

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



United Nations  
Peacebuilding

**PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT**

(Length: Max. 12 pages plus cover page and annexes)

<b>Country (ies): Pacific Island Countries with a focus on Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Marshall Islands</b>		
Country	Implementing Partner	Outputs to be delivered by country
1. Kiribati	UNDP	All outputs except 2.2 which does not apply to Kiribati
2. Republic of the Marshall Islands	UNDP and IOM	All outputs
3. Tuvalu	UNDP	All outputs
<p><b>Project Title: Climate Security in the Pacific</b>  <b>Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):</b></p> <p>RMI: 00122867 <a href="https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122867">https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122867</a>          Tuvalu: 00122865 <a href="https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122865">https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122865</a>          Kiribati: 00122866 <a href="https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122866">https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00122866</a></p>		
<p><b>PBF project modality:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRF  <input type="checkbox"/> PRF</p>	<p><b>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund  <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund  <b>Name of Recipient Fund:</b></p>	
<p><b>List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organization (UN, CSO etc): UNDP, IOM</b>  <b>List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:</b>  <b>Government of the Republic of Kiribati; Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands; Government of Tuvalu; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); Coalition of Low-Lying Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC); Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC); United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF); UNWomen; Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)</b></p>		
<p><b>Expected project commencement date<sup>1</sup>: 17 July 2020</b>  <b>Project duration in months:<sup>2</sup> <del>24 months</del> 36 months (new project end date: 16 July 2023)</b>  <b>Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: All</b></p>		
<p><b>Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below:</b></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative  <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative  <input type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project</p>		

<sup>1</sup> Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.

<sup>2</sup> Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

## Total PBF approved project budget\* (by recipient organization):

	Total	Tranche 1	Tranche 2
Kiribati			
UNDP	\$ 1,044,196.49	\$ 730,937.54	\$ 313,258.95
IOM	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Total	\$ 1,044,196.49	\$ 730,937.54	\$ 313,258.95
Tuvalu			
UNDP	\$ 1,000,326.49	\$ 700,228.54	\$ 300,097.95
IOM	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
TOTAL	\$ 1,000,326.49	\$ 700,228.54	\$ 300,097.95
RMI			
UNDP	\$ 523,107.02	\$ 366,174.91	\$ 156,932.11
IOM	\$ 632,370.00	\$ 442,659.00	\$ 189,711.00
TOTAL	\$ 1,155,477.02	\$ 808,833.91	\$ 346,643.11

Total Project Budget (PBF): \$3,200,000

\*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source): There are no further funds allocated towards this project. IOM will provide an in-kind contribution of approximate value of \$25,000 towards office space, office running costs and transportation in the RMI. UNDP will provide an in-kind contribution of approximately \$26,150 for staff time in this project implementing in the 3 countries.

**Two-three sentences with a brief project description and succinct explanation of how the project is time sensitive, catalytic and risk-tolerant/ innovative:**

Although climate change is cited as the most significant security threat to the South Pacific, its likely effects on security and potential conflict are yet to be widely explored by the international and regional organisations present on the ground. Climate change in the Pacific region has the potential for a myriad of cascading fragility and instability risks. These will affect men, women and youth differently, and vary across the region both according to timeframes under consideration and depending on the country contexts.

There are a range of critical climate fragility risks emerging in the Pacific Region that will require greater examination, monitoring and coordinated action by many stakeholders at the national, regional and international

level to prevent potential irreversible economic, social, cultural and environmental damage with a range of potential security implications and a direct impact on social cohesion. Most critical issues amongst these include:

- Displacement and forced migration due to irreversible degradation of livelihoods, food sources and coastal erosion;
- Increased social tensions linked to access to land and fisheries resources;
- A decrease in national revenues that could affect the ability of these states to mitigate the social impacts of climate change;
- Challenges to the Blue Economy, particularly losses in fisheries and tourism revenue and at the same time the rising costs of responding to disasters and climate change reduces national budgets and impact on the livelihoods of coastal communities;
- Food security and a decline in health and productivity of Pacific people as local food source degradation exacerbates dependency on unhealthy cheap imports coupled with an existing and growing NCD crisis;
- Reduced coping capacity and vulnerability of at risk populations with successive and strengthened natural disasters; and
- Impacts of sea-level rise on the jurisdictions of Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) with uncertainty on maritime zones and boundaries.

To avoid reaching critical thresholds for social conflict and exhausting coping capacities, effective responses must be tailored to the unique political, economic, cultural, social, environmental and development circumstances of the region, and must work with and through national systems.

The project responds to this need by providing capacity to Pacific Countries, with a focus on low lying Atoll nations, to assess, better understand and address their critical climate security challenges. This will be achieved through: the application of tailored climate security assessment approaches; inclusive youth and gender-sensitive dialogues; partnerships with the range of stakeholders operating across the aspects of climate security and supporting the uptake of key findings in relevant national, regional and international policy and resourcing strategies. These activities will add value through key regional frameworks and initiatives such as the Boe Declaration and Action Plan. The project is designed as a catalytic intervention to both strengthen capacity for global advocacy as well as capacity to plan and respond to challenges at the community, national and regional level in Pacific SIDS.

**Summarize the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists, including whether civil society and target communities were consulted and how:**

A multi-step process was undertaken to develop this project.

1. Individual consultations were undertaken by the Resident Coordinator and the Peace and Development Adviser across the region from January to June 2019 (involving governments, experts in the fields of security and of climate change, and representatives of civil society and women's groups). Based on these discussions a PBF concept note was developed that provided an analysis of the issues and scoped the range of activities and areas that could potentially be strategic to address. It was indicated in this concept note that further work would be needed to narrow down the focus of the project, and the concept was approved by PBSO with this in mind.
2. A focused meeting was held with officials from low-lying Atoll Nations in Suva in July, to secure agreement on a possible atoll focus for the project, given that in the Pacific context the security threats linked to climate change are most imminent in these countries - and as requested by the UN Secretary-General in follow up to his May 2019 visit to the region.
3. A small gathering of 15 experts (including 8 women) was held on 8 August to brainstorm in more detail on the issues discussed in the concept note, take stock of existing efforts and refine the possible interventions that would yield the maximum added value to the unfolding climate security discourse in the region. A more detailed project concept focus emerged from this discussion, which was further

<p>elaborated during working level meetings with officials in the sidelines of the Pacific Island Forum Leaders meeting in Tuvalu.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. A high-level meeting with the leaders of the 3 Atoll nations subsequently took place at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders Meeting in Tuvalu. Leaders endorsed the direction of the project and as well continued the development of the project by their officials. They noted their interest in meeting during the GA week to finalise discussions with the Secretary General.</li> <li>5. A workshop (50% women in attendance) was held in early September in Suva at which the detailed project proposal was discussed and refined by relevant countries, key regional stakeholders, experts and civil society.</li> <li>6. The project proposal was presented by the Head of the Climate Change Department of Tuvalu at a side-event to the Secretary-General's climate summit on 21 September in New York, organized by the Group of Friends on Climate Security.</li> <li>7. The project proposal was further developed, revised and finalized between September 2019 and April 2020 through ongoing email correspondence with national Government counterparts by the project recipient organizations and supported by the Resident Coordinator's Office. During this period, general elections were held in all three atoll nations: in Tuvalu in September 2019, in the RMI in November 2019 and in Kiribati in April 2020.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Project Gender Marker score: <u>1</u><sup>3</sup></b> Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in direct pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment: <u>16</u> %</p>
<p><b>Project Risk Marker score: <u>1</u><sup>4</sup></b></p>
<p>Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (select ONLY one): <u>2.3</u><sup>5</sup></p> <p>If applicable, UNDAF outcome(s) to which the project contributes: Outcome Statement: By 2022, people and ecosystems in the Pacific are more resilient to the impacts of climate change, climate variability and disasters; and environmental protection is strengthened</p> <p>If applicable, Sustainable Development Goal to which the project contributes: SDG 13</p> <p>If applicable, National Strategic Goal to which the project contributes:  <b>Tuvalu:</b> Te Kakeenga III: GOAL 1: Protect Tuvalu from the impacts of climate change: resilience, mitigation, adaptation  <b>Kiribati:</b> Kiribati Development Plan 2016-2019: Goal 4: To facilitate sustainable development through approaches that protect biodiversity and support the reduction of environmental degradation as well as adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. <b>In addition, Kiribati Development Plan 2020-2023: Key Priority Area (KPA) 4: Protecting our Environment and Strengthening Resilience.</b></p>

<sup>3</sup> **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

**Score 2** for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate at least 30% of the total project budget to GEWE

**Score 1** for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

<sup>4</sup> **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 1** = medium risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 2** = high risk to achieving outcomes

<sup>5</sup> **PBF Focus Areas** are:

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3)

Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

<p><b>Republic of the Marshall Islands: National Development Theme #9: Mitigating the impacts of climate change and creating awareness of the importance of environmental assets through community, national, regional and international approaches and specifically the implementation of the Majuro Declaration. National Strategic Plan, 2020-2030: Environment, Climate Change and Resiliency Pillar.</b></p>	
<p><b>Type of submission:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New project  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Project amendment</p>	<p><b>If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:</b></p> <p><b>Extension of duration:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date): <b>This project had already been extended for 6 months, until 16 January 2023; hence this is a request for a “second extension of 6 months with a new end date 16 July 2023”.</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Change of project outcome/ scope:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Additional PBF budget:</b> Additional amount by recipient organization: <b>N/A</b></p> <p><b>Brief justification for amendment:</b>  The project had been granted the first No Cost Extension (NCE) period until 16 January 2023, with an operational flexibility for closure by 13 February 2023. However, significant delays were experienced in <b>Kiribati</b>, where specific activities amounting to ~US\$300,000 could not be undertaken and completed during the first NCE period. The installation of pilot initiatives and convening of policy research were stalled for 23 weeks (i.e., over 5 months) before the NCE document was finally signed on 30 October 2022. By then, the price of goods and services had to be re-negotiated finalized towards the end of the first NCE phase. To a lesser extent, delays were also experienced in the <b>Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI)</b> and <b>Tuvalu</b> where corresponding activities worth ~US\$140,000 and ~US\$120,000 remain unspent. In <b>RMI</b>, the timeframe from procurement to installation of pilot initiative was eight months (from February to October), restricting the time for commissioning and monitoring during the first NCE phase. Furthermore, Government response to the offer to support the establishment of Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) Secretariat took five months and was only confirmed in September 2022, mid-way into the first NCE period. For <b>Tuvalu</b>, the installation of pilot initiative was affected by shipment delays between Australia and Tuvalu. The expected delivery date in early August did not materialize until three months later in early November, which was late into the first NCE phase and with very little room for monitoring. At the <b>regional level</b>, the climate security risk assessments at both country and regional levels were also delayed. Completion dates have been re-negotiated several times followed by contract extensions, as the lack of information flow affected the timely availability of drafts and their review, and finalization of the narratives. Despite these delays, the project has successfully convened</p>

	<p>its second and third project board meetings (May and December 2022), which acknowledged the project's progress and recommended for both first and second NCEs to provide ample time for the completion of activities. The project's achievements to-date are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive consultations, completion of perception surveys, and commencement of pilot initiatives.</li> <li>• Increased awareness of communities on security issues and risks of climate change on their livelihoods and overall well-being.</li> <li>• Enhanced support from the Pacific Climate Security Expert Network (PCSN), led by IOM, and through the Regional Dialogue.</li> <li>• Enhanced cooperation with regional actors, including the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and engagement of Pacific Islands Forum Officials Committee (FOC) Sub Committee on Regional Security (FSRS).</li> <li>• Increased visibility of climate security in the Pacific via innovative communication products.</li> <li>• Presentation of the project in international fora (Group of Friends, Pacific Ambassadors in New York post COP26 dialogue, Pacific high-level dialogue in New York, UNFCCC COP27, Climate Security Mechanism induction and informal networking of Pacific Ambassadors in New York).</li> <li>• Completion of Climate Security Risk Assessments and production of Country Profiles and Regional Climate Security Assessment Framework.</li> <li>• Completion of research for embedding climate security into national policies and budgetary processes in the Republic of Marshall Islands and Tuvalu.</li> </ul> <p>The second six months No-Cost Extension will enable the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Convening of a <u>deep dive workshop (30 January)</u> to discuss the main findings of Climate Security Risk Assessments, in particular the issue of contention relating to pathway 5 on possible loss of statehood and territorial integrity. Participants from key national government ministries and departments such as defense, law-enforcement, climate change, disaster management, natural resources, environment, immigration, foreign affairs, and national legal experts within national governments are expected to attend. Regional experts from key sectors (science, international relations, and law) will be invited to provide expert opinions. The expected results are as follows: key issues that require discussion and definition of a national position, including on pathway 5, identified and decisions reached through discussion; consolidated feedback</li> </ul>
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

