










PEACEBUILDING FUND

PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

Project Title: Support to Elections during the Transitional Period	Recipient UN Organization: UNDP
Project Contact: Randa Aboul-Hosn Address: UNDP Yemen, Sana'a, Yemen Telephone: +967 712 222 202 E-mail: randa.aboul-hosn@undp.org	Implementing Partner(s): The Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER)
Project Number: To be completed by UNDP MDTF Office	Project Location: Yemen
Project Description: In light of recent high levels of political and armed conflict characterized by armed violence and continued political tension between the different political groups and formal and informal opposition, the Phase I of this project will help ensure the organization of successful participatory elections, with engagement of youth, women and marginalized groups, paving the way to a smooth and nonviolent transitional period for the new Government of National Unity.	Total Project Cost: US\$ 15,028,046
	Peace Building Fund Contribution: US\$ 1,000,000 - Phase I
	Other funds received/pledged: 9,458,389 US\$ 1,000,000 (UNDP), US\$ 2,000,000 (EC), US\$ 1,140,000 (Japan), US\$ 2,318,389 (DfID/UK), US\$ 1,000,000 (Germany); US\$ 800,000 (Denmark), US\$ 1,200,000 GPECS (UNDP)
	Government Input: N/A
	Unfunded: US\$ 4,569,657
	Project Start Date and Duration: 15 December 2011. Phase I 3 months, Phase II 27,5 months (Total 30,5 months)
Gender Marker Score: 2	
PBF Priority Area(s) and Outcomes: Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution	
<i>6. Good governance, transparency of public financial management improved and corruption addressed, e.g. through support of peaceful, free and fair election processes, enhanced local governance capacity and decentralization of authority, as well as to initiatives that promote accountable civilian leadership and proper parliamentary oversight</i>	
Outputs and Key Activities: The aim of the project is to support the Government of Yemen (GoY), and the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER), in particular, in reinforcing the electoral cycle by conducting fair, open and inclusive elections within the terms of the agreed GCC Initiative (signed in Riyadh on 23 November, 2011 by the ruling and the opposition parties). The project will adopt a two-phase approach: Phase One, where PBF support is requested, will focus on the early presidential elections scheduled for 21 February, 2012; Phase Two will focus on electoral reforms, the expected referendum on the new/revised constitution, as well as post-referendum elections. The capacity of the SCER will be reinforced during both phases, at the institutional and individual levels. Support will be provided from a multi-partners basket fund to ensure coordination and cost-effectiveness.	
The output of the project is 2 Presidential, 1 Parliamentary and 1 local councils' elections supported and one constitutional referendum conducted within the transitional period 2011-2014. The project has four key activity results: 1) Resources required for the smooth running of the February 2012 early Presidential Elections mobilized; 2) i) Goods and services for the first 90 days President elections procured and put in place; 2 ii) SCER Capacity gaps at central and local levels addressed; 3) Communication, engagement and advocacy needs identified, and an	

action plan prepared with a timeline; and 4) Voters' registry updated for forthcoming elections and database management reconfigured. Phase I will focus on results 1, 2 and 3, with only initial work carried out for results 4. Given the extremely tight deadline to hold the February 2012 Elections, PBF funding is essential to ensure the organization of technically sound elections that will safeguard the country from entering into long-term violence and instability that might spread in the region. PBF funding will be critical in ensuring that voter turnout rates increase, that elections-related violence is reduced and that the elections receive necessary support to enable a smooth, nonviolent and stable process and E-day. PBF support will also play a catalytic function to show the UN commitment towards the process and attract more development partners for both Phase I and II of the project.

<p>Recipient UN Organization(s) <i>Mr. Gustavo Gonzalez</i> <i>Senior Country Office Director</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p>  <p><i>Country Office Yemen</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal 280112</i></p>	<p>National Implementing Partner(s) <i>H.E. Judge Mohammed H. Al-Hakimi</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p>  <p><i>Chairman, Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p> 
<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) <i>Ms Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations for Peace building Support</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p>  <p><i>Peacebuilding Support Office, NY</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p>	<p>Representative of National Authorities <i>H.E. Dr. Mohammed Al-Saadi</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p>  <p><i>Minister of Planning and International Cooperation</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p> 



