

2010 ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR PROJECT IRFFI/UNDG IRAQ TRUST FUND (UNDG ITF)

Participating UN Organization:
UNOPS

Old Cluster: Governance

New Sector: Governance Sector Outcome Team

Project No. and Project Title:
C9-20
Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through
Constitutional Review and National Dialogue

Report Number:
ATLAS Project Number: **66950**
ATLAS Award Number: 54950

Reporting Period:
1 January – 31 December 2010

Project Budget USD 6,033,807

List Implementing Partners:
Implementing Partners:

- National counterparts (government, private, NGOs & others)
- Council of Representatives
- Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee (part of Council of Representatives)
- 4 Iraqi CSOs (in the reporting period)
- International Organizations, including NGOs
- None in the reporting period

Geographic Coverage/Scope:
Nationwide with bulk of activities in Baghdad.

Abbreviations and Acronyms:

OCS = Office of Constitutional Support
CFA = Culture for All
CRC = Constitutional Review Committee
CoR = Council of Representatives
CSO = Civic Society Organisation
MoA = Memorandum of Agreement
NRGF = National Reconciliation Grant Fund
GOI = Government of Iraq
PRA = Participatory Rapid Appraisal
SCSO = Steering Committee Support Office

Project Status: On going

Over all Duration: 57 months
Start Date: 25.10.2006
Original End Date: 25.10.2007
Revised End Date: 30.06.2011
1st Extension: 31 Dec 2008
2nd Extension: 31.03.2009
3rd Extension: 31.12.2009
4th Extension: 30.09.2010
5th Extension: 30.06.2011

NARRATIVE REPORT FORMAT

I. Purpose

The main objectives of the programme/project are to:

1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the Constitutional Review Committee, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.
2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicised and by providing neutral environment for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors.
3. Reach out to the wider Iraqi society to increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives

The outcomes of the programme/ project are:

1. Technical and logistical Support to the Constitutional Review Committee

- 1.1 Iraqi governmental institutions involved in the Constitutional process are presented with an array of viable best practice options to guide the constitutional review and implementation process.
- 1.2 Improved management of the constitutional review process and implementation of constitutional mandated laws.
- 1.3 Enhanced capacity, both operational and technical, of the Constitutional Review Committee in order to ensure optimal discharge of its responsibilities

2. Consensus-driven Constitution Review through the facilitation of a neutral environment for dialogue

- 2.1 Enhanced process of dialogue between political actors, based on an improved understanding, in and out of Parliament, of options available for the resolution of divisive issues, leads to real consensus-based constitution making process.
- 2.2 Secure the support of influential Iraqi and international actors towards the constitutional process through intense coordination, awareness raising and dialogue.

3. Iraqi society aware and involved in the review process and efforts towards national reconciliation

- 3.1. Greater visibility of the efforts carried out by the Iraqi Government to conduct a transparent, inclusive and consensus-based constitutional review process.
- 3.2. Multi-stakeholder and other initiatives working towards the resolution of divisive constitutional issues, the contribution to cessation of violence in order to provide an environment for constructive dialogue and the support to the national reconciliation plan.
- 3.3. Empowerment of civil society to advocate their constitutional and national reconciliation concerns.

The expected outputs of the programme/project are:

- 1.1.1. Submissions to CRC for constitutional amendments and knowledge-based support on constitutional principles and practices to Iraqi institutions.
- 1.1.2. Improved management of the Constitutional Review Process.

1.1.3. Direct support to CRC for logistics and outreach.

2.1.1. Inter-party Dialogues and Study Tours.

2.1.2. Intensive and ongoing coordination with other international actors involved in the Constitutional Review Process.

3.1.1. Publications and Media events.

3.1.2. NGO Grant Fund.

3.1.3. Civil Society consultation and participation in the Constitutional Review Process.

- **Explain how the Programme relates to the Strategic (UN) Planning Framework guiding the operations of the Fund.**

UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq

This project directly contributes to achieving the fourth goal of the UNCT Assistance Strategy matrix: *“To promote good governance and democratic processes, assist to uphold the rule of law and establish a human rights regime”*.

