SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT DOCUMENT

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT

United Nations
Peacebuilding

Country: South Sudan

Project Title: Local Solutions to Build Climate Resilience and Advance Peace and Stability in Bor, Pibor and Malakal

Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):

PBF project modality:	**If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):**
☐ IRF	☐ Country Trust Fund
☒ **PRF**	☐ Regional Trust Fund
	Name of Recipient Fund:

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.): UN Women, IOM, FAO

List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO):
Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)

Project duration in months[1] [2]: 36 months
Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: Bor, Jonglei State: Pibor town in Greater Pibor Administrative Area and Malakal in Upper Nile

Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:
☐ Gender promotion initiative[3]
☐ Youth promotion initiative[4]
☐ Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions
☐ Cross-border or regional project

Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):
IOM: $ 1,500,000
FAO: $ 1,100,000
UN Women: $ 1,080,700
Total: 3,680,700

> **The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.*

---

[1] Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

[2] The official project start date will be the date of the first project budget transfer by MPTFO to the recipient organization(s), as per the MPTFO Gateway page.

[3] Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

[4] Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):		
PBF 1st tranche (70%): IOM: $ 1,050,000 FAO: $ 770,000 UN Women: $ 756,490 **Total: 2,576,490**	**PBF 2nd tranche* (30%):** IOM: $ 450,000 FAO: $ 330,000 UN Women: $ 324,000 **Total: 1,104,210**	**PBF 3rd tranche* (0%):**

Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):

The overall objective of the project is to advance peace and stability in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile by reducing the negative impact of climate shocks on existing conflict dynamics as well as gender and age-based discrimination. In Greater Jonglei and Upper Nile, particularly in fragility-affected areas with active conflict dynamics, the impact of climate shocks on people's livelihoods is significant and exacerbates existing conflict dynamics, instability, gender and age-based discrimination, poverty and governance challenges. This contributes to the rise of new tensions, often triggered by competition over scarce resources, thus creating a vicious cycle of climate shocks and instability. As a peacebuilding response, the project is designed to bolster community resilience in these areas to ensure that have local communities have access to a set of distinct capacities and resources that are critical for communities to cope with, withstand or bounce back from the confluence of conflict and climate-related risks. More specifically, the project is designed to bolster three 'resilience capacities'[5] in the targeted areas; (1) absorptive capacities in order for communities to take protective action to anticipate, plan and recover from shocks such as climate shocks; (2) adaptive capacities in order for communities to make 'incremental adjustments, modifications to adapt to climate shocks without major change in their lifestyle; (3) transformative capacities in order to create sustainable structures that systematically respond to stressors and shocks. IOM, FAO and UN Women seek to advance these three resilience capacities in Bor, Pibor and Malakal through integrated and joint programming that also involves stakeholders at multiple levels including local women and youth representatives, community leaders, local government and national government. The climate-informed peacebuilding approach explores how prevention, adaptation and/or mitigation measures can be mainstreamed into interventions that seek to address conflict before, during and after conflict as a mechanism to sustain and build peace in pilot programming. In doing so, these climate-informed peacebuilding processes can incentivize collaboration between conflict parties (or their constituents) for a common purpose to overcome the impacts of climate change, using climate-related challenges as entry points to build confidence and for technical cooperation and dialogue that lead to joint planning and peacebuilding between conflict parties.

Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):

Consultations have been held with UN Result Group 4 (RG 4) of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, and the Programme Management Team (PMT) under the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). Further, stakeholder focus group discussions, key informant interviews with stakeholders and beneficiaries form the backbone of the analysis that underpins the rationale and programmatic approach. The Community Empowerment for Peace Organisation (CEPO), a guarantor of the peace agreement, has provided valuable input to the conceptualization and design

---

[5] United Nations (2020), United Nations Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilient Societies, New York (UN).

of the peacebuilding dialogue-cum-peacebuilding roadmap/action plans that are envisaged under the project. CEPO will be a key partner in the implementation, working with the project team as a whole, and with contractual arrangements with both IOM and UN Women. Similarly, the concept note is based on conflict analysis compiled based on assessments conducted by IOM-South Sudan Conflict Analysts between March and July 2021, as well as other information sourced in preparation for the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative 2021 and informing ongoing peacebuilding projects. The rationale and approach further take on recommendations for ensuring conflict sensitivity for peacebuilding programing under the PBF. The Ministry of Peacebuilding is a key partner for PBF projects and the Ministry has provided their guidance and input to the project development process including the underlying rationale and project locations. UN Women has consulted the Ministry of Environment and Forestry on the proposal and is linking part of the awareness raising activities to the Ministry's efforts. The Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare has been contacted and will be consulted throughout the project cycle. Consultations with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have also been held – particularly with representatives from field offices in Bor and Pibor and with UNMISS' climate and security advisor – which resulted in key guidance and recommendations that informed this project's problem analysis and activity design. UNMISS will continue to be a key partner throughout the implementation of this project in all locations, including through participation in Technical Working Group (TWG) meetings in Juba and ongoing coordination with UNMIS Heads of Field Office (HoFO) at field level.

Project Gender Marker score[6]: 2
52.51 % and 1,956,564.85 $ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment:

Briefly **explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment** [7]:

Due to deep-rooted socio-cultural norms, gender inequality runs deep in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, and in ways that hinder women's political and economic roles. In this view, this project seeks to engage women in Bor, Pibor and Malakal in a comprehensive process that seeks their political and economic empowerment. On one hand, the activities planned under Outcome one will equip women with the fundamental skills for leading and engaging in peace- and decision-making processes. This will grow the influence of women in political circles where they are able to voice their experiences and needs in these processes and contribute to the development of future Peacebuilding Action Plans in the respective locations, thus playing an active role in advancing peace and stability. On the other hand, the activities planned under Outcome two aim to enhance the economic resilience of women in the face of climate risks, which will be done by supporting women's agricultural and fish production practices. These interventions target women's adaptive capacities in project locations where flood-related risks pose a threat on women's livelihoods. Finally, the activities planned under Outcome three aim to address entrenched discriminatory gender and social norms, including highly patriarchal, exclusionary, and discriminatory customary practices that are contrary to human rights standards and principles of gender equality. The review of customary laws and practices is a process through which community representatives jointly agree

---

[6] **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)
Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE
Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)
[7] Please consult the **PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding**

on their historical laws and practices, reviewing those that are contradictory to the national constitution, international gender norms and human rights.

Project Risk Marker score[8]: 1

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project *(select ONLY one)* [9]: 2.3

SDCF **outcome(s)** to which the project contributes: UNCF (2019-2022) Priority 1: Building peace and strengthening governance and Priority 4: Empowering women and youth. On January 2023 the new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework will be launched and the project will contribute to the strategic objective: Women and youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development.

Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s) to which the project contributes:
SDG 16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions and SDG 13 – Climate Action

Type of submission:	If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:
☒ New project ☐ Project amendment	**Extension of duration:** ☐ Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date): **Change of project outcome/ scope:** ☐ **Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:** ☐ **Additional PBF budget:** ☐ Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX **Brief justification for amendment:** *Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in* *TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.*

---

[8] **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

[9] **PBF Focus Areas** are:
(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

PROJECT SIGNATURES:

UN Migration Agency IOM	Ministry of Peacebuilding
Peter Van Der Auweraert ████████████ *Signature* Chief of Mission Date & Seal 24 01 2023	*Hon. Pia Philip Michael* ████████████ *Signature* Undersecretary Date & Seal 26/1/2023 [stamp: REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN MINISTRY OF PEACE BUILDING 2023 JAN OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY]
UNWOMEN	**DSRSG/RC/HC**
Peterson Magoola ████████████ *Signature* Country Representative Date & Seal [UN WOMEN stamp]	*Sara Beysolow Nyanti* ████████████ AUNEANOU *Signature* UN Resident Coordinator OIL Date & Seal 24 01 2023
FAO	**Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**
Meschak Malo ████████████ *Signature* FAO Representative in South Sudan Date & Seal 31 01 2023 [FAO FIAT PANIS stamp]	*Elizabeth Spehar* ████████████ *Signature* Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Date & Seal 31/01/2023

I.   Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

A. A brief summary of **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age-responsive.

Context

South Sudan is one of the highly vulnerable countries to the effects of climate change. Both long-term climate change, such as the gradual increase in temperatures, and sudden extreme climate events such as flooding[10], have indirect and interlinked implications for peace and security in the country. This is especially true in areas impacted by fragility, conflict and violence where climate-related crises exacerbate existing tensions and where community resilience to these shocks is at their lowest. Jonglei, Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) and Upper Nile are emblematic examples of contexts where conflict and climate-related risks collide (*Annex E*).

The ethnic makeup of Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile State includes a plethora of ethnic groups including the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Mabanes, Murle, Lou Nuer, Anuak and others. Comparable to other parts of South Sudan, many of the tensions that typify conflict dynamics in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile have their roots in the last civil war with the north in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the era of peace in Sudan ushered in by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) never truly reached these areas, where a series of political and communal conflicts, aided and abetted by external actors, continued after independence. Just by way of illustration of the severity of the post-CPA violence in Greater Jonglei, nearly half of all violent deaths and displacements in South Sudan in 2009 were in Jonglei State alone.[13] Indeed, past grievances continue to fuel present-day violent ethnic animosities and political competition between the Lou Nuer, Bor Dinka and the Murle in Jonglei and GPAA, and between the Shilluk and the Padang Dinka in Upper Nile.

In Greater Jonglei, cattle-related violence between the three communities is one of the most frequently referenced sources of violence and conflict, along with widespread allegations of tit-for-tat child abductions, rape, murder and cattle-raiding. In addition, conflict is not the only shock that populations grapple with in Jonglei and GPAA. It is an area that has frequently been influenced by extreme climatic conditions, including floods and droughts, with flooding being particularly disastrous in 2019 and 2020. These climatic pressures have exacerbated conflict, with shrinking rivers pushing pastoralists outside their homes, sometimes towards areas where they are not welcomed.

Areas in Upper Nile such as Malakal and surrounding areas on the East and West Bank are some of the starkest illustrations of the complex overlap of local conflict triggers and climate shocks. These areas had been hit hard with fighting at the start of the civil war, switching hands multiple times and resulting in civilian atrocities. This violence, including forced displacement, was not merely a consequence of the conflict, but part of the process of contestation over administrative boundaries between the Shilluk and Padang Dinka that started after the CPA. This culminated into the forced displacement of Shilluk populations starting from 2013 into Malakal Protection of Civilian (PoC) site -a microcosm for political and military developments in Upper Nile- which hosts Shilluk, Nuer and Padang Dinka IDPs alongside traders from Darfur and elsewhere. Today, Upper Nile continues to witness ethnic tension coupled with population movement due to conflict as well as flooding. By way

---

[10] OCHA. "South Sudan: Flooding Snapshot No. 2 (As of 11 October 2022) - South Sudan,"
https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-snapshot-no-2-11-october-2022.

of illustration, an estimated 18,323 new IDPs from Tonga and Wau Shilluk are reported to have arrived in the Malakal PoC for safety from mid-august 2022 to date. Mindful of the above intricate complexities, the project focuses on **four main conflict factors** that continue to fuel tension and conflict in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile:

1. Political Competition and Ethnic Division

Competition over land, natural resource and administrative control

Much like the rest of South Sudan, violence in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile is inexorably linked to questions of land competition and administrative control. Indeed, the dissolution of the 32-state system and reversion back to 10 states and three administrative areas was said to reinforce negative sentiments with respect to the allocation of land and administrative control and political appointments. Generally, administrative control can be seen as an expression of power vis-à-vis 'others' or out-groups in such a way that competition consistently reinforces zero-sum logics between different communities even when said competition emanates from the centre.

In Greater Jonglei, the status granted to Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA)[11] generated a degree of frustration amongst other Jonglei State communities, particularly the Bor Dinka and Nuer who perceived the Murle as being rewarded despite their relatively small population size, at least when compared to the two largest ethnic groups in the country. It is noteworthy to mentioned that the Lou Nuer have consistently made demands for a mono-ethnic Lou Nuer area similar to what was given to the Murle in 2014. Conversely, the Murle perceive other communities and the South Sudanese state as trying to dispossess them from their land, or at the very least dislocate them from the rest of Jonglei State and the centre in Juba and keep the GPAA in a perpetual state of instability. As a result, the 2020 attacks were apparently construed by the Lou Nuer to be a Murle assertion of their political and military strength *against* the Lou Nuer who did not receive their own area and was said to be used as a justification for the assaults on Pibor that followed[12].

In Upper Nile, the Shilluk and Padang Dinka both lay claim to Malakal Town and other areas of the East Bank. Each community maintains that they migrated to Upper Nile first, with land claims extending into the 12th and 13th centuries. For the Padang Dinka, they have ownership over everything on the East Bank and the Shilluk's conventional land lies solely on the West Bank, which is what both political and military developments have tried to reinforce, including the Establishment Order of October 2015 creating 28 states out of the original ten, which were upped to 32 in January 2017 before reverting back to ten (and three administrative areas) on 14 February 2020 [REF]. For the Shilluk it is exactly the opposite. They are the rightful claimants of the East Bank. Also, there is competition over water and rangelands between pastoralists and host communities in Upper Nile during livestock

---

[11] After the onslaught of the South Sudan civil war in December 2013, deep-rooted feelings of political marginalisation led to a series of alliance formations between various actors across the region, with the Murle allying for instance with the government against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM/iO) - an alignment that culminated in the agreement that established Pibor as an Administrative Area, as opposed to a county; thus achieving the goal of greater autonomy from the Jonglei State government dominated by Nuer and Dinka. The Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), established in May 2014 as part of the deal brokered between Murle leader David Yau Yau and the central government, now encompasses the former Pibor administrative area and is administratively independent of the state administration in Bor. These borders have been essential to shaping conflict and political dynamics in the GPAA.

[12]

migration seasons, which has become a source of conflict. Especially access to water points is known to be a major conflict trigger. In addition, pastoralists are often destroyed agricultural products during the cattle migration move.

In this context, mobility (e.g., return of refugees from neighboring countries, resettlement of IDPs) whether triggered by violence or climate shocks in neighboring areas, intensifies this competition and places considerable stress on community relations. In addition, at household level, widespread lack of literacy and insufficient documentation of pre-existing rights have made it hard for women, as well as women and youth IDPs and returnees to participate in the decision-making processes and political discussions related to land ownership, thereby being exposed to structural violence in the form of a denial of resources.

Sentiments of Political Marginalization from the Center (Juba)

Perceptions of political marginalization from central government are deeply felt by all the communities in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, who feel politically slighted, particularly in the aftermath of the state-level appointments that occurred in 2020. In Jonglei, amongst the Bor Dinka, there has been marked discontent with the central government. As the late John Garang was Bor Dinka, the SPLA and the government that it would later form were heavily influenced by the predominance of the Bor, at least until the end of the 2005 period when there was a gradual devolution of power away from Bor towards Bahr El Ghazal Dinka sections. The tensions that were generated because of the marginalization of the Bor Dinka – who once sat at the helm of the South Sudanese vision – is also in tandem with the compound marginalization of Lou Nuer and Murle, who are even further isolated from the bases of power in Greater Jonglei and the Dinka-dominated center in Juba. These dynamics of political marginalization generate tensions between the Lou Nuer, Murle and Bor Dinka as it is a dynamic that the Bor Dinka are generally blamed for, which fed into the recent conflict that emerged in 2020.

