

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



United Nations  
Peacebuilding

**PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT**

(Length : Max. 12 pages plus cover page and annexes)

<b>Country (ies):</b> Guinea-Bissau	
<b>Project Title:</b> Political Stabilization and Reform through Confidence Building and Inclusive Dialogue. <b>Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):</b>	
<b>PBF project modality:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> IRF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRF	<b>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund <b>Name of Recipient Fund:</b>
<b>List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):</b> UNDP, WFP, UNFPA	
<b>List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:</b> UNIOGBIS, Organizing Commission of the National Conference (OCNC); Women's Council, REMUME, Tiniguena, National Statistics Institute, National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP).	
<b>Expected project commencement date<sup>1</sup>:</b> 1 January 2020 <b>Project duration in months:<sup>2</sup></b> 24 Months until December 2021 <b>Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation:</b> Nation-wide	
<b>Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below?</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project	
<b>Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):</b> UNDP: \$1,682,103.04 UNFPA: \$ 135,462.00 WFP: \$ 182,435.00 Total: \$2,000,000.04  <i>*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.</i>	
<b>Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):</b> UNDP will contribute up to US \$200,000 for Output 2.2., Activity 2.2.1.	

<sup>1</sup> Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.

<sup>2</sup> Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

<p><b>PBF 1<sup>st</sup> tranche (50%) for UNDP:</b> \$ 841,051.52</p> <p><b>PBF 1<sup>st</sup> Tranche (100% for UNFPA and WFP:</b>  UNFPA: \$135,462.00  WFP: \$182,435.00  Total: \$1,158,948.52</p> <p>Release of 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche will require expenditure of 75% of first tranche and an email from SRSG or RC to PBSO on the political situation, the progress with the reforms and the continued relevance of this project.</p>	<p><b>PBF 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche* (30%):</b>  UNDP: \$ 504,630.91</p> <p>Total: \$504,630.91</p> <p>The release of the 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche will require and expenditure of 75% of the second tranche.</p>	<p><b>PBF 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche (20%)</b>  UNDP: \$336,420.61</p> <p>Total: \$336,420.61</p>
<p><b>Two-three sentences with a brief project description and succinct explanation of how the project is time sensitive, catalytic and risk-tolerant/ innovative:</b></p> <p>This project will provide the technical support, capacity strengthening and resources to enable a smooth transition during and following the closure of UNIOGBIS on 31 December 2020. The project will enable the UN Agencies to advance key peacebuilding priorities and enable better coordinated strategies and stronger partnerships related to political stabilization and confidence building efforts. It will enable inclusive dialogue on key reforms outlined in the Conakry Agreement (constitution, political party framework and electoral law) that are crucial for long term peace and stability. The project will reinforce, complement and expand on work accomplished in 2018 and 2019 to strengthen the Government’s and civil society’s capacity to accelerate political stabilization and systemic reform processes that are key to sustainable development in the country.</p>		
<p><b>Summarize the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists, including whether civil society and target communities were consulted and how:</b></p> <p>The CSOs linked to the 2<sup>nd</sup> PBF Political Dialogue Project held a lesson learned session that directly fed into the development of this project. A specific consultation was held with OCNC commissioners and the group endorsed the planned outputs. The draft project document was shared with UNCT and PBF focal points at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Council of Ministers and Legislative Affairs. The CSOs and Political Party leaders involved in the Stability Pact and the CSO monitoring network are aware of the project and are expecting a follow-up project to continue the work initiated in the previous PBF project that ended on 31 October 2019.</p>		
<p><b>Project Gender Marker score: __1__<sup>3</sup></b>  24% or \$472,020.87 of total project budget is allocated to activities in direct pursuit of gender equality and women’s empowerment.</p>		

<sup>3</sup> **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GEWE)  
**Score 2** for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate at least 30% of the total project budget to GEWE  
**Score 1** for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)


<b>Project Risk Marker score:</b> <u>  2  </u> <sup>4</sup>	
<p><b>Select PBF Focus Areas</b> which best summarizes the focus of the project (<i>select ONLY one</i>): 1.4,<sup>5</sup></p> <p>If applicable, <b>UNDAF outcome(s)</b> to which the project contributes: Outcome Group 1 on Governance</p> <p>If applicable, <b>Sustainable Development Goal</b> to which the project contributes: 5 (targets: 5.1, 5.2, 5.5., 5.6), 10 (targets: 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5) and 16 (targets 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.10B)</p> <p>If applicable, <b>National Strategic Goal</b> to which the project contributes: Terra Ranka - Axe 1 on Peace and Governance</p>	
<p><b>Type of submission:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>New project</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <b>Project amendment</b></p>	<p><b>If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:</b></p> <p><b>Extension of duration:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):</p> <p><b>Change of project outcome/ scope:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Additional PBF budget:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional amount by recipient organization:</p> <p><b>Brief justification for amendment:</b></p> <p><i>Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.</i></p>

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<sup>4</sup> **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes  
**Risk marker 1** = medium risk to achieving outcomes  
**Risk marker 2** = high risk to achieving outcomes

<sup>5</sup> **PBF Focus Areas** are:  
(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;  
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;  
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services  
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

**PROJECT SIGNATURES:**

<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>a</sup></b></p>  <p><b>Tjark Egenholt,</b>  <b>RR UNDP</b>  <i>Name of Representative</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Name of Agency</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p>  <p><b>Suzy Barbosa,</b>  <b>Minister Foreign Affairs</b>  <i>Name of Government Counterpart</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Title</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 30/12/19</p>
<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>a</sup></b></p>   <p><b>Cheikh Fall,</b>  <b>RR UNFPA</b>  <i>Name of Representative</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Name of Agency</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 24/12/2019</p>	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p><i>Name of Government Counterpart</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Title</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>
<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>a</sup></b></p>   <p><b>Kiyoshi Kawaguchi,</b>  <b>RR WFP</b>  <i>Name of Representative</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Name of Agency</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 24 Dec</p>	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p><i>Name of Government Counterpart</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Title</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>
<p><b>Head of UN Country Team</b></p>   <p><b>Cheikh Fall,</b>  <b>RR UNFPA OIC for</b>  <b>Mamadou Diallo,</b>  <b>DSRSG/RC Guinea-Bissau</b>  <i>Name of Representative</i>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Title</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>	<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p>  <p><b>Oscar Fernandez Taranco</b>  <b>AG Peacebuilding</b>  <i>Signature</i>  <i>Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office</i>  <i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p>

<sup>a</sup> Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

## **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)**

### **a) A brief summary of conflict analysis findings**

#### **Peacebuilding Context**

Guinea-Bissau is a post-conflict country marred by violent political turmoil. Its cyclical instability is mainly the result of structural conflict factors at the political, institutional, security and economic level that have not been resolved since the country's liberation. 14 November, 17 October, 17 March, 7 June, and 12 April<sup>6</sup> all refer to episodes of political violence, which included political assassinations, executions, war and coups d'état, that have never been properly addressed. The incidents of political instability, fueled by both internal disputes between political elites and direct interventions by the military, have undermined the capacity of the State to generate, negotiate and implement public policies, foster a culture of political dialogue and compromise much less provide the basic of services that the population needs.

Following the legislative elections in 2014, which were considered free, fair and transparent, the inclusive government of Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira successfully had its program approved by unanimity in the Guinea-Bissau parliament (known as the People's National Assembly (ANP in Portuguese)). The government initiated crucial reforms, which created a sense of hope, both internally and internationally and led to a very successful donors round table in March 2015 which garnered billions in pledged for reconstruction. Immediately afterwards, political differences between the President of the Republic, José Mário Vaz and Prime Minister Pereira (popularly referred to as DSP), led to the dismissal of the latter.

Per the Constitution, the winning party has the right to form the government, but it is the President that must name the Prime Minister. Nine successive Prime Minister appointments ensued; but, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) - the political party the won the majority in the 2014 elections - rejected all but the last of the President's choices. The power struggle between the two sides: one comprised of the President of the Republic, José Mário Vaz, the Social Renewal Party (PRS) party leadership and, more recently, the leadership of the MADEM G-15, and the other side led by the President of PAIGC, Domingos Simões Pereira, and the leaders of smaller political parties, namely: UM, PND, PUN, PCD and, APU-PDGB (which recently joined the its PRS and MADEM G-15 coalition) lasted most of President Vaz's five-year term.

To overcome the power struggle, the UN and ECOWAS negotiated with the key political actors the Conakry Agreement of October 2016. The Agreement along with constant international and internal pressure from Civil Society helped set the course for a return to constitutional normality. Finally, in April 2018 a managerial government headed by a consensus Prime Minister Aristides Gomes was named and legislative elections were successfully organized on 10 March 2019. Just before these elections, on 14 February, a Stability Pact was signed to (among other issues) enable a stable transition of power after the elections. However, the aftermath of these elections was marred by renewed political tensions and a stalemate over the composition of the Executive Bureau of the ANP, the appointment of the prime minister and the composition of the new government.

ECOWAS intervention on 29 June 2019 along with persistent pressure from civil society enabled a breakthrough in the political impasse with the appointment of Prime Minister Aristides Gomes, after PR rejected to nominate the leader of the most voted party in the 10 March elections, and the swearing in of a new government with gender parity, and some highly qualified youth. The return to a legitimate government was regarded as an important step in overcoming the current political crisis. Then, on 28 October 2019, with the presidential election less than a month away, President

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<sup>6</sup> LGDH (2013) *Quarenta Anos de Impunidade na Guiné-Bissau*. Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos.

Vaz dismissed the government and named a new one, jeopardizing the holding of the election on 24 November 2019. However, the disruption led to a strong reaction internally and from the international community. When the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces refused President Vaz's request to evacuate the Government Palace to enable the installation of the new government, the President Vaz ceased further attempts to forcibly replace the government.

This power struggle was the most recent incident in a cycle of instability that brought the country's institutions to a standstill. The paralysis has grave consequences for the population as each cyclical political crisis accelerates the progressive "de-structuring" of the State and society that has been happening since independence. Basic services and infrastructure have been neglected, for example potholes don't get filled, hospitals are not functioning, salaries for teachers are not paid resulting in strike action and closure of schools, taxes are collected but not handed over to the treasury and rules and regulation of every kind go ignored. This recent history reveals the structural factors (root causes) that have not been addressed since the country's liberation from colonialism, namely:

- The incomplete consolidation of the political system, and the lack of formal mechanisms to ensure strong and independent oversight and broad participation (beyond political elites) in policymaking, thereby, reinforcing patronage networks within the State that resist reforms.
- The entangled relationship of the military with political elites, which is contributing to the excessive weight of military budget on the State and their resistance to reform.
- The organization of the State, stemming from historical and geopolitical factors, and its dependency on external assistance, which makes the country more responsive to the needs and demands of donors, than those of its citizens.
- Undiversified and unsustainable economic system, which marginalizes large sectors of the population created and continues to encourage inequality.

The situation is made worse by certain drivers or proximate causes that aggravate the political instability and make the conflict more complex. The main drivers are:

- ✓ The marginalization of women, youth and rural constituents from decision-making. As a result, in public policies do not reflect the needs and aspirations of the majority population but serve the narrow interest of the political and economic elite to maintain power over the State and the economy.
- ✓ A fragile State and that allocates resources and recruits personnel to the public sector through highly informal and irregular processes
- ✓ Impunity on small and serious crimes, present and past
- ✓ Corruption and transnational Organized Crime impacts on Guinea-Bissau's political stability.

An important element in Guinea-Bissau conflict dynamic is that political elites support dialogue efforts solely to the extent that they enable power and resources sharing and on the distribution of the current resource pie. They seem unwilling to govern and enable the kinds of reforms that could create new wealth and expand the resource pie. They are fighting for a piece of the resources pie that is progressively contracting and dissipating. With the passage of time the conflict has become a zero-sum game of winners and losers. The conflict is becoming more and more severe as the political actors perceive the potential loss of power as an existential threat.

There have been some strategies in the last few years that have contributed to stabilization. First and foremost, there is broad consensus among national and international partners that the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council following the 2012 coup have had a positive impact in discouraging interference by the military in national politics. This was key to restoring

constitutional order in 2014 and has contributed to non-interference of the military in politics since that time.

Second there was the Conakry Agreement, which is not without controversy. This high-level dialogue process facilitated by ECOWAS with the support of the international community was restricted to the most immediate political leaders and focused on short-term solutions. The process was not inclusive, per UN rules such as SCR 1325, it violated the Guinea-Bissau Constitution and because of that, its implementation was subject to diverse interpretations. Nevertheless, it created a roadmap that enabled the international community to speak and engage political actors in a unified manner. The ECOWAS imposed sanctions in February 2018 shook the national political space and forced key players to review their entrenched positions, and to be more open to dialogue. While Conakry was useful, it was the continuous pressure and the prospects of sanctions that proved most effective. The focus on short-term solutions negotiated exclusively amongst political leaders did not generate support from the Bissau-Guinean people, which could otherwise have exerted pressure and made political leaders accountable when renegeing on agreements that resulted in instability.