UN Millennium Development Goals

MDG: 8

“Develop a global partnership for Development”, point 1, which “...includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction— nationally and internationally.”

Iraqi National Development Strategy

The Programme contributes to the following Iraq National Development Goals:

“Strengthening good governance and security”

International Compact with Iraq

Benchmarks/Indicators: 4.2.1. (Engaging with Civil Society)

II. Resources

Financial Resources:

- **Budget revisions approved by the Iraq Trust Fund Steering Committee.**

The following no cost extension budget revisions/time extensions were approved during the reporting period adding additional activities to the project.

(i) 15th November 2010 (till 30th June 2011).

- activities prompting dialogue over sensitive political issues among various groups by the way of organising three High-level roundtable meetings on outstanding constitutional issues;
- activities promoting civil society participation in discussion on constitutional issues and developing relations between civil society and ICOR.

- **Good practices and constraints in the mechanics of the financial process, times to get transfers, identification of potential bottlenecks, need for better coordination, etc.**

In general, the financial process with the UNDG-ITF is very well managed as funds for newly approved projects are transferred in a few days after the official signature of the Project Document. There are no real bottlenecks and currently budget revisions are processed quickly. Moreover, the financial reporting on an annual basis facilitates the process compared to the previous practice of semiannual financial reporting. The on line reporting portal used for financial reporting of all the Multi Donor Trust Fund projects also helps improve the quality of reporting.

Human Resources:

- **National Staff:**

Operation (all part-time positions):

- 1 Finance Assistant – Amman (10%)
- 1 Field Coordinator (10%)

Programme:

- 2 Project Officers (50% and 20%, 9 months) – Amman
- 1 Project Officer (50%, 9 months) – Baghdad
- 1 Programme finance associate (50%, 9 months) – Amman
- 1 Programme admin assistant (50%, 9 months) – Amman

- **International Staff:**

Programme staff:

Program Manager (40%) – Amman
International Project Officer (8%) - Amman

Consultants (programme):

- 3 Constitutional/reconciliation experts (retainer contracts)
- 1 evaluation expert (temporary contract).

III. Implementation and Monitoring Arrangements

UNOPS as the executing partner of UNAMI-OCS works by making the necessary financial, logistical and project management arrangements. The roles of UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS in the implementation process were clearly defined in the Exchange of Letters (EoL) document signed by the two agencies. The work plan of the UNAMI OCS includes three components: Continued advice and assistance with respect to the Constitutional Review itself; advice and assistance in the development of constitutionally mandated (or other, relevant) legislation; and advice and assistance in the design, formulation and development of Iraqi institutions that will support the constitutional framework, including, among numerous others, the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federation Council. The UNAMI budget supports regular OCS staff, while the project supports international consultants and experts to provide complementary advice as necessary. Implementation and administrative support to the project is provided by UNOPS, under the leadership of an international Programme Manager, based in Amman with frequent visits to Iraq. The Programme Manager coordinates not only operational and administrative support to the OCS team and activities, but also coordinates the implementation of activities directly under the responsibility of UNOPS. This comprises of the civil society component of the project. Under this component UNOPS works with NGO partners operating in Iraq. Monitoring of the grant project implemented by NGO partners working in Iraq is carried out through UNOPS field staff and (depending on the needs) additionally by an external monitoring agent. The coordination and remote monitoring is carried out from the Amman office. The Project Manager is supported by staff based in Amman and Project Associates in Iraq. Substantive and financial reporting is the responsibility of the Project Manager.

- **The procurement procedures utilized.**

Procurement for the project is done in accordance with UNOPS procurement policies

Any NGO applying for grants offered by UNOPS is required to register in the UNOPS NGO data base. The registering entity has to feed in various data on the NGO history, composition, profile and registration in Iraq. The registration, when finalized, is validated by UNOPS staff in charge of the DB. The DB is also used for disseminating Requests for Proposals with grant projects offered to NGOs.