Similarly in Upper Nile, sub-national appointments in 2020 and 2021 deepened perceptions of exclusion from the center among communities in this area. Compounding this at the state level, the Shilluk feel excluded from the bases of power in Upper Nile state, which have been increasingly concentrated amongst the Padang Dinka through both political and military means over the past decade and a half. At a micro-level even, IOM South Sudan Conflict Analysis in March 2021 noted how Shilluk women in Malakal PoC report being stigmatised by Dinka women and being viewed as 'different', refusing to participate jointly with them in any activities organised by humanitarian agencies.

Internal (Age-Set) Conflict in GPAA

As is the case in many parts of South Sudan. It is not just 'external' violence, but 'internal' violence within communities that has considerably undermined stability, as well. In GPAA, Murle society is organized socially around three inter-connected institutions, including: the age-set or generation system (buul); red chiefs (alan merik); and clans (kidonwa)[13]. It was not until the emergence of the

---

[13] Age-sets are male groupings, based vaguely on age, and increasing less so, to which males will belong for most of their life. Each age-set has its own 'red chiefs', with a hierarchy of authority determined by clans, which demonstrates social standing within each age-set and across the Murle as a whole. As is the case across many of South Sudan's

Bothonya over the past decade that competition between the two youngest age-sets – the Kurenen and the Lango – became violent in the ways that it is today. This is not to say that competition is not an inherent part of the age-set system. Amongst the Murle, younger age-sets are supposed to demonstrate that they have reached ideals of responsible adulthood through seeming displays of violence and are at times anticipated to "rebel" against the ruling age set. Although fighting between age-sets had traditionally employed sticks and was viewed as a rite of passage, age-set fighting has become progressively militarized and politicized. What's more, whereas before age-sets were said to reside together, that is no longer the case, and what was a system of social organization and order has turned into a system of difference wherein the age-sets have settled separately due to their need for self-defense and protection in ways that transcend more conventional practices of rebellion against older age-sets[14]. Conflict induced internal displacements have also impacted the intergenerational relations and perhaps resulted in a loss of culture, traditions and respect of traditional leaders from youth who may have become separated from their parents and tribal elders as a result of their displacement. This has created knock-on effects with respect to wider generational and societal relations, including intra-familial relations, with younger age-sets as well as between generations and their elders, such as the red chiefs, at the community level.

Age-set violence not only implicates the Murle communities but also creates insecurity within as well as in neighboring communities. In retaliation, other communities attack, put blockade to all trade routes supplying Pibor. This in turn results in lack of access to market and subsequent shortage of livelihood commodities, which has a disproportionate impact on women, young girls, children and elderly. It also prevents access to land use such as water and pasture points. In addition, gender shapes age-set violence and implicates women in a particular way due to the prevailing conceptions of masculinity and power, which typically accentuate men's capacity to seize females as commodities, where the ability to 'take' women from the other side is an important display of masculine authority and reinforces the powerlessness and femininity of the other, which in this case encompasses rival age-sets. This leads to vicious cycles of violence targeting women and young girls. This also reinforces social-norms relating to the commodification of women and girls (discussed in subsequent section) and their treatment as objects, where gender inequality becomes not only a consequence of age-set conflict, but a cause in some instances, as well.

2. Local Governance and Access to Services and Resources

Jonglei, GPAA, and Upper Nile are home to significant service delivery and governance challenges. Recurrent clashes over the past two-plus years have made it very hard to retain even the most rudimentary of services, forcing many partners to retain a reactive rather than proactive aid posture in the area that has reinforced the chronic underdevelopment that has characterized both areas in the post-2005 CPA and post-2011 independence periods. At least eight humanitarian staff were killed between May and August 2020 in Greater Jonglei and at least 183 evacuations took place, resulting in the suspension of services. In many instances, destruction was a deliberate tactic by groups advancing on Pibor. In other instances, assets are said to have been looted by the community themselves to ensure

---

communities who engage in patrilocal marriage practices, women do not hold the same identifiers as their male counterparts and will usually belong to their fathers age-set until they marry and fall under the age-set of their husband. Akin to other social groupings, including those who engage in violence, such as community-embedded armed groups and gangs, age-sets provide males with a sense of belonging that they cannot often attain elsewhere

[14] Information retrieved from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted by IOM South Sudan's conflict analysis team in August 2021

that attackers do not benefit from services in their area. Compounding this, consecutive flooding since 2019 has devasted local infrastructure throughout Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, preventing mobility, trade and the return of population to their homes. This has a significant impact on access to education, clean water and health services. With that, the preponderance of services, limited as they might be, are concentrated in the main towns (e.g., Bor, Pibor, Malakal town). This mirrors the reach and influence of much of the local governance structure.

Displaced persons who decide to return in South Sudan and host communities in areas affected by displacement and returns, frequently face multiple challenges including especially access to services. Further the social fabric upon which communities depend for early recovery is threatened or completely eroded due to disputes around destruction and occupation of their housing, land and property, lack of access to land tenure rights, discrimination, violence, as well as unresolved tensions between communities. As a result of lack of access to justice mechanism, redress systems and the general lack of governance, the chiefs and their courts are one of the most widely recognized and accessible forms of local government across the country. However, their legitimacy is questioned due to contention of chieftaincies' resulting from displacement and returned chiefs, leading to duplicative customary systems causing significant obstacles to dispute resolution among individuals and between communities, preventing social cohesion in areas affected by displacement and return. As other research has highlighted, the influence of chiefs and other traditional leaders in South Sudan is performative and contingent on their ability and capacity to deliver both justice and services. For example, Weakened capacity of local authorities in many cases prevents conflict mitigation, which is true for both statutory and customary leaders. Chiefs have reduced their ability to peacefully resolve disputes relating to cattle migration. This has enabled broad impunity for cattle-related conflict and encouraged the intensification and diversification of retaliatory violence between communities. There are weaknesses in customary codes and their application includes outdated/redundant levels of harmonized dowry, and exclusion/marginalization of certain ethnic groups. There has also been no recent consensus on the provisions of customary law between the communities and their relevance to addressing and regulating conflict, let alone conflict that is fueled and/or aggravated by climate-related risks. With years of war and humanitarian crisis, they are no longer able to do so, placing them in a difficult position where their authority can be continuously contested, leading to the slow erosion of a very particular and often narrow form of social order that has yet to be replaced with something different. This erosion has been long under way due to the militarization and politicization of customary power that occurred during the last civil war with Sudan between 1983 and 2005 but has been further entrenched through the recent political developments. This includes the creation of a 32-state system out of the original ten between 2015 and 2017, which led to the multiplication of customary chiefs in many locations due to the creation of new administrative units and concomitant decline in their overall influence. This has contributed to the wider accountability deficit that persists in most local governments, where vertical accountability to populations is basically non-existent.

The cumulative impacts of external and internal conflict coupled with severe levels of economic deprivation and climate shocks has had a disproportionate impact on the youth in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile and access to employment opportunities, who often turn to humanitarian organisations to fill this gap, while also creating competition between ethnic communities over the available opportunities. Criminality, including cattle raiding have become one of the prime mechanisms through which young males can access resources. In addition, young males and disillusioned soldiers defecting and returning, only to find that they have few opportunities for employment, find a sense

of belonging in joining militia and violent gang groups, engaging in criminal activity and often targeting women and girls. While many youths have opted into crime in the absence of other opportunities, they are yet excluded from the profits that such violence brings, with even the redistribution of raided cattle sometimes reinforcing generational and wealth inequalities. They are also disbarred from participating in decisions and chastised when they try to demand space or the realization of greater rights to taking part in social, political and economic life.

It should be noted that, the ability to lodge a complaint was not always equally available and it was clear that there were few forums through which citizens, especially marginalized groups of women and youth could voice their concerns. This is not surprising. Many institutions, including informal ones, such as customary chiefs continue to be predominantly male reflecting the prevailing patriarchal moral and social order, which frequently fails to consider the individual rights of women and juveniles who are excluded from community structures, while at the same time rendered dependent on them. Still, chiefs oftentimes remain the focal point for relaying community problems, acting as a liaison between the community and the government.

3. Gender and Age-based Discrimination

Intimately tied into deep-rooted socio-cultural norms, gender inequality runs deep in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, and in ways that end up systematically underscoring just how deeply embedded violence and marginalization are in the area. Due to traditions of bride wealth, women are seen as property and as a source of wealth that have no agency in economic, political and cultural aspects of life. This has merely reinforced the already subordinate position that women hold in the target areas and cultural perceptions of violence and discrimination as acceptable tools of authority and control. For instance, with the exchange of bride wealth for a women's hand in marriage, females are generally viewed as assets that are effectively transferred between males in their lives, which men can in many cultures in South Sudan "pre-book" while they are still young girls. This valuation of females in terms of bride wealth leads to a variety of so-called "knock on effects" where paying for a woman or girl ends up justifying their mistreatment and abuse. Girls are pulled out of school at an early age to marry, if they are given the opportunity for education at all. This tradition also opened the door for a cultural of raiding, which is intimately tied into social norms and masculine ideals dictating the need to accumulate cattle to marry.

That being said, not only do these socio-cultural norms exacerbate existing conflict dynamics, but they also multiply women and youth's exiting vulnerabilities. On one hand, conflict dynamics directly impact women as they are targeted, along with children, young girls and elderly during cattle raids, murder/killing, abduction and kidnapping throughout Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, experiencing high rates of sexual- and gender-based violence. In fact, the practice of cattle raiding and counterraiding for women, children, young girls and elderly creates a widely accepted need to "replace" women, young girls, elderly and children killed or abducted. For instance, in Murle society, and against the backdrop of external conflicts, the widespread abductions of women, young girls and children was one of the principal repertoires of violence. In the 2020 conflict, for example, an estimated 686 women and children, mainly from the Murle community, were abducted and 39 Murle women were raped, or gang raped. On the other hand, conflict dynamics indirectly impacts women as they are forced to step outside their traditional gender roles as wives and child bearers which have not been translated into added authority but rather bolstered their secondary status. For instance, in the absence of the male figure within the family, the burden of both income generation and domestic work now falls almost entirely on the shoulders of women and where gender norms do not bar females from participating actively in community life, the sheer workload alone oftentimes does. In sum, cultural

practices have kept them subordinated to social and economic systems that treat them as property and prohibit them from fully realizing their rights, whether that be in participation in the development of their community, or in their protection from various forms of violence, including sexual violence and child forced marriages.

With that, women are by no means the only group who are increasingly experiencing discrimination and exclusion. In Upper Nile, for instance, young girls and young men in Malakal PoC as well as and other counties are highly affected by the reinforcing cycle of conflict and displacement. With few having the opportunity to attend school, even fewer had alternative opportunities to make a living through employment. As per youth key informants in the PoC, many the youth are now involved with drinking habits, fights, violence, criminality (e.g., theft) and sexual assault. In addition, young men have, by and large, been the key players in ongoing external and internal conflicts as they are easily mobilized for conflict. Indeed, the vulnerability of youth, as well as their search for a sense of belonging and purpose, has created a fertile ground for political parties to easily engage them in conflict and has created entry points for manipulation and ethnicization of the conflict. Yet, they are excluded from the profits that such violence brings, with even the redistribution of raided cattle sometimes reinforcing generational and wealth inequalities. They are also disbarred from participating in decisions and chastised when they try to demand space or the realization of greater rights to taking part in social, political and economic life. Nevertheless, the youth in some areas across Jonglei State and Upper Nile are now becoming more expressive in a society that has otherwise treated them as peripheral, undermining their interests to wider political and community goals.

4. Climate Change as a Risk Multiplier

While hostilities in Greater Jonglei and Upper Nile have deep roots pre-dating South Sudan's independence, they are presently being aggravated by the depletion of resources and the occurrence of large-scale natural disasters including drought, desertification, wildfires and especially flooding. in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, approximately 900,000 people and 4 million livestock were directly impacted by floods between 2019 and 2021. In Jonglei 10.67 per cent and in Upper Nile 7.56 per cent of livestock died due to flooding according to 2021 FAO Floods assessment. In Addition, other shocks including challenges faced by households in livestock production indicated that 80% in Pibor and 53% in Malakal reported disease outbreaks, in Pibor 61% and Malakal 53% reported insecurity as a major shock as well as lack of grazing pasture (Pibor 27%) and (Malakal 18%) according to FSNMS round 28. Moreover, lack of veterinary services and Community Animal Health Workers is another key challenge for income generation and livelihoods security. In a study conducted by FAO in Juba, Maban and Pibor on gender and climate change, respondents in Pibor, reported the impact of the floods of 2020 on their communities and lives, with 79% of respondents stating that floods in Pibor caused significant loss of property, death, injuries and worsened inter-communal tensions. As of October 2022, this season's floods are already more widespread than in previous years. Flooding is expected to worsen before year's end[15]

---

[15] International Crisis Group. "Floods in South Sudan." October 27, 2022. http://southsudan.crisisgroup.org/.

Figure 1. Flood Areas Between 2019 and 2022 (Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei)[16]

Since 2019, two years of consecutive flooding have also devasted local infrastructure throughout Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, including in Pibor and Malakal towns where most services are concentrated. Numerous boreholes were said to have been contaminated during the flooding with a December 2019 REACH assessment estimating that 76% of water points had been contaminated. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) is not the only service needed, either. Flooding in 2020 also damaged an estimated 45% of the total cereal producing area in GPAA, while high water levels impacted more than 70% of the total livestock population in many parts of Greater Jonglei. For agro-pastoralists in the lowlands of Jonglei and Upper Nile who rely on livestock systems, the raiding, drowning, diseases and starvation of cattle, sheep and goats has also meant that people have lost access to resources and critical coping mechanisms. Increasing food insecurity led to a series of devastating cattle raids, particularly in Jonglei in 2020 and thus contributing to, and aggravating, a climate of social unrest, with young males residing in border areas, such as the border with Canal/Pigi, struggling to cope with ongoing raids of cattle.

Mindful of the above, conflict and climatic shocks are not equally experienced by all community members, as they are further intensified according to gender and age. For instance, in December 2021, the population of Bor IDP Site comprised a total of 2,687 individuals (1,047 households). About 55 per cent of the registered population were found to be youths under the age of 18 years, while 46 per cent were female. Indeed, gender norms, roles and power structures determine how women, young girls and male, children and elderly experience shocks and hazards and capacity to cope with risks due to their differences in decision making power, access, use and control of productive and economic resources as well as social responsibilities. Further, the convergence of conflict and climate-induced disasters aggravate gender inequalities and compound risks as seen in spikes of SGBV during violent conflict and other emergencies. Therefore, extreme weather events or slowly evolving events have direct impact on both women and youth; including loss of means of subsistence due to climate-induced migration or displacement, conflict and lack of access to livelihoods. As highlighted during the Gender Day at COP 27 on 14 November, women play a crucial role in climate change mitigation and adaptation, although they continue to bear a disproportionate burden from the adverse impacts of climate change. Despite some progress having been made over recent years, the gender perspective needs further work to be fully integrated into the processes of formulating and implementing policies and actions on the ground, and it is in this view that this project pilots an approach to mainstream gender throughout peace and climate security interventions.