In that context, the third contributing factor to stability is UN and UNIOGBIS support (with PBF funds) of civil society's efforts to promote stability and dialogue. While this support was always there since the beginning of the mission, it was in 2017, that UNIOGBIS (with PBF funds) reinforced efforts to support Civil Society Organizations, especially representatives of the Women Organizations, to engage in a quiet diplomacy effort to address the interpersonal barriers between the political actors that was jeopardizing the political dialogue. These efforts and those of other civil society actors helped remind the political leaders of their responsibilities to adhere to their international commitments. These interventions prevented the collapse of the Conakry Process. It was the intervention of the religious leaders that enabled the naming of Aristides Gomes as the consensus prime minister in April 2018, that opened the way for the naming of a new government charged primarily with preparing the elections in 2019.

In addition, the Organizing Commission for the National Conference (OCNC) and civil society groups, including women's organizations, in 2018 – 19 (with the help of UNIOGBIS and support from the PBF) led an inclusive process of consultations mobilizing communities across the country on the need for long-term engagement to ensure stability. Discussions focused around two main sets of commitments: general commitments aimed at ensuring short-term stability, through respect of the legal framework already in place (constitution, human rights, parity law) and the creation of mechanisms to promote dialogue and social cohesion on national issues, such as structural reforms and national reconciliation.

This mobilization culminated in the signing of a Stability Pact on 14 February 2019. The process helped crystalize recognition of the influential role civil society organizations can play when they speak with one voice. Although the follow up committee foreseen in the Stability Pact has not been established yet, the signature of the Pact brought to the public's attention that a reform process, and a national conference were considered as the way forward for overcoming the country's instability. The initiative has put the reform of the political system, public administration, justice and security sector back on the political agenda as a cross-party and national priority.

In view of the drivers of instability and peace capacities identified in the Conflict Analysis conducted by UNIOGBIS Political Affairs Section in 2019, it identified the following peacebuilding priorities for the UN's transition:

- Encourage political dialogue and the reform of the political system, through an inclusive process.
- Support the building of a functional state by strengthening state institutions and fostering active citizen engagement and oversight.
- Support an enabling environment to expand socio-economic opportunities for more people beyond the economic elite (i.e. expand the economic dividend)
- Encourage and support the continuation of the positive change in civil-military relation

- Strengthen capacity to effectively address impunity, promote and protect human rights.
- Support combatting of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.
- Enhanced alignment of international assistance with the peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau.

For each peacebuilding priority, the conflict analysis identifies entry points, which builds on peacebuilding capacities and addresses proximate causes and accelerators of instability. Specifically:

- Support national dialogue/agreement at the strategic level on key reforms: promote inclusive political dialogue and an agreement on key reforms (stability pact and Conakry Agreement); engage with CSO, particularly women’s groups, on priority reform efforts; promote dialogue between branches of government; support for youth engagement and participation in governance and development processes at all levels;
- Support political reforms (constitution, electoral laws and political party framework law) and their implementation through inclusive dialogic processes, including providing technical capacity like imbedding technical advisers within key State institutions
- Strengthen political parties’ capacity to engage with the population, including training on communication strategies
- Fully integrate a gender perspective into planning and program development for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding
- Support the creation of conditions for decentralized governance system
- Support the implementation of systems and processes (at ministry level), as well as oversight mechanisms aimed at ensuring transparency and accountability and anchoring stability
- Advocate for international support to commissions established to investigate illegal management/use of State resources
- Support the coordination of External Assistance and the unit which was established in the Prime Minister’s office for the implementation of reforms;

This project builds on previous interventions, addresses identified gaps, such as the participation of previously excluded actors, and focuses dialogue on measures to promote long term stability and improved accountability to political commitments.

### **Rationale for PBF support**

The project aims at strengthening crisis prevention capabilities and enable key legal reforms. When public policies and laws are approved without a participatory process with relevant stakeholders, people feel deprived of voice and policies lack national appropriation and implementation suffers. This also aggravates the divide between the political elite and the rest of the population.

By engaging the President, the government, political parties (including the youth and women’s wings of the political parties), the judiciary, parliament, private sector, women-based and other CSOs, trade unions, community and religious leaders in a meaningful dialogue on the political system and key reforms needed, this will provide the space for the collective definition of the rules of a new social contract create the conditions for effective citizen participation in the political arena and meaningful decision-making processes.

Addressing the systemic issues, and leaving no one behind, will contribute to longer-term stability and social cohesion in the country, key components for sustaining peace in Guinea-Bissau. The project will build on capacities developed during the implementation of the recent PBF project entitled: “Support to political dialogue and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau”, taking in consideration lessons learnt from the experience of the two previous national dialogue projects funded by the PBF in Guinea-Bissau. It will also involve non-traditional partners –religious and

traditional leaders and the armed forces - that play a pivotal role in reinforcing and championing political dialogue and social cohesion.

**b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports existing Governmental and UN strategic frameworks, how it ensures national ownership and how the project builds on any previous phase of PBF support and/or any concrete lessons learned.**

The project envisioned here was designed to support the implementation of key elements included the Conakry Agreement of 2016. Its approach is based on the principles of participation, accountability and transparency that underpin the ECOWAS Roadmap and the key reforms stipulated in the Conakry Agreement, as well as the Stability Pact. The Conakry Agreement defines crucial measures needed to ensure stability, including undertaking key reforms, develop a national development plan and the signing of a Stability Pact.

The Stability Pact signed by all the political parties and civil society organizations on 14 February 2019 was a nationally owned process that aimed at creating political and institutional stability, which would ensure the basic conditions for socioeconomic and cultural development, consolidation of the rule of law and reconciliation (article 1). The Stability Pact specifically calls for the creation of mechanisms to promote dialogue and social cohesion around national issues, such as structural reforms and national reconciliation. It also calls for the creation of a follow-up mechanism to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the Pact, to still be implemented

The project was also designed to complement the implementation of unfunded UNIOGBIS mandate outlined in UN SC resolution 2458 (2019), in particular residual tasks to be implemented before prospective Mission completion by 31 December 2020, including “Support the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS Roadmap, and facilitate an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, using SRSG good offices to support ECOWAS led mediation efforts and confidence building measures among the key political actors, strengthening institutions of democratic governance, particularly with regards to the implementation of necessary urgent reforms;”

Furthermore, the project proposed here is also aligned to the national Vision and Strategy called “Terra Ranka.” National Reconciliation is a key element of Terra Ranka. Systemic reform refers to key reforms, namely the political parties’ framework, the electoral law and the Constitution, as well as reforms in the defense, security and justice sectors, which will require deep and comprehensive change and that are broadly seen and recognized in the Conakry Agreement and the Stability Pact as fundamental to long-term stability. The project prioritizes the reforms of the Constitution, political party framework and the Electoral Law, as these fit with the UNIOGBIS mandate (UNSCR 2458 of 28 February 2019). National Reconciliation refers to a process that has long been in the works and is led by the OCNC to help the country overcome a set of political assassination and/or disappearances of known political figures that have never been redressed in court. These are broadly referred to as historical crimes that like “open wounds” keep the country tethered to the past. Moreover, the strategy is aligned with various UN strategic documents such as the UNDP Fragility Assessment Study 2017 conducted under the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States, the pre-MAPS mission report on SDG fast-tracking 2018 and the UNDAF. Outcome 1 of the UNDAF calls for: “State institutions, including defense, security, and justice, consolidate the stability and the Rule of Law, democratic participation, and equitable access to opportunities for all.”

In its conclusions of a study on institutional reforms in Guinea-Bissau, the Institute for Security

Studies (ISS)<sup>7</sup> stated that:

*Deliberations on institutional reforms must emphasize the creation of political conditions conducive to a constructive dialogue on the profound changes needed in the relations between various centers of power: between leaders and the people, between political power and public administration, between political power and the defense and security forces, and between formal institutions and the informal institutions rooted in tradition and that largely guide the behavior of citizens. .... National capacity to turn the difficult moment of crisis into a historic opportunity to regenerate institutions will depend on the mobilization of the country's vital forces and the steadfast support of its international partners. The stabilization of Guinea-Bissau is also one of the conditions for strengthening stability and security in West Africa.*

The project is a follow-on to the current IRF project entitled: “Support to political dialogue and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau.” It is the third in a string of PBF financed projects that supported national dialogue and political stabilization. The first of which supported the process that led to the Conakry Agreement.

The new project will pick up on activities not concluded, but deemed necessary, under the second project that began in January 2018 and ended 31 October 2019. This third project will enable effective follow-up actions not initially envisioned in the previous project given that the Stability Pact was not signed at the time.

The project proposal also capitalizes on the confirmation that key reforms are part of the priorities of the government led by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes established on 3 July 2019, as well as in the post legislative elections agreement signed on 18 March 2019 by PAIGC, APU-PDGB, UM, and PND. Members of the PAIGC led alliance have consistently stressed the importance of the Stability Pact and key reforms as well as inter-party-political dialogue, requesting the UN to play a leading role in support of its implementation.

At the opening of the X Legislature, in June 2019, the ANP decided to prolong the mandate of OCNC until the organization of the National Conference, as well as renewing the mandate of the ANP ad hoc commission for the revision of the Constitution and the ad hoc commission for the revision of the electoral law and the political parties' law. Finally, the project builds on the national appropriation afforded by the establishment within the Office of the Prime Minister of the *Office of Support for [State] Reforms*, as indicated in dispatch no. 043 / PM / 2019, signed by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes.

While all these are elements underscoring the importance and relevance of the project to the political actors, the priority that will be given to political stabilization and the key reforms will depend greatly on who wins the upcoming run-off presidential election scheduled for 29 December 2019 and the actions taken afterwards.

### *1. Main achievements from the previous phase*

#### The Stability Pact

The previous project contributed to an environment conducive to political and institutional stabilization for peace and development that led to the signing of the Stability Pact. This result was achieved by enabling civil society's mobilization (the OCNC, the Human Rights League, Tiniguena, the women's mediation network and the Women's Council) to sensitize national political stakeholders on the importance of long-term stability and key reforms as indicated in the

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<sup>7</sup> Which institutional reforms for Guinea-Bissau? Institute for Security Studies, 2018, [https://uniogbis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english\\_6\\_summary.pdf](https://uniogbis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/english_6_summary.pdf)

Conakry Agreement. The negotiations around the Stability Pact showed the project's potential for enabling stakeholders to participate collaboratively and constructively in political dialogue. The ability of OCNC and CSOs to coordinate, cooperate and deliver a document that represents a common agenda provided legitimacy to the Stability Pact. The project also diminished the need for UN interventions and the substitution of national actors. The CSOs drafted and conducted negotiations with political parties on the Stability Pact and enabled the signing of the Stability Pact by political actors.

Early attempts by CSOs to facilitate an agreement between political actors were hindered by criticism of politicisation. Although still permeable to political influence, throughout the implementation of the project, CSOs were able, at critical moments, to put aside their divergences and coordinate their approaches around a common position (common minimum denominator). This was the case following the legislative elections, when the CSOs formed a forum and issued a statement calling for the timely nomination of a government. Although this initiative was later criticised and another communiqué (focusing on non-consensual elements) was issued, by the Civil Society Movement (Movimento da Sociedade Civil), this did not lead to a rupture and only highlighted the need to continue efforts towards a common vision within CSOs. In fact, following the constitution of that forum of discussion, CSOs held several meetings to reiterate the importance of maintaining a coordinated approach. This stemmed from previous project activities, which contributed to articulate a common agenda for CSOs on structural reforms and led to the signing of the Stability Pact. This was established by enabling civil society's coordination and joint-mobilization to sensitize cross-parties' political stakeholders on long-term stability, addressing the need for key reforms and a national conference, as indicated in the Conakry Agreement.

#### National Reconciliation

With help from UNIOGBIS, the OCNC advanced the national reconciliation agenda by building political will among high level politicians and ensuring that it stays among the national priorities. It ensured the inclusion of national reconciliation in the Stability Pact and lobbied the ANP for a prolonged mandate by the X Legislature. Following the printing of its report "Em Nome da Paz", in March 2018, OCNC concluded, in the first semester of 2019, a round of regional consultations visits to disseminate the findings of the report. The OCNC also concluded two similar sessions with the diaspora, in Lisbon (January 2019) and in Dakar (April 2019).

