SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT

Country(ies): Kyrgyz Republic	
Project Title: Strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Meaningful civil society engagement for trust-building and social cohesion	
Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project): N/A	

PBF project modality:
    IRF
X   PRF   ⌐DS
     NG
	If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):
	    Country Trust Fund
	    Regional Trust Fund
	Name of Recipient Fund:

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.): UNDP, UNESCO	
List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO): Ministry of culture, information, sports and youth policy (respective unit/department of Youth Affairs and the Department of inter-ethnic relations), civil society, youth, women-led and human rights organizations, educational institutions	
Project duration in months[1][2]: 36 months	
Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: Alamedin and Sokuluk district level state administrations of Chui province, Osh, Uzgen, Jalal-Abad, Batken and Razzakov cities	

Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:
  Gender promotion initiative[3]
  Youth promotion initiative[4]
  Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions
  Cross-border or regional project	

Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization): **UNDP:** $1,620,150.00 **UNESCO**: $ 379,850.00 TOTAL: $2,000,000.00 **The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.* Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):	

PBF 1st tranche (70,00%):	**PBF 2nd tranche* (30,00%):**
Recipient: UNDP:US$1,134,105.00 UNESCO: US$265,895.00 Total: US$1,400,000.00	Recipient: UNDP: US$486,045.00 UNESCO: US$113,955.00 Total: US$600,000.00

Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs): The project's **overarching goal** is to strengthen trust between the state and civil society and enhance social cohesion by encouraging collaboration on local sustaining peace issues. The project will redefine the existing network of Public Consultative Councils (PCC) to broaden their scope beyond the interethnic relations and empower them to work on improving cohesions along different other lines of social division. The PCCs will engage diverse civil society actors and media, central and local authorities into a dialogue and cooperative action

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addressing needs, grievances and priorities of communities. The PCCs will be enabled to prevent social polarization and will cultivate cross-cultural diversity firmly grounded on the shared civic identity at the core. To translate these aspirations into action, the project will be allocating seed-funding under the **Grant Facility** for CSOs' and media initiatives on different peacebuilding related themes that will be defined with the support of the PCCs and will be aligned with the state and municipalities peacebuilding priorities.

Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):

Civil Society and Civic Space review (UNDP in the Kyrgyz Republic) engaged Civil Society Organizations operating in different thematic areas, including INGOs (Peace Nexus, Soros Foundation), human rights defenders, independent experts, media organizations, business associations, Presidential Administration, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Science (civic education, schools, civic identity), Ministry of Culture, Communications, Sports and Youth Policy, Ombudsperson, Central Elections Commission and its Training Center, Members of Parliament, National Statistical Committee (detailed list is provisioned in Annex 1)

Ministry of Culture, Communications, Sports and Youth Policy and Presidential Administration.

Project Gender Marker score[5]: 2 - gender equality as a significant objective

Specify % and $ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment: 50%

Briefly explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment [6]: (i) ensuring a meaningful engagement of women led CSOs into central and local Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) (ii) gender mainstreaming and integrating priorities of the National Gender Action Plan with national and local peacebuilding action plans (iii) empowering female civil and municipal servants and young women in local level conflict prevention and resolution

Project Risk Marker score[7]: 1 – medium risk to achieve outcomes

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project *(select ONLY one)*[8]:

(2.2) Democratic Governance

If applicable, **UNSDCF outcome(s)** to which the project contributes: Output 4: Support national efforts to promote just, accountable, and inclusive institutions and a civil society that fosters peace, cohesion, and human rights for all

Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s) to which the project contributes: SDGs 4, 5, 16, 17

Type of submission:	If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:
New project **Project amendment**	**Extension of duration:** Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date): **Change of project outcome/ scope:** **Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:** **Additional PBF budget:** Additional amount by recipient organization: **Brief justification for amendment:** *Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.*

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[5] **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE

Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

[6] Please consult the **PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding**

[7] **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

[8] **PBF Focus Areas** are:

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services;

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats).

PROJECT SIGNATURES

Recipient Organization(s)[1]	Representative of National Authorities
United Nations system in the Kyrgyz Republic	*Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic*
Ms. Antje Grawe	**Mr. Almaz Isanov**
Signature	Signature
Title	Title
United Nations Resident Coordinator	**Head of the Department for Political and Economic Research**
Date & Seal	Date & Seal
Recipient Organization	**Recipient Organization**
United Nations Development Programme in the Kyrgyz Republic	*United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*
Ms. Monica Rijal	**Mr. Magnus Magnusson**
Signature	Signature
Title	Title
UNDP Resident Representative (a.i.)	**UNESCO Director (Officer in Charge)**
Date & Seal 25-Dec-2020	Date & Seal 21.12.2020
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)	
Ms. Elizabeth Spehar	
Signature	
Title	
Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support	
Date & Seal 16/1/2023	

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[1] Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

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Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

a) A brief summary of **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age-responsive.

Brief country context

The Kyrgyz Republic has undergone a difficult transition process characterized by complex social, economic, and political changes since gaining independence in 1991. Throughout this period, the country oscillated between presidential system of governance and parliamentary democracy, which resulted in three revolutions that ousted presidents in 2005, 2010 and 2020; incursion of terrorist fighters in 1999, violent inter-ethnic conflicts in 1990 and 2010, and recurrent border conflicts due to unresolved border demarcation and delimitation erupted into large scale armed conflicts in April 2021 and September 2022.

The *Common Country Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic* explains, the political instability remains an important risk for sustainable development in the Kyrgyz Republic. Underlying factors for instability are multiple. They include weak political institutions, suboptimal economic development and public services, as well as rule of law and human rights challenges that create public grievances and dissatisfaction. Possible narrowing of political diversity and pluralism could be a major threat[9]. Kyrgyzstan faced decline in major indexes measuring quality of democracy, governance and rule of law [10] [11] [12] [13] . The country has also dropped considerably in **Global Peace Index and** ranks 91st in 2022 among 163 countries against the 70th place in 2021.[14] The **Fragility Index** puts Kyrgyzstan in the category of countries with "elevating warning" while it has not shown a breakthrough improvement from 66th place in 2022 compared to 68 in the previous year.[15] These declining scores and positions are expressive indications against different peace related indices which the project proposes to address.

The societal polarization is not confined to ethnicity-based conflicts alone. A *Conflict and Peace Analysis* commissioned by UNCT[16] identified self-isolation of Uzbek minorities - there is a strong feeling that the tensions that led to the June 2010 conflict have not yet subsided. As per *Country Situation Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic* the narrative around ethnic inclusion, ensuring their economic, cultural and civic rights and opportunities are areas of concern. Due to unresolved long-standing socio-economic problems, further exacerbated by the multiple crisis since Covid-19 pandemic, the tendency of **horizontal societal polarization is growing**. In accordance with *Country Situation Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic*, the gap between the conservative and liberal values and groups, as well as the gap between the legal framework and the practices followed by people is widening within the country. In a context of the growing role of traditional, nationalistic values, multiple cleavages appear that divide people around the role of state, the role of ethnicity and religion in the state, political affiliations, regional and clan loyalties, and other factors. The increasing conflict between adherents of different streams of Islam is also noted.

A *Conflict and Peace Analysis* also found that many structural factors that led to violence in 2005 and 2010 are still present in the country, including weak dialogue mechanisms between the government and the population, weak governance capacity and corruption, low state effectiveness, the persistence of gender-based violence and the exclusion of women and young people and inter-ethnic tensions. Weak rule of law has manifested in high levels of corruption, lack of trust in political decision-making, and ineffective service provision from government institutions. The government's limited capacity to implement policy, coupled with widespread perceptions of state ineffectiveness, contribute to increasing frustration among people and **vertical distrust** to state institutions.

Challenges civil society organizations and their peacebuilding role

Civil society organizations, which continue to be the strongest democratic institution in Kyrgyzstan, albeit centered mostly in the capital city - Bishkek. CSO presence in the political arena impacts strategic decision-making.

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[9] Common Country Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic, page 55, section Political Instability. https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/ru/node/166597
[10] Kyrgyzstan ranked 99th out of 139 countries in the Rule of Law Index in 2021 having dropped four positions from the previous year. In the Worldwide Governance Index the country ranked 83rd out of total 180 in 2021. Largest decline among 167 countries was observed on Democracy Index 2021as the country lost eight places
[11] WJP Rule of Law Index 2021 | World Justice Project
[12] https://solability.com/the-global-sustainable-competitiveness-index/the-index/governance-capital, 0 - lowest rank, 100 - highest rank
[13] Democracy Index 2021 (static-nzz.ch)
[14] https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/
[15] https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/fsi2021-report.pdf, scores from 10 to 120, the lower the score, the better
[16] United Nations in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2019

Under different forms of governance, the CSOs have been facing deepening challenges due to dwindling political will from the frequent changes of political environment. The democratic processes and democratic debates in Kyrgyzstan have been always propelled by the **freedom of expression, democratic and pluralistic media.** According to *Common Country Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic* political and public actors persistently use rhetoric accusing civil society and independent media of acting in conflict with national traditions and spreading a culture alien to the nation's values, operating on foreign grants or advocating for the rights of minority groups. Some CSOs, human rights defenders, and mass media are especially vulnerable to increasing hostility, and smear campaigns, especially those who work on civil and political rights issues. Relatedly, the tendency to perceive gender equality and the empowerment of women as an "alien" and pro-western concept is growing.

The **Briefing Paper**[17] [18] [19] covers key concerns with respect to major legal-political developments since October 2020 crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Among others, the **Briefing Paper highlighted an alarming trend,** civic space has recently narrowed in Kyrgyzstan and those standing up for human rights, justice and the rule of law in the country have increasingly been subjected to pressure. These legal-political developments were also criticized by the civil society organizations in a wide range of online discourse.[20] The pre-election and post-election discourse, shown that online discussions shaped the additional concept of hate.[21] Overall, the concerns of CSOs deriving from the new developments related to **shrinking civic space, freedom of expression, freedom of media, intimidation and harassment.**

The discourses also highlighted the important role of non-governmental organizations in delivering services to various segments of population and to the public institutions, thus filled in the capacity gaps. **The new developments may also lead to a gradual phase-out of NGOs** from socially significant niches remaining uncovered the provision of services to the population, vulnerable segments, work with people with disabilities, youth, women, patients with tuberculosis, cancer, etc. The authorities will also be left without relevant expertise in various dimensions - policy making, humanitarian response, civic education and etc. **The weakened role of CSOs will negatively impact** both on the social contract and societal polarization due to people's unheard and unaddressed concerns and disillusionment. Meanwhile, UNDP 2022 CSO review identified that **CSOs themselves are highly fragmented and polarized internally**, preventing their ability to formulate an integrated response and participate meaningfully in decision-making and peacebuilding processes, which necessitates strengthening their internal networking and partnership.

Challenges of media and its peacebuilding role

It is no longer possible to address social cohesion without also addressing hostility and intolerance online. According to national data[22], 99% of population covered by mobile networks, of which 70% has access to 4G Internet. Approximately 63% of population are internet users. An increased use of Internet, further shifted /refocused society's attention and trust to social media, which is not a source of verified data, but where the quality of information remains low, often followed by inflammatory speech and incitement to hatred[23]. Together with low competencies in media and information literacy and without having an appropriate knowledge on diversity, tolerance and/or intercultural dialogue, the hate speech is contributing to increased tensions between communities, identity groups and regions, which is deepening divides between various social groups and during electoral processes.[24] [25]

The positive peacebuilding role of media is still underestimated while implementing various national concepts or reforms. The assessment of the predecessor document of Kyrgyz Jarany Civic Identity Concept - Concept on People's Unity and Inter-Ethnic Harmony for 2013-2017 identified that *the potential of television, Internet resources and of various types of art was used insufficiently effective to achieve the planned tasks.* These gaps happened due to lack of critical skills and competencies of national and local authorities: (i) in strategic communication, campaigning and/or messaging their peacebuilding platforms among wider public (ii) in mediation and negotiation skills to facilitate conflict resolution, prevention of incitement to hatred, harassment and hostility in media spaces and (iii) in handling open and regular discussions to voice out issues through social media and other online platforms.

[17] KEY-CONCERNS-IN-KYRGYZSTAN-SEPT-2021.pdf (iphronline.org)
[18] 11th EU-Kyrgyz Republic Human Rights Dialogue | EEAS Website (europa.eu). Prepared by the International Partnership for Human Rights
[19] The 11th round of the Kyrgyz Republic-European Union Human Rights Dialogue was held in Brussels - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic (mfa.gov.kg)
[20] Power and civil society of Kyrgyzstan: transformation - Central Asia Analytical Network (caa-network.org), Anar Musabaeva.
[21] http://ca-mediators.net/en/5402-hate-speech-in-the-parlamentary-election-discourse-of-kyrgyzstan.html, School of Peacemaking and Media Technology in Central Asia. Hate Speech in the Elections Discourse in Kyrgyzstan
[22] http://www.stat.kg/ru/news/den-interneta-99-kyrgyzstancev-ohvacheny-mobilnymi-setyami/
[23] MDI-KG-2021-(full)-EN-31-07-2022_with editions from ET.docx, The 2021 Media Development Indicators
[24] https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/UN_Kyrgyzstan_SERF%20Report.pdf, section 5 on Social Cohesion and Community Resilience, p. 65
[25] http://ca-mediators.net/en/5402-hate-speech-in-the-parlamentary-election-discourse-of-kyrgyzstan.html, School of Peacemaking and Media Technology in Central Asia, Monitoring of Hate Speech in the Elections Discourse in Kyrgyzstan

Past experience of the state-society Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) and ways forward

In the aftermath of 2010 violent inter-ethnic conflict in the south, the Government adopted the Concept on Strengthening People's Unity and Inter-Ethnic Harmony for 2013-2017[26] (hereinafter as to Inter-Ethnic Harmony Concept). For implementing the concept, 23 Multi-Ethnic Public Consultative Councils on Inter-Ethnic Harmony (PCCs) in 23 multi-ethnic districts and one Republican Public Consultative Inter-Ethnic Council were established under the State Agency on Local Self-Governance and Inter-Ethnic Relations. Within the previous PBF cycle, the United Nations in Kyrgyzstan supported in sustaining those 23 PCCs through policy support. As a result, the PCCs started to be funded by the republican budget since 2019, the necessary regulations developed, methodology for monitoring of inter-ethnic tensions operationalized, the response mechanisms devised.

Since its completion in 2017, **the sustaining peace[27] issues have considerably expanded** and increasingly attain multi-dimensional and multi-layered nature going far beyond the inter-ethnic domain. *The United Nations Covid-19 Socioeconomic Response Framework for the Kyrgyz Republic (SERF)*[28] identified that the crisis has exposed the lack of readiness of the country's economic, social, health, political and other sectors to handle a nationwide crisis and its consequences in a coordinated and integrated way. The SERF reaffirms the need to foster synergies, as well as governance and coordination mechanisms **to build a comprehensive national peace infrastructure** and ensuring a fundamental shift from a post-crisis response and recovery towards comprehensive pre-emptive governance, prevention and response.

The new context overlaid new and long-standing factors. It considerably expanded contemporary challenges, embracing the growing tendency of polarization among various social and/or identity groups and vertical distrust. As such, the issues of broader social cohesion go far beyond PCCs' remit due to their institutional set up that is confined to inter-ethnic conflict dynamics. Therefore, **a new context provides a 'watershed moment' for fundamental redefinition through institutional renewal of PCCs and bridging the divides with CSOs and media.**

In Kyrgyzstan, there is a need for CSO development at the peripheral conflict-prone areas and their meaningful engagement across development sectors, where civil society, being a pillar of the democratic system, serves a number of important functions that span different peacebuilding themes and institutions such as the inclusive governance, democracy, the rule of law, justice and human rights, freedom of expressions and civic engagement, voice and participation. CSOs also serve as intermediaries (insider mediators[29]) among different parties during conflict and/or crisis situations and advocacy agents by monitoring and pushing the local authorities to fulfill obligations to its citizens (e.g., on the issues of human rights, anti-corruption, democracy etc.) and therefore bridge together various stakeholders in conflict prevention as well as fills in and create some checks-and-balances in response to gaps in policy implementation at the local level.

B) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks[30],** how it ensures **national ownership**. If this project is designed in a PRF country, describe how the main objective advances a relevant strategic objective identified through the Eligibility Process

This project responds to the following national policies and UN strategic frameworks:

- The National Development Strategy (2018-2040)
- The National Development Programme for 2021-2026
- Sectoral development policies, which are focused on strengthening unity of the nation. This includes foremost the Kyrgyz Jarany Concept. Other policies include: Youth Development Concept, National Action Plan on Gender Equality, Concept of State Policy in Religious Sphere
- Global 2030 Agenda. Especially, the project has been organized within SDG16 to create more peaceful, just, and inclusive societies through strengthened social contract and mitigating the risks of societal polarization.
- General Assembly resolution 70/262, Security Council resolution 2282 (2016), Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015)
- 'The Highest Aspiration" UN Secretary General's Call to Action for Human Rights

The project is fully aligned with the Outcome 1 (*Horizontal and vertical trust are enhanced due to improved government mechanisms for inter-group dialogue, inclusivity and accountability)* of the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) for PBF

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[26] Указ Президента КР от 10 апреля 2013 года УП №74 "О Концепции укрепления единства народа и межэтнических отношений в Кыргызской Республике" (minjust.gov.kg)
[27] For the term "sustaining peace" please visit the General Assembly Resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016)
[28] https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/UN_Kyrgyzstan_SERF%20Report.pdf, Chapter 5 on Social Cohesion and Community Resilience, pages 66 and 69
[29] https://www.undp.org/publications/engaging-insider-mediators-sustaining-peace-age-turbulence
[30] Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc.

engagement for 2021-2026 in the Kyrgyz Republic It directly contributes to strengthening of both vertical and horizontal trust by enhancing partnership between the state and civil society.

Considering the complexity of current development context, the **strategic peacebuilding challenges** the project aims to address include **growing societal polarization and vertical distrust.** These challenges will be addressed through **conceptual redefinition of PCCs** – by bridging three pillars of the Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) – CSOs, media and state & municipal institutions through:

- contributing to 3 of the 5 priority areas of **Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept:** i) strengthening the unity of the nation, enhancing values of tolerance and diversity ii) creating equal conditions in the access to administration and decision-making iii) building trust to political institutions and public authority.
- Contributing to the four areas of priority concern identified by **Common Country Analysis for the Kyrgyz Republic:** (i) exclusion and inequalities (ii) reestablishing trust between the government and society (iii) stronger integration of ongoing reforms, national development strategies, and sectoral programmes, calling for stronger national coordination capacities (iv) ensuring policy coherence

The Government recognizes the complexity of the horizontal (identity-based) and vertical (State-and-Society) polarization and therefore is attempting to address the long-lasting public debate on nation-building and state-building. In this respect, the Kyrgyz Republic adopted number of policies[31] aimed at achieving a greater social cohesion such as Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept.

A Civic Identity Concept "Kyrgyz Jarany" (Kyrgyzstani citizen) was adopted through a presidential decree in 2021. The Concept aims to form a shared value of civic identity, strengthen the unity of the people, increase tolerance and respect for the values of diversity, develop multilingualism and national language, create equal access to decision-making processes and build trust in state institutions. As a result of conceptual redefinition of PCCs, the Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept will be placed at the core of their strategic focus, vision, mandate and action plans to drive inter-group dialogue and unite various identity groups for preventing societal polarization.

The project is aligned and contributes to the UNSDCF's Strategic Output 4 - *Just, accountable and inclusive institutions and a pluralistic civil society promoting peace, cohesion and human rights for all.*

The proposed project is also aligned with and contributes to the implementation of recommendations of the Regional Consultation on UN Peacebuilding Architecture in Central Asia, Bishkek, March 10-11, 2020.

Apart from the afore-mentioned ways of ensuring synergy and coherence, UNDP and UNESCO (RUNOs) will ensure conceptual linkages and synergy with respective areas of their expertise and technical competence to address the peace issues, identified in the conflict analysis section, form different angels and concerns (e.g., inclusive governance, civic participation, media, education and etc).

Currently UNDP, jointly with OHCHR and UNICEF implements a PBF-funded project on "Inclusive Governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development". Among others, the project aims to build whole-of-government Infrastructures for Peace at all levels, by placing Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept at the centre. The proposed project will connect the civil society organizations with those infrastructures for peace with relevant knowledge and capacities on civic identity.

While designing the project, necessary consultations have been taken place with the Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Culture, Communications, Sports and Youth Development, the main responsible body for whole-of-government coordination in implementation of Kyrgyz Jarany Civic Identity Concept. The Ministry also serves as a custodian of the existing 23 Public Consultative Inter-Ethnic Councils, which are one of the project beneficiaries.

C) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief **summary of existing interventions** in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below.

The present project aims to address the following strategic gaps:

– **The existing local infrastructures for peace continue to be heavily reliant upon the existing PCCs,** strongly shaped (fragmented) around inter-ethnic conflict prevention. However, contemporary challenges

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[31] The two concepts should be also noted in which the United Nations has not been involved either at the design or implementation stages, which are the "Concept on spiritual and moral development and physical education of the person" and Presidential Decree "On national tradition".

of social cohesion considerably expanded, which mix the new and long-standing factors. Consequently, the conflict dynamics are becoming more complex, multi-layered and multi-faceted. Against this backdrop, it is vital to improve *sustaining peace* measures on the ground by **fundamental redefinition, reorientation in the local infrastructures of peace towards portfolio implementation** to address contemporary challenges.

- **Public and local governments have little vertical integration.** The silos derive from the division of responsibilities between sectorial public institutions engaged into PCCs. Each entity focuses on its own sector-specific mandate at the expense of overall coherence and pooling their respective funding sources. On the other hand, the **centralized mechanisms of decision-making** and the top-down communication style prevent public and local governments to maintain inclusive and intercultural conflict-sensitive social dialogue and engagement. To address this gap, the project will promote a mutually supportive and reinforcing peacebuilding action plans of PCCs.

- **Local self-governance stays disconnected from national and local peacebuilding agendas.** An additional layer of fragmentation is added at the local self-governance level, which as an institutional system, stays disconnected from national and local peacebuilding agendas. It happens because their sustainable role in peacebuilding/sustaining peace has not yet been clarified and sustained at the policy level. To reconcile this gap, the ongoing PBF-funded project on "Inclusive governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development" promotes necessary amendments into the respective national legislation in the area of on local self-governance.

- **These gaps directly mirrored in the fragmentation of peacebuilding measures on the grounds.** Most importantly, mutually supportive and cohesive central and local level peacebuilding action plans have not yet been devised and institutionally integrated into the broader local development programming and budgeting, which the present project will address. The peacebuilding action plans therefore will be supported by seed-funding under the Grant Facility.

- Meanwhile, **CSOs themselves are highly fragmented and polarized internally**, preventing their ability to formulate an integrated response and participate meaningfully in decision-making and peacebuilding processes, which necessitates strengthening their internal networking and partnership. **Further fragmentation** is impacted by the recent legal-political developments, when the civil society tends to retreat into their own siloes / self-isolation to participate in the conduct of public affairs because of security issues, such as online hostility, intimidation and/or targeting by reactionary groups. If such self-withdrawal of CSOs continue to take place, as they tend to do so, then the risks of societal polarization will continue accumulating over time. Notably, the emptied CSOs' niche will be further filled in by intolerant values, patriarchal views, nationalistic narratives, religious enmity etc.

  All of these risks pose a high risk of identity-based polarization, where civil society plays an important pre-emptive role by promoting values of multi-cultural cooperation, tolerance, diversity, inclusive governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and etc. **It is therefore necessary to continue promoting a shared civic identity concept 'Kyrgyz Jarany'** that offers to unite all social and identity groups through strengthening a shared civic identity grounded on the respect for human rights and ethno-cultural identity. The project will help to **fill in the capacity gaps** of national partners and CSOs in preventing multi-dimensional identity-based cleavages, while redefining PCCs.

- **A flourishing environment for online hostility and intolerance** becomes increasingly apparent. Together with low competencies in media and information literacy and without having an appropriate knowledge on diversity, tolerance and/or intercultural dialogue, online hostility and intimidation are contributing to increased tensions between communities, identity groups and regions, which is deepening divides between various social groups. It is no longer possible to address growing polarization without also addressing the growing tendencies of online hostility and intolerance.

The present project is complementary with the ongoing PBF-funded project on "Inclusive Governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development" in several instances.

Firstly, the ongoing PBF project strengthens governance arrangements for building a whole-of-government Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) at all levels by reconciling policy agendas across sectors through the prism of Kyrgyz Jarany shared civic identity concept. However, while essential, the public and municipal institutions are only one

pillar of I4P. It is far important that civil society and media, being important pillars of the democratic system, should complement I4Ps at all levels to ensure participative democracy, dialogical decision-making and peacebuilding.

Secondly, while ongoing PBF-funded project promotes a decentralized peacebuilding through refining respective national legislation, the present project will further put into the practice the decentralized peacebuilding action plans of PCCs by providing seed-funding under the Grant Facility component.

Thirdly, both ongoing and the present PBF projects are mutually supportive in building national I4Ps at all levels, strengthening national capacities to cope with multi-faceted challenges in preventing identity-based cleavages by putting in place relevant capacities, knowledge and tools.

The project is built on and complements the existing interventions to strengthen social cohesion as provided in the Table below.

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
Inclusive governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development	PBF, $3,000,000	Social cohesion through shared civic identity	**Complementarity:** aims to implement Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept and establish Infrastructures for Peace. **Difference:** the project doesn't particularly targeted at CSOs and Media
Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in Asia (STRIVE Asia, EU-UN Joint partnership) 2020-2023	EU, $350,000 Ongoing Implemented by UNDP	Preventing violent extremism	**Complementarity:** aims to establish C/PVE advisory boards at the target locations, which could serve as part of the peace infrastructure. **Difference:** the project doesn't aim to promote social cohesion in its broader sense
Socio-Economic Recovery from negative consequences of COVID-19 in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken provinces of the Kyrgyz Republic"	Russian Federation, $2,000,000 Ongoing Implemented by UNDP	Socio-Economic Recovery from Covid19	**Complementarity:** aims to strengthen early warning and early response system by establishing a Data Processing Center under the National Institute for Strategic Studies. The PBF and Russian funded project will complement each other by combining resources. **Difference:** the project doesn't aim to promote social cohesion in its broader sense
Economic empowerment of youth and developing sustainable solutions for youth's entrepreneurship at the local level for fostering greater social cohesion and resilience 2022-2024	Russian Federation, $2,000,000 Approved by the donor Implemented by UNDP	Economic empowerment of youth	**Complementarity:** aims to improve entrepreneurial ecosystem and support business projects of youth. **Difference:** the project doesn't aim to promote social cohesion in its broader sense

Addressing hate speech and information pollution for social cohesion in Kyrgyzstan	UNDP HQ, Crisis Bureau, $300,000	Addressing hate speech	**Complementarity:** aims to build capacity of CSOs and media in addressing hate speech **Difference:** the project doesn't aim to promote social cohesion in its broader sense
Media development Indicators Assessment in Kyrgyzstan 2021-2022	UNESCO $30,000	Addressing gaps in media regulation, pluralism, democratic discourse, capacity, viability and infrastructure	**Complementarity:** aims to promote data-based policies in access to information, safety of journalists, quality reporting and access citizens to media **Difference:** the project aimed directly involved into social cohesion by contributing to building inclusive, just and peaceful societies by promoting freedom of expression
Internet Universality Indicators Research in Kyrgyzstan, 2022-2023	UNESCO $30,000	Addressing Internet governance frameworks and ROAM principles (rights, openness, access, multistakeholder participation)	**Complementarity:** aims to setup multistakeholder advisory board for global Internet governance framework **Difference:** is linked with social cohesion by Promotion of freedom of expression and the right to information, as well as inclusion and combat discrimination, hate speech and stereotypes
Quality Education for Sustainable Development through ICT-based approaches in Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan (part 2).	UNESCO $132,000	Mainstreaming 21st century skills (transversal skills), including tolerance, gender equality, medial literacy, critical thinking leadership and citizenship skills, in education and	**Complementarity:** the project works with the Ministry of Education and Science, schools and teachers in target areas and those can be a source of expertise and support the project activities aimed at developing transversal skills **Difference:** the project works with public schools and local education departments

Apart from the United Nations there are other development partners operating in the area of peacebuilding such as Peace Nexus (peacebuilding), International Alert (peacebuilding), Search for Common Ground, GIZ (youth), OSCE (Kyrgyz Jarany), Safer World (peacebuilding), as well as various Civil Society Organizations advocating governance, human rights, youth and women agenda. Under the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) as specified in further sections, the project will ensure greater synergies within UN and with external players for: i) integration of solutions ii) building of existing capacities and results and hence ensure that response is scalable iii) multi layered cross-sectional partnerships.

Lessons learnt from the previous peacebuilding engagement

The project will be addressing structural and proximate factors that led to violence in 2005, 2010 and 2020 -- weak dialogue mechanisms between the government and the population, lack of trust in political decision-making, and exclusion from political and economic life, social and cultural isolation.

In the context of ongoing multiple crisis, UNDP's and UNESCO's engagement in strengthening social cohesion, information and media literacy resulted in several lessons learned for improving *sustaining peace*. While not exhaustive, these offer a pragmatic way forward to address multiple concurrent crises by 1) bridging the state and civil society divide 2) applying a multidimensional approach 3) promoting sustainable collective action 4) facilitating conflict resolution in social media and other online platforms 5) preventing multi-dimensional identity-based cleavages

Bridging the divide between the state and civil society. The divides between these partners increasingly becomes apparent since legal-political developments since October 2020 crisis. The lack of interaction and communication between the partners is a critical obstacle to building trust and better service delivery to address people's needs and concerns. A growing imbalance and trust between the partners, alongside a lack of adequate resourcing and disjointed management of sustaining peace processes, may further leave people's concerns and disillusionment unheard and unaddressed and thus weakening social cohesion.

For both state and civil society actors, resolving these persistent issues will require a social dialogue for building mutual trust and a willingness to act upon jointly. Facilitating a dialogue between these actors could step forward in resolving the communications deficit and trust through cultivating a participative and dialogical decision-making process. It can help to find consensus, reconcile visions and promote more context-wide and informed ways of engagement.

Applying a multidimensional approach is highly important to pursue a holistic multi-stakeholder engagement for better policy, financing and strategy. The need for multidimensional approach is especially apparent in light of the complex contemporary challenges as explained in the foregoing sections. Even incremental progress towards achieving a multidimensional approach can yield important and lasting peace dividends.

Promoting collective action can help both public & municipal institutions and civil society to achieve greater results by combining resources and expertise. Notably, it can help actors better synergize their programmatic interventions and therefore ensure a shared responsibility for peacebuilding results. While various tools and processes exist to promote peacebuilding, the partners have not yet linked them to a sound collective action to address polarization on the ground.

Facilitating conflict resolution in social media and other online platforms can help to prevention of flourishing environment for hostility and intolerance online and generate a common public understanding on the locally tailored conflict and problem resolution solutions.

Preventing multi-dimensional identity-based cleavages through promoting a shared civic identity concept 'Kyrgyz Jarany'. It aims to prevent identity-based polarization, where civil society plays an important pre-emptive role by promoting values of multi-cultural cooperation, tolerance, diversity, inclusive governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and etc.

The afore-mentioned lessons learned derive from different context analysis such as the results of UNDP's internal CSO review (more details are provisioned in **Annex 4**), evaluation of previous Inter-Ethnic Harmony Concept 2012-17, Common Country Analysis and others as appropriate.

a) **Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex).** A brief **description of the project** focus and approach – describe the project's overarching goal, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- responsive).

Infrastructures for peace: a watershed moment for institutional renewal

In the preceding sections, the project document explains complex challenges, which mix the new and long-standing factors. Consequently, the conflict dynamics are becoming more complex, multi-layered and multi-faceted. As the contemporary challenges considerably expanded, it is vital to improve *sustaining peace* measures on the ground that are responsive to the current context. This necessitates a fundamental redefinition or reorientation in the local infrastructures of peace - *Public Consultative Councils on Inter-Ethnic Harmony* (hereinafter as to PCCs) strongly shaped around inter-ethnic conflict prevention.

Currently, the key tasks of PCCs include: (i) raising awareness of population on inter-ethnic policies (ii) consider written and oral complaints from citizens (iii) monitor inter-ethnic situation/tensions on a day-to-day basis and data collection (iv) undertake necessary response measures in conjunction with relevant state bodes. Since adoption of Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept in 2021, the 'civic identity' was included as one of areas of responsibility of PCCs, rather as an "add on" task, but not fundamental and without explicit mechanisms of implementation.

Governance arrangements of PCCs: (i) institutionally, the PCCs sit within the Ministry of Culture, which is a custodian of PCCs and responsible for overall policy elaboration, M&E. The Ministry's department on Inter-Ethnic Relations is a key accountable structure for PCCs' work (ii) at the district and city levels, the PCCs are headed by

the heads/akims of district level state administrations and mayors (iii) the PCCs are supported by Executive Secretaries, the human resources of the Ministry of Culture and paid by the state budget and fulfilling secretarial role for coordination, monitoring of the situation and preparing proposal for PCCs' decision-making, data collection, ensuring response (iv) response to prevent or respond to inter-ethnic incidents are implemented through administrative decisions, instructions of akims of districts and mayors of cities based on the recommendations of PCCs. (v) at the central level, the monitoring data collected by Executive Secretaries collected at the Monitoring Center of the Ministry of Culture and further disseminated among relevant public institutions for further response measures.

The generic composition of PCCs clearly shows that their area of mandate is particularly anchored around inter-ethnic relations and cover multi-ethnic districts and some cities. The composition remains shaped around *Government-Ethnic Diaspora-Mosques-Councils of Elderly, Youth and Women* formula, whilst there is a need to further enrich them with CSOs from diverse themes of peacebuilding such as civic identity, justice, human rights, media, journalists, mediation, gender and etc.

Notwithstanding positive impacts of PCCs, the weaknesses in "Delivering as One" capacity is persistent due to several reasons. **Firstly,** the silos within PCCs derive from the division of responsibilities between sectorial public institutions engaged. Each entity focuses on its own specific mandate at the expense of overall coherence and pooling their respective funding sources. **Secondly,** due to absence of peacebuilding-related functions within the national legislation on local self-governance, the municipalities are not enabled to plan and allocate appropriate funding from local budgets for peacebuilding activities[32]. **Thirdly,** an additional layer of fragmentation is added between various local peace infrastructures such as the peace clubs, youth and women led groups and their creative centers, crime prevention centers, women crisis support centers, inter-faith councils, net of mediators and etc., which tend to retreat into their own silos. **Finally,** the divisions are, of course, directly mirrored in the fragmentation of peacebuilding measures on the grounds. Also, the peacebuilding action planning has not yet been institutionally integrated into the broader local development strategies and plans.

The new context overlaid new and long-standing factors. It considerably expanded contemporary challenges, embracing the growing tendency of polarization among various social and/or identity groups and vertical distrust. As such, the issues of broader social cohesion go far beyond PCCs' remit due to their institutional set up that is confined to inter-ethnic conflict dynamics. Therefore, **a new context provides a 'watershed moment' for fundamental redefinition through institutional renewal of PCCs.**

The redefined PCCs should become the advisory bridge between the relevant public and municipal institutions and civil society that they were always intended to be. However, the only debates might not all the time bring a value added. Thus, the project greatly focuses on sustaining peace mechanisms through institutional renewal of PCCs. As a result of the project, the redefined PCCs should have a **renewed strategic political role** in a new *sustaining peace* context -- from being mostly a *monitoring* platform of inter-ethnic relations to more *governing, supervisory and strategic oversight platform* of social cohesion with relevant roles, mandates and instruments. Relatedly, an institutional set up and capacities and the ways of working to be redefined. It will require a broad range of project engagement to improve legal, financial, governance, operational, coordination, partnership, communications, methodological frames and capacities to sustain peace mechanisms.

Upon institutional renewal, the PCCs should be enabled to facilitate strategic debates, define a vision, formulate policy recommendations and *sustaining peace* measures; substantively lead, advise and advocate their implementation; monitor and evaluate; leverage funding sources. The PCCs should also be enabled to be accountable for delivering results and undertaking much more inclusive and transparent working practices by offering a space for interested parties to facilitate a holistic approach in addressing broader challenges of social cohesion.

The present project will be implemented both at policy and local levels. The policy level activities will be aimed at institutional renewal of PCCs. The local level activities will be implemented through **Grant Facility** in order to operationalize *sustaining peace/peacebuilding* strategies and action plans of PCCs, leverage funds from respective local budgets, resources and expertise of CSOs from different thematic areas. This will allow to elaborate a new collaborative business model in promoting locally tailored *sustaining peace* agendas.

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[32] The amendments into the Law on Local Self-Governance are promoted within another PBF-funded project on "Inclusive governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development"

Through institutional renewal of PCCs, the project will address the **structural factors** such as the governance gaps and fragmented approaches of sub-national Infrastructures for Peace (PCCs) and **proximate factors** such as the insufficient civil society participation, exclusion of minorities, low levels of trust, hate speech to civil society and human rights defenders. The project will help to strengthen trust and social cohesion that will prevent (minimize) societal grievances (**trigger)**, which can potentially contribute to social unrests and possibly political instability with dire **(effects)** consequences for sustainable development, peace and security.

Gender inequality and human rights

As per Human Development Report for 2020, the Kyrgyz Republic ranks in Group 2 on the Gender Development Index[33] and 82nd out of 162 countries on the Gender Inequality Index[34]. According to the 2021 World Bank report on Women, Business and the Law, the Kyrgyz Republic[35] scored 76.9 out of 100 regarding how women's employment and entrepreneurship are affected by legal discrimination, with particularly poor results on "getting salaries paid" (25 out of 100) and "getting a pension" (50 out of 100). Due to existing stereotypes on women's role in society, women also spend 3.6 times more time than men on unpaid domestic work and two times more on childcare.[36] Women's representation in the Parliament is 18%[37] (currently 18 female MPs), which is bellow gender quotas, whilst female deputies climbed from 11% to 38% in local councils.[38]

The study of the Development Policy Institute[39] highlights that social norms and cultural patterns, disproportionate burden of unpaid care work, discriminatory practices against women's participation in decision making, ethnic and religious subculture, limited capacity of local self-governments to advocate gender equality are negatively impacting women's political rights.

The fifth periodic report[40] to the CEDAW Committee in 2021 welcomes the progress achieved in undertaking legislative reforms, such as the adoption of the Law on Protection and Defense Against Domestic Violence,[41] criminalizing bride kidnapping, forced marriage and child marriage. At the same time, among others, the Committee remains concerned about gender-based violence against women and harmful practices, as well as participation of women in political and public life. As of 2022, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 3,988 cases of domestic violence were registered in the first 5 months of 2022.[42]

Considering the above, the project will empower women led CSOs and media to voice out and overcome these challenges in a systemic way at the community level and actively advocate National Action Plan of the UNSC Resolution 1325 to protect the rights of women and girls, prevent all forms of violence against women and girls and promote women's meaningful engagement in decision-making processes.

The **preventive value of human rights** will be promoted through the civic identity concept Kyrgyz Jarany, which places at its core the equal social opportunities and protection under the law, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity or other identity. The Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept will enable the project to address inequalities and grievances through promotion of inclusiveness/non-discrimination, participation/empowerment.

Over the past recent years, the fragility context in Kyrgyzstan has changed considerably due to multiple crisis (Covid pandemic, economic recession, armed conflicts, political instability, legal-political developments and etc). Amidst this context, the local infrastructures for peace and their *sustaining peace* measures need to be strategically responsive to address contemporary complex challenges of social cohesion that go far beyond the ethnicity-based cleavages. Indeed, the inter-ethnic cleavages still persist and acute, however, amidst complex challenges, it is not sufficient to ensure a greater peacebuilding impact.

The project's **overarching goal** is to strengthen both vertical trust and horizontal cohesion by promoting an increased **social dialogue** between the state and civil society. This will be achieved through promoting a **fundamental redefinition of existing PCCs** with relevant spaces and platforms for social dialogue, inclusive governance and accountability arrangements with equal voices and meaningful participation of CSOs. The renewed

[33] Human Development Report 2020 | Human Development Reports (undp.org), page 358
[34] Ibidem
[35] Kyrgyz-republic.pdf (worldbank.org)
[36] UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls | United Nations in Kyrgyz Republic
[37] Elections 2021: Women can take only 18 percent of seats in Parliament - | 24.KG
[38] Kyrgyzstan politics moves closer to gender equality — Precedentinfo
[39] Путь к продуктивному партнерству: эволюция взаимоотношений граждан с местным самоуправлением в Кыргызстане (dpi.kg)
[40] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/351/71/PDF/N2135171.pdf?OpenElement, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Kyrgyzstan by the CEDAW Committee
[41] Закон КР от 27 апреля 2017 года № 63 "Об охране и защите от семейного насилия" (minjust.gov.kg)
[42] https://www.unicef.org/kyrgyzstan/press-releases/un-calls-kyrgyzstan-intensify-curbing-violence-against-women-and-girls

PCCs should be also enabled to prevent polarization and cultivate cross-cultural diversity firmly grounded on the shared civic identity at the core. In this way, the project will build a positive social capital by greater engagement and participation of civil society and media in political, legal and social spheres, which is a necessary precondition for democracy and building a cohesive society.

The redefined PCCs and a new model of social dialogue will be further translated into practice through operationalizing *peacebuilding action plans* of PCCs that are intertwined with local development programmes and shared responsibility of the public & municipal institutions and civil society. For these purposes, the project will be allocating a seed-funding under the **Grant Facility** to support CSOs' and media initiatives that span different peacebuilding related themes. The lessons learned and successful practices of the Grant Facility will be promoted to be replicated at a national level in consultation with the Ministry of Culture, the custodian of PCCs.

Implementation strategy

The project is based on UNDP *Conceptual Framing for Social Cohesion*[43] for strengthening vertical state–and-society relationships & trust (social contract) and mitigating societal polarization that are aligned with Governmental plans and priorities (e.g., Kyrgyz Jarany Concept, Concept in religious sphere, Youth Development Concept and etc).

In the context of the present project, the **vertical dimension** focuses on the state and its relationship to civil society and citizens and trust in national, sub-national or local state actors, institutions and processes. The **horizontal dimension** represents horizontal dynamics (polarization) in the society that is affected, while not exhaustive, by social, economic and political exclusion, identity-based cleavages, values of intolerance, low levels of participation and representation, limited access to public services.

In the context of ongoing multiple crisis, the implementation strategy offers to prevent the existing vertical and horizontal dynamics and risk patterns by 1) bridging the state and civil society divide 2) applying a multidimensional approach 3) promoting sustainable collective action 4) facilitating conflict resolution in social media and other online platforms 5) preventing multi-dimensional identity-based cleavages

By bridging the state and civil society divide through social dialogue, the project aims to ensure a participative, dialogical decision-making and peacebuilding with meaningful space for civil society and media. It can help to find consensus, reconcile visions and promote more context-wide and informed ways of engagement. For holistic policy, financing and strategy, the project will promote a **multi-dimensional approach** and multi-stakeholder engagement. Social dialogue platforms and holistic policies and strategies will be further capitalized in the form of **collective action.** In the course of project implementation, **these mutually supportive and reinforcing capacities will be converged within PCCs** to enable them to be strategically responsive to the current contemporary complex challenges of social cohesion. Thus, the PCCs will need to be fundamentally **redefined** to fit the current context.

While strengthening the above capacities, the project will anchor a shared civic identity concept 'Kyrgyz Jarany' at the core. Relevant pre-emptive capacities of PCCs will be built to prevent **multi-dimensional identity-based cleavages** by promoting values of multi-cultural cooperation, tolerance, diversity, inclusive governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and etc.

Also, PCCs will be enabled to promote and deliver their peacebuilding strategies through media space, digital and public communication platforms, traditional and digital media outlets. In this regard, the PCCs will be equipped with necessary **skills and competencies** in generating a common public understanding online on the locally tailored conflict and problem resolution solutions.

To further capitalize gained capacities for collective action, the project will allocate seed-funding under **Grant Facility** to kick-off the peacebuilding action plans of PCCs. In turn, the project will ensure that peacebuilding action plans of PCCs are devised in an inclusive way and embedded into local sustainable development planning to leverage funding sources from local budgets. For intertwining local sustainable development plans, peacebuilding action plans and local budgeting a methodology will be devised to ensure consistency and scalability of peacebuilding action plans across geographical regions. The peacebuilding action plans cohesive with local development plans and local budgeting will be further operationalized through seed funding under the Grant Facility offering a new business model of Government-CSO relationship in sustaining peace at the local level.

The project avoids applying one-way grant-dependent allocation of small grants, in opposite, through grant facility, the project pursues establishing sustainable business models with shared ownership and shared responsibility

[43] Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications. UNDP. 2020. Concept (socialcohesion.info)

of public & municipal institutions and CSOs. The small grants will be channeled through CSOs, by making PCCs the main accountable body for results of grants. Since the grants will foster a new business model of Government-CSO cooperation and partnership in managing and implementing grants, including from sources other than this project, the results of the project will be replicated at a national level for scale up.

The project will also explore establishing a central level PCC to provide advisory support to PCCs on the grounds. Tentatively, the central level PCC should apply a co-working business model that provides a joint working environment for generating an innovative content, ideas, and knowledge. This might require collaboration with the existing creative and innovative centers and/or hubs in Bishkek.

As the focus navigates towards complexity and multidimensionality of social cohesion, the range of stakeholders and the scope of engagement expand considerably. Therefore, **the project will pursue** building long-term and sustainable Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) based on the existing PCCs that are strategically compliant to maintain participative, dialogical decision-making and peacebuilding with relevant institutional (legal, operational and financial) frames and preventive capacities in place.

The project will be implemented in six target locations as an experimentation, and the results will be replicated at a national level. Thus, the project results will have a multiple cascaded/catalytic positive **peace impacts** through: **(i)** state and civil society divide reduced through inclusive PCCs with relevant governance, accountability and decision-making arrangements in place, equal, diverse and contested civil society engagement **(ii)** a multidimensional approach and a collective action scaled up through a holistic multi-stakeholder engagement, better policy, financing and strategy **(iii)** the government and CSOs enabled for positive democratic debates through media and online platforms **(iv)** a civic identity is placed at the core of peacebuilding interventions of PCCs accelerating long-term nation-building efforts of the country and preventing identity-based polarization

b) Provide a **project-level 'theory of change'** – explain the assumptions about why you expect the project interventions to lead to changes in the conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis. What are the assumptions that the theory is based on? Note, this is not a summary statement of your project's outcomes.

Theory of Change

The Theory of Change (ToC) and assumptions of the proposed project are **fully aligned** with and built on the ToC and the assumptions of the Strategic Results Framework (SRF). While this project aims at contributing to the ToC and outcome statements at the portfolio level (SRF), the project impact is more circumscribed. At the re-eligibility request level, the proposed project contributes to the "Democratic Governance" strategic area and complements the already ongoing PBF-funded project on "Inclusive Governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development" that fits to the "Dialogue and peaceful coexistence" strategic area.

Theory of Change: The enhanced social dialogue between the state and civil society, inclusive governance and mutual accountability, can help to facilitate a holistic action to increase trust and social cohesion:

Engaging civil society and the media in identifying local sustaining peace issues and in acting on them increase the timeliness, relevance and the impact of actions taken thus increasing the public trust in institutions as well as the mutual confidence between the state bodies and the civil society.

Decision making informed of grievances, needs and priorities of diverse groups, especially those under-represented by providing safe spaces through Public Consultative Councils (PCCs) to voice issues and have them acted upon improve confidence in the state and increase the trust within the communities.

Empowering local communities to engage in the identification of priorities for financing sustaining peace measures and enabling local civil society and media for implementing these priorities through the Small Grant Facility will ensure that the local knowledge will be put in a better use and the actions taken will be context-specific, more targeted and impactful.

Having a community level open dialogue on issues of inclusion, representation and rights protection and taking collaborative measures to prevent exclusion and discrimination will strengthen the social bonds across the different backgrounds.

Assumptions

A conflict and peace analysis commissioned by UNCT found that many structural factors that led to violence in 2005 and 2010 are still present in the country, including weak dialogue mechanisms between the government and

the population, weak governance capacity and corruption, low state effectiveness, the persistence of gender-based violence and the exclusion of women and young people. Weak rule of law has manifested in high levels of corruption, lack of trust in political decision-making, and ineffective service provision from government institutions. The government's limited capacity to

implement policy, coupled with widespread perceptions of state ineffectiveness, contribute to increasing frustration among people and lack of trust in the state. Inter-ethnic tensions persist, notably with the Uzbek community continuing to suffer exclusion from political and economic life, social and cultural isolation, and grievances linked to the 2010 violence.

Support to inclusive and collaborative governance is considered an important investment for sustaining peace and preventing future crises.[44] Research suggests that more inclusive and representative decision-making may reduce the likelihood of civil war and violence,[45] particularly when women are included.[46] Equally, space for civil society engagement-including that of media, particularly when it is diverse and contested, must be preserved or opened where lacking.[47] Evidence also shows how civil society organizations, media and leaders serve as the link between the state and population, helping to influence and monitor government decisions; mobilize the population and educate them on their rights, responsibilities, and opportunities to influence government policies and lobby for reform; assist in public service delivery; and facilitate intergroup dialogue and other means for social reconciliation.[48] To leverage existing capacity, understanding the diverse landscape of organizations that are already present and identify those with the potential to play a positive role, as well as those that have played a negative role.[49] Understanding the historical relationship between the state and population is also an important step in maximizing the potential of civil society in ensuring lasting peace and promoting good governance, among other peacebuilding objectives.

Research has shown that the creation of opportunities for respectful and inclusive dialogue and cooperation, focused on areas of common interest and supported by political and other key public leaders from the respective groups is likely to lead to a reduction in inter-group tension and an increase in trust over time.[50] Facilitating contact between identity groups can increase mutual understanding.[51]

> a) **Provide a narrative description of key project components** (outcomes and outputs), ensuring sufficient attention to gender, age and other key differences that should influence the project approach. In describing the project elements, be sure to indicate important considerations related to sequencing of activities.

Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.

Proposed project outcomes, outputs and activities with identification of the grant facility's theme (purpose)

Outcome: Horizontal and vertical trust[52] enhanced due to improved government mechanisms, dialogical decision-making and holistic action for inter-group dialogue, inclusivity and accountability

Output 1: Building long-term and sustainable I4P by strengthening institutional frames and capacities of PCCs that are strategically responsive to the current complex challenges of social cohesion

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[44] FES (2019), Investing in Governance - Accelerating progress towards peaceful, just and inclusive societies. https://www.fesny.org/article/investing-in-governance/
[45] Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press, 1985; Lijphart, Arend. Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. Routledge, 2008); Reynal-Querol, Marta. "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no. 1, 2002, pp. 29-54. Also see United Nations. Sustainable Development Goal 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; New Deal for Building Peaceful States; UK Department for International Development. Building Stability Framework; and Institute for Economics & Peace. Positive Peace Report 2016.
[46] O'Reilly, Marie. *Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies.* Inclusive Security, 2015.
[47] Pathways for Peace. World Bank and United Nations. 2018, p. 280.
[48] Michael Lund, Peter Uvin, and Sarah Cohen, *Building Civil Society in Post-Conflict Environments: From the Micro to the Macro (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006).* The World Bank identifies seven key functions of CSOs: (1) protection, (2) monitoring and early warning, (3) advocacy and public communication, (4) socialization, (5) social cohesion, (6) intermediation and facilitation, and (7) service provision (World Bank, "Civil Society and Peacebuilding," 2006). Dziedzic/Sotirin/Agoglia, "Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments," 2008.
[49] Beatrice Pouligny, "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies," Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 4 495-510 (2005).
[50] Adrienne Dessel & Mary E. Rogge, "Evaluation of Intergroup Dialogue: A Review of the Empirical Literature", Conflict Resolution Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2, Winter 2008; UNICEF, The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: Literature Review, May 2011; Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Dialogue in Peacebuilding: Understanding different perspectives, 2019; Humanity in Action, Peace from the Bottom Up: Strategies and Challenges of Local Ownership in Dialogue-Based Peacebuilding Initiatives, Humanity in Action Press, 2016; Sub-Sector Review of Evidence from Reconciliation Programs, CDA Collaborative Learning for the Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium, 2019.
[51] All you need is contact. American Psychological Association. November 2001, Vol 32, No. 10. Jesse Singal. The Contact Hypothesis Offers Hope for the World. Social Psychology. 10 February 2017
[52] For the purposes of this SRF and adapting UNDP's definition of vertical and horizontal social cohesion. Strengthening Social Cohesion: Conceptual Framing and Programming Implications. UNDP. 2020.

The overall purpose of this Output is in line with the four priority areas of concern identified by the *Common Country Analysis*: **(i)** exclusion and inequalities **(ii)** reestablishing trust between the government and society **(iii)** stronger integration of national development programmes **(iv)** ensure policy coherence.

In line with the above priority areas of concern, the Output pursues achieving the following results: **(i) bridging the state and civil society divide** through strengthening social dialogue for dialogical decision-making and peacebuilding with meaningful space for civil society and media. It can help to find consensus, reconcile visions and promote more context-wide and informed ways of engagement of multiple stakeholders. **(ii) strengthening their internal networking and partnership** of CSOs to enable them to formulate an integrated response and participate meaningfully in decision-making and peacebuilding processes **(iii)** For holistic policy, financing and strategy, the project will promote a **multi-dimensional approach** and multi-stakeholder engagement. The need for multidimensional approach is especially apparent in light of the complex contemporary challenges as explained in the foregoing sections. Social dialogue platforms and holistic policies and strategies will be further capitalized in the form of **collective action.** It can help both public & municipal institutions and civil society to achieve greater results by combining resources and expertise in *sustaining peace* efforts, better synergize their programmatic interventions and therefore ensure a shared responsibility for peacebuilding results. **(iv)** All of these mutually supportive and reinforcing capacities will be converged and sustained within the PCCs. In turn, the PCCs will need to be **institutionally redefined** to enable them to be strategically responsive to the current contemporary complex challenges of social cohesion with relevant inclusive governance and accountability arrangements in place with meaningful participation of CSOs **(v)** reducing identity-based polarization by strengthening pre-emptive capacities of PCCs in promoting values of multi-cultural cooperation, tolerance, diversity, inclusive governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and etc.

An important result of this Output is that PCCs will be equipped with necessary **skills and competencies in** generating a common public understanding online on the locally tailored conflict and problem resolution solutions. This will cover strengthening **strategic communications skills** in messaging their peacebuilding platforms among wider public. Their capacities will be strengthened in **direct interaction** with vulnerable groups for their open and regular voicing of issues online. The **mediation and negotiation skills** of PCCs will be built to facilitate conflict resolution, trust-building, countering hate speech online. The PCCs will be enabled to **promote literacy of the population online** on the fundamentals of democracy, rule of law, human rights. As a result, the PCCs will be enabled to promote and deliver their peacebuilding strategies through media space, digital and public communication platforms, traditional and digital media outlets.

As a first step, the project will support in convening series of consultative platforms among all stakeholders concerned for sensitizing and generating political will and commitment, deploying relevant technical expertise to support in joint visioning for redefinition of PCCs, framing the structure and content, and coordination mechanisms among three pillars of PCCs *(government-CSOs-media).*

To ensure an institutional sustainability of PCCs, vertical and horizontal integration of policies, financing and programming, the project will support in policy making through refining legal framework, defining their sustainable roles and mandates in conflict prevention, social cohesion.

Further operationalization and sustaining of PCCs will necessitate capacity building interventions of public and municipal authorities, civil society organizations, media, journalists, youth and women-led organizations, activists and community leaders from all identity groups to improve the level of understanding of government processes, participative decision-making, civil society and media priorities, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, social cohesion, media and information literacy and etc.

Expected activities:

- **Activity 1.1:** Conduct consultative meetings among diverse civil society actors and media, central and local authorities towards redefinition of PCCs with respective governance and accountability arrangements
- **Activity 1.2:** Conduct analysis and dialogue platforms for **refining legal and/or policy frameworks** for redefining PCCs with respective governance and accountability arrangements; for greater public-municipal vertical integration, pooling funding sources and joint programming

- **Activity 1.3:** Support local authorities and civil society and media **to establish an inclusive PCCs** by bridging public & municipal institutions, CSOs and media pillars for increased social dialogue and social contract

- **Activity 1.4:** Conduct series of collaborative events to facilitate the establishment of formal and/or informal **networking and partnership** among central and local authorities and CSOs engaged in diverse areas of social cohesion as well as promote the establishment of community-based organizations

- **Activity 1.5:** Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations, media, journalists, youth and women-led organizations, activists and community leaders from all identity groups **to build capacity** on such topics as public administration, decision-making at national and sub-national levels, interaction with governmental and municipal institutions, forge partnerships and collaborate across identity group lines through Kyrgyz Jarany concept, on joint needs identification and advocacy and outreach strategy — to improve the level of understanding of government processes and civil society priorities

- **Activity 1.6:** Build capacity of PCCs in **confict sensitivity programming and comprehensive peacebuilding action planning** based on UNDP's Prevention Academy training tool

- **Activity 1.7:** Developing respective tools for capacity building of PCCs in preventing online hostility and intolerance, such as **_antithesis_** to hate speech - **_language of consent,_** and tools for developing transversal skills aimed at empowering both civil society and duty bearers to think critically about information and use of digital tools and promote intercultural understanding, tolerance and citizenship skills

- **Activity 1.8:** Capacity-building of PCCs on conflict prevention online, strategic communication skills, maintain constructive and positive public debates online, generating a common public understanding conflict and problem resolution solutions, promote literacy of the population online etc.

Output 2: Collective action, pooling funding sources and joint programming of partners sustained and scaled up through experimentation and exploration of comprehensive social cohesion strategies of PCCs

All gained results under Output 1 such as the redefined PCCs, a new model of social dialogue, skills and competencies, joint financing and programming will be further translated into practice within Output 2. As a result, collective action, joined financing and programming of partners will be sustained through experimentation and exploration of the decentralized comprehensive _peacebuilding action plans_ of PCCs. These action plan will be intertwined with local development programmes and budgets. For these purposes, the project will be allocating a seed-funding under the **Grant Facility** to support CSOs' and media initiatives that span different peacebuilding related themes.

As a first step, the project will facilitate inclusive process on the development of guiding tools (regulation/SOPs) for Grant Facility in accordance with pre-defined arrangements as specified bellow.

The project will further support in joint design of gender responsive, conflict sensitive _peacebuilding action pans_ by placing a shared civic identity at the core. These plans of PCCs will be developed in line with local, sectorial and national development programmes and strategies to ensure national ownership and sustainability.

Respective training courses on fund raising and developing funding proposals will be organized to enable diverse CSOs and media to participate in the Grant Facility calls.

The calls for proposals will be organized among CSOs and media -- both members and non-members of PCCs – to submit proposals in accordance with comprehensive _peacebuilding action plans_ of PCCs. While, issuing calls for proposals, the CSO and media will be encouraged to submit their proposals in coalitions to incentivize greater partnership and networking among CSOs.

The success stories, good practices and lessons learned will be documented and widely disseminated through media with due visibility of RUNOs and the donor and their replication and scale up will be explored at the national level in coordination with key national partner – Ministry of Culture, the custodian of PCCs and Kyrgyz Jarany concept.

Predefined arrangements for Grant Facility.

Purpose of the Grant Facility: These grants would fund a wide range of peacebuilding activities, tailored to the specific dynamics of situation at the local level. The small grants will operationalize PCCs, as integral parts of infrastructures for peace at central and sub-national levels, and enable them to address the complex challenges of

social cohesion in a participative, inclusive way. The small grants will be implemented as part of peacebuilding action plans of PCCs and aimed at strengthening civic identity, social cohesion and trust-building. The grants should address the needs of citizens from different backgrounds/ethnicities/cultures, vulnerable women and children, and promote values of multicultural cooperation. The implementation of grants should forge partnerships and collaboration, establish effective communication platforms between CSOs and government agencies, strengthen infrastructures for peace both at central and local levels and influence national and sub-national government decisions. The grants would also encourage CSOs to enter coalitions between themselves to make their voices and participation far visible and vocal.

Governance and decision-making arrangements of the Grant Facility (Annex 3): The CSOs and media – both members and non-members of PCCs are the recipients of grants and will a shared responsibility and ownership for results along with public and municipal authorities that are members of PCCs. To evaluate and select proposals of CSOs and media, ensure transparency and avoid conflict of interest, the independent Grant Committee will be composed of representatives of public and municipal institutions – both members and non-members of PCCs, representatives of CSOs and media either from Bishkek or those who do not participate in the Grant Facility Call, peacebuilding practitioners, the United Nations (RUNOs and PBF Secretariat). For including CSOs to the review panel, the pool of CSOs will be selected on a competitive basis through an open call that should become a part of central level PCC with at least 30% of women. The minimum requirement will include expertise of CSO representative, history of CSO. The role of CSOs selected for the review panel/central level PCC will not be confined to 'voting' alone. Rather through institutional contract those selected CSOs will be engaged to provide continuous advisory services, mentorship support, monitor and evaluate the projects of CSOs which will successfully pass through all stages of the competition for implementing Grant Facility.

The review panel will be co-chaired by one representative from public institutions, United Nations and civil society. From central level, at least the Ministry of Culture and Youth Development and the State Agency on Local Self-Governance will be members of the review panel. Respective municipalities - members of PCCs will be members of the review panel from the local level. The co-chairmanship might be on a rotational basis to give a space for different institutions and civil society members. The review panel will commonly decide the most acute challenges and priority activities to be funded through grant allocation of the project as well as from any other sources – such as the local budgets, CSOs' own resources, private sector and/or through grants of other development agencies. Meanwhile, the peacebuilding action plans of PCCs will be intertwined with (or embedded) local development plans and budgeting of local self-governments – the members of PCCs in order to leverage sustainable financing from respective budgets and ensure ownership and responsibility.

Role of the Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs) -- UNDP and UNESCO -- will be members of the review panel will full-fledged decision-making role and voice, M&E, Quality Assurance and will technically accompany that Grant Facility scheme provisioned in Annex 3 is fully established and operationalized as a coherent grant facility, integrated both vertically and horizontally. With regards to joint design of peacebuilding plans, the cumulative role of RUNOs is defined as Capacity Building, which is unpacked within the following project activities 1.2; 1.5; 1.6; 1.7. and 2.1.-2.5. The RUNOs will help in conducting analysis, revealing the risks and developing peacebuilding action plans based on UNDP's Prevention Academy training tool and UNESCO's Media and Information Literacy.

Quality Assurance: As member of the review panel, the United Nations will ensure a quality assurance at all stages in accordance with UNDP Operational Guide on **Low Value Grants** by **(i)** developing grant selection criteria, encompassing purpose, method, capacity, submission criteria **(ii)** ensuring that grant solicitation process is open and grant selection process is transparent and competitive **(iii)** signing grant agreements with recipient CSOs and media outlining the terms of disbursement, implementation, monitoring and reporting on results. Thus, small grants will be allocated and implemented in full compliance with the above UNDP Operational Guide on Low Value Grants.

The quality assurance, as per Annex 3, will be ensured through at the community, intermediary and strategic levels.

Grant Threshold: As per Low Value Grants Operational Guide, *the funding provided to each grant recipient cannot exceed $150,000 per grant and $300,000 on a cumulative basis within the same programme period. To receive multiple grants, the grant recipient must have produced the results agreed to in the prior grant agreement, and a new grant agreement must be approved by the project board or selection committee. The same entity could receive separate grants under different projects with a cumulative ceiling of $300,000 in the programme period. The UNDP business unit is responsible for reviewing proposed grant awards under UNDP projects and confirming that the amount falls under the grant threshold amounts allowable per programme period.* Within the project, one individual grant agreement will be up to $20 K, whilst grant agreement for coalitions cannot exceed $50 K, which is

composed of a number of mutually and logically interlinked sub-components (initiatives/activities). **Grant eligibility:** Low Value Grants can be awarded to civil society organizations and media, including non-governmental academic or educational institutions. Grant recipients either represent beneficiaries of the project or can be beneficiaries themselves. Low-Value Grants are cash awards – selected via programmatic decisions – to civil society and non-governmental partners to generate and solicit development solutions for which no repayment is typically required.

Expected results of the Grant Facility: As a result of implementation of small grants, the PCCs at sub-national level, with one representation PCC at the central level will be sustained and operationalized as integral parts of the national and local infrastructures for peace. The devised PCCs' action plans will be kicked-off with solid focus on addressing complex challenges of social cohesion with civic identity at the core. Under the leadership role of respective national partners – Ministry of Culture and Youth Development and State Agency on Local Self-Governance – the project will promote the successful results of the grant facility are replicated at a national level as a new business model for Government-CSO collaboration at the local level in addressing complex social cohesion challenges with civic identity at the core.

While Output 1 is mostly aimed at institutional renewal of PCCs, the Output 2 will result in operationalized paradigm shifts in the existing peacebuilding practices towards addressing complex social cohesion challenges.

Expected activities:

- **Activity 2.1:** Develop guiding tools (regulation/SOPs) for Grant Facility, encompassing mechanisms of joint management, formulation, implementation, M&E, transparency and accountability and facilitate discussions with and approval by PCC members – CSOs, media, central and local authorities etc., by focusing upon the root causes of particular identity-groups (gender, ethnic, religious)

- **Activity 2.2:** Support PCCs in joint formulation of gender responsive and conflict sensitive peacebuilding action plans with civic identity at the core

- **Activity 2.3:** Facilitate the process of alignment of action plans of PCCs with respective action plans of Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept, Concept on religious affairs, Youth Development Concept, National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 WPS, PVE Programme, human rights norms and standards and etc.

- **Activity 2.4:** Facilitate that Action Plans of PCCs are integrated with local development plans and resources from local budgets allocated as co-funding

- **Activity 2.5:** Organize trainings on fund raising and developing funding proposals for diverse groups of CSOs and media

- **Activity 2.6:** Issue call for proposals with at least two windows and allocate grants, so to contribute to the implementation of Action Plans of PCCs: (i) among CSOs, youth- and women led organizations engaged across diverse topics of social cohesion (civic identity, access to justice, human rights, rule of law, mediation, and etc.) (ii) among media CSOs, journalists, local bloggers etc.

- **Activity 2.7:** Documenting lessons success stories, good practices and lessons learned, wide dissemination through media, and explore replication and scale up at the national level

c) **Project targeting** – provide a justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, expected number and type of stakeholders/beneficiaries (must be disaggregated by sex and age). Indicate whether stakeholders have been consulted in the design of this proposal. Do not repeat all outputs and activities from the Results Framework.

The proposed project will be implemented both at national and local levels. At the local level, the geographic zones include Alamedin and Sokuluk municipalities of Chui province that are district level administrative centers of the eponymous districts, Osh, Uzgen, Jalal-Abad, Batken and Razzakov cities. These locations are from northern and southern regions of the country and have been consulted with the Ministry of Culture, the custodian of PCCs and the key responsible state agency for Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept as well as inter-ethnic harmony.

At the national level time, the Republican Public Consultative Inter-Ethnic Council, consisting of sub-national level PCCs, will be partnered and redefined into the broader PCC on Social Cohesion and integrated with national level I4P -- Inter-Ministerial Coordination Mechanism (IMCM) on Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity.

The project end beneficiaries are the PCCs in target locations, consisting of: **i)** national level CSOs, members of central level PCC, and which should provide peer-to-peer mentoring and coaching support to local level CSOs, operating in different topics (human rights, gender, youth empowerment etc) **ii)** local level CSOs, members of the sub-national-level PCC, with different thematic background, including youth centers, youth and women led CSOs **iii)** regional and community media and journalists **iv)** central and local authorities, members of PCCs at respective levels of governance, such as target local authorities, Ministry of Culture, Communications, Sports and Youth Policy, State Agency on Local Self-Governance.

At the project initiation stage, the RUNOs will devise a joint implementation strategy in the target locations.

Osh city is the second biggest city with total population of more than 312 thousand people including both living in urban and peri-urban areas. According to the 2009 census, Kyrgyz made up 48.31% of the urban population, and Uzbeks - 43.05%. The other ethnic groups include Russians, Turks, Tatars, Uighurs, Tajiks, Azerbaijanis and other ethnic groups. Osh city experienced two interethnic violent clashes btw Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 1990 and 2010. The 2010 events caused 470 deaths, more than 2 thousand people were injured, and 19 people are still missing. In accordance with Conflict and Peace analysis identified self-isolation of Uzbek minorities - there is a strong feeling that the tensions that led to the June 2010 conflict have not yet subsided. These signs indicate risk of increasing distrust and weak inter-ethnic relation in the country.

Uzgen city's total population is about 61 582 people, of which 30 920 female and 30 662 males. Ethnic composition represented by Kyrgyz – 8,9%, Uzbeks – 86,8%, other nationalities – 4,3%. In 1990 the Uzgen city experienced a violent inter-ethnic conflict, which left 305 people dead, and 1371 people injured. Similarly, to Osh city, the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities live in isolation. The economic decline in 1990-s also caused massive growth of religiosity of the population, including on non-traditional movements of Islam.

Jalal-Abad is an administrative center of Jalal-Abad province with total population: 125,493 people. Ethnic composition: Kyrgyz –78,080 (62.2%); Uzbeks – 41, 971 (33.4%); Russians- 2,173 (1.73 %); Tajiks- 400 (0,3 %); Tatars-681 (0,5%); Uyghurs- 623 (0,5%); Turks 606 (0,5%); other nationalities 585 (0,46%); Conflict risks: livelihood conflicts, risks of mobilization through ethnic lines, disputes over scarce water and land resources, tensions pertaining to internal migration,

Alamedin municipality (Alamedin district) is one of the multi-ethnic settlements with a large influx of internal migrants, leading to problems of illegal construction. The average population density is 109.7 people per 1 km2 of area. There are only 17 ayil okmotus in which approximately 200 thousand people live. More than half of the 37 operating schools are in disrepair. There are schools in which classes are held in three shifts, that is, there are simply not enough places in schools. Many children from housing estates go to study in the city. 90% of the residents of housing estates are poor people. Secondly, 90% of them are unemployed from 20 to 50 years old, that is, of childbearing age. Youth unemployment, poverty, drunkenness, drugs, crime, problems with light, schools. Ethnic Kyrgyz living in the village of Vasilievka, Alamedin district, report numerous problems with housing. It is noted that migrants from Tajikistan have been living here since 1995. But due to the fact that there are 10-15 people in families, they asked the state to give them land for building houses. Approximately 13,000 ethnic Kyrgyz live in this area. Many of them received the status of kayrylmans (ethnic returnees from other countries – Tajikistan, Afganistan etc.). From time to time there are conflicts on domestic and ethnic grounds between the local population and returned ethnic Kyrgyz.

Sokuluk municipality is the administrative center of the Sokuluk district of the Chui region. The river Sokuluk flows through the village. The Bishkek-Tashkent highway and the Bishkek-Lugovaya railway pass through the village. There are many internal migrants from the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, which influenced the national composition. The total population: 197,365. Ethnic composition: Kyrgyz – 143,014 (72.46%); Uzbeks – 1,194 (0.6%); Russians- 26,347 (13.3 %); Kazakh - 4,340 (2.2 %); Azerbaijanis - 2,497 (1.2%) other nationalities 585 (0,46%); Uyghurs- 1,777 (0,9%); Dungans – 4,587 (2.3%); Turks - 2,985 (1.5%); other nationalities - 5,915 (2.9%) Conflict risks: livelihood conflicts, week municipality infrastructure, lack of irrigation water.

Batken city is a central city of the Batken province - the country's most left behind regions both from geographic location and socio-economic development. The population of the Batken region is extremely vulnerable to poverty and heavily dependent on remittances and cross-border trade. The difficult socio-economic situation, interspersed with constant aggravations at the border, make the region the largest donor of external migrant flows. The population of the city has representatives of 14 nationalities. The overwhelming majority of the city population is

Kyrgyz – about 99.5% out of the total population - 28,358. The situation in Batken region stays tense, which is characterized by the decline of socio-economic and trade activities between the Sughd and Batken regions, closing borders, growing tendency of hate speech at different levels and increasing of presence of armed forces. The border talks between the governmental delegations of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are ongoing, however no significant agreements have been reached so far.

Razzakov city (formerly Isfana) is an administrative center of Leilek district of Batken region. The city is surrounded on three sides by the territory of Tajikistan. In some areas, the conditional boundary adjoins the settlements that are part of the city. The population of Razzakov town and its subordinate 6 villages is about 35 thousand people. The city is multi-ethnic, slightly more than 50% of population is Kyrgyz, about 48% - Uzbeks. Tajiks also live there. There are Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Russian language schools in the city. Due to its remoteness from the main part of the Kyrgyz Republic and the undeveloped local economy, most of the able-bodied population of the city is in labor migration. The main problems of the city and its residents can be divided into the following groups: (i) lack of drinking water, absence of central sewerage, interethnic - despite the fact that there have not been any mass clashes between ethnic groups in Razzakov, there are latent tensions which sometimes lead to interethnic incidents. There is a growing religiosity among the population and young people in the city.

II. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list all direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local knowledge and existing capacity.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
Convening Organization: UNDP	2021 budget = $23 million	EU, PBF, UNDP-Russia Trust Fund for Development, Japan, UK, Swiss, Global Fund, thematic regular resources	UNDP: Bishkek (covering northern regions), Osh&Jalal-Abad, Batken	UNDP: 3 in Bishkek, 1 for Osh and 1 for Batken	Senior Adviser on Social Cohesion will be directly responsible for this PBF project, who will be supported, when needed, by relevant UNDP staff engaged in RoL, Climate Resilience, Water Management, DRM etc.
Implementing partners:	Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy; State Commission on Religious Affairs; IMCM; CSOs: Center for Public Technologies; Ololo House; Welcome Kg; John Gault				
Recipient Organization: UNECO	UNESCO Cluster Office in Almaty, $625,000	Regular and Extrabudgetary (EU, Estonia, Korean Fund-in-Trust, Government of the RK, UNDP)	Almaty, Kazakhstan	Almaty – 15staff members, Staff in Bishkek – 2, Staff in Dushanbe - 4	National Programme Officer on Communication and Information in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (UNESCO), who will be supported by relevant experts
Implementing partners:	Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy,				

Implementation capacity of the Agencies (up to 1 page)

Please briefly describe the operational capacity of the Agencies to carry out small grant facility for CSOs outside of Bishkek, and prior experience in supporting civil society capacities for peace and social cohesion

UNDP, as a convening agency in this project, has a long-standing expertise in implementing small grant facility for CSOs outside of Bishkek. During 2010-2022, UNDP delivered small grants to CSOs for more than **$9,2 million** in different areas, including in the peacebuilding and social cohesion. While implementing small grants, UNDP has been applying different programme tools, including national implementation modalities such as the Low Value Grants and the UN system-wide *Harmonized Approaches to Cash Transfer (HACT)* as well as procurement tools.

The one-way allocation of grants is not the purpose, rather UNDP utilizes grants as seed funding to bring development solutions, accelerate nationally owned development transformations and generate national ownership by embarking grants onto the local development planning and resource allocation from the local budgets. In implementing small grants, UNDP has generated a solid expertise in bridging together local and national authorities and CSO Implementing Partners by consensus building, joint action planning, co-financing and shared responsibility for results. Also, UNDP's long-standing experience with small grants enables it to technically accompany the implementation of small grants on the grounds ensuring quality assurance at the highest standards for delivering transformative results.

The small grant experience is doubled with past and ongoing experience in supporting civil society capacities for peace and social cohesion. UNDP applies a portfolio approach to social cohesion programming, the total budget of which stands at **$6,3 million** (including the recent confirmed resource mobilization pipelines). The interventions of the portfolio encompass political, governance, economic, socio-cultural and security domains; youth empowerment, civic participation, regional development and local governance, migration, hate speech, preventing violent extremism, developing entrepreneurial ecosystem; building Infrastructure for Peace at all levels, establishing Early Warning and Early Response system and etc. The environmental interventions (especially on natural resources management) are under the national discussions.

UNDP has also deployed a social cohesion team of national staff managed by the Senior Advisor on Social Cohesion and strategically guided by UNDP Deputy Resident Representative who has a solid peacebuilding professional background including at the UNDP Crisis Bureau. UNDP is also underpinned by the team of regional and global team of highly qualified peacebuilders at the Istanbul Regional Hub and UNDP HQ. In response to the multiple crisis the Kyrgyz Republic is facing with, the social cohesion programming became a flagship programme to support the country in peaceful transition by making conflict sensitivity programming as a core dimension of the Country Programme Document for the next programming cycle (2022-2026), meaning that the results of the proposed project will be taken forward and reinforced within and future interventions.

UNESCO is mandated to "promote peace in the minds of men and women" operates in the Central Asian region through its multi-country office for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan based in Almaty, and the antenna office in Bishkek (three staff) to promote sustainable development, inter-cultural dialogue and understanding by promoting the free flow of ideas. In the field of communication and information, UNESCO defends and promotes freedom of expression, media independence and pluralism, and the building of inclusive knowledge societies underpinned by universal access to information and the innovative use of digital technologies.

In addition, UNESCO can draw on its expertise and global resources in the fields of education, the sciences, culture and media through its specialized institutions and centers. UNESCO's programming engagement in Kyrgyzstan includes both country-level activities as well as regional projects with funding from both its core budget as well as from donors, incl. developing interactive online modules on Education for Sustainable Development, the Partnership Project on Silk Roads Heritage Corridors in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Iran; the new ICT Competencies Standards for Teachers, Capacity building of CSOs in media and information literacy skills (MIL) and the Teacher Policies and Practices. UNESCO with its convening power, neutrality, networks and programmes is best placed to bring different actors from the state institutions and representatives of professional communities to local communities.

b) **Project management and coordination** – Indicate the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explicitly indicate how the project implementation team will ensure sufficient gender or youth expertise. Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements and ensure link with PBF Secretariat if it exists. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex A.1** and attach key staff TORs.

The project coordination and oversight arrangements

Joint Steering Committee (JSC)

A Joint Steering Committee (JSC) established by order of the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers (dd. March 22, 2022, with ref # 228). It will meet at least once every six months, guide and oversee overall project implementation and be responsible for providing advice and guidance to the Project, including making, endorsing, and/or approving recommendations (for project work plans, revisions, etc.) to ensure a coherent and timely project implementation. The JSC will consist of representatives of the Presidential Administration, central and local authorities, civil society, the Resident Coordinator (RC) and the Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs). The JSC will be co-chaired by the Representative of the Presidential Office, and the UN Resident Coordinator. Members will consist of representatives of UNDP (Convening Agency) and UNESCO. The Committee may decide to invite other participants as observers.

The synergy and coherence will be ensured both at both strategic and operational levels through **i)** PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC) **ii)** PBF Secretariat and UN PDA team under the UN RC **iii)** creating a technical level working group consisting of RUNOs and partnering CSOs, institutions and other development agencies **iv)** synergizing with peacebuilding projects of both UN agencies and other development partners.

The project will be jointly implemented and monitored with the government with an aim to strengthen national ownership and leadership, as well as sustainability and introduction within all relevant national and UN frameworks and plans, of activities and results. This will include due investment into developing the capacity of national counterparts to sustain results beyond project lifecycle and application of Low Value Grants and the UN harmonized approach to cash transfers where appropriate.

Senior Adviser on Social Cohesion

Senior Adviser on Social Cohesion (NPSA11, 20%) Under the supervision of the Team Leader 'Accountable Institutions, Justice and Peace" Cluster and in close cooperation with SDG16 cluster team the Senior Advisor will provide technical and strategic advice to the UNDP senior management, SDG 16 Cluster, other UNDP programmatic areas, national counterparts and implementing partners, on interventions related to strengthening social cohesion in the country through mainstreaming and strengthening the principles of effective governance.

S/he will ensure proper formulation, execution and monitoring of project's agreements and work-plans, supervise consultants and national staff as required by project' organogram, as well as be accountable to the Project Steering Committee for progress and the achievement of project results. The Senior Advisor is expected to provide strategic guidance to UNDP programmatic components which are interlinked with strengthening social cohesion and effective governance in order to maximize partnership and impact of the relevant portfolio and enhance synergies and coordination between other projects within the SDG16 cluster and UNDP programmatic areas.

The emphasis of the assignment will be also on building strategic relationships and capacity of national counterparts with regards to social cohesion and effective governance. The Senior Advisor will work with staff in the UNDP CO and at the project level, to promote effective achievement of results, ensure information sharing, promote knowledge, as well as develop viable working relationships with colleagues across the organization and counterparts, ensuring responsive client orientation and problem-solving attitude. S/he will be supported by a Finance, Administration, Communications and M&E capacity.

Project Coordinator

A **Project Coordinator** (NPSA 8, 100%) will be recruited and hosted by UNDP as lead agency for the project. The Project Coordinator will be responsible for the efficient and effective day-to-day technical and overall coordination of implementation, and monitoring, ensuring timely achievement of project activities and associated results, and supporting project visibility and knowledge management. The Project Coordinator will facilitate cross-fertilization and coordination among UN agencies and different components of the Project. S/he will monitor the implementation of project activities, and shall coordinate production of timely, quality progress reports as required by the Project according to PBF guidelines, and in coordination with the relevant UN agencies. S/he will chair the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), provide substantive and secretarial support to the Joint Steering Committee, and liaise with the PBF Secretariat and the Peace and Development Advisors, as required. The Project coordinator

will also take part in project meetings organized by the PBF Secretariat to improve coordination with other PBF projects and ensure information exchange.

The Project Coordinator will be based in UNDP and will lead the joint monitoring of project implementation and results across all three agencies. The TOR of the Project Coordinator will also include focus on strengthening national capacities and sustaining project results through national systems. The Project Coordinator will take regular travel to the relevant geographic areas for project implementation.

Project Specialist Grant Manager (NPSA-7, 100%) will provide programmatic, project implementation, coordination, M&E support of the Grant Facility under the direct supervision and guidance of the Senior Advisor on Social Cohesion.

Project Peacebuilding Specialist (NPSA-7, 100%) will provide programmatic, project implementation, coordination, M&E support on sustaining peace aspects under the direct supervision and guidance of the Senior Advisor on Social Cohesion.

Two Project Specialists in Osh/Jalal-Abad and Batken (NPSA, 50%) under the direct supervision and guidance of project coordinator will be responsible for implementation of relevant activities under respective components and will provide support on developing and implementing the Programme/Project activities as per approved plans etc. Strong monitoring and evaluation expertise will be available within existing competencies of the project specialists.

Communication specialist (NPSA-8, 15%) Under the guidance and direct supervision of the Project coordinator will supports the formulation and implementation of the communications/PR and advocacy strategies to increase the standing and awareness of project activities with partners, the media and the public.

Administrative Finance Assistant (NPSA-6, 15%) will provide administrative, finance, procurement support in project implementation under the direct supervision and guidance of the Senior Advisor on Social Cohesion.

Technical Coordination Group (TCG)

A Technical Coordination Group (TCG) will be established and meet at least on a monthly basis to ensure adequate coordination between RUNOs and update on the implementation of the project. The TCG will be organized and chaired by the Project Coordinator and will include technical representatives from each RUNOs (i.e., UNDP and UNESCO). The Peace and Development Advisors and PBF Secretariat under the UN Resident Coordinator will also support and participate as required.

The TCG will ensure effective technical coordination and integration at the local and national levels, the implementation of activities, facilitate coordination and cross-fertilization of activities among all implementing partners, as well as develop a joint work plan, joint M&E, joint communication and identification of new opportunities and gaps. The TCG may also support capacity building activities as may be required to enhance project efficiencies and effectiveness. Members of the TCG might also participate in meeting organized by the PBF Secretariat, in coordination with the Project Coordinator, as required.

Role of Participating UN Organizations

Each participating UN Organization will be substantively and financially accountable for the activities designated to it in the joint Project. The participating agencies will be individually and collectively responsible for: ensuring the timely implementation of the activities and delivery of the reports and other outputs identified in the project document; updating of the results framework quarterly; contracting and supervising qualified local and international experts; financial administration; monitoring, reporting and procurement for the activities they are responsible for; and carrying out all the necessary tasks and responsibilities in a timely, coordinated and integrated manner to support the Project Coordinator, Technical Coordination Group, Joint Steering Committee and PBF Secretariat.

UNDP will serve as lead agency for the coordination of the project and will be responsible for donor reporting. The project will closely coordinate with the envisaged "Inclusive governance and shared civic identity for sustainable peace and development" project to complement each other and maximize results.

The UN RC will convene quarterly meetings of RUNOs and technical staff to discuss and review project implementation and to address risks that may arise. When necessary or requested by RUNOs, RC may convene ad hoc meetings on the same topics.

UNDP: Programme and Policy Analyst UNDP CO (10%) - quality assurance; Senior Social Cohesion Adviser (50%) - project management, implementation and coordination; Programme Specialist - programmatic support (100%); The TOR of the Programme Specialist will also include focus on strengthening national capacities and sustaining project results through national systems. Communication specialist (10%) - communications/PR and advocacy strategies; Two field specialists Osh, Batken (30%) - implementation and coordination of project activities in the fields; Administrative Finance Assistant (100%) – administrative, financial, procurement services. UNDP will engage existing gender team to ensure relevant expertise at no cost to the project and engage Programme Associate (10%) who represents UNDP at the UN Youth Thematic Group.

UNESCO: UNESCO will use expertise of the relevant programme staff in Almaty and the Headquarters to provide relevant technical support to the Project at no cost. Project Specialist (100%) will provide overall coordination of the project, its timely implementation, synergy and coherence among RUNOs. The Project Specialist will work closely, coordinate overall project implementation (including monitoring of the Budgets), and report to the Donor project management.

c) **Risk management**

Given the rapid changing political environment, the proposed project carries multiple risks, mostly of reputational and perception nature (but not limited to only). **The conflict sensitivity will be ensured** through the following ways such as i) reputational: avoiding policy interventions that may potentially lead to criminalization, securitization of CSO and media critics and interventions; ii) perceptions: along with CSOs to equally engage duty bearers into the project interventions to avoid any misinterpretations and misperceptions of the latter; build the capacity of both CSOs and at the same time of duty bearers to cultivate a culture of participatory decision-making and dialogue by equal/balanced capacity building for bringing positive peace impact when both CSOs and duty bearers respect and recognize each other's voices and role in decision-making.

The UN project team acknowledges and accepts the risk that PCCs are likely to be underfunded, the current political space for CSOs and or other operational risks (e.g., rotation of the government). This is why the project is focusing on redefining the existing PCCs (rather than pushing for a new one) by creating inclusive and accountable mechanisms for shared responsibility and ownership among public institutions and local self-governments, CSOs and media.

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
Political instability may lead to conflict and potential violence which will affect overall implementation of project	High	Introduce regular consultations on implementation of project activities with all involved actors. The UN/RUNOs will monitor the security situation and adjust project activities, as necessary, to ensure conflict sensitivity and the achievement of peacebuilding outcomes.
Lack or weakening political will of state actors to strengthen the role of CSOs and independent media in decision making	Medium	Engage state and civil society counterparts into multi-level dialogue to advocate for change and implementation. The project will be scanning the environment regularly to reveal the risks and to take preemptive actions
Competition for scarce recourses among CSO participants or potential conflict of interest for CSOs participating in the decision-making	Low	To evaluate and select proposals of CSOs and media, ensure transparency and avoid conflict of interest, the independent Grant Committee will be composed of representatives of public and municipal institutions – both members and non-members of PCCs, representatives of CSOs and media either from

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
regarding fund allocation, but also applying for small grant facility		Bishkek or those who do not participate in the Grant Facility Call, peacebuilding practitioners, the United Nations (RUNOs and PBF Secretariat). For including CSOs to the review panel, the pool of CSOs will be selected on a competitive basis through an open call that should become a part of central level PCC with at least 30% of women. The minimum requirement will include expertise of CSO representative, history of CSO. The role of CSOs selected for the review panel/central level PCC will not be confined to 'voting' alone. Rather through institutional contract those selected CSOs will be engaged to provide continuous advisory services, mentorship support, monitor and evaluate the projects of CSOs which will successfully pass through all stages of the competition for implementing Grant Facility. Also, under **Activity 2.1** a guiding tool (regulation/SOPs) for Grant Facility will be developed, encompassing mechanisms of joint management, formulation, implementation, M&E, transparency and accountability.
Government re-structuring – changes in key Ministries, departments and agencies; changes in high level decision-makers and technical staff	High	Continual engagement with stakeholders at all levels
High turnover of government civil servants	Medium	Assist Government representatives in the implementation of most important tasks through consulting/advisory, experts and technical support. The RUNOs will continue to engage with government and partners at different levels, to ensure strong ownership and sustainability of implementation even in the face of staff changes.
Weak implementation capacity of local stakeholders and implementing partners	Medium	The RUNOs will establish rigorous selection process of implementing partners and monitor implementation.
Activities supported through the project touch on potentially sensitive topics	Medium	RUNOs will follow "Do No Harm" and conflict sensitivity principles throughout project implementation and will build capacities of the implementing partners on the same areas
Rise of ethno-nationalistic groups, which target civic activists and human rights defenders as promoters of ostensibly pro-western culture and values	Medium	Introduce regular consultations on implementation of project activities with all involved actors. The UN/RUNOs will monitor the political and socio-economic country's context and security situation and adjust project activities, as necessary, to ensure conflict sensitivity and the achievement of peacebuilding outcomes.
Low buy-in from local governments to address civil society perspectives and take their participation seriously	Low	Leverage leadership role of the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy (the respective unit/department of Youth Affairs and the Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations); collaborate

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
		with civil society and media organizations to support implementation and use their connections and relationships to address concerns
Ongoing multiple crises context (Covid19, political instability and associated reforms, economic recession, Batken crises) makes the overall socio-political situation volatile, fluid and rapidly unfolding	Medium	Mitigate the impacts through the JSC as a strategic decision-making body of the project as well as by working with medium level managers of partnering institutions.
The post-conflict situation in Batken province, regular incidents at border areas	Medium	In cases of escalation the situation, the project will follow the guidance from UNCT
Possible divergence between the concept's intentions and its implementation, which can be unintentionally/intentionally harmful.	Medium	The risks will be quarterly reviewed jointly by RUNOs (Joint M&E Task Force) under the leadership of UN PDA and if needed to escalate to the level of UN Heads of Agencies and UN Resident Coordinator.
Insufficient understanding of GEWE and WPS concepts exacerbated by weak level of gender sensitivity in general population enables anti GEWE environment in Kyrgyzstan as well as lack of understanding and resistance to gender-responsive peacebuilding programming. Traditionalist, ethno-nationalist and religious groups acts against women and girls' rights to keep control over women for reinforcement of gender inequality and patriarchy in Kyrgyz society.	Medium	Introduce regular consultations on implementation of project activities with relevant partners and actors in the areas of GEWE. Consultations and advice of the UN Gender Task Group, IRH Gender Unit and state's gender machinery experts.

d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – Describe the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include: a budget break-down for both monitoring and evaluation activities, including collection of baseline and end line data and an independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Fund recipients are obligated to reserve at least 5-7% of the project budget for M&E activities, including sufficient funds for a quality, independent evaluation.

At minimum 5% of the total budget will be allocated to M&E. A final independent evaluation will be carried out at the end of the project to measure progress of the project's achievements against outputs, outcomes and indicators. The budget for this exercise is **$60,000.** Monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the project will follow the PBF monitoring, and evaluation arrangements as outlined in the PBF Guidelines by involving M&E Officers of RUNOs.

The peacebuilding impact that contributes to *UNSCDF Output 4.3[53]* will be measured in accordance with the methodology of measuring *SDG Indicator 16.7.2.* The project-specific methodology will be developed at the stage of baseline survey and measured by end-line survey and also at the final evaluation stage. The budget for this exercise is **$40,000.**

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[53] UNSCDF Output 4.3: Civil society has the knowledge, skills, and capabilities to exercise their rights, participate in public decision-making, and engage in constructive dialogue to achieve social cohesion, justice and equality

The project's Results Framework provides a basis for project monitoring. During the first six months of project implementation RUNOs will develop an Integrated M&E plan with a clear vision of joint responsibilities and timeframe. To ensure cohesiveness in M&E, the RUNOs will establish a joint M&E Task Force. During the project life cycle, the baseline and end-line assessments will be conducted to verify results and measure the progress achieved against indicators of the project. For baseline and end-line assessments the Leading Agency (UNDP) will allocate - **$40,000.** Therefore, in total, **$100,000** will be reserved for M&E and baseline and end-line purposes under the lead agency's (UNDP) budget.

Through the support of UN PDA, the Heads of Agencies and UN Resident Coordinator will meet on a quarterly basis in order to discuss the risks that might emerge in the political environment.

The Project Steering Committee will monitor project implementation and provide recommendations based on meetings conducted every six months. Data on project implementation will be undertaken by implementing partners who will report against the common results framework of the project. Progress under the outputs will be closely monitored by RUNOs on monthly basis to ensure good coordination, application of best practices, lessons learned and timely adjustments in the activities when needed. Pre and post test results of trainings will be used to assess changes in the knowledge, skills and attitudes of participants. FGDs, individual interviews and mini surveys among stakeholders and beneficiaries will be carried out to assess changes as a result of project interventions. Quarterly meetings of RUNOs to review monitoring results will be held to inform project implementation in a coordinated way. For monitoring activities, the RUNOs under their respective project budgets will allocate budgets as following: **UNDP - $25,000; UNESCO - $20,000.**

The project team intends to use Community-based Monitoring (CBM) in order to monitor and evaluate the progress of the project and its impact including functioning of the newly established PCCs, implementation of the comprehensive peacebuilding aciton plans supported with the small grants, engagement of civil soceity and media in peaceful local developmentLocally-driven CBM approach will lead to a more horizontal type of monitoring and evaluation, which will be carried out by a community-based group of people. **The selection criteria of communities for CBM** will include availvility community members, leaders who are already actively involved in strengthening social cohesion in the community, or availability of active community-based organization (CBOs) with regular social dialogue platforms with respective local governments. The aforementioned group would collect answers to specific questions from the affected population, which then would be passed on to the Project Coordinator and Technical Coordination Team to compile the analysis. This type of monitoring and evaluation was chosen due to the fact it will have to be carried out amongst specific, remote communities, it is more cost effective and can provide more frequent or real-time data, however that does not negate the possible need to use perception surveys as means to collect data for M&E purposes, as required.

The project team will also ensure that CBM is linked to the other community-oriented activities, such as support to Youth and Women Empowerment, Community Media, C/PVE Advisory Boards and Local Self Governement, when and where relevant.

Overall, the project will spend **$145,000** for M&E purposes, which stands at 7,25% of the total budget.

e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project's exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do concretely and pro-actively to try to ensure this support from the start. Consider possible partnerships with other donors or IFIs.

The exit strategy is taken into account from the onset - at project formulation and design stages and is fundamentally focused on:

- Achieving **institutional sustainability of PCCs** through vertical and horizontal integration of policies, financing and programming, establishing relevant governance, accountability and participative decision-making arrangements
- Ensuring **national ownership over comprehensive peacebuilding action plans** by alignment with local development planning and budgeting as well as placing Kyrgy Jarany civic identity at the core.

The PBF re-eligibility request signed by the President of KR serves a solid foundation to ensure political will and commitments towards national ownership and sustainability. In this respect, the project has already been discussed with Presidential Administration and relevant national stakeholders. Planning and implementation of respective activities will be carried out through inclusive and participatory way so that "shared responsibilities" of national counterparts are ensured. The exit strategy will be ensured through institutionalization of project results within central and sub-national level Infrastructures for Peace – PCCs.

The Civic Identity Concept Kyrgyz Jarany both at local and national levels will be placed at the core and comprehensive social cohesion strategies will be operationalized as long-term development tools of PCCs through policy making, advocacy, dialogue and capacity building and national financing of the project activities through the national and/or local budgets.

RUNOs will apply respective corporate Results-Based Management tools throughout the project's life cycle, by aiming to deliver the development results, ensure national ownership and sustainability which are vital from the "exit strategy" perspective. The project will be implemented as part of the National Development Programme (2021-2026) and its action plan and consolidated as part of RUNOs' Country Programme Documents, so that project results are further taken forward beyond the project lifecycle.

I.   Project budget

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every GEWE allocation (e.g., training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
Planning			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	X		
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	X		
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the projec Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		Presidential Administration, Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and Youth Policy (including the Department of Inter-Ethnic Relations), target municipalit
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		UNDP Civil Society Review, Assessment of the Concept on Inter-Ethnic Harmony, UNCT's Conflict and Peace Analysis as well as various analyses and evaluation reports under previous PBF-funded projects.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	X		
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	X		
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?		N/A	
Gender			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g., has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	X		
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?	X		
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	X		

Question	Yes	No	
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	X		

Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	X		
2. Are unit costs (e.g., for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	X		
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g., number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	X		
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e., no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	X		
5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	X		
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		X	However, the project may purchase necessary hardware and software for strengthening CSOs and media for less than 15% of the budget.
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		X	
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	X		

Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the <u>signed Memorandum of Understanding</u> between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned.
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO.
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations' headquarters).
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
	instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent's website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated targets)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
Outcome 1: Horizontal and vertical trust enhanced due to improved government mechanisms, dialogical decision-making and holistic action for inter-group dialogue, inclusivity and accountability (Any SDG Target that this Outcome contributes to) **Target 16.6:** Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels **Target 16.7:** Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels **Target 10.2:** By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status		**Outcome Indicator 1.a** Percentage of the population who believe government decision making is inclusive and responsive (SDG 16.7.2) **Baseline:** 0 **Target:** at least 5% **Outcome Indicator 1.b** (Corresponds to UNDP CPD Output 4.3.1): Number of inclusive policies and mechanisms for pre-emptive governance and risk-informed development, civic participation, and social dialogue with focus on most vulnerable women and youth, to strengthen social contract at national and local levels. Baseline 2020: 0 Target 2025: at least 1 mechanism **Outcome Indicator 1.c** Voice and Accountability Index Baseline 2021: 32/100 Target: 34/100	Baseline and Endline Survey Official data and reports of the Cabinet of Ministers Annually Worldwide governance indicators (World Bank)	2023: 0% 2024: 5% 2023: 0 2025: 1 inclusive mechanism replicated at a national level (new 6 PCCs) 2023: 32/100 2025: 34/100

(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)		**Outcome indicator 1.d** Index on Public Trust to the government Baseline 2023: 33.3 Target: 36	National Statistic Committee	2023: 33.3 2025: 36
	Output 1: Building long-term and sustainable I4P by strengthening institutional frames and capacities of PCCs that are strategically responsive to the current complex challenges of social cohesion			
	– **Activity 1.1:** Conduct consultative meetings among diverse civil society actors and media, central and local authorities towards redefinition of PCCs with respective governance and accountability arrangements	**Output Indicator 1.1.** Inclusive PCCs institutionalized and capacitated for conflict sensitivity programming as well as for comprehensive prevention and peacebuilding action **Baseline 2023:** 0 **Target 2025:** 6	Project progress reports Official data and reports of the Cabinet of Ministers	2023: 0 2025: 6
	– **Activity 1.2:** Conduct analysis and dialogue platforms for **refining legal and/or policy frameworks** for redefining PCCs with respective governance and accountability arrangements; for greater public-municipal vertical integration, pooling funding sources and joint programming	**Output Indicator 1.2.** Number of relevant CSOs and informal civil society groups capacitated to jointly advocate their needs and participate in national and local decision-making, public oversight, and regional development **Baseline 2023:** 0 **Target 2025:** 20	CSO and project data and information	2023: 0 2025: 20

	– **Activity 1.3:** Support local authorities and civil society and media **to establish an inclusive PCCs** by bridging public & municipal institutions, CSOs and media pillars for increased social dialogue and social contract	**Output Indicator 1.3.** Proportion of increase of civil society representation advocating for under-represented groups in the composition of the PCC Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase	PCC data, baseline and endline survey	Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase
	– **Activity 1.4:** Conduct series of collaborative events to facilitate the establishment of formal and/or informal **networking and partnership** among central and local authorities and CSOs engaged in diverse areas of social cohesion as well as promote the establishment of community-based organizations	**Output Indicator 1.4.** % change of the surveyed respondents demonstrating better awareness of dialogue between the government and the civil society and media around key policies and decisions Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase	Baseline and endline survey	Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase
	– **Activity 1.5:** Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations, media, journalists, youth and women-led organizations, activists and community leaders from all identity groups **to understand and advocate** for their fundamental rights, and influence national and sub-national government decisions, monitor government action, forge partnerships and collaborate across identity group lines	**Output Indicator 1.5.** Proportion of PCC members demonstrating awareness on tools of addressing the hate speech and hostility Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase	Baseline and endline survey	Baseline : 0 Target: at least 20% increase

	through Kyrgyz Jarany concept, on joint needs identification and advocacy and outreach strategy — to improve the level of understanding of government processes and civil society priorities – **Activity 1.6:** Build capacity of PCCs in **conflict sensitivity programming and comprehensive peacebuilding action planning** based on UNDP's Prevention Academy training tool – **Activity 1.7:** Developing respective tools for capacity building of PCCs in preventing online hostility and intolerance, such as *antithesis* to hate speech - *language of consent,* and tools for developing transversal skills aimed at empowering both civil society and duty bearers to think critically about information and use of digital tools and promote intercultural understanding, tolerance and citizenship skills – **Activity 1.8:** Capacity-building of PCCs on conflict prevention online, strategic communication skills,			

	maintain constructive and positive public debates online, generating a common public understanding conflict and problem resolution solutions, promote literacy of the population online etc.			
	Output 2: Collective action, pooling funding sources and joint programming of partners sustained and scaled up through experimentation and exploration of comprehensive social cohesion strategies of PCCs	**Output indicator 2.1.** Each PCCs has operational comprehensive gender-sensitive social cohesion strategies with relevant capacities for designing and implementation **Baseline 2023:** 0 **Target 2025:** 6	Project progress reports	2022: 0 2025: 6
	– **Activity 2.1:** Develop guiding tools (regulation/SOPs) for Grant Facility, encompassing mechanisms of joint management, formulation, implementation, M&E, transparency and accountability and facilitate discussions with and approval by PCC members – CSOs, media, central and local authorities etc., by focusing upon the root causes of particular identity-groups (gender, ethnic, religious) – **Activity 2.2:** Support PCCs in joint formulation of gender responsive and conflict	**Output indicator 2.2.** No. of civil society organisations who successfully apply and implement small grants initiatives across diverse topics of social cohesion (civic identity, access to justice, human rights, rule of law, mediation, GEWE etc.) Baseline 2023: 0 Target 2025: 20 **Output indicator 2.3**. % of beneficiaries believing that opportunities for collaboration between the government and civil society improved Baseline : 0 Target: at least 50%	Project progress reports CSOs data Baseline and endline survey	2022: 0 2025: 20 Baseline : 0 Target: at least by 50%

	sensitive peacebuilding action plans with civic identity at the core – **Activity 2.3:** Facilitate the process of alignment of action plans of PCCs with respective action plans of Kyrgyz Jarany civic identity concept, Concept on religious affairs, Youth Development Concept, National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 WPS, PVE Programme, human rights norms and standards and etc. – **Activity 2.4:** Facilitate that Action Plans of PCCs are integrated with local development plans and resources from local budgets allocated as co-funding – **Activity 2.5:** Organize trainings on fund raising and developing funding proposals for diverse groups of CSOs and media – **Activity 2.6:** Issue call for proposals with at least two windows and allocate grants, so to contribute to the implementation of Action Plans of PCCs: (i) among CSOs, youth- and women led organizations engaged across diverse topics of social cohesion (civic identity, access to justice, human rights, rule of law, mediation, and etc.)	**Output indicator 2.4.** Local development plans include budgeted activities addressing social cohesion priorities Baseline : no Target: yes	PCC, LSG data	Baseline: no Target: yes

	(ii) among media CSOs, journalists, local bloggers etc. **– Activity 2.7**: Documenting lessons success stories, good practices and lessons learned, wide dissemination through media, and explore replication and scale up at the national level			

Annex 1: List of consulted parties

Ms. Joanna Brooks and Ms. Gulmira Mamatkerimova *International and National Consultants on Strengthening Civil Society and Civic Space*

April 06, 2022, Wednesday
Meeting with Ms.Chynara Esengul, Head of INGO PeaceNexus Kyrgyzstan
April 07, 2022, Thursday
UN agencies
Meeting with Developmental Partners – based on the guidance of UNDP.
Meeting with Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan Mr. Shamil Ibraimov, Executive Director Ms. Nuriana Kartanbaeva, Law Programme Director Ms. Takhmina Ashuralieva, Law Programme Coordinator **Meeting with FHO 360 project**
April 11, 2022, Monday
Clinic Adilet Ms. Cholpon Djakupova, Executive Director
Networks of CSOs working on children rights Ms. Nazgul Turdubekova, League of Child Rights Defenders Ms. Mira Itikeeva, Child Protection Center Ms. Natalia Shipp, Children's Rights Protection Network
Election-related CSOs Ms. Ainura Usupbekova, Executive Director, Civic Platform Mr. Edir Bova, Taza Shailoo Association Mr. Tagir Osmonaliev, expert
Human Rights Defenders Organizations FGD Ms. Erkina Ubysheva, Smart Zharan Mr. Aidar Mambetov, Civil Participation Mr. Nurbek Toktakunov, Precedent Ms. Dinara Oshurakhanova, Civil Initiatives Ms. Burula Makenbayeva, Mental Health Society Ms. Rita Karasartova, Institute for Public Analysis Ms. Gulshaiyr Abdirasulova, Kylym Shamy Ms. Gulnara Dzurabayeva, CSO Expert
Meeting with Ms. Mira Karybayeva, independent expert
Meeting with Ms. Elmira Nogoibayeva and Mr. Medet Tyulegenov, independent experts
April 12, 2022, Tuesday
Meeting with human rights organizations for Muslim women and identified religious groups Ms. Jamal Frontbek kyzy, "Mutakalim" Ms. Indira Aslanova, Independent religious expert
Media organizations and experts, FGD Mr. Bektur Iskender, Founder of KLOOP Ms. Begaiym Usenova, Institute for Media Development Ms. Dina Maslova, Founder of Kaktus Media Mr. Avlanbek Dzhumabaev, Media Expert Mr. Almaz Ismanov, Media Expert
Meeting with business associations **Mr. Daniyar Amanaliev**, co-founder of the Ololo co-working network and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Creative Industries Association
DPCC WG Mtg on New Civil Society Reporting Requirements • Civil society perspectives on the legislative drafting and approval process with respect to the new requirements • Overview of the information CSOs are required to submit • Assessment of the required form and submission process • Consequences of not submitting • Impact of the new requirements on Kyrgyz civil society **Presenters:** - the International Center for Non-Profit Law (ICNL) - together with Legal Clinic Adilet - and Civic Participation
Meeting with justice sector CSOs and anti-torture, FGD Ms. Chynara Aidarbekova, Kyrgyz Association of women-judges

Ms. Leyla Sydykova, Strategic Decisions
Ms. Asel Koilubaeva, Lawyers for Human Rights
Members of Coalition against torture from the regions
Environmental organizations
Ms. Maria Kolesnikova
Ms. Anna Kirilenko, BIOM
Meeting with PwD
Ms. Seinep Eshmuratova, ARDI
Ms. Tamara Dyikanbaeva
April 13, 2022, Wednesday
Administration of the President
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Education and Science *(civic education, schools, civic identity)*
Ombudsperson
Central Elections Commission and its Training Center
Members of Parliament
National Statistical Committee
April 14, 2022, Thursday
Meeting with Gulnara Ibraieva, Independent expert
Meeting with Business associations:
Ms. Askar Sydykov, International Business Council
Ms. Aisanat Sapharbek kyzy, Business Ombudsman office
Ms. Gulnara Uskenbayeva, Association of Distributors
AIDS and others
Aibar Sultangaziev, Partner Network
Natalya Shumskay, AFEW-Kyrgyzstan
Daniyar Orsekov, Indigo
Meerim Osmonalieva, Oasis Kyrgyzstan
Youth organizations
Institute for Youth Development (Bishkek-online)
Akmaral Satinbaeva, Youth of Osh
Anastasiya Stycenko, International volunteering "Liderstvo" (Karakol)
Salyia Akulova, Public Association "Agents of Change" (Batken, Djalal Abad)
Meeting with Tolekan Ismailova, Human Rights Movement "Bir Duino-Kyrgyzstan
Meeting with gender CSOs, FGD:
Tolkun Tulekova, Crisis Centers Association
Larisa Ilibezova, gender expert
Anara Nyiazova, Innovative Solutions
Zulfia Kocherbaeva, Social Technology Agency

Annex 2: Brief information on the existing PCCs: mandate, composition, geographic presence

Background:

The existing 23 Public Consultative Councils on Inter-Ethnic Issues were established in post-conflict settings after 2010 inter-ethnic violent conflict in the south. Initially, they were operational under the State Agency on Local Self-Governance. After 2021 Constitutional reform, the Government was re-structured and PCCs were handed over to the Ministry of Culture & Youth Development. The PCCs are operational based on the regulation of the Ministry of Culture & Youth Development.

Key tasks of PCCs include:

– Raise awareness of population on inter-ethnic policies
– Consider written and oral complaints from citizens
– Monitor inter-ethnic situation/tensions on a day-to-day basis and data collection
– Undertake necessary response measures in conjunction with relevant state bodes.

Governance arrangements:

– Institutionally, the PCCs within the Ministry's structure
– At the central level, the Ministry of Culture & Youth Development is a custodian of PCCs and responsible for overall policy elaboration, M&E. The Ministry's department on Inter-Ethnic Relations is a key accountable structure for PCCs' work
– At the sub-national (district) level, the PCCs are headed by the heads/akims of district level state administrations and mayors
– The Executive Secretaries are human resources of the Ministry of Culture in districts, paid by the state budget and fulfilling the role of the secretariat for coordination, monitoring of the situation and preparing proposal for PCCs' decision-making, data collection, ensuring response
– Response to prevent or respond to inter-ethnic incidents are implemented through administrative decisions, instructions of akims of districts based on the recommendations of PCCs

Generic composition of PCCs:

Every PCC has its own area-specific composition, but having analyzed, the common composition is as following:

– Heads/Akims of district level state administrations and mayors of cities
– Executive Secretaries
– Reps from district level branches of educational, medical, social protection, law enforcement agencies, lawyers, religious organizations (mostly from local mosques)
– Reps from available ethnic minority diasporas
– Reps from available newspapers, radios, TVs
– Reps from selected local self-governments
– Reps from councils of elderly, women and youth
– In some cases, reps from local businesses and museums; pensioners and veterans

Geographic presence of PCCs:

– Osh province: Aravan, Nookat, Kara-Suu, Uzgen district level PCCs and Osh city
– Batken province: Batke, Leilek and Kadamjay districts and Kyzyk-Kya town
– Jalal-Abad province: Ala-Buka, Aksy, Bazar-Korgon, Suzak, Nooken districts and Jalal-Abad city
– Chui province: Alamedin, Jayil, Moskva, Sokuluk, Panfilov, Yssyk-Ata districts and Tokmok town
– Issyk-Kul province: Karakol city

Annex 3: Schematic outlook of the Grant Facility: governance arrangements, decision-making, implementation, M&E processes

Composition of the Grant Facility Mechanism	Public Consultative Councils (I4Ps)		UNDP & UNESCO	Strategic level Quality Assurance
	Central and local authorities	CSOs and media		within JSC of the project and central level PCC (I4P)
Key roles	National ownership and shared responsibility over the results of small grants		Bridge together Govt and CSOs & media, catalyze ownership and responsibility	
Joint design of peacebuilding plans	Bottom-up formulation of joint peacebuilding action plans of PCCs and alignment with local and sectorial development plans & budgeting		Capacity building	Quality assurance at intermediary level
Joint decision-making & selection	Joint selection of proposals submitted by CSOs & media through convening Review Panel within PCCs			by UN staff, respective sub-national PCCs within their regular meetings and/or public hearings of LSGs
Implementers – recipients of grants	CSOs and media organizations from diverse thematic areas in association with relevant municipal and public institutions			
Contributions to grant facility	Co-funding from local and/or sectorial budgets	Provision of expertise, mentorship support etc.	Low value grants, technical accompaniment, M&E	
Addressing social cohesion challenges	Implementation of small grants as part of Peacebuilding Action Plans of PCCs embedded / intertwined with local development plans and local budgeting **Small grants** will be implemented by CSOs & media and as part of peacebuilding action plans of PCCs, encompassing diverse themes of peacebuilding such as the civic identity, justice, human rights, media, journalists, mediation, gender and etc., for building trust and social cohesion			Community-based monitoring Collection of evidence; Documenting success stories and lessons learned by UN, CSOs, community media, leaders

Annex 4. Some of the conclusions of CSO review

Background: According to various estimates, up to 30,000 CSOs have been officially registered, but only a few hundred are regularly operational across the country as the majority are concentrated in Bishkek and Osh, are highly dependent on donor funding and their work is often guided and shaped by donor priorities rather than their own agenda. Recently, CSOs have been also facing deepening challenges due to national setbacks on rule of law and democratic governance, tightening legislation and practices on civic space.

In this regard, UNDP conducted an internal political economic analysis of CSO landscape to provide strategic recommendations to strengthen CSOs partnership, civic space, civic education, public participation and civic engagement into decision-making processes (including legal and policy-related, as well as public oversight), and to strengthen the civil society movement in the country, in light also of the recent political developments and with the aim of strengthening democratic processes in the country, good governance, improve human rights, and leverage in general CSOs expertise/collaboration/partnership, to promote Agenda 2030.

Some of the conclusions of the review relevant to the present project:

1. It is necessary to complete the processes of both **state-building and nation-building,** which have still not been finalized.

2. It has become clear that many processes in the country, including formation of CSOs, are strongly connected with the **state-building of a new state and nation-building**.

3. These imbalances in Kyrgyzstan lead to limitations for peacebuilding. **It is necessary to urgently resolve challenges around building the state and nation.** A specific concept must be developed in Kyrgyzstan; the concept of state-building and the concept of nation-building, in order to specify a path for defining the nation's identity and strategic goals towards building a robust state.

4. Despite reductions in the democratic space for CSOs and the decline of their influence in the new political conditions, **CSOs nonetheless remain an important sector** in Kyrgyzstan that is committed to democracy, protecting human rights, the rule of law, and social justice.

5. The civil sector urgently needs to start improving **internal communications and coordination**.

6. It is necessary to **offer strategic partnerships to the authorities** and explain their approaches and the benefits of working together.

7. CSOs **as a sector have not yet become strong, financially stable, and an equal partner of the authorities**

8. For more than two decades of independence, Kyrgyzstan has not been able to develop its own project for the future. It was necessary to develop a state ideology or strategy that would find a response in the minds of, if not the majority, then at least among a significant part of the citizenry.

9. It is certain that in Kyrgyzstan, **the process of the development of CSOs has not been properly managed and still remain donor driven and dependent,** which now remains neglected.

10. The protracted situation of Kyrgyzstan's path has involved significant **uncertainty on the issues of religion and ideology**. The ambiguity of the state's position has led to starkly opposing ideas now flourishing in this area, over which conflict is arising (Tengrianism, Islam, nationalism, traditionalism, liberalism, etc.).

11. **Democracy itself has become unpopular,** and CSOs have broken away from their social base and beneficiaries because they could not carry out systematic work with them. However, religious organizations have been able to consistently work with their beneficiaries, and so much of the population of Kyrgyzstan has converted to Islam rapidly.

12. T**he state understands the spanusefulness of cooperating with CSOs**, since both the state and CSOs are part of society.

13. The active CSOs used to be the main counterweight to negative trends**, but new trends have made the work of CSOs even more dangerous and high-risk.** Many representatives of NPOs fear for their safety and the safety of their families. Human rights defenders and legal experts are more likely to receive threats of intimidation and demands to halt their activities.

14. **The level of development of CSOs and their capabilities are now much lower** than necessary to have a tangible impact on people's lives and the emergence of changes in state policy.