. [8] Although joint monitoring and evaluation were robustly defined and designed in the Project proposal, the Evaluation Team found no evidence that OneUN or joint monitoring approach was applied. On the other hand, the Project document mentions only UNDP and UNICEF Monitoring and Evaluation staff to be responsible for M&E system.
19. Monitoring was not considered as a separate or sufficiently important activity to allocate additional staff or funds for its implementation. Therefore, the original Results framework remained very, very ambitious and burdened with high-level outputs, which are in actually medium-term outcomes. Furthermore, the results matrix contains an overly ambitious number of complex indicators, some of which are difficult to calculate or explain and which actually confused the new staff who came on board later during Project implementation.
20. The purpose of RBM is to provide results on the simplest and most efficient level within the available budget and time and not to burden the Project with indicators that are difficult to collect or calculate. Impressive partners’ reports do not contain sex and age segregated data while RUNO staff efforts to capture the number of women and men who participated in the activities were noticed in several documents.
21. Despite being robustly defined in the ProDoc, the Project M&E system did not establish an effective or joint monitoring framework in practice and did not established proper methodological instruments for data collection and Project performance and results monitoring and evaluation. The key Project results and outputs and more importantly the evidence, remained dispersed across RUNOs and their implementing partners narrative and financial report because there was no joint platform for data collection, and the exchange of outputs, results, and success stories.
22. On the other hand, despite the lack of M&E system, each of the RUNOs conducted rigorous monitoring missions, collected data, and filled field mission reports – 25 of those reports were reviewed only from UNDP.
23. This confusion and complicated Project results matrix is often the case when there is no assigned specialized M&E staff which is identified as a severe Project risk. This is especially true in a disaster-prone area and countries with specific political landscape with fast contextual changes where Project staff are also responsible for M&E aspects of the Project. It is important to notice, that strengthening of the M&E system was also a recommendation from the Project One evaluation, too. Within the changes occurred and revisions made, the reporting tasks of the project staff could have been easier if these changes were incorporated in the project Results Matrix.
24. For this reason, it was difficult to make a random sample of the Project beneficiaries except for **UNDP IMG database and UNICEF Youth as Peacebuilders Training participant database**, which remains an example of the best data collection and monitoring practices, that are simple, efficient and cost-effective. The UNDP database was improved on the spot to include sex disaggregated data on IMG group and IMG statistics were calculated because it already contains comments on the most responsive and active IMG. The UNICEF database contained sex and age disaggregated data.
25. The second example **remains the U-Report**, which transformed young boys and girls perspective and allowed them to utilize their technological advantage to advance the peace agenda primarily played by adults. This platform represents an efficient platform not only to engage the population but also to monitor their attitudes towards peace and other issues. However, this tool could be used as a joint RUNO platform for advocacy mobilization and attitudes assessment as it was already implemented by UNICEF and UN Women in other countries.
26. Lastly, during field interviews, the implementing partners’ ambitions in the area of monitoring, reporting, data collection, and evaluation were noticeable, and this factor should be capitalized on in the future. Also, the evidence was found with one of the actors, the religious leaders, that partners had created their own monitoring forms, which would enable them to report on their activities, topics, and people reached out. In addition, the same partner reported that there was an ongoing initiative for the improvement of the mentioned forms, by collecting sex-disaggregated data, e.g., the number of women present during Friday prayers.
27. Having in mind open-source data collection and available third-party resources, as well as the national potential for **Community Based Monitoring System** data collection and monitoring, the opportunities for the capacity building of CSOs, academia, and youth are important. And monitoring, if used appropriately, will go beyond PBF reporting forms which remain too narrow to capture all the remarkable results this Project has produced.
28. Lastly, considering the changing context during the Project period and the programming adjustments made, the Project M&E data and indicators should have been reviewed and adjusted, even without the formal approval of the Project Board. This should be the responsibility of the Technical Working Group, which, if formed and functional, could have had a more substantial role, primarily in resolving technical issues and as a mechanism used to bring in the voices and expertise of the implementing partners. This would positively influence Project communication and coordination.
29. The best practice of the Project coordination and efficiency was the UNICEF Technical Committee established and praised by both CSO and the government. The Technical Committee established at the local level was comprised of the staff of RUNO, government, CSO and two more representatives of the interested parties. It facilitated leadership understanding and secured political will for solution-oriented approach to Project implementation. While meeting on a quarterly bases, this technical Committee resulted in the reduction of expectations and clarification of the UN Project implementation modalities and strengthening partnership.
30. **RECOMMENDATION**S: Budget for and deploy on-call M&E Specialist/Advisor with a background in Women and Gender Studies and gender mainstreaming skills from the very Project signature. This person should facilitate the establishment of the M&E system with the Project staff, implementing partners and/or the most prominent CSOs.
31. Because of the work burden of the Project staff, the actual development and implementation of the full M&E system can be achieved only by allocation of additional resources to engage extra Project staff or consultants for monitoring purposes, methodological design and development of specific methodological notes and gender sensitive monitoring tools. Those on-call monitoring and evaluation Project staff could serve on an on-call bases, could support the Project technical committee members and more importantly the field staff. In an ideal world, the Project should budget for a national Project team member, located in one of the agencies who could be a knowledge management and M&E focal point.
32. Again, in an ideal world, as the next step or within the scope of the work of mentioned M&E on-call support, it would be good to design a joint knowledge management platform which would be monitoring platform and data visualization dashboard to generate real-time Project results, to record events and beneficiaries’ numbers disaggregated by age and sex.
33. Furthermore, this platform should be the key for organizational learning and cross-fertilization among RUNOs and partners because the staff explained that due to a limited size of **PBF reporting template, some results** which were considered important, were not mentioned nor were elaborated enough in the reports to the PBF.
34. Use IT technology to fast track communication among implementing partners and to facilitate communication and clarification of procedures and options.

## Sustainability - rating is GOOD

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Evaluation questions** | **Ratings** |
| * + 1. How likely are the outputs and results of the Project to be sustained? | Good |
| * + 1. How strong is the commitment of the government, MILF and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of the Project and continuing any unfinished activities? | Good |
| * + 1. What, if any, catalytic effects did the Project have (financial and non-financial)? | Very good |

1. The Project has produced the most substantive and multiple results at all levels: outcomes, outputs and activity levels. However, the results are more prominent on the national level then on the community and individual levels.
2. Not only that the Project was able to push forward negotiations around BOL text, but it enabled incorporation of gender equality and indigenous people concerns and priorities.
3. While contributing towards positive outcomes of two plebiscites by providing necessary public education directly to communities, the Project resulted in the incorporation of several members of the IMG into the newly appointed Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA). A total of 13 IMG members were included in the Cabinet and three got Ministerial positions in the BTA, among whom one female IMG member. In addition, another 12 IMs hold senior positions in the legislative and executive branches which is a full recognition of the Project support towards peace process.
4. Towards this end, the government and the BTA remain committed to implement policies and to incorporate women, youth and indigenous people priorities into policy, programming, legislative and further actions. Some of the Results achieved and description of their sustainability level are described below:

**Outcome 1:**

* 1. After forging a consensus between Moro leadership and the Senate and HOR on the BOL text, the BOL was signed by the President into Law containing articles formulating and recognizing women and Indigenous People priorities and needs
  2. Women priorities identified and women leaders participated in the advocacy for BOL adoption by the Senate and HOR (“*women were protesting outside*”, Interview with the IMG, male, no age available, Nov 2019)
  3. 10-Point Bangsamoro Women Agenda accepted by the Bangsamoro Women Commission
  4. Two plebiscites held confirming people’s understanding of the benefits of BOL and BARMM
  5. Transition process included nomination and promotion of the IMG members to key government positions and functions and inauguration of the Bangsamoro Vision for the future by BARMM
  6. IMGs very efficient in both peacebuilding and normalization track. For example, a number of IMG advocated for speedy implementation of the rehabilitation on conflict affected areas, more particularly Marawi which was a high level priority for local communities and people on the ground. Indigenous IMG went down to communities to educate and explain to people the whole context of BOL and ancestral domain meaning.
  7. IMG sustained as an informal group of actors and IMG experience was shared regionally with the participants from Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, Fiji, Maldives, Nepal, Afghanistan and Cambodia
  8. Women’s Speakers Bureau remains an effective platform to open more spaces of empowering women to play their role in building a gender responsive governance in the Bangsamoro.

**Outcome 2**:

* 1. **Ten written Khutbahs** were accepted by the Dawah Committee and translated to five dialects, and rolled out to be used by religious leaders who are now using written sermons during Friday prayer to both women and men in Mindanao
  2. **Religious leaders** feel empowered to engage with their constituencies, have developed strong public speaking skills and are better able to manage mosques
  3. **Dawah committees** is processing collecting sex disaggregated data on attendees of the Friday sermons.
  4. **Community dialogues** conducted with local partners and local governments have resulted in an impressive inventory of community priorities and needs on child protection and those data are available for policy and decision making and programming of the government resources
  5. A certain number of **para social workers** feel now more confident to communicate and approach camp leadership and former combatants living inside. Those women also feel empowered to communicate camp people’s needs to the barangay officials. This number of para-social workers represent significant social capital and partners have proposed their potential certification and inclusion in the public services labor force. They will be essential as future public educators, community mobilizers and monitors able to quickly reach out to other vulnerable groups in hard to reach areas.
  6. **Peace Education Curriculum** was produced and incorporated in official curriculum of schools in Zamboanga and teachers continue to use it within Cultural Education subject
  7. **Teachers** use new Peace Curriculum; they feel empowered to engage with local communities and mobilize resources among private sector towards improving educational outcomes for youth; and, peace corners and online platforms developed during the Project remain maintained by pupils-leaders and teachers.
  8. **Boys and girls** who were engaged in **peace camps and school projects** take the ownership for the future of their communities and schools including their peers: they stand up against bulling and can better understand, identify and are able to handle problems in their classrooms, including peer pressure, bulling, and violence; waste disposal and waste management in schools has improved significantly due to increased awareness of waste management because there is an increased awareness of environment protection among pupils; waste collection and waste recycling corners established in a few schools remain sustainable and generate money and employment for poverty affected pupils. Students are now more aware of solutions and take ownership for leading their communities towards solutions and peace.
  9. **U-Report** was accepted by the Office of the Bangsamoro Youth Affairs as a data collection and youth consultation platform; boys and girls trained as U-reporters developed leadership and community organization skills, they feel more confident to speak up and communicate with people, and can now train their peers and facilitate communication with their peers to discuss community problems. Same as it happened for peace camps participants.
  10. **Youth mobilized as U-Reporters** transitioned from lethargic and angry youth towards youth capable and ready to mobilize communities around solving joint problems. The major reason for this is that opportunities to engage with peers and to travel are rare for these children.
  11. Nation-wide consultations facilitated participatory design of the **NAP PCVE,** with strong gender components. After consultation, RUNOs have mobilized resources for the NAP finalization and before the Project ended, the plan was endorsed by the Government of the Philippines National Anti-Terrorism Council. Some respondents opposed the way those consultations were held as “*non-efficient, missing important stakeholders such as private army groups and hasty*” (Interview, respondent, Nov 2019)
  12. The consultation process around the **National Youth peacebuilding platform** remains a unique experience and a success story considered for replication in other counters as it paved the way for the transposition of the UN SCR 2250 in the national level commitments
  13. **Online platforms** produced during Project implementation remain significant resources for local communities, for example, prevention of cyberbullying for youth and PossiBOL and YEStoBOL Facebook pages
  14. **Indigenous youth and indigenous women** platforms for dialogues were established and continue to be sources for leadership and resolution of indigenous peoples priorities

1. However, for all those high-level outcome results it is necessary to follow up on the next steps and local level implementation so that ordinary citizens could feel the difference and improvement in their life because there are still pockets of anger and dissatisfaction, e.g., leadership or MILF camps reported equally by IMG and religious leaders.

