

Joint SDG Fund

Template for the Joint Programme Annual Progress Report

SDG FINANCING PORTFOLIO – COMPONENT 1

Cover page

Reporting period: June 30 – December 31, 2020

Country: MALI

Joint Programme (JP) title: Joint Programme for Influencing Financing of Human Capital Development in Mali

Short title: Financing Human Capital Development in Mali

Start date (month/year): 07/20

End date (month/year): 07/22

RC (name): Mbaranga Gasarabwe

Government Focal Point (name and ministry/agency): Mahamadou Zibo Maiga, CT CSLP Ministry of Economy and Finance

Representative of Lead PUNO (name and agency): Sylvie Fouet - UNICEF

List of PUNOs: UNICEF-UNDP

RCO Main JP Focal Point (name): Francis Negue E-mail: francis.negue@un.org

Lead Agency Joint Programme Focal Point (name): Kobehi Guillaume TOUTOU E-mail: kgtoutou@unicef.org

Contact person for Joint Communications (name): Joyce Brandful E-mail: jbrandful@unicef.org

Budget (Joint SDG Fund contribution): USD \$ 963,000

Overall budget (with co-funding): USD \$ 2,172,100

Annual Financial Delivery Rate: 0

Rate of Committed Funding : 0

	Expenditures January 2020 - December 2020	Committed resources January 2020- December 2020	Transferred Funds January 2020- December 2020	Annual Financial Delivery Rate (%)	Committed Funding Rate(%)
PUNO 1				#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!
PUNO 2					
PUNO 3					
PUNO 4					
PUNO 5					

Short description of the Joint Programme (max 1 paragraph):

The issue addressed by the Joint Programme is urgent and central to the SDGs: in a context of demographic explosion (Mali's population will double over the next 30 years) and limited fiscal space and budget transparency, how can Mali use existing public resources more effectively and mobilise additional resources to finance the development of its Human Capital?

The premise of the JP is that the most effective way to improve the allocation and use of public resources is through budget systems that are transparent, open to public engagement and scrutiny, and driven by evidence-

based public finance management diagnostics with robust oversight institutions and mechanisms. On this basis, the JP will contribute to address the four main financing bottlenecks for Human Capital Development in Mali: (i) Limited budget transparency; (ii) Poor value for money; (iii) Inequitable spending; and (iv) Inadequate funding.

To address these bottlenecks, the JP will support a set of high-impact and transformational interventions to complement and add value to ongoing efforts to reform the country's public finance management system. These interventions are articulated around four complementary pillars to improve the transparency, value for money, equity, and adequacy of investments in human capital development, as follows:

1- Transparency and accountability: (i) develop and disseminate user friendly and gender sensitive analysis of the State Budget in human capital development sectors; (ii) partner with the International Budget Partnership to improve Mali's budget transparency practices; and (iii) support the Government to record all aid on budget.

2- Efficiency, effectiveness and equity: (i) Carry out Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) of Human Capital Development sectors (health, education and social protection).

3- Adequate funding: (i): Conduct a costing of national plans for Human Capital Development sectors; (ii): Conduct a fiscal space analysis of the Human Capital Development sectors.

4- Policies and capacity: (i) Secondment of economists to the Ministry of Finance; (ii) PFM training programmes.

The foundational nature of these interventions means that they are only a starting point. The JP is thus implemented with a longer-term perspective than its two-year period. As part of the 2020-2024 UNSDCF, UNDP and UNICEF have committed financial resources to take forward and expand the work well beyond the two-year period of the JP.

Executive summary

The project has a strong potential to bring together several actors at both the UN system and government levels to accelerate ODDs in Mali. However, given the particularly difficult context marked by the COVID-19 epidemic, the effects of which on the economy and society are still very little known at present, and especially the socio-political unrest that led to the overthrow of the President in August 2020, the project has not yet formally started.

However, a framework for dialogue with the national authorities has been maintained to keep a programmatic focus on the programme. Thus, the national authorities have been officially informed of the content of the programme and its implications for collaboration and partnership at both strategic and operational levels.