COMPONENT 1: Situation Analysis

1. Twelve months of popular protest that started in Yemen in January 2011 in the wake of other mass protests in the Middle East have done little to clarify Yemen's political future. Until recently, persistent street protests across the country failed to oust President Ali Abdullah Saleh or bring about genuine institutional reform. It is estimated that more than 1500 persons between civilian and the security forces lost their lives and several thousand got injured during the uprisings. Furthermore, beneath the surface lie developments that should be worrisome to all: the division between pro- and anti-Saleh forces is deepening, the government lost control of large areas of the country, the economy is in tatters and both security and humanitarian conditions are deteriorating.
2. Up to a point, the regime managed to contain popular discontent through its policy of 'exclusive inclusiveness', which sought to incorporate into the regime's formal or informal networks a limited number of chosen personalities, whether pro- or anti-regime, with political or tribal influences extending to the grass roots level. Yet, this time the regime has met a crisis of legitimacy unprecedented in the past 30 years. Its legitimacy has been eroded far and wide, unrelentingly contested by forces as diverse as students and young people, religious leaders, business people, tribal authorities and others in many locations throughout the country.
3. Underlying this crisis of legitimacy are critical development failures, especially the deficits in governance, freedoms and social justice and, in particular, at their nexus with poverty, unemployment and inequality – in essence, failures in promoting and protecting human and national dignity.
4. The drivers of conflict and fragility in Yemen are multifaceted. Weak governance, including a lack of capable and effective state and non-state institutions, can be considered the single most important driver. Not surprisingly, governance in Yemen has many features making it similar to other developing countries in the region, such as a repressive regime with a record of systematic human rights violations; highly centralized government incapable of effective service delivery; high levels of corruption; a continuing exclusion of youth and minorities (including descent-based groups) from a wide range of opportunities; gaping gender disparities in politics, economy and social life; and so on. There are however a few political drivers that make Yemen particularly fragile and vulnerable to internal and external shocks:
 - a. ***Lack of developed democratic institutions.*** The lack of a culture of political participation beyond periodic elections disenfranchises participation and fuels a system of widespread corruption and patronage. Political culture at the grass roots level is equally underdeveloped. Inspired by genuine democratic inspirations and spearheaded by the youth in the beginning, the public protest movement has been hijacked by tribal-based elite groups who are now settling scores between them at the expense of ordinary people.
 - b. ***Strong tribal culture and tribal divisions.*** One of the factors that enabled tribal elites to use a genuinely democratic movement to their own advantage is a deeply rooted cultural tradition of tribal identification in Yemen. As the leaders of the Hashid tribal federation Hameed and Hussein al-Ahmar broke with the president and announced an open confrontation in March 2011, the conflict gained a tribal dimension. The President has managed to recruit the assistance and loyalty of the second-most powerful group in Hashid led by Sheikh Jalidan, thus splitting the federation and pitting these tribes against each other.
 - c. ***The split within the security sector.*** Security services, including the Army, function very much as personal fiefdoms with their loyalties

belonging to personalities in charge rather than to law and order. This has been clearly demonstrated by the defection of general Mohsen al-Ahmar together with his division in March 2011 whereas the Republican Guard under the President's son Ahmed Saleh remains staunchly on the side of the regime. Further divisions in the security sector may lead to a military confrontation and, in the worst case scenario, to a collapse of the Yemeni Army. The security consequences of this development would be very grave, particularly in light of the mass proliferation of small arms in the country (up to 60 million).

- d. *Unresolved Southern question.* Dissatisfaction with the current, highly centralized, organization of state and the perceived domination, if not outright occupation, by the North, has remained strong in the South after the unification of 1990 as evidenced by the 1994 conflict and the continuing Al-Hiraak movement. As mass protests have continued without results, frustration has grown and so too has Southern distrust that anything that happens in the North will improve their situation. An enduring political impasse could prompt further collapse of security and economic conditions throughout the country, producing greater unrest and instability in the South.
- e. *Sa'ada conflict.* In the North, Houthi tribes have their own grievances against the government and harbour aspirations of greater autonomy. The Houthi rebellion has, since 2004, passed through six rounds of intense fighting and has yet to be fully resolved. The conflict is dormant at the moment but the current truce signed in 2010 has held largely because the Houthis have since been left to run their affairs in Sa'adah. Any attempt to impose central rule without addressing first the ideological, political and economic roots of the situation, will rekindle the conflict, with grave consequences for the overall stability in Yemen.

Towards a political settlement

- 5. Against this backdrop, attempts have been made to reach a political settlement. The GCC Initiative, brokered by the GCC with US and EU backing and signed on 23 November 2011 by the regime and the opposition, envisages the safeguard of the unity, security and stability of Yemen and respect for the aspirations of the Yemeni people for change and reform. It also calls for a smooth and safe transfer of powers to avoid anarchy and violence and for an immediate stop to the protests. The implementation steps of this plan, known as the "GCC Mechanism," include the transfer of power to the Vice President (via an election) and the formation of a government of National Unity. In accordance with the GCC Mechanism, Phase 1 requires the Vice President to call for presidential elections within 90 days, and he thus set the date for 21 February, 2012. In accordance with the terms of GCC Mechanism, the Vice President issued a decree appointing a Prime Minister from the opposition, tasking him to form a government of National Unity. The Vice President also set up a Military Committee for Establishing Safety and Security. In phase 2 of the Mechanism, which begins with the election of the new president, the Government of National Unity will take steps to undertake constitutional reform, electoral reform, a conference of national dialogue, and new elections according to the terms of the new constitution. While there is still some disagreement with the GCC Initiative, particularly among the youth groups from the Changes Squares across the country, early presidential elections will go ahead on 21 February. Therefore, the February 21st Presidential elections should be considered as the very first step of a 2-year transition process whose success will heavily depend on the credibility and legitimacy of these first elections. The elections will be a key measure of the transfer of power as they will confer the necessary legitimacy, authority and support to the elected President to manage and safeguard the transition process, preventing a relapse into violence.