For example, women are more affected by climate related food insecurity and water problems and health impacts – food insecurity, scarcity of water and fuel due to climate change implies that women have to trek longer distances daily, which increases exposure to sexual violence, illness and injury. That said, women, young girls, children and elderly lack adaptive capacities for conflict and climate-related challenges. They navigate crises with fewer resources, greater care responsibilities, more

---

[16] *Ibid.*

vulnerability to SGBV and less influence over decision-making. For instance, many people, including young girls, as well as women have resorted to the sale of firewood and water which includes long travels. As is the case in many parts of the country, this can render both girls and boys and women vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and abuse, including both kidnapping, sexual and labour exploitation, compounding the marginalization and vulnerability that many pastoralist communities already face in places like Pibor and Malakal.

Opportunities and Sources of Resilience

In Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile, there is significant scope to move beyond 'do no harm' towards 'doing and collaborate with the growing number of peacebuilding partners, local and international, when it comes to humanitarian and development investments, which if coordinated, could serve as important peace dividends in sustaining the momentum towards peace that has already been created through multiple initiatives. For instance, **the Pieri Peace Process** in Greater Jonglei is an important peacebuilding entry point. The process was designed to bring communities embroiled in the fighting in 2020 together and followed a series of concurrent engagements with communities from Pibor (Murle), Akobo (Lou) and Bor (Bor Dinka). These engagements were designed to discuss what was needed to sustain peace and identify concrete steps to support the implementation of peace in Greater Jonglei. This peace process remains fragile, particularly in light of the climate-shocks that hamper access to resources including water and pasture and thus contribute to fueling conflict dynamics in the area. However, it presents a solid entry point for dialogue and community engagement efforts in the region.

In Upper Nile, it is crucial to seize the opportunity to build on the momentum created thus far by the **Peace Dialogues conducted by IOM South Sudan in October 2022 in the Malakal PoC site**, which brought together youth, women, elders, religious leaders, IDPs, CSOs, person with disabilities, and block leaders to identify root causes of recent hostilities and possible solutions to ongoing tensions. This project can take stock of one of the key lessons learned from these recent peace dialogues, which is to integrate discussion related to the effects of climate change on communal violence and cattle raiding related violence.

Furthermore, and in all project locations, natural resource management – including decision-making over access to land, water sources and other resources, resource-sharing and sustainable livelihood options – can provide women in particular with opportunities to develop and demonstrate leadership skills in conflict prevention and resolution. In situations where women are systematically excluded from meaningful participation and decision-making, natural resources can provide a "neutral" entry point for engaging in political dialogue and mediation of conflicts, as women typically derive legitimacy from their traditional resource-related roles that is not conferred to them on other issues. Nonetheless, UN Women integrates advocacy in programs to promote women as leaders and decision-makers and to shift perceptions that limit the participation of women, youth and vulnerable members of communities.

Finally, and in flood-affected areas in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile**,** opportunities for economic resilience exist, whereby flood-affected households can take advantage of receding flood water by increasing fish and vegetable production in receded areas after flooding. As the floods water recedes, livestock trade routes will re-open and therefore communities will have access to markets. However,

access to markets, health services and the establishment of trade relationships depends on the extent to which communities can co-exist peacefully without escalation of hostilities or conflict.

Stakeholder Analysis Matrix

Principal Stakeholder	Peacebuilding/Conflict Characteristics
Political elites & Organized forces	Political elites and organized forces May influence the links between access to land, administrative control and ethno-political power dynamics and tensions in their own interest[17].
Traditional/Customary authorities	Customary authorities traditionally play an important role in addressing conflict and governing raiding behavior, wielding significant power to initiate sanction and prevent raids. Chiefs, who are largely elder males, influence behavior in two main ways: 1) by acting as intermediaries between their communities and government officials; and 2) by presiding over customary courts, deciding how cattle will be redistributed in compensation claims and thereby pronouncing on the rights and wrongs of community behavior. Red chiefs are amongst the most important groups in GPAA and amongst the Murle. Their presence holds a historical significance as they incarnate customary institutions and are often seen as potential community champions. Their influence is often assumed and has been on the decline due to their cooptation into political structures. Yet, red chiefs remain important entry points and stakeholders for local governance and the remote nature of most parts of the GPAA means that red chiefs, as well as administrative chiefs and age-set leaders still hold considerable power, at least when compared to their statutory counterparts.
Government authorities	Local government authorities (county land authority and payam/boma land councils) at the county, Payam and boma levels charged with administration of land in some cases, dispute resolution
State governors	State governors are responsible for implementing state laws and overseeing the operation of the state executive branch which they are head of. As such, they advance and pursue new and revised policies and programs.
County commissioners	In addition to other responsibilities, county commissioners chair the county land authority. Therefore, they have power over how land is administered in the county.
Women and Women Unions	Women play a role in mobilizing locally for peace and intervening to prevent and reduce violence in the targeted locations. Women can also indirectly play a role in fueling conflict dynamics through cultural practices (e.g., war anthems) * GPAA has a relatively strong Women's Union who have participated in

---

[17] Numerous reports on the fighting in 2020 such as the UNMISS Human Rights Division (HRD) have detailed the involvement of the organized forces in the fighting that swept through the GPAA and surrounding parts of Jonglei State between early and mid-2020. Numerous political and military elites from Bor and other areas are said to have a hand in the fighting. This is also true for Murle elites. Even if the organized forces were involved along communal lines, their collusion in the fighting shows that the conflict in Jonglei State and the GPAA was not a mere artifact of "inter-communal" tensions alone.

	processes, such as the Pieri Peace Process and were able to leverage their roles as women, and in some ways outsiders/mediators, to push for peace amongst youth.
Youth and Youth Unions	The youth, particularly young men, are key players in the current conflict dynamics as they are easily mobilized by conflicting parties. Young men and girls can also be drivers for peace when they are united in Youth Unions to advocate for more inclusion in peace- and decision-making processes.
Displaced persons and returnees	IDPs who leave behind their land, housing, and properties, due to climate shocks and/or conflict, are amongst the most vulnerable groups in targeted areas. In particular IDPs living in the camp in Bor and the host community will be engaged to developed a peace and transition roadmap.
Persons with disabilities	During climate-related disasters and violent conflict, persons with disabilities are amongst the most vulnerable groups
Agricultural and pastoralist communities	In the absence of strong land administration and management structures, agricultural and pastoralist communities disadvantaged by ethnopolitical power dynamics and tensions are likely to lose access to land; or clash over land use. Pastoralist communities are also incredibly vulnerable and marginalized from service and resource access.

B. A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks[18],** how it ensures **national ownership**. If this project is designed in a PRF country, describe how the main objective advances a relevant strategic objective identified through the Eligibility Process

Project Alignment

This project comes in alignment with the momentum created by COP 27 in Sharm El Sheikh which placed climate security as a key priority area for countries such as South Sudan given the evident interplay of climate and security risks. In light of this, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) governance cluster has discussed climate security in recent meetings, under the auspices of the First Vice President, and recommended the prioritization of climate security as a key element to be integrated in South Sudan's national peacebuilding agenda. This recommendation has been taken onboard by the Ministry of Peacebuilding, who seeks to include climate security as a key outcome in the ministry's Peacebuilding Strategic Framework. In this view, the overall objective of this project, which is seen as a pilot demonstration project for climate security for the Government of South Sudan, comes in alignment with the government's efforts to integrate climate security in its peacebuilding endeavors.

Further, the project is also aligned with the draft GPAA Community Development Plan, which focuses highly on youth and women empowerment in GPAA. In terms of resource management, climate adaptation and mitigation, Outcome I and II of this project is aligned with a number of national endeavors such as South Sudan's National Environment Policy (2015-2025) which seeks to ensure the

---

[18] Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc.

protection, conservation and sustainable use of the natural resources of South Sudan. Similarly, Outcome I and II of this project is in alignment with South Sudan National Adaptation Programme of Actions (NAPA) which specifies five priority activities for effective climate change adaptation and emphasizes the importance of managing issues related to resource management, particularly water resources, as well as the country's limited technical and institutional capacity to understand and predict climate change.

In terms of alignment with more global UN frameworks, this project's overall goal is aligned with IOM's Migration, Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Institutional Strategy(2021-2030), and particularly its second priority area of engagement, which seeks to reinforce IOM operational role as an operational actor, who can support States and other players to operationalize responses to migration and displacement in the context of environmental degradation, climate change and disasters, across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN). The project design and implementation strategy are aligned with the UNSDG's Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilient Societies[19]

Finally, the project is in line with the United Nations Cooperation Framework (UNCF) 2019-2022.[20] In January 2023 the new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework will be launched, and the project will contribute to its strategic objective: Women and youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development. which aims to empower national partners and communities, in particular women, youth and other vulnerable groups, to be more resilient and better placed to withstand complex impacts of ongoing protracted crises. Finally, the project seeks to contribute to advancing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development particularly SDGs (5), (13) and (16).

---

[19] United Nations (2020), United Nations Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilient Societies, New York (UN)

[20] A new UNSDC is being developed that will cover 2023 and onwards.

C) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief summary of existing interventions in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
Community Violence Reduction Project (WFP, UNMISS, RoLAS, WHO, VSF-G, NP and UNMISS CAD and PAD)	RSRTF $12,496,239	Peacebuilding and violence reduction in Greater Bor, GPAA, Akobo	These projects have achieved significant success in engaging youth and women in the three locations. However, significant gaps in youth engagement and peacebuilding directed at addressing 'internal' Murle age-set dynamics remain. Youth engagement remains essential to the success of other interventions, including early recovery and the management of 'external' conflicts with other communities in Jonglei State and its bordering communities. IOM used enrollment of women and youth in functional adult literacy courses as an entry point for peacebuilding, and trust building across the communities.
Community Security for the Most Vulnerable (UNDP and UNPOL)			
Access to Quality Learning through Secondary School Education and Functional Adult Literacy (UNICEF and IOM)			
Ending Cycles of Violence though Prevention of Abduction of Women and Children (OHCHR, UNHCR, CEPO and SCI)			
IOM South Sudan Bor Flood Risk Mitigation Project (BFMP)	Netherlands - Ministry for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation $11,000,000	Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)	This project is building the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to develop warning systems and climate resilient infrastructure to reduce the impacts of flood-related risks. These efforts can be complemented by the peacebuilding and resilience-building activities envisaged by this proposal in Bor, to promote collaborative management of climate resilient infrastructure and prevent the escalation of violence that could contribute to the poor operations/management/maintenance of infrastructure.

Enhancing Community Resilience and Local Governance Project (ECRP II)	World Bank $109,400,000	Community Stabilization	The overall project objective is to improve access to services, reduce flood risks, and enhance institutional capacity for local service delivery and integrated disaster risk management at the national, subnational and local levels in various location including GPAA. This is done through (1) infrastructure development (2) institutional strengthening. These endeavours can be completed by the activities envisaged by this proposal as it will seek to engage Murle age-sets in peacebuilding processes that could contribute to reducing current conflict dynamics and preventing their future escalation. This is critical to creating a peaceful environment in GPAA where community assets are preserved and can create opportunities for joint resource management.
FAO- Emergency Locust Response Project (ELRP)	World Bank $50,700,000	Emergency Response in Pibor Country	The project aimed to provide emergency direct income support in the form of conditional cash transfers to 900 poor and vulnerable locust affected households in Pibor County. The project supporting livestock vaccination and treatment however, the resources are not enough to cover all the livestock. Therefore, the envisaged activities under this proposal will cover the gaps in term of additional vaccines. The project targets 1000 beneficiaries (600 male and 400 female) for the fisheries activities. 1- Net making 2- Trainings on improved Fish preservation through smoking, sun drying 3- Training on boat building and repairs
FAO- Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security in the Horn of Africa: South Sudan component	African Development Bank $26,912,603	Resilience and Food security	The objective of the Program is to build resilience to food and nutrition insecurity and climate change by enabling participating countries to (i) increase the agropastoral production and productivity, (ii) increase incomes from agropastoral value chains and (iii) enhance the adaptive capacity of the

			populations to better prepare for and manage climate change risks and variation.
			Beside distribution of nets and hooks, the project can assist fishers in training on boat building so that they are able to access distant areas where fishing is abundant. Training also on improved FTT oven for smoking as well as improved drying racks. This new technology practice is meant to bring in the hygiene aspects that will reduce post-harvest loss in the sector

II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)

a) A brief **description of the project** focus and approach – describe the project's overarching goal, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- responsive).

The overall objective of the project is to advance peace and stability in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile by reducing the negative impact of climate shocks on existing conflict dynamics as well as gender and age-based discrimination. Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile are particularly vulnerable and fragile areas with active conflict erupting seasonally and due to various disputes arising over access to land and water resources. The impact of climate shocks on people's livelihoods is significant and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, conflict dynamics, instability, gender and age-based discrimination, poverty and governance challenges. This can also contribute to the rise of new tensions, often triggered by competition over scarce resources, thus creating a self-reinforcing cycle between climate shocks and insecurity (*See Figure 1*). In this view, this project is designed to bolster community resilience in these areas to ensure that build a set of distinct capacities and resources to cope with, withstand or bounce back from the confluence of conflict and climate-related shocks.

Figure 1. Effect of Climate Change on Vulnerabilities and Insecurity[21]

According to the *UN's Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilient Societies*, 'systems, institutions and people are considered resilient when they have at their disposal a set of distinct capacities and resources that are crucial to cope with, withstand or bounce back from adverse events and shocks'. In light of this, this project seeks to bolster three 'resilience capacities' in the targeted areas. Firstly,

---

[21] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Climate Change and Risk Programme (2022)

building communities' ***absorptive capacities*** means that communities can take protective action to anticipate, plan and recover from shocks such as climate shocks. Secondly building communities' ***adaptive capacities*** entails that communities will be able to make 'incremental adjustments, modifications or changes to adapt to stressors and shocks without major qualitative changes in lifestyle or identity. Thirdly, building communities ***transformative capacities*** means that communities can go a step beyond their anticipatory/absorptive and adaptive and create sustainable structures that systematically respond to stressors and shocks.

Implementation Strategy

This project seeks to advance the three resilience capacities in Bor, Pibor and Malakal through integrated and jointly implemented interventions between IOM, FAO, and UN Women, involving stakeholders on multiple levels (i.e., individual, household, community, local, city, subnational, institutional, and national).