UNOPS utilizes standard procurement process according to its procurement manual* and following principles

- a) Best value for money
- b) Fairness, integrity and transparency
- c) Effective competition
- d) The best interests of UNOPS and its clients

UNOPS procures goods and services in close collaboration with the Clients, Iraqi authorities, and the Beneficiaries. While the individual arrangements vary depending on the Client and the specific project requirements, the general modalities are:

Requirements

- Upon request of Client, and together with the Iraqi counterparts, identify the goods and services for UNOPS to provide or contract.
- Preparation of detailed specifications of equipment and services and work plan, by UNOPS, based on input and with the support from the Client, the Iraqi authorities and the beneficiaries.
- UNOPS utilizes standard procurement process, including; Request for Quotations (RFQ), Invitation to Bid (ITB), Request for Proposal (RFP)

Short-listing

- UNOPS has developed and maintains a database of known suppliers and service providers in Iraq (incl. performance assessment, capacity, registration in Iraq, etc.) and a roster of registered experts.
- Qualified and potentially interested vendors in the area can also be drawn from the local authority's relevant company registration offices.
- Alternatively, interested companies can be requested to submit their profiles in response to an Expression of Interest ad published in the Iraqi and/or international media (incl. internet).
- Where necessary and relevant, information on companies/vendors can also be drawn from other UN agencies and entities operating in Iraq.
- The short-list of companies selected to be included in the procurement exercise requires approval by the Regional Director, confirming that all relevant sources of information have been utilized for compiling the list.

Tendering Process

- UNOPS issues an Invitation to Bid/Request for Proposal to all short-listed companies, requesting them to submit an Offer/Proposal in line with the specific requirements. The document also stipulates the exact process of submission, receipt, opening, and evaluation of bids and it informs on the nature of the contract/purchase order the selected bid could result in.
- Requests for clarification received from potential bidders are responded to by UNOPS, if necessary upon consultation with the Client, relevant Iraqi authorities, and/or Beneficiaries.
- After expiration of the submission deadline, all Bids received are opened by a UNOPS Bid Opening Committee. The opening ceremony is open to observers from the Client, relevant Iraqi authorities, the Beneficiaries, as well as for companies participating in the tender.
- The evaluation follows UNOPS standard procedure, varying on procurement type and value, and should result in a recommendation for award of contract to the lowest, compliant bid. This recommendation requires approval by the relevant authority within UNOPS.

*<http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/services/procurement/Pages/Procurementpolicies.aspx>

- **The monitoring system.**

The overall monitoring and reporting of the projects' achievements is the responsibility of UNAMI-OCS. UNOPS shares responsibilities for the monitoring on components that are under its direct implementation responsibility: (i) support to the CRC (infrastructure, secretariat, public outreach), (ii) Grant Funds, (iii) and all of the project components' operational, administrative and financial monitoring and reporting.

Management and oversight of the project is governed by the normal procedures laid out in the programming manual of UNAMI-OCS and other reporting requirements agreed between UNOPS and the Governance SOT. UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS prepare periodic joint progress and final reports. UNOPS is responsible for preparation of the project's Final Financial Statement.

UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS monitor and refine the project implementation strategy through feedback from the CRC, parliamentarians, project partners, stakeholders and other concerned parties.

With regards to particular monitoring arrangements for the NGO grant fund projects, it was conducted, during the reporting period, as follows:

- UNOPS staff in Erbil, Baghdad and Amman
- UNOPS staff in Amman monitoring and evaluating activities based on the feedback from the field.

UNOPS is continuously evaluating the monitoring modalities and improving them on an ongoing basis. In the reporting period, UNOPS finalized "Guidelines for Grants Management" and "Guidelines for Civil Society and NGO Partners". The documents are addressed to UNOPS staff working on grants (former) and to NGO partners working with UNOPS grants (later document). They contain provisions on M&E and explain the modalities of UNOPS work in this field.

- **Assessments, evaluations or studies undertaken.**

Independent Evaluation for ITF was undertaken in January and February 2010.
The evaluation report is annexed to this report.