Preparatory work such as the terms of reference of the main studies to be carried out in the framework of the project have been finalised and will be subject to joint validation with the national side. A risk assessment matrix has been updated and mitigation measures identified. A review of the recommendations of the OBS study has been carried out and an analysis of the feasibility and relevance of these recommendations has been carried out in order to prepare an implementation plan.

In order to catch up with the delay due to institutional changes and their impact on the implementation schedule of the joint programme, a programme acceleration plan has been developed and significant progress should be made by the next reporting period.

A. Annual Progress (MAXIMUM 7 PAGES)

A.1 The overview of progress and challenges

A.1.1. Overall self-assessment

Provide a self-assessment on the overall JP progress in the last year.

- Above expectations (expected annual results fully achieved and additional progress made)
- On track (expected annual results achieved)
- Satisfactory (majority of expected annual results achieved)
- Not-satisfactory (majority of expected annual results not yet achieved)

The JOINT PROGRAMME FINANCING HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALI under Component#1 was approved in June 2020 and after minor changes, funding was received in July 2020. Unfortunately, since June, regular demonstrations demanding the departure of the president have been organized by the M5-RFP, a heterogeneous organization composed of religious, political and civil society groups and personalities. On July 10, these previously peaceful demonstrations advocating civil disobedience degenerated into deadly violence and prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intensify the mediation process initiated in June. Under the leadership of the Economic Community of the ECOWAS, concessions were made, but the discontent did not abate and demands ended up aiming at the departure of the President and then the Prime Minister. This was considered by ECOWAS as the "red line".

Following the legislative elections, the Prime Minister was reconducted on June 12, but no government was formed until July 27th with only 6 ministers being designated. The running of this government was short lived since it was dissolved on August 18 by an institutional coup followed by the arrestation of the president and his prime minister. The public administration has thus experienced a certain paralysis with the absence of government and institutions that spanned over 3 months until the Government was put into place early October. While the effective start of the programme was already suffering from the restrictions and other mitigation measures to control pandemic of the COVID-19, the coup d'état and sanctions imposed by ECOWAS to Mali has dramatically hampered the implementation of the programme.

The institutional rupture that occurred in August 2020 shook and slowed down efforts in the implementation of the JP. PUNO agencies were unable to continue to interact with national structures during times of crisis. The new transitional authorities needed to imbibe the content and scope of the JP before any activity continued. This caused a delay in the realization of the activities prior to the launch of the Program.

The COVID-19 context affected the implementation of the day-to-day activities of public structures due to rotation measures and often the closure of certain structures following the detection of cases of COVID among staff. In addition, the national partners did not all have the means required for teleworking. This state of affairs hampered activities.

A.1.2. Overall progress and key developments to date

No progress at this stage.

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A.1.3. Changes

Was the JP document modified in the past year?

- Yes
 No

A.1.4. Challenges

Did the JP face any major challenges in the past year?

- Yes
 No

Unfortunately, since June, regular demonstrations demanding the departure of the president have been organized by the M5-RFP, a heterogeneous organization composed of religious, political and civil society groups and personalities. On July 10, these previously peaceful demonstrations advocating civil disobedience degenerated into deadly violence and prompted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to intensify the mediation process initiated in June. Under the leadership of the Economic Community of the ECOWAS, concessions were made, but the discontent did not abate and demands ended up aiming at the departure of the President and then the Prime Minister. This was considered by ECOWAS as the "red line".

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A.1.5. COVID-19 and other strategic alignment

The Mali's Joint programme is directly aligned with three (3) out of the five (5) pillars of the UN's global framework for the urgent socio-economic response (SERP) to COVID-19:

- 1- Protecting health services and systems;
- 2- Social protection and basic services and
- 3- macroeconomic response and multilateral collaboration

A recent self-evaluation of the SERP has called for a stronger partnership framework and the need to leverage resources to address the short term socio-economic impact of the covid-9 while connecting this response to the system.

A.2 Update on priority issues

A.2.1. Progress on Integrated National Financing Framework/SDG financing building blocks

- Please define the status and progress of your JP’s INFF, SDG financing strategy or enabling framework according to the implementation stages in the table below. **The INFF survey (<https://ee.kobotoolbox.org/x/mFDFH54N>) needs be completed online (one per country) and is considered an integral part of the Annual Progress report.** This question and the survey are applicable to all Component 1 JPs, even if the JP does not aim to complete all INFF steps and blocks. The INFF scope was considered comprehensive enough to cover the planned activities under the 62 JPs. (Instructions to complete the survey are online – for questions contact UNDP helpdesk tim.strawson@undp.org).