	<p>for the final version of the document to be advanced and endorsed; and practical suggestion on national climate security priorities to be considered in the design of the phase 2 of the project.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Convening of the <u>Pacific Climate Security Mediation Training (31 January – 1 February)</u> for participants from the three countries and Fiji (the latter being the main recipient country for climate migration). This workshop will be based on the recently developed Facilitator Guide and will be an invitation to dialogue amongst the different participants and to share experiences across the Pacific on how to engage diverse stakeholders with regards to climate change related conflict situations. Due to the significant cultural and historical differences and the different challenges encountered by stakeholders in the Pacific, the guide showcases one specific complex challenge and the intervention methods used to address it as a learning tool for facilitators to develop their own methods. The training will provide a discussion starter and a real-life case study to practice climate change informed conflict analysis and intervention design. The workshop will also provide an opportunity for building relationships and networks of collaborative action between the different stakeholders.</li><li>• Convening of a <u>Strategic Foresight workshop</u> with participants from the three countries and PCSN members to support the implementation of Country Profiles and Regional Climate Security Assessment Framework (<u>2-3 February</u>). Following the recent Climate Security Risk Assessments and development of Country Profiles (for Kiribati, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu) and the regional Pacific Climate Security Assessment Framework (PCSAF), the purpose of the exercise is to show participants how to make use of foresight techniques to test basic underlying assumptions, better understand and anticipate climate-related security risks, and explore the policy implications of plausible alternative futures and enabling adaptive pathways. The exercise will demonstrate to practitioners how to implement the Country Profiles and PCSAF by applying foresight to develop and assess scenarios and response strategies in their respective contexts. In terms of the final product, with the feedback from the pilot, the scenario exercise will be developed as a standalone training module that can be replicated in different geographic contexts.</li><li>• Convening of the <u>Development Partners Dialogue</u> and presentation of concepts for phase 2 (<u>3 February</u>).</li><li>• Endorsement of Climate Security Risk Assessments and publication of Country Profiles and Regional Climate Security Assessment Framework (February), by respective governments and the Forum Sub Regional Committee on</li></ul>
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	<p>Human Security. Completion of implementation of pilot initiatives in Kiribati (March), launch and monitoring of pilot initiatives (April-June). The shipment has arrived in Tarawa and the project staff will be undertaking material inspection once the containers are cleared by 20 January 2023. The materials will be shipped to Tamana and Marakei Islands during the week of 6-11 February 2023 and the project team will also travel with technical experts from Tarawa to Marakei and Tamana islands to quality assure the delivery of fishery and agriculture materials and make financial payments for the actual installation processes. In April 2023, the project team will conduct monitoring visits and in May 2023, the team will conduct a gender survey and end-of-project perception survey and undertake communications-related tasks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring of and enhancement of pilot initiative in Tuvalu (February-April). The project team had travelled to Nui Island during 13 to 23 December 2022 with technical experts and government officials and quality assured the installation and handing over of food cubes to each household, and also conducted a gender survey. The project team will undertake monitoring visits in February and March 2023 and conduct an end-of-project perception survey in April 2023.</li> <li>• Launch of and monitoring of pilot initiative, convening of youth workshops in RMI (February-April). With the pilot installation and training completed in RMI (Mejatto), the project team has developed a short video for the pilot initiative that was released on 14 January 2023. The project staff will travel to Mejatto in February 2023 to conduct a monitoring visit, which will be followed by an official commissioning of the pilot initiative in March 2023. In April, the project staff will visit Mejatto and conduct a gender survey and end-of-project perception survey, and prepare press releases, etc., to further promote the visibility of solar-run vertical aeroponic towers as a possible solution to addressing climate-induced food security issues in RMI.</li> <li>• Completion of support to the institutionalization of CANCC (March). This involves the convening of post-UNFCCC COP27 meetings and the establishment of CANCC desks within the Climate Change Directorate.</li> <li>• Completion of policy work on embedding climate security concept into national policies and budgetary processes in Kiribati (February).</li> <li>• Support to Government of Kiribati in addressing the discrepancy in one of the coordinates of Kiribati's shared maritime boundary with the Cook Islands (March-May).</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Completion of the project Final Evaluation (February), and convening of last Project Board meeting, and project closures (June-July).</li></ul> <p>The second NCE would allow for additional timeframe to complete all operational activities. This will require the entire 6 months for Kiribati while only 3 months are needed to complete the remaining activities in the Republic of Marshall Islands and in Tuvalu. Salaries for project staff positions that are being retained for the respective timeframes are available within the remaining project budget and sourced from each country allocation, as well as from the project management costs. While each country coordinator will manage daily activities in their respective countries, the management team of the UNDP Resilience and Sustainable Development Unit will provide overall management support to the project. Furthermore, there is no impact on the budgets beyond small activity cost readjustments.</p> <p><i>Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.</i></p>
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**PROJECT SIGNATURES:**

<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>6</sup></b></p> <p><i>Yemesrach Workie</i></p> <p>Signature</p> <p>DocuSigned by:                    2CF9606A75D94B3...</p> <p><i>Officer-in-Charge,</i></p> <p><b>UNDP Pacific Office in Fiji</b></p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p>	<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>7</sup></b></p> <p>Mr. Pär Liljert</p> <p>Signature</p> <hr/> <p><i>Coordinator and Advisor for Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific</i></p> <p><b>International Organizations for Migration</b></p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p>
<p><b>Head of UN Country Team - Fiji</b></p> <p><i>Sanaka Samarasinha</i></p> <p></p> <hr/> <p>Signature</p> <p><i>Resident Coordinator (Fiji), UN Resident Coordinators Office in Fiji</i></p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p>	<p><b>Head of UN Country Team - Micronesia</b></p> <p><i>Jaap Van Hierden</i></p> <hr/> <p>Signature</p> <p><i>Resident Coordinator (Micronesia), UN Resident Coordinators Office in Micronesia</i></p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p>
<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p><i>Elizabeth Spehar</i> for</p> <p></p> <hr/> <p>Signature</p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p> <p><b>9 March 2023</b></p>	

<sup>6</sup> Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

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<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b> for</p> <p><i>Elizabeth Spehar</i></p> <hr/> <p>Signature</p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p>Date &amp; Seal</p> <p><b>9 March 2023</b></p>	

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**Representative of National Authorities**

For Honorable Christopher J. Loeak, Honorable Jiba Kabua



*Signature*

Minister of Assistance to the President/Environment

Kino S. Kabua



*Signature*

*Chief of Secretary*

*Republic of Marshall Islands*

Date & Seal: 19 Feb 2023

**Representative of National Authorities**

Honorable Seve Paeniu,



*Signature*

Minister for Finance, Government of Tuvalu

Date & Seal: 03 /02 /2023



**Representative of National Authorities**

*Name of Government Counterpart*

Dr. Naomi Biribo

*Signature*

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the signature area. To the left of the box, a small portion of a circular stamp or seal is visible.

*Title: The Secretary to Cabinet*

*Kiribati Government*

*Date & Seal:*

## I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

- a) A brief summary of **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age- sensitive.

The UN Secretary-General has repeatedly called climate change the biggest challenge of our time and warned of its potential to wreak chaos around the world. Due to their multidimensional nature, climate change impacts extend beyond the domains of the environment and development and into the political and social realm. During his visit to the South Pacific in May 2019, the Secretary-General recognized these cascading effects and highlighted the linkages between climate change and security.

The latest climate science, including the recent IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C, confirms the Secretary-General's assertion that more ambitious and urgent climate action is needed to prevent far-reaching impacts on states and societies. Nevertheless, global efforts to limit warming to below 2°C are vastly inadequate and currently have the world on track for at least 3°C warming this century. The social and security impact on the population of such a scenario is also without any known precedent, and in the Pacific, its effect is already starting to be felt. Better understanding the cost of such gross inaction and the implication this has on the security of the most vulnerable is critical to engender greater global ambition levels.

Due to their particular characteristics, small island developing states and especially atoll nations are uniquely exposed to climate risks. For good reason, therefore, Pacific leaders have acknowledged climate change as the greatest threat to security in the region. However, the likely effects on security and potential conflicts are yet to be explored in detail by regional organisations and national governments. Rising sea levels, king tides, flooding, drought and extreme weather events threaten to overwhelm infrastructure, disrupt economies and displace populations. Such stressors place a massive burden on the coping capacity of states and societies and can trigger a web of cascading effects that challenge their ability to absorb shocks of this scale. Where critical thresholds are met and coping capacities exhausted, this can ultimately threaten peace and security.

Given the lack of pace in global mitigation efforts, adaptation has assumed critical importance in order to moderate the adverse impacts of climate change. In this regard, building resilience and reducing insecurity of the most vulnerable nations and communities are imperative. In the context of the Pacific region, this requires inter alia efforts to enhance the management of land and ocean resources and address rapid transitions and political instability. While there is a consensus among governments and experts in the Pacific that climate is a very real threat to security in many ways, little has been done to map out the drivers and dynamics of potential conflict across different countries in the region, which vary in terms of the pace, scale and nature of multiple interacting threats.

A number of development partners and stakeholders have recently ramped up efforts in this space and are starting to explore what climate security means for Pacific countries from different viewpoints and on different critical issues. This is contributing to a growing while still largely fragmented body of knowledge and conceptual approaches. Based on the findings of these reflections, it is clear that a number of climate fragility issues which have the potential



to lead to security challenges for communities and countries in the Pacific region are rapidly evolving. These issues are highly contextual and vary significantly in their impacts at different levels and time horizons, as well as in the extent to which they have been subject to focused assessment.

There are several emerging examples of interlinkages between climate changes and security risks. In a region characterized by a strong sense of identity and culture unique to each country, and often to individual islands, the integration of regional migrants can prove challenging. Tensions regarding migrant communities have contributed to riots in several Pacific islands in recent years and are likely to grow in strength as climate change is expected to forcefully displace populations in large numbers. While mass displacement may be a scenario of the medium-term future, other effects of climate change on international peace and security can already be felt today. As global warming drives ocean acidification and a shrinking blue economy reduces traditional livelihood opportunities, illicit activities in the region have experienced an uptick. Research indicates that a perceived lack of economic prospects has contributed to the growing role of Pacific islands as a hub for criminal networks and international trafficking routes for people and drugs. For example, according to the US State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report 2019 the Marshall Islands is a source and destination country for sex trafficking and is highly vulnerable to labor trafficking in the fishing industry. While it is unclear on the full gendered and youth implications of this, it is clear that Pacific Island nations, especially small atoll nations, tend to have weak national mechanisms to prevent, protect and prosecute illicit activities. Predictions that climate change will lead to more frequent and severe storms in the region are another cause for concern. The aftermath of recent cyclones and typhoons across the Pacific witnessed heightened crime rates and threatened to erode the rule of law in several states.

There is also evidence that climate change affects men and women differently. The impacts are felt most strongly at the local level and often the burden is disproportionately carried by women. The Pacific already experiences high levels of domestic and gender-based violence and climate change threatens to further exacerbate existing disadvantages, vulnerabilities, and inequalities facing women in their communities. Inequalities reduce individuals' capacity to cope with climate change impacts, therefore in a region of the world that still faces gender inequality resilience is weakened. By understanding why these vulnerabilities exist and planning for them accordingly in climate change mitigation or disaster risk reduction programming is extremely important. Similarly, youth are experiencing an outsized effect of climate change as decreasing livelihood opportunities threaten the viability of their cultural identities and may force them to relocate, thus uprooting young people and confronting them with a number of socio-economic and political challenges.

Besides these examples of early indications for potential climate-related security risks, recent research undertaken in the framework of the Climate Security Experts Network and consultations in the development of this project have arrived at the following set of broad-brush pathways:

#### *Displacement and forced migration*

Keeping at 1.5°C spares the homes of an estimated 60,000 people in Small Island developing states from inundation (Pringle, 2018). However, long before lands disappear beneath the ocean, they will become unproductive due to salt water intrusion, erosion and reef degradation, and in the absence of ambitious adaptations will force the migration of thousands of people. This is already happening in a number of Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such

as Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The effect of such changes on complex and at times contested traditional land tenure systems increases the potential for conflict and fragility of communal systems.

#### *Developmental stress and coping capacity*

Countries are facing significant loss in revenues at the same time as their expenditure on recovery and adaptation is rising. They have far less to invest in maintaining development, social services, peace, and law and order. Up to 20% of national budgets in some SIDS are already being spent on climate change investments, despite their minimal contribution to greenhouse gas emissions.

#### *Challenges to the blue economy*

Coral reef degradation – 70-90% loss of corals at 1.5°C, and 99% at 2°C (IPCC 1.5°C) – stands to devastate coral reef systems which underpin a quarter of all life in the Ocean and are the basis of the blue economy and food chain. Important coastal infrastructure (tourism infrastructure, ports, roads, fuel depots, fisheries processing plants) across Pacific SIDS is at risk due to coastal erosion, inundation from wave surge and damage from intensified cyclones. Marine-based tourism accounts for a significant part of regional GDP, and for some smaller islands it is in excess of 60% of GDP and 25-35% of employment (SPTO 2017). Predictions of up to 20% decrease in fisheries productivity and 30% decrease in tourism income earnings as a result of climate impacts. (PIFS, 2018). Pacific SIDS have an extraordinary dependence on coastal and pelagic fisheries for revenue generation and employment. Six Pacific SIDS derive between 45% and 98% (SPC 2019) of all government revenue from tuna fishing licence fees. Climate change threatens to permanently alter the fishing industry in SIDS with migratory fisheries stocks predicted to move eastwards and into adjacent high seas. This is already causing tension between countries in the region and distant water fishing nations over the sustainable management of migratory fish stocks. Revenues from the blue economy are under serious risk and will become threat multipliers for coastal communities and national economies heavily dependent on these revenues and without other livelihood and development options. This transformation will directly impact communities and will stress the resilience of their coping mechanisms and social cohesion.

#### *Health, food and water security*

The region is suffering irreversible coastal fisheries and food source degradation where between 70-90% of Pacific populations access healthy foods and livelihoods. Diminishing fresh water supplies for low-lying atolls from inundation and saltwater intrusion, and droughts, is affecting key food crops. As a result, there is an increasing dependency on low nutritional imports as alternatives for example noodles, rice, flour and mutton flaps. This occurs against a backdrop of Pacific populations with some of the highest non-communicable disease (NCD) rates in the world (70-75% of deaths due to NDCs) and 1 in 3 children suffer from stunting as a result of malnutrition. With increasing temperatures and precipitation, water-borne diseases like dengue and malaria are predicated to grow and spread to new sites that were previously unaffected. A number of complex risks combine together in this space, challenging the basic needs and health of Pacific people, their ability to positively contribute to their communities and economies, resulting in increased fragility with potential for instability.

#### *Coping capacity and natural disasters*

The vulnerability of Pacific SIDS has increased while their capacity to cope has not. The Pacific is the most highly exposed region in the world to natural disasters (tropical cyclones, droughts and floods) and the least insurable. In the last three years, single tropical cyclone

events have caused losses of up to 64% of GDP for some Pacific Island nations. Traditional defense force responders (New Zealand and Australian militaries) are already indicating this may strain their capacity to respond effectively in supporting Pacific nations' resilience and recovery efforts. The immediate aftermath of disasters is often an environment with heightened incidences of crime and violence where women and young people are most at risk. Successive impacts over time with ever shortening recovery periods in between present significant fragility risks and potential for short term conflict and violence, and longer-term deterioration of security and sustainable livelihoods.

*Impacts of sea-level rise on maritime zone and boundaries*

Clear and stable maritime boundaries are critical for governance, security, law enforcement, and natural resource management within and between countries in the Pacific. All SIDS are at risk of losing land and thus of contracting exclusive economic zone (EEZs); the lowest-lying atolls are at risk of complete inundation. Boundary delimitation efforts are ongoing and require concerted negotiations between island countries and larger neighbouring countries with territories in the region. The right to govern one's resources in the case of part, or all, of their country being lost to inundation is still a matter of legal and ethical debate. Pacific leaders want to ensure that the rights of their people to their countries' resources are protected in the future. Options to fix boundaries and to avoid legal loss of EEZs to countries are the subject of considerable ongoing programmes, research and debate.