IV. Results

During the months of January and February 2010, the Iraqi political parties actively directed their energies towards the federal election campaign. A protracted period of negotiations over the position of the Prime Minister followed the 07 March 2010 elections and remained unresolved until December 2010. As of March 2011, most of the ministers have been nominated and approved but the formation of the government (ministries of Defense, Interior, National Security) has not been finalized yet.

This situation had direct impact on the project implementation as none of the activities geared towards political decision makers (parliament, government) could be implemented. Therefore, only the civil society component was completed during the period covered by this report.

Outcome 1 - Technical and logistical Support to the Constitution Review Committee

Output 1.1.1 - Submissions to CRC for constitutional amendments and knowledge-based support to Iraqi institutions

Completion: 89% This is an ongoing process. The rate of completion reflects the achievement during 50 months of implementation, proportional to an extended 56-month project duration. However, the trajectory of progress is unlikely to be linear. The Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) of the Iraqi Council of Representatives concluded its work in January 2010, and its mandate officially lapsed on 15 March 2010, together with that of the Council of Representatives. The third CRC report was informally submitted to the Presidency of Iraq in July 2009, but it was not formally received by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. The July 2009 Report acknowledges that a number of key constitutional issues, including the management of hydrocarbon resources, the Paramountcy Clause (Art. 115), the formation of the Federation Council, the status of Article 140 and Kirkuk, and the respective powers of the Presidency, governorates and regions within the Iraqi federation remain unresolved. It is unclear whether the current Council of Representatives will be able to muster sufficient political will to continue with the Constitutional Review Process or convene a Constitutional Review Committee in the short or intermediate term. It can be said, in very general terms, that both ISCI and the Kurdistan Alliance will continue to favor the status quo of a politically decentralized government, with perhaps an interest in a marginal further decentralization, while the SLC, Iraqiya, the Sadrists and most Sunni nationalist elements favor a re-centralization of political powers. Consequently, it can be anticipated that the key issues identified by the CRC in the July 2009 report will remain deeply contested.

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

- a) OCS (now UNAMI OPCA) has closely monitored the discussions and, where relevant, provided inputs into the discussions aimed at facilitating a political agreement on the constitutional amendments under the Article 142 Constitutional Review Process.
- b) UNAMI OPCA has also continued to offer technical assistance and one-off commentary on constitutionally-mandated legislation to be passed by the CoR.

- c) Three external international experts were hired by UNOPS to support the work of UNAMI in the areas of reconciliation, comparative constitutionalism/federalism; hydrocarbon regulation; water management; and reconciliation. The reconciliation expert was fielded in Iraq during the period of 5 months.

Output - 1.2.1 Improved management of the Constitutional Review Process

Completion: 89% *This is an ongoing process. The rate of completion reflects the achievement during 50 months of implementation proportional to the extended 56-month project duration. Again, it should be noted that progress on this file is unlikely to evolve in a linear fashion. Major activities planned for the initial project under its 12-month duration were accomplished. The CRC's mandate expired on 15 March 2010, as mentioned above. However, it remains unclear whether the current Council of Representatives will form a successor to the Constitutional Review Committee in the short term and, even if it does, whether this Committee will have sufficient political strength to advance the key issues listed above. It should also be noted that the CRC itself has indicated the need for higher-level political leaders, including the Presidency Council and the Office of the Prime Minister, to become involved in this process.*

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

UNAMI OPCA continued to meet bilaterally with various elected political leaders and officials, including the Chairs of various CoR committees (such as the CRC, Oil and Gas Committee and Regions Committee), related to the Constitutional Review Process. On 15 May, 2010, UNAMI OPCA established a Committee on Ethnic and Religious Communities in Ninewa and continued to meet with members of the Committee. Three sub-committees on Security, Political, Cultural, Religious and Administrative Rights as well as Education and Services were also established to work with the Committee in drafting a set of recommendations adopted by the Committee on Ethnic and Religious Communities to be incorporated in the larger Ninewa agreement to end the boycott of the Ninewa Provincial Council. The recommendations focused on representation of minorities in local police, curriculum reforms, language rights and preservation, access to institutions of higher learning especially by the minorities in the disputed areas, establishment of satellite universities, preservation of cultural rights and protection of places of worship, the implementation of Article 125 of the Constitution which guarantees the political, administrative, cultural and educational rights of various ethnicities.