“*In my team, we conducted a seminar regarding cyberbullying [,] this issue was widespread in our school\* at that time, and also we created a FB page wherein also other people can relate and understand various of important lessons about cyberbullying.”*

FGD with youth, Philippines, Nov 2019

[\*resulted in two suicides within a school year]

1. Despite remarkable and longstanding results at the policy level, the sustainability remains fragile on the community and individual level because of several factors. The first is because of the disaster prone area characteristics of Mindanao: fragile peace with occasional bombing, kidnapping and presence of private armed groups; deep poverty and extreme needs of population towards basic services; and, fluctuating and disaster-prone context (earthquakes, measles outbreak, typhoons, volcano eruptions, etc.).
2. The second is still an insufficient capacity of the government to absorb the needs of the “awakened” communities and fragile capacity of actors who still need mentoring towards leadership positions and support. If their vulnerability is left without further support to move dialogue on peace and social narratives, the momentum for change will be lost because the government needs to show life improvement gains for communities and that should happen quickly.
3. Therefore, an additional support is indispensable and should enlarge critical mass of empowered and knowledgeable peace advocates and facilitate their influence on communities and institutions. Now that those actors have been mobilized and empowered, they feel the urge to continue working with communities and expect further support. They explained that their efforts were just the beginning of a long journey and they expected continued support. Within the online survey responses, an average rate for Project sustainability stands at 61% out of 100%.
4. The highest level of mobilization is observed among the youngest actors of this initiative: pupils, and young girls and boys who participated in the peacebuilding camp and U-report campaign.

**“Child rights are not following Islam tradition."**

**“We could have benefited from the support of religious leaders during community dialogues."**

**“When woman leads a family, that is very wrong.”**

**"We want training on transformative leadership."**

Youth Focus Group, Nov 2019

1. The implemented youth projects in schools in Zamboanga have high potential for sustainability. In some cases, fundraising activities have been organized even though it was not requested, and local community provided financial support to pupils’ projects. The sustainability remains strongly connected to individual level of interest, but some KII showed very high level of devotion and determination to continue with activities (e.g., peace corners, garbage collection activities, cyberbullying prevention).
2. The older portion of youth, those who participated in the BOL campaign and who were not linked to educational institution, expect livelihood opportunities some of which could be built by their inclusion in the CSOs volunteering programs or with the UN at the national level.
3. The most delicate portion of youth are young women and men who struggled to gain trust of elderly, traditional leaders, community leaders and to implement community dialogues. Their narratives confirm still large misunderstanding of Quran which was so successfully explained by the ulama in the other parts of the region. It is essential that those two groups meet and resolve tensions and support each other in dealing with communities.
4. The ulama who participated in the Training of Trainers (TOT) sessions on the actual Khutbah delivery during Friday prayers, expressed “significant improvement” in their public speaking skills, more confidence and eloquence in dealing with their constituencies and managing the mosques in the areas of Bangsamoro. Their intention is to continue to distribute Khutbahs and deliver sermons and to continue training additional number of religious leaders for the same skills. Those very concrete results that speak about the strong sustainability of the Project result.
5. However, two challenges have been identified. The first was the observed attempt for advocacy of the Bangsamoro Islamic Auxiliary Women Brigade (BIWAB) member that more attention should be given to women and their role during war and peace and during institutions building. Although articulated in a low voice, the respondent did not feel comfortable to elaborate on it because the respondent was the only woman in the male prevalent focus group. This confirms the necessity to mainstream gender more strongly in any future interventions and to enable women-only spaces to discuss their priorities.
6. **RECOMMENDATION**: It will be important to support women ulama and female religious leaders and organize a women only focus groups to hear and help this group resolve the interior tension between the traditional and new roles assigned to them in the Bangsamoro process and support their participation and advocacy in all processes, especially taking over leadership roles. In the case of transformative Project potential, this is an opportunity to further work with women religious leaders and to work towards the transformation of the traditional gender roles.
7. The second challenge identified by ulama was the resistance of camp commanders and other ulama, especially those in the camps, who opposed Project activities and showed distrust in Khutbah delivery widely elaborating on the negative Project influence. It is the case that participants often wrongly judge initiatives when not having enough or not having correct information. This might indicate that potentially one side of the next level peacebuilding efforts should go towards working with camp population and leadership in a more coherent manner.
8. Women Speakers Bureau was a structure to some extent parallel to IMG and a brilliant platform for the participation and leadership of women. However, UN Women were allocated insignificant portion of the Project funds to deliver only two out of 16 activities linked to one out of five outputs. This represents approximately ten percent of the total budget and UN Women reported to have implemented its activities very fast in the Project beginning leaving an empty space and pockets of women advocates and women leaders later in the implementation of Project activities.
9. According to the interviewed participants, especially young women from far-away or the most vulnerable communities, who were not able to attend a follow up training session, the connection with the Project team was lost. However, during Project activities an established WhatsApp platform was used efficiently for communication. This young woman got married and gave birth and thus her engagement was cut off due to the “classical” women-related family obligations. It would be good to consider measures for reasonable accommodation for the most vulnerable groups to continue their participation in Project activities.
10. Although this target group felt empowered by its increased knowledge about the Bangsamoro history and current events (e.g., Marawi siege), peace process, transitional justice and the future of the Bangsamoro autonomy, too, to some extent they felt abandoned and powerless and without guidance on how to continue to mobilize communities and work towards peace. Established linkages with the institutions remained weak because of the nature of the transition process and the establishment of the new commissions, ministries and agencies and the new officials taking up the office.
11. There **was no transformative change in gender roles in** the regions outside or inside the BARMM and girls and boys who are seen together are forced to marry causing girls to drop-out from school as young as 13 years. Sexual and reproductive health education lacks for both parents and children, and families still feel safer to immediately marry young girls who are then discriminated at school because of early marriage and early pregnancy. Their basic belief is that once a woman becomes a mother, she cannot study anymore because if she does, the child will not receive “*100 percent of mothers attention*”[[49]](#footnote-50). As mentioned above, it will be good to come up with criteria and reasonable accommodation measures to continue engagement of especially vulnerable groups and not to leave anybody behind.
12. Lastly, the effectiveness of the IMG is proven with the pure fact that several women and men were incorporated in the new government bodies and highest-level institutions. This highly skilled and influential group has produced a network of actors who decided to maintain the informal nature of the group in order to: (1) keep their individual identities as representatives of the individuals/organization/sector they are associated with; (2) perform mediation and negotiation work only when the need arises; and, (3) do away with operational expenses in running a formal organization.

*“ I mean there are IM members who are now with the BTA, the parliament, there are IMs who are now with the Cabinet, [person name] continue to engage the National Government in the amendment of the Constitution* ***so we are in the right places now that you know constitute the foundation of the Bangsamoro Government****.*

KII, male, Nov 2019

1. The dialogue around the future of the IMG among its members goes from keeping the informal structure of the groups towards the establishment or registration of an entity with clear structures and hierarchy. This potential solution has to be discussed carefully because of a belief that the group has to keep its neutrality and influence and one of the proposed solutions goes towards the establishment of the independent think-thank similar to the United States Institute for Peace. This is important consideration having in mind that UNDP has trained different stakeholders from different parts of the society, e.g., religious leaders, civil society. However, the remaining women and men who were trained as IMG in June 2019 did not have the opportunity to implement their skills. The existing IMG have expressed willingness to continue exchange practice with other peacebuilders, e.g., Colombia, The Balkans and to learn new strategies for sustaining peace.

***Hope this is not the end ..... more power!***

Survey respondent, female, age group 36-65

***“The peace process is a long and enduring one. We need the constant mentoring of experts.”***

Survey respondent A, male, age group 36-65

“***IMG is relevant, responsive and effective****”.*

Survey respondent B, male, age group 36-65

1. According to the anonymous online survey, the “statistical average” mark for sustainability of the Project stands at 64 percent with the marks ranging from drastically three percent to 90 percent. It is worth to note that 32 percent of online survey respondents were UN staff and the rest were implementing partners staff: government, inside mediators, academia, informal networks of youth and women. In order to eliminate the bias, priority in quoting was given to non-UN staff remarks.
2. Even though the survey was completed by only 26 respondents (53% male and 48% female) this rank did slightly correspond to the statements of the interviewees giving marks from 20 percent to 96 percent for the relevance of the Project and pledging for more support and continued collaboration with the UN.
3. **CATALYTIC EFFECT:** RUNOs staff confirmed that the Program Offer as defined in the Project Document, was not submitted to the World Bank but instead the opportunities were pursued with other interested donors and those were very successful. To confirm that statement, there is an ample evidence that PBF supported project served as the seed funding enabling UN agencies to expand interventions and impact, especially the activities under the second outcome related to the Prevention of Violent Extremism.
4. The evaluation collected evidence (agreements and Project reports) that RUNOs’ managed to mobilize 400% worth of PBF support or over USD 12 million from Japan, Australia and European Union.
5. As reported by RUNOs, a total of USD 8,450,000 was mobilized due to catalytic nature and flexibility of PBF support. This represents an increase of 280% of the total worth of PBF support. “*Suddenly the Prevention of Violent Extremism became a buzz word for donors, and everybody wanted to fund something in that area*” (KII, November 2019).

**Table 13:** Catalytic effect of PBF support

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Donor - RUNO** | **Raised funds** |
| Japan - UNDP | $ 3,000,000 |
| EU - UNDP | $ 750,000 |
| DFAT - UNDP | $ 3,900,000 |
| Japan - UN WOMEN[[50]](#footnote-51) | $ 800,000 |
| GRAND TOTAL: | $ 8,450,000 |

1. On the other hand, local implementing partners which participated in the evaluation, CSOs and academia, claim not to receive significant support from the other donors. Actually, not a single CSO that participated in the online survey has reported to have received external support.
2. In addition to the above mentioned, in terms of mobilizing additional financial resources, it is important to note that one of the local implementing partners who received significant grant agreement amount, has made a financial contribution towards Project implementation in the form of funding all Project staff salaries during Project implementation. This local potential remains an important sustainability factor for consideration in future programming for both academia, government and CSOs.
3. However, CSO were knowledgeable about the donors who supported activities that complemented PBF supported RUNOs activities. The identified donors were the Foundations and Governments of Spain, Japan, United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany. All those delivered support either directly or through their development agencies and International organizations such as German Development Aid Agency (GIZ), British Council, Save the Children, OXFAM, Catholic Relief Services, Bread of the World and The Asia Foundation.
4. On the other hand, some of the implementing partners ensured dissemination of good practices and continuation of work with support of other International Organizations. Others unfortunately were less successful in obtaining support for their activities from other donors.
5. More importantly, all three RUNOs emphasized the appreciation for the flexibility of PBF funding to cover the gaps or initiate activities that other donors do not support. In this way, catalytic effect of PBF is very efficient.
6. PBF Project remains unique for providing support to youth, women advocacy and lobbying and BOL advocacy efforts on the ground. Local CSOs identified irreplaceable value of the PBF intervention because other donors were working with the other target groups e.g., “*elderly or traditional leaders and nobody worked with youth”* (Focus group, youth aged 18-35, Nov 2019)
7. Women in the BTA Parliament occupy only 12 out of 80 seats which is 15% indicating that women and Mindanao and BARMM need stronger support to take up space in decision making roles. Women’s roles remain at the nominal or participation level, whereas their leadership and narratives need continued support to transform gender roles and narratives.
8. **CONCLUSION:** The online survey word cloud summarized that survey respondents consider that primary responsibility to ensure Project results lies on the next Project phase and the role and the capacity **of the local government** BARMM and its agencies to deliver local projects and to engage with youth. Responding to local needs of diverse youth and priorities will be the crucial peace sustainability factor.

***Figure 13:*** *Word cloud summary of Online survey respondents*

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## Human Rights and Gender Equality (HRGE) - rating is SATISFACTORY

1. It is important to understand that human rights and gender equality approach go beyond simple inclusion or extending invitation to vulnerable groups, or women (or men) to participate at events and meetings or ensuring that the Project targets certain number of women, indigenous women and men or youth or persons with disability, for example.

*“Make inclusion a reality, not just tagline.*

*The success of the peace process is not just about rebel group and its followers,* ***the general populations who have suffered from the protracted conflicts need to feel the benefits of BARMM****”.*

*Survey respondent, age group 36-65*

1. The UN approach toward HRGE is designed to ensure going beyond the numbers and list of beneficiaries and must target and transform the inequality power structures via acknowledging and addressing different needs and priorities of women and men who are not monolithic groups and have multilayered identities.
2. It is interesting to note that for one of the indicators baselines, more specifically for 1.3.1., the UNCT identified support required from the HQ especially on “cross cutting issues” as essential in developing Programmatic Offer. Later on, this activity was reprogramed, and the indicator lost its gender focus.
3. The Project was working with the political elites, which was appropriate for both Project outcomes and political moment. However, only a small portion of the Project targeted working with the grassroots women leaders, as opposed to the grassroots civil society leaders and youth networks. It was the effort of UN Women which tried to capture critical inputs on women’s peacebuilding perspectives and BOL as articulated by ordinary women and girls' needs. To this end, the number of men interviewed within the beneficiaries or the Project participants within the Outcome One activities was far higher than the number of women. Only one-third of interviewees reached out within the outcome one were women. Overall conclusion is that more adult men then adult women were represented in the evaluation – see Table 7 and 8 on the respondents profiles.
4. Internal Mediators Group (IMG) established in the Project One phase currently includes 194 individuals out of whom 18% or 34 are women and 82% or 160 are men. In terms of IMG active engagement, meeting attendance and exchange of information, 78 members or 40% are active[[51]](#footnote-52). In the cohort of active IMGs there are 21% of women and 79% of men. This indicates that once mobilized, women remain more committed to voluntary work than men. However, their number remains low and beyond the expected percentage. The RUNOs made a significant effort to include all stakeholders and not leave anybody behind:

*“we work with different stakeholders, different levels, different categories, different classifications, different sectors not just with youth and women per se but then being part of those groupings. So, when you say Insider Mediators, women are represented, youth are represented, IP [Indigenous People] are represented. When we worked with civil society groups, you had one working with local leaders, with youth leaders […]”*

1. However, the representation remains to be the first step in the empowerment but mentioned groups still face large and complex barriers and need to be represented in larger numbers.
2. **RECOMMENDATION**: This imbalance between women and men membership in the IMG is noticeable and important for equalization of opportunities for women and men, and therefore, in the next phase, the intervention needs more investment and reach out towards increasing the number, decision making roles of women, young women and other vulnerable groups, including the investment in representation and advocacy for gender equality on behalf of the OneUN with the government counterparts.
3. The evaluation respondents identified several groups that need to be more represented and involved in Project activities. Those groups are: the orphans of war, women, men and youth with disabilities or to use more politically correct wording “people with different abilities”, widows, indigenous people from various tribes, indigenous women and men in BARMM like Dulangan Manobo and Lambangian, and Moro ethnic groups like: Kagan, Sangil, Kolibugan, Sama, Badjao, Yakan, Jana Mapun, Molbog and Panimusan. Further vulnerable groups recommended to be included in Project activities were vulnerable children under 18, internally displaced people (IDPs), MNLF children, MILF camp leadership and religious leaders, and fishers, farmers, and senior citizens. In addition, a diversity of women’s identities was identified during research: indigenous women, Moro Islamized and non-Islamized Moro, different religion girls and women, refugee women and girls, widows, orphaned girls and boys, women, mothers and girls with disabilities, young mothers, settlers, etc.
4. Figure 14 indicates that twice as many adult men (13) responded to online survey then women (6), this leads to a potential conclusion that either (a) younger women are using technology more than adult women, or that (b) adult women had obstacles to participate in the online survey perhaps because they do not have access to technology or internet, or (c) there were no adult women available to participate in the online survey or (d) there was a small number of adult women were targeted or participated in the IM and peace camps and U-Report related activities. The evaluation tends to accept the assumption (d).

A close up of a map

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**Figure 14:** Age and sex disaggregated data of the online respondents

1. Besides the insufficient budget of 10% allocated to gender equality a significant portion of budget aimed towards Women, Peace and Security Agenda skills building of the UNCT was reprogramed in a non-transparent way. Although women nominal presence and engagement was evident up to a satisfactory level, at least in the photos of the partners reports, the evaluation did not find evidence that mediation and negotiating teams were engaged in direct consultations with women CSOs.
2. In this highly militarized, religious and patriarchal culture, the priority was given to male IM who claim that women and youth were “*invited to participate and were free to do their own*”. The following statement explains the attitude towards gender equality, which perceived women as competitors not as genuine and equal partners:

*“IM: […], we agreed during the first meeting, we agreed that this is a platform for the women, for the youth, the traditional leaders, yes those we were able to generate* ***not membership*** *but we* ***can invite them to participate****, we generate participation in the whole process. Of course, the* ***women are free to do their own,*** *how they work, how they implement their activities”*

*Q: So, you think their engagement as IM was also critical in the success?*

*IM: Yes of course always,* ***because they accuse of gender bias****. “*

*(IM, male, Nov 2019, emphases added by the evaluator)*

1. One female IM claims that when speaking on the final BOL negotiations, there were 50%-50% women and men engaged, even 60% women and 40% men. The Evaluation did not find written evidence that substantiates this statement, although, on the list of the IMG, women were marked as more active once they joined the IMG. This statement does not contradict the statistics on the number and sex-disaggregated composition of the IMG and the overall claim that women are excellent negotiators. Women as negotiators are not given space because they do not possess the "row" power, but "soft" power, instead.
2. Beside high-level gender expertise via consultants and gender mainstreaming in the key Legislative text, the engagement of women CSOs is invisible or to say at least sporadic. In accordance with the United Nations guidelines it is essential not only to engage and empower women and girls but also to explain how women and men benefit from a peacebuilding project. For this, it is necessary to empower women, and to bring men on board as allies, not competitors.
3. Gender was to some extent mainstreamed into the Project Design, which was positively evaluated as it contains gender mainstreaming. However, it was not implemented fully due to Project reprogramming and changes in the political context. Some activities were supposedly seen to be implemented jointly by several partners but in the end only one partner used the resources without consulting others.
4. One of the possible reasons could be that joint M&E system was not fully developed, and it was not gender sensitive. The approach of RUNOs was gender negative to gender neutral, but aside from UN-Women approach, it was not gender responsive nor gender transformative.
5. The most reasonable explanation was the reluctance of senior leadership and implementing partners to prioritize this topic among “more important” topics in fluctuating political context, fragile peace environment, highly patriarchal society and military and police related discourse.
6. More importantly, it is very dangerous to reinforce traditional caring roles of women who were trained as para-social workers or even worse, it is absolutely damaging to reinforce gender stereotypes and impose and strengthen traditional roles of women as care-givers, parents, mothers in the Family Needs Assessment and Family Intervention Plans. It is dangerous to the same extent not to acknowledge women’s needs and priorities and not to engage men as advocates and keep women narratives locked. Those need to be heard by decision makers.
7. The elimination of gender negative approach to empowerment remains politically sensitive and complex topic in fragile and patriarchal society but women’s empowerment and gender equality remains crucial for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is essential to include gender analyses in Project background section besides gender specific outcome and indicative outputs and indicators in the results framework. Finally, it is a must to measure the involvement of women CSOs, implement correctly gender marker and follow and evaluate budget allocations in Project design, implementation and reporting.

It is essential to bring men on board as allies when talking about gender equality because they have also suffered from trauma, and that needs to be acknowledged:

“*Men’s perspective is different and there is no space really for them to talk about, you know it hurts. The challenges specifically are the mujahedeen those ordinary men who had struggled and suffer from trauma and that something need to look at.*

*Maybe in the future; [….] if you want an ally, you should also have allied from the men sector* ***to open up a space for dialogue with them.***

KII, female, no data on age, Nov 2019

1. Although this piece of information was received unofficially, it remains unclear under which circumstances the UNCT leadership has accepted IP suggestion to redirect funds aimed at improving WPS agenda skills of the UN team to another activity. Another activity was the training in Risk and Disaster Management Training which was conducted instead of Women, Peace and Security training.
2. It is often the case with gender equality that it is considered “soft”, unnecessary and area of lower priority action. However, the UN should better negotiate solutions with IP and share the envelope size in a more equitable manner. Even if the RUNOs decide to change their own activities, it is necessary to consult the lead and the affected agencies and to obtain approval from the donor. At this point, no evidence was provided that the donor or other RUNOs were consulted for this change despite the urgency of the reprogramming case.
3. In 2020, when the world is celebrating anniversaries of the Beijing Platform for Action, Convention of Elimination of discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and UN Declaration of Human Rights, absence of WPS capacity within the UNCT remains frightening because of the evidence of the roles of women and girls play in the communities affected by violent terrorism. They remain recruited as suicide bombers and funders of terrorist activities, and the increase in the new “feminism related terrorists’ narratives” make essential reasons to keep focus on this area. Even in the case of COVID-19, when the countries report increases in family violence cases in China it is of the utmost importance to keep this topic in the frontline of priorities because it damages all other development priorities if inequalities are perpetuated.
4. **RECOMMENDATION:** Organized targeted capacity building for the UNCT team in gender equality, gender analyses, gender mainstreaming, WPS including women’s role in violent terrorism and its prevention and combating. Organize Participatory Gender Audit that will include Gender Capacity assessment of the UNCT to mainstream gender and potentially explore opportunities for the UNDP Gender Seal implementation. Having in mind the new UNDAF for the Philippines 2019-2023, it would be a good point to reflect on UN-SWAP.
5. As reported by the Project staff, due to significant challenges in the political context, and assassination of one of the women activists in one of the barangays, UN Women had to realign their activities which were perceived as “political”[[52]](#footnote-53). The realignment was successful, and Women’s Speaker’s Bureau was organized, and community meetings delivered to selected geographical areas.

*“ […] women survivors who have witnessed the violence. So now, what can be accorded for them?*

*We cannot afford to just neglect them.*

*They might have experienced trauma and if we take them for granted that might bring more harm to them.*

*So what can the community give back to these women? [The] community meaning leaders from the traditional leaders, INGO and any other community players in the area.*

Female respondent, no data on age, Nov 2019

1. Working with the political elite in predominantly patriarchal culture means accepting and presenting women as “caregivers” or “mothers” and predominantly nominal representation and involvement of women, without real participation and women’s priorities and needs addressed, regardless of “10-Point Bangsamoro Women’s Agenda.” The major recommendation is to further strengthen gender mainstreaming in all activities including gender sensitive campaign design, targeting, avoiding gender stereotyped roles in messaging, identifying and eliminating misogyny, especially towards women from the groups that are mostly marginalized: women and young women from indigenous people, internally displaced women, women with disabilities and other vulnerable women and girls.
2. **RECOMMENDATION**: The issue of power has to be carefully addressed especially when working with young women and young men, and women from vulnerable groups.
3. Gender transformative assessment workshop was not implemented during evaluation due to multiple limitations and challenges among which was limited access to Women’s Speakers Bureau (WSB) participants. However, personal interviews of women included in WSB demonstrate significant impact and empowerment. Unfortunately, the interviewed women claimed that no further contact was made so a few of the young participants feel abandoned.
4. **RECOMMENDATION**: To this goal, it is necessary to link newly empowered women with informal or formal women groups and established organizations.

## Theory of Change – rating is GOOD

1. According to Dillon, L. and Vaca, S. (2018) the TOC robustness spectrum consists of six components[[53]](#footnote-54): level of the evidence base, causal links, representation accuracy, precedence, visual relevance, and participation level, as depicted below:

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***Figure 15:*** *Six elements comprising the robustness of the TOC (Dillon, L., and Vaca, S, (2018))*

1. The Project TOC has proven to be holding and the additional assumptions were added by the Evaluation Team in the presentation of the TOC. The implementation at the local level needs to be strengthened because the emphases was on the highest political level.
2. Mid-term review of the TOC is highly recommended to take place with all the stakeholders especially with the Project implementing partners. Specifically, it is necessary to review the assumptions and each step and chain of the TOC and to make necessary alignment.
3. **RECOMMENDATION** for the UN: Project staff should be empowered to design (via narrative and visually) and test the TOC with the participation of stakeholders.

*Greater dialogue among, participation by, and empowerment of all key stakeholders in Bangsamoro is likely to lead to a more effective and complete implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, as combined action by a wider group of stakeholders will not only expedite agreement but also guarantee the stability of the peace process from the contingent risks such as violent radicalization due to the collective efforts of multiple actors."*

*[Project Document, p.14.]*

1. The assessment of the TOC robustness based on the Evaluation Team reasoning and field impressions is presented below.

**Table 14:** Theory of Change assessment results

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Minimal characteristic** | **Optimal characteristic** | **Scale**  **(1-10)** | **Comment** |
| Option Based | Evidence Based | 9 | Based on the first phase of the Project, equally embedded in both outcomes, interaction missing among actors (IMG or ulama only) |
| Implicit causal links | Explicit causal links | 7 | Causal links are identified but not implicitly spelled out nor explained in detail |
| Oversimplified | Sufficiently detailed | 9 | Identifies key parts and their connection |
| Innovative | Largely tested | 9 | Tested by the previous IM training and impact, established in the political theory. |
| All elements have similar visual relevance | Relevance expressed visually | 2 | No evidence of any visual representation found apart from the requested Project results matrix; Visual representation established through end-of-Project evaluation |
| Internal | Shared with stakeholders | 3 | No evidence found that it was shared with stakeholders at the planning stage or during end-of-Project review session held in Davao City, March 2019 |
| **Robustness percentage:** | **65% out of 100%** | **39** | **/ 60** |

1. The TOC was not discussed with the Project team, nor was it discussed with partners, but it should have been the topic of participatory TOC workshop for the validation and reconstruction of the TOC as envisaged in the Inception Report, and as advised by PBF.
2. In the end, this analyses will hopefully resonate as a solid foundation for the next Project intervention dialogue on the quality of the TOC and processes and actors involved in its design.
3. The definition of “Bangsamoro agreement is implemented” is vague and not specified to a third party, however, the TOC as reconstructed and depicted below followed by the narrative description.
4. Visual representation of the TOC robustness is a foundation for the improvement of the next level interventions.

**Figure 16:** Visual representation of Project Results Framework

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1. The implicit TOC with the higher transformative potential is reconstructed as follows:

IF diverse and selected stakeholders are empowered

THEN they will have adequate skills

And

IF there is a safe space for dialogues

THEN empowered Stakeholders, communities and institutions will enter into meaningful and solution-oriented DIALOGUES

BECAUSE both sides will better understand differences between interests, processes and positions

And

IF combined actions and collective efforts are designed and implemented jointly

The PEACE process will be stable

And CAB will be efficiently and completely implemented


BECAUSE

The citizens and institutions will have increased understanding and information

AND INSTITUTIONS (formal and informal) and RELATIONS will be transformed

1. The major criticism to the TOC could be that the element of the “joint action” among empowered stakeholders should have been strengthened to enable synergies in the same geographic areas. This absence of "jointness" has caused RUNOs to work in isolation and with limited communication and joint action planning. To a certain extent, only the IMG implemented this joint action, whereas all other activities created dispersed activities within the effort to cover as many possible places and stakeholders.


**Figure 17:** Visualized TOC



1. The following statement from an IMG member confirms the validity of the TOC:

*“I think it helped, especially the IM activities, they really helped us the IM members during the BiCam, they* ***mobilize, they organize people*** *to support the passage and* ***call for the passage and support*** *for the passage of BOL and they were* ***able to muster pressure groups*** *and our positioning at that time was we were at the right place at the right time, we were* ***able to convince the leaders of the institutions, the executive, the legislative and even the judiciary*** *to support the passage of the BOL.”*

*(Respondent, male, age group unknown, Nov 2019)[[54]](#footnote-55)*

***Figure 18:*** *Evaluation of the Project TOC robustness*

1. The level of change in terms of gender could be described as follows:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gender @ Work Quadrants of Change[[55]](#footnote-56) | | |
| **Type** | **Level** | **Changes description** |
| Individual | Consciousness and awareness | Changes that occur in women’s and men’s consciousness, capacities and behavior. |
| Formal | Access to resources and opportunities | Changes that occur in terms of access to resources, services and opportunities. |
| Systemic | Formal policies, laws and institutional arrangements | Formal rules that are adequate and gender equitable policies and law are in place to protect against gender discrimination |
| Informal | Informal cultural norms and deep structure | Changes that take place in deep structure and the implicit norms and social values that undergird the way institutions operate, often in invisible ways. |

1. In accordance with the above scale, the representation of the observed levels of change per target group is depicted below:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Project Stakeholders** | **Individual** | **Formal** | **Systemic** | **Informal** |
| IMG male | √ | √ | √ | √ |
| IMG female (only one IMG became minister, there are 11 female members for the BTA Parliament) | √ | √ |  |  |
| Ulama – female | √ |  |  |  |
| Ulama – male | √ | √ | √ | √ |
| Women Speakers’ Bureau | √ |  |  |  |
| Young women | √ | √ |  |  |
| Young men | √ | √ |  |  |
| Para social workers - female | √ | √ |  |  |
| CSOs – male | √ | √ |  |  |
| CSOs – female | √ | √ |  |  |

1. The TOC as per the results framework is depicted on Figure 20 below:

**Figure 19:** Visual presentation of the TOC and assumptions

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Description automatically generated

**TOC narrative:**

1. The power of each of the internal stakeholders is defined by the size of the geometrical shape on the visual presentation.

*“[…….] we’ve noticed that the deliberations in the inside mediation group is far different from some other deliberation groups we also participated.*

*In this group, we were much open, and we’ve always valued the ideas of people who sit in the platform, which was a far cry from earlier attempts to bring us together.*

*There was always tension when people are not able to dissect the issues and separate what are positions and what are interests*.”

IMG member, Nov 2019

1. After (effective and high quality) capacity building sessions, the individuals are changed, “have all the same skill sets for negotiation and are more committed to pushing consensus *because no one was coerced or tricked into agreeing into something they did not fully understand*[[56]](#footnote-57)” and because they are willing to “practice” their skills on one side, and while the government is open to receiving suggestions, and to entering into dialogues to better understand the different needs of its diverse and marginalized citizens on the other side…and
2. If a critical mass of Insider Mediators among Moro Leadership, who are the independent internal but objective third party to the process, is created [*within each of the target groups, e.g., ulama, women, youth*], and if they all have the same understanding of the peace process *[and gender[[57]](#footnote-58)]* and if they have access to decision makers, leadership and communities, and if they apply peaceful pressure, the change of pre-existing rules, beliefs and norms is more likely to happen. This will lead to a unique position among Moros and stronger position towards the government because they will now advocate as one voice.

*[…] that capacitating experience provided IM members with the right attitude*

*the right knowledge, the right skills in trying to provide platform for people to engage like the facilitation made with different organizations both from highly educated constituents to ordinary farmers, so those skills are either complementary or provided by IM experience. So on that aspect it’s very effective…*

IM, w/o age data, Nov 2019

1. If space for meaningful dialogue is created, and after the meaningful dialogues has taken place, all sides will be more willing to align their positions and to change their behavior towards being less susceptible to “radical” (defined as “anti-government”) influence and to better understand the needs and the interest of the “other” side.
2. In this way, the institutions and communities are changed, and peace is maintained because of the nature of the insider mediators and the form of the discourse which takes into consideration political and community rhetoric, framing, messages, narratives, idioms and vocabularies. This meaningful dialogue in the form of negotiating communication has the force to alter cognition, to influence behavior and make a significant effect on the resistance to change.
3. One important side of this TOC that should be considered is the time necessary for change and the interactions among those stakeholders. By building connections and networks among stakeholders in one area, not immediately but only after significant amount of time, an exponential growth of the peace potential will be achieved.
4. The **underlying assumptions** which are crucial part of any of the TOC and which were missing in the ProDoc, were identified by the evaluation and are listed below:
   1. Political will exists at the highest levels for a “certain problem” to be resolved
   2. Government actively supports peacebuilding by creating safe space for dialogue
   3. Political process allows for the intervention, advocacy and lobbying to take place
   4. There are groups of women and men from all spheres of society and stakeholders (at least from the parties to the conflict) who are willing to participate in the training and to take up a role in the IM group and women speakers bureau
   5. The capacity building exercise equips trainees with top-notch skills in negotiations and mediation (and behavior, narratives, discourse, etc.)
   6. Trainees are willing to “practice” what they have learned, and they are willing to push for consensus
   7. The trainees have the opportunity to put their skills into practice and engage with constituencies
   8. Disaster and conflict-prone area in the country allows for activities to take place
5. The main conclusion is that the TOC is valid but misses one key chain and that is the establishment of the links between different actors and supporting them to undertake joint preventive actions.

## Best practices and strategies

1. IMG is highly efficient and effective mediation and negotiation mechanism which should be expanded and replicated into other areas and other groups, especially vulnerable groups because of its key characteristic: inclusivity, and the creation of an open space for dialogue among different actors.
2. The operational implementation of the PBF-funded partnership should be led, as explained in the PBF Project Board Meeting Minutes, (p.1-2) “*by a Joint Technical Working Group (JTWG) comprised of the implementing partners*”.
3. The JTWG should prepare a detailed work plan for the implementation based on the priority actions identified by the partners, as well as feedback from the Project Board. In doing so, the TWG will ensure that overlaps are avoided among the partners, and the overall work plan is coherent, well-coordinated, and internally consistent. The TWG will present the work plan to the Project Board for final approval.
4. The only example of the functional Technical WG was found among UNICEF implementation. More specifically, for a specific output for which it was entrusted, UNICEF formed a Project TWG composed of UNICEF, CSO and government representatives—an excellent coordination group involving UNICEF-1, CFSI-1, MILF-5 (DAWAH-2, Social Welfare Committee-2, BIWAB -1), a highly appreciated and functional mechanism and also capacity building platform for national counterparts.
5. U-Report is an effective way and platform to engage and mobilize youth.
6. Para-social workers’ role and potential mainstreaming into government institutions, their certification and official engagement in public services labor force.
7. Women’s Speakers Bureau platform to engage and empower women for meaningful roles and political positions in the new government, especially young women on different political items on the agenda.
8. Partnership with institutions with similar program and advocacy skills and initiatives facilitate sharing of resources by partner institution which adds success to Project implementation. This is the case of Ateneo de Zamboanga University which took care of management fee for its Project staff as the travel expenses exceeded the approved budget.
9. The Project provides new perspective of delivering Khutbah through script, something that made religious leaders adopt to international standard and move away from the traditional way.

## Innovation and scaling up

1. Insider Mediators Group – well established, with a negotiating and consensus-building role, had a significant role in the Bangsamoro transition. As the next step it could serve as a model to scale up, e.g., create a platform in other sector or area, and among vulnerable groups leadership. In this process it will be critical to expand their gender skills, and make a focused effort to engage more women, more youth and more indigenous people as IMG members.
2. U-Reporters – an established group of young people, feel empowered to be community mobilizers and facilitators of change.
3. Women Speakers Bureau – young women feel empowered to speak up once their capacity and skills and understanding of current policy issues are improved. A total of 21 empowered women emerged as new leaders who have reached out the unreachable communities of Moro diaspora and non-Moros alike.
4. Para-social workers – new labor force with the potential for establishment of the experience certification process and their inclusion in the government services.
5. Being proven as effective in delivering the correct information, the Khutbah should also be provided in all mosques and adopted as instructional material in madrasah and government schools.
6. Religious sermons translated into five dialects, English and Arabic represent significant output which should be expanded to other areas of life, most importantly the role of women in peacebuilding, family, contemporary society, women’s rights to education and elimination of early marriage.
7. Academia proved to be a valuable partner – elaborate more on their potential and capacity especially for evidence-based advocacy, community mobilization and monitoring and evaluation.

# Conclusions

## Project strengths

1. The Project produced substantial results in fluctuating and fragile context and represented a collection of innovative practices available for adjustment and further replication like the IMG, U-Report, written Khutbahs, and Women’s Speakers Bureau.
2. Identifying and training insider mediators has proven to provide more efficient and improved results, than when bringing external negotiators. However, this process takes time and needs longer-term investment and monitoring of the results.
3. Community dialogues are important mechanism to engage with local government units (provincial down to barangay level), community leaders and ordinary women and men and to discuss their priorities. However, dialogues increase expectations and need to be followed-up in bringing immediate solutions and improvement in people’s life.
4. RUNOs staff with more extended institutional memory, meaning with longer employment history with the RUNOs, have a higher perception of the overall communication and coordination among the RUNOs. For example, the staff that participated in Phase One of the Project has significantly better-evaluated communication and coordination among agencies in the Phase Two Project. Their perspectives indicate that coordination has improved considerably in comparison to the coordination of Phase One of PBF support. However, the Evaluation Team noted multiple gaps and opportunities for fine-tuning coordination, communication, and visibility enhancement.
5. After Action Review Workshop held in Davao City was an excellent example of strong coordination and kick off internal review and evaluation process, the external evaluation confirmed most of the findings and lessons learned during Project implementation and has shed some critical light on gender.

## Project weaknesses

1. Despite remarkable results, the Project missed opportunities to create synergies between UN agencies, their partners, and relevant target groups at the grassroots level and did not connect different stakeholders in the same geographical areas. This omission creates a geographic map of "sporadic actions in dispersed communities" without any linkages or connections between them. The synergies could have created a bigger peace force to continue working on common interest of achieving long-lasting peace in Mindanao.
2. It seems that the Project engaged with single stakeholders in different communities as if there was no coordination and communication between RUNOs and as if each of the RUNOs had a "title-deed" on a single target group or actors or a specific area, where other RUNO did not work. The evaluation noted that Project documents such as joint Project Annual Work Plan, joint budget, and procurement plans were unavailable.
3. **RECOMMENDATION:** In the next phase, the intervention must ensure more powerful coordination not only between RUNOs, but among Project stakeholders and target groups living and working in the same geographical areas and among different actors. The role of the UN Agencies in this area should be to act as a facilitator of the coordination process and provide space and support to a selected stakeholder who will take the lead for the process among all stakeholders.
4. Evidence on the impact and results is dispersed across agencies, and there is no joint UN platform to create and secure the results, exchange case studies, and impact stories and to preserve institutional and organizational memory. Communication and coordination are also significantly better among the field level UN staff than at the senior management levels. In the capital, also it was noted that the notion of each other's results remains hidden and invisible to other RUNOs. .
5. High staff turnover and absence of regular communication and coordination meetings at the senior management level, created the atmosphere of distrust partially because of the invisibility of results. To some extent, "more important" results were captured and presented to the donor, whereas "due to the limited text inputs in the PBF form," "lower-level" results and successes had to be omitted in the reports.
6. **RECOMMENDATION**: All evidence stemming from project implementation has to be collected and exchanged between RUNOs without criticism, for learning purposes.
7. Financial processing of the funds was somewhat slow thus the Project Annual Work Plan and Procurement Plan together with additional staff hired to facilitate Project implementation might be a good tool for efficiency.
8. Weak geographical and operational alignment and stronger coordination was reported by some respondents within the new United Nations Sustainable Development Framework for the Philippines (2019-2023) implementation and established outcome working groups.

## Project challenges

1. CSOs expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with the approach because they were rushed to implement activities and lacked enough funds for the campaigns. In addition, they have provided significant resources on their own such as food and materials for the BOL campaign. The short-term agreements and different RUNOs approaching the same CSOs for the same projects but different components implementation and the obvious confusion on who the actual donor was did not bring any transparency nor visibility to PBF. Low capacity of some of the implementing partners to formulate concepts, log frames and implement agreements and financial procedures represent an important area for the efficiency improvement and administrative factor of success.
2. Strong social media skills have influenced the BOL campaigns ran by CSO partners at the national level but the RUNO staff might have ensured better visibility of Project results in comparison to other UN efforts and visibility on Twitter, FB. The UNDP has one communication person covering the whole portfolio of the country program and for other agencies it could be matter of only brief training and agreement on displaying success stories.
3. No horizontal or vertical interaction among different target groups on the ground – e.g., religious leaders, women and youth. For example, community dialogues which were implemented by different target groups in different or similar areas without interactions between actors and representation of OneUN approach have demonstrated absence of the Project Team Leader and complete absence of coherent approach and actual coordination and communication. Concrete causes for this could be different and do not represent an excuse for emphasizing this component of the next joint Project design regardless whether that document has already been created or agreed upon.
4. The impact made with young women and young men remains fragile and is best demonstrated with the statement obtained at the focus group with youth about the controversy of child rights and Islam tradition.
5. Despite the inclusive nature of IMG, Moro IPs have only one male and one female representative in the group which can potentially create feeling of being minority and less important. The limited or no participation of other Moro sectoral or tribal groups can fuel disintegration, marginalization and disunity in the continuing intra-Moro conflict.
6. The failure of the IMG to get the support of MNLF founding chairman Nur Misuari to BOL and the new Bangsamoro government is posting a continuing challenge in the Mindanao peace process owing to existence of thousands of his loyal supporters. No fresh approach or mechanism from low level to higher level is being undertaken.

# Recommendations

1. Several recommendations have been drawn from the Project implementation and response to challenges and those solutions could be systematized as follows:

## Programming factors of success

1. Engagement with the political elites in crucial negotiating moments brings sustainable impact but represents a danger of alienation from the solutions realistic and close to ordinary women and men. Once political elites adopt the policies and programs, the wisdom and answers from ordinary people should be acknowledged and blended with new solution-oriented opportunities. That will strengthen ownership and peace sustainability.
2. Collaboration and coordination of RUNOs ensure synergies and enhances long-term results. For example, although PBF has supported nation-wide consultations on the design of the NAP on PCVE, the finalization of the document is gender-sensitive thanks to UNDP and UN-Women's coordination and collaboration.
3. Recurring themes prioritized or mentioned by evaluation respondents are transitional justice, support to the BTA to deliver services to citizens, managing opposition from camp leadership as crucial to the peace process and citizens' expectations, availability of services, respond to youth needs for livelihood and community engagement.
4. Strong and trusted partners are the key to effective implementation. With a simple support in terms of the capacity building on financial reporting, procedures and grant implementation, those “strong” partners could serve as mentors to other CSOs, government and academia actors.
5. The capacity and obligation to coordinate development actors and activities at the local level could be built-in in the Project agreement with new or existing CSO partners and with targeted investment, those could become the key peace sustainability factor.
6. Nationwide consultative processes on different topics have brought together diversity of grassroot actors and their priorities, and enabled them to be heard. All those priorities have been submitted to government for programming.
7. Ensure targeted youth, young women, and young men from diverse groups participation in decision making, engagement and visibility, and ensure substantive and gender-equal participation and empowerment among all stakeholders' groups.
8. Involve community members and CSOs in program design and not only high-level political leaders, removing the gap between the government and the people in the communities and allowing adolescents and youth to come up with issues and approaches that matter to them most.
9. With the focus of next phase more on support to the Bangsamoro transition government, the BARMM leadership should take the lead instead of the national government. Moreover, national government, CSO and academia representatives could form part of the top level decision making.

## Coordination and Communication:

1. Clarify leadership and accountability roles for UN agencies via establishing a clear organigram, annual work plan, especially useful for field and new staff.
2. Implement the OneUN approach in representation and communication – if one agency has a valid partnership with an implementing partner or government, it should advocate for the remaining partners' interests or agenda, e.g., women or youth.
3. Create safe platforms for problem-solving, exchange, and learning on methods, gaps, and failures between implementers, CSOs, academia, government, including the field and technical staff.
4. Empower CSO and government partners to improve coordination at the municipal or city level with the government officials, CSOs and various groups; and, to take the lead in participatory monitoring.
5. Empower and encourage field staff to coordinate activities via joint Project technical board meetings, joint planning, and joint monitoring missions.
6. Facilitate the work of Projects’ Outcome/Output TWGs composed of decision-makers (government, CSOs, UN) at the output level, e.g., UNICEF TWG on khutbah development.

## Monitoring, evaluation, knowledge management and TOC/results

1. Although Project funds are allocated for monitoring and evaluation purposes, the implementation did not follow through, so it is recommended to engage RBM or M&E Advisor with a background in gender sensitive peacebuilding, and potentially national M&E staff, or even third-party monitoring services in the Project kick off phase. This on-call technical assistance or expertise should be deployed early from the Project start-up and then on an on-call bases towards the Project end and Project evaluation. It must have a capacity building component for the Project implementation staff to:
   1. Establish joint monitoring and data collection systems – develop and use a common online platform to serve as a knowledge management platform and shield organizational memory;
   2. Simplify and define indicators and outputs early in the Project beginning and establish tools for data collection (by IP); and,
   3. Organize regular meetings to incorporate adjustments in the Results framework especially the indicators and M&E tools
2. Empower implementing partners staff for data collection via online platforms (mobile phones, open software) joint beneficiaries’ databases, and sex and age disaggregated data. Build the capacity to develop simple and useful tools and methodology and document changes to manage knowledge and facilitate learning.
3. Engage staff in timely monitoring and data collection for convenient and rapid data and documents prepared for the evaluation. Continue with joint monitoring or progress-review sessions.
4. The TOC should be presented visually and discussed with partners (see the lowest two marks the TOC received on the evaluation scale, Chapter 7.6.). The most effective and efficient way would be to empower local staff to conduct the TOC workshops and visualization exercises with IP and CSOs. Those sessions could be performed occasionally with the assistance from external facilitators as those skills are transferable in both directions: from RUNOs to the IP and from local IP or local CSO partners to the RUNOs.

## Gender and human rights

1. Ensure gender equality is practiced and, as an item on the agenda, with all stakeholders and at all times. Having in mind the role of women in conducting and financing violent terrorist attacks, women’s role in the institutions building, and the new governance system in BARMM, it is important to capture women's narratives and experiences and to embed them in the policy making agenda. BARMM parliament has only 15% women (12 out of 80 seats). It is sad to note that the following project of UNDP on PVE, funded by the Government of Japan, has not identified gender as important component[[58]](#footnote-59).
2. Identify and support women’s networks and women’s organizations especially at the grassroot level.
3. Recruit more women and prepare them for leadership roles in the BARMM and IMG.
4. Expand and strategically strengthen the capacity of UNCT and IP, including women and men from government and CSOs in gender and conflict analyses, gender mainstreaming, and incorporating and implementing Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in existing and future programming. It is evident that the role of women is only nominal and that more emphases should be done to educate both women and men on their gender roles and how gender interacts and determines decisions in such a vulnerable context.
5. Ensure gender roles are analyzed and understood clearly. UNICEF research[[59]](#footnote-60) acknowledged the role of the family and specifically mentioned the role of fathers and mothers in the recruitment of children towards MILF (UNICEF 2016, p22); however, this Project acknowledged only women's role in this vein.
6. Build a critical mass of protagonists from different sectors (government, CSOs, media, academia, etc.) with essential gender-relevant knowledge and skills.
7. Provide further support to Women Speakers' Bureau and facilitate additional networking and empowerment events for members of this platform, with the emphasis on young women and women religious leaders, indigenous women, and women with different abilities.
8. Bring men from different sectors on board as HeForShe champions and Gender Equality advocates and role models who will promote gender equality, substantively. At the point of Project evaluation timeline, “women issues” are understood either as “their own topics” or as “competitors” or “less important voices” who need to be given attention and who are taking up space and time because, “*they will accuse of gender bias*” [because they know their rights, emphases added by the evaluator].

## Administration and financial

1. Ensure Annual Project Work Plan and Procurement Plan are in place and that re-programming needs and changes are discussed among RUNOs and RCO.
2. Coordinate engagement of CSOs and improve transparency around grant amounts, timing in activities and aligning Project fees and expenses for CSOs.
3. Organize Project kick-off meetings with IP or agreement kick-off meetings to clarify obligations, donors, timelines and train IP on financial rules and regulations, reporting templates, and other important Project implementation details.
4. Partners prefer longer-term MoUs that secure staff positions and provide stability of the operations in critical moments. Partners need support to work with volunteers and to keep their staff often “stolen” by other international organizations.
5. Share the envelopes among the UN agencies in a more transparent way and with the established criteria, delivery rate, beneficiaries reach out, prioritized area or prioritized target group.

## Visibility

1. Facilitate implementation of OneUN approach to IPs especially government and CSOs.
2. Enhance visibility of the donor and joint RUNO Project in social media (Twitter, Facebook, internet). For example, although RUNOs claim that the PBF Project has supported nationwide consultations on the NAP on PCVE, the final product is without formal logo on the front cover page and indicates support from the Government of Japan.
3. Increase visibility of the donor among partners by communicating clearly and transparently the donor’s and Project’s name in the agreement.

# Lessons Learned

1. A rapid-changing nature of the operating environment partially explains the challenges or limitations in regularly/formally convening the Project Board and Steering/Technical Committees, in joint programming, in work plan and M&E recalibration, and in engaging local implementing partners. However, with the emerging opportunities to use information and communication technology for informal consultations and decision making (such as Skype, Zoom, What’s Up, Viber), this challenge could be fast-tracked.
2. Conduct of community dialogues and action research increases expectations and partners need to follow up with the next steps and “joint actions”, meaning CSOs, barangay leadership and community women and men.
3. Transparency in communication and exchange of best practices and approaches is the key for OneUN approach and there should be no space for competition among agencies. Stronger alignment across different program components is essential and learning and cross fertilization should take place instead.
4. Establishment of the Technical Committee meetings per output and/or outcome with lower level implementing partners. Support CSOs to operate as a consortium to enable local CSO partners to deliver the project based on their experience and expertise of the local context.
5. Enable learning and growth through exploration and exchange among partners through joint activities, trainings or short-term secondments. This is valid also for Project stakeholders, e.g., women: “*There is a need to encourage the women to have these exchanges of experiences in addressing insecurity and look at the lessons learned like in the case of people in Lanao Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, Zamboanga City, Bukidnon, and Wao. They should see their commonalities, and from that they may harvest idea something that they can do, even we are not working in the government, and that we can also do our share to secure the safety of our community” (KII, female, Nov 2019)*
6. **Strengthen youth volunteering programs** and systems to engage young people as volunteers whose motivation is not based on monetary gains since the common notion amongst youth leaders and their organizations is that they can get money or funds by engaging in Project activities. The same observation was noted to be valid for some barangays’ officials, the practice to which RUNOs have not concurred.

A close up of a sign

Description automatically generated

***Figure 21:*** *Word cloud summary of the survey respondents on the best way how to overcome challenges*

1. **Violent extremism** is “inappropriate terminology” for communities, it is better to gather people around Local Peace and Order, Public Safety and Security Plans. To this end, it is essential to: (1) use local and indigenous knowledge for early warning; and, (2) to cater for unique needs of diverse community women: senior women, women combatants, women non-combatants, Islamized Bangsamoro women, settlers women, women IP, and girls' needs.
2. Set up administrative and financial training for partners upon contract signing – introduce also Administrative and Finance staff to guide IP staff on financial procedures and eligibility of the expenditures.
3. Allocate resources for monitoring system to be established or reviewed by an on-call team member or external expert who will support the staff and partners to develop and manage M&E, to collect data and design and use data collection tools and implement joint monitoring missions.
4. Limited monitoring data and beneficiaries’ lists which were keep confidential from the Evaluation Team due to serious security reasons and previous bad experience with third-party evaluation. Limited availability of documents for desk review – multiple agencies with individual archiving techniques, no data sharing practices.
5. Access to barangays and camps through courtesy calls and relationship and trust building with leadership, for which it takes time to establish and nurture.
6. **RECOMMENDATION** - EVALUATION CONDUCT: Enhance timeline for the evaluation - maximum 35 days within two months and 20 days for the field work in the Philippines was not sufficient. It is necessary to extend the overall evaluation timespan, both the number of days and the total evolution duration. The main reason for this is that it is necessary to calculate in the time needed for the discussion and feedback from the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) set to ten working days. In addition, due to transition of the government, several experts accepted and then denied the work which caused significant delays in the onboarding of the National Evaluation Consultant. The Evaluation Manager succeeded to commission the National Evaluation Consultant only on 31 October 2019, after several rounds of the recruitment process.
7. Budget time and funds for longer term interactions with stakeholders with strong security risks and curfew limitations. (Note: Evaluators had to deliver four FGD within four hours in two venues with four different focus groups in an earthquake-prone area – a bit stressful experience)

# Annexes

## TOR for the Evaluation.

Available in the link provided below: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ANddpEism4Dsvmv2Nyd7gVNCnKrvIVim/view?usp=sharing>

## Biographies of the Evaluation Team members

## International consultant – Team leader

1. **Ms. Milica Turnic** Evaluation Team leader, is a development professional with an educational background in Women’s and Gender studies and master’s degree in State Management and Humanitarian Affairs. She has over fifteen years of results-based management (RBM) experience specifically in post-conflict and humanitarian settings in peacebuilding projects designed and implemented in the South-East Europe, middle East and sub-Saharan Africa and this evaluation has been her first experience in Asia.
2. Within several strategic and advisory roles, Milica provided policy advice and designed, managed, monitored and evaluated various cross border and transnational programs, and joint projects, led research studies and evaluations in the area of peacebuilding such as security sector reform, national reconciliation, prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), women’s economic empowerment (WEE), women’s political participation (WPP) as well as national implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. She designed and managed innovative projects in the area of social services, education and employment of groups that need additional support among other development priorities.
3. Trained on Gender and Peacebuilding at the United Nations Headquarter in New York, by PBF and UN Women in 2016, Milica provided critical inputs from the field office to the “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict” – a joint study of the United Nations and the World Bank. (p.199 Box number 6.5 Liberia case study).
4. Milica is also experienced facilitator of the Participatory Gender Audit certified by the International Labor Organization (ILO), gender sensitive evaluation manager and has contributed to gender mainstreaming into several national development frameworks and gender policies. Since 2018, she has been rostered by the UNDP for Rapid Response Experts Team.

## National consultant

1. **Mr. Ombra A. Imam, Ed.D.** is an accredited full-fledged professor at the College of Education, Cotabato City State Polytechnic College, Philippines. He is a madrasah leader, CSO leader, researcher, trainer and contributor at Mindanews. He has published researches in international refereed journals and local journals. He co-authored Values Education Textbook 1-6 published by the Department of Education (DepEd). He has been invited by the DepEd Central on madrasah policy review and validation and worked with international donor communities on madrasah education. On several occasions, he served as discussant, panelist, and convener of conferences on madrasah education. For the last four years, he has been co-managing a Madaris Volunteer Program that help upgrade the quality of madrasah education in the Bangsamoro. Recently, he served as one of the research consultants on the Project “Orphans of War: A Rapid Assessment of At-risk Orphans in Mindanao” funded by The Asia Foundation – Philippines. He has attended trainings on peace building, school management, research, and language evaluation in the US, Australia, Singapore and Malaysia.

## International consultant - Proofreader and peer review evaluator

1. **Ms. Tatjana Obradovic-Tosic** is a professional with more than 15 years of experience working on development projects. With an educational background in Psychology and Gender and Development, she has been working as a project manager, trainer, process facilitator, and gender expert contracted directly or under projects funded by international organizations like REF, WB, UN, OHCHR, EU, and SIDA.
2. Her evaluation experience included independent evaluations of projects funded by UN Women and the EU Delegation in Serbia. Aside from that, as an experienced facilitator, she facilitated more than 50 progress or final evaluation meetings on projects funded by Roma Education Fund, UN TRUST FUND, and European Union in Serbia.
3. Tatjana also has more than 15 years of work in the field of gender equality and minority rights as a trainer, process facilitator, and project manager, applying Gender Equality and Human Rights approach to national and local projects she worked on. As a lead trainer, working with OHCHR office in Serbia, she had contributed to the improvement of employment policies for Roma, enabling inclusive, participatory, and human rights-based approaches to be incorporated into the development and adoption of national policies and documents.

## National Research Team members

1. **Dr. Maripaz C. Abas** is an accredited full-fledged professor, former Vice President for Academic Affairs, former Director of Extension Services, and current Dean of College of Education of Cotabato City State Polytechnic College, Cotabato City, Philippines. She is a seasoned researcher and educator, curriculum writer as well as a trainer. She authored and co-authored researches published in international peer-reviewed journals. She mentored students both in the undergraduate level and master's level doing thesis writing. She also authored a manual "Integrating the DRR-CCA Learning Experiences in the Tahderiyyah Curriculum: A Teacher's Resource Guide," which is being used by hundreds of traditional madaris in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao.
2. She is the brainchild of the SALAM extension project in transforming marginalized communities. Recently, she has worked as Co-lead in Central Mindanao on a research project, "Orphans of War" funded by The Asia Foundation. Currently, she is helping the BARMM Ministry of Education as a member of the Technical Working Group on the curriculum. She is a holder of a Doctor of Education major in Educational Management.
3. **Ms. Zajarah M. Duma** is a graduate of Bachelor of Secondary Education Major in English from Notre Dame University in Cotabato City. She is a graduate of Master of Arts in Teaching English Language and Literature from the Ateneo de Davao University through the CHED Continuing Education Scholarship. Ms. Duma is a faculty member (15 years) of the Language Department of the College of Arts and Sciences in Cotabato City State Polytechnic College. She was an instructor of social research and was also designated as a Research Coordinator. As such, she has designed and conducted pieces of training in research writing and data analysis. She has also conducted research studies in Language, Social Science, and Health, which were presented in the college's in-house reviews. She was also part of the trainers of the mass training of English teachers of K12 Basic Education Curriculum and a mentor in an extension project on classroom-based mentoring for Madaris teachers.
4. **Ms. Sharida D. Mandi** finished a Bachelor of Science in Social Work, and she is a licensed social worker. While doing her undergraduate program, she worked as researcher for a social contract survey funded by a research fellow from the University of California, San Diego. Upon graduation, she worked as a community organizer, a Child Rights Project funded by UNICEF. She was active in psychosocial sessions to women and children in conflict-affected areas of Maguindanao. For two years, she worked as field officer, interpreter, and technical staff at the International Monitoring Team under Human Rehabilitation and Development Component. She also served as a Municipal Link in the municipalities of Buluan and Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao, where she conducted monthly family development sessions and facilitated social case study reports and community profiling. Recently, she was a survey supervisor under the Philippine Business for Social Progress in partnership with the British Council on community profiling on Safe, Cohesive, and Just Communities Project. Lastly, she worked as research staff on a rapid project assessment of the Orphans of War commissioned by The Asia Foundation. Within Projects, Ms. Mandi provided interviews' and discussions' transcriptions in both Tagalog and English.

## Additional methodology-related documentation

Evaluation matrix and data-collection instruments (questionnaires, interview guides, and protocols) are available in the link provided below:

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BlNjABl_wGuWE0HP2cdzttZ4LGK2SHr3?usp=sharing>

## List of individuals or groups interviewed or consulted, and sites visited

**Table 15:** List of groups interview or consulted and sites visited

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Method** | **Participants** | **Number of participants** |
| Key Informant Interviews (KII) | UNDP staff | 5 |
|  | UN Women staff | 3 |
|  | UNICEF staff | 3 |
|  | RCO staff | 2 |
|  | PBSO | 2 |
|  | OPAPP | 4 |
|  | Implementing partners staff | 20 |
|  | Consultants | 2 |
|  | Women Speakers Bureau | 2 |
| Focus Group Discussions (FGD) | Implementing partner CSOs | 20 |
|  | Teachers | 4 |
|  | Youth | 8 |
|  | Religious Leaders | 10 |
|  | Disengaged children | 4 |
|  | Social and Parasocial workers | 4 |
|  | U-Reporters | 15 |
| Total KII and FGD: 108 (51f, 57m) | | |
| Online Survey 1 | Anonymous | 25 |
| Online Survey 2 | Anonymous | 17 |
| Total survey: 42 | | |
|  | | |
| **Grand total: 150** | | |
|  | KII – total: | 37 prs. (17f, 20m) |
|  | FGD – total: | 71 prs. (34f, 37m) |
|  | Online survey | 42 prs. (20f, 22m) |
|  |  | 150 prs (71f, 79m)  Female: 47%; Male: 53% |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Places where the respondents were reached** | **In %** | **Total #** |
| Cotabato City | 25% | 38 |
| Davao City | 4% | 6 |
| Kabacan, NC | 3% | 4 |
| Manila | 9% | 14 |
| Marawi City | 11% | 16 |
| Zamboanga City | 18% | 27 |
| Online survey/ Skype | 30% | 45 (42/3) |

**Note:** Sex and Age disaggregated data are presented and discussed in depth in the text under Chapter VII. Stakeholder participation

## List of references and supporting documents reviewed

* + 1. Reference documents reviewed are available at Google Drive: <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1tdJ5503KKIJgeWuSs8BVF0XL0Qd_f5Y2?usp=sharing>
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* The UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Terms of Reference and Inception Reports (available at: www. unevaluation.org/document/detail/608). This document provides a more detailed checklist to conduct quality control of the evaluation design.
* The UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports is available at: www.unevaluation.org/document/ detail/607;
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## Project results model or results framework

See Table 1, page 13-14 or access ProDoc here:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xGjke1_-ksHS-_gNmlkHAcUtTF87nzZH/view?usp=sharing>

## Summary Table of Findings and Main Recommendations

See Table 2 on page 33 for detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations.

*Table 9: Final score per evaluation area on the scale from 1-4[[60]](#footnote-61)*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | **Final score per evaluation area** | **Rating (1-4)** |
| 1 | Achievement of Project results | 3 |
| 2 | Relevance | 4 |
| 3 | Effectiveness | 3 |
| 4. | Efficiency | 3 |
| 5. | Sustainability | 3 |
| 6 | Catalytic effect | 4 |
| 7 | Human Rights and Gender Equality | 2 |
| 8 | Monitoring and Evaluation | 2 |
| 9 | Innovation | 4 |
| 10 | Risk Mitigation and Management | 3 |
| 11 | Interagency Coordination, Communication and Management | 1 |
| 12 | Visibility | 1 |
| 13 | Inclusive planning | 3 |
| 14 | Impact | 3 |

## Code of conduct signed by evaluators

Available here, from all five Evaluation Team members:

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1MRg95wkJXJ4f74dCd_gxA7ooFv_hRfQH?usp=sharing>

1. <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00107354> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00107354> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The entity that has overall responsibility for implementation of the Project (award), effective use of resources, and delivery of outputs in the signed Project Document and work plan. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. This project was designed and implemented by UNDP, UNICEF, UN-WOMEN, UNHCR, FAO and ILO and two implementing partners: OPAPP and National Economic and Development Authority (*ProDoc PBF/IRF 110, Support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB): Increasing Public Confidence and Participation, 2014*) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The overall Project goal added by the Evaluator could be like: Peace is sustained in Mindanao. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Loode, Serge, 2011, Peacebuilding in Complex Social Systems, Peace, Conflict and Development (18), 1-15. Assessed January 2020: <https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:268040> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. See for example Gender Mainstreaming for Health Managers: A Practical Approach/WHO Gender Analysis Tools, available [here](https://www.who.int/gender/mainstreaming/GMH_Participant_GenderAssessmentScale.pdf) accessed Jan 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. SMART stands for s-specific, m-measurable, a-achievable, r-relevant, and t-time bound. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. In majority of western cultures the decisions are made around the table. The concept of gathering and negotiation around the table is recognized globally and the seating arrangements are crucial for all events as they indicate status and power and sometimes the results of the decisions made around a specific topic. The scientists attribute this to the territorial nature of human beings. (Seidel, Andrew D. 1978, The Issue of the Physical Environment in Peace Negotiations, Politics and Design Symbolism Vol 32, No 2. Pp. 19-23. Accessed April 2020, available: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1424284>

   Peace tables continue to be conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation spaces where decisions are made on the future relationship between parties to the conflict. The concept of peace education which introduced a peace table in the classroom was first introduced by a woman, Maria Montessori (1870-1952), Italian medical doctor and a teacher who worked with children with disabilities early in the XX century.

   The Government of the Philippines recognized a multifaced nature and potential of the peace tables, in the promotion of the culture of peace. See for example National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 2018. Socioeconomic Report 2017: Facilitating Transition, Implementing CHANGE. Available: accessed 18 Jan 2020. Peoples’ Peace Tables are indicated “*as the space for building of relationships, healing, and reconciliation* […]” NEDA, Socioeconomic Report 2017, Chapter 17: Attaining Just and Lasting Peace as of March 26, p.2, as an educational tool (Ibid, p.4.) “*[…] to equip young peacebuilders with basic knowledge of the Culture of Peace*” (Ibid, p.4) and as a tool ”*to prevent and counter violent extremism*” (Ibid, p.6.).

   Lastly peace tables are used as a mobilization tool: “*Multisectoral peace conversations were also organized including those with key indigenous peoples (IP) leaders that resulted in the activation of the IP Peace Panel, in response to the persistent clamor for IP representation in the peace process*.” (Ibid, p. 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. KII, male, no data on age, Nov 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. KII, female, no data on age, Nov 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. Online survey respondent, male, aged 36-65. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. For details, see the discussion on coherence in Chapter 10.2. Effectiveness. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. UNDP (2015), Independent Evaluation Office, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, August 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. This statement was noted and repeatedly spelled out in several KII and FGD with direct Project Beneficiaries e.g., FGD U-Reporters, girls, FGD Youth CSOs young men and women, and KII female, Nov 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. UN Women Research Paper, October 2015, The Participation of Women in the Mindanao Peace Process, available [here](https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2017/participation-of-women-in-mindanao-peace-process.pdf?la=en&vs=3030), accessed 18 Oct 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Women Participation in Peace Processes, updated 30 January 2019, available [here](https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-processes), accessed 18 October 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Herbert, Siân, (2019), Conflict analysis of The Philippines, University of Birmingham, 29 July 2019, available [here](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/648_Conflict_Analysis_of_The_Philippines.pdf) accessed 20 October 2019. See also: Howe, Brendan (2013), Conflict Drivers in Muslim Mindanao. in “The Protection and Promotion of Human Security in East Asia”, Palgrave Macmillan UK, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited. p.93-117. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Those were: UNDP, UNICEF, UN-WOMEN, UNHCR, FAO and ILO and two implementing partners: OPAPP and National Economic and Development Authority (*ProDoc PBF/IRF 110, Support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB): Increasing Public Confidence and Participation*), 2014. Available: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00093225?bar_metric=account> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation, “Better Criteria for Better Evaluation: Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles of Use, (2019), Jan 2020 available: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Gender Mainstreaming for Health Managers: A Practical Approach / WHO Gender Analysis Tools, available at [https://www.who.int/gender/mainstreaming/GMH\_Participant\_GenderAssessmentScale.pdf accessed Jan 2019](https://www.who.int/gender/mainstreaming/GMH_Participant_GenderAssessmentScale.pdf%20accessed%20Jan%202019). For example, UNDP uses Gender Results Effectiveness Scale (GRES) in its evaluation, see UNDP (August 2015), P. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. For discussion and levels of women’s empowerment see: Mahotra, A., Shuler, S. R., and Boender, C. (2002), Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development: Background Paper Prepared for the World Bank workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives, Final Version: June 28, 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. MacCoy, David. (2014), Appreciative Inquiry and Evaluation – Getting to What Works, First Leadership Limited, Toronto, Canada. Available <https://evaluationcanada.ca/system/files/cjpe-entries/29-2-104.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Coglan, A.T., Preskill, H., and Catsambas, T. T. (2003). An overview of appreciative inquiry in evaluation, *New Directions for Evaluation, Special Issue: Using Appreciative Inquiry in Evaluation,* Winter 2003, p 5-22. Available he[r](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ev.96)e. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), (2014) Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation, <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1616> and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), (2014), Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation: Towards UNEG Guidance" is available at: http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/980 ;

    See also: United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) (2017) Norms & Standards for Evaluation, available: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914> and: The *UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Terms of Reference and Inception Reports* (available at: www. unevaluation.org/document/detail/608) provides a more detailed checklist to conduct quality control of the evaluation design. The *UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports* is available at: www.unevaluation.org/document/ detail/607; the *UNEG UN-SWAP Evaluation Performance Indicator Technical Note and Scorecard* is available at: www.unevaluation.org /document/detail/1452. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. UN Women (2015), Independent Evaluation Office, How to Manage Gender-Responsive Evaluation: Evaluation Handbook, available: <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/4/un-women-evaluation-handbook-how-to-manage-gender-responsive-evaluation>. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. John W. Creswell, 2016, Steps in Conducting a Scholarly Mixed Method Study, a lecture from the University of Nebraska – Lincoln. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. One person was interviewed twice, on two different protocols, due to the person’s two-fold role within the project implementation: as an Inside Mediator and as a direct project implementer. This person is counted only once among 108 persons, but the team counted it as two KII because those occurred on two different occasions/ dates. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Online surveys are available in Annex G – Data collection instruments [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. The third survey, which was planned to be designed and conducted among the development partners, Japan, EU, DFAT, British Council, Germany, Spain, the World Bank was not implemented because of the sufficient documents submitted by agencies on proposals developed and supported by the identified donors. It is worth noting that respondents on the field, specifically CSOs have sufficient and complete information on all the donors operating in one geographical area and respective theme. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Available at: i<http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100> [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. All members of the Evaluation Team have signed Code of Conduct statements as provided by the Evaluation Manager. UNEG (2008), UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System, March 2008. Available: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. United National Peacebuilding, (2019), PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Scoring accessed January 2020 [here](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_guidance_note_on_gender_marker_scoring_2019.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. SMART meaning: S-specific, M-measurable, A-achievable, R-relevant, and T- time-bound. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. The following scale and color coding was used: 1- needs improvement/red, 2- satisfactory/orange, 3-Good/yellow and 4-Very Good / green [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. The ratings are green (5), yellow (4), orange (3) and red (2) as follows: very good 75-100%, good 50-75%, satisfactory 25-50% and unsatisfactory 0-25%. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. The numbers indicated in the beginning of some paragraphs in parentheses e.g., [2] indicate the number of the evaluation questions within the specific evaluation criteria to which the paragraph refers to. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. The Philippines Development Framework 2017-2022, Available at: <https://manila2018.dof.gov.ph/index.php/philippine-development-plan-2017-2022/> [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the Philippines (2012-2017), available: <https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/portal-document/Philippines_UNDAF%202012-2018.pdf.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Mindanao Strategic Development Framework, National Economic and Development Authority of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed 19 Oct 2019. Available: <http://www.neda.gov.ph/mindanao-strategic-development-framework/>

    [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. RED color indicates outputs not implemented or started up to 25%; ORANGE refers to those implemented between 25-50% and YELLOW indicates those achieved within 50-75% range. Finally, GREEN color, which could look like any SHADES OF GREEN AND BLUE, due to computer or screen performance and quality, shows indicators and targets fully achieved with elements of innovation and lessons learnt. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. **Strategic coherence** refers to the extent to which the various functional **strategies** a firm employ complement and reinforce one another. ... Thus, **coherent strategies** often result in a sustainable competitive advantage, coherence’ as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives. Coherence is pursued because it is assumed to generate increased levels of efficiency and effectiveness. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Women’s empowerment can take place at different levels depending on the framework employed in the analyses. For example, one framework explains women’s empowerment at the four-fold space: individual level (consciousness and awareness), group level (informal cultural norms and deep structures), relationship level (access to resources and opportunities), and community level (formal policies and law, and institutional arrangements). Other defines the level of individual, formal, systemic and informal levels of change. One framework interprets empowerment at three distinct but related dimensions: 1) The micro-level or personal level where observed changes can be noticed at individual beliefs and actions level; 2) Meso- or relational level which encompasses beliefs and actions in relations to others; and 3) Macro-level, which contains societal dimensions and speaks about broader social context and societal empowerment. There are also economic, socio-cultural, familial/interpersonal, legal, political, and psychological dimensions of women’s empowerment. Lastly, Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) for example, measures empowerment as an aggregate index of ten indicators that measure: (1) agricultural production decisions, (2) access to and decision making power over productive resources, (3) control over the use of income, (4) leadership roles within the community, and (5) time allocation. For details see for example:

    * Malapit, H.J. L. and Quosumbing, A. R. (2015), What dimensions of women empowerment in agriculture matter for nutrition in Ghana? Food Policy (52), P. 54-63.
    * Huis, M. A., Hansen, N., Otten, S., Lensink, R.., (2017), A Three-Dimensional Model of Women’s Empowerment: Implications in the Field of Microfinance and Future Directions, Frontiers in Psychology, 2017, Vol 8, page 1678, available: [10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01678](https://dx.doi.org/10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2017.01678) accessed 19 September, 2019.

    Therefore, the Evaluation Team argues that the observed changes in this project happened on the first dimension or micro-level and that further empowerment work is needed to enable three-fold empowerment to take place. Furthermore, it depends on the type and timing of the intervention, which empowerment level will take place. For example, the IMG empowerment is observed in the reverse order (because they were already prominent leaders) and has started at the personal and ended fully at the macro level, or their group empowerment. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Coherence is the compatibility of the project with other intervention in the country, sector or institution and we distinguish internal and external coherence. Internal addresses synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out but the same institution/government, as well as the consistency with relevant international norms and standards to which that institution/government adheres to. External coherence encompasses complementarity, harmonization and co-origination with other actors in the same context and the added value of the intervention and extent to which we avoided duplication of efforts. OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation, “Better Criteria for Better Evaluation: Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles of Use, (2019), Jan 2020 available: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. De Coning, Cedric & Friis, Karsten. (2011). Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach. *Journal of International Peacekeeping.* 15. 243-272. Available: 10.1163/187541110X540553. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Ibid, p. 253. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Report of the Secretary-General on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding (A/65/354–S/2010/466), tracking progress: 7-Point Action Plan, available at: <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/seven_point_action_plan.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. KII interview, Nov 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Interview with a young woman, aged 18-35, Nov 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. This is UN Women multi-year regional project implemented in four countries, including the Philippines, is worth 5,200,000 USD. The evaluators calculated here only the allocation for the Philippines. Otherwise the catalytic effect would be 400%. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Within this project around 50 new IMs were trained. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. The official investigation confirmed that the assassination did not have any connections to the gender equality activism of the official. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. DHILLON, Lovely; VACA, Sara. Refining Theories of Change***. Journal of Multidisciplinary Evaluation***, [S.l.], v. 14, n. 30, p. 64-87, Apr. 2018. ISSN 1556-8180. Available [here](http://journals.sfu.ca/jmde/index.php/jmde_1/article/view/496). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. The emphases is added by the evaluator. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. UNDP (2015), Independent Evaluation Office, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, August 2015. P. 46. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Interview with a member of the IMG, Mindanao, November 2019 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. The word and emphases added by the evaluator. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. See project description indicting that Gender Marker is zero: <https://open.undp.org/projects/00100448> [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. UNICEF Philippines-Mindanao Field Office, (2016), Drivers of Child Association with Armed Groups in Bangsamoro communities in Mindanao & Entry points to Prevent Association: Analytical Report, UNICEF and Transition International, January 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. The following scale and color coding was used: 1- needs improvement/red, 2- satisfactory/orange, 3-Good/yellow and 4-Very Good/green [↑](#footnote-ref-61)