6. The GCC Implementation mechanism calls on the *United Nations Secretary General, in cooperation with other agencies, to provide ongoing assistance for the implementation of this agreement. He is also requested to coordinate the assistance from the international community to implement the initiative and this mechanism.*

7. A UN Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) led by the Department of Political Affairs visited Yemen on a five-day mission (1-5 December), and met with numerous Yemeni interlocutors, including the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum(SCER), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Vice President and other key stakeholders. The mission confirmed the need to support the early presidential elections and emphasized the urgency of a support intervention in order for the elections to be successfully held in the announced timeframe. At the same time, the NAM also looked to the transition period as a whole, and envisaged longer-term UN support to assist the Yemeni authorities through all phases of the transition, including support to an eventual referendum on the new constitution, the first parliamentary elections envisaged following the adoption of the new constitution, and eventual presidential elections to elect a new president (should the new constitution maintain a presidential administration system in Yemen), all within 2 years of the swearing in of the president elected following the early presidential elections of 21 February, 2012. Support from the Peacebuilding Fund through the Immediate Response Facility will help increase voter turnout rates, reduce Elections-related violence and ensure a smooth transition period through the successful organization of early Presidential Elections. Support from the PBF would also be catalytic in attracting additional funds, and underlines the key correlation between the short term electoral process and a more medium term process which holds the promise of stability in the country as a whole after more than 33 years under the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

COMPONENT 2: Narrative Section: Project justification

Budget Breakdown by Phase

Programmatic Area	PHASE I (Needs: US\$ 6,395,046)			
	Partner	Received (US\$)	Pledged (US\$)	Gap (US\$)
Democratic Governance, Support to Elections during the Transitional Period	UNDP (TRAC)	1,000,000		
	UNDP-EC (JEAP)	2,000,000		
	Germany	1,000,000		
	Japan		1,140,000	
	PBF		1,000,000	
	TOTAL, Phase I	4,000,000	2,140,000	255,046
	PHASE II (Needs: 8,633,000)			
	DfID		2,318,389	
	Denmark		800,000	
	UNDP (GPECS)		1,200,000	
	Total, Phase II		4,318,389	4,314,611
TOTAL, Project	4,000,000	6,458,389	4,569,657	

8. The current project will require substantial support from the international community. Many donors have expressed interest to support elections in the Arab countries of the Arab Spring and it is expected that this interest will be sustained for Yemen, particularly considering the political significance of the transfer of power cemented by the first presidential elections and the implementation of the subsequent clauses of the GCC Mechanism. However, given the extremely tight

deadline to hold the February 2012 Elections, PBF funding is essential to ensure the timely organization of technically sound and fully participatory elections.

9. The project will be implemented by UNDP using the Direct Implementation modality. In order to quickly and efficiently mobilize resources, a basket fund arrangement was set up and implemented. The basket fund will enable fast-track procurement and expenditures flexibility as outlined in the project document. Also, in line with principles of aid effectiveness, non-earmarked funds deposited into the basket fund will enable the project to priorities needs under the various components continuously and modify expenditure, as required. UN partners and development partners from the OECD and the GCC alike, as well as others, will be approached to contribute to the basket fund. In kind contribution from the private sector will also be considered where relevant and useful.
10. The project will also benefit from the expertise of the Electoral Assistance Division within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA/EAD), UNDP's Regional Bureau of Arab States, the Lead Electoral Advisor of the Bureau of Development Policy, and including staff members of the EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance (also BDP staff). Other international, inter-governmental and regional bodies will also assist, where necessary. The Electoral Assistance Division Desk Officer (a recent member of the NAM), and the EAD Director (who led the mission), will liaise with senior Country Office management and the Elections Coordinator regularly from HQ, and will provide political backstopping, in particular, as well as being the contact and facilitation point between the UNDP Country Office, the project, senior DPA officials, and the offices of the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Yemen and the implementation of the GCC Mechanism. Local CSOs will also be engaged in the implementation of some of the project components, liaising with both the SCER and its sectors and committees.
11. **Funding sources already identified for Phase One of the SETP project, and components:** The SETP project will target the duration of the Transition Period and the electoral processes therein. Phase One of the project, which focuses exclusively on the early presidential elections on 21 February, will overlap with the remaining three months of the existing Joint EC-UNDP Electoral Assistance Project (JEAP). As some US\$ 600,000 worth of remaining activity of the JEAP project was pre-programmed and with commitments already entered into in important areas such as womens' participation, discussions were entered into with the EU Delegation in order to priorities the remaining US\$ 1.4m of projects funds towards the Feb 21 early presidential elections, primarily in the training of polling staff, voter education, public outreach and procurement components below (a, c and d). Thus a total of US\$ 2m of EU funds can be considered a crucial and integral part of the overall funding for the SETP project during phase I. The JEAP activity, from January 1, 2012 – March 31st, 2012 will complement the SETP project and will priorities the following four areas:
 - a. **Advocacy, public outreach and voter education** – The project will support the SCER's efforts in the area of public outreach, advocacy and voter education, consisting primarily of the design and procurement of TV ads, radio jingles, newspaper ads and other communication messages, etc.
 - b. **Enhance women's participation in the electoral process** – via awareness raising support to enhance women's participation as voters, including the provision of a women's voters' hotline, the production of a newsletter and the development of female ballot guidelines, etc. A series of roundtables in literacy centres will also be supported. Specific women-focused voter education messages and products will be developed.
 - c. **Provision of training via ToT activity and seminars (poll workers, judges, domestic observers and political parties)** – This will target key personnel in the SCER involved in polling day operations. It will support

the rental of training venues, and transport and personnel costs for the team of hundreds of trainers that SCER will use to conduct the polling staff training. It will also assist the SCER with regards to training seminars for judges and prosecutors on the electoral law and electoral offences, as well as assisting the SCER on conducting training sessions for domestic observers and political party representatives.