Output 1.3.1 - Direct support to CRC for logistics and outreach

Completion: 100% in the previous reporting period.

Outcome 2 - Consensual constitution review through providing neutral environment for dialogue

Output 2.1.1 – Multi Party Dialogues (MPD) and Study Tours

Completion: 100% of the number of dialogues and study tours planned at the time of drafting the proposal. Additional activities were implemented in the reporting period.

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

- a) As outlined above, on the protection of Minority rights UNAMI OPCA continued its engagement with the Committee on Ethnic and Religious Communities and the three sub-committees established to enhance the work of the Committee and also advocate for the elaboration of Legislation called by Article 125 of the Constitution.

Output 2.2.1 – Intensive and ongoing coordination with other international actors involved in the Constitutional Review Process.

Completion: 81% *This is an ongoing process. The rate of completion reflects the achievement during 39 months of implementation proportional to the extended 48-month project duration.*

Outcome 3 - Iraqi society aware and involved in the review process and efforts towards national reconciliation

Output 3.1.1 - Publications and Media events.

Completion: 35%

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

No activities implemented under this output.

Output 3.2.1 - NGO Grant Fund

Completion: 100%

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

Activities planned under this output in the initial 12-month project implementation period were completed during previous reporting period. A report on additional activities implemented is provided below hence the completion rate 100% does not reflect the additional activities delivered under the project.

- a) During the reporting period, INSAN NGO completed the implementation of Phase II of the Peace-building project in Kirkuk at the end of February (co-funded by C9-21e). The garbage collection campaign was completed during 5 days where 14 workers took part and 3 large garbage bins, as requested by community leaders, distributed. The last theatre performance was conducted. 186 persons benefited directly from the project activities and grants and the entire community has actively participated in most of the activities. During the two phases, at the community level the peace-building project in Rapareen paved a way for further interventions as the community was mobilized and came together around the different activities implemented with this initiative. The project was successfully completed.

Expanded report on this grant fund is annexed to the report.

Output 3.3.1 Civil Society consultation and participation to constitutional review

Completion: 100%.

Progress/Results in the reporting period:

Activities planned under this output in the initial 12-month project implementation period were completed during previous reporting period. Additional activities implemented are provided below.

- a) An RfP was launched in December 2009 to identify NGO to support to the ongoing debate towards the development of constitutional and legislative mechanisms to support three main issues: the distribution of water resources, hydrocarbon management, with a focus on revenue sharing; and the situation of minority groups in the country. The Dialogue Grant Fund objectives were to: (i) raise the awareness and the understanding among Iraqis of issues related to constitutional-democratic government, including particularly, the distribution of water resources, hydrocarbon management and the situation of minorities in Iraq ; (ii) promote an open discussion about these issues among Iraqi citizens including student groups; (iii) gather recommendations of civil society regarding the best solution for the discussed issues.
- b) Four NGOs were selected: two in Erbil Ainkawa Centre for Employment (ACE) and Al Mesalla Organization for Human Resources Development) and two in Kirkuk Iraqi Human Rights Establishment (IHRE) and Civil Development Organization (CDO) and started their implementation by mid March, the duration of each grant was from 3-5 months. Each NGO

had a different approach to collect the views and recommendations of their respective communities, while some used workshops, focus groups and general meetings including a different range of participants others were more creative and included media outlets (TV, radio programs and debate sessions printed in local newspaper), handouts, surveys, and research studies. In the two governorates, communities at the grass root level have been mobilized to participate in the different activities, informed and empowered. In some cases, local authorities were engaged in the initiatives, which provided space for interaction and hence fostered their relationship, despite the difficult topics tackled. With this grant fund different actions to establish effective dialogue spaces and debates among various stakeholders at a local, grass roots level were made possible. Complete reports including the findings with recommendations were compiled and shared with the authorities and main stakeholders as a contribution to the ongoing debate and in support to a broader national dialogue over vital issues.