Repeated disasters at short intervals in SIDS combined with lack of time and resources for effective post-disaster recovery process will deepen vulnerabilities, amplify risk profiles, increase tensions over fragile natural resources, and affect domestic and regional stability. Land formation (e.g. coral atolls, low lying coral islands), chronic development challenges (e.g. distance from international markets, remoteness, narrow resource base economy and national capacity gaps in both the public and the private sector), rapid unplanned coastal settlements and degradation of natural defenses (mangroves, coral reefs, top soils, etc.) combined with climate change effects make atoll nations extremely vulnerable to disasters.

Capacities for conflict prevention is likely to be further tested as, sequentially: a. climate change exacerbate pressures on environment and jeopardizes (economic) development gains; b. multiple competing resource uses accumulate in small localities where scarcity of productive land increases, and coastal erosion occurs; and c. tensions escalate between the growing private sector -e.g., tourism, agriculture, mining- and subsistence livelihoods over resource exploitation. Natural resources are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of conflict. Rather, availability and access to natural resources can contribute to triggering conflict in tense situations.

These pathways represent a mix of quick onset and slow onset disasters that unravel under different timeframes. They are also cascading, interlinked and with feedback loops; a better understanding of not only discrete risks but the compound effects is part of the challenge. Similarly, required responses would ultimately range from managing and reducing the risk to viable livelihoods and strengthening institutions or conflict resolution mechanisms – in a holistic fashion. In the Boe Declaration Action Plan, environment and resource security are identified. With PSIDS heavily dependent on biodiversity and natural resources, the scale and high-speed of current and projected impacts on PSIDS ecosystems are exceptional and pose major risks for the many constituents of human security supported by nature (income, food, water, shelter, health and energy).

Addressing the root cause of these threats to security in the Pacific lies largely outside the region, in the global political arena in which these small countries have an important moral voice that warrants amplification. Irrespective of the eventual success and pace of these efforts at the global level, the impact of climate change within the region itself is now inescapable. Adaptation, even to best-case scenarios, will require major investment that must be directed wisely. Countries require a deeper and more contextualized understanding of their own climate security profile to prevent or avert the worst-case scenarios, as well as to support focused advocacy on the global stage.

The earlier responses can be formulated to address these threats before they gather pace and the more inclusive that such responses can be, the more likely societies and states are to be sufficiently resilient to withstand the challenges ahead, in line with the vision for the region endorsed by PIF Leaders in the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. There are specific opportunities and options at this stage because of the growing political acknowledgement – both internationally and domestically – that these threats to security are real and imminent, as well as the early emergence of good practice and lessons learned as governments and societies begin the process of designing responses to them. While there are competing geopolitical interests in the region, Pacific countries currently retain significant space to design and establish regionally owned responses to future security threats arising from climate change.

Responding to the call from member states, the recent visit of the Secretary-General to the Pacific took place in recognition of the severe vulnerability of the region to climate change and the Region's proactive work to address the issues. Regional and sub-regional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, Pacific SIDS, Smaller Island States (SIS) and the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) have made head way on the issue, mobilizing behind – and helping to operationalize – the Boe Declaration of 2019 in which leaders from the region united to identify climate as the biggest security threat to their countries and peoples. On behalf of the UN, the Secretary-General undertook to support the region (and particularly vulnerable low-lying atoll countries) in their struggle against climate change and its impact - amplifying their voices globally and supporting their efforts at the national and regional levels to strengthen their resilience. This project seeks to assist in operationalizing that commitment.

This project proposal represents a catalytic intervention to sustain peace and security in the Pacific region by establishing dedicated capacity in atoll nations and regional institutions to address climate-related security risks; supporting multidimensional risk analysis and identifying effective response strategies; and strengthening global advocacy through a unified Pacific voice and the development of knowledge products. While working with the Pacific Island Forum on climate security in the broader region, the project will consistently focus on the circumstances of three atoll nations: Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu.

- b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks**, how it ensures **national ownership** and how the project builds on any previous phase of PBF support and/or any **concrete lessons learned**.

At their Forum in August 2019, Pacific Leaders endorsed an Action Plan for the coordinated implementation and monitoring of the Boe Declaration and expanded concept of security in the region including both climate security and environment and resource security. The project's

activities will link directly with the national, sub-regional and regional channels and existing and planned efforts to progress this Action Plan.

It will incorporate the practical application, adaptation, and testing of the UN Climate Security Mechanism's draft Conceptual Approach to Climate-related Security Risk Assessments at country level in at least 3 countries in the region and at least 2 emerging climate fragility areas at the regional level. These assessments will strengthen the collective understanding of climate-related security risks in the region and help to amplify Pacific countries' voices in relevant negotiations, policy and resourcing fora. This should result in clearer messaging on the urgency of climate fragility and related security issues facing the most vulnerable Pacific SIDS. Through the assessments and some pilot initiatives, the project will also help to shore up the necessary support to address these security concerns. Effective interventions in this space need to be multifaceted in nature and thus will require effective partnerships. A key aspect of the project's implementation, as has been the approach throughout its design, will include the establishment or strengthening of such partnerships at regional, national and sub-national levels. To this end, the project will be implemented under the leadership of 3 national focal points within the government structures (one per country) and will be supported by regional organizations to ensure national ownership and stronger regional coordination.

In the context of broader UN efforts to address the interlinkages between climate change, peace and security, the Pacific represents a priority region for the work of the UN Climate Security Mechanism. This project will help to generate valuable knowledge regarding contextual pathways of climate-related security risks as well as effective response strategies that, along with similar activities in other regions, will inform future efforts designed to strengthen the capacity of states and communities to cope with the impact of climate stressors.

It should be noted that all the three countries which are a part of this project recently underwent national elections. General elections were held in Tuvalu in September 2019, in the RMI in November 2019 and in Kiribati in April 2020. Following elections, climate change remains a key priority for the atoll nations and the climate security proposal is aligned with national priorities and complements existing projects and initiatives.

- c) A **summary of existing interventions** in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below.

Although climate change is cited as the most significant security threat to the region, its likely effects on security and potential conflict are yet to be widely explored by the international and regional organizations present on the ground. Many organizations do engage on a portion of the issue, either thematically, through development programming or knowledge development, or by country through national planning support; however, no organization nor programme has attempted to translate the recently developed global assessment architecture to the region nor explored the effects on atoll nations and what will need to be in place to prevent security breakdown or respond to increasing levels of climate-induced conflict. The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, although a coordinator of political recognition of the issue, is not involved in knowledge development or programme delivery addressing it. Other regional agencies, such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) or Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), address parts of the issue, such as food security or marine conservation through project-based work in a similar manner to thematic UN agency projects which focus on migration or the effect of climate change on gender. This PBF project is well placed to utilize the comparative advantage of the reformed UN in order to holistically engage

on the issue, delivering as one. The project would benefit from close collaboration with the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) agencies, which include SPC and SPREP amongst others, drawing on ongoing work and feeding into regional planning and governance frameworks.

Within the region there are organizations involved in related work that tackle issues in the region through various lenses such as: humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness & recovery, natural resource protection, security, climate change and political cooperation. These varied approaches are reflected in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security which highlights human security (including humanitarian assistance, the protection of rights, health and prosperity), environmental and resource security, transnational crime and cyber security, as the main focus areas. As it stands, there is not a significant amount of cross-fertilization between the topic areas or organizations working broadly on issues related to climate security. This proposal, with its focus on assessing and responding to climate related security risks is distinct from related key projects in the region and fills a key strategic niche by strengthening an understanding of the implications of climate change for peace and security in the Pacific development context.

List of key projects /programmes and initiatives in the region in the region related to climate security noting that none of these projects duplicate the work of this proposal:

<b>Project/ Organization or process name (duration)</b>	<b>Donor and budget</b>	<b>Project/Organization or process focus</b>	<b>Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal</b>
<i>Boe Declaration on Regional Security and Action Plan - Pacific Islands Forum.</i>	Pacific Islands Forum	To positively and proactively shape our regional security environment by progressing specific, achievable and targeted activities under the relevant strategic focus areas prioritized under the Boe Declaration on Regional Security. Climate Security is one of the strategic focus areas to progressing the vision for the Pacific under the Framework for Pacific Regionalism.	The current proposal is an outcome of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, and it will feed into the Boe Action Plan.
<i>Pacific Climate Fragility Brief and Fact Sheet, developed by the Climate Security Experts Network. – Climate Security Experts Network, September 2019.</i>	The German Federal Foreign Office – as Presidency of the UN Security Council 2019-2020	The Climate Security Expert Network, comprises some 30 international experts, and supports the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the Climate Security Mechanism of the UN system by synthesizing scientific knowledge and expertise, by advising on entry points for building resilience to climate-security risks, and by helping to strengthen a shared understanding of the challenges and opportunities of addressing climate-related security risks.	Key climate fragility and security areas identified in the Pacific Fragility Brief and Fact Sheet will help to inform the in-depth regional climate fragility assessments as well as shaping coverage of issues in the national climate security assessments.
<i>Enhancing protection and</i>	UN Trust Fund for	To protect and empower Pacific communities focusing specifically	This project is narrowly focused on developing a

<i>empowerment of migrants and communities affected by climate change and disasters in the Pacific region</i> – IOM, ILO, OHCHR, ESCAP. Duration: 2019-2022	Human Security - USD \$5,308,945	on climate change and disaster-related migration, displacement and planned relocation.	regional framework for the movement of peoples as a response to climate change. The current proposal will build on and compliment the work and knowledge established by IOM, ILO, OHCHR, ESCAP project as one element/ response to the wider security implications of climate change on the region.
<i>Kiribati Food Security Project</i> – UNDP Duration: 2016-2020	Global Environment Fund – USD \$3,416,537	To build the adaptive capacity of Kiribati to ensure food security under conditions of climate change by assisting to address urgent institutional capacity building needs primarily at national level; and assisting to address climate change vulnerabilities through implementing and demonstrating community-based adaptation measures.	The current proposal will build upon the institutional capacity established by UNDP and other partners in Kiribati.
<i>Climate and Oceans Support Program In The Pacific</i> – SPREP	Australian Government - USD \$250,353.00	COSPPac works with Pacific Island stakeholders to analyse and interpret climate, oceans and tidal data to produce valuable services for island communities. This information helps island communities to prepare for, and mitigate the impacts of severe climate, tidal and oceanographic events.	SPREP's scientific information and country climate change profiles inform the interventions to be in this proposal. This data will be useful in the analysis of how climate change is affecting security in the region and at the national level.
<i>Global Programme Sustainable Management of Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change</i> – GIZ Duration: 2017-2020	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – EUR 4 million	To improve applied knowledge relating to the sustainable management of human mobility in the context of climate change in the Pacific.	GIZ's programme can be a useful partner initiative taking place in parallel to the current proposal. The learnings about human mobility as a result of climate change and the knowledge development structures (steering groups) that they have enacted as part of their programme should be drawn upon to provide the latest developments on this issue in the region, in addition to the wider focus of this proposal.
Secretariat of the Pacific		Implementing projects across the following areas:	

Community (SPC)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maritime Boundary Delimitation</li> <li>• Oceanic and Coastal Fisheries monitoring in relation to climate impacts</li> <li>• Food Security</li> <li>• Water Security</li> <li>• Health</li> </ul>	
<i>Oceans and Maritime Programme – SPC</i>	2019 Budget: 1,875,600 Donors: Australia; EU IFAN; KfW; New Zealand International Maritime Organisation	Helps create, understand, and apply the technical and scientific knowledge to ensure sustainable management of the Ocean can be met. Four main outcomes supported: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good Oceans and Maritime Governance.</li> <li>• Sustainable Maritime Transport and Safe Navigation.</li> <li>• Strengthened Ocean and Coastal Monitoring and Prediction Services.</li> <li>• Improved Ocean and Maritime Literacy and Capacity</li> </ul>	Pacific Community’s program will inform the interventions and activities to be undertaken in this proposal
<i>Climate Change and Security Policy Briefs</i> by Toda Peace Institute	Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research	Provide policy-relevant research and explore findings that can be translated into practical policies and peacebuilding practice.	The policy briefs will assist in guiding interventions identified in this proposal
<i>Breaking Waves Project - Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC)</i>	Unknown	Breaking waves is research on existing relocation work in Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu. Speaking to church leaders and communities and developing a theological framework for churches which would include focus on 1.5°C targets to address climate change and non-economic loss and damage focus.	The research by PCC will help inform on the community awareness and advocacy initiatives of the current proposal
<i>Global Programme on Strengthening Women’s Resilience to Disasters in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – UN Women</i>	Government of Australia 603,720	The Programme looks at advocating for policy change that promotes gender-responsive resilience building through knowledge base and development of regional and gender profiles on disaster resilience focusing on Kiribati, RMI and Vanuatu.	The current proposal will draw on this work, including gender considerations cross the project’s outputs.

**II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**



- a) A brief **description of the project content** – in a nutshell, what are the main results the project is trying to achieve, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- sensitive).

Knowledge and consensus on how to understand and respond to security and potential conflict arising from climate change in the Pacific will be built at a variety of levels through the project outputs identified below. The project capacities will be implemented within the Climate Change Divisions of the different governments with a view to mainstream climate security issues into the different policies and strategies of the government, ensure government ownership of the processes and advocacy emerging from them, and to increase the link with regional structures.

***Outcome 1. Atoll states and regional actors assess and are empowered to address security threats of climate change***

**Output 1.1 – Dedicated catalytic local capacity developed in Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu to drive country level project implementation, dialogue, analysis and direction on critical climate security issues.**

- 1.1.1. Establish and resource National Climate Security Project Coordinator Positions in the three focus countries (**STATUS: completed**) to:
  - 1.1.2. Lead implementation of country level activities in the project and implementation of priorities identified, ensuring a country driven approach (**STATUS: completed**);
  - 1.1.3. Work across government to assess and provide recommendations on merits and options for establishing long term cross-governmental capacity or mechanism on climate security coordination (in their respective countries) based on the findings of the project (**STATUS: completed**).

**Output 1.2 – Facility established for provision of high-level catalytic policy advice on climate security to atoll nations on an on-demand basis.**

The project will provide high-level policy advice in strategic areas related to climate security based on demand from the three countries. UNDP will establish a system that is able to rapidly identify and deploy high-level cutting-edge upstream policy advice to the leaders and high-level policy makers of Tuvalu, RMI and Kiribati as well as PIF, CANCC and the UN. This system will utilize the UN system's global knowledge network, academia, the private sector, CSOs and other institutions for knowledge exchange and innovation across sectors and will be set up in partnership with other entities of the UN Country Team. The facility will be demand driven, swift, highly strategic and will seek to deploy the best knowledge and experience available on the subject. The support provided will not only help inform domestic and regional policy, but it will also assist leaders of the three countries in their global advocacy and negotiations on climate security.

In terms of funding allocation for provision of high-level dedicated policy advice, the current budgetary allocations will be reviewed and revised during the project inception within the overall allocated budgets to ensure this catalytic support is well funded.

Establish a dedicated facility in support of:

- 1.2.1 Provision of high-level dedicated policy advice on an on-demand basis to the three-atoll countries, CANCC, PIF and UN as needed (**STATUS: in-progress**);

- 1.2.2 Assess and present recommendations for more permanent support to the CANCC, for example the establishment of a Secretariat in support of their unique situation at the frontline of climate change (STATUS: in-progress); and
- 1.2.3 Explore and propose options for strengthening partnership mechanisms with the UN system to cooperate on addressing climate security threats (STATUS: in-progress).

**Output 1.3 – Coordination capacity strengthened in the Pacific Islands Forum to support the developing regional understanding of climate security contributing to and informing the Boe Declaration Action Plan.**

- 1.3.1 Resource a climate security advisory position at PIFS (STATUS: completed) to:
  - 1.3.2 Manage regionally focused activities of the project and foster collaboration amongst key stakeholders in the region (STATUS: in-progress);
  - 1.3.3 Feed into relevant reporting and decision-making processes linked to the Boe Declaration and relevant regional and international fora ensuring that relevant findings and outputs of the project are institutionalized in regional and international resolutions / declarations (STATUS: in-progress);
  - 1.3.4 Support national focal points in focus countries (STATUS: in-progress).

**Outcome 2: Strengthened understanding, articulation and addressing of key climate-related security risks with a focus on atoll nations and key climate security areas emerging in the region**

**Output 2.1 – Three country specific Climate Security Profiles developed.**

These climate security profiles will identify critical climate security issues as the basis for action, resource mobilisation and advocacy in the three focus countries, building on existing assessment as relevant.

- 2.1.1 Identify key stakeholders and consult and agree on objectives, focus and purpose of Climate Security Profiles (CSPs) depending on their existing challenges, available information, and requests, in each focus country. The scale of this work will vary according to the level of existing assessment already undertaken, for example in Kiribati where the Joint Implementation Plan is already approved, the existing “whole of islands approach” and related assessments will be the foundational basis for the CSPs (STATUS: completed).
- 2.1.2 Undertake rapid analysis of existing relevant information and sources that should inform the CSP and identify gaps. Draw on existing climate projection profiles (SPREP 2014) and relevant assessment work; include local knowledge specifically suited to this project, including local climatological system dynamics (tides and seasons), disaster risk reduction strategies (food preparation and preservation) and coping capacities (family clans and social networks) to expand concepts of human security as relevant; include hard security as also relevant; and consider scenario-based assessments in line with the latest IPCC reports to identify which are the priority interventions for conflict prevention in the short and long term. Assessments including Gender should include non-economic losses as well – such as culture, identity and community values; the unique considerations for, and perspectives of, youth and gender and innovative ways of soliciting input from these groups (STATUS: in-progress).
- 2.1.3 Design and agree on methodology/approach to develop National and/or Sub-national Climate Security Profiles drawing on the UN Conceptual Approach for Climate Related

Security Risk Assessments and ensuring the methodology is gender sensitive. Consider scenario-focused methodologies to identify security and conflict risks over different timeframes in the country contexts. Where this has not already been done, the methodology should also draw on existing assessment approaches e.g., online and face-to-face consultation with marginalized segments of society as well as traditional and church groups (STATUS: completed).

- 2.1.4 Develop three National Climate Security Profiles (CSP), one for each atoll country, tailored to the needs of that country considering any existing assessment (STATUS: in-progress).
- 2.1.5 Identify and recommend policy and management frameworks (e.g., National Security Policies, Climate Change Profiles) that may need to be developed, adjusted / updated at national and regional levels to consider the priorities identified in the profiles (STATUS: in-progress).

**Output 2.2 – Country focused consultative process and outreach arrangements established in Tuvalu and RMI that help to inform, validate and address and respond to Climate Change Security risks over time<sup>8</sup>.**

- 2.2.1 Design and reach agreement on country specific collaborative arrangements to support ongoing inclusive dialogue and decision-making processes (STATUS: completed). This should draw on existing arrangements and help to inform, validate and guide climate security interventions drawing on relevant expertise on dialogue design, including regional civil society and the Mediation Support Unit in DPPA. (E.g., This will also help to inform profiles, identifying priorities, testing potential responses and support their monitoring and evolution over time and proposed sustainability options of these into the future) (STATUS: completed)
- 2.2.2 Undertake inclusive dialogue (including an information sharing loop to ensure that information collected, and analysis conducted is fed back to communities) and outreach in the focus countries to bring together viewpoints of all relevant stakeholders. This could include country wide inception discussions, thematic focused outreach, and innovate ways to engage unique perspectives from stakeholders including women, youth and diaspora (STATUS: completed). This activity will be aligned with national consultations under ongoing programmes addressing climate security, such as the programme on enhancing protection and empowerment of migrants and communities affected by climate change and disasters in the Pacific region (STATUS: completed).
- 2.2.3 Strengthen the capacity of groups representing the interests and perspectives of vulnerable and marginalized people (e.g., CSOs, church groups, some women, some youth, and community organizations) to effectively engage in the climate change security risk discourse. The criteria for selecting relevant organizations, stakeholders and activities will be identified under activity 2.2.1 (STATUS: completed).

**Output 2.3 Pilot or implement at least four initiatives (one per focus country and an additional one in Kiribati) that address an identified climate security priority at country and/or the community level.**

- 2.3.1 Establish criteria and an inclusive process for the early selection of pilot projects to respond to climate-related security risks, drawing on country level, regional and

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<sup>8</sup> Kiribati will not undertake this particular process as country consultative processes and outreach arrangements were undertaken through the Kiribati National Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (KIVA) under the Whole of Island Approach. Kiribati will continue to develop its climate change profile based on the KIVA.

international expertise on peacebuilding and conflict prevention as well as on existing plans where already in place (i.e., Kiribati) and /or on the consultation process described in output 2.2 (STATUS: completed). The final selection of the projects to support will be endorsed by the Project Board. Such projects will pay particular attention to the needs of women and young people with regards to climate security risks (STATUS: completed).

- 2.3.2 Develop and implement, draw lessons, and disseminate lessons from at least four interventions, at least one relevant to RMI and Tuvalu and at least two that implement activities outlined in the Kiribati Joint Implementation Action Plan and the Kiribati national Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (KIVA) Database (STATUS: to commence in extension period). Examples of projects relevant in this area drawing on this plan could include (but are not limited to):
- Develop and provide training on processing and marketing of ‘climate resilient products’ in communities where there is a risk of social conflict over resources and/or potential for displacement to other areas that would increase social tension (STATUS: to commence in extension period).
  - Establish or strengthen national or local conflict resolution mechanisms to respond to tensions and disputes over land (including potential systems for engagement between government and traditional landowners) (STATUS: to commence in extension period).
  - Develop and strengthen local businesses and artisanal fisheries in communities where there is a risk of social conflict over resources or potential displacement to better use bycatch for food security (STATUS: to commence in extension period).
  - Strengthen revolving funds within community-based cooperatives for agricultural activities to strengthen resilience to stressors and competition over resources at the community level (STATUS: to commence in extension period).

**Output 2.4 – Improved regional dialogue and understanding through the establishment of a Pacific Climate Security network (PCSN) of relevant disciplines (climate change, security, disaster, culture, health, academia, humanitarian etc) and through the development of two deep dive assessments.**

The objective of the PCSN is to ensure cross-disciplinary information sharing and brainstorming, effective partner collaboration through the implementation of the project, including input to related activities of other practitioners and institutions stakeholders in the space.

- 2.4.1 Review existing relevant formal and informal coordination mechanisms (PRP Task Force, Forum Sub-Committee on Security) to design PCSN in a way that will add value to existing arrangements (STATUS: completed).
- 2.4.2 Identify network stakeholders including a mixture of practitioners and development partners which could consist of at least: relevant regional agencies (PIFS, SPC, SPREP, USP) UN Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women and IOM), development partners (GIZ, DFAT, MFAT), academia (Toda, USP, ANU, Griffith Uni), civil society (Pacific Conference of Churches, Trancend Oceania, Dialogue Fiji, Femlink Pacific, Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding), private sector (PIPSO) and youth representatives including those engaged in the development of the proposal (STATUS: completed).
- 2.4.3 Establish network partnership arrangement including relevant medium for ease of ongoing communication, consultation and collaboration (STATUS: completed).

- 2.4.4 Meet face to face periodically with specific clear objectives and deliverables (e.g., support to “deep dive” thematic dialogues, CSPs and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) that are action oriented and time bound and also contribute to project objectives **(STATUS: in-progress)**).
- 2.4.5 Identify sustainability options for the network, drawing on the considerable partner interest in supporting practical initiatives that will advance programmatic work in financing available to support this field **(STATUS: in-progress)**.

The objective of the deep dive assessments is to facilitate better understanding of multisectoral issues, stakeholders and resources involved in the issue and to inform effective policy development and implementation in this space. Among themes covered: women; youth; displacement and forced migration; maritime boundaries; health, food and water security nexus; blue economy challenges; disaster coping capacity.

- 2.4.6 Develop deep dive assessments on at least one climate fragility issues of direct relevance to climate related tensions and inclusive approaches (issues to be recommended by Pacific Climate Security Network) through applying the Pacific tailored Conceptual Approach to Climate-related Security Risk Assessments, to feed into the Sub-Committee on Security reporting under the Boe Action Plan. This should help to guide effective government policy interventions in related areas e.g. NDC implementation, prioritization of financing; Health policies and interventions, fisheries management. **(STATUS: completed)**
- 2.4.7 Convene at least one regional dialogues on climate fragility issues with a focus on issues most relevant to Atoll Nations (e.g., Displacement and forced migration, Maritime boundaries certainty Health, Food and Water Security; Coastal Protection; Impacts on the Blue Economy). This activity will draw upon outcomes from already existing regional consultations, such as on migration and human security in the context of climate change. **(STATUS: completed)**.

### **Output 2.5 A Pacific climate security assessment prepared and presented**

This assessment will draw on and feed back into the UN Conceptual Approach to Climate-Related Security Risk Assessments - strengthening both the regional and global framework for understanding climate security.

- 2.5.1 Identify key stakeholders (at country and regional level with a special focus on identifying specific women and youth groups) that need to be part of the dialogue to ensure all perspectives are heard and considered. Draw on experiences from 3 Atoll Nation approaches and application (see 2.2 above) and existing Pacific specific assessment frameworks in climate change, human security and traditional security as relevant. (Particularly the PIF Implementation Action Plan, endorsed by leaders in August 2019 and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) and Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP) **(STATUS: completed)**).
- 2.5.2 Ensure the most vulnerable groups are engaged in a meaningful way with particular focus on youth, women & LGBTQI, and persons with disabilities **(STATUS: completed)**.
- 2.5.3 Engage leading experts (particularly from Atoll Nations) to support the translation of the global UN Conceptual Approach to Climate-Related Security Risk Assessments to the Pacific context **(STATUS: completed)**.

- 2.5.4 Present outcome framework and any associated comprehensive assessments (see output 1.4.ii below) to the Forum Officials Sub-committee on Regional Security for consideration at their scheduled meeting on Security on 14 Oct 2020 (STATUS: completed).
- 2.5.5 Identify opportunities to ensure a strengthened regional understanding of climate security is integrated into UN reporting and analysis at the global level (see output 3.x below) (STATUS: completed)

***Outcome 3: Stronger advocacy by atoll nations and Pacific Island countries in global fora combatting climate change through greater emphasis on its impact on peace and security***

**Output 3.1 – Greater awareness and reflection of positions on climate fragility and security for Pacific SIDS and low-lying atoll nations in relevant fora including: the CANCC, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, UNCLOS, UNGA, WEF, CSD.**


- 3.1.1 Develop agreed country-level impactful advocacy strategies associated with the Country Climate Security Profiles including identification of innovative forms for communicating climate security priorities to different audiences e.g., Video's, VR, social media, art (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.1.2 Develop an agreed joint Regional Advocacy Strategy for targeting key fora and events to progress greater appreciation and understanding of the climate security challenges of atoll nations and Pacific Island Countries which also include the perspectives of women and youth. Include key fora and processes such as Boe Action Plan reporting to Sub-Committee on Security; Group of Friends on Climate and Security; Pacific Resilience Partnership Technical Working Group on Human Mobility; UNFCCC; UNSG reporting; Blue Pacific Strategy 2050 (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.1.3 Support the CANCC to convene and build consensus on their priority climate security challenges and to articulate these as a basis for calling on the international community to raise ambition and provide longer-term support. Provide funding for platforms, meetings, advice and research in support of this. Identify and provide support to connect CANCC work to relevant regional and global processes and advocacy (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.1.4 Design and develop fit-for-purpose knowledge and communication products from Pacific perspectives to support the efforts of Pacific Countries to help to raise the awareness of these challenges for the region and global community. Knowledge products will consider already existing materials and should be developed for different audiences including community, policy makers, potential donors and negotiations experts (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.1.5 Support CANCC members and stakeholders to attend key regional and international events to promote greater awareness of their climate security challenges to inform practical and progressive international support to address them, for example in discussions related to maintaining EEZ boundaries, maintaining revenues from migratory fish stocks, protection of people who may be displaced and forced to migrate because of climate change impacts (STATUS: in progress).

**Output 3.2 Identification, mobilization, and coordination of resources for addressing the unique climate security challenges of the focus countries.**



- 3.2.1 Resourcing strategies developed for National Climate Security Profiles for focus countries, tailored to ensuring the most serious risks to human, cultural and societal security and resource integrity are mitigated (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.2.2 Identify good practice examples of integrated approaches amongst climate change, humanitarian, development and security practitioners to address climate security challenges with a focus on how they affect different groups including women and youth – at country and regional level (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.2.3 Consultations between atoll and other Pacific countries and donor/partners to foster resourcing opportunities and identify modalities of suitable programmatic and coordinated resourcing (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.2.4 Support governments to negotiate the inclusion of the unique climate security considerations of the Pacific into relevant climate finance, development finance and security finance fora across the region and internationally (STATUS: in progress).
- 3.2.5 Explore suitable resourcing options and modalities that could be put in place to address the unique loss and damage issues faced by Pacific countries and atoll countries in particular. This could support readiness on how to address loss and damage in the Pacific context (as these issues continue to accelerate in line with climate impact projections) and would also inform global negotiations on resourcing implications of loss and damage (STATUS: in progress).

b) Project-level ‘theory of change’



**If**, capacity is made available at the national and regional level, in conjunction with existing coalitions, to build on current global & regional political momentum, and foster collaboration between the stakeholders involved in climate security nexuses at community, national and regional levels, and

**If**, key bodies of practice across the climate change, security, human security, environment and development space in the Pacific region are networked together to generate dialogue and work on assessing more accurately the climate security nexus and drivers in the Pacific context, and

**If**, the clarity of climate security issues for Pacific SIDS is well understood at a sufficiently granular level (community, country, regional levels) and captured in simple and effective knowledge products targeting a range of key stakeholders, and

**If**, platforms for focused dialogue between the most vulnerable, and with the most influential are created and supported,

**Then**, Pacific SIDS and low-lying atoll nations will have greater ability to build resilience and respond to climate security threats and have greater credibility to call for greater ambition with GHG reductions. **And**, together with practitioners, they will be better placed to harness and coordinate the necessary resources and interventions of the range of partners across, climate change, development and security spheres operating in the region and their countries



and communities. **And**, this will assist to build resilience of Pacific people avoiding and/or postponing reaching tipping points of fragility across a range of climate exacerbated areas, which have the potential (both individually and collectively) to result in insecurity and conflict.

- c) **Project result framework**, outlining all project outcomes, outputs, activities with indicators of progress, baselines, and targets (must be gender- and age- sensitive). Use **Annex B**; no need to provide additional narrative here. For any baselines not yet established, this will be recorded as part of the inception workshop report (estimated to be within 4 months of project start).

Attached

d) **Project targeting and sequencing strategy**

Atoll countries have been selected as the focus for this project based on the urgency of the climate threats that they are facing and the desire of the UN Secretary-General to strengthen UN support to their advocacy in this area. The work to strengthen gender and age-sensitive understanding at the national level and to pilot approaches (or to move to implementation where needs are clear) can feed effectively into a regional understanding. In terms of sequencing therefore, the work at the national level will be conducted first, and to feed into work at the regional level and then global.

Different strategies will be applied to different country contexts, given that Kiribati is more advanced than RMI and Tuvalu in its analysis of the issues, in developing national adaptation plans and understanding what climate security means in the Kiribati context – in particular the concept of needing to address this as a ‘whole of island’ issue. For RMI and Tuvalu, therefore, considerable investment will be to develop assessments and analysis of climate security concerns and how they manifest in site-specific ways in these countries. Pilot approaches to addressing some of the key security concerns will also be developed and implemented, and mechanisms for both short- and long-term community engagement and outreach will be developed. This community selection will be done in consultation with government and non-government stakeholders to ensure an all-stakeholder approach as outlined in the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP).<sup>9</sup> In particular, community selection will take into account of the following FRDP principles:

- Prioritize the needs and respect the rights of the most vulnerable, including but not limited to women, persons with disabilities, children, youth and older persons, and facilitate their effective participation in planning and implementation of activities.
- Integrate gender considerations, advocate and support equitable participation of men and women in the planning and implementation of activities.
- Build on and help reinforce cultural and traditional resilience and knowledge of communities, who should be engaged as key actors in designing plans, activities and solutions that are of relevance to them.

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<sup>9</sup> [http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/assets/FRDP\\_2016\\_Resilient\\_Dev\\_pacific.pdf](http://gsd.spc.int/frdp/assets/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf)

- Acknowledge and factor in a traditional holistic worldview, where spirituality plays an integral role in constructing a meaningful life and pro-active existence.

For Kiribati, the focus will be on implementing activities that respond to climate related issues that are already understood to have an impact on security in the country or in specific areas. These include interventions towards adaptation and mitigation measures and building resilience, especially linked to vulnerabilities identified in KIVA. Some preparatory and follow-up work will be conducted, however, to ensure that the approaches taken are consistent and that lessons are integrated into a climate security profile from which other countries may draw lessons and good practice.

The work on at the national level is most effectively done by governments directly, who will work closely with UN actors and Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP) agencies on the ground to ensure synchronicity of approaches and outputs. Strengthening the capacity of the CANCC will be a crucial element in the ability of atoll countries to define coherent messages about the unique climate security messages that they face. In terms of strengthening conceptual coherence across the wider region on how to define and respond to climate security risks (and thus feed effectively into global decision-making fora), the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat is uniquely placed to facilitate buy-in and feed into formal regional structures of governance - such as the PIF sub-committee on security – ensuring a level of clarity and formality in response to these issues that will be needed if messaging on clear priorities for the region are to be effectively communicated globally (e.g. through a Secretary-General report on climate security in the Pacific region).

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), as the pre-eminent policy coordination body in the region, is responsible for drawing member states together to agree on relevant policies such as the Boe Declaration (2018), highlighting climate change as the number one security threat to region. It is paramount that the UN coordinates with the regional and sub-regional bodies/initiatives working around this topic and the project would greatly benefit from PIF ownership. In addition to the inclusion of the PIF, it is important that funding and cooperation is channeled through the climate change ministries in each of the three countries. It is hoped that working directly with ministries will ensure that the project is best tailored to the needs of each country, reaches deep into communities which only in-country counterparts could access, ensures ownership of the project, and builds the capacity of those national counterparts, which will in-turn lead to greater sustainability for the project and its outcomes. The implementation will follow country level best practice on gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment and through engagement with a range of stakeholders, ensure an inclusive and gender sensitive consultation process.

This project intentionally takes a bottom-up knowledge-based approach which starts with the establishment of national coordinators in each recipient country, leading to the creation of national profiles, then wider regional profile, which can then address global fora. Therefore, the project impacts will not be limited to the recipient countries but instead create knowledge relevant to all countries which contain inhabited atolls as part of their territory.

### III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

#### a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners:

UNDP Pacific and IOM Marshall Islands will be the recipient UN Organisations under this project, with UNDP as the lead coordinator of the project.

RUNO	Role
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	<p>UNDP will be the lead coordinator for this project and will co-implement with IOM. UNDP will undertake the work at the regional level and all country-level activities in Tuvalu and Kiribati.</p> <p>The UNDP Pacific Office in Fiji is a multi-country office which covers 10 countries in the Pacific including RMI, Tuvalu and Kiribati.</p> <p>Within the UNDP Pacific Office in Fiji the Resilience and Sustainable Development team does work related to climate change, disaster risk management and environment. The current portfolio is approximately USD\$295 million with an estimated delivery of USD\$32m in 2020.</p> <p>In Kiribati, UNDP has a portfolio of national projects of approximately USD\$19 million focusing on food security and whole of island approach. UNDP has one staff in Kiribati.</p> <p>In Tuvalu, UNDP has a portfolio of national projects of approximately USD\$42m including a Green Climate Fund coastal adaptation project. UNDP has three staff in Tuvalu.</p> <p>In RMI, UNDP has a portfolio of national projects of approximately USD\$33m related to water security and NDCs. UNDP has 5 staff in RMI.</p> <p>UNDP is uniquely positioned at both the national and regional levels to act as an integrator in relation to climate change work ensuring that the climate security agenda is integrated into the wider climate change discourse in the Pacific.</p>

International Organization for Migration	<p>IOM will be the coordinator of the RMI national component of this project (Activity 1.1.1, Output 2.2, 2.3) and the regional output 2.4. IOM will coordinate closely with the UNDP and the Project Manager on all project activities.</p> <p>Under the IOM structure in the Pacific the RMI Country office will implement this in coordination with IOM liaison office in Canberra, Australia. The IOM Fiji office will support the implementation of output 2.4 as it relates directly to its PCCMHS project. The overall portfolio of the IOM Fiji office is USD3.5m which includes country specific projects and regional multi country projects.</p> <p>IOM Marshall Islands has been established with an in-country presence since 2009 and is embedded within government structures for disaster risk reduction, emergency response, climate change awareness, national adaptation planning and migrant services. There are currently 14 staff with IOM Marshall Islands: 13 in Majuro and 1 in Ebeye.</p> <p>IOM Marshall Islands is uniquely positioned to implement the country activities due to the strong relationship with the government on the ground as well as experience implementing with UNDP specifically with the regional Ridge to Reef Project.</p> <p>Given IOM's presence in the Marshall Islands and working experience in country and work with RCO and UN on project development, the Government of RMI requested that IOM be the implementing partner for national activities.</p> <p>The IOM Marshall Islands office falls under the leadership of IOM Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia, RMI and Palau). The project will be implemented under the overall leadership of the IOM Micronesia Chief of Mission, and the direct implementation of IOM Head of Sub Office based in the Marshall Islands. IOM Micronesia has portfolio of over approximately \$15 million, with approximately \$2 million annual in RMI.</p>
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The additional entities and agencies below are possible partners for the implementation of project interventions and for provision of technical support to complement various components of the project.

Entity	Type of organization	Expected role
Climate Change Directorate (CCD) (Majuro, RMI)	Government Agency	Policy advice to President/Prime Minister and Cabinet and planning for climate security.
Department of Climate Change, Ministry of Finance, Tuvalu	Government Agency	Policy advice to President/Prime Minister and Cabinet and planning for climate security.
Office of the President, Kiribati	Government Agency	Policy advice to President/Prime Minister and Cabinet and planning for climate security.


CANCC Secretariat	Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change	An Early Warning System for the global community, the Coalition was formed with the intention of joining forces to focus global attention on the threats caused by climate change that undermine the development and stability of low-lying atoll countries and their communities. The Coalition includes countries that are hardly three meters above sea-water level, comprising of Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu.
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC	International intergovernmental organization	Regional technical support on agriculture, fisheries, energy, education, etc.
UNICEF	UN Agency	Technical support for output 2.2. to ensure Country focused consultative process and outreach arrangements incorporate the perspectives of various stakeholders, including youth.
UN Women	UN Agency	Technical support on gender and social inclusion integration, technical expertise in GBV, women's economic and political empowerment and resilience building.
UN Environment	UN Agency	Technical support on environmental factors affecting climate security
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat	Regional intergovernmental organization	Support and linkages at the Regional level to the PIFS Boe Declaration on Regional Security
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)	Regional intergovernmental organization	Technical support for the protection and sustainable development of the Pacific region's environment
Non-Government Organisations	International, Regional and National e.g. WWF, PCDF, WCS, CI	Technical support for climate security work as these organizations are undertaking climate change initiatives at community level.
Academic Institutions such as University of the South Pacific and Griffith University.	Regional and National University	Support and linkages for research opportunities

**b) Project management and coordination**

The project will be implemented following UNDP's direct implementation modality and IOM's direct implementation modality. Direct Implementation (DIM) is the modality whereby UNDP and IOM take on the role of Implementing Partner. In the DIM modality, UNDP and IOM have the technical and administrative capacity to assume the responsibility for mobilizing and applying effectively the required inputs in order to reach the expected outputs. UNDP and IOM assume overall management responsibility and accountability for implementation of their respective parts of the project. Accordingly, UNDP and IOM must follow all policies and procedures established for its own operations. UNDP will be the convening agency for this project.

UNDP may identify a Responsible Party to carry out activities within a DIM project. A Responsible Party is defined as an entity that has been selected to act on behalf of the UNDP on the basis of a written agreement or contract to purchase goods or provide services using the project budget. The Responsible Party may manage the use of these goods and services to carry out project activities and produce outputs. All Responsible Parties are directly accountable to UNDP in accordance with the terms of their agreement or contract with UNDP. Further, we are currently implementing the USD\$36m Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project funded by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in Tuvalu as this was identified as the most effective implementation modality for the context of Tuvalu. Further to this, all regional projects use the DIM modality as well.

The Implementing Partners, UNDP and IOM, are responsible and accountable for managing this project, including the monitoring and evaluation of project interventions, achieving project outcomes, and for the effective use of resources.



The **Project Board** is responsible for making, by consensus, management decisions when guidance is required by the Project Manager, including recommendation for UNDP/Implementing Partner approval of project plans and revisions. In order to ensure UNDP's ultimate accountability, Project Board decisions should be made in accordance with standards that ensure management for development results, best value money, fairness, integrity, transparency and effective international competition. The Project Board will have the highest level of decision-making authority. In case a consensus cannot be reached within the Board, the UN Resident Coordinator in consultation with UNDP and IOM as implementing agencies will be responsible for making the final decision.

The Project Board is comprised of individuals from the following organizations:

- Chief Executive Officer/ Permanent Secretary of the 3 governments and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Senior Beneficiary)
- UN Resident Coordinator's Office, UNDP and IOM (Executive)
- UNSG Peace Building Fund Representative (Donor)
- Project Manager (ex-officio)
- Other Board Members (Regional Agencies, UN Agencies, Other relevant govt agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders) as agreed by Project Board members

### **Project Staffing**

Six staff will be recruited by UNDP and fully funded by the project. The **Project Manager (P-4 NPSA-11/IPSA-11/IC)** will run the project on a day-to-day basis within the constraints laid down by the Board. They will undertake efficient and effective day-to-day planning, management implementation and monitoring of project activities and associated results and support implementation of project visibility and knowledge management activities. This person will monitor the use of PBF resources including resources provided to Governments and PIFS for implementation of project activities. The Project Manager will be based in Suva at the UNDP Pacific Office in Fiji. The **Finance & Administrative Associate (SB-3)** will provide administrative and financial services and support for the project. The **Communications and Advocacy Specialist (International PSA)/NPSA/IC** will provide communications support and knowledge management to ensure visibility of the project activities and outcomes.

The three **National Climate Security Project Coordinators (SB-4)** who are based in Kiribati, and Tuvalu are recruited by UNDP while for Republic of the Marshall Islands it is recruited by IOM. One additional local consultant is recruited in Kiribati to cater for the recent staff turn-over and recruitment for a successor Coordinator in Kiribati. The National Coordinators will be hosted by the respective Government in the 3 capitals (Majuro, Funafuti & Tarawa) in office space provided by the relevant Government Office. The CEO/Permanent Secretary/Director as national project director will oversee the performance of the National Coordinators and hence will share responsibility with the UNDP Project Manager in the management of the project. The National Coordinators will have budget to travel between the atoll nations. It will be extremely useful for the National Coordinator to see, first-hand, how the project is rolling out in the other atoll nations.

The four IOM staff projectized to work on the PBF project are already in country and do not need to be recruited. The IOM project implementation staff are 1) IOM Project Officer based in Majuro will work at 35% of time, 2) national project assistance G5 staff based in Majuro at 25%, 3) Finance and Administration support from Pohnpei based IOM Resource Management

Office 10% and 4) Majuro based Admin/Finance assistant at 10%. The IOM Project Officer will be responsible for the overall management and oversight of the project. IOM will be responsible for the management, implementation and financial management of activity 1.1.1 in RMI, Output 2.2 and 2.3 in RMI, and Output 2.4. IOM will work directly with the National Designated Authority on all project implementation and contract additional responsible parties when necessary. IOM work will closely with UNDP Project Management to ensure cohesive project implementation and reporting, as well as Monitoring and Evaluation. The Regional components of the project will be implemented with the support of the technical expertise of the PCCMHS project staff based in IOM Fiji.

The Project Management Unit will collaborate closely and exchange information with the regional Peace and Development Adviser (who should also be involved in the screening of pilot activities proposed for funding under Activity 2.3) and with the HQ level Climate and Security Mechanism to support adaptation of global conceptual approaches to the Pacific and sharing of lessons.

Given that the remaining activities for the second NCE period (February – July 2023) are operational in nature requiring monitoring of pilot initiatives and support for procurement of goods and services, the size of Project Management Unit and advisory support is significantly reduced to the following: (i) Finance and Admin Associate (based in Suva, Fiji); and (ii) three Deputy Project Managers in Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu. The services of the Project Manager, the Climate Security Specialist, and the Communication Specialist are not required for the second NCE period as activities requiring their support are already completed and corresponding budgets have been expended accordingly. While each country coordinator will manage daily activities in their respective countries, the management team of the UNDP Resilience and Sustainable Development Unit will provide overall management support to the project. The six-monthly progress and end of project reports will be prepared by the Project Manager before completion of contract in mid-February, which will be made available for updating by the retained project staff. During the second NCE phase, each government will be closely examining the possibility of institutionalizing the climate security positions and absorption of national country coordinators within the current government structures. This requires the preparation of proposals and justification for the inclusion of new positions and allocation of additional budgetary resources in the new fiscal year 2024 and beyond. This could be handled in a progressive manner and treated as a step further to the establishment of CANCC desks, and as way forward for the policy research recommendation on the integration of climate security into policies and national budgetary processes.

### **Project Technical Advisors**

Other positions under the project which will be recruited by UNDP include an Advisor based in Pacific Island Forum.

Additional personnel may be hired, under long-term agreement (LTA) or short-term consultancy agreements, as necessary to ensure adequate support. In order to ensure relevance, global leading experts to provide demand-driven advisory services to Pacific Islands Countries and their Leaders are needed. Relevant procurement of services required to support the implementation of the project will be managed by the PIU, following established rules and procedures of the UNDP, which are objective, transparent, and participatory. The Governments will sit in the selection panels for procurement of goods and services.



The **Technical Advisory Group**, made up of Government selected individuals and CROP Agencies, IOM, UN and NGO staff with the relevant capacity, will provide technical guidance to the PIU and to the Project Board through regular meetings during implementation and on an as-needed basis, e.g., reviewing specific deliverables, terms of reference, etc. Apart from providing technical guidance, the Technical Advisory Group may also deliver support for capacity building activities.

- c) **Risk management** – assess the level of risk for project success (low, medium and high) and provide a list of major project specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include any Do No Harm issues and project mitigation.

<b>Risk</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Mitigation Measures</b>
Limited capacity of Governments to the project	Medium	This risk will be minimized through targeted capacity building support to the countries to introduce Climate Security concepts especially those articulated in the outcomes and outputs in this project, drawing in part from UNDP, IOM's and other partners extensive and collective Climate Security experience and networks in Asia and the Pacific region and regional and global capacity building networks.
Limited capacity for project implementation in the countries	Medium	The project implementors will ensure adequate levels of project technical, administrative and financial support and backstopping are in place for effective results and financial delivery in each of the national component. Special capacity building and training is included to focus on local talent to build human resources for the relevant component of the project.
High staff turnover and limited local human resource base could compromise the project management unit and delay implementation	Medium	In the past there are several positions that straddle multiple UNDP-supported projects that facilitate better coordination across these projects and a more flexible arrangement whereby a shortage of staff in one project can be supplemented, at least in the interim.
Political Risks: Changing leadership at national and local level resulting in project delays or refocus and/or suspension	Low	Even though Climate Security is a priority in the 3 Atoll nations, all efforts will be made to brief incoming new leaders from Community to Cabinet on the project – a task that all partners; Government, UNDP, implementing partners, stakeholders, etc will be collaborating on.
COVID19 pandemic	Medium	As a result of COVID19, RMI, Tuvalu and Kiribati have closed borders. As face-to-face meeting and community consultation is critical, the project will be severely impacted if travel restrictions remain in place.
Tropical Cyclones and storm surge	Low	With RMI, Tuvalu and Kiribati being near the equator, direct hits from cyclones/typhoons are infrequent (but can happen); however, the storm surge can cause significant damage. If a tropical cyclone/typhoon or storm surge affects the islands, will need to ensure safety of personnel and adaptive manage engagement based on the level of impact of the event.

### **UNDP (Direct Implementation Modality)**

1. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds]<sup>10</sup> [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]<sup>11</sup> are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via [http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq\\_sanctions\\_list.shtml](http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml). This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).
4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
6. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient:
  - a. Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA [or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document], the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in such responsible parties, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall:
    - i. put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
    - ii. assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
  - b. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the

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<sup>10</sup> To be used where UNDP is the Implementing Partner

<sup>11</sup> To be used where the UN, a UN fund/programme or a specialized agency is the Implementing Partner

responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.

- c. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud or corruption, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients in implementing the project or programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.
- d. The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices and (b) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org).
- e. In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors' and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
- f. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud or corruption with due confidentiality.

Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.

- g. UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement. Recovery of such amount by UNDP shall not diminish or curtail any responsible party's, subcontractor's or sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.
- h. Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other payments, other than

those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.

- i. Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
- j. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled “Risk Management” are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled “Risk Management Standard Clauses” are adequately reflected, mutatis mutandis, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

#### **IOM (Direct Implementation Modality)**

1. IOM as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)
2. IOM shall receive and administer the Funds in accordance with its regulations, rules and directives. The funding will be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the financial regulations, rules and directives of IOM. If an audit report or auditing procedure reveals an irregularity relevant to the Funds, IOM will immediately bring the information to the attention of the Donor.
3. If the Funds are provided in a currency other than the Project Currency, the value of the Funds will be determined and reporting on the project account will be done by applying the United Nations Operational Exchange Rate in line with IOM’s applicable rules and policies.
4. IOM, as the Implementing Partner will manage the Project in accordance with IOM’s policies and practices in relation to anti-corruption and the prevention, detection and investigation of fraud and recovery of funds the subject of fraud.
5. Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the Funds will vest in IOM. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by IOM will be determined in accordance with the relevant policies and procedures of IOM and in consultation with the donor.
6. IOM, as the Implementing Partner, will ensure activities funded under this Arrangement will be subject to IOM’s regulations, rules, policies and procedures relating to child protection and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. IOM will make all reasonable efforts not to engage in any practice inconsistent with the rights set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

7. IOM, as the Implementing Partner, will take appropriate measures to prevent sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH) of both adults and children in connection with implementation of the activities in accordance with its applicable regulations, rules, administrative issuances, policies and procedures. For all credible allegations of SEAH, IOM will take swift and appropriate action to stop and investigate any person suspected of such practice and consider other action in accordance with its regulations, rules, administrative issuances, policies and procedures. IOM will promptly inform the Donor when it assesses that a SEAH allegation would impact its partnership with the Donor and/or the reputation of the Donor.
8. IOM, as the Implementing Partner, will conduct any procurement in accordance with its procurement policies and standards. IOM will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the Funds are not provided, directly or indirectly, to individuals or entities listed on the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List. If, during the course of this Arrangement, IOM discovers any link between the Contribution and any individuals or entities listed on the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List it will inform the Donor immediately. The Donor and IOM will jointly determine an appropriate response.
9. As an Implementing Partner, IOM warrants that it shall abide by the highest ethical standards in the performance of this Agreement, which includes not engaging in any fraudulent, corrupt, discriminatory or exploitative practice or practice inconsistent with the rights set forth in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Implementing Partner shall immediately inform IOM of any suspicion practice that may have occurred or exist.
10. As an Implementing Partner, IOM shall not assign or subcontract the activities under this Agreement in part or all, unless agreed upon in writing in advance by the donor.
11. All information which comes into the IOM's possession or knowledge as the Implementing Partner will be treated as strictly confidential. IOM will not communicate such information to any third party without the prior written approval of the donor. The IOM will comply with its IOM Data Protection Principles in the event that it collects, receives, uses, transfers or stores any personal data in the performance of this Agreement.
12. As the Implementing Partner, IOM will maintain financial records, supporting documents, statistical records and all other records relevant to the Project in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles to sufficiently substantiate all direct costs of whatever nature involving transactions related to the funds provided to IOM.
13. Expenses incurred by IOM as an Implementing Partner will meet the following minimum criteria:
  - a) They are incurred in accordance with the provisions of the donor's agreement; and
  - b) They are necessary for carrying out the activities as per the donor's Agreement; and
  - c) They are foreseen in the estimated project budget as submitted by IOM to the donor; and
  - d) They are incurred during the implementation period; and
  - e) They are genuine, reasonable, justified, comply with the principles of sound financial management; and
  - f) They are identifiable, recorded in the IOM's financial system in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

- d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – The project will be monitored through the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities as per table below, with the associated M&E budget:

The UNDP CO (Programme Analyst, M&E officer and Programme Associate) can support this process with technical advice. The Regional IOM M&E Officer will provide technical backstopping for this project. The main means of verification and monitoring methodology is outlined in detail in Annex B and all indicators, where applicable, will be gender disaggregated. It is important to note the innovative nature of this project and the expectation that it will serve to develop a body of knowledge also for the UN, including Climate Security Mechanism and Peace Building Support Office. Although UNDP will commission the monitoring and evaluation activities listed in the table below, UNDP will work closely with IOM to ensure a coordinated approach to cover all project activities including both UNDP and IOM components. The PMU will lead the surveys. The details of the survey methodology will be detailed in the inception report.

Type of M&E activity	Responsible Parties	Budget US\$ <i>Excluding project team staff time</i>	Time frame
Inception Workshop and Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager</li> <li>▪ UNDP CO</li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$20,000	Within first two months of project start up
Measurement of project results.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ UNDP CO/Project Manager will oversee the hiring of specific studies and institutions, and delegate responsibilities to relevant team members.</li> <li>▪ IOM will oversee the IOM components</li> </ul>	To be finalized in Inception Phase and Workshop.	Start, mid and end of project (during evaluation cycle) and annually when required.
Measurement of Project Progress on <i>output and implementation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Oversight by Project Manager</li> <li>▪ Project team</li> </ul>	To be determined as part of the Annual Work Plan's preparation.	Annually prior to ARR/PIR and to the definition of annual work plans
ARR/PIR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team</li> <li>▪ UNDP CO</li> </ul>	None	Annually
Periodic status/ progress reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team</li> </ul>	None	Quarterly
Mid-term Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <del>Project Manager and team</del></li> <li>▪ <del>UNDP CO</del></li> <li>▪ <del>External Consultants (i.e. evaluation team)</del></li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$30,000	<del>At the mid-point of project implementation.</del>
<del>Sustainability Assessment and Strategy</del>  <b>Project Perception Survey</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team</li> <li>▪ Government representatives, <b>communities, and stakeholders</b></li> <li>▪ <b>Regional partners</b></li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$5,000	At the <b>end of project, and prior to Final Evaluation</b>

Type of M&E activity	Responsible Parties	Budget US\$ <i>Excluding project team staff time</i>	Time frame
Final Evaluation (inc. Sustainability Assessment and Strategy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team,</li> <li>▪ UNDP CO</li> <li>▪ External Consultants (i.e. national and international evaluation team)</li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$60,000	At least three months before the end of project implementation
Project Terminal Report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team</li> <li>▪ UNDP CO</li> <li>▪ Local consultant<sup>12</sup></li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$3,000	At least three months after the end of the project
Audit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ UNDP CO</li> <li>▪ Project Manager and team</li> </ul>	Indicative cost: per year: US\$ 3,000 – will not be necessary if transfers do not go over \$450k in one year	Yearly
Visits to field sites (where necessary for Component 2.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ UNDP CO and IOM</li> <li>▪ Government representatives</li> </ul>	UNDP costs are paid from GMS fees and Government representatives from operational budget	Yearly
M&E and Knowledge exchange Forums	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project Manager and team.</li> <li>▪ All sub project executants</li> <li>▪ Government representatives</li> </ul>	Indicative cost: US\$45,000	Mid-point of implementation and at project termination
TOTAL indicative COST <i>Excluding project team staff time and UNDP staff and travel expenses</i>		US\$ 150,000	

d) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability –**

The project will work with communities/townships, provincial/island and national government to ensure the requisite enabling environment is in place to provide the best chance of sustainability of the project interventions the site, provincial and national government levels. It is important for all three levels, from site level, Provincial Government level to National Government level to take sustainability actions to sustain the interventions at site level. Communities are primarily responsible for sustaining the interventions of the project at community site level, however Provincial Government and National Government are especially important for sustaining and policy and the hi-tech and/or relatively expensive to maintain interventions.

<sup>12</sup> The local in-country consultant will support the Project Manager and team with data collection from national project sites.

As has taken place during the design phase, coordination with CANCC, and the chair Marshall Islands, is ongoing. The IOM Marshall Islands office will work closely the UNDP management team to ensure maximum communication and coordination with the CANCC as the Marshall Islands is the Chair of the CANCC. The coordination will take place with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Climate Change Directorate as the key government industry. The coordination with CANCC is vital for the overall sustainability.

The ~~mid-term review~~ **Final Evaluation** will also include a Sustainability Assessment and Strategy led by the Project Manager and involving all project partners and stakeholders. This analysis will explore interventions and mechanisms for securing the long-term sustainability of project interventions beyond the life of the project. ~~Mid-term~~ **Final Evaluation** is the appropriate time to carry out the exercise since by then the project would have identified what **could be done beyond the project, in view of the project's catalytic nature.** ~~project interventions have or have not worked and to propose the key impact actions and sustainability actions that can realistically be taken by the project in order to achieve any impact and sustainability aspirations. Recommendations and practical measures for improving building in sustainability into project activities will be incorporated into project work plans for the remainder of the project.~~

## **I. Project budget**

The project budget will be provided in two tranches with the second tranche being released upon demonstration by the project (by the Coordinating Agency on behalf of the project and through the Resident Coordinator's Office or PBF Secretariat) that the first tranche has been expensed or committed to at least 75% between the recipients and upon completion of any regular PBF reports due in the period elapsed.

The project travel budget, which includes travel between and within countries, is high due to countries remoteness as SIDS and the cost and availability of transportation, flights and routes within the Pacific region. The travel costs outlined in the budget include the travel cost of project staff and personnel and delegates. This travel is important to facilitate broad consultation processes at the national level, sharing of knowledge and experiences and strategic participation in key regional and international fora for advocacy on climate security challenges and responses.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

Attached



## **Annex A.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned.
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO.
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
<b>30 April</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b><i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i></b>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

<b>31 July</b>	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

#### Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

**Annex B: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)**

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	indicator milestones
<p><i>Outcome 1. Atoll states and regional actors well informed and empowered to address security threats of climate change .</i></p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 a # of countries demonstrating progress towards establishing cross governmental recommendations/mechanisms on addressing climate security Baseline: 0 Target: 3 countries <b>Current progress: 3</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TORs of cross governmental coordination mechanisms established</li> <li>Cross governmental climate security recommendation paper or report</li> </ul>	<p>National coordinators are operational</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1 b <i>Extent of CANCC members understanding of regional and national climate security issues</i> Baseline: <b>TbD</b> Target: 90% <b>Engagement with CANCC Secretariat has started and initiating dissemination following Palau conference.</b></p>	<p>Online survey to also establish baseline<sup>13</sup></p>	<p>Technical advisor is operational</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1c <i>Extent of PIF members understanding of regional and national climate security issues</i> Baseline: <b>74%</b> Target: 90%</p>	<p>Online survey to also establish baseline<sup>14</sup></p>	<p>Technical Advisor is operational</p>
	<p>Output 1.1 <b>Dedicated catalytic local capacity in three member states of the Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change (CANCC) – Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu – to drive country level project implementation, dialogue, analysis, and direction on critical climate security issues.</b> 1.1.1. Establish and resource National Climate Security Project Coordinator Positions in the three focus countries.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1 <i># of countries with a coordination mechanisms informing the direction on critical climate security issues</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>Baseline and target to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 3</b></p>	<p>Project activity report Coordination mechanism meeting minutes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ToR are advertised</li> <li>Institutional arrangements are finalized to anchored NC in proper Govt position</li> </ul>
		<p>Output Indicator 1.1.2</p>		

<sup>13</sup> To be recorded as part of the inception workshop report (estimated to be within 4 months of project start)

<sup>14</sup> To be recorded as part of the inception workshop report (estimated to be within 4 months of project start)

<p>1.1.2 Lead implementation of country level activities in the project and implementation of priorities identified, ensuring a country driven approach.</p> <p>1.1.3 Work across government to assess and provide recommendations on merits and options for establishing long term cross-governmental capacity or mechanism on climate security coordination (in their respective countries) based on the findings of the project.</p>	<p>Number of countries with country driven &amp; cross governmental priorities including gender priorities on critical climate security issues established</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 countries</p> <p>*Baseline and Targets to be disaggregated by country</p> <p><b>Current progress: 3</b></p>	<p>Project activity report</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cross governmental recommendation report or paper</li> <li>• TOR on set up mechanism on climate security coordination</li> </ul>	<p>Consultations and dialogue are undertaken</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TOR for post are published</li> <li>• Contractual arrangements are finalized</li> </ul>
<p>Output 1.2</p> <p><b>Dedicated catalytic capacity within CANCC to support Atoll Nations collaboration on climate security matters and their unique advocacy at all levels.</b></p> <p>1.2.1 Establish and resource an Advisor Position.</p> <p>1.2.2 Assess and present recommendations for more permanent support to the CANCC, for example the establishment of a Secretariat in support of their unique situation at the frontline of climate change; and</p> <p>1.2.3 Explore and propose options for strengthening partnership mechanisms with the UN system to cooperate on addressing climate security threats.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1</p> <p>Number of countries adopting the recommendations on permanent support to the CANCC</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3</p> <p>*Baseline and target to be disaggregated by country</p> <p><b>Current progress: 0</b></p>	<p>Confirmation letter from Government on adopting the recommendation</p>	<p>• Consultations are undertaken</p>
<p>Output 1.3</p> <p><b>Coordination capacity strengthened in the Pacific Islands Forum to support the developing regional understanding of climate security contributing to and informing the Boe Declaration Action Plan.</b></p> <p>1.3.1 Resource a climate security advisory position at PIFS.</p> <p>1.3.2 Manage regionally focused activities of the project and foster collaboration amongst key stakeholders in the region.</p> <p>1.3.3 Feed into relevant reporting and decision-making processes linked to the Boe Declaration and relevant regional and international fora ensuring that relevant findings and outputs of the project are institutionalized in regional and international resolutions / declarations.</p> <p>1.3.4 Support national focal points in focus countries.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.2</p> <p>Extent of which the Position paper for strengthening the CANCC partnership with the UN is validated and disseminated</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: Position paper for strengthening the CANCC partnership with the UN is validated and disseminated</p> <p><b>Current progress: 0</b></p>	<p>Position paper</p>	<p>• Consultations are undertaken</p>
<p>Output 1.3</p> <p><b>Coordination capacity strengthened in the Pacific Islands Forum to support the developing regional understanding of climate security contributing to and informing the Boe Declaration Action Plan.</b></p> <p>1.3.1 Resource a climate security advisory position at PIFS.</p> <p>1.3.2 Manage regionally focused activities of the project and foster collaboration amongst key stakeholders in the region.</p> <p>1.3.3 Feed into relevant reporting and decision-making processes linked to the Boe Declaration and relevant regional and international fora ensuring that relevant findings and outputs of the project are institutionalized in regional and international resolutions / declarations.</p> <p>1.3.4 Support national focal points in focus countries.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.3.1</p> <p>Extent of PIF's capacity in coordinating regional support towards informing BOE declaration action plan with climate security matters (scale)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: Regional support and collaboration gauged amongst key stakeholders on establishing regional understanding of climate security and contribution to Boe Declaration Action plan</p> <p><b>Current progress: 1</b></p>	<p>Project activity report</p>	<p>Coordination group is established</p>

		<p>Output Indicator 1.3.2  <i>The extent of which the action plan for the implementation of the Boe Declaration integrated climate security recommendations</i>                      Baseline: 0                      Target: 1 <i>action plan for the implementation of the Boe Declaration integrated climate security recommendation</i>                      *Baseline and target to be disaggregated by country                      Current progress: 1</p>	<p>Project activity report</p>	<p>Consultations and agreements on the priorities actions with stakeholders</p>
<p>Outcome 2:                      Strengthened ability of key stakeholders in Pacific countries to understand, articulate and mitigate security threats of climate change with a particular focus on comprehensive threats to atoll nations and key climate security areas emerging in the region</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2 a  <i>Percentage of national stakeholders who consider that the security threats linked to climate change for their country are clear and mitigation measures have been identified (disaggregated by gender)</i>  <b>Tuvalu</b>                      Baseline (female): 66%                      Target: 80%                      Baseline (men): 62%                      Target: 80%  <b>Kiribati</b>                      Baseline (female): 60%                      Target: 80%                      Baseline (men): 75 %                      Target: 80%  <b>Marshall Islands</b>                      Baseline (female): 62%                      Target: 80%                      Baseline (men): 58%                      Target: 80%  <i>Percentage of women and youth who consider their needs are reflected in the assessment and mitigation measures.</i>  <b>Tuvalu</b>                      Baseline (female): 36%                      Target: 80%                      Baseline (men): 60%                      Target: 80%</p>	<p>Survey to sample of national key stakeholders</p>	<p>Consultations and dialogues</p>

	<p>Output 2.1 Three country specific Climate Security Profiles developed that will identify critical climate security issues as the basis for action, resource mobilization and advocacy in the three focus countries, building on existing assessment as relevant.</p> <p>2.1.1 Identify key stakeholders and consult and agree on objectives, focus and purpose of Climate Security Profiles (CSPs) depending on their existing challenges, available information, and requests, in each focus country. The scale of this work will vary according to the level of existing assessment already undertaken, for example in Kiribati where the Joint Implementation Plan is already approved, this focus on demonstrating the climate security relevance of the “whole of island approach”.</p> <p>2.1.2 Undertake rapid analysis of existing relevant information and sources that should inform the CSP and identify gaps. Draw on existing climate projection profiles (SPREP 2014) and relevant assessment work; include expanded concepts of human security (culture, identity) and hard security as relevant and consider scenario-based assessments in line with the latest IPCC reports to identify which are the priority interventions for conflict prevention in the short and long term. Assessments should include non-economic losses as well – such as culture, identity, and community values; the unique considerations for, and perspectives of, youth and gender and innovative ways of soliciting input from these groups.</p> <p>2.1.3 Design and agree on methodology/approach to develop National Climate Security Profiles drawing on the UN Conceptual Approach for Climate Related Security Risk Assessments. Consider scenario-focused methodologies to identify security and conflict risks over different timeframes in the country contexts. The methodology should also draw on existing assessment approaches e.g., online, and face-to-face consultation with marginalized segments of society as well as traditional and church groups.</p>	<p><b>Kiribati</b> Baseline (female): 35% Target: 80% Baseline (men): 36% Target: 80%</p> <p><b>Marshall Islands</b> Baseline (female): 35% Target: 80% Baseline (men): 41% Target: 80%</p> <p><i>*Baseline and target to be disaggregated by country, sex and age groups.</i></p>	<p>Project activity report</p>	
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.1 <i>number of countries with gender-sensitive Climate security Profiles established</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country.</i> <b>Current progress: 3</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.1.2 <i>Number of policy and management frameworks developed, adjusted or updated at national and regional levels.</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 per country <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 2</b></p>	<p>Project activity report</p>	<p>Review of strategic policies potentially relevant for the review</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.1.3 <i>Number of gender-responsible country profiles</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>*Baseline and Targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 3</b></p>	<p>Project activity report</p>	<p>Minutes of meetings Consultations and dialogues</p>

	<p>2.1.4 Develop three National Climate Security Profiles (CSP), one for each atoll country.</p> <p>2.1.5 Identify and recommend policy and management frameworks (e.g. National Security Policies, Climate Change Profiles) that may need to be developed, adjusted / updated at national and regional levels to take into account the priorities identified in the profiles.</p> <p>Output 2.2</p> <p>Country focused inclusive consultative process and outreach arrangements established in Tuvalu and RMI that help to inform, validate and address and respond to Climate Change Security risks over time.</p> <p>2.2.1 Design and reach agreement on country specific collaborative arrangements to support ongoing inclusive dialogue and decision-making processes. This should draw on existing arrangements and help to inform, validate and guide climate security interventions drawing on relevant expertise on dialogue design, including regional civil society and the Mediation Support Unit in DPPA.</p> <p>2.2.2 Undertake inclusive dialogue (including an information sharing loop to ensure that information collected, and analysis conducted is fed back to communities) and outreach in the focus countries to bring together viewpoints of all relevant stakeholders. This could include country wide inception discussions, thematic focused outreach, and innovate ways to engage unique perspectives from stakeholders including women, youth, and diaspora. 2.2.3 Strengthen the capacity of groups representing the interests and perspectives of vulnerable and marginalized people (e.g., CSOs, church groups, women, youth, and community organizations) to effectively engage in the climate change security risk discourse.</p> <p>Output 2.3</p> <p>Pilot or implement at least four initiatives (one per focus country and additional in Kiribati) that address an identified climate security priority at country and/or the community level.</p> <p>2.3.1 Establish criteria and process for the early selection of pilot projects to respond to climate change security related risks, drawing on country level, regional and international expertise on peace building and conflict prevention as well as on existing plans where already in place (i.e., Kiribati) and /or on the consultation process described in output 2.2.</p> <p>2.3.2 Develop and implement at least four pilot interventions, at least one relevant to each focus country and additional in Kiribati.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2 Number of inclusive dialogue and outreach arrangements undertaken per country Baseline: 0 Target: 3 per country <b>Current progress: 41</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.2.3 Number of participants, disaggregated by sex and age who have participated in the dialogues Baseline: 0 Target: Total number per country 500 Percentage of 50% women Percentage of 50% youth <b>Current progress: 1538 (~50% men, ~50% women)</b></p>	<p>Dialogue meeting reports</p> <p>Dialogues attendance data</p>	<p>Key groups are identified</p> <p>High number of participants</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.3.1 <i>Number of gender-sensitive initiatives selected per country addressing climate security priority</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 1 <b>*Baseline to be disaggregated by country</b> <b>Current progress: 1 per country</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.3.2 Percentage, disaggregated, who consider that the pilots have significantly improve the capacities of the community to deal with climate security issues Baseline: 0 Target: 70% <b>*Baseline and targets to be disaggregated by country, sex and age</b> <b>Current progress: 0</b></p>	<p>Project activity report</p> <p>Community Survey</p>	<p>Consultations with national stakeholders</p> <p>Agreement on priority initiatives</p> <p>Survey partner identified</p>



	<p>The objective of the PCSN is to ensure cross-disciplinary information sharing and brainstorming, effective partner collaboration through the implementation of the project, including input to related activities of other practitioners and institutions stakeholders in the space.</p> <p>2.4.1 Review existing relevant formal and informal coordination mechanisms (PRP Task Force, Forum Sub-Committee on Security) to design PCSN in a way that will add value to existing arrangements.</p> <p>2.4.2 Identify network stakeholders which could consist of at least: relevant regional agencies (PIFS, SPC, SPREP, USP) UN Agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, IOM), development partners (GIZ, DFAT, MFAT) academia (Toda, USP, ANU, Griffith Uni), civil society (Pacific Conference of Churches, Transcend Oceania, Dialogue Fiji, Femlink Pacific, Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding), private sector (PIPSO) and youth representatives including those engaged in the development of the proposal.</p> <p>2.4.3 Establish network partnership arrangement including relevant medium for ease of ongoing communication, consultation, and collaboration.</p> <p>2.4.4 Meet face to face periodically with specific clear objectives and deliverables (e.g., support to “deep dive” thematic dialogues, CSPs and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) that are action oriented and time bound and contribute to project objectives.</p> <p>2.4.5 Identify sustainability options for the network, drawing on the considerable partner interest in supporting practical initiatives that will advance programmatic work in financing available to support this field.</p> <p>2.4.6 Develop deep dive assessments on at least one climate fragility issues of direct relevance to climate related tensions and inclusive approaches</p> <p>2.4.7 Convene at least one regional dialogues on climate fragility issues with a focus on issues most relevant to Atoll Nations (e.g., Displacement and forced migration, Maritime boundaries certainty, Health, Food and Water Security; Coastal Protection; Impacts on the Blue Economy)</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.3.3 Number of documented lessons learned highlighting pilot interventions in addressing climate security priorities Baseline: 0 Target: 10 <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 0</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.4.1 <i>Extent of which PCSN is established and demonstrated effective partner collaboration, information sharing and exchanges</i> Baseline: no Target: <i>PCSN is established and demonstrated effective partner collaboration, information sharing and exchanges</i> <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: PCSN established and operational</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.4.2 Percentage of women members of the PCSN Baseline: 0 Target: 40% <b>Current progress: 46%</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.4.3 Extent of Options paper on the sustainability options for the PCSN adopted by partners &amp; received buy in for additional funding Baseline: 0 Target: PCSN established, adopted with some financial support <b>Current progress: 0</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 2.4.4 <i>I deep dive assessments on regional issues are produced</i></p>	<p>Project Activity Report</p> <p>Project Activity Report</p> <p>PCSN meeting attendance sheet</p> <p>Project activity report</p> <p>Project Activity Report</p>	<p>Interviews of stakeholders are conducted with proper representation of women and youth</p> <p>Members of network are identified ToR of network approved</p> <p>Consultations are undertaken</p> <p>Agreement of the priority issues to be assessed</p>
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	<p>Output 2.5  <b>Pacific climate security findings informed the UN Conceptual Approach to Climate-Related Security Risk Assessments - strengthening both the regional and global framework for understanding climate security</b></p> <p>2.5.1 Identify key stakeholders (at country and regional level) that need to be part of the dialogue to ensure all perspectives are heard and considered. Draw on experiences from 3 Atoll Nation approaches and application (see 2.2 above) and existing Pacific specific assessment frameworks in climate change, human security, and traditional security as relevant. (Particularly the PIF Boe Implementation Action Plan, endorsed by leaders in August 2019 and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) and Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP).</p> <p>2.5.2 Ensure the most vulnerable groups are engaged in a meaningful way with particular focus on: youth, women &amp; LGBTIQI, and persons with disabilities.</p> <p>2.5.3 Engage leading experts (particularly from Atoll Nations) to support the translation of the global UN Conceptual Approach to Climate-Related Security Risk Assessments to the Pacific context.</p> <p>2.5.4 Present outcome framework and any associated comprehensive assessments (see output 1.4, ii below) to the Forum Officials Sub-committee on Regional Security for consideration at their scheduled meeting on Security on 14 Oct 2020.</p>	<p>Baseline: 0  Target: 1  <b>Current progress: 1</b>  Output Indicator 2.4.6  <i>% of participants to the regional forum who consider that their understanding of the issue has improved and that the plan of action is clear</i>  Baseline: 0  Target: 75%  <i>*Baseline and targets to be disaggregated by gender and country.</i>  <b>Current progress: 40%</b></p>	<p>Survey to participants to the regional forum</p>	<p>Agreement on the issue to be subject of dialogue</p>
<p>Output 2.5.1  <b>Extent of Regional Climate Security Risk Assessment Framework incorporating climate change, human security, inclusivity (including gender and youth issues), and traditional security as relevant</b></p> <p>Baseline: 0  Target: 1  <i>Regional Climate Security Risk Assessment Framework incorporating climate change, human security, inclusivity, and traditional security established in line with the Principles of the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific</i>  <b>Current progress: 1</b></p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.5.1  <i>Extent of Regional Climate Security Risk Assessment Framework incorporating climate change, human security, inclusivity (including gender and youth issues), and traditional security as relevant</i>  Baseline: 0  Target: 1  <i>Regional Climate Security Risk Assessment Framework incorporating climate change, human security, inclusivity, and traditional security established in line with the Principles of the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific</i>  <b>Current progress: 1</b></p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.5.2  <i>% of stakeholders who consider that the Risk Assessment properly addresses the risks link to climate change</i>  Baseline: 0%  Target: 80%  <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by sex and country</i>  <b>Current progress: 40%</b></p>	<p>Project activity Report</p>	<p>Consultations at the regional level</p>
		<p>Output Indicator 2.5.2  <i>% of stakeholders who consider that the Risk Assessment properly addresses the risks link to climate change</i>  Baseline: 0%  Target: 80%  <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by sex and country</i>  <b>Current progress: 40%</b></p>	<p>Survey to participants to different consultations and dialogue</p>	<p>Consultations and dialogues</p>

	<p>2.5.5 Identify opportunities to ensure a strengthened regional understanding of climate security is integrated into UN reporting and analysis on the global issue</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.5.3 <i>Number of national, regional and global reports and frameworks informed by the Pacific climate security findings</i> Baseline: 0 Target: At least 3 including the UN Conceptual approach to climate-related security risk assessments. <b>Current progress: 0</b></p>	<p>UN publications Project Activity Report</p>	<p>Consultations at regional level List of opportunities drafted</p>
<p>Outcome 3: Advocacy capacity of atoll nations and Pacific Island countries strengthened in global fora combatting climate change and addressing its impact on peace and security.</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 3 a <i>Percentage of country representatives and project stakeholders that consider that the Pacific Islands are better equipped to advocate in international fora.</i> Baseline: 20%<sup>15</sup> Target: 80% <i>*Baselines and Targets to be disaggregated by country and sex</i> <b>Current progress: 40%</b></p>	<p>survey for national and regional stakeholders</p>	<p>Regional position cleared Tools are developed</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 3 b <i>Percentage of country and regional representatives who considered that the project has increased the visibility of climate security on global fora.</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 80% <i>*Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country and sex</i> <b>Current progress: 40%</b></p>	<p>Online survey for national and regional stakeholders</p>	<p>Regional position is cleared Tools are developed</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 3 c Number of Pacific Atoll Islands Leaders' statements advocating at the global level <b>combatting climate change and addressing its impact on peace and security.</b> Baseline: TBD for 2019<sup>16</sup> Target: At least three in 2020 and 2021 <b>Current progress: 3</b></p>		

<sup>15</sup> To be recorded as part of the inception workshop report (estimated to be within 4 months of project start)

<sup>16</sup> To be recorded as part of the inception workshop report (estimated to be within 4 months of project start)

<p>Output 3.1 <b>Greater awareness and reflection of positions on climate fragility and security for Pacific SIDS and low-lying atoll nations in relevant fora</b></p> <p>3.1.1 Develop agreed country level impactful advocacy strategies associated with the Country Climate Security Profiles including identification of innovative forms for communicating climate security priorities to different audiences</p> <p>3.1.2 Develop an agreed a joint Regional Advocacy Strategy for targeting key fora and events to progress greater appreciation and understanding of the climate security challenges of atoll nations and Pacific Island Countries. Include key fora and processes such as BoE Action Plan reporting to Sub-Committee on Security; Group of Friends on Climate and Security; UNFCCC; UNSG reporting; Blue Pacific Strategy, 2050.</p> <p>3.1.3 Support the CANCC to convene and build consensus on their priority climate security challenges and to articulate these as a basis for calling on the international community to raise ambition and provide longer-term support. Provide funding for platforms, meetings, advice, and research in support of this. Identify and provide support to connect CANCC work to relevant regional and global processes and advocacy.</p> <p>3.1.4 Design and develop fit-for-purpose knowledge and communication products from Pacific perspectives to support the efforts of Pacific Countries with target audiences.</p> <p>3.1.5 Support CANCC members and stakeholders to attend key regional and international events to promote greater awareness of their climate security challenges to inform practical and progressive international support to address them.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 3.1.1 <i>Number of countries with established country level strategies on climate security informed by climate security profiles</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>Baselines and targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 3</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 3.1.2 <i>Number of CANCC members countries using the Security Profiles (SP) to advocate positions on climate security at global fora</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>CANCC members are advocating on the SP position on climate security at global fora</i> <b>Current progress: 3</b></p>	<p>Project Activity Report</p> <p>Project activity report</p>	<p>National consultations</p> <p>National and regional strategies are available</p>
<p>Output 3.2 <b>Identification, mobilization, and coordination of resources for addressing the unique climate security challenges of the focus countries.</b></p> <p>3.2.1 Resourcing strategies developed for National Climate Security Profiles for focus countries, tailored to ensuring the most serious risks to human, cultural and societal security and resource integrity are mitigated.</p> <p>3.2.2 Identify good practice examples of integrated approaches amongst climate change, humanitarian, development, and security practitioners to address climate security challenges – at country, regional and global level.</p> <p>3.2.3 Consultations between atoll and Pacific countries and donor/partners to foster resourcing opportunities and identify modalities of suitable programmatic and coordinated resourcing.</p> <p>3.2.4 Support governments to negotiate the inclusion of the unique climate security considerations of the Pacific into relevant climate finance, development finance and security finance fora across the region and internationally.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 3.2.1 <i>Number of countries with Resourcing strategies established (1 per country and a regional one) informed by national climate security profiles</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 3 <i>* Baseline and targets to be disaggregated by country</i> <b>Current progress: 0</b></p> <p>Output Indicator 3.2.2 <i>1 good practice document on integrated approaches to address climate security challenges at regional and global levels</i> Baseline: 0 Target: 1 <b>Current progress: 0</b></p>	<p>Project Activity Report</p> <p>Project Activity Report</p>	<p>National multi stakeholders consultations</p>

	<p>3.2.5 Explore suitable resourcing options and modalities that could be put in place to address the unique loss and damage issues faced by Pacific countries and atoll countries. This could support readiness on how to address loss and damage in the Pacific context (as these issues continue to accelerate in line with climate impact projections) and would also inform global negotiations on resourcing implications of loss and damage.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 3.2.3 Number of countries negotiating inclusion of loss and damage issues faced by Pacific countries and atoll countries across the region and internal for a readiness on how to address loss and damage in the Pacific.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 Current progress: 3</p>	<p>Project Activity Report</p>	<p>National strategies are available</p>
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### Annex C: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	X		
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Plz attach to the submission	X		Project Manager, Finance & Admin Associate, National Coordinators.
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		Kiribati - <b>This has been confirmed.</b> Tuvalu – <b>This has been confirmed.</b> RMI – <b>This has been confirmed.</b>
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		Kiribati - Government offices have been consulted on the project and there will be further consultations with local communities after the inception workshop and roll out of the project. The initial consultations with Government Offices were done through KNEG (Kiribati National Expert Group) in mid-January 2020. Once the inception workshop has been conducted, the beneficiaries/local communities will then be consulted, informed and be part of the planning and implementing process. Tuvalu - Key departments have been consulted during the preparation phase of this project. Local communities will be consulted during the Inception meeting of the project. RMI - Some preliminary consultations have been done with a few government departments (especially those associated with the nature of the work) and will be elaborately done with govt & especially stake holders such as the communities at the Inception workshop.

<p>5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>Kiribati – The project support will complement the existing Whole of Island Approach implemented throughout Kiribati and where initial Integrated Vulnerability Assessments will be conducted, the development of the island strategic plans based on the IVAs conducted will inform the implementation and outputs of the project support. We look to implement the project on islands which have already undergone IVAs and ISPs and which will serve as the guide for implementation and where the support will be provided. The proposed timeline will be in alignment with the project workplan.                  Tuvalu – There hasn't been any analysis done, however the department have collated lesson learnt, best practices and other findings from previous relevant project. The next step should be focus on analysing these issues. It is proposed that the project will provide the funds that enable the department to carry out these related activities.                  RMI - There are ongoing projects such as the Ridge to Reef where there are related existing activities to cope with consequences of Climate Change. The soon to be rolled out Third National Communication &amp; Biennial Update Report (TNC/BUR) – reporting obligations to the UNFCCC will also greatly help complement &amp; contribute to this work.</p>
<p>6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the procedure and timeline.</p>	<p>X</p>	<p>Kiribati - No Beneficiary criteria has been identified, however upon the roll-out of the inception workshop, and the identification of the sites, we will then provide information on this. The IVA and ISPs will also be able to support the beneficiary criteria.                  Tuvalu – There is no work done to formalize the selection of beneficiary criteria. However, that are some initial discussions among the National advisory Council on Climate Change (NACCC) on how this project and other related projects (e.g., GIZ and IOM projects) their potential benefits to different levels of the communities. It is expected that this project could facilitate the formalization of beneficiary criteria.                  RMI - This will be done during through a consultation commencing at the Inception Workshop and especially coordinated with the newly established Climate Change Secretariat</p> <p><b>Beneficiary criteria have been identified in all 3 countries and</b></p>

<p>7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?</p>	<p>X</p>		<p>Applied, hence the selection of pilot sites and interventions.  Tuvalu - Agreements between the Department of Climate Change and Department of Agriculture have been identified and finalized at the inception workshop and when need arises</p>
<p>8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?</p>	<p>X</p>		<p>Done during the consultation workshop in Suva and in numerous email communication.</p>
<p>9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?</p>	<p>N/A</p>		

Annex D: Detailed and UNDG budgets (attached Excel sheet)