UNIOGBIS is supporting the OCNC in implementing its Communication Plan by printing a new batch of 1000 copies of the report and by producing an audio in Creole summarizing key findings and recommendations of the report for the radio. Moreover, UNIOGBIS and UNDP are supporting INEP (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa da Guiné-Bissau) in its collaboration with OCNC for the preparation of an historical exhibition on Guinea-Bissau, to investigate historical root-causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau and encourage dialogue and reconciliation; with an itinerant audiovisual component, to be used during regional consultations.

The report includes an annex that explains a range of options for redressing the so-called historical crimes. This new project will enable the Commission to prepare the delegates to the National Conference to make an informed decision on the model of National Reconciliation for the country from among the options the Commission has identified and to hold the Conference at which the choice will be made.

#### The Women's Council

The previous project enabled UN compliance with SCR 1325 in post-Conakry period, since Conakry did not reflect the 1325 responsibilities. It also built on the 2017 achievements of the Women's Facilitation Group, which later became the Women's Council. Their silent diplomacy effort under the first dialogue project in 2017 resulted in the temporary resumption of institutional relations between different organs of sovereignty, namely between the President of the Republic and the President of the National Assembly.

The Second Dialogue project helped strengthen the Bissau-Guinean Women's Council and increase their membership to where it now comprises of the 27 women's groups in the country including political party members, the business sector and representatives of women's groups in the regions mainly rural areas. Thus, the project enabled the consolidation of a nationally grown women's peacebuilding network. Key WPS associations, such as the REMPSECAO-GB (Women's Peace and Security Network in West Africa / ECOWAS) and the Women Mediators Network, as well as historic women's empowerment, participation and protection organizations, such as PPM (Women's Political Platform) and RENLUV (National Network against GBV) integrated the Council, adding to its relevance, credibility, and operational and mobilization capacity.

The project continued to enable the Women's Council with the support of the Women Mediator Network, to continue to work for an environment conducive to mitigating tensions through quiet engagement with high-level political actors. The project, therefore, enabled the women to continuously pressure political actors to accept ECOWAS mediation solution and prevented the political actors from abandoning the ECOWAS process from mid-2017 through appointment of PM Aristides Gomes.

The project enabled the Women's Council to hold of two National Forums of Women and Girls for Peace in Bissau in 2018 and 2019. These events brought together approximately 800 women to discuss the impact of the recent political and institutional stalemate on the lives of women and youth throughout the country. These impacts of the instability helped frame the discussions at the National Forum and lead to a set of recommendations that were shared with Government authorities and international partners. Thus, the process enabled rural women to voice the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable to national and international actors and insured rural women understood national political issues from women's perspective spreading the message of the need for social cohesion. The process around these events contributed to consolidating and legitimizing the Women's Council as a nationally grown women's peacebuilding network. It contributed also to bringing the voices of vulnerable and marginalized groups from across the country to decision-making levels in the capital. The Women's Forum helped engage the international community and ensure women's views were taken into consideration in international efforts to gain adherence to Conakry Agreement.

As evidence of the long-term impact of the Women Council's work, some of the women members of the current Government actively participated in the discussion of the Forum and other activities of the Women's Council. As examples: Fatumata Djau Balde, Deputy Coordinator of the Women's Council and a key organizer of the Extraordinary Peace and Stability Forum at June 2019, is now minister of Public Administration and State Modernization; Nelvina Barreto, adhering to the Women's Council in her role as President of MIGUILAN, a Council-represented NGO, is now minister of Forests and Agriculture; Cadi Seidi, founder and ancient President of REMPSECAO - GB, who attended the January 2019 Forum and other activities of the Women's Council, is now Minister for Women, Family and Social Protection. Moreover, other women activists and community leaders are now Ministers in the current Government, namely: Rute Monteiro from Women Jurists, Minister of Justice, Odete Costa Semedo, Minister of Territorial Administration and Suzy Barbosa, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

### Systemic Reforms

The previous PBF project supported the development of technical documents outlining key aspects relating to the substance and process of the systemic reforms. These documents were socialized through a series of CSO workshops, thus ensuring that CSO are better equipped to engage in political dialogue processes on the systemic institutional reforms when the time comes. In addition, the project has supported the preparation of an annotated version of the Bissau-Guinean Constitution, elaborated by the Faculty of Law of Bissau. The annotated version was presented to CSOs representatives at a workshop on the Constitutional Review in mid-June 2019. These workshops are critical to socializing the substantive and process issues around the reforms. These workshops were preceded by extensive consultations and review of current and past reform processes and

enabled information sharing and inclusive discussion on ways for shaping an inclusive participatory process for the development, monitoring and implementation of reforms. More help is needed preparing them to participate constructively in political dialogue around these key reforms. Finally, the project took some initial first steps towards the creation of a CSOs network to monitor the reforms. Specifically, the group was able to develop a set of baseline indicators for tracking future implementation of the reforms and commit to be a member of the Observatory.

## *2. Lessons learnt from the first project*

This project proposal was built on lessons learned from two previous dialogue projects, key among them:

- Top-level dialogue, supported by ECOWAS, should be accompanied by social pressure by the various civil society groups. The Women's Council facilitation role reinforced the ECOWAS mediation. The development of a CSOs common position on the need for structural reforms to overcome cyclical instability (Stability Pact), was key for the national appropriation of the Conakry Agreement, and contributed to the acceptance of commitments made by political actors.
- Peacebuilding efforts need to happen simultaneously at the top of the political elite, the mid-level and at the grass-root level. A coordinated and synchronised approach in supporting top-level and grassroots interventions is key to prevent manipulation of the process by the elite and to encourage grassroots actions, leading to a stronger impact; technical support to CSOs to develop collaborative approaches in the implementation of their activities was not defined as a key activity in the current project and therefore was provided in an ad hoc manner and only successfully achieved in critical moments. Building a framework for collaboration from the insight will provide better tools to coordinate and synchronise different interventions, which while singular, are aimed at a common goal.
- Supporting political dialogue aimed at creating a space for the implementation of structural reforms, requires a coordinated approach of the UN system in Guinea-Bissau. Harmonisation of mandated activities, including PAS, CDTOC and HRS (funded through RBB), as well as UNDP governance and justice programmes, with PBF support is crucial to avoid the logic of project-based interventions and will be critical during the UN reconfiguration.

### *Empowerment/ownership:*

- Rather than direct UN engagement, the project acted through national actors, civil society and women's group, empowering them to engage in intervention roles. This, respecting the principle of non-substitution of national actors, resulted also in strengthening a sense of ownership and responsibility.
- The approach resulted in a mentality shift among groups involved, creating capacity in conflict management, feeling of ownership, responsibility, and empowerment. Enhancing recognition that national problems should be addressed by national actors if a long-term impact is the objective. In particular, the proactive role in the elaboration of the Stability Pact and consultation process, resulted in empowering CSOs, enhancing inclusiveness, a sense of national ownership and built their strategic planning capacities. Enhancing capacities induced a shift of mentality among youth's groups from passivity and a sense of powerless to a sense of civic commitment and public engagement.
- The project supported the establishment of spaces for information sharing, built opportunities and voiced informed opinions. Support to CSOs and their coordinated action need to be mindful of respective roles in promoting peace and stability. Whilst some CSOs have a watchdog role, others have developed mediation skills and/or implemented programmes aimed at addressing gaps in the provision of services by the state.
- Forming a coalition of women across the country (and across urban/rural communities), the Women's Council managed to bring about a sense of unity and solidarity within the group.

They felt the power of being able to speak with one voice. Rural women were empowered also by becoming more knowledgeable and conversant with national level processes that were happening in the capital.

- Women in decentralized areas felt empowered that through the Women’s Council, their messaging could reach national actors. Participation of women from the regions, in Bissau-based activities, strengthened the perception that their experiences of deprivation and suffering mattered, their voice counted, and their opinion valued. Women’s groups were able to put moral pressure on the elite, by transmitting messages denouncing the neglect of the population’s needs during the political crisis.
- A lot of efforts are needed to really reach out to women at the local level. This is due to constraints: educated urban women have different concerns and priorities than regional rural women do; infrastructure, communication and connectivity are limited; cultural, economic and physical distances are hard to overcome. Careful planning, strong determination and clear targeting are needed to effectively include the hardest to reach.

*Women Peace and Security:*

- The Conakry negotiation process, nor the agreement itself did incorporate UN obligations about SCR 1325. It had to be included at a later stage to bring in the women’s active participation and voice.
- Women shaped an effective non-threatening role as facilitators (instead of mediators), based on their moral role as “mothers”. Through this non-threatening role, women managed to maintain an active role in intervention and keep doors opened. Women’s engagement focused on addressing interpersonal animosities between political actors, reminding them of their institutional roles and responsibilities and the need to address, resolve, and overcome interpersonal differences.
- Group change versus individual change: women who managed to be elected in the legislative election, thanks to capacity building efforts targeting women candidate, recognized sense of responsibility towards future generation.
- Election campaigns were more issue-based rather than personality-based and live radio programs financed by PBF enabled women to speak directly to constituents. This fostered informed decision making of voters during the elections.

**c) A summary of existing interventions**

<b>Project name (duration)</b>	<b>Donor and Budget</b>	<b>Project focus</b>	<b>Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal</b>
ECOWAS Mediation (diplomatic engagement - not a project)	ECOWAS	Bring Stability to Guinea-Bissau	High level diplomatic intervention not connected to civil society initiatives.
Support to Political Dialogue and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau – 00108244	PBF - US\$826,121.00	This project contributes to the political stabilization process by enabling inclusive dialogue on systemic issues and the national reconciliation process	The new project will allow the uninterrupted continuation of the current project activities ensuring the presence of the UN during the transition period. The new project will enable better coordination between international and national stabilization strategies. The new project will continue to support civil society to

			participate in systemic reforms and the monitoring system, through inclusive and constructive dialogue. Most importantly, it will support the empowerment of women, youth and other marginalized Stakeholders enabling them to effectively participate in systemic reforms process. The new project would enable the OCNC to prepare and hold the National Conference and enable the development of a follow-up strategy.
Boosting the Media Sector for Greater Peace and Stability in Guinea-Bissau - 00108750	PBF – US\$940,977.	This project contributes to institutional stabilization of the media sector in Guinea-Bissau by helping create better conditions for journalists to perform their role in a democratic society in a professional manner	This project helps stabilize the sector through national legal reform that will help the sector become more financially and politically independent. But otherwise not much connection
Supporting Political and Institutional Stabilization of the Justice Sector for Peace Consolidation in Guinea-Bissau – 00108261	PBF- US\$1,406,900.	This project contributes to the stability of the Justice Sector by enabling the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with a restorative justice within the formal and informal justice systems with greater respect for human rights, with a women and children’s rights.	This project is providing professional mediation skills training to REMUME, complementary to the political mediation and dialogue training provided through the Political Dialogue and National Reconciliation Project to the same network.
Supporting Women’s and Youth Political Participation for Peace and Development in Guinea-Bissau - 00108258	PBF US\$1,775,482.	This project empowers women and (mainly urban) youth leaders to engage in the political life of the country. It provides a conduit to political power for change makers, support to youth and women’s wings of the parties, candidates for election and election oversight. It also enables WFP to work with rural women farmers and enabled rural advocacy on issues affecting rural communities which, if not addressed, they easily grow into conflicts. Empowered rural women	Output 2.1 in this Project envisions capacity building for high-level party leaders, government actors, youth and women’s wings of the political parties. But the goal here is to sensitize them on the importance of inclusion of women and youth in party structures and decision-making processes. The Women and Youth Project should provide some initial training and enable the creation of the Youth Political Platform but more training and support to this platform would be

		and their chosen leaders are now able to apply their newly earned skills and experience working with other rural women to participate in broader advocacy forum.	forthcoming into the new project. Output 1.4 enabled WFP to create a rural women's advocacy network, if appropriately supported and strengthened can participate in the development and monitoring of the laws foreseen in this project.
Mobilizing Rural Youth and Adolescents to serve as Peacebuilding Leaders – 00108256	PBF US\$1,564,821.	This project strengthens the capacities of youth and adolescents' leadership skills to advocate on their own behalf for influence in decision-making processes and acquire the resilience they need to manipulation.	The overlap with this project centers on the REMUME intervention in the dispute between Elias, Djobel and Arame communities in Suzana region. The Mobilizing Rural Youth enabled a small grant for three groups to work together to help find a negotiation/peaceful solution to this problem.
Toward a New Gender Equilibrium in Guinea-Bissau - 00104809	PBF US\$534,184 (Phase 1) and US\$427,714 (Phase 2) for a total of US\$961,898	The project contributes to the reduction of women's exclusion in decision-making spheres, by reinforcing their participation in governance and local conflict-resolution throughout Guinea-Bissau.	Voz de Paz has a Regional Dialogue Platform running for the last 10 years. PBF projects should work with these structures and not create duplicate structures.
Placing Women at the Centre of Justice Reform in Guinea-Bissau – 00113214	PBF US\$1,000,000.	The project places women at the center of the ongoing justice reform efforts in Guinea-Bissau, by promoting women's rights and gender equality, through the revision of the legal framework, capacity building, awareness raising and increased access to legal services.	This project synergies with the new PBF being proposed here, centers around the possibility for women to address GBV and gender discrimination as a sociocultural issue and not only an individual victimization issue. The empowerment of women's protection networks at the rural village level, mediators' networks and women's leadership go hand in hand in building and mobilizing a cadre of active women citizens able to claim their rights, foster agency, and promote political awareness. The project also envisioned enabling the revision of the NAP-1325 but a NAP is a

			higher strategic document involving more than just justice reform. Doing a NAP could be an additional tool which would contribute to the new project by providing the women a space for determining women's peace priorities and collective position on systemic reforms.
Project to Support Institutional Capacities Strengthening in the Justice Sector (sept. 2018-sept 2020)	UNDP/AfDB 1,800 000 USD	It is contributing to the reform and modernization of the justice sector, specifically by strengthening human and institutional capacities.	The skill sets imparted here are not the one envisions for support by the AfDB. That project envision capacity building for development this is for national policy formulation
RBB Budget from the UNIOGBIS Mission	16, 000 USD (PAS: 2018)  47,500 USD (PAS: 2019)	<i>RBB budget was used to complement to the PBF funds. RBB budget was crucial to address gaps not envisioned in the previous project. RBB provided the necessary flexibility to enhance synergies between mandated activities and the PBF project.</i>	<b>Development of a Code of Conduct for elections and outreach in the regions</b> (2018 and 2019 RBB), contributed to support CSOs' coordination around the development of a Code of Conduct, as well as in promoting a dialogue between political parties aimed at its signature. The Code of Conduct and the Stability Pact were signed at the same ceremony at the ANP on 14 February. <b>Support to the ad-Hoc Commission on Constitutional Reform (funded by RBB in 2018 and 2019).</b> Whilst the RBB supported the ad-Hoc Commission to develop a technical draft for discussing the Constitution Review, the PBF project supported the development of an annotated version of the constitution and the organisation of a workshop to establish a common agenda for CSO on such Reform. Synergies between the RBB and PBF were key for the participation of the Ad-Hoc Commission and the Faculty of Law in the workshop to explain the work done so far, and a commitment of the Ad-Hoc Commission to consult the recently created Civil Society's

			<p>network for the monitoring of reforms during discussions of the draft.</p> <p><b>A meeting with Civil Society groups on lesson learned from peace efforts (funded through RBB in 2018)</b> served to address a gap in the PBF project: to foresee activities aimed at developing collaborative approaches. These include activities funded by PBF, but also other initiatives by CSOs to advance the political process. A space for dialogue where CSOs could share their experience and challenges proved useful to develop confidence among CSOs and strengthened information sharing and cooperation.</p> <p><b>Political Parties leadership training (RBB 2018)</b>, contributed to a better understanding of political parties' role in democracy and in advancing politician dialogue.</p> <p><b>Support to the Women's Council Meeting and the participation of women from the regions in a forum to demand stability (RBB 2019)</b>. Although not foreseen in the political dialogue project, mobilisation of the Women's Council, to call for the resolution of the impasse created after the legislative elections, was important to deliver a clear message that women from all political parties were united in demanding that the impasse be solved, and a new government be appointed.</p>
EU		Electoral support in coordination with UNFPA, UN WOMEN, UNIOGBIS	Civil society mobilization for the monitoring of elections and situation room

**II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**

a) A brief **description of the project content** –

This project seeks to harness national and international resources and advance effective political stabilization strategies in times of political crisis and impasse, enable key national and regional interlocutors to dialogue and establish effective working relationships necessary to undertake key and urgent reforms (political party law, electoral law, and constitutional reform) that are widely regarded to be the long term stabilizing reforms called for by the Conakry Agreement, the ECOWAS Roadmap and the Stability Pact.

The project will have two Outcomes: one focused on promoting trust and confidence building measures and in-country mediation efforts among the key political actors to reach political settlement and willingness to work for the country's political stabilization (recognizing the elections in Guinea-Bissau have never sufficed to end political impasse); and the second outcome focused on enabling broader inclusive dialogue on the design and implementation of key reforms (as stipulated in the Conakry Agreement) and national reconciliation. The project recognizes that advancement on the second outcome is contingent on effective results/efforts under the first outcome. Both outcomes prioritize enabling greater participation of women and youth in reform processes and promote the oversight functions of the National Assembly and Civil Society.

**OUTCOME ONE: EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED IN-COUNTRY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, DIALOGUE AND MEDIATION INTERVENTIONS FROM ECOWAS, UN, CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER KEY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS STRENGTHEN POLITICAL STABILIZATION IN GUINEA-BISSAU.**

Outcome 1 focuses on galvanizing the international and national actors' efforts towards the achievement of political stability by enabling effective engagement and dialogue between key national interlocutors to address the issues that have hampered effective working relationships and prevent them from reaching political settlements on key issues of concern. Thus, the project outputs will contribute to building trust between the political actors through confidence building measures necessary to enable better governance. Also, outputs contributing to this outcome aim at enabling more effective coordination between the UN, ECOWAS, UNOWAS and other international structures and civil society actors so that civil society actors can play a stabilizing role during political crises.

***Outputs 1.1: Support ECOWAS-led intervention efforts to foster effective inter-party and political leader dialogue***

This output focuses on supporting ECOWAS led intervention efforts through its office in Bissau in collaboration with the Group of Five and other international partners to facilitate inter-party and political leader dialogues on key issues of concern, in order to work together in the Parliament and in the Government towards the implementation of key reforms as stipulated in the Conakry Agreement. This would create a stabilizing role in the political arena. It recognizes the need to enhance the conflict resolution skills of national political actors to enable them to play an effective role in accordance with democratic principles. UNIOGBIS SRSG and RC will play the convening role, which it has been doing to support ECOWAS-led mediation efforts to bring about political agreements and settlements amongst the political actors embroiled in disputes and resulting in cyclical institutional and political paralysis in Guinea-Bissau. In that respect, UNIOGBIS SRSG good offices, the RC and the ECOWAS mission in Bissau will collaborate to advocate, and rally support for national dialogues and mediation initiatives, including inter-political party dialogue. The hope is to help find solutions before political disputes escalate out of control, and to persuade political actors to abide by their agreements. This will ensure political stability and create a

conducive environment for socio-economic development that will benefit all Guinea-Bissau's population.

Key activities:

**Activity 1.1.1: Support the development of an intervention strategy to foster dialogue between political actors in Guinea-Bissau.** This activity would support the efforts of ECOWAS office in Guinea-Bissau to develop an intervention strategy that engages key political and party leaders to help settle their differences and put the interests of the country first. Specifically, the activity will help ensure a coordinated approach between the UN in Guinea-Bissau, UNOWAS and ECOWAS, and the Group of Five, so that actions on the ground are part of a high-level intervention strategy and are linked/coordinated with national stabilization efforts, including through consultation with credible and influential national figures. To achieve this, ECOWAS would need an expert Mediator (a Consultant) to develop the "strategy and related plan of action" to be implemented by ECOWAS. So, the cost is Consultant fees and related travels as well as cost related to coordination between UN, UNOWAS and ECOWAS, including a mediator to facilitate specific dialogue, if needed to ensure political actors abide by their agreements or to reach agreements.

**Activity 1.1.2: Design and Facilitation of a High-level Forum.** The intervention strategy designed above by UNIOGBIS could include holding a high-level forum of political actors, with or without the help of the mediator mentioned above. It is hoped that the political actors will reach a commitment to change, to commit to ending political killings as an instrument of politics and demonstrate their support for the reforms, which also would entail the political parties becoming more inclusive of women and youth representatives. UNFPA has a mandate to support youth leadership development and wants to see that youth and women are properly prepared to engage government and political parties' leaders and lobby for effective women and youth political participation. Under the PBF supported Women and Youth, UNFPA with support from UNIOGBIS is responsible for forming the Youth Political Platform, comprised of the youth wings of the political parties, that will continue to be supported under this project.

**Activity 1.1.3: Support capacity building of high-level national actors including members of parliament, political party leaders, ministers and other key actors in conflict resolution skills and techniques (including crisis management, dialogue and mediation).** The country's leadership needs to be equipped with effective tools that will enable them to negotiate effectively on key issues and reach consensus on solutions that would ensure stability and peaceful resolution of political crises/impasses. *The resources for this would be made available through Activity 2.2.1.*

### ***Output 1.2: Civil Society contributes effectively to Political Stabilization***

Civil society is currently divided with many contributing (knowingly or not) to instability. This output would correct the imbalance from the previous support provided support to some groups but not to others and build the capacity of a broader swath of civil society groups' in crisis intervention. Support should also help the CSOs come together more broadly around key national issues and develop a coordinated strategy for stabilization during times of crisis that is linked to regional and international efforts. As part of this output civil society actors will be supported to acquire the necessary skills and to develop effective dialogue and intervention strategies and agree on a range of measures to engage with political leaders in a coordinated manner to voice their concerns and outline their priorities as a contribution to political stabilization efforts.

Key activities:

**Activity 1.2.1: Convene a Civil Society Forum and working meetings to produce a Strategic Plan for Stabilization based on agreed strategies.** This forum and planning meeting will enable the Women's Council, the OCNC, the Movimento da Sociedade Civil, youth networks, religious and traditional leaders, private sector, rural network and other civil society actors including those

representing the most marginalized groups, to jointly discuss and coordinate efforts on how they can contribute to ensure stability and come up with a strategic plan of action and specific interventions that will contribute to a political stabilization process during times of crisis.

**Activity 1.2.2: Enable civil society capacity building in crisis management and conflict resolution skills and method.** The Civil Society actors in the strategic plan for crisis management could identify as part of the stabilization strategy the capacity gaps that need to be filled so that civil society can play a more effective role in political crisis management and stabilization. This activity will enable the training, with the resources allocated, through Activity 2.2.1.

**Activity 1.2.3: Support Civil Society Stabilization Strategies.** This activity will enable civil society to implement a communication strategy and advocacy activities that would support the political stabilization process with small grants, per the strategy designed in Activity 1.2.1. For example, funds could enable radio and social media messaging that calls on political actors to avoid acting in ways that could perpetuate instability. It could support creative and innovative dialogue efforts and enable sensitization of rural communities on the causes and consequences of political instability and its effects on the people. This would build on the signed Stability Pact and enable its implementation.

**Activity 1.2.4: Conduct Baseline Mapping of Stakeholders**

The baseline mapping activity will help the project team identify the Stakeholders groups, with specific attention to women and youth stakeholders and partners, that would be involved in policy design and implementation and the skill sets they will need to participate effectively in these processes. This will help establish a baseline for the project and determine exactly who the stakeholders should be and what training will go into the Leadership Academy for policy design and implementation. It could also assess the confidence levels among the actors and measure change in the quality of relationship over time.

***Output 1.3: Support the SRSG's Good Offices and RC's role to build on and support coordination of dialogue initiatives and enable effective transition to the RC's Office.***

When crises breakout in Guinea-Bissau, it takes high-level intervention of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis, including through visits to Bissau, where up to now representatives have met exclusively with key national actors. However, there are limited existing national mechanisms to persuade the political actors to abide by their agreements and ensure timely implementation. National actors from civil society have been sidelined in lieu of the regional and international mediation and conflict resolution efforts. These efforts are not coordinated with or build upon local dialogue and mediation efforts due several factors, namely that the crises are usually extremely time-sensitive, and that the national actors do not have an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the political elite abide by agreements. Moreover, these shuttle diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts have usually been done in a short-time span, thus not allowing enough time for consultation with civil society actors. Long term stability requires that local actors be able to play a stabilizing role. The UN's added value is that it can link high level efforts with those of local actors and enable a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to political stabilization in collaboration with other international actors in Guinea-Bissau. This output will enable SRSG good offices convening mandate and international partner coordination role to effectively support implementation of political agreements facilitated by ECOWAS and others by convening local actors to dialogue efforts around issues impeding implementation of an agreement(s) or other points of contention in collaboration with ECOWAS, UNOWAS and other international community members in Guinea-Bissau. This will also enable effective coordination between the Group of Five in Bissau (which includes ECOWAS), UNOWAS, other international actors and national civil society actors involved in stabilization efforts.

Key activities:

**Activity 1.3.1: Support Coordination of Stability Strategies.** The activity will enable the SRSB and then the Resident Coordinator to support the follow up to international efforts as well as link these efforts to a civil society strategy that enables stabilization. This includes managing improved coordination between government and civil society and with international partners, including with ECOWAS, UNOWAS, the Group of Five in Bissau and the UN. The UN could work closely with the Coordination Mechanism established by the Stability Pact, if that approach is viable. It should enable ECOWAS, UNOWAS, UNDP and the Resident Coordinator to continue to work in a coordinated manner during UNIOGBIS' drawdown. Funds will support technical assistance if needed to help design an effective coordination strategy and workshops or dialogue forums with key actors to enable the effective transfer of coordination functions and the linking civil society with international efforts, above and beyond what is offered by the UN Transitions Project or DPPA's Mediation Support Unit Stand-by Experts.

**OUTCOME TWO: URGENT REFORMS ADVANCED THROUGH INCLUSIVE PROCESSES (AS SITUATED IN THE ECOWAS ROADMAP AND CONAKRY AGREEMENT).**

Currently, public policies and laws are approved without a participatory public process with relevant stakeholders, and therefore citizens do not feel they have a voice on policies and consequently are not invested in their implementation. This leads to a lack of national appropriation of public policies and divides political elites from and the rest of the population. The project will provide different sets of stakeholders the knowledge and skills they need to ensure that public policies reflect the will of the people. An approach that widens the range of change agents.

Supposing a degree of stability is achieved with the strategies in Outcome 1, the project will support a range of **key activities** related to three specific reforms processes (political party law, electoral law and constitutional review), spanning the breadth of such processes from galvanizing/rallying political will, enabling policy design, approval, implementation, monitoring and public outreach.

The focus of this project Outcome is to enable policy reforms that are broadly seen as key to long term stability. The process will - at the same time - serve as a catalyst for effective interactions among political actors and between political actors and civil society. Thus, the reform processes, if driven effectively and transparently, can lead to increased trust, effective working relationships and collaboration – the ingredients of confidence building among key political and local actors.

The project will focus on constitutional, political party framework law and electoral law reforms and the depth to which these reforms will reach and be implemented will depend to a large extent on the degree of mobilization of additional resources. The goal is also to maximize the role that civil society groups from both national and local levels can play to ensure that the reforms reflect broad, inclusive and diverse voices from the Bissau-Guinean society. In other words, the implementation of reforms developed through broad consultation should reflect the collective will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

Thus, the project also seeks to ensure that women (including women farmers) and youth, traditional leaders, religious leaders, NGOs and their networks active in peacebuilding and other relevant stakeholders can actively and effectively participate in regional and national dialogues related to the reforms, their implementation and monitoring.

As such, the project focuses on building and strengthening the capacities of citizens to fully participate in national democratic process and clarifying policy development, enabling citizens, especially those who tend to be excluded from such discussions, to articulate policy inputs and engage in national decision-making processes, thereby advancing participatory democracy.

**Output 2.1. Systemic reforms drafted and approved with effective lobbying, implementation strategies designed, monitoring mechanism established and training and communication strategies undertaken**

The project will provide the technical support needed for the development of draft-legislation, to steer the draft laws through the parliamentary approval processes and develop an implementation strategy on three specific national policy reforms: *political party law, electoral law and constitutional reform*. Any efforts undertaken by this project about electoral law reform, will be done in accordance with the UN policy on electoral assistance, in close consultation with DPPA Electoral Assistance Division (on behalf of the UN Election Focal Point).

Key activities:

**Activity 2.1.1. Support the Reform Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office and the ANPs ad-hoc Parliamentary Commissions and/or other bodies/mechanism created to advance the reforms, with specific focus on the three laws.** The support will cover efforts to rally political will for the reforms by developing confidence building measures to create the space for the reforms to be discussed, approved and implemented. The support will enable the reform unit and the relevant ad-hoc parliamentary commissions to carry out their functions related to the drafting/revising proposed laws. It could include providing international experts to provide up-to-date information on international best practices. Most specifically it will support high level inter-institutional cooperation and dialogue among the branches of government and political parties to coordinate the government’s and parties input into the concerned laws. In this regard, the output seeks to promote high-level political dialogue and coordination among state organs with regards to the reforms.

The activity will also support the government to agree on the terms of a national agenda for the implementation of the reforms, including definition of timing, sequence and extent of the reforms, as well as to ensure good governance and transparency of on-going reform processes, to create confidence amongst stakeholders. Given that the span of the project will not allow for an accompaniment of the full implementation of the policies, the project will ensure that a comprehensive implementation plan is in place with a wide buy-in from national stakeholders and the requisite capacity to go forward.

**Activity 2.1.2: Support the organization and facilitation of stakeholder consultations on draft Constitution, political party law, and the electoral law and their implementation.** The project will specifically ensure that inclusive consultation processes involving different sets of relevant stakeholders at the national and regional levels to enable input to the draft laws. This activity will cover costs associated with specific technical assistance in national policy dialogue design as well as the costs of holding national stakeholder consultations. Regional consultation will be supported in 2.2.2.

**Activity 2.1.3: Enable bottom up advocacy for the design and passage of the draft laws in parliament.** This activity will also enable civil society stakeholders to engage with lawmakers and political parties to help rally political will and advocate for the passage of draft laws in the national assembly through small grants. In this regard, the project will support forms of participatory dialogue between citizens and parliament, to reinforce the link between local and national policy formulation and accountability. The activity will pay attention to the inclusion of women and youth in these processes. These activities precede the work of the Observatory, which comes into play once laws are approved and implementation plans need to be developed and monitored.

**Activity 2.1.4 Enable media communication and public education/dissemination efforts on reform laws based on a jointly developed Strategic Communication Plan.** The project will

enable broad public knowledge of the reforms at different stages. For example, the project will support radio programs on the role of National Popular Assembly (ANP) specialized commissions and their areas of intervention. Culturally sensitive and adapted messaging will also focus on enhancing citizens' awareness, mainly in rural areas, of the need to exercise their civic rights and duties to receive information on political processes, and the gendered dimensions of the reforms in accessible formats and language. In addition, the project will enable youth, women and other CSO groups to consult the draft laws with their networks and community. Stakeholders will draw up a **Strategic Communication Plan** to ensure that civil society groups are speaking in a coordinated fashion with a set of commonly agreed key messages that are tailored for the different stakeholders. The strategy would enable dissemination of information through traditional and social media platforms, amongst others.

**Activity 2.1.5: Support design, establishment and maintenance of a Civil Society Observatory for monitoring of the key reforms.** The Stability Pact calls for the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to monitor stability and empower civil society actors to advocate with political stakeholders for the implementation of the Pact. The project would enable the participation of Civil Society in that structure through the creation of an inclusive Observatory for monitoring of the key reforms that will be responsible for collecting data on a set of preestablished indicators, analyzing the information and drafting thematic reports as a means of assessing the implementation of reform process, envisaged in the Conakry Agreement and the Stability Pact.

The Observatory would also develop a common strategy that will enable civil society organizations to be engaged in the implementation and monitoring of the reforms. The observatory will be organized in a manner that new voices and broader participation of civil society representatives, especially from the regions, is ensured. At the same time, it is crucial to empower those actors that do not have the same experience as other NGOs that have been part of existing dialogue structures. For example, data from the women mediators' network, Houses of Justice and other conflict management, protection, and local advocacy structures, including from rural women's networks, will be provided from the regions to feed into progress and thematic reports that contribute to the analysis of reform implementation constraints and progress made.

The production of statistics, credible reports and thematic studies on the implementation of the reforms will contribute to a better understanding of the forces reticent to change and the development of strategies to address them. The studies will also assess the impact of the reforms in rural areas and have data gathering mechanism that will enhance rural participation in the reform implementation. The observatory will gather gender disaggregated data from the local and regional advocacy structures established through **Activity 2.2.2** below.

The Observatory will interface with the Coordination Mechanism established through **Output 1.3**. Technical support will be crucial to ensure the efficiency and credibility of the Observatory, which could build on UNFPA's expertise on data collection and tailored trainings. All collaborating partners will support the process of establishing the Observatory, the definition of its specific activities and the cost of rural consultations and production of specific outputs.

The products of the Observatory will provide information for a **civil society – government dialogue platform** whereby the effectiveness of the reform implementation will be discussed periodically based on credible information. This will allow for adaptations to be made. The dialogue platform will strengthen confidence between Civil Society Organizations, Members of the National Assembly s and the Government and provide the space to discuss further measures that could be implemented to create an environment conducive to reforms, as well as mitigate any resistance to the implementation of the reforms, by putting in place accountability and transparency measures. There are forces that prefer the status quo and do not want reforms that will enable greater political inclusiveness. The Observatory will also contribute to supporting the Government establish a Transparency Portal as the interface for communication between the government and

the people. The project will tap into UNFPA's data collection, analysis management and training expertise.

**Output 2.2: CSO stakeholders, government officials and political party leaders supported, and capacities built to enable effective engagement on the three reform processes.**

Effective participation doesn't happen merely by inviting stakeholders to the negotiation table. The project recognizes power asymmetries inherent in such processes and seeks to create a more level playing field by enabling the empowerment of stakeholders to enhance effective process and informed decision making. This output focuses on enabling specific sets of trainings to key stakeholders engaged in policy processes, with an emphasis on enabling the participation of rural women who have long been excluded and marginalized. Government and political party leaders also have capacity gaps. These actors need to be encouraged to become more receptive to the public's views and improve their public engagement skills.

Together the activities in this output will form a *Methodology for Engagement*. This creates a mechanism whereby local and mid-level perspectives and issues can be incorporated into national policy inputs. The advocacy structures will be developed based on lessons learnt in the past and cross fertilization to establish a workable methodology that fits the country context and that will link local stakeholders that have been through training to advocacy to regional consultation platforms.

Key activities:

**Activity 2.2.1: The design and launch of a Leadership Academy** that will provide Tailored Training to different Stakeholder groups (with a focus on women and youth) and equip them with the essential tools and mindset to contribute effectively to the three systemic national policy processes. The activity also envisions the development of replicable and contextualized, gender-sensitive training materials, that will cover a gamut of subjects and contribute to the development of specialized skill sets that will be needed to help stakeholders engage in crisis management and to enable effective stakeholder engagement in national policy design, implementation and monitoring.

UNDP proposes the formation of a Leadership Academy to deliver Activities 1.1.3, 1.2.2, 2.1.5 and this 2.2.1. The Leadership Academy seeks to identify, develop and nurture change agents, from different sectors and levels of society (such as women and youth networks, traditional leaders, religious leaders, private sector, rural women farmers, NGOs active in peacebuilding and governance), by designing and providing long-term progressive and complementary courses that will provide a 360-degree understanding of the political, societal and economical challenges prevalent in the country. The mapping exercise (Activity 1.2.4) will help determine the trainees to be selected and the training they will need from the Leadership Academy under this project. Similarly, UNDP will study the options for getting the Leadership Academy quickly off the ground by assessing potential partnerships with national institutions engaged in leadership development, such as the Ubuntu Leadership Academy that is currently providing leadership training in 13 cities throughout the country for another PBF supported project.

Stakeholders will also include government officials and political party leaders who require capacity-building to better comprehend their respective roles within a democratic society. Special focus will be paid to youth and women's wings of all political parties to ensure their active participation in the three reform processes, by diagnosing and addressing their specific training needs such as leadership, party management, and legal drafting.

Through a human-centered design approach, the Academy will identify and create leaders (particularly women and youth) through an intensive program of intellectual growth and hands-on leadership development that envisions:

1. Catered training courses in conflict analysis, prevention, resolution and negotiation skills, gender analysis, human rights, citizenship, policy design and advocacy, communication, organization and outreach, consultation/dialogue design and facilitation, networking and coalition building, policy monitoring and accountability, data collection and analysis, etc. – as relevant to national public policy processes.
2. Incubators, where members of civil society groups, government, the arts, and political parties can come together with Leadership Academy members and discuss what leadership means in Guinea-Bissau, share ideas and bring important topics to the semi-public sphere.
3. A platform, that will consolidate training models and methodologies that have been ongoing and sporadic throughout the country and streamline efforts to focus on steady and committed participation through experimental forms of teaching and coaching. The training will build on diagnosis and evaluations of the different materials developed by PBF supported projects and other available learning experiences and methodologies.
4. Short study trips, international and national meetings and debates, virtual seminars with international experts to foster knowledge exchange and flow of new information and ideas. Additionally, the Academy will build a network, both internally amongst participants of cohorts, and externally with other Leadership Academies on a national and global level
5. Trainings that also focus on complementing the capacity of members of the Observatory on data collection, analysis and management and ensure data collected are all gender sensitive and disaggregated (gender, age, location).
6. Commitment of Leadership Academy participants to give back to their local communities and contribute to the development of new partnerships with local governance institutions and CSOs.

UNDP will consolidate the Leadership Academy and will create partnerships and synergies with other programs in the areas of governance, environment conservation and other areas as judged pertinent, aiming at its financial and technical sustainability. As stated, the Leadership Academy will certainly obtain resources from other sources for its opening to other areas and its consolidation. The funds available for this activity are insufficient to the task. Recognizing this, UNDP will contribute up to 200,000.00 USD to ensure the sustainability of the output. The strategy fits with UNDP's longer-term strategic plan for Guinea-Bissau and is committed to a fundraising effort to better endow this work. The Academy will likely be housed at an existing public institution for example, the Escola Nacional de Administração (with which UNDP already has a solid partnership built through the implementation of the Local Economic Development Programme) and additionally include a mobile component to reach new and marginalized stakeholders.

Funds amounting to 170,000 USD are envisioned in this project to enable the inclusion of rural women farmers to the regional and national consultations. WFP, with PBF support, trained a cadre of rural women advocates from three regions last year. Efforts in this project will enable more women from at least one region to participate in regional and national consultations.

WFP has developed a unique methodology through the previous PBF project and trained women farmers in an array of life skills including literacy, nutrition, basic business skills and value chain. Through this “affirmative action” methodology WFP is able to upskill a broad group of rural women. The genius of the model is that the broad training enables WFP to identify the smartest and most articulate women and give them additional training as well as experience advocating for rural women's rights issues with local, regional and national policy makers. This select group of women is then introduced to another set of topics, such as: human rights including economic and social rights, rights to land and water, gender equality, communication for citizenship and mobilization, family budget and basic business management, cooperativism, access to justice, and

conflict resolution. Once these women go through the WFP program the smartest and most capable women will be referred to the Leadership Academy where they will receive the additional training that will prepare them to participate in regional and national consultations on the policies to be devised through the project.

Special attention is needed to this stakeholder group because of the distinct disadvantages they face in expressing their views and using their influence. Rural women farmers need more foundational training before they can attend a 'leadership academy' and genuinely participate in consultations on national laws. The focus is also warranted since rural women comprise over 50% of the rural population and 30% of the total population and are the principle producers of agricultural products. The WFP strategy is important because it will also prepare women to participate in local elections, which will be a key element of the electoral reform bill, thus preventing further delays to their inclusion in decision-making processes. This strategy will also ensure that regional and national consultations include more than the usual actors. This is important to ensuring that the laws reflect the will of common people.

The training curricula and methodologies of the rural women's training can be integrated into the portfolio of materials and methodologies of the leadership academy once it is up and running. Likewise, the materials of the leadership academy, where applicable (such as with any conflict resolution components) will be used in the rural women trainings once they are available to ensure a more harmonized approach and prevent mixed messaging. Once the leadership academy is equipped with a mobile training team with local language capacities and can reach deep into the countryside, more synergies can be expected.

**Activity 2.2.2: Support the formation of local and regional advocacy meetings on systemic policy reforms.** Regional advocacy spaces will enable groups of stakeholders to come together at regional level to reach a common understanding, find workable public policy solutions and develop common strategies for engagement, develop commonly held positions, identify interests and enable a more effective civil society participation in the national dialogues related to the three reform processes. The training environment will not suffice to develop consensus on policy input, advocacy, engagement and outreach strategies and effective policy monitoring. The regional advocacy meetings will be convened to gather from rural representatives input for the policies. They are necessary to support effective and balanced processes and ensure the voice of rural constituencies are heard. It would also create the opportunity for spiritual leaders and other marginalized or excluded stakeholders, to participate in a visible process. The hope is that these meetings can eventually be shaped into a permanent dialogue and advocacy structure at the regional level with a coordinating committees and secretarial support to reach down to the sectoral level to identify delegates to the regional meetings. The regional structures will also identify participants for the national consultations. The members of the regional advocacy spaces will also provide data for the Observatory and can be convened for consultations on the implementation of the reforms through the activities of the Observatory.

**Output 2.3: Preparations and follow up actions for the National Conference Paths to Peace and Development supported**

The Stability Pact calls for holding a National Conference on Reconciliation. One objective of the conference is to extract a commitment from political elites to not go back to a time when political assassinations were a way of doing political business. While these have ceased over the past five years, there are no guarantees that political violence may not return. Another objective is for the concerned political elite to seek the nation's forgiveness for the past human rights violations and to give closure to the victims and families of martyrs. Concerning the widows, children and other relatives of those killed in politically motivated crimes, the model for addressing the past will need to be sensitive to the will of the victims – the most vocal of which are the widows. It is important to keep in mind that no women have ever been the target of political motivated deaths in the history

Guinea-Bissau, but as widows, mothers, daughters and sisters of the diseased, their victimization has had unique and lasting consequences. Delegates to the conference will also have to make an informed choice from among a set of given options on a model to enable the country to address past unresolved and impugned political crimes that keep the country tethered to the past. The project will provide support to convene the National Conference, bring an end to the work of the current OCNC and give a mandate to a new structure that will be responsible for implementing the chosen model. The OCNC has made progress for a National Conference with the preparation of technical documents relevant to an informed choice. The political crises, and the sensitive period around the electoral cycle, did not allow the OCNC to create the political momentum necessary to convene the National Conference. However, the OCNC and civil society mobilization helped keep high on the country's political agenda that efforts towards stability must be inclusive of a process for dealing with the past.

Key activities:

**Activity 2.3.1: Engage stakeholders and prepare them to participate in the National Conference.** The involved stakeholders would include state institutions, political parties and the security and armed forces and, on the other hand, civil society, victims, women, youth, traditional leaders, religious communities, media, academia, in order to ensure inclusivity, local relevance and sustainability of the process. Additional stakeholders can be identified to participate and secure political and community buy-in for the holding of the National Conference. Engagement with stakeholders would include communication on the aim of the National Conference and its expected outcomes to enable informed decision-making. It would also include capacity-building sessions targeting participants to allow for their meaningful participation.

**Activity 2.3.2. Help prepare the OCNC to facilitate the National Conference.** This will enable the finalization of preparations for the National Conference that started in the previous project. This includes developing the TORs, agenda, and methodology, identification of participants, modules and facilitators. Support also in the preparation of supporting documents, such as sample draft regulations and strategies, which can contribute to discussions during the National Conference. Preparatory activities will include also an assessment, identification of reasons for lack of effective implementation of recommendations from various national reconciliation conferences held in Guinea-Bissau (e.g. National Conference Paths to Peace and Development, a two-day Journey on Reflections on Stability) and lesson learned. Preparatory activities for the National Conference will also include an assessment of conflict resolution systems and national and community structures aimed at managing causes of tension and conflict, and the formulation of recommendations for the strengthening of institutional arrangements.

**Activity 2.3.3: Support the development and implementation of a Strategic Communication Plan for the conference.** The plan will inform on the preparation, work and outcomes of the National Conference. Social communication products will be developed on the work of the National Conference, including the development of key messaging, including tailored language, and appropriate means of communication.

**Activity 2.3.4: Hold the National Conference.** The National Conference will bring together delegates from all regions and representatives from state institutions and civil society. It will constitute the opportunity to build a national agenda and strategy for reconciliation and the way forward for the country's peace and development efforts. Delegates will choose from among a range of models for addressing the past that go from doing nothing, to declaring an amnesty of perpetrators, to promoting development and institutional reforms, to enabling symbolic recognition of the victims with the construction of a memorial, to creating a special tribunal to judge human rights violators, to establishing a fact finding commission to enabling reconciliation through restorative justice methodologies. Delegates may choose one or combine several options to

formulate a hybrid model and provide a set of recommendations for whatever structure would follow from the deliberations at the conference.

**Activity 2.3.5: Support post conference reporting and the development of a strategic action plan.** The project will help prepare a Conference Report and, an inclusive action plan on the way forward for the reconciliation process.

b) Provide a **project-level ‘theory of change’**

The theory of change is built on the assumption that the engagement and support of new actors in the public sphere is germane to an effective long-term stabilization process. These new actors include, among others: Rural women and disempowered citizens, youth, cultural groups, traditional local authorities (the “Regulos”), animist influencers and the private sector. The assumption is that with appropriate capacity building and support, vertical and horizontal dialogue among stakeholders around concrete policies is the best approach for fostering sustainable change. The key and urgent reforms are an opportunity for advancing confidence-building measures that can will create renewed positive dynamics among the people, the political institutions and the State, and allow for the approval of laws and effective implementation of reforms to guarantee stability. The effort is built on the following assumptions:

- If citizens are provided with levers to render public officials and political leaders accountable when policies do not meet their expectations, then a governance transformative mechanism can be put in place, supporting implementation of necessary reforms, in favor of peace and stability that will enable generating growth and development;
- If the Government and the Parliament receive political-dialogue and coordination support under the UN’s lead, then an inclusive consultation processes for systemic reforms can take place, organs of sovereignty can build their capacities and a common understanding can be reached towards systemic reforms;
- If inclusive opportunities for political dialogue and capacity development are created with special reference to women and youth, as well as other relevant stakeholders, then the civil society can influence public policies and actively monitor State reforms, participate in decision-making and exercise pressure towards change;
- If the Reform Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office is technically supported to engage with concerned stakeholders, civil society and international partners on the development and implementation of reforms, this will strengthen the political will of the government, as well as the willingness of international partners to support the reform process;
- If a National Conference on reconciliation is held, a commitment can be extracted from the political elite to never return to the dark days when political killings were part and parcel of the political game and a mechanism for dealing with past political crimes can be determined and established, the country will be able to move on from it bitter past. This will contribute to, peace and stability and enable development.

This theory of change envisions two possible scenarios one in which the political impasse continues, and efforts will have to go toward crisis intervention. But, the theory of change also assumes that if a modicum of political will in favor of stability in the political environment, the political stalemate and impasse can be overcome through better planned and coordinated efforts. If the engagement between political actors is well managed and a positive experience for them and if the new actors can be properly supported and organized to enter the public space in a meaningful and effective way, then the tractions derived from increased confidence and renewed trust between high level political actors and between political actors and citizens for systemic policy reforms

could be generated and lead to not only to progress on the reforms but, improved relationships that are key to long term stability

**c) Project result framework**

See **Annex B**

**d) Project targeting and sequencing strategy –**

The project will enable a coordinated approach to the political crisis and as soon as the situation allows, quickly and effectively move to the development and implementation of systemic reforms essential to long-term stability. In so doing, the project will also contribute to changing the political and institutional culture in Guinea-Bissau towards greater inclusivity of women, youth and other populations in the country’s stability and thus strengthen its resilience to crises. For this, UNDP will prioritize the Leadership Academy, taking advantage of existing leadership development institutions in the country like the Ubuntu Academy.

The project will build on the results and lessons learnt from the previous project on “Political Dialogue and National Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau” and will bring together key national political stakeholders, organs of sovereignty and the civil society to enable engagement and dialogue. The project will incorporate the usual partners as well as an expanded network to the local and regional level, to ensure rural residents are part of an inclusive processes. At the local and regional level, it will seek to consolidate established rural networks on the mainland: **Gabu, Cacheu, Bafata, Oio, Tombali and Quinara Regions**. Thus, marginalized or excluded stakeholders will be engaged and given the skills and opportunity to participate in a visible, and transparent manner to ensure that their interests are reflected and included in the reforms. But the specific stakeholders and their training needs will be determined through the baseline mapping outlined in Activity 1.2.4. This will be one of the first activities undertaken by the project

A national agenda for reforms implementation will generate a coordination mechanism to enhance collaborative leadership and dialogue between the three branches of power. An Observatory comprised of a CSOs network will collect, analyze and report critical data on a set of pre-established indicators for the implementation of the reforms. The data will be used to inform constructive government – CSO dialogue on the reform implementation. Media structures will be engaged to ensure journalists’ increased capacity to inform the public about the reforms at the various stages. Gender perspective will be reflected in all aspects of the interventions.

The project will - through the preparatory activities of the OCNC - contribute to stabilization by advancing the national reconciliation agenda. These preparatory activities and then the holding of the National Conference will enable a unifying discourse around the issue of national reconciliation, which like the systemic reforms, is also key to long-term stability.

**III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)**

**a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Total budget in previous calendar year</b>	<b>Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)</b>	<b>Location of in-country offices</b>	<b>No. of existing staff, of which in project zones</b>	<b>Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project</b>
UNDP	USD 27,405,079	Donor government	Bissau	60	UNDP has ha governance unit

	Fiscal year (2017)	Core			that will support the project, especially at the launch stage to ensure TOR for staff are done and project staff is hired
UNDP	\$30,528,441 Fiscal year (2018)	Donor government Core	Bissau	60	
UNDP	\$26,680,580 Fiscal year 2019	Donor government Core	Bissau	60	
WFP	USD26,333,099 Calendar year (2017)	EU, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, USA	Bissau and Bafata	39	RR for WFP is very involved in the project as is one International staff member, Head of Program. WFP Gender Focal Point will accompany rural women activities with support from M&E/VAM specialist and Program Policy Officer and Resilience Assistant.
WFP	USD16,617,705 Calendar year (2018)	EU, Guinea-Bissau, Italy, Japan, UN/PBF, USA	Bissau and Bafata	40	
UNFPA	3,334,935 Calendar year (2017)	H4+	Bissau, Gabu Bafata, Quinara, Tombali, Bolama, Bijagos		UNFPA has assigned one part time NOB to enable effective implementation and will support with in-house M&E specialist
UNFPA	1.090.669,27 687,955 Calendar year (2018)	H4+ PBF	Bissau Gabu Bafata, Quinara, Tombali, Bolama, Bijagos		

**UNDP**

UNDP will serve as the lead RUNO for the project and will ensure coherence and partnership in activity implementation jointly with UNIOGBIS, WFP and UNFPA across the outcomes, outputs and activities.

UNDP has been operating in Guinea-Bissau for more than 40 years in the areas of democratic governance, inclusive growth and sustainable development. Currently composed by 60 staff members, including programme and operations staff, the country office has been able to successfully implement many joint programs as well as donor basket funds, such as the recent elections basket fund with contributions from more than 10 donors. Between 2014 and 2017, UNDP annual budget allocations to support Guinea-Bissau's development initiatives have been approximately USD 27,500,500, with annual delivery rates of 79.9 per cent (2014), 83.4 per cent (2015) and 85.4 per cent (2016). UNDP has been the recipient of approximately 75% of PBF money allocated to Guinea-Bissau over the past 10 years. UNDP has also been acting as operating agent of non-resident agencies and is the host of the PBF Secretariat in the country.

The Governance Unit of UNDP will oversee the operational aspects of the project to ensure that it is compliant with corporate management policies and procedures. This Unit is engaged to support government efforts to strengthen the national institutions and participatory democracy to stabilize Guinea-Bissau. The core of the UNDP contributions in this regard are: (a) judicial reforms, including access to quality services; (b) supporting civil society participation in democratic processes and economic governance, and development of the capacity of the National People's Assembly to play its oversight and control role; (c) improving the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration, including extension of state services at the local level; and (d) strengthening electoral cycle systems in order to deliver on robust, transparent electoral exercises.

During the Transition period, UNDP and UNIOGBIS will both lead on the substantive design and implementation of the project, building on UNIOGBIS experience leading on the 2 previous national dialogue projects. UNDP and UNIOGBIS will benefit from multi-faceted technical support provided by UNIOGBIS substantive components (political affairs, gender, public information, human rights, and CDTOC) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and UNOWAS. UNIOGBIS is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General i.e. (SRSG) for Guinea-Bissau, while the RC is responsible for the United Nations country team (UNCT). The mission has a staff capacity of 140 civilians, 13 Police Advisers, 2 Military and 3 Government-Provided Personnel. The regular budget approved for the mission in 2016-2017 amounted to USD 36,250,600, excluding USD 400,000 in extra-budgetary resources allocated to the Mission by DPA.

## **UNFPA**

The UNFPA Guinea-Bissau Country Office, established in the country since 1979, is managed by a Resident Representative. In addition to the Representative and his personal assistant, the office has five technical staff, including one international, three operations and three support staff. Total funds available to UNFPA for 2019 are USD 869,508 from regular resources and USD 1,210,381 from other resources. From 2009 to 2012, UNFPA managed an MDG Achievement Fund for "Strengthening Justice and Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau" in a partnership with UNDP, UN Women UNODC, for a total amount of USD 3,854,817, of which UNFPA managed USD 226,305. From 2013 to 2018, UNFPA coordinated the H4+ initiative, a "Global initiative for maternal and child mortality reduction" in a partnership with WHO, UNICEF, UN Women, UNAIDS, Government and NGOs. The amount approved for UNFPA was USD 3,334,935. for a total amount of USD 6,900,000. Since 2013, UNFPA participate in the FGM Joint Programmed, in a partnership with UNICEF. The 2019 budget is USD 233,645 for UNFPA. Currently, through a PBF project of USD 1,775,482, to promote women and youth political participation, the approved amount for UNFPA is USD 687,955.

UNFPA has chaired both the United Nations Thematic Group for HIV and the United Nations Thematic Group for Gender two times each. UNFPA typically supports the Government of Guinea-

Bissau among which the Ministry of Women, Family and Social Protection, through its Institute for Women and Children, Ministry of Public Health and Ministry of Youth and the Institute of Youth to coordinate activities with various organizations, NGOs, youth networks and associations.

With specialist staff qualified in diverse areas of expertise especially Youth and Gender specialists, data collection, analysis and management expert, an M&E Officer and a Communications Officer, UNFPA is prepared to support effective youth and women participation and data collection efforts by the observatory, specifically as well as the other activities of the project. UNFPA aims to support women and youth organizations to be heard in the process of legal reforms and to actively participate with suggestions and recommendations in all matters concerning their contribution to the stabilization of the country. In the current PBF supported project, UNFPA is charged with creating a youth platform of the political parties that will be an important stakeholder in this project. UNFPA is also backstopped by a regional office and headquarters incorporating several advisers and specialists, including for youth, gender and M&E components. With this support, UNFPA will be an important partner on all aspect of project, especially regarding youth engagement and data collection.

## **WFP**

WFP's current Country Strategic Plan 2019 – 2024 approved by the Executive Board on 14 June 2019 started in July 2019. It contributes to three outcomes of the United Nations Partnership Assistance Framework (UNPAF) and is aligned with Government priorities identified in the strategic and operational plan for 2015–2025, also known as *Terra Ranke*. Built on widely consulted and extensively inclusive Zero Hunger Strategic Review conducted by the Government supported by WFP in 2018 as well as lessons learned from previous WFP programmes, the Country Strategic Plan promotes government and community ownership of an integrated, multi-sector social protection approach to treat and prevent stunting, improve nutrition and food security for primary school children and shock-prone vulnerable households, strengthen resilience of smallholders and strengthen national capacity food security and nutrition.

People assisted through the Strategic Plan include approximately 60% of primary school children enrolled in all eight regions; undernourished and/or stunted children aged 6-59 months in three regions with stunting rates over 30%; undernourished people living with HIV (PLHIV) on treatment and their families; and vulnerable smallholder farmers, particularly women and youth. WFP provides food and cash-based transfers, capacity strengthening, M&E and supply chain support for sustainable achievement of SDG 2 by the Government.

The Country Strategic Plan with USD61.6 million approved budget has five strategic outcomes: (i) Crisis-affected populations in Guinea-Bissau are able to meet their basic food and nutrition requirements in the aftermath of shocks; (ii) School-age children in Guinea-Bissau have access to nutritious meals during the school year; (iii) Populations at risk of malnutrition in Guinea-Bissau, particularly children, women and adolescent girls of reproductive age and people living with HIV, have improved nutrition status in line with national targets by 2024; (iv) Smallholder farmers in Guinea-Bissau, particularly women and young people, have improved livelihoods and increased household incomes by 2024; and (v) National institutions and legislators in Guinea-Bissau have enhanced capacity in and are accountable for the development, implementation and monitoring of evidence-based food security and nutrition policies and programmes by 2030.

The WFP country office, established in 1974 in Guinea-Bissau, is currently staffed by 2 international staff, 36 national staff and 2 international consultants led by a Representative and Country Director. Areas of functional expertise comprise strategic planning and management, policy advisory, evidence generation and technical assistance on food security and nutrition, capacity strengthening, resilience, vulnerability assessment and mapping, M&E, and supply chain. The operation is supported by experienced officers and support staff of communications, finance, budget, human resources information technology and administration. A trained gender focal point

ensures consistency with corporate strategies and best practices. At regional and headquarters level, senior specialists provide technical support and oversight to all functional areas, as well as cross-cutting support in accountability, evidence generation, gender, and innovation.

WFP chairs the SUN (Scaling Up Nutrition) UN Network and Inter-agency Humanitarian Working Group in Guinea-Bissau, hosts Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System and participates in the Government and development partners sector coordination groups in agriculture and food security, education, health and nutrition and social protection. In coordination with the Government and African Union, WFP has completed a Cost of Hunger Analysis that quantifies long-term economic impacts of chronic malnutrition. WFP has completed KAP study in nutrition to formulate a strategy for social behaviour change communication and is preparing for piloting real-time digital nutrition monitoring system, award-winning SCOPE/CODA.

WFP partners with Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry; Economy and Finance; Education; Public Health, Woman, Family and Social Protection; Interior and signed Letter of Understanding for its Country Strategic Plan, 2019 – 2014. WFP looks forward to an opportunity to empower rural women, 30% of the population, and unleash their potentials to contribute to reforms, confidence and peacebuilding. It is high time to liberate rural women from traditional norms and practices that kept them enslaved for too long away from economic and political participation speaking with their voice.

## **b) Project management and coordination**

A professional Project Manager (PM) P-3 International with a solid specialization in project management and a background in inclusive and gender-sensitive peacebuilding and political dialogue will be recruited to lead the project. The PM will be co-located at UNIOGBIS/PAS (50 per cent of his/her time) and UNDP (50 per cent) until mid-2020 and then completely at UNDP. The PM will report to the Head of Governance unit at UNDP who will contribute 20% of his or her time to this project. The DRR will contribute 10% to oversight and high-level engagement with the political actors and the RR will contribute 5%-10% of his time to this project, as needed, focusing on the sensitive political engagements and addressing bottlenecks. These contributions are not covered by the project.

The PM will coordinate and manage the overall intervention and will have responsibility on project implementation, including providing technical guidance on substantive aspects, ensuring effective coordination among the RUNOs and implementing partners, and supervising external personnel contracted by the project. The Program Manager shall coordinate the necessary support for the implementation of the PBF project, responding to WFP, UNFPA, UNIOGBIS/PAS and to UNDP, as well as to UNCT when necessary. The PM will work with an Administrative and Finance Assistant and 2 part time staff from UNFPA and WFP. The PM and the AFA will be based in UNDP. The PM will also:

- Ensure the timely implementation of all project activities and achievement of all project deliverables;
- Identify, monitor and regularly report on project risks to the Project Coordination Team and Project Board
- Prepare Annual Work Plans and mid-year, annual and final narrative reports for the consideration and approval of the Project Coordination Team;
- Provide project management support to national implementing partners, as required;
- Provide secretariat support to the Project Coordination Team and the Project Board, including by organizing meetings and preparing their respective summaries.

The structure for project management herein proposed considers the needs for implementing the activities related to the described outputs in annex B, with the achievement of the concerned expected results, and considers the phase of transition that includes a plan for reconfiguring, downsizing and ultimately closing UNIOGBIS by the end 2020.

The PM, with support of the PBF Secretariat, will support the development of the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, including data gathering and analysis and will identify problems and issues to be addressed. The Programme Manager shall propose corrective actions, coordinate the activities of all involved implementing partners, supervise and ensure that activities correspond to project goals; verify and measure indicators for appropriate monitoring and evaluation purposes; ensure compliance with regulations of the PBF Secretariat and UNDP/WFP/UNFPA Finance and Procurement departments, in coordination with all relevant stakeholders.

- A National Administrative and Finance Officer will be hired and shall be able to operate as UNDP staff member, mastering accounting and administration according to UNDP Finance and Procurement departments. The Admin and Finance Officer will ensure timely response to procurement needs of the different component of the project in close coordination with the Programme Manager and implementing partners. The officer will be entrusted with the management of the payment through cash vouchers needed for activities' implementation, that only agency's staff are entitled to handle.
- WFP and UNFP will be each have a half-time staff person on the project team to enable the inclusion of the agencies' added value but will also support the implementation of all activities under the direction of the PM not just the ones to which these agencies contribute directly. WFP will participate with a less than half-time Gender Focal Point, a Program Manager and M&E Specialist

The modality of implementation utilizing grants to civil society organizations will be utilized, according to the circumstance. This modality enables easier management and procurement and favors national ownership and appropriation but must follow UNDP rules and regulations. Where necessary ad-hoc consultancies will be planned at project development level.

A Program Analyst already paid for exclusively by UNDP, will be responsible for the operational management of the project, in accordance with existing corporate rules, including reporting, financial management, and procurement of goods and services. This Program Analyst will ensure that the initial Term of Reference (ToR) for hiring the project team are prepared and advertised, The UNDP Program Analyst will operate under the overall guidance of the Project Coordination Team.

A technical-level Project Coordination Team (PCT), chaired by the Program Manager, will be established to serve as platform for coordination and exchange of information, and to oversee technical aspects of project implementation, including joint field missions for programmatic visits, assurance of project overall quality and reporting, and technical backstopping and programmatic guidance to the Project Coordinator.

The PCT will include relevant personnel from UNIOGBIS (including PIU, PAS and Gender Unit), UNDP (Governance Cluster), WFP, UNFPA, the PBF Secretariat, the PBF national focal point and other relevant entities in the country team. The Project Coordination Team will meet on a monthly basis or as regularly as required to address project implementation needs. The PCT format will be reviewed based on UNIOGBIS' drawdown with responsibilities shifted to UNDP.

A senior-level Project Board, co-chaired by the SRSG (and Head of UNIOGBIS) and the RCO, and composed by UNIOGBIS, UNDP, WFP, UNFPA the PBF Secretariat, relevant

entities in the country team and representatives of national implementing partners, will be established to provide strategic guidance and oversight on project implementation, including making management decisions upon request by the Project Manager. The Project Board, which will meet once per quarter, will also perform the duties and tasks assigned as per UNDP Guidelines on Annual Review process.

c) **Risk management**

<b>Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes</b>	<b>Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)</b>	<b>Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)</b>	<b>Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)</b>
Persistence of the current political crisis and the institutional stalemate at the National Assembly (lack of 2/3 majority at the National Assembly to approve the legal reforms)	High	High	The project will support the mediation role of ECOWAS to develop an intervention plan. The project will support the SRSG to undertake a coordination role with international partners, to facilitate understanding among political actors on the implementation of the Conakry Agreement
Persistent lack of will of the Government and concerned political stakeholders to implement Systemic reforms, namely the Reform's Unit	High	High	Support to creation of tools to be used by civil society to leverage influence with Government officials and politicians
Lack of coordination between organs of sovereignty for reform implementation and conflicts of power attributions between the President and Prime Minister	High	High	Ensure coordination and technical support to organs of sovereignty by UNIOGBIS/PAS and UNDP/Governance
Lack of capacity of the empowered CSOs and related network to be able to effectively exercise levers at socio-political level for implementing and monitoring the State reforms	High	High	Ensure coordination, technical support and capacity development by UNIOGBIS/PAS, UNDP support sharing responsibilities among network members and support with external consultancies for strengthening management skills
Lack of responsiveness of the targeted stockholders within the sensitization activities for gender equality in political dialogue, reconciliation, mediation and participation in decision-making	High	High	Ensure wider gender inclusive opportunities and capacity development by UNIOGBIS/Gender Unit
Military intervention in politics	Medium	High	Ensure the support of ECOWAS and democratic

			institutions by the UN system in the Country The presence of ECOMIB, which continued to serve as a deterrent, and the possible use of preventive action and verbal alerts, by national stakeholders and international partners, against politically motivated violence
Transition from UNIOGBIS to Country Team and how this will affect capacities of the UN to engage with high level national authorities	Medium	Medium	UN Agencies already have access to high level authorities but the UNIOGOBIS PAS will ensure proper introductions to enable effective engagement with high level actors
Insufficient Resources for the Reforms	High	High	Prioritize the reforms undertaken
Insufficient resources for a Leadership Academy as envisioned	High	High	UNDP is committed to raising additional funds to ensure that this effort has a more permanent impact. UNDP will consolidate the Leadership Academy and will create partnerships and synergies with other programs in the areas of governance, environment conservation and other areas as judged pertinent, aiming at its financial and technical sustainability.

#### d) **Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation will be conducted at different stages and with different methodologies. Annual workplans (AWP) and a M&E plan will have to be approved by the project team and main national partners and shared with PBF. The Project Manager (PM), with technical support from the PBF Secretariat in Guinea-Bissau, will prepare a detailed M&E plan based on the AWP for the Project Coordination Team. The M&E plan will stipulate monitoring activities every six months to support reporting requirement and data collection activities, based on the adjacent Results Framework. Surveys and Community Based Monitoring will be used where feasible. Project activity 1.2.4 envisions a survey that could contribute to the project baseline. 30,000 USD has been earmarked for this activity. It will be necessary to determine the experience, capacity and gaps of different stakeholder groups for engaging on policy formulation, in order to design effective capacity building and engagement strategies.

The PM will be responsible for ensuring data collection from project activities, in close consultation with partners, and will coordinate regular monitoring activities with the Project Coordination Team.

In collaboration with the Project Coordinator, the PBF M&E Specialist will work with the UN M&E Group and project implementers to regularly review and propose adjustments, as necessary, to the Results Framework so that it remains complementary to the UNPAF, UNSDCF and other UN strategic documents.

As the project RUNO, UNDP will be ultimately responsible for complying with all narrative and financial reporting requirements established by both the PBF and the JPSC, in addition to any internal agency reporting requirements. The Project Manager, operating at UNDP level with the support of the National Officers from WFP and UNFPA, will produce narrative and financial reports, in coordination with project substantive leads and UNDP, respectively, for the approval of the Project Coordination Team. UNFPA's M&E Officer will support the project's M&E efforts. The Project Manager will also prepare and submit one consolidated Annual Work Plan to the Project Coordination Team by 31 January for each year of the project.

The project also operates within the substantive framework of the UNPAF Outcome Group on Governance (OG1), for which there is a Joint Program Management Committee and a Steering Committee (JPSC) that brings together senior United Nations and Government officials. Project results will also be reported through this mechanism.

The project plans to reserve a substantial portion of the budget (6%) for monitoring, evaluation and communication activities. The project plans will make use of the PBF M&E expert to assist with the establishment of a regular monitoring and evaluation system, including data collection tools and field visit templates. These will be fine-tuned and implemented in collaboration with national partners, under the responsibility of the project's operational unit. 76,000 UDS has been set earmarked for baseline development, regular monitoring and data collection and analysis activities. These funds should enable the participation of national focal points on the UNPAF to ensure national ownership and oversight.

The monitoring and evaluation framework will have two objectives: 1) monitor program performance and effectiveness of the project through the collection and analysis of relevant and timely monitoring data but also; 2) support program management and eventually, if necessary, readjustment of project planning. Monitoring activities will consist of regular and joint site visits to verify, among other things, the progress of the project and the achievement of the targets set in the logical framework, semiannual and annual activity reports, preparation of periodic progress reports, documentation of good and innovative practices during the implementation of the project and the search for synergies between the different project components.

An Independent Evaluation of the Project will be commissioned at the end of the project. A total of 35,000 USD has been set aside for that purpose. An external final evaluation will verify the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, impact and sustainability of the project. An experience capitalization document will draw lessons learned from the initiative and make specific recommendations directed at national authorities to strengthen inclusive policy formulation in Guinea-Bissau.

In addition, the PBF Secretariat in Bissau, will support the project team by providing quality assurance of PBF support, technical advice on peacebuilding issues and methodologies and by ensuring and facilitating the coordination and monitoring and evaluation of the PBF portfolio, including of this project.

#### **e) Project exit strategy/ sustainability**

Project exit strategy is linked to the UN Transition strategy in Guinea-Bissau and the drawdown of UNIOGBIS and based on the transfer of capacity from UNIOGBIS to UNDP Governance section part of this project. The project sustainability will be ensured by the enhanced capacities of UNCT

in Political Dialogue and Reconciliation, within the regular funded activities of the UNDP Governance Section. Nothing in this project document will or should be construed as any impediment to the timely and effective drawdown, closure and liquidation of UNIOGBIS.

The transition and reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in Guinea-Bissau, which ensued following the UN Security Council resolution 2458 (Feb. 2019), that renewed UNIOGBIS mandate by one year and effective 1 March 2019; endorsed Secretary-General's recommendations presented in his Special Report S/2018/1086 of 6 December 2018, which outlined three distinct phases of transition process and prospective closure of UNIOGBIS by 31 December 2020.

Following a Transition Workshop held in Bissau (April 2019), a draft Mission transition calendar was established; drawdown of some personnel kicked started and budget cuts incorporated in the 2020 Mission's budget. The transition workshop recommended key tasks for to UN presence in Guinea-Bissau to undertaken, notably, development of a transition plan that is integrated into the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) process.

After this transition period, the capacity assessment for UNCT and key partners, Government institutions and partners will be enhanced, and they will take-over implementation of peacebuilding priorities, to prevent relapse into conflict. The following assumptions are considered to ensure sustainability of political dialogue and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau after project conclusion:

- The Peacebuilding Fund will continue financing the joint efforts of the National Government and the UN system for peace, stability and development;
- The Resident Coordinator Office will be reinforced, throughout the Transition Process, in its technical capacity to effectively coordinate and timely allow implementation of the transition of the UN presence in the country;
- Conflict analysis and identification of residual peacebuilding priorities and UN benchmarks for the transition will be carried out by UNDP-Governance,
- UNCT capacity in a post-mission scenario and after the end of the proposed project will be ensured by UN regular funding for continuing implementation and monitor of the systemic reforms;
- A resource mobilization strategy to support implementation of key peacebuilding tasks and capacities required by UNCT, UNOWAS and other partners will take place.
- Communication and partnership engagement strategies, as well as and operational activities to ensure good communication will take place during transition and ensured after project closure.

The project's exit strategy, beyond the transition, will also be based on the results and lessons learned gathered from this and the previous project's evaluation and UNPD's strategic plans. The exit strategy will be forged based key national and UN strategic documents such as SDG acceleration plans. The ultimate hope is that the project will building internal technical capacities in inclusive, consultative policy design and implementation within the ANP.

Furthermore, consolidation of the project's achievements will be ensured and reinforced through future interventions in the country. It will provide continuous support to partners and beneficiaries, building on improved capacities and experience. The project can be an entry point for donors wishing to support governance issues. In this regard the Leadership Academy that is advanced with the seed money in this program and additional funds from UNDP is part of UNDP on-going capacity development strategy for Guinea-Bissau. Results on progress will also be shared with the UN Security Council, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, DPPA and international donors, including the P5.

#### **IV. Project budget**

Funds will be divided into two tranches for UN recipients with the second tranche being released upon demonstration by the project that the first tranche has been expensed or committed to at least 75% between the recipients and upon completion of any regular PBF reports due in the period elapsed.

The PM will be responsible for the overall management and coordination of the project. Each agency will be responsible for the management of their funds. In terms of financial obligations with staff, the project will require the following staffing configuration:

- ✓ 1 Project Manager P3 International split between UNIOGBIS and UNDP for 24 months
- ✓ 1 Finance & Admin Assistant at UNDP for 24 months
- ✓ 2 NOBs – Half -time from WFP and UNFPA for 24 months.

Total Personnel are higher than the recommended 20%, these funds are necessary because both the UN and the country have very little installed capacity in the subject matter and the UN agencies do not have staff that they can redirect to the project. It is very difficult to find people with requisite skills who speak Portuguese and are willing to move to GB for a 2-year commitment. Although listed as a family duty station the schools in GB are not viable and most families have to relocate to Dakar. Bissau is classified as a hardship post Category E with irregular distribution of electricity and water.

Apart from management costs, the project will include

- ✓ Personnel Costs USD \$559,000.00
- ✓ Direct Operational costs at 6% is approximately \$ \$67,876.92
- ✓ Indirect support costs 7% is approximately \$ \$130,841.12
- ✓ M&E Costs at 6% is approximately \$110,000.00
- ✓ Gender Marker at 24% is approximately \$ \$472,020.87

Funds will be disbursed in two tranches of 50% each for UNDP and one tranche for UNFPA and WFP. The second tranche will be transferred when 75% of the 1<sup>st</sup> Tranche is expended or committed. Release of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Tranche will also require an email from SRSG or RC to PBSO on the political situation, the progress with the reforms and the continued relevance of this project.

See Excel budget **Annex D, Options A and B** for Further details.

## **Annex A.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. For the MPTF Office to financially close a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost’s extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in

		consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Event</b>
<b>30 April</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b><i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i></b>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

<b>31 July</b>	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

#### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

#### **Annex A.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

**Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:**

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

**Reporting:**

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reports and timeline

<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Event</b>
<b>28 February</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b>30 April</b>	Report <b>Q1 expenses</b> (January to March)
<b>31 July</b>	Report <b>Q2 expenses</b> (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Report <b>Q3 expenses</b> (January to September)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure</i>	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent website (<http://www.mptf.undp.org>)

### **Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects**

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

### **Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism**

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

### **Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:**

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust

Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have enough time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

- Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation
- Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE:** If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches)
- Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant
- Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE:** If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
- Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project<sup>8</sup>
- Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought
- Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

**Annexes (provided in separate/attached documents):**

Annex B: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

Annex C: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Annex D: Detailed and UNDG budgets (attached

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<sup>8</sup> Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.