Under **Outcome (1)**, the project seeks to enhance communities' **absorptive capacity** by supporting local peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and natural resource management through engaging with local actors, including women, youth and CSO's. These efforts will contribute to addressing root causes of conflict dynamics and will pave the way for the implementation of climate-informed peacebuilding. This will allow for the identification of community-driven solutions that could address the exacerbating role of climate shocks on existing conflict dynamics and explore avenues for their inclusion in the peace process. A tangible result of this outcome would be the development of community-driven Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans, which will be developed by communities during the envisaged dialogues and trainings under this outcome. Developing Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans seek to empower local communities by allowing them to articulate their own peacebuilding priorities and areas of need as they are the best placed to identify them and the actions necessary to meet them. Additionally, taking charge of these processes contributes to a sense of community ownership, which can contribute to the sustainability of interventions.

Lessons learned from decades of peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan have shown that community engagement through traditional peacebuilding mechanisms are highly effective at conflict prevention, mitigation and management. Experience also shows that communities often convene to discuss a number of issues of concern including known conflict triggers. There is an observed gap in capacities to follow up and especially monitor implementation of agreed resolutions from joint conferences and dialogues, which leave communities vulnerable to shocks and uncertainties they may face as time progresses. The risk of conflict being triggered increases exponentially as pressures on natural resources such as water and land increase during the dry season. The project design therefore addresses this gap institutionally and operationally to demonstrate that peace agreements can result in peacebuilding and sustaining peace at the community levels. The project therefore actively engages lines ministries including the Ministry of Peacebuilding at the local and national level for monitoring of implementation and support to operational implementation of actions under the peacebuilding roadmaps. The Ministry of Peacebuilding is expected to play an active role in dissemination and monitoring the Peacebuilding Roadmaps.

Under this outcome, there is significant build on the momentum created by the *Pieri Peace Process* in Greater Jonglei is an important peacebuilding entry point as it remains fragile, particularly in light of the climate-shocks that hamper access to resources including water and pasture and thus contribute to fueling conflict dynamics in the area. However, and as previously mentioned, it presents an important entry point for dialogue and community engagement efforts in the region. In Upper Nile, this outcome will build on the momentum created thus far by the **Peace Dialogues conducted by IOM South Sudan in October 2022 in the Malakal PoC site**, which brought together youth, women, elders, religious leaders, IDPs, CSOs, person with disabilities, and block leaders to identify root causes of recent hostilities and possible solutions to ongoing tensions. This outcome will also take stock of one of the key lessons learned from these recent peace dialogues, which is to integrate discussion related to the effects of climate change on communal violence and cattle raiding related violence.

Under **Outcome (2)**, the project seeks to enhance communities' **adaptive capacity** and preparedness, particularly women and youth who are disproportionally affected by climate shocks and conflict, through activities that promote diverse and adaptable livelihood strategies, improve human capital (e.g., agriculture production and fishing skills), support smallholder market linkages and promote gender empowerment. In flood-affected areas in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile**,** opportunities for economic resilience exist, whereby flood-affected households can take advantage of receding flood water by increasing fish and vegetable production in receded areas after flooding. As the floods water recedes, livestock trade routes will re-open and therefore communities will have access to markets. However, access to markets, health services and the establishment of trade relationships depends on the extent to which communities are able to co-exist peacefully and on whether the objectives of Outcome 1 are achieved.

Under **Outcome (3)**, the project seeks to enhance communities' **transformative capacity** through activities that strengthen community structures (e.g., customary institutions) and promote local capacities in gender responsive and climate-informed dispute resolutions. Building on opportunities created by successful stakeholder driven processes for reviewing customary and traditional dispute resolution in other areas in South Sudan, communities targeted in this project will be supported to ascertain, review and operationalize customary practices. Success stories from IOM South Sudan's operations in Terekeka County, for instance, showed that the youth were able to jointly decide to review their customary practices, limiting dowry to 12 cattle only and thereby reducing the pressure for cattle rustling and violent cattle raiding from neighboring communities.

More generally, this project seeks to apply a **climate-informed peacebuilding approach** exploring how climate adaptation measures can be mainstreamed into peacebuilding processes. In doing so, these climate-informed peacebuilding processes incentivize collaboration between conflict parties for a common purpose to overcome the impacts of climate change, using climate-related challenges as confidence-building measures and entry points for technical cooperation. The approach creates pathways for dialogue between conflict parties.[22] More generally, the application of this approach in contexts such as South Sudan will 'catalyze' and complement existing peacebuilding efforts by aiming

---

[22] United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affair (2022), The Implications of Climate Change for Mediation and Peace Processes (Practice Note)

for a deeper level of change and more effective peacebuilding through the adoption of a climate security lens.

To ensure that this approach is effectively implemented, the project will engage **technical experts** who support the implementation of climate-informed dialogues and the design of climate-informed peacebuilding strategies. This can also include engagement with local environmental defenders (including women, youth and indigenous environmental and human rights defenders) who will leverage local capacities for climate related challenges.

The interaction between climate change and security risks is a complex one that requires a scale-up in research and analysis endeavors that look at the linkages and interconnections between these twin challenges. That being said, the generation of knowledge products in parallel with the implementation of climate security focused programs is essential as it can (1) examine and detail the nature of the interaction between these climate change and insecurity; (2) examine the impact of climate change on peacebuilding efforts in fragile and conflict-affected settings; (3) inform future programming in similar areas where climate and security risks collide; (4) serve as a knowledge base for policy actors and national government authorities to inform national level strategy and policymaking. For these reasons, an essential objective envisaged under this project is to maintain an analytic and reflexive effort throughout the implementation process whereby findings and progress made by the project activities contribute to bridging **knowledge and data gaps** through specific knowledge products on how climate security and climate-displacement-peace nexus plays out in South Sudan. These knowledge products seek to inform a broader discussion around effects of climate change and conflict for policy formulation and decision making as follow up actions to COP 27 in Egypt as well as ongoing national processes on climate security.

b) Provide a **project-level** '**theory of change'** – explain the assumptions about why you expect the project interventions to lead to changes in the conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis. What are the assumptions that the theory is based on? Note, this is not a summary statement of your project's outcomes.

The overall objective of the project is to advance peace and stability in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile by reducing the negative effect of climate shocks on existing conflict dynamics as well as gender and age-based discrimination. The project's theory of change is based on the notion that structural conflict factors are long-term variables that have an impact on social demographics and on inter-group relations. Acute risks, such as floods, are immediate shocks that have a multiplier effect on these structural factors and have a negative impact on the communities by increasing their vulnerability to risks and further exacerbating conflict dynamics. Over an extended period, this can decrease an individual's resilience and ability to 'bounce back'. In this view, communities need to acquire a set of distinct capacities and resources in order to cope with, withstand or bounce back from the confluence of conflict and climate-related risks. Embedded in the 'Seen through UN's resilience programming lens'[23], this project's theory of change posits that:

---

[23] United Nations (2020), United Nations Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilient Societies, New York (UN)

→ **IF** the absorptive capacity of communities in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile is strengthened through engagement in constructive climate-informed and gender-sensitive peace processes. (Outcome 1) and;

→ **IF** the adaptive capacity of communities in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile is improved through initiatives that promote diverse and adaptable gender-sensitive livelihood strategies (Outcome 2) and;

→ **IF** the transformative capacity of communities in Greater Jonglei and Upper Nile is enhanced through the establishment of sustainable gender responsive and climate-informed dispute resolutions (Outcome 3)

→ **THEN** the exacerbating effect of climate-shocks on existing conflict dynamics will be reduced

→ **BECAUSE** (1) communities will be able given the opportunity to resolve past-grievances and dialogue openly, potentially achieving common cooperation methods aimed at absorbing the effects of climate shocks; (2) communities will be able to make incremental adjustments to their lifestyle to moderate the effects of climate-shocks and continue functioning without major loss of livelihoods; (3) communities will be able to access resilient and sustainable customary institutions that outline gender sensitive and climate-sensitive dispute resolution mechanisms.

(Note: Change may happen through various and diverse approaches, i.e. social cohesion may be fostered through dialogue or employment opportunities or joint management of infrastructure. The selection of which approach should depend on context-specific factors. What basic assumptions about how change will occur have driven your choice of programming approach?)

Theory of change assumptions

Assumption	Supporting Evidence
Climate-informed peacebuilding processes can reduce the amplifying effects of climate shocks on existing conflict dynamics	1. IOM South Sudan community peace engagements **in Unity State:** Previous IOM peacebuilding engagements in February-May 2021 have led to violence reduction when floods occurred in Unity State in August 2021. Initially, communities in Guit County could not graze in one place with communities from Rubkona County. However, the peace engagements conducted before the occurrence of the floods, assessments showed that these neighboring communities were able to graze their animals together. IOM reports also show that dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives before the rainy season could have reduced the likelihood of the recent conflict that took place in February 2022 between displaced communities due to floods from Rubkona and host communities in Ruweng Administrative Area.
	2. In **Somalia**, the recurrent flooding and droughts have been exacerbating conflict dynamics and political instability for the past 10 years. Actors in Somalia are calling for the need to transition from responses that focus on rapid-onset disaster mitigation to long-term cross-sectoral planning which will incentivize the operationalization of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus (HDPN). In addition, research

Assumption	Supporting Evidence
	efforts in Somalia indicate that a climate-informed peacebuilding approach can contribute to reducing insecurity in the country by addressing *-inter alia-* armed groups recruitment, which is a phenomenon that is currently being exacerbated by climate change in Somalia.[24]
Climate adaptation strategies can enhance livelihoods and also create entry points for inter-community collaboration and trust-building between conflict parties	1. In **Kapoeta, South Sudan**, FAO constructed solar powered boreholes and haffir/water reservoirs infrastructures that are managed by the committees selected by the communities. 2. Common development of water infrastructure was used in the **Kenya-Somalia** context to build inter-community confidence. Cooperative management of water resources was in these cases used as a confidence-building measure to increase trust and humanize conflict parties and show that they can work together. Water-related confidence-building measures usually occur in the context of a larger peace process in which water plays a non-decisive role, often fairly early on in a peace process. CBMs are used in about 80% of all peace processes.[25]
Strengthening customary institutions and establishing climate-informed and gender sensitive dispute resolution mechanisms will prevent the amplifying effects of climate shocks on conflict dynamics in the long-term	1. IOM South Sudan has been rolling out customary law review program since 2021 and has gathered significant experience and lessons learned from the benefit of reviewing customary laws and aligning these to international norms and standards and the national constitution. During the flooding in **Warrap, Northern Bahr-El Ghazal** and **Abyei area** several communities were forcibly displaced into new locations without customary regulations on management of cattle and communities in the areas. The peace dialogue was governed by rules of compensation based on recently reviewed customary laws and provided the communities with a point of departure for negotiations. When proposals contradicted the reviewed customary laws, the communities were able to refer back to foundation and amicably reject and propose new solutions that aligned to the adopted customary laws. 2. In the **Pacific (Republic of Vanuatu)**, traditional customary law helped solve a variety of climate change-related problems in the Pacific, including sea level rise, loss of culture, decline in biodiversity, and loss of arable land. This shows that if climate concerns are integrated into customary law, the later can assist with developing future pathways concerning the security of humans and ecosystems in the region, using customary law as a tool to aid the process of re-establishing the vital human-nature relationship and strengthen ties between members in a community.

[24] Broek, Emilie & Hodder, Christophe. (2022). Towards an Integrated Approach to Climate Security and Peacebuilding in Somalia. *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*

[25] Simon J. A. Mason and Dorothea Blank (2013) Mediating Water Use Conflicts in Peace Processes

c) **Provide a narrative description of key project components** (outcomes and outputs), ensuring sufficient attention to gender, age and other key differences that should influence the project approach. In describing the project elements, be sure to indicate important considerations related to sequencing of activities.

The proposed project has three outcomes, each of which is expected to be realized through several inter-linked and mutually re-enforcing outputs which in turn are results of activities proposed below. Activity implementation will be preceded by a short **inception phase** of four months. The inception phase will synthesize existing materials, refine the project approach, engage in contractual arrangements with implementing partners, develop procurement plans and revise workplans. Depending on the start date of the project, the inception phase will include, for example, advice on how to target stakeholders and how to ensure a subset of stakeholders participate throughout the project. The rationale being that a few influential and capacitated stakeholders would be strong advocates for change and provide opportunity to utilize the training in ongoing peace dialogues, negotiations advocacy and planning processes, but that intense project engagement may present itself as a burden to some participants.

Outcome 1: Climate informed, gender-age sensitive peace processes effectively resolve or prevent the escalation of disputes, including disputes due to competition over natural resources.
This Outcome seeks to bolster the *absorptive capacities* of communities in Bor/Pibor and Malakal by supporting local peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and natural resource management through strengthened inclusive dialogue and reconciliation platforms. The outcome includes the following outputs and activities.

Output: 1.1. Enhanced local capacities for conflict mitigation and natural resource management for targeted groups including women and youth groups

o *Activity 1.1.1. Validate and contextualize peacebuilding training manual, with support of UN Women gender advisor, through national level consultations and community engagements (UN Women and IOM)*

Under this activity, a climate-informed, trauma-informed and gender/age sensitive peacebuilding training manual will be developed with support of a gender advisor from UN Women. Prior the validation of this manual, national-level consultations with the Ministry of Peacebuilding will take place in order to ensure that the manual reflects key national priority areas and aligns with national peacebuilding agendas and existing training and/or educational materials. Following the endorsement of the Ministry of Peacebuilding, this peacebuilding training manual will be further contextualized and refined through the input of community partners. It will cover the fundamentals of dialogue facilitation, conflict analysis, risk mitigation and healing-centered engagement. The training manual will strike a balance between general climate, gender, and age conflict dynamics as experienced throughout the country, with opportunities for the sharing of participants' specific communal and personal experiences. This training manual will also build on IOM, UN Women and FAO's materials from previous peacebuilding and livelihood interventions, integrating climate concerns (e.g., impact of climate shocks on violence), women and youth's leadership opportunities in addressing climate concerns and their role in the management of natural resources, and emergency preparedness.

Activity 1.1.2: Trainings on Peacebuilding Training Manual for community representatives in Bor, Pibor and Malakal (UN Women)

After the validation and contextualization of IOM and UN Women's training manuals, trainings conducted in Bor, Pibor and Malakal will bring together community representatives, including women and young women and male representatives across fault lines in the project locations. Representatives will be trained in the peace training manual developed under Activity 1.1.1, with the aim of equipping participants, particularly women and youth, with the fundamental skills for leading and engaging in peace- and decision-making processes. Trainers will travel to towns and villages to conduct the course. UN Women will work with local leaders to ensure that women, youth and vulnerable members of the community are well represented, and that the enrollment processes are fair.