- d. Support to polling integrity** – in the procurement area, the project will provide some vitally important equipment to enhance the integrity of the polling process, including the provision of battery-powered lamps for polling centre lighting, and 380 netbook computers that will be used in 345 polling centres to enter the basic data of unregistered voters. This measure is a precursor to a more advanced voter register update plan being developed by the SCER with the assistance of the project, which, later in 2012 as part of the SETP project, will use these same computers, plus additional ones to be procured, to allow for full data capture and registration of all voters not on the voter register, so that they can vote as normal in the other electoral events foreseen under the transition.
12. Germany has committed **US\$ 1m** to the basket fund in non-earmarked contributions,
 13. **US\$ 1.14m** has been identified from the Japanese Government, which will also target phase one of the project.
 14. The Country Office is committing **US\$ 1m** of TRAC funds to support the remainder of the envisaged Phase One support.
 15. **Phase One of the SETP project and PBF utilization.** Thus the **US\$ 1m** of PBF funds sought will solely focus on Phase One of the project, covering some of the remaining urgent needs for the successful conduction of early Presidential elections. The **US\$ 1m** will represent a substantial contribution to the overall current funding gap for the entire project of over **US\$ 5m**, and address a critical funding gap Phase One. This indispensable funding will enable to project to produce key results in terms of helping the SCER organize Elections, thus facilitating the political transition, contributing to a peaceful transfer of powers and to the overall legitimacy of the process. Acting as essential partner and donor of last resort PBSO's engagement will also provide confidence and time for more donors to come onboard in Phase II.
 16. **Advancement of PBF mandate and priorities.** The implementation of the project will significantly contribute to the advancement of PBF priority area 2 in Yemen as it will bolster good governance and contribute to initiate national dialogue, reconciliation and the process of constitutional and legislative reform envisaged in the GCC agreement. The project will also target participation of youth and women in the electoral and nation building process thus addressing some of the reasons of discontent that led to the 2011 uprisings. In particular, one of the assumed main threats of discontent and potential unrest is the exclusion of the young and unregistered voters in these early Elections. The successful organization of the early Elections, with a clear emphasis on voter turnout, engagement campaigns, voter education, media coverage and general advocacy, are therefore all key to reduce Elections-related violence and contribute to stability. The inclusion of these voters will account for almost 20 percent of the new electorate and will help to bring hope to many of the young demonstrators who have been excluded from formal political processes and expressed their dissatisfaction on the streets of Yemen. The investment in capacity development for the SCER, for them to carry out a seamless preparatory electoral process, and efforts to enhance youth's and women's participation, will therefore have a catalytic long-term effect, providing relief to distressed and excluded youth, including women, and contribute to highly peaceful and successful electoral events. It will also have a positive impact on youth, in general, enhancing their belief in the democratic processes for future participation. The support to the

inclusion of youth and women should also be seen as additional to the National Dialogue process for constitutional reform which the new government will carry out in 2012.

17. **Phase Two of the SETP project and catalytic effect of the PBF contribution.**
It is expected that other donors, such as the EU, who have a governance envelope of EUR18m available for governance support in 2012, will come forward with fresh funds once the commitment of the UN to contribute its own funds is shown in the first phase thus filling the remaining US\$ 4,569,657 funding gap (after receipt of \$1m from PBSO).
18. In the meantime, a further **US\$ 1.2m** has been requested from the UNDP Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) project, and specifically from its Country Window. GPECS is almost fully-funded by the Spanish Government, and the Country Window targets individual countries,
19. **US\$ 2.3m** has been identified and is expected to materialize from DfID, which will be used primarily to support procurement and an evaluation of phase I that will inform the finalization of the activities foreseen under Phase Two.
20. An additional **US\$ 800,000** will be contributed by the Government of Denmark, also to the basket fund, non-earmarked.
21. Annual Work Plans for the post-February months remaining in 2012, as well as for 2013 and 2014, will identify the exact activities required to reach the results identified in the Results Resource Framework. This main components of the AWP, however, will focus on:
 - a. **Substantial capacity building of the SCER**, including both at the human resources level (through the provision of BRIDGE-type training activities, a thorough training needs analysis, and assistance with both strategic and operational planning for the various elections) and the institutional level (including the continued roll-out of the system to link up all SCER branch offices in a network, with access to databases, etc., and additional vehicle support);
 - b. Support to the **update of the voter register**, which will include both concept planning, system design, procurement and technical assistance for the full digitization of the voter register, the removal of duplicates and deceased voters, and planning on the eventual merger of the voter register with elements of the civil register and other population records (including biometric records for duplicate analysis);
 - c. Substantial continued **focus on women's participation** in the electoral process, including both as voters and as candidates, primarily through advocacy work, voter education targeting women, and technical assistance to the SCER that addresses women-friendly operational practices (such as voter registration times and location, etc.). The latter area will involve closer work with political parties and civil society groups, as well as with other international partners (such as NDI),
 - d. Continued heavy focus on **public outreach work, civic and voter education**, as a means to promote full participation by Yemeni citizens in the electoral processes of the transition period, in particular the referendum on the expected new constitution.
 - e. Potential support in the **area of political financing**, and regulation of the media and campaign finance framework.

COMPONENT 3: Logical Framework (including implementation strategy)

The Working Group on Elections (WGE), composed of key donors, will be formalized within the context of this project during its implementation. The composition of the WGE will be enlarged to include the witnesses of the signing of the GCC Agreement in Riyadh, as key players in providing technical, moral and financial support for the smooth holding of the early presidential elections in February 2012, and other subsequent elections/constitutional referenda in 2014. Under the umbrella of this project, the WGE will be chaired by UNDP and will meet on a weekly basis during the initial stages of preparations for the February 2012 elections, to review, assess and coordinate progress. The frequency of WGE meeting after the February 2012 early presidential elections will be decided by the members of the group after the announcement of the results of the elections

Logical Framework

Part 1 (Strategic Level):

Objectives	Measurable indicators/Targets	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>PBF Priority Area 2: <i>Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution</i></p>	<p>Timely, peaceful and successful conduct of the Interim Presidential elections Target: elections held on 21st February in a peaceful and participatory environment; acceptance of the election results and smooth transition of powers</p>	<p>GoY and Ministry of Interior data on the polling. Results of phase I evaluation including assessment on the participation in the elections and acceptance of the results in different geographic areas and social groups including CSOs, youth, women, and media</p>	<p>Transition government is able to agree on a schedule of compromises in order to allow elections to take place.</p>
<p>PBF Outcome 6: <i>Good governance, transparency of public financial management improved and corruption addressed, e.g. through support of peaceful, free and fair election processes, enhanced local governance capacity and decentralization of authority, as well as to initiatives that promote accountable civilian leadership and proper parliamentary oversight</i></p>	<p>Number of people who vote in the Interim Presidential election. Baseline: 12.4m eligible voters Target 15%</p>	<p>SCER data on the polling; Results of phase I evaluation</p>	<p>75% of population are safely able to access a polling station. All major political parties (GPC & JMP) continue to support participation in the election.</p>
<p>OUTPUTS: <i>1) SCER Capacity gaps at central and local levels addressed;</i> <i>2) Communication, engagement and advocacy needs identified, and an action plan prepared with a timeline;</i></p>	<p>1) Number of polling staff trained in the rules, procedures, and special arrangements for the conduct of the interim president elections. (disag.) Target: 1000 ToT 2) Extent to which Communications Strategy is appropriate, achievable and targets women and youth</p>	<p>Results of phase I evaluation</p>	<p>75% of population are safely able to access a polling station. All major political parties (GPC & JMP) continue to support participation in the election.</p>

Part 2 (Implementation Level): This table describes what will be implemented, by whom, how, and how much.


PBF Outcome: 6

Main Activities	Inputs	Rough Cost Estimate (optional)	Person(s) responsible for mobilizing inputs
Note: PBF support for Phase I only			
1. Operational Electoral Support Unit	Elections Coordinator	US\$ 75,000	UNDP Yemen
	Elections Operations Adviser	US\$ 75,000	
	Procurement Specialist	US\$ 60,000	
	Finance Officer	US\$ 60,000	
	ICT/Database Expert	US\$ 40,000	
	Civil Society Expert	US\$ 60,000	
	Media Expert	US\$ 40,000	
	National CSO Experts (2)	US\$ 10,000	
	Translator	US\$ 6,000	
	Nat'l Communications Officer	US\$ 6,000	
	Laptops (10)	US\$ 15,000	
2. Capacity Development, Training and Advocacy	Training of Trainers, polling staff	US\$ 240,000	UNDP Yemen Complements JEAP funds
	Training of core SCER staff	US\$ 213,110	
3. Polling station integrity/safety	Lamps (6893pcs)	US\$ 34,469	UNDP Yemen (additional lamps and battery will be purchased using other funds)
Total		934,579	

COMPONENT 4: Budget

PBF PROJECT BUDGET	
CATEGORIES	AMOUNT
1. Supplies, commodities, equipment and transport	US\$ 34,469
2. Personnel (staff, consultants and travel)	US\$ 447,000
3. Training of counterparts	US\$ 453,110
4. Contracts	
5. Other direct costs	
Sub-Total Project Costs	US\$ 934,579
Indirect Support Costs (GMS, 7 percent)	US\$ 65,421
TOTAL	US\$ 1,000,000

COMPONENT 5: Management Arrangements



UNDP has been requested by the Yemeni Government to provide technical and substantive assistance in setting up the project and assist with the electoral processes envisaged under the GCC Agreement. Moreover, as per in the GCC Mechanism, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has been requested to provide and coordinate electoral assistance, in order to help ensure the orderly and timely holding of elections during the transitional period (2011-2014). UNDP is in a prime position to assist the Government, due to its mandate and ability to build partnerships, coordinate between the various parties involved, obtain knowledge from global experiences, develop capacities, and assist with fundraising efforts. UNDP's fast track mechanism expedites effective and timely procurement of goods and services, necessary for the success of elections during the transitional period.

The project will be implemented by UNDP in accordance with established UNDP procedures. The responsible party will be UNDP. Basket fund resources will be channelled through the UNDP bank account and funds will be managed by UNDP, using the cost sharing modality.

A Project Board will be established to oversee the implementation of the project. Membership in the Board should ensure inclusion from leading CSOs working on elections, human rights and gender, to the greatest extent possible.

The Project Board is the group responsible for making, by consensus, management decisions for the project when guidance is required by the day-to-day manager of the project, the Elections Coordinator), including recommendations for UNDP/Implementing Partner approval of project annual work plans and revisions. In order to ensure UNDP ultimate accountability, the Project Board decisions are made in accordance with standards that ensure management for development results, best value for money, fairness, integrity, transparency and effective international competition. In case a consensus cannot be reached within the Board, the final decision will rest with the UNDP Resident Representative or his/her delegate.

The Project Board has the following specific responsibilities:

1. Provide overall guidance and direction to the project, ensuring it functions within any specified constraints;
2. Address project issues raised by the Elections Coordinator;
3. Provide guidance and agree on possible countermeasures/management actions to address specific risks;
4. Agree on the Elections Coordinator's tolerances in the Annual Work Plan and quarterly plans when required;
5. Conduct regular meetings to review the Project Quarterly Progress Report and provide direction and recommendations to ensure that the agreed deliverables are produced satisfactorily, according to plans;
6. Review Combined Delivery Reports (CDR), prior to certification by the Implementing Partner;
7. Appraise the Project Annual Review Report, make recommendations for the next AWP, and inform the Outcome Board about the results of the review;
8. Review and approve the end of project Final Report, and make recommendations for follow-on actions;
9. Provide ad-hoc direction and advice for exceptional situations, when the Elections Coordinator manager's tolerances are exceeded; and
10. Assess and decide on project changes through revisions.

Since the project is directly implemented by UNDP, UNDP will be in charge of the overall monitoring of the project, ensuring the achievement of results. UNDP will also be responsible for the recruitment of project staff. The recruitment process will be conducted in close consultation with the SCER. An international Elections Coordinator will be recruited, as this is necessary for the effective and timely implementation of the project (see Annex III – Terms of Reference – Elections Coordinator). Additional support staff will be recruited as needed, including a Finance Expert, a Data Management Expert, a Procurement Expert and a Civil Society/Elections Expert.

The **Elections Coordinator** will provide coordination and day to day **management of the project**. The Elections Coordinator will be responsible for implementing the project activities and will be accountable to the Project Board. The Elections Coordinator will be responsible for preparing a detailed project work plan and budget, reporting on the day-to-day activities and progress of the project, and submitting progress and financial reports to UNDP and the Project Board. The Elections Coordinator will also be responsible for managing the project's finances according to UNDP's financial management rules and regulations, and for maintaining all documentation related to the project. Any changes in the milestones and outputs of the project will be discussed with and agreed upon with the Project Board.

UNDP will be responsible for the recruitment and contracting of project staff based on mutual agreement with the SCER, and will be responsible for the purchase of expandable and non-expendable equipment in accordance with UNDP rules and procedures, taking into consideration the specifications laid down by SCER and UNDP Country Office senior management.

SCER will provide office space, access to telecommunications, and assign a qualified counterpart to the project and to each of the international and national project staff, in order to ensure transfer knowledge and experience within the broader concept of capacity development, which is the key component of the project.

While the SCER will be the main target group of the project, other stakeholders will be engaged, including CSOs and youth groups active in the democratisation area (which will play a crucial role in the implementation of domestic monitoring and civic and voter education activities), as well as key Ministries, political parties and the media. The project will also seek to promote linkages with other international actors/organisations.

The Working Group on Elections during the Transitional Period (2011-2014)

As indicated in the project strategy section (and also taking into account the current ongoing political uprising in Yemen), the project will also benefit from the existence of the Working Group on Election (WGE), which will be formalized under this project, and which will deal mainly with two major issues:

1. Provide political input in order to fulfill the GCC agreement's requirements; and
2. Assist the UNDP Country Office in mobilizing financial resources required to ensure smooth implementation of the planned project activities and achievement of the ultimate results.

The Working Group on Election will be chaired by the UNDP Country Office Resident Representative or his designated official. During Phase I of the project (early presidential election scheduled for 21 February 2012), the Group will meet on a weekly basis. After the announcement of the February 2012 early presidential election results, the Group will decide on the meeting intervals for the remaining period of the political transition in Yemen.

Contributions through the cost sharing modality

The cost sharing by third party is the modality through which the donors, the international financial institutions (IFI) and private institutions contribute to the funds and to individual programmes and project sponsored by UNDP. To that end, the typical agreement of cost sharing, signed between the donor and UNDP, constitutes the legal agreement between the two parties. This agreement states the contribution of the donor as well as the schedule of payment. UNDP shall ensure that payments are received before carrying out the planned activities.

The cost sharing is entirely integrated into the UNDP project budget and registered as part of the document of the programme and the project budget. A contribution as cost sharing cannot be allocated to a specific budget line, to specific contributions or to a specific element. The contribution applies to the whole budget of the project.

A contribution through cost sharing shall include a part calculated to the pro rata of all the payable costs of the Operational Support Service, as well as the reimbursement of the costs incurred by UNDP. The unexpended balance of the cost-sharing portion of the budget of UNDP programme or project is carried forward to the following year. The utilization of unexpended contributions due to changes in the implementation of the programme or project is negotiated with the donor. If the activities are cancelled, the non-utilized funds can be either reimbursed or reallocated after consulting the donor and the programme country.

Reports on the expenditure and results obtained through donor contributions are regularly established and submitted to donors. The context and period of the reports shall be clearly established in the agreement. Annual reports are recommended. In comparison to the Trust Fund modality, the cost sharing modality allows a greater flexibility in the utilization of the resources during the implementation of the project, and is particularly recommended in a post-crisis context. The value of the payment, if made in a currency other than United States dollars, shall be determined by applying the United Nations operational rate of exchange in effect on the date of payment. Should there be a change in the United Nations operational rate of exchange prior to the full utilization by the UNDP of the payment, the value of the balance of funds still held at that time will be adjusted accordingly. If, in such a case, a loss in the value of the balance of funds is recorded, UNDP shall inform the respective donor (including contributions from the Government of Yemen) with a view to determining whether any further financing could be provided by the respective donor/GoY. Should such further financing not be available, the assistance to be provided to the project may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.

The above schedule of payments takes into account the requirement that the payments shall be made in advance of the implementation of planned activities. It may be amended to be consistent with the progress of project delivery.

UNDP shall receive and administer the payment in accordance with the regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.

All financial accounts and statements shall be expressed in United States dollars. The UNDP Country Office will only provide Provisional Financial Statement during the submission of progress reports, and the certified Financial Statement for the full year will be issued by Division of Finance (DoF) during the second quarter of the following year.

If unforeseen increases in expenditures or commitments are expected or realized (whether owing to inflationary factors, fluctuation in exchange rates or unforeseen contingencies), UNDP shall submit to the donor/Government on a timely basis a supplementary estimate showing the further financing that will be necessary. The donor/Government shall use its best endeavours to obtain the additional funds required.

If the cost sharing payments referred in the cost sharing agreements are not received in accordance with the payment schedule, or if the additional financing required in accordance with paragraph 5 above is not forthcoming from the donor/Government or other sources, the assistance to be provided to the project under this Agreement may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.

In accordance with the decisions and directives of UNDP's Executive Board:

The contribution shall be charged:

- a. 7% for the third party cost sharing coming from donors and 5% for the Government of Yemen cost sharing contribution (if any) to cover cost recovery for the provision of general management support (GMS) by UNDP headquarters and country offices

Interest

Interest on cost sharing sums, if any, will be administered in accordance with UNDP's financial regulations and rules.

Balance of Funds

Participating donors/agencies: Any unutilized funds from cost sharing contributions of more than US\$ 5,000 remaining after the financial closure of the project will be returned to the respective donors/agencies, or utilized in a manner agreed upon with the respective donor/agency.

Audit

As the project is directly implemented by UNDP Country Office, the corporate audit procedures will be applied accordingly, under the leadership of the Office of Audit in UNDP in New York.

Quality Assurance

A UNDP Programme Officer based in the UNDP Country Office, will be in charge of **project assurance**. The project assurance role supports the Project Board by carrying out objective and independent project oversight and monitoring functions. The role ensures appropriate project management milestones are properly managed and completed. Project assurance must be independent from the Elections Coordinator; therefore the Project Board cannot delegate any of its assurance responsibilities to the Elections Coordinator.

The implementation of the assurance responsibilities needs to answer the question "What is to be assured?" The following list includes the key suggested aspects that need to be checked by the project assurance Programme Officer throughout the project to ensure that it remains relevant, follows the approved plan and continues to meet the planned targets with quality:

1. Liaison is maintained between the members of the Project Board throughout the project;
2. Beneficiary needs and expectations are being met and managed;
3. Risks are being controlled;
4. Adherence is maintained to the Project Justification (Business Case);
5. The project fits with the overall Country Programme;
6. The right people are being involved;

7. An acceptable solution is being developed;
8. The project remains viable;
9. The scope of the project is not developing "mission creep";
10. Internal and external communications are working;
11. Applicable UNDP rules and regulations are being observed;
12. Any legislative constraints are being observed;
13. Adherence is being maintained to the Results Management Guide (RMG) monitoring and reporting requirements and standards;
14. Quality management procedures are properly followed;
15. The Project Board's decisions are implemented and revisions are managed in line with the required procedures, and;
16. In addition, project assurance approves the appointments/termination of and responsibilities of the Elections Coordinator and other international experts.

Communication

UNDP, in consultation with SCER, shall take appropriate measures to publicize the project and to give due credit to donor agencies. Information given to the media/press, to the beneficiaries of the project, all related publicity material, official notices, as well as reports and publications, shall acknowledge the role of the Government of Yemen, UNDP, and contributing donor agencies and any other relevant parties. In particular, UNDP will include and ensure due recognition of the role of UNDP, the Government of Yemen and donor agencies in all external communications relating to the project.

COMPONENT 6: Monitoring and evaluation

As referred to in the project document, a Project Board will oversee project implementation, and will be particularly cognizant of the various funding sources, including the PBF. The PBF funds will also act as a catalyst to spur greater political coordination on the part of the UNCT and the office of the RC, and to mobilize the political, as well as financial, might of other international partners, including the GCC countries that oversaw the signing of the GCC initiative. Internal monitoring will be coordinated so as to provide updates to Project Board meetings. Finally, an evaluation will be conducted at the end of phase one of the project, during the finalization of phase two plans, so as to ensure a more focused intervention for the medium term.

In accordance with programming policies and procedures outlined in the UNDP User Guide, the project will be monitored through the following:

Within the annual cycle

- On a quarterly basis, a quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in the quality management table below.
- An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Elections Coordinator to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.
- Based on the initial risk analysis submitted (see annex 1), a risk log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly updated, by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project's implementation.
- Based on the above information recorded in Atlas, Project Progress Reports (PPR) shall be submitted by the Elections Coordinator to the Project Board through the Project Assurance Officer (UNDP Programme Officer), using the standard report format available in the Executive Snapshot.
- a project Lesson-learned log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the project
- a Monitoring Schedule Plan shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions/events

Annually

- **Annual Review Report.** An Annual Review Report shall be prepared by the Elections Coordinator and shared with the Project Board and the Outcome Board. As minimum requirement, the Annual Review Report shall consist of the Atlas standard format for the QPR covering the whole year with updated information for each above element of the QPR as well as a summary of results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level.
- **Annual Project Review.** Based on the above report, an annual project review shall be conducted during the fourth quarter of the year or soon after, to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the following year. In the last year, this review will be a final assessment. This review is driven by the Project Board and may involve other stakeholders as required. It shall focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes.

The annual review process will be subjected to the approval of this project for the entire transitional period 2011-2014 and also subject to availability of envisage funds from donors.

Additionally, a project evaluation will be carried out during the second quarter of 2012 for the Phase I of the early Presidential elections according to UNDP Evaluation Policy and funds to carry such activity has been allocated under the Short-Term Consultants budget line. The process is a complex engagement of many national partners and beneficiaries, development partners and other stakeholders and the project's success will be key parameter in guiding the support for the second phase of the transitional plan in which the new presidential Elections will be carried out in 2014. Despite the fact the number of voter turnout has not been used as a key indicator for this project due to current security status of the country, as mainly this elections is treated a special event that will safeguard the country in entering into a long-term violence and security instability that might spread to the region. Hence, all types of indicators such as 1) voter turnout numbers; 2) gender and youth participation in the elections; 3) comparison of voter turnouts in all polling stations with the last President elections of 2006 (by gender) will be use and assessed during the evaluation applying security lenses and report the evaluation findings. It is evidently that security might be impediment for the turnouts of voters in areas where access/movement is limited/restricted in areas as Sa'adah and Abyan if no security measures/progress made in the Military and Security Committee is not reached prior to the elections.

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation will be shared with all partners and stakeholder during the first quarter of 2012.

The lessons learn and evaluation recommendations, if any, will be integrated into this project document through a substantive revision in order to enhance the elections work within the remaining duration of the transitional period (2012-2014) and future elections as well.

COMPONENT 7: Analysis of risks and assumptions

Offline Risk Log

No	Description	Date Identified	Type	Impact & Probability	Countermeasures / Mgt response	Owner	Submitted, updated by
1	Lacking support from donors, lacking resources to finance project	2 Dec 2011	Operational, financial	I = 4 P = 2	Advocacy with donors; clarification of project's purpose and its importance to the transition	UNDP	Project Design Team
2	Inability to procure materials and services in time, or delays in delivery	2 Dec 2011	Operational	I = 4 P = 3	Continuous follow-up on contracts	UNDP	Project Design Team
3	UNDP considered partial for providing support to Elections which do not have support in the entire population	2 Dec 2011	Political	I = 3 P = 2	Dissemination of information on the project and its role; continuous dialogue with critical parties	UNDP	Project Design Team

The Need Assessment Mission conducted by UNDP and EAD/DPA from December 1-5 2011 highlighted the risk that low turnout due to apathy or disillusion, especially of the youth would have an impact on the overall outcome of the process and the legitimacy of the newly elected President. The NAM also acknowledged that elections of bad quality risk compromising the transitional process and the credibility of the UN as a new peace-building partner too. Possible tensions between signatories of the agreement (ie GPC and Opposition Parties) as well as the central government and various factions were also identified as possible threats to the successful conduct of the elections. Finally, funding the conduct of elections within 90 days from the signature of the agreement was considered a significant challenge.

The project design has taken in due consideration the risks above and included appropriate measures to address and/or mitigate these risks. In particular the project will undertake significant efforts in terms of public outreach and voter education seeking to engage all sections of the population and explain the importance of this round of elections for the success of the entire transition. The project set up a multi-donor basket fund to mobilize resources from interested donors and a robust Elections Support Unit (ESU), located at the SCER's offices providing the following expertise: Elections Coordinator, Elections Operations Adviser, Procurement Specialist, Civil Society and Elections Expert, Media Expert, Financial Specialist, An international IT/Communications Expert also came to help set up and ensure all ICT systems at the SCER were operational.