- **The delays in programme implementation, the nature of the constraints, actions taken to mitigate future delays and lessons learned in the process.**

The activities in this project were requested by and planned in close cooperation with the principal Iraqi client under the Project, the Constitutional Review Committee of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Hence, the design of activities within this project depends on the full participation of the Iraqi CRC/CoR and GOI counterparts, including key ministries such as the Ministries of Oil, Water Resources, Finance, Planning, Electricity and others. They cannot therefore be implemented without their consent and active engagements. It appeared that, in some cases relating to the planned 2009 activities, Iraqi counterparts were either not ready to engage in particular actions or were preoccupied by other political and security issues (such as elections), which demanded priority in their agendas. Therefore not all the planned activities could be delivered.

Another constraint and the reasons for delays in implementation of activities was very slow process of Constitutional Review Process run by Iraqi Constitutional Review Committee. The lack of progress at the time was a direct consequence of the continuing political stand-off between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional government. In addition, at critical times between 2006 and 2009, the country still suffered from open military hostilities. These factors resulted in a partial shift of political attention, on the part of both the Iraqi Government and the Parliament, to areas other than the Constitutional Review Process.

In late 2008, Prime Minister Maliki entered the constitutional debate with a demand for greater centralization, i.e. essentially the opposite position taken by the KRG, which is seeking to preserve the status quo of the 2005 Constitution. In addition, the referendum effort in Basra, which, had it been successful, would also have increased demand for political decentralization, has stalled. This failure has led to a stronger focus on the constitutional dispute between the Maliki Administration and the KRG. It is unlikely that the Constitutional Review Process, as a whole, will make significant progress unless/until the challenges surrounding the status of Kirkuk and the hydrocarbon framework are resolved (see below). This, in turn, is not expected to happen prior to the final formation of the next Parliament/Government, following the March 2010 elections.

Consequently, the project activities were not completed by the end of 2009, as originally envisioned. During the months of January and February 2010, the Iraqi political parties actively directed their energies toward the federal election campaign. A protracted period of negotiations over the position of the Prime Minister followed the 07 March elections, which remained unresolved until December 2010.

As of March 2011 most of the ministries have been nominated and approved but the formation of the government (ministries of Defense, Interior, National Security) have not been finalized yet.

This situation had direct impact on the project implementation as none of the activities geared towards political decision makers (parliament, government) could be implemented. Therefore only the civil society component was completed during the period covered by this report.

UNAMI and UNOPS have attempted to mitigate these implementation constraints by retaining, to the greatest extent possible, flexibility in accommodating particular dates for key events. In order to maximize future participation by the key political groups, detailed bilateral consultations continue to be held with major stakeholders in the course of preparations for the proposed events.

- **The key partnerships and collaborations, and their impact on the achievement of results.**

The key partnership for this project is between UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS. Task division is clear and complementarities evident. While OCS is mostly engaged on the political and planning level and the provision of substantive and technical advice to the CRC, UNOPS has focused on setting the operational framework of the project, as well as preparing logistical support to the CRC and leading its civil society component.

ACE, Mesalla, IHRE and CDO – NGOs, implementing partners under Dialogue Grant Fund.

- **Other highlights and cross-cutting issues pertinent to the results.**

Security: The security situation in Baghdad with regards to UN operational capacities was generally stable. However, it continues to pose immense challenges for the work of OCS, UNOPS as well as NGOs implementing grants on the ground. It has also created difficulties in the monitoring process.

Gender: Some of the projects implemented under NRGF contained specific references to women's rights and Article 41. In the course of the peacebuilding project implemented by the NGO Insan, the income generation activities were particularly focused on vulnerable women living in female headed households. The NGO also organized special social activities for women: An average of 60 women met regularly to take part in manual activities including ceramic painting and clothes and jewel designing. The activities were an opportunity for women to engage in dialogue during diverse sessions organized on diverse sources of conflicts identified in the community

Human Rights: During the course of NRGF implementation, most of the partners targeted issues related to human rights through discussions on the Iraqi Constitution (ex. art 46).