Implementation stages	Planned (0%)	Emerging (1-49% progress)	Advancing (50-99% progress)	Complete (100% progress)	Previously completed	Not applicable	Comments/ Notes
1. Inception phase	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2. Assessment & diagnostics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3. Financing strategy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4. Monitoring & review	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5. Governance & coordination	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

- Provide a brief description of the progress made during the reporting period.

A.2.2. Thematic focus

- | | | | |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cross-cutting | <input type="checkbox"/> Social protection | <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture | <input type="checkbox"/> Other..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Gender | <input type="checkbox"/> Health & nutrition | <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity | <input type="checkbox"/> Other..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Children & youth | <input type="checkbox"/> Climate change & nature | <input type="checkbox"/> Blue economy | <input type="checkbox"/> Other..... |

A.2.3. Gender marker

Did your Joint Programme feature Gender Results in the past year at the outcome or output level?

- Yes
 No

Briefly explain: The activities of the joint programme have not fully started in the field during the six months covered by this report. However, the commitments towards gender equality are secured. Thus, as plan:

- Gender equality and the empowerment of women that are already visibly mainstreamed across all output of the Joint programme in line with SDG priorities including SDG 5 will be narrow down at activities level and implemented as plan.
- The budget analysis with gender lens and the capacity building of the different actors in gender budgeting will continue to be at the hearth of the intervention.
- In addition, the joint programme will pay great attention to the generation of evidence on budget and support the engagement of women’s/girls group in dialogues with Government on the findings of the analysis for a greater focus on gender transformative budgeting.

- Please indicate the total average scoring of the JP’s gender marker as defined in the JP document.

Gender Marker total average scoring from 0 to 3 (as defined in the JP document):

- If the score is lower than 2 what measures are you planning to take to address this scoring which is below the minimum requirements of the Fund? Please reassess and attach a new Gender Marker Matrix when submitting this report (Instructions for the Gender Marker Scoring [here](#) and for any doubts contact Un Women helpdesk UNCT-GEM.helpdesk@unwomen.org).

Not available at this stage.

A.2.4. Vulnerable groups

Will the JP directly impact marginalized and/or vulnerable groups through a dedicated outcome or output?

Yes
 No

The upstream work on policy advocacy of the PUNOs was guided by the principle of mitigating the risk of a re-prioritization of budgetary expenditure to the detriment of the social sectors in order to meet urgent sovereign spending such as security and defense with a view to stabilizing the situation and pursuing the agreement for peace and reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers peace process. The indirect objective was to protect budgets for the most vulnerable. As a result the initial plan of social measures and particularly the government-led cash transfer programme to mitigate the social-economic impact of the COVID-19 on vulnerable population survived even in the transition plan and will cover 350,000 HHs compared to the initial 500,000 targeted.

The PUNO will continue work with the government in designing targetting mechanisms to insure the most vulnerable are actually targeted.

List of marginalized and vulnerable groups	Dedicated Outcome	Dedicated Output	Status (planned/in progress/complete)
Women and girls			
Children			
Youth			
Persons with disabilities			
Older persons			
Minorities (incl. ethnic, religious, linguistic...)			
Indigenous peoples			
Persons of African Descent (when understood as separate from minorities)			
Migrants			
Refugees & asylum seekers			

Internally displaced persons			
Stateless persons			
Persons deprived of their liberty			
Peasants and rural workers			
Human rights defenders (incl. NGOs, journalists, union leaders, whistleblowers...)			
LGBTI persons (sexual orientation and gender identity)			
Persons affected by (HIV/AIDS, leprosy...)			
Persons with albinism			
Victims or relatives of victims of enforced disappearances			
Victims of (slavery, torture, trafficking, sexual exploitation and abuse...)			

[A.2.5. Learning and sharing](#)

A.3 Update on events and partnerships

[A.3.1. Events](#)

Type of event	Yes	No	Comments
JP launch event	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>The launch event was held virtually on January 29TH 2021</i>
Annual donors' event*	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Planned in Q2 2021</i>
Partners' event **	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Planned in Q2 2021</i>

*the Fund donor countries are Denmark, European Union, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. Please note that this event can be held together with a launch event or partners' event.

** Key advocacy outreach events with high level JP partners.

[A.3.2. Partnerships](#)

Did your Joint Programme facilitate engagement with with diverse stakeholders (e.g. parliamentarians, civil society, IFIs, bilateral/multilateral actor, private sector)?

- Yes
 No

To maintain the momentum of the strong national stakeholder involvement since the design phase, the PUNOs and work together on a better understanding of the project including roles and responsibilities and activities. In this regard, the joint programme document was translated in French and shared with national counterpart.

[A.3.3. Additional financing](#)

- Yes
 No

- Additional funds were mobilized thanks to the German Cooperation. This is a contribution to the national response to the socio-economic impact of the Covid-19 on the most vulnerable population. In this regard, UNICEF will support cash delivery to 40,000 HHs (approximately 250,000 individuals) with complementary services including Social and behavior change communication. This cash will be delivered in urban areas of Bamako and the regions of Koulikoro, Segou and Sikasso selected on several vulnerability factors, including: the number of poor households currently registered in the unified social registry, The communal Poverty Index and the results of the Multiple Overlapping Deprivation Analysis (MODA). Under this partnership UNICEF will also support national social protection system strengthening.
- Overall, the partnership will operate in line with the CREDD which is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals. By addressing horizontal expansion of social protection, the project will not only contribute to the inclusion of the most vulnerable but also tackle household's poverty (SDG 1 and 10), hunger (SDG2) and good health and wellbeing (SDG3). By working together between agencies and with government partners, the project will also contribute to strengthening partnerships (SDG17). Through evidences generation the project intends to feed national dialogue on system strengthening and planning and policy formulation at the national, sub-national and local levels as recommended in the national voluntary report on SDGs to the High-Level Political Forum (2018) as a next step to support country's agenda.
- Also, to ensure its continuity, the program was linked to the new program for economic governance and sustainable development. In this context, it will benefit from funds from the common financing basket of this program.

Source of funding	Yes	No	Co-funding or Co-financing?	Name of organization	Amount (USD)	Comments
Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Donors/IFIs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Private sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				
PUNOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				
Other partners	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				

A.4 Strategic communications

Did the JP develop a strategic communications plan?

Yes

No

The teams have decided to work on the communication plan starting January 2021;

B. Annual Results (MAXIMUM 3 PAGES)

B.1. SDG acceleration

List up to 3 main SDG targets that your Joint Programme primarily focused in 2020.

SDG:

SDG:

SDG:

- *Not available at this stage of implementation.*

B.2. Contribution to Fund's global results

During the 6 months covered by the report, significant result has not been achieved given the political and social context that prevails in the country between July and December 2020. Preparatory work which outputs will be instrumental during the next 6 months was undertaken:

- Development of the TORs of budgets briefs and Public Expenditures review in the Human Capital Sector (Education, Health and Social protection)
- Review of Open Budget Survey's recommendations and assessment of the feasibility of their implementation
- Development of the TORs for the recruitment of an economist to support the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in the monitoring of reforms and to insure liaison with PUNO teams
- Policy dialogue on the recording of external aid for a more budgetary framework.

B.3. JP Outputs and outcomes

- Achievement of outputs

Not applicable at this stage for the reporting period

- Achievement of outcomes

Not applicable at this stage for the reporting period

B.4. Strategic Documents

Did the JP produce strategic documents in the last year (policy, strategies, analyses/assessments, methodological documents, and other relevant documents)?

Yes

No

C. Plan for the Next Year of implementation (MAXIMUM 2 PAGES)

C.1 Upcoming activities

Between January and December 2021, the PUNOS and the Government will accelerate the implementation of the programme by conducting sequenced and parallel activities. This will include:

- **Transparency and accountability of funding and allocation for Human Capital**
 - Finalization of Budgets briefs of the human capital sector based on 2020 and 2021 budgets
 - Dissemination of budget briefs results
 - Dialogue with the IFIs and donors to support the Government in the development of a routine system aims at systematically recording the aid flow in Mali.
- **Efficiency, effectiveness and equity of resources allocated to human capital**
 - Partnership framework to support the resources mobilization and the implementation of the Public Expenditures Revue for human capital sectors
- **Sustainable financing of human capital sector**
 - Finalization of the costing methodology and scope of work and launch the analysis of human capital financing in Mali
 - Finalization of the fiscal space analysis methodology and launch the study for human capital sectors
- **Policy and capacity to invest in human capital**
 - Recruitment and posting of 3 economists in the ministry of finance
 - Training on Public Financial management

The desired change that the Joint Programme will seek to achieve is to improve the use and increase the availability of resources to accelerate the achievement of the SDGs in critical human development sectors in Mali. This will be achieved by supporting a set of activities aimed at improving the transparency, value for money, equity and adequacy of public investments for the development of human capital in Mali. These activities are specifically designed to address the main critical financing bottlenecks that exist in Mali: (i) Low budget transparency; (ii) Poor value for money; (iii) Inequitable spending; and (iv) Inadequate funding.

C.2. Expected changes

Overall the political and institutional environment between June and December 2020 did not allow the implementation of activities during the first semester of the project. To take into account this constraint, a 3 to 6 months Non-Cost Extension will be considered from the initial project period.

C.3. Risks and mitigation measures

Are there any changes made/expected to be made to the Risk Matrix?

- Yes
 No

In addition to the monitoring of the risk matrix of the joint programme, the PUNOS conducted a risk identification and mitigation measures to consider the emerging risk factor directly affecting the smooth implementation of the project. The most recurrent risks and their associated measures are as follows:

- Desegregated data are not available for revised budget 2020 and the recent development in the country context may have induced reprioritization among sectors mainly from social sectors to core sectors such as defense and security. These changes may not be adequately reflected in the current budget. As a result, budget briefs will cover only the period of 2015-2020 where 2020 will reflect the Initial financial low which in real word may showcase important disparities. UNICEF and UNDP agencies will acknowledge these limitations and conduct the analysis. The 2 agencies will develop a matrix of the implementation of OBS' recommendations and highly the level of complexity of each of them and build a realistic road map with clear accountabilities associated with.
- The government may find that the recommendations of OBS are difficult to implement given emerging priorities and recent development in political and institutional context.

- - Partners are reluctant to share financial flow information with the government institutions given their “legitimacy” in this transition period. To mitigate this risk UNICEF and UNDP will give the example/best practice by sharing own information using agreed template for at least 3 past years and support the government’s advocacy effort including providing technical support to demonstrate the importance and medium to long term returns with regard to transparency and accountability agenda.
- Failure to raise additional funds needed to conduct the PER in the 3 sectors (health, Education and Social protection and Government is not willing to conduct PER to avoid hindering the national effort towards a smooth political transition period. UNICEF and UNDP will explore additional partners to support the funding and as a second option a prioritization exercise will be made between the 3 sectors based on strategic criteria and anticipated donors’ interest to invest in each sector for the 3-5 coming years in the country. Finally, the two agencies will develop a joint statement on the importance of the PER and how this exercise can play an important role in resources mobilization by consolidating the donor trust in the national institutions to adequately manage resources
- PER’s recommendations and budget classification are not gender sensitive making it hard to develop a feasible action plan toward the implementation. In this regard UNICEF and UNDP will revisit the PER’s recommendations from a gender perspective and support the development of the action plan
- The government prefers not to go for costing for "human capital sectors" as a standalone process but rather integrate the costing into the overall process of the revision of the CREDD. UNICEF and UNDP will identify entry points and size the opportunity to influence in-depth costing activity for the 3 sectors of Human Capital development
- Limitation in scope of fiscal space analysis given the recent development that might have hindered the potential and interest of some financial actors/options including innovative financing mechanisms and the global, regional and national growth perspective in a post-Covid context might reduce the power of assumptions in modeling the fiscal space and anticipated outcomes. UNICEF and UNDP will therefore evaluate the options based on realistic assumptions and build at least 3 scenario and conduct the analyze
- Country might be less attractive for highly qualified economists to be hired for secondment in the MoF. UNICEF and UNDP will explore partnership with WB and IMF to access among other their rosters to source suitable candidates.
- The capacity building activities in PFM might be delayed given the risk of turnover in the transition period and the parliament will not be in place before 2-3 years as a result of 18 months transition period and new elections. UNICEF and UNDP will develop capacity building activities by prioritizing key directorates in MoF, Primature and Social Development line ministries.

Annex 1: Consolidated Annual Results

1. JP contribution to global programmatic results (annual)

- Provide data for the Joint SDG Fund global results (as per targets defined in the JP document).

Joint SDG Fund Global Outcome 2: Additional financing leveraged to accelerate SDG achievement (Update table below)

Indicators	Target 2020	Result 2020	Target 2021
2.1: Ratio of financing for integrated multi-sectoral solutions leveraged in terms of scope(for other/ additional sector/s or through new sources/means)			
2.2: Ratio of financing for integrated multi-sectoral solutions leveraged in terms of scale(for the same multi-sectoral solution.)			

Joint SDG Fund Global Output 4: Integrated financing strategies for accelerating SDG progress implemented (Update table below and provide details as requested)

Indicators	Target 2020	Result 2020	Target 2021	List of strategies/ frameworks developed
4.1: #of integrated financing strategies that were tested (disaggregated by % successful / unsuccessful)				
4.2: #of integrated financing strategies that have been implemented with partners in lead disaggregated by (1) government/public partners (2) civil society partners and (3) private sector partners				
4.3: # of functioning partnership frameworks for integrated financing strategies to accelerate progress on SDGs made operational				

2. Selected global performance indicators (annual)

2.1. Did your Joint Programme contribute to the improvement of the overall UNCT coherence in 2020?

Yes, considerably contributed

Yes, contributed

No

Explain briefly: **Implementation of activities has not yet started**

2.2. Did your Joint Programme contribute to reduced transaction costs for the participating UN agencies in interaction with national/regional and local authorities and/or public entities compared to other Joint Programmes?

Yes,

No

N/A (if there are no other joint programmes in the country)

Explain briefly: **Implementation of activities has not yet started**

2.3. Was your Joint Programme aligned with the UNCT Results Groups in 2020?

Yes

No

Explain briefly: **Implementation of activities has not yet started**

3. Results as per JP Results Framework (annual)

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
Outcome 1 Enhanced transparency and accountability of funding and allocation for Human Capital Development						
Indicator 1.1 Parliamentary capacity to review human capital development sector with gender lens budget proposals is strengthened	No	Yes	No	Parliament dissolved following the political unrest	Parliament is planned to be in place after a transition period of 18 month (July 2021 to December 2021) so this activity can only be implemented in q-2 2022	Yes
Indicator 1.2 Budget analysis with gender lens capacity is strengthened within the	No	Yes	No	Mali was under economic sanction from July to October 2020 so the	Yes	Yes

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
Ministry of Finance and social sector ministries				activity was not found relevant		
Output 1.1 Citizens have access to quality information on the state of financing for Human Capital Development						
Indicator 1.1.1: New gender sensitive channels are established for non-government stakeholders to contribute meaningfully to budget processes	0	2	0	Budget formulation in 2021 was exceptional given the circumstance that does not allow participation	2	2
Indicator 1.1.2: Production and distribution of citizen budget specific including gender analysis to Human Capital	0	2	0	Budget formulation in 2021 was exceptional given the circumstance that does not allow participation	MoF/DGB/CSO	
Output 1.2 indicator Budget transparency practices have improved						
Indicator 1.2.1: Open Budget Index (Mali)	OBS 2019: 38/100 (transparency) 4/100 (participation) 43/100 (Budget oversight)	n/a	Assessment of the feasibility of the recommendations of the previous study	The activity was found not relevant given the exceptional circumstance the budget was formulated in 2020	OBS 2021: 60/100 (transparency) 40/100 (participation) 60/100 (Budget oversight)	OBS 2021: 70/100 (transparency) 50/100 (participation) 70/100 (Budget oversight)
Output 1.3 External assistance is recorded on-budget						
Indicator 1.3.1: Donor support for all social sectors is recorded on budget	No	60%	Policy dialogue to assess the feasibility	Political instability	80%	80%

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
Indicator 1.3.2: UN Donor support for all social sectors is recorded on budget	0	60%	Dialogue within UNCT to assess the feasibility	The focus was on the SERP	80%	80%
Outcome 2: Improved efficiency, effectiveness and equity of resources allocated to human capital development sectors						
Indicator 2.1 Budget allocations to education, health, and social protection are maintained or increased in real terms (i.e. after adjusting for inflation)	25%	26%	25%	Competing public spending to address core expenditures of the transition	25%	27%
Output 2.1 Value for money diagnostics of current investments in human capital in Mali is available						
Indicator 2.1.1: Progress towards global spending benchmarks for social sectors are recorded	No	Yes	No	Political instability	Yes	Yes
Indicator 2.1.2 The variance between planned and actual expenditure in social sectors is reduced to 10% or less	No	Yes	NO	Competing public spending to address core expenditures of the transition	Yes	Yes
Output 2.2 Plans to improve the efficiency effectiveness and equity of domestic and public spending for Human Capital are implemented						
Indicator 2.2.1: Social sector budgets increasingly prioritize evidence-based interventions with gender lens	No	Yes	No	The activity was found not relevant given the exceptional circumstance the budget was formulated in 2020	Yes	Yes
Outcome 3: Greater and sustainable funding for human capital development sectors						
Indicator 3.1:	No (2019)	No	No	Political instability	CARFIP/DGB/MoH	

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
Resources mobilization strategies with gender lens for the three sectors are available to address human development capital funding gaps						
Output 3.1: Resource requirements to finance Human Capital Development national objectives are identified						
Indicator 3.1.1: Funding gaps in line with health sector's policy results related relevant commitment in the CREDD is correctly estimated	No (2019)	No	No	Competing public spending to address core expenditures of the transition	Yes	No
Indicator 3.1.2: Funding gaps in line with Education sector's policy results related relevant commitment in the CREDD is correctly estimated	No (2019)	No	No	Competing public spending to address core expenditures of the transition	yes	No
Indicator 3.1.3: Funding gaps in line with Social protection sector's policy results related relevant commitment in the CREDD is correctly estimated	No (2019)	No	Yes	Sector results costing document	MoSP	
Output 3.2: Financing options (including innovative financing) for human capital sectors are identified						
Indicator 3.2.1: Fiscal space for Health's sector financing is assessed and known	No (2019)	No	No	The activity was found not relevant given the exceptional circumstance the budget was	Yes	Yes

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
				formulated in 2020		
Indicator 3.2.2: Fiscal space for Education's sector financing is assessed and known	No (2019)	No	No	The activity was found not relevant given the exceptional circumstance the budget was formulated in 2020	Yes	Yes
Indicator 3.2.3: Fiscal space for Social protection's sector financing is assessed and known	No (2019)	Yes	No	The activity was found not relevant given the exceptional circumstance the budget was formulated in 2020	Yes	Yes
Outcome 4: Strengthened policies and capacity for investing in Human Capital Development						
Indicator 4.1 The main MoF structures have capacity to conduct PFM reforms and stakeholders have good knowledge in PFM process	No	Yes	No	Political unrest has a negative impact on the PFM actors	Yes	Yes
Output 4.1 - There is increased capacity in the MoF to carry out essential PFM reforms						
Indicator 4.1.1: 3 economists are recruited to strengthen MoF capacity to conduct PFM reforms	0	3	0	The timing was rationalized to recruit the economist when the period is more suitable (workload and strategic opportunity)	1	3
Output 4.2 - There us enhanced capacity among stakeholders in PFM						

Result / Indicators	Baseline	Expected 2020 target	2020 Result	Reasons for variance from planned target (if any)	Expected 2021 target	Expected final target (if different from 2021)
Indicator 4.2.1: Number of stakeholders which capacity built in PFM with gender lens	0	Government staffs: 3 Parliamentarian groups 4 (Health, Education, Social Protection, Finance) Civil Society Organizations 2	Government staffs: 0 Parliamentarian groups 0 (Health, Education, Social Protection, Finance) Civil Society Organizations 0	Parliament not in place	Government staffs: 3 Parliamentarian groups 4 (Health, Education, Social Protection, Finance) Civil Society Organizations 2	Government staffs: 10 Parliamentarian groups 10 (Health, Education, Social Protection, Finance) Civil Society Organizations 10

Annex 2: List of strategic documents

- Complete the tables by focusing on documents that are of particular strategic importance for the JP results and for the priorities of the Joint SDG Fund in this portfolio.

- Strategic documents that were produced by the JP

Title of the document	Date (month; year) when finalized	Brief description of the document and the role of the JP in finalizing it

- Strategic documents for which JP provided contribution

Title of the document	Date (month; year) when finalized	Brief description of the document and the role of the JP in finalizing it

Annex 3: List of strategic communication documents

- *Provide the responses to the questions below with data for the last year overall.*

1. Have you created a strategic communication plan for the Joint Programme?

- Yes
 No

Explain briefly:

2. What percentage of the annual budget towards communications was utilized from the total budget? (Note that the entire JP comms budget must be min 5% of the total JP budget)

Explain briefly:

3. Have visibility outcomes increased due to the provided funding for JP strategic communications?

- Yes
 No

Explain briefly:

4. Does the Country Profile Page on the Joint SDG Fund website contribute to your JP outreach?

- Yes
 No

Explain briefly:

5. How many articles (interviews, human interest stories, press releases, expert insights, etc) about your JP were published by an external media outlet (Non-UN published)?

Total number:

Explain briefly:

6. How many articles (interviews, human interest stories, press releases, expert insights, etc) about the Joint Programme were published by the UNCT and JP PUNOs?

Total number:

Explain briefly:

7. Have you received an increase of social media followers?

- Yes
 No

Total number: (Not mandatory)

Explain briefly:

Multi-Media Faucets

- *Complete the table by focusing on most important strategic communication documents (factsheets, promotional materials, infographics, videos, etc.). Provide hyperlinks when possible.*

Title of the document	Date when finalized (MM/YY)	Brief description and hyperlink (if it exists)

Social Media Campaigns

- Complete the table by focusing on the highest social media impressions or campaigns. Provide hyperlinks when possible.

Title of the document	Type (FB/Twitter/LinkedIn/Etc.)	Brief description and hyperlink (if it exists)

Annex 4: Updated JP Risk Management Matrix

Risks	Risk Level: (Likelihood x Impact)	Likelihood: Certain - 5 Likely - 4 Possible - 3 Unlikely - 2 Rare - 1	Impact: Essential - 5 Major - 4 Moderate - 3 Minor - 2 Insignificant - 1	Mitigating measures	Responsible Org./Person
Contextual risks					
Intensification of insecurity and the spread of conflict	12	3	4	Development of a risk-management strategy and adaptive programming	Senior Management (Heads of PUNO or Deputy Heads of PUNO)
Global economic recession	20	5	4	Reviewing budgetary allocation by government taking into account priorities sectors	Government
Vulnerability of the economy to vagaries of weather	6	2	3	Strengthening of projects / programs to mitigate the effects of climate change	Government and related partners
Vulnerability of the economy to vagaries of commodity price fluctuations	15	5	3	Adoption of economic stabilization measures such as exemptions	Government
Epidemic and pandemic outbreak (including COVID-19)*	20	5	4	Adjusting activities in line with the context and guidance that will be provided	Senior Management (Heads of PUNO or Deputy Heads of PUNO)
Programmatic risks					
Slower-than-desired program implementation due to weak capacity and governance	21	3	4	Enhancing of monitoring, readjusting of strategy and roadmaps if necessary	Senior Management (Heads of PUNO or Deputy Heads of PUNO)
Institutional risks					
Diminution of government presence and control in some areas	6	2	3	Anticipation measures, identifying other partners who can contribute	Senior Management (Heads of PUNO or Deputy Heads of PUNO)
Fiduciary risks					

Misuse or mismanagement of JP funds (corruption, leakage...)	6	2	3	HACT implementation; PUNOs' anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption policies	Senior Management (Heads of PUNO or Deputy Heads of PUNO)
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