- o *Activity 1.1.3: Facilitate joint/inter-community and inter-generational climate-informed dialogues designed to address conflict factors and areas of priority as determined by participants (UN Women and IOM)*

Building on the outcomes of Activity 1.1.2, IOM and UN Women will facilitate dialogues for community representatives in Bor, Pibor and Malakal. This will include women, youth, age-sets who participated in the training under Activity 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, as well as representatives from farmer/pastoralist communities and religious leaders. These dialogues seek to allow participants to engage openly and discuss past-grievances-through trauma-aware facilitation- and possible pathways for reconciliation. Building on the momentum created by the Pieri Peace Process, these dialogues series will be an entry point for parties to (1) include climate-related issues in their negotiations; (2) to create opportunities for trust-building, cooperation and building collective resilience and social cohesion; (3) help shift the communities' focus from zero-sum thinking to the benefits of collective natural resource management, utilizing FAO's training toolkit on land tenure, natural resource governance and land mediation. These dialogues also aim to grow the influence of women, youth and vulnerable members including people with disabilities and enhance their preparedness vis-a-vis climate-related matters. For this reason, the sequence of this output will ensure that women and youth, along with vulnerable community members, are able to set the agenda and areas of priority for dialogue. Participants that have been trained using the peacebuilding training manual will be given the opportunity to facilitate dialogues and when possible, co-facilitate with the community leaders and elders. The process for the dialogues and the content will largely be determined by the participants thus the details will emerge at the time of the intervention.

The progress achieved under Output 1.1 will be used to build the foundations of the activities planned under output 1.2.

Output: 1.2. Climate-informed, gender/age sensitive peace and security concerns are articulated in Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions Plans

- o *Activity 1.2.1. Facilitate community-led workshops to develop Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans according to community prioritization (UN Women, FAO and IOM)*

The dialogues series implemented in Output 1.1 will determine the key priority areas for communities in Bor, Pibor and Malakal. This will be translated into the development of climate-informed Peacebuilding Roadmaps in each area and Action Plans. The implementation of the Action Plans will be conducted jointly between IOM, FAO and UN Women, as well as relevant national and local partners such as CEPO. The Action Plans will be community driven and owned and will not be predetermined however they will emerge from experiences with the project dialogues, and trainings. Community priorities for the Action Plans will be informed by the needs as they arise during the particular time and place. This allows an opportunity for participants to operationalize the tools acquired through the trainings.

- *Activity 1.2.2: Joint advocacy and awareness actions on climate, environment and peace (UN Women and IOM)*

Complementing this output, this activity aims to raise the awareness of communities in Bor, Pibor and Malakal, particularly the youth, on climate-related risks and possible pathways for mitigating the risks posed by climate change on the environment, with a particular focus on women and youth as an audience. Indeed, the increasing impact of climate change is not widely understood, whereas incidents such as flooding have been argued to be caused by rivals seeking to displace populations.[26] This activity will therefore aim to reduce misconceptions around this phenomenon, teach vulnerable communities, especially women and young women and men, on possible pathways to enhance their resilience in the face of climate risks. This activity will complement the climate change and environmental awareness initiative headed by the Ministry of the Environment. UN Women Gender Advisor will help coordinate the local and national awareness initiatives.

- *Activity 1.2.3: Community presentations of roadmaps for each of the three communities and any joint actions to the Ministry of Peacebuilding, Ministry of Gender and other relevant line ministries for coordination support at the local and national levels. Sustainability of plans will be assessed by communities and partners (UN Women and IOM).*

To ensure local ownership and sustainability the project will support participants of the trainings and dialogues to (ideally) jointly present dialogue resolutions to relevant line ministries at the state level and especially the Ministry of Peacebuilding. The Ministry of Peacebuilding's mandate is to monitor peace agreements, to which dissemination and presentation will help operationalize this mandate in a practical way. The activity needs to be refined, though it is anticipated that a number of community representatives travel to the state capital and possibly to Juba for a workshop, presenting the peacebuilding roadmaps, the process of developing the roadmap and any resolutions that have emerged.

Output 1.3. Lessons learned and synthesis of climate-informed peacebuilding approach

Finally, taking stock of the results achieved under Output 1.1 and Output 1.2, Output 1.3. serves as a consolidation exercise where lessons learned from activities implemented are documented, synthesized and analyzed, serving as a feedback tool for targeted communities and other relevant stakeholders.

- *Activity 1.3.1: Develop synthesis report on lessons learned on 1) community driven and climate-informed peacebuilding and 2) linking local level initiatives to national level processes on conflict, environment, and climate change (IOM)*

Development of knowledge products envisaged under this activity will serve as a basis for analysis including synthesizing a collective understanding of any dynamics observed during community driven and climate-informed peacebuilding processes are documented and reflected upon. As previously outlined, knowledge products can contribute to local and national level understandings of the complex linkages between conflict dynamics and climate-related challenges in project locations.

In this view, this report will not only analyze the impact of activities but will also extract the lessons learned and recommendations other local initiatives on climate security and inform national processes and ongoing policy dialogue on climate change and climate security. Indeed, while communities in Jonglei, GPAA and Upper Nile are mainly affected by climate-related challenges such as flooding, it is essential that this report informs stakeholder in other locations where other forms of climate risks

---

[26] Consultation with UN Women project participants on Bentiu, Unity State, October 2022.

(e.g., drought, wildfires) are affecting vulnerable communities in other areas within South Sudan. By extracting and synthesizing the lessons learned from the activities implemented under this project into actionable frameworks and tools, this report can guide, and more importantly advocate for, upcoming climate security programming in other locations made vulnerable due to climate risks as a reference point outlining the approach that was implemented in this project's locations and its strengths and weaknesses.

- *Activity 1.3.2: Community-led dissemination of lessons learned and synthesis of climate informed peacebuilding approach to sustain peace in South Sudan (UN Women, FAO, IOM)*

In coordination with IOM, FAO and UN Women, a selected number of young women and young men who participated in the peace process under Output 1.1 and Output 1.2 will be designated as "Youth Peace Ambassadors" and will map areas in South Sudan, outside target locations, where the dissemination of lessons learned from the implemented climate-informed peacebuilding efforts would help raise awareness on the interlinkages between climate related risks (e.g., floods, drought etc.) and insecurity and the importance of dialogue in creating opportunities to cooperate in the face of these security risks. This process prepares these young Peace Ambassadors to become future agents of change who will utilize their gained awareness and understanding of the climate change and peacebuilding to advocate and promote for security as entry points for trust-building and cooperation on a common purpose across areas affected by climate change in South Sudan. This will be done through radio messages and social media advocacy and information dissemination.

Under **Outcome 2: Resilience against negative effects of climate change and related disputes is increased through operationalization of Community Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans,** and building on the progress achieved under Outcome 1, this outcome seeks to bolster the *adaptive capacities* of communities in Bor/Pibor and Malakal by implementing Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans. More specifically, this outcome is designed to build communities' social and technical skills in certain areas in order to support a more resilient response to environmental shocks.

Output 2.1. Inter-communal peace dividends are promoted through the implementation and operationalization of prioritized actions in Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans

Under Outcome 1, the planned peace processes and dialogues series are designed in a way to allow communities to determine the key priority areas for communities in Bor, Pibor and Malakal. This is planned to be translated into the development of climate-informed Peacebuilding Roadmaps in each area and Action Plans. Building on the deliverables of Outcome One, this output will support community driven implementation of the Action Plans with joint support from IOM, FAO and UN Women, as well as relevant national and local partners such as CEPO. While the Action Plans will be community-driven and community-owned in accordance with the needs as they arise during the time and place, this output also includes activities that builds on lessons learned from past community-led peacebuilding processes and projects. In other words, this output anticipates that Roadmaps and Action plans will benefit from including livelihood and skill-building activities such climate-resilient income generating solutions (fish and vegetables production) and education on Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA).

- *Activity 2.1.1: Conduct mapping of natural resources and hotspots of climate and conflict threats (FAO/IOM)*

During the inception phase, a desk review will inform the finalisation of this activity to avoid duplication with existing mechanisms and programmes. Tentatively FAO will use any existing mapping or conduct a new mapping of natural resources, threats to livelihoods, climate risks, population movement patterns, transhumance cattle migration routes and identify conflict

axes/hotspots. Information will be used to further inform programming including conflict sensitivity. Existing mapping efforts implemented by IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) will also feed into the envisaged mapping. Since the target locations are those highly impacted by flood and cattle-related conflict, particularly during the latest four years, this activity will also contribute to raising the awareness of exposed communities to the compounding effects of climate shocks and conflict through effective early warning strategies in pilot areas, targeting communities in Pibor and Malakal. Dissemination of messages highlighting key issues related to climate change and agricultural production during radio programmes or other mass communication means will also be considered. FAO will tentatively also procure 500 solar-powered radios to facilitate beneficiary access to radio programmes. Finally, local community members, including women and youth, will be trained in early warning messaging and communication in alignment with existing programming

- *Activity 2.1.2: Provide training on Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) for conflict and climate threats for youth representatives (IOM/FAO)*

Sudden and slow-onset weather events have a direct impact on both women and youth; including loss of means of subsistence due to climate-induced migration or displacement, conflict and lack of access to livelihoods. This activity aims to enhance knowledge on EWEA mechanisms among the youth by providing EWEA trainings for climate shocks and conflict, targeting youth representatives in Bor, Pibor and Malakal. In Bor and Pibor in particular, this activity also aims to utilise and build on the existing Early Warning Systems and Disaster Risk Reduction Committees (DRRC) already created under IOM South Sudan's Bor Flood Risk Mitigation Project (BFMP) and Enhancing Community Resilience and Local Governance Project (ECRP II) to ensure the envisaged deliverables of this activity complement and strengthen existing efforts. These trainings can provide an opportunity to unite young men and girls through education on EWEA to help establish a common purpose for collaboration among young people, allowing for education on EW to serve as tangible peace dividends to sustain peace in target locations.

- *Activity 2.1.3: Climate-resilient crop seeds will be distributed, and communities will be trained in Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) practices (FAO)*

FAO will distribute crop kits to 1000 households (of which 60% will be women) in year 1 and 2 of the project to support crop production during the main season. The climate-sensitive crop seeds/varieties will be composed of 3 types of crop seeds and 1-2 hand tools. The selected crop varieties will be those that are adaptable to the different agro-ecologies and farming practice, are fast maturing, and tolerant to drought or flood (climate sensitive), high yielding and to meet the taste and preference of the end users. FAO will ensure that all inputs provided are of high quality, kit sizes are reasonable, and that inputs are provided timely to the target beneficiaries to minimize negative consequence of climate variabilities and ensure sufficient harvests. In addition, FAO will ensure that distributions are done in locations which are accessible to beneficiaries.

Communities participating in activities under Outcome 1, particularly women and youth participants, will be trained on Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) including Conservation Agriculture (CA) to strengthen their knowledge and good agriculture practices (GAP), integrated soils and water management practices, and integrated pest management (IPM) practices. with the objective of building resilience and adaptive capacities to climate-related challenges.

- *Activity 2.1.4: Fishing activities and vegetable farming will be supported through the receding waters during the dry season and in flood prone or low-lying areas (FAO)*

During flooding, fish move to newly inundated areas attracted by the increased amount of food, creating significant potential for fish harvest. Thus, flooding provides an opportunity to intensify fish

and vegetable production in receded areas with the aim of compensating for crop and livestock losses. The activity will support fish production and vegetable farming through recession agriculture during the dry season. Flood prone or low laying areas will be modified into ponds which will serve as a trap where water and fish are retained when the water recedes. During the dry season, the water will be used for irrigation to cultivate vegetables in nearby gardens and as livestock drinking points and - at the end - fish can be harvested for food or market. The ponds will also be fertilized using manure to enhance fish productivity.

To enable flood-affected households to take advantage of receding flood water, FAO will train 60 Trainers of Trainers (ToT), who will in turn train 600 individuals in modification of flood-prone low-lying areas into fishponds, pond management and how to farm fish/vegetable from the ponds. FAO will provide vegetable kits to 1500 households each year for dry season vegetable production. The vegetable kits will comprise of 3-5 types of fast-maturing and nutrient-rich vegetable seeds, 1-2 hand tools and training on vegetable production. In addition to vegetable kits, FAO will ensure 1000 flood affected households and those with access to water bodies are provided with fishing kits to enable access to fish resources to improve fish catch.

In addition, FAO will establish business-oriented fish net making groups with the aim of diversifying income streams. The groups will be trained in net making and provided with fishing twines on a revolving credit basis as start-up capital for their business. The fishing kits will enable beneficiaries to access fish-based food immediately, while vegetables will be available for consumption after one month. Both fish and vegetable kits will increase intake of nutrient-rich food groups and enhance income. Participants will also be trained on modern fish preservation method known as FTT ovens to prolong the quality of the smoked fish product. Introducing these improved post-harvest technologies with fishermen communities will ensure better utilization of the harvest and longer lasting improvement of the community livelihood and have no environmental and social impact to fishermen communities. According to FSNMS round 28 the following data was reported in Pibor in the fisheries sector: 32% reported no fishing equipment distributed to them; 22% of all inputs were provided by NGOS; 2.3% of the respondence made their own gears. This unequal distribution not only leads to unequal livelihood levels and livelihood support but can also lead to tension between communities. Therefore, the equal distribution of fishing kits will contribute to preventing of escalation of conflict due to limited access to resources, by enabling beneficiaries to access fish-based food immediately, while vegetables will be available for consumption after one month. Both fish and vegetable kits will increase intake of nutrient-rich food groups and enhance income. FAO will complement these fishing activities with trainings on appropriate fish harvest, processing and post-harvest handling.

- *Activity 2.1.5: Provision of animal health services to prevent the spread of livestock diseases during cattle migration in Bor, Pibor and Malakal (FAO)*

Since 2019, there has been an increase in the frequency and severity of floods resulting in huge losses of animals due to disease outbreaks and starvation as pastures were flooded. Flooding predisposes animals to worm infestation and several infectious diseases. Therefore, under this activity 80,000 animals owned by both migrating and host communities annually will be vaccinated, treated, and dewormed. Often migrating livestock owning communities are accused of spreading animal diseases due to unregulated movement resulting from conflict. To facilitate animal vaccination campaigns a functional cold chain system is important. The project will contribute towards strengthening of the vaccine cold chain network in Bor, Pibor and Malakal through procurement of three (3) solar fridges. FAO and partners work with and train 0 youth (both female and male youth) as Community based

Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) to deliver animal health services. Veterinary vaccines, drugs and supplies will be procured for CAHWs to enable them to facilitate and respond to disease outbreaks emerging diseases of zoonotic importance. Veterinary laboratory diagnostic services are only available in Juba at the Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory - the only such facility in the country. Laboratory diagnosis and confirmation of disease outbreaks and the causative agents is important for an evidence-based response. Therefore, the project will procure laboratory test kits to facilitate the diagnosis of priority diseases including zoonosis such as Rift Valley Fever, anthrax and brucellosis. Three (3) animal disease surveillance missions will also be conducted. Movement of livestock causes the spread of diseases which results in conflict. Livestock vaccination therefore provides an entry point to conflict mitigation. Given that livestock disease contributes to creating disharmony and tensions among pastoralists, the availability of Veterinary Laboratory diagnostic services will enable CAHWs to quickly identify new and emerging livestock diseases of public health importance. The CAHWs will therefore provide feedback to the households on possible protection measures and will quickly report any suspicion. This can contribute to peaceful coexistence among livestock keepers as disease outbreaks create mistrust and 'pointing of fingers' and if not addressed in time can lead to conflict escalation.

The activities *2.1.6: Provision of materials and equipment to implement prioritized actions as determined in the Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans (IOM/UNW)* and *2.1.7: Provision of FAL course, livelihoods training or cash for work grants as determined in the Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans (IOM/UNW)* will be informed by the peacebuilding roadmaps and are likely to include material and equipment support as well as initiatives that promote social cohesion and joint activity across fault lines. This could include for example support to establish joint water management committees, or trust building through enrolment in inter-group functional adult literacy classes, livelihoods training, cash for work schemes as may be defined by the communities themselves. IOM has extensive experience with functional adult literacy and uses FAL as an entry point for peacebuilding. In this project, should FAL be recommended by the community, climate security concerns may be integrated in some modules to align content with the project and create synergies across outcomes and outputs.

In parallel to Outcome 1 and Outcome 2, **Outcome 3: Enhanced long-term local customary capacities in dispute resolution, including climate-related disputes** seeks to enhance communities' *transformative capacity* through activities that strengthen community structures (e.g., customary institutions) and promote local capacities in gender responsive and climate-informed dispute resolutions. This ensures that communities will be able in the long run to access resilient and sustainable customary institutions that outline gender sensitive and climate-sensitive dispute resolution mechanisms.

Output 3.1 Possible pathways for mainstreaming climate considerations customary laws and practices are reviewed and document in knowledge product

- o *Activity 3.1.1: Conduct a gender and age sensitive assessment to identify gaps and opportunities in mainstreaming climate-related considerations in broader dispute resolution mechanisms (IOM)*

A climate security expert will be contracted to identify current gaps and opportunities in integrating climate-related considerations in customary laws and practices in Pibor and Bor. The expert will produce a climate-informed and contextualized knowledge product that outlines an implementation methodology for Output 3.2.

Output 3.2: Strengthened community structures/foundations for gender-responsive and climate-informed dispute resolutions

The process for customary law review is a process to ascertain review, and document customary laws and traditional justice systems to strengthen rule of law organs for peacebuilding, dispute resolution and conflict prevention. The review process should be ideally conducted state-wide in order to codify the customary law, let the state legislature adopt the customary code, and issue warrants of establishment to the customary courts. This cannot be done at the County level only; however, it is still beneficial to border communities to have customary laws ascertained, reviewed, and documented for peacebuilding processes to function properly. The process includes the following steps:

- *Activity 3.2.1 Review, contextualisation and validation of customary law review methodology* to validate the approach and ensure gender and human rights are mainstreamed and opportunities for further improvement are identified.
- *Activity 3.2.2: Conduct community led customary law assessment in Pibor, Bor* is an initial assessment to understand the status of customary systems in the target locations, including stakeholder identification and taking any mitigating actions needed before the process starts.
- *Activity 3.2.3: Conduct community led customary review in Pibor and Bor* convenes community representatives in separate workshops and discusses key issues of customary law and practices pertinent to the communities in question. The review leads to a customary law review report that outlines the rules regulating social behaviour in the communities and how to resolve disputes, customs and laws that are contradictory to the national constitution and national laws are revised and amended to align with applicable laws.
- The findings from the review are presented and discussed during *Activity 3.2.4: Conduct community led customary validation in Pibor, Bor*, where the community will clarify issues, and further elaborate on more specific scenarios and disputes.
- Once the validation is complete, *Activity 3.2.5:* is to *Conduct community led customary law codification in Pibor and Bor.* The codification is a step towards recognising customary law in the state legislature.
- Following the review process, a number of recommendations will have been made, key among them will *be Activity 3.2.6: Facilitate restructuring of customary courts to comply with local government act.* The membership of the courts is important to ensure representation in the courts in accordance with provisions for gender equality and impartiality. It also provides an opportunity to re-assign redundant chiefs following the review process.
- Following these steps *Activity 3.2.7: Train customary courts on reviewed customary law and practices* the project will facilitate training workshops with Executive Chief, Paramount Chiefs, Head Chiefs and Court Clerks, MajokWut (cattle camp leaders) and cattle camp youth to train them on the newly adopted customary law and on general court procedures.
- To further promote rights awareness with community members *Activity 3.2.8:* will *Disseminate reviewed customary law to community representatives, courts and the public*. The newly adopted customary laws will be communicated through radio and social media.

Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.

d) **Project targeting** – provide a justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, expected number and type of stakeholders/beneficiaries (must be disaggregated by sex and age). Indicate whether stakeholders have been consulted in the design of this proposal. Do not repeat all outputs and activities from the Results Framework.

The geographical location of the project will be Bor, Pibor and Malakal, which are areas where significant peacebuilding opportunities are identified based on the analyzed conflict factors in Section

I. Indeed, advancing peace and stability in these three areas is critical to ensuring stability in neighboring areas and is now a high national priority. The Project also seeks to complement existing climate adaptation and mitigation efforts in the aforementioned geographical areas to ensure that a holistic approach to community stabilization is in place. This translates into the engagement of communities in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes which are critical to ensuring the sustainability of the adaptation and mitigation effort already deployed.

A focus will be placed on community representatives from different ethnic communities (Dinka Bor, Murle, Shilluk, Nuer), including women, youth, pastoralists, farmers, IDPs, local state authorities (MHADM, Ministry of Peacebuilding, Ministry of Environment), CSO's (e.g., CEPO), and youth and women unions. The project will strive to be inclusive of all tribal groups and to leave no one behind. The implementation of activities will take a conflict sensitive approach, bearing in mind the deep sense of marginalization being experienced by all groups.

		Beneficiaries	**Selection Criteria**
Outcome I	Output 1.1	Women and youth	Age 18-35 50% m/f
	Output 1.2	Women and youth	Age 18-35 50% m/f
	Output 1.3	Women and youth	Age 18-35 50% m/f
	Approximate total number of participants: 250 participants		
Outcome II	Output 2.1	Livestock: 60 Community based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs; 6 female and 54 male)	● Ages 18-45 years ● People from livestock keeping communities that own livestock ● People that have interest in keeping livestock ● Preference for females owning livestock because of the role they play in livestock production and due to their under representation ● 9% of the 50 CAHWs will be female that is 6 females and 54 males
		Crop production: 1000 beneficiaries (400 male, 600 female) Vegetable production: 1500 beneficiaries (600 male, 900 female)	● Age 18-45 years ● Vulnerability – female headed households, households affected by flooding, households with people living with disability or chronically ill people ● Households will access to space for vegetable /crop production ● Households must be farmers or agro-pastoralists ● Households shall have access to a land for planting ● Households shall have the capacity to mobilize enough labor for

			• Households that have no access to crop/vegetable seeds and tools or have lost them • Households committed to attending training that will be carried out by FAO or the partners.
		Fisheries: 1000 households (600 male, 400 female) of ages between 18-45 years. Other stakeholders involved in the fisheries activities include youth; fisher folk; processors; transporters; net making groups	• Fisher folk who received inputs and trained on fish handling and preservation • Fisherfolk who were trained on income generating activities by NGOs and other partners • Female headed households • Youth groups • Canoe builders within the target locations • Selected households must be fisher folk, farmers and/or agro pastoralists • Selected households shall have access to a water source suitable for fishing • Households committed to attending training that will be conducted by FAO or the partners.
	Approximate total number of beneficiaries: 3560 beneficiaries		
Outcome III	Output 3.1 Output 3.2	Community representatives including women, youth, elders, chiefs, people living with disability and IDPs and host community, government officials, project capacitated stakeholders.	• Community identified representatives, • participants from project activities that have received capacity building.

The project will target Bor South County (including Bor Town) with an estimated population standing at 343,657 and Pibor (including Pibor town and Gumuruk County) with a population estimated at 230,566 for the customary law component (Outcome Three). These population estimates are the number of indirect beneficiaries that will have access to strengthened customary law services and dispute resolution. It is estimated that the A, B, C courts and the Town Bench could hear 5-10 cases per week, if courts are restructured and are functional. There are typically 5-8 Payams in a county, and the overview below is a low estimated number of direct beneficiaries to the project.

Cases in each Payam/year	Average 6 Payams/county	2 counties targeted
100	600/year	1200/year

III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

A) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list all direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local knowledge and existing capacity.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) began operations in southern Sudan in early 2005 and established the IOM South Sudan mission after the country's independence in July 2011. Since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013, IOM has provided support to thousands of host communities, returnees, and IDPs. With over 2,350 staff operating in seven static locations, in addition to the provision of frontline responses, IOM has one of the largest UN operational footprints in South Sudan. IOM champions an integrated, multi-sector approach, where migration management and recovery and stabilization efforts complement humanitarian interventions for peacebuilding, community resilience and reduce dependency on humanitarian aid. This work is underpinned by IOM's DTM, which has established itself as the key tool providing updated information on the numbers, locations, and priority needs of IDPs and returnees, combined with analyses of the peace, conflict and migration dynamics in the country, humanitarian needs and area-based service and infrastructure mapping. Furthermore, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix conducts ongoing data collection across the three target counties, which includes tracking of IDP and returnee populations at the payam level. In other areas of South Sudan, IOM has implemented transition and recovery programming, community policing capacity building initiatives, peacebuilding projects, and facilitated community dialogues, as well as supported the rehabilitation of key community infrastructure.

IOM has a strong track record in innovative peacebuilding projects and initiatives at both the grass roots level, particularly with women and youth groups to promote peaceful co-existence and lead community peacebuilding processes and at the national level. A similar approach and lesson learnt from Abyei and PSQIF will be applied for this project. IOM in South Sudan has implemented several PBF funded projects including the following joint PBF projects:
- Community Action for Peaceful Resolution of Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Disputes and Conflicts
- Beyond Bentiu Protection of Civilian Site (PoC) Youth Reintegration Strategy: Creating Conditions for Peaceful Coexistence between Youth Internally Displaced Person (IDP), Returnees and Host Community Members
- Youth Action for Reduced Violence and Enhanced Social Cohesion in Wau, South Sudan
- National Dialogue for Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): FAO works closely with the Government of South Sudan to improve food and nutrition security and eradicate hunger in the country. FAO provides support in three priority areas: sustainable increase in production and productivity, agriculture-based economic growth, and increased resilience of livelihoods to threats and crisis. Livelihood, access to land and security of tenure are essential components of post-conflict stability, food security, and economic growth. FAO has been leading and coordinating projects relating to livestock and livelihoods across the country. FAO is also the lead technical agency of the United Nations dealing with tenure in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. FAO's vision is to contribute to an enabling environment for Member Countries and partners to lead and manage their own processes of improving governance of tenure. FAO's activities on the governance of tenure are conducted within the framework of the VGGT and promotes use by partners. As a neutral UN technical organization, with 194 Member Nations and a unique multilingual centre of excellence across sectors, disciplines, professional fields, and thematic areas relevant to tenure, FAO tailors support to a variety of context, ranging from contributing to setting the foundation for comprehensive tenure reform to addressing specific aspects of tenure, upon

UN Women is the lead agency working on women's equal rights and gender mainstreaming in South Sudan. The organization has the mandate to support UNSCRs on Women Peace and Security. UN Women also serves as Secretariat of the WPS working Group which brings together all the donor countries, Transitional institutions and UN agencies working on WPS. UN Women has supported community peace dialogues in all 10 former states – to amplify voices of women in the implementation of the R-ARCSS. Government ministries and other key institutions have been supported by UN Women with advisory and capacity building services focused on gender-sensitive policy and systems.

Overall, UN Women is considered the main coordinator and convenor of GEWE stakeholders in South Sudan, the lead on CEDAW, the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and Beijing +25. UN Women works closely with the Ministry of Gender and Child and Social Welfare, the Women Parliamentarians Caucus, and the Ministry of Peacebuilding. UN Women's work on Women's Economic Empowerment, Gender Based Violence and Peacebuilding is known for its best practice of its integration of gender in interventions. With support from the World Bank, UN Women will establish Women Economic Empowerment Centers in each state beginning in 2023.

UN Women participates in select humanitarian clusters including education, food, security and livelihood (FSL), protection and the GBV sub-cluster. In October 2022, UN Women has been officially invited to be a member of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) to ensure gender responsive humanitarian response through evidence-based analysis of the GEWE situation. The primary tool the CO employs to influence the work of the HCT is to conduct gender assessments related to the humanitarian context and advocating for the data and analysis to contribute to integrating gender into humanitarian programming.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
Convening Organization: International Organization for Migration (IOM)	$116,288,969	World Bank US-BHA EU CERF	Central Equatoria State, Juba Western Bahr El Ghazal State, Wau	Staff = 520 Non-staff (casual workers) = 2500	Transition and Recovery Coordinator

Implementing partners: CEPO		MPTF-SSHF UNOPS ECHO Netherlands MPTF-RSRTF FCDO Cost Recovery MPTF-PBF Korea Germany GAVI Canada WHO UNOPS Japan IDF Switzerland US-PRM US-CDC	Unity State Bentiu. Upper Nile State, Malakal, Abyei Administrative Area	**Total = 3020**	
Recipient Organization (UN Women)	7.05 million USD	Peacebuilding Fund, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), The Government of the Netherlands, The Government of Canada, The Government of Japan, Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office, UNAIDS	Juba (with plans to open field offices in Yambio and Wau in 2023)	**Staff = 37**	Governance and Leadership Specialist, Women's Economic Empowerment Specialist,
Recipient Organization : (FAO) Implementing partners:	US$ 107, 584, 247	USAID, FCDO, EU, Norway, Netherlands, RSRTF, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Russia, Denmark and	Yambio, Torit, Wau, Malakal, BOR Maban, Kuajok, Bentiu, Rumbek, Aweil, Juba	**Staff =363**	Deputy Representative Programme (FAO)

		UNOCHA, AfDB, WB			

B) Project management and coordination – Indicate the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explicitly indicate how the project implementation team will ensure sufficient gender or youth expertise. Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements and ensure link with PBF Secretariat if it exists. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex A.1** and attach key staff TORs.

The UN in South Sudan will continue to advance its mandate and work with government, community structures and citizens, to help create a safe and stable environment and build more favourable conditions for durable peace. The UN in South Sudan will continue their robust, nimble, and proactive approach in implementing their mandate, and target key drivers and critical conditions to maximise the impact of conflict prevention and resolution as well as building durable peace and reconciliation.

Localised approaches and adaptive peacebuilding and flexible reallocation of resources are critical for effective discharge of the objectives of this project. The project will mainstream and integrate a gender perspective in all the envisaged activities aimed at the protection of vulnerable populations with focus on displaced populations.

The strategic governance arrangement (steering committee) for PBF investments is being activated as part of the re-eligibility process. Coordination and strategic management are envisaged to be undertaken by the DSRSG/RC/HC and the Minister of Peacebuilding, with support from the UNCT appointed PBF reference group (UNDP, UNWOMEN, IOM) while the RCO provides secretariat services.

On a day-to-day basis, the project will be directed by a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of IOM, FAO, UN Women and implementing partners such as CEPO. Functions include: the day-to-day management, technical and coordination functions. A technical expert (consultant) in the area of climate change/climate security will be recruited to participate in TWG meetings that monitor the progress made towards achieving the project's intended results and will advise the TWG during this monitoring process to ensure that activities adequately advance a climate-informed peacebuilding approach. The PBF secretariat (RCO) will provide secretariat support to the TWG. The project will be implemented under the general guidance and leadership of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) for South Sudan. The Representatives of each UN organisation will oversee implementation of the project and are responsible for overall accountability of fund allocation and achievement of results, review of implementation progress including budget revisions.

The TWG has been established to develop the project document and will lead, coordinate to ensure effective project implementation. The leading agency is responsible for ensuring timely submission of project progress reports to the RCO/PBF Secretariat for quality control and onward transmission to PBSO. The Technical working group will have regular joint coordination meetings with key project government interlocuters, UNMISS and implementing partners.

Staffing table:

Due to the wide geographic coverage of the project, including coverage in three separate states/administrative areas, project staffing beyond 20% is proposed to ensure feasibility of project implementation.

Staff	%	Main functions
Transition and Recovery Dept. Coordinator (IOM)	10%	Support overall coordination between PUNOs, UNMISS
Peacebuilding Officer (IOM)	50%	Responsible for Day to day project management and planning
Project Officer Peacebuilding (CL) (IOM)	15%	Provides technical backstopping to customary law review processes
Project Assistant(IOM)	60%	Provides travel, administrative, logistics support to project implementation
TRU Project support and reporting officer(IOM)	30%	Ensures timely and quality reporting, capturing lessons learned and synthesizing recommendations for programme learning
Procurement officer(IOM)	5%	IOM Procurement support staff contribution to ensure procurement support services are available for direct project implementation
Logistic officer(IOM)	5%	IOM logistics support staff contribution to ensure logistics services are available for direct project implementation
Resources Management Officer(IOM)	5%	IOM finance support staff contribution to ensure finance/resources management services are available for direct project implementation
Security assistant(IOM)	10%	IOM security support staff contribution to ensure security services are available for direct project implementation
Driver(IOM)	10%	IOM drivers support staff contribution to ensure logistics services are available for direct project implementation
Program Manager (UN Women)	20%	The UN Women Program Manager will oversee overall management and coordination of PBF projects. Project Coordinator will report to the Program Manager.
Project Coordinator (UN Women)	50%	She will lead the project implementation and directly engage all partners and participants. The project coordinator will be hired specifically for this project.
Gender Advisor (UN Women)	75%	Will ensure project activities and outputs are gender informed. Will be involved in most activities and the development of the peacebuilding training content.
M&E Officer(UN Women)	30%	Will be responsible for supporting all monitoring and reporting activities.

Project Admin and logistics associate (UN Women)	40%	Will support logistics, administration, and preparation of activity implementation, including support with procurement.
Livestock Officer (FAO)	17%	Provide technical support during implementation of livestock activities
Project Manager (FAO)	11%	Responsible for day to day project management and planning
GIS Officer (FAO)	3%	Provide technical support during implementation of early warning activities
Crop Officer/Agronomist (FAO)	14%	Provide technical support during implementation of crop production activities
Malakal Head of Field Office (FAO)	11%	Coordinate and support implementation of the day-to-day field level activities in close consultation and cooperation with FAO's program unit and the relevant program support units
M&E Data Quality Assistant (FAO)	17%	Assist in monitoring of activities, data collection, reporting and preparing monthly M&E updates on activity delivery
Travel, HR, Finance & Admin Support (FAO)	22%	FAO support staff contribution to ensure these services are available for direct project implementation
Operations, Procurement and S&RPU Support (FAO)	22%	FAO support staff contribution to ensure Project operations, Procurement Services and Resource Planning services are available for direct project implementation
Fisheries Officer (FAO)	14%	Provide technical support the implementation of fisheries activities
Drivers (FAO)	67%	FAO drivers ensure logistics services are available to staff for direct project implementation

C) Risk management – Identify project-specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include a Do No Harm approach and risk mitigation strategy.

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
Risks during dry and wet seasons: The project is set locations where natural disasters, and extreme weather events occur during the rainy season, and where the escalation of conflict is possible during the dry seasons.	High	The project will ensure that project planning, work plans and workflows for 2023 considers the ways in which interlocking shocks will impact implementation, i.e. the inaccessibility some areas, as well as the hotspots for external and internal conflicts, which tend to occur during dry season and wet season respectively. This includes prepositioning of supplies, as well as the scheduling of both 'hard' and 'soft' activities, whether it be community meetings or the construction of infrastructure. The project will also ensure flexibility in implementation deadlines and modalities given the otherwise fluid environment that may necessitate staff evacuations during different periods of the dry and wet season. The project will also continue to monitor the conflict situation through ad hoc updates to this analysis in 2023, utilizing the conflict sensitivity monitoring tool as a way to inform project design and implementation and assess project impacts, making real-time adjustments based on identified mitigation measures.
Due to the high level of gender discrimination in project locations, the communities are highly patriarchal women and girls might be excluded from CAHWs trainings	High	The project will ensure that communities' awareness is raised on the project and on importance of women and girls' participation.
Corruption- Division of livelihoods assistance	Medium	The use of biometric registration system as well as tracking distribution at household level Establishment of feedback/complaint mechanisms and AAP committees which will collect feedback on provided support
Women's participation is hampered by their lack of availability due to home and work duties.	Medium	Scheduling of training and events will be done in coordination of women's availability. Some trainings will be carried out for just 2-3 hours a day so that women may be included and be able to get back to their work.

The risk of reinforcing perceptions of inequitable access to services and the marginalization of certain population groups given that the project will operate across multiple locations where services are concentrated in certain locations.	Medium	The project will ensure that conflict sensitivity is maintained across all the activities in the different locations to ensuring equal representation and avoid deepening existing inequalities or fuel tension between communities. The project will also consider how to equitably balance assistance across flood and conflict-affected areas project locations.
Customary law review process becoming a procedural process without direct 'real-life' impact	Medium	The customary law review is designed as a community-based stakeholder led process, not a top-down administrative exercise. The project's role is to facilitate the review by providing a platform for community members to share and reflect on their experiences, values and shared cultures in terms of customary law, traditions and practices. Where these contradict the constitution or human rights, discussion on the importance of aligning laws ensures capacity on the subject matter and awareness is raised contributing to real-life impact and tangible results.
Customary law review process triggers communal and political sensitivitiespotentially leading to loss of access to project locations for security or other reasons (e.g. being barred from returning to communities by local leaders)	Medium	The customary law review process is designed to challenge community perceptions on sensitive issues including gender equality and human rights. For example the issue of child marriage will be controversial in communities where traditions may favour certain practices that contradict national and international law and rights. To mitigate the risk of 'being barred from access to communities' it is important to note that the review process is only started at the request of communities and is led by the communities themselves, it is in effect not the a review that 'belongs' to the project, but rather the project supports the community initiative and provides the technical backstopping to ensure legality of the outcome and incorporation of do no harm considerations throughout the review process.
Low capacity of implementing partners and responsible partners	Low	Prospective i mplementing p artners will be assessed. Partners will be trained in project management and finance requirements.

D) Monitoring and evaluation – Describe the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include: a budget break-

down for both monitoring and evaluation activities, including collection of baseline and end line data and an independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Fund recipients are obligated to reserve at least 5-7% of the project budget for M&E activities, including sufficient funds for a quality, independent evaluation.

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework aims to improve the quality and integrity of project delivery, ensure that projects are responsive to peacebuilding dynamics, and meet donor requirements and standards of accountability. Internal structures are developed to monitor the progress of projects through data collection, analysis, reporting and feedback.

In targeted areas, a baseline mapping will be complemented by more in-depth qualitative research, which will be area specific, participatory, age, gender, and diversity sensitive. The tool will be developed in collaboration with participating partners and agencies to ensure coverage of key areas of interest and to seal identified information gaps and inform the baseline of the results matrix.

The project will adopt a mixed-method approach to monitoring, including the utilization of Village Assessment surveys and community-based monitoring, to enable an in-depth understanding of the impact of activities on community members. This is a particularly pertinent approach given the sensitivities of interventions aimed at peacebuilding and social cohesion on highly contentious issues. The mapping will inform project targeting and provide evidence to contextualize the development of other project outputs, including capacity building and diagnostic tools, which will be conducted during project implementation. Focus group discussions with communities, and 'change agents' will be held at the beginning, at mid-term level, and at the conclusion of the project to check accountability and integrate issues to be addressed over time. Furthermore, IOM, UN Women and FAO will invite donors, government, and other key stakeholders to observe major interventions, including participation in policy workshops, review meetings, and joint field monitoring to facilitate feedback and the periodic review of project interventions.

Through these processes progress against project deliverables is monitored and challenges identified. IOM, UN Women and FAO will integrate a combination of quantitative and qualitative gender-sensitive indicators to provide evidence against the theory of change that underpins this project. The outcome level indicators have been aligned with the UNCF (2019-2022) and the PBF Strategic Results Framework. The project monitoring and evaluation frameworks assist in identifying strengths and weaknesses in implementation, and the degree to which the project is reaching targeted communities.

Proposed indicators in the results matrix are based on results-based management principles and seek to measure impact of interventions as well as activity-based indicators measuring performance deliverables against set activity targets.

The conceptual framing of the indicators includes analysis of community perceptions of own participation, ownership and relevance to the proposed outputs and outcomes. To analyze perceptions of stakeholders' own impact and the project's impact on addressing key conflict drivers and impact of climate change, a number of tools will be used during the baseline data collection process. The baseline will review adaptive capacities of communities from a temporal perspective since the initial large scale

floodings occurred in 2019. Questions such as 'How did communities react to those shocks then and how do they react now, and what will the reaction be after the project has ended?' will be investigated. For other components of the baseline including the absorptive and transformative capacities of local communities and especially their own perceptions of these will be measured through a mix of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods to ensure triangulation of data and to ensure that there is both representative samples of populations surveyed, and that the data collected informs complex social systems and processes such as sustaining and building peace. The baseline will be designed during the inception phase and the indicators will be revised according to that initial design phase.

At the inception of the program, an inter-agency M&E team will be established, to encompass IOM, UN Women, FAO, and national partners, to develop and refine the joint M&E plan under the intervention, which will be reviewed and further refined during the intervention. The project M&E focal points, project managers and project staff from each of the UN AFPs will regularly conduct monitoring exercises, quality assurance processes of knowledge products and quality control of activity implementation. This will be coordinated through the technical working group established under the project, where respective workplans are coordinated and activity implementation is based on thorough conceptualization. The objectives and rationale of activities should be clarified and discussed jointly prior to implementation in order to take advantage of the collective experience of the joint UN peacebuilding expertise, a process for developing and reviewing activity planning concept notes and project knowledge products will be established, and these deliverables will be used to inform programming on an ongoing basis and shared with national actors for policy and decision making processes.

As regards M&E expertise, both IOM, UN Women, FAO have M&E focal points in Juba, Bor and Pibor and Malakal who will support and advise on the process, the development of relevant tools and data analysis, and undertake field visits to oversee M&E processes on-the-ground. Finally, an external evaluation will be conducted at the end of the project, including qualitative and quantitative approaches, to measure whether the project objectives were met, and activities conducted according to the abovementioned principles. As required by PBF guidelines a minimum of 5% of the project budget will be allocated to monitoring and evaluation. A total of $65,000   has been allocated for a joint IOM-commissioned independent evaluation to be split between IOM, UN Women and FAO budgets and 91,000 for monitoring activities.

Finally, an annual review meeting will be held during the duration of the Project with all partners, and a midterm evaluation will be undertaken as well as the end of Project evaluation. The evaluation will be conducted by an independent company specialized in peacebuilding evaluation contracts in fragile and conflict affected countries. The evaluation will be contracted by the lead agency and the cost has been budgeted for accordingly. All agencies have budget 5-7% of the project budget towards M&E processes.

Lessons and strategies of the Project will be documented and used for other contexts and as knowledge products on climate change, women, peace and security and youth peace and security in South Sudan.

E) Project exit strategy/ sustainability – Briefly explain the project's exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do concretely and pro-actively to try to ensure this support from the start. Consider possible partnerships with other donors or IFIs.

The project is well received by national stakeholders and benefits from a significant level of ownership and thematic interest. S   everal national processes are contributing to a conducive environment for the project and to anchor lessons learned into institutional and community structures for sustainability. Following COP26 in Glasgow and COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh   , climate adaptation   and climate security has been elevated on the political agenda for South Sudan. In 2021, South Sudan's first NAP[27] presented a comprehensive framework for building local resilience and reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building the adaptive capacity of local communities. This NAP will guide adaptation in South Sudan from 2021-2025. Interlinkages between climate change, peace and security has also been recognized by South Sudan's Governance cluster, demonstrated by the Ministry of Peacebuilding's plans to include climate security as an outcome area of its strategic results framework.   . Since the project is seen as a pilot demonstration project for climate security for the Government of South Sudan deliverables under the project and project outcomes/impact will be highly relevant to key stakeholders, increasing the chances of catalyzing project activities into broader, longer term and better-informed   peacebuilding interventions and adaptation plans across South Sudan and in the region. The project specifically addresses the following seven   **measures** to support sustainability of the project:

1. Training local implementing partners to strengthen their systems, processes, and overall operations
2. S   upporting partners to adapt to unexpected events that may interfere with implementation of activities
3. The focus of the project is supporting existing peace processes and governance structures; thus continuation of these processes is expected to be enhanced with the extended participation of women and youth
4. The ownership will be local, and the vast majority of the implementation will be done through local implementing partners thus the partners can use expertise and lessons learned to extend activities and mobilize resources past the project cycle of this proposal.
5. By establishing research expertise on the climate-displacement-peace nexus within the implementing teams, this project aims to generate a knowledge product that will provide an evidence-base reference point for practitioners and policymakers in other areas across and beyond South Sudan. By capturing the lessons learned during the implementation of this project, this knowledge product can contribute to a wider conversation on reducing the perceived risks associated with large scale climate financing and vertical funding in South

---

[27] First National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change – Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2021. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/South-Sudan-First-NAP%20.pdf

Sudan. The successful implementation of this project can prove operational and technical feasibility on a smaller scale and therefore incentivize much-needed larger integrated climate investments in South Sudan that not only prioritize climate action but also yields co-benefits for peace and security.

6. Providing institutional and technical capacity to the state or county authorities
7. Coordinating with the MoEF and the MHADM– leading ministries on South Sudan's NAP process – to ensure that progress made under this project is sustained beyond the project cycle and continues to advance national adaptation priorities, particularly in the sector of agriculture, livestock and fisheries (addressed under Outcome two).

IV.   **Project budget**

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

Project budget request has been increased to accommodate for a number of factors that significantly increase cost of implementation. Due to climate security dynamics leading to displacement and rising tensions in Malakal, the Ministry of Peace Building recommended to include a third location in addition to GPAA and Jonglei. The operational presence in Malakal is significant for IOM and FAO and synergies have been leveraged to reduce transaction costs of establishing new presence. However, the duplication of outcomes one and two have led to increased budgeted costs. The costs are primarily borne by the need to include a peacebuilding officer, additional management and operational support for the project in Malakal. It is envisaged that outcomes one and two can be completed in a shorter time frame than the full project duration since outcome three is not included in Malakal, and therefore these staff positions are budgeted for a shorter duration only. Without the additional national project management and assistants it is not feasible to cover the scope of the expanded geographical area.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every GEWE allocation (e.g. training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
Planning			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline		x	CEPO has been identified as an implementing partner and will be contracted should the proposal be successful. Additional Ips may be identified during the inception phase.
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	x		
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	x		Bor South, Pibor Town and Gumuruk, Malakal POC and Malakal town
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence o the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	x		Yes. During the project development with Ministry of Peace Building, and Ministry of Environment. Seven sections of the Malakal POC site have been consulted on the approach and held intensive dialogues on a proposed way forward which has informed the approach.
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	x		The project is based on significant analysis and collective understanding across HDP on the situation in Bor, Pibor and Malakal.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	x		The project is women and youth led, inn an addition, criteria will be further refined during the inception phase, focusing on influential individuals who are able instigate change.
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to projec implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	x		Ministry of Peacebuilding have provided their guidance and input to the project development and conceptualization.
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	x		Yes, and these will be further refined during the inception phase of the project.

		Yes	No	
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?			x	The inception phase is crucial and will ta approximately 4 months to complete.
Gender				
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/foca point or UN Women colleague provided input)?		x		UN Women has backstopped as the expert fo point and ensured that gender considerations ha been mainstreamed throughout the proje activities.
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?		x		Partially. In local consultations in Pibor the you union and women's union were consulted.
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?		x		Yes partially, where relevant.
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?		x		Yes.

Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	x		
2. Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	x		
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	x		
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	x		

5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	x		
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		x	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.	x		Yes, an all-terrain 'quad' bike is proposed for Pibor since it is otherwise not possible to move around the town during the rainy season. Supplementary rental of MOSS compliant vehicles has also been budgeted for to ensure mobility.
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	x		The implementing agencies bring with them existing capacities and expertise in peacebuilding project management. Further operational capacity and support from FAO and IOM is significant in project locations and will support the project. For example, the project will take advantage of the existing IOM offices and vehicles in Malakal, Pibor and Bor.

Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

● Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;

● Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;

● Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations' headquarters);

● Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by

Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent's website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Annex B.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or

may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it		Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
28 February	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
30 April	Report **Q1 expenses** (January to March)
31 July	Report **Q2 expenses** (January to June)
31 October	Report **Q3 expenses** (January to September)
Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will

as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

➢ Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation.

➢ Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE**: If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches).

➢ Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant.

➢ Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE**: If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.

➢ Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project.[28]

➢ Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought.

➢ Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

---

[28] Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated targets)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
Outcome 1: Climate informed, gender-age sensitive peace processes effectively resolve or prevent the escalation of disputes, including disputes due to competition over natural resources		Outcome Indicator 1a % of targeted community members who report reduced violence in their community Baseline: TBD Target: 50% (50% women 50% men)	Reports detailing community perceptions of peace Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
		Outcome Indicator 1b % of targeted communities willing to cooperate with other communities and engage in joint natural resource management Baseline: TBD Target: 30% (to be verified during the inception)	Report detailing community perceptions of peace and potential areas of cooperation Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

		Outcome Indicator 1c % of women and youth participants who report being able to hold leading roles during the peace dialogues and the development of Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans Baseline: TBD Target: 75%	Reports detailing impact of peace processes on women and youth Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
Output 1.1 Enhanced local capacities for conflict mitigation and natural resource management for targeted groups including women and youth groups				
	Activity 1.1.1 Validate and contextualize peacebuilding training manual, with support of UN Women gender advisor, through community engagement/consultations in Bor, Pibor and Malakal (4 Workshops)	Output Indicator 1.1.1 Number of interagency peacebuilding training manuals completed Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Number of workshops conducted to develop peacebuilding training manual Reports detailing the active engagement of the community in the validation and contextualization of the training manual. Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

	Activity 1.1.2 Trainings on peacebuilding manual for community representatives in Bor, Pibor and Malakal (UN Women)	Output Indicator 1.1.2 a Number of trainings on peacebuilding manual completed Baseline: 0 Target: 16 (13 Training and 3 Trainings of Trainers) Output Indicator 1.1.2 b % of trained women and youth report increased capacity to participate in decision-making related to conflict resolution, particularly climate induced conflict Baseline: TBD Target: 75% (to be verified during the baseline/inception)	Reports detailing the improved capacity of women and youth particularly. Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

	Activity 1.1.3 Facilitate joint/inter-community and inter-generational climate-informed dialogues designed to address conflict factors and areas of priority as determined by participants	Output Indicator 1.1.3 a Number of dialogues completed Baseline: Target: 7 1x Bor Town 1x IDP camp Bor, 1x Pibor 1x joint Bor/Pibor 1x Malakal POC with 7 sectors 1x Malakal Town 1 x Joint Malakal town and POC Output Indicator 1.1.3 b % of participating communities who report that the dialogues have provided an opportunity to address past-grievances and can mitigate the escalation of future conflict Baseline: TBD Target: 60%-70% (50% women 50% men)	Reports detailing the impact of the dialogues on community relations and perceptions of peace Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

		Output Indicator 1.1.4 Percentage of resolutions resulting from the peace dialogues that include the joint initiatives, joint climate action or joint management of natural resources Baseline: 0 Target: 20%-30%		
	Output 1.2: Climate-informed, gender/age sensitive peace and security concerns are articulated in Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions Plans			
	Activity 1.2.1 Facilitate community-led workshops to develop Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans according to community prioritization (3 Workshops)	Output Indicator 1.2.1 a Number of Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action plans developed Baseline: 0 Target: 3 Output Indicator 1.2.1 b % of community representative, women and youth who perceive that their interests and concerns are adequately addressed in the Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions plans	Number of workshops conducted Reports detailing the impact of Peacebuilding Roadmaps development Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

		Baseline: TBD Target: 75%		
	Activity 1.2.2 Joint advocacy and awareness actions on climate, environment, and peace (UN Women and IOM)	Output Indicator 1.2.2 % of target community members who perceive improved knowledge and understanding around climate change, environment and peacebuilding issues within their communities Baseline: TBD Target: 75% (50% women 50% men)	Reports detailing the impact of advocacy and awareness raising campaigns on communities' knowledge levels Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
	Activity 1.2.3 Community presentations of roadmaps for each of the three communities and any joint actions to the Ministry of Peacebuilding, Ministry of Gender and other relevant line ministries for coordination support at the local and national levels. Sustainability of plans will be assessed by communities and partners (45 participants, 15 from each state to Juba)	Output Indicator 1.2.3 Number of agreements to commit made by line ministries to monitor Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions Plans implementation Baseline: 0 Target: 3 (one per location)	Number of agreements made	
	Output 1.3 Lessons learned and synthesis climate-informed peacebuilding approach			

	Activity 1.3.1 Develop synthesis report on lessons learned on 1) community driven and climate-informed peacebuilding and 2) linking local level initiatives to national level processes on conflict, environment, and climate change.	Output Indicator 1.3.1 Number of areas within and outside South Sudan where report's lessons learned and recommendation are applicable. Baseline: 0 Target: (minimum) 1	Roundtable/ UN Peer review on report
	Activity 1.3.2 Community-led dissemination of lessons learned and synthesis of climate informed peacebuilding approach to sustain peace in South Sudan	Output Indicator 1.3.2 a % of 'Youth Peace Ambassadors" who perceive they would be able to influence positive change in their community by advancing peacebuilding and cooperation Baseline: TBD Target: 75% Output Indicator 1.3.2 b Number of events, media engagements including social media during the project Baseline: 0 Target: 3	Project monitoring reports

Outcome 2: Resilience against negative effects of climate change and related disputes is increased through operationalization of Community Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans		Outcome Indicator 2a % of targeted community members who report improved ability to adapt to climate threats such as floods without major qualitative change to their lifestyle Baseline: TBD Target: 75%	Reports comparing the adaptive capacities of flood-affected individuals in 2019 – 2023 – 2026 Surveys and community feedback	
		Outcome Indicator 2b Number of Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions Plans that have started implementation Baseline: 0 Target: 3	Number of implemented Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Actions Plans	
	Output 2.1 Inter-communal peace dividends are promoted through the implementation and operationalization of prioritized actions in Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans			
	Activity 2.1.1. Conduct mapping of natural resources and hotspots of climate and conflict threats	Output Indicator 2.1.1 Number of updated maps of natural resources and hotspots of climate and conflict threats Baseline: 0 Target: 3 maps (Bor, Malakal and Pibor)	Number of maps	

	Activity 2.1.2 Provide training on Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) for conflict and climate threats for youth representatives	Output Indicator 2.1.2 a Number of trainings provided Baseline: 0 Target: 13 Output Indicator 2.1.2 b % of youth representatives who perceive improved knowledge and technical skill in EWEA for conflict and climate threats Baseline: TBD Target: 75%	Training and progress reports Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
	Activity 2.1.3 Climate-resilient crop seeds will be distributed, and communities will be trained in CSA practices	Output Indicator 2.1.3 Number of households trained in CSA practices Baseline: 0 Target: 1000 (Male and 60% female – 18-45 years)	Training reports	
	Activity 2.1.4 Fishing activities and vegetable farming will be supported through the receding waters during the dry	Output Indicator 2.1.4 a Number of households supported with fishing inputs (nets, twines and hooks)	Assessments and progress monitoring reports	

	season and in flood prone or low-lying areas	Baseline: 0 Target: 1000 HHs (600 male, 400 female) Output Indicator 2.1.4 b. Number of households supported with vegetable kits Baseline: 0 Target: 1500 HHs (600 male, 900 female) Output Indicator 2.1.4 c. Number of post-harvest trainings conducted Baseline: 0 Target: TBD Output indicator 2.14 d. Number of trainers trained in modification of flood-prone low-lying areas into fishponds, pond management and how to farm fish/vegetable from the ponds (disaggregated by gender)		

		Baseline:0 Target:60 (20 per location comprising of 15 male, 5 female) Output Indicator 2.1.4 e Number of individuals trained in modification of flood-prone low-lying areas into fishponds, pond management and how to farm fish/vegetable from the ponds (disaggregated by gender) Baseline:0 Target: 600 (400 male and 200 female)		
	Activity. 2.1.5 Provision of animal health services to prevent the spread of livestock diseases during cattle migration in Bor, Pibor and Malakal	Output Indicator 2.1.4 a Number of livestock vaccinated and treated Baseline: 0 Target: 80000 Output Indicator 2.1.4 b Number of solar fridges installed Baseline: 0 Target: 3	Assessments and progress monitoring reports	

		Output Indicator 2.1.4 c Number of individuals trained as CAHWs Baseline: 0 Target: 60 (54 male, 6 female) Output Indicator 2.14 d Number of vaccines, drugs and laboratory tests kits doses procured Baseline: 0 Target: TBD Output Indicator 2.14 e Number of animal disease surveillance missions conducted Baseline: 0 Target: 3 Output Indicator 2.1.4 f Number of households covered with treatments/vaccinations Baseline: 0 Target: 3000		

	Activity. 2.1.6 Provision of materials and equipment to implement prioritized actions as determined in the Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans	TBD	Dialogue workshop report/recommendations Project monitoring report	
	Activity. 2.1. 7 Provision of FAL course, livelihoods training or cash for work grants as determined in the Peacebuilding Roadmaps and Action Plans	TBD	Dialogue workshop report/recommendations Project monitoring report	
Outcome 3: Enhanced long-term local customary capacities in dispute resolution, including climate-related disputes		Outcome Indicator 3a % of community members who perceive they can rely on customary institutions for dispute resolution Baseline: TBD Target: 75%	Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
		Outcome Indicator 3b % of community members who perceive they can rely on customary institutions for resolving dispute arising from competition over scarce natural resources Baseline: TBD	Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	

		Target: 75%		
		Outcome Indicator 3c % of women and youth who feel they can rely on customary institutions to defend their rights and needs Baseline: TBD Target: 75%	Surveys and/or community feedback/interviews	
	Output 3.1 Possible pathways for mainstreaming climate considerations customary laws and practices are reviewed and documented in knowledge product			
	Activity 3.1.1 Conduct a gender/age sensitive assessment to identify gaps and opportunities in mainstreaming climate-related considerations in broader dispute resolution mechanisms	Output Indicator 3.1.1 Number of knowledge products that successfully identify current gaps and opportunities to mainstreaming climate change in customary laws and practices in Pibor and Bor and outlines an implementation methodology for Output 3.2. Baseline: 0 Target: 2	Needs/gaps assessment conducted by climate security expert	
	Output 3.2 Strengthened community structures/foundations for gender-responsive and climate-informed dispute resolution			
	Activity 3.2.1 Review, contextualisation, and validation of Customary	Output Indicator 3.2.1	Post-review feedback/interviews	

	Law Review (CLR) methodology	CLR methodology reviewed and endorsed by reference group. Baseline: 0 Target: 1		
	Activity 3.2.2: Conduct community led customary law assessment in Pibor, Bor	Output Indicator 3.2.2. Number of assessments that successfully outline the status of customary systems, map stakeholders and outline any mitigation actions required prior CLR process Baseline: 0 Target: 2	Assessment report	
	Activity 3.2.3: Conduct community led customary review in Pibor and Bor	Output Indicator 3.2.3 a Number of review workshops conducted Baseline: 0 Target: 2 Output Indicator 3.2.3 b Number of community representatives participating in review in Pibor Baseline: 0	Number of workshops	

		Target: 42 Output Indicator 3.2.3 c Number of community representatives participating in review in Bor Baseline: 0 Target: 42		
	Activity 3.2.4: Conduct community led customary validation in Pibor, Bor,	Output Indicator 3.2.4 a Number of validation workshops conducted Baseline: 0 Target: 2 Output Indicator 3.2.4 b Number of community representatives participating in validation in Pibor Baseline: 0 Target: 42 Output Indicator 3.2.4 c	Number of workshops	

		Number of community representatives participating in validation in Bor Baseline: 0 Target: 42		
	Activity 3.2.5: Conduct community led customary law codification in Pibor and Bor	Number of codified CL Baseline: 0 Target: 2	Number of codified CL	
	Activity 3.2.6: Facilitate restructuring of customary courts to comply with local government act.	Court membership is representative and aligns to Local government act with a minimum 35% women Baseline: 0 Target: 2 restructured courts Target: 2 restructured courts	Number of restructured courts	
	Activity 3.2.7: Train customary courts on reviewed customary law and practices	Number of training workshops with Executive Chief, Paramount Chiefs, Head Chiefs and Court Clerks, MajokWut (cattle camp leaders) and cattle camp youth Baseline: 0 Target: 10	Training reports	
	Activity 3.2.8: Disseminate reviewed customary law to community	Number of disseminated radio or social media messages per week since activity implementation until project end	Social media and radio messages	

	representatives, courts and the public.	Baseline: 0 Target: 3		

IOM SOUTH SUDAN
Greater Upper Nile State Administrative Map
09 Nov 2022