Employment: This project does not have a job creation impact, except on a very marginal basis. Notably based on the MoA signed between UNOPS and the CoR, the CoR was granted financial assistance to employ 27 temporary staff as well as a certain number of short-term staff (12 persons per month). Based on the MoA, the CRC can also hire 5 Arab constitutional experts who will advise the CRC from their home bases via videoconferences.

Environment: The project has no direct impact or link with the environment.

V. Future Work Plan (if applicable)

The planned workplan for 2010 included events targeting issues of hydrocarbon management and revenue sharing in the context of a federal state as well as distribution of water resources, such as:

1. January – June 2011 – planned series of six roundtable discussions will be organised in Baghdad. Completed by a series of four or five more specific follow-up discussions would then serve as the process to address each of the identified priority areas in more depth.
2. February – March 2011 – Grant project implemented via Iraqi NGO partner on promoting participation of Iraqi civil society in constitutional and legislative debates in Iraq and strengthening relations between Iraqi civil society and ICOR.

- **Major adjustments in strategies, targets or key outcomes and outputs planned.**

The above plan can only be implemented if the political situation allows for it. It is anticipated that the process of government formation, combined with the planned Arab Summit to be held in Baghdad as well as the overall situation in the Region, including civil unrests in Iraq, can significantly affect implementation of some of the planned activities.

VI. Performance Indicators (optional)¹

I. Performance Indicators assessment

	Performance Indicators	Indicator Baselines	Planned Indicator Targets	Achieved Indicator Targets	Means of Verification	Comments (if any)
IP Outcome 1: Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the Constitutional Review Committee, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.						
IP Output 1.1 Iraqi governmental institutions involved in the Constitutional process are presented with an array of viable best practice options to guide the constitutional review and implementation process.	Indicator 1.1.1 Actual support provided to key Iraqi governmental institutions in managing the constitutional amendment and relevant legislative process (number and kind of experts, duration of assignments).	0	N/A	3 international experts on constitutional and reconciliation issues and 1 expert on M&E hired during the reporting period.	UNOPS documentation.	There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period.
IP Output 1.2 Improved management of the constitutional review process and implementation of constitutional mandated laws.	Indicator 1.2.1 Legal texts, policy papers, working papers, and other documents produced by project team and expert consultants to advise key players and institutions.	0	N/A	an evaluation report produced by an M&E expert.	UNOPS documentation.	There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period.
IP Output 1.3 Enhanced capacity, both operational and technical, of the Constitutional Review Committee in order to ensure optimal discharge of its responsibilities	Indicator 1.3.1 Direct support provided to CRC and other relevant parliamentary committees / structures, in terms of equipment, staffing, capacity-building.	0	N/A	100% of planned equipment/support delivered in the previous reporting period.	UNOPS documentation/reports, handover documents, MoA between UNOPS and CoR.	There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period.

¹ E.g. for the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and the MDG-F.

<p>IP Outcome 2 Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicized and by providing neutral environments for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors.</p>						
<p>IP Output 2.1 Enhanced process of dialogue between political actors, based on an improved understanding, in and out of Parliament, of options available for the resolution of divisive issues, leads to real consensus-based constitution making process.</p>	<p>Indicator 2.1.1 Level of participation (number, seniority, representation) from politicians, governmental representatives and independent experts, to seminars, workshops, conferences and study tours.</p>	0	N/A	Committee on Ethnic and Religious Communities established	OCS, UNOPS reports.	There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period.
<p>IP Output 2.2 Secure the support of influential Iraqi and international actors towards the constitutional process through intense coordination, awareness raising and dialogue.</p>	<p>Indicator 2.2.1 Level of participation in coordination meetings, task group meetings, presentations by project team, from influential Iraqi and international actors.</p>	N/A	N/A	UNAMI OPCA continued to act as the Co-Chair of the International Legislative Roundtable.	OCS reports.	Roundtables were held until June 2009, when the process was suspended. There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period and no baseline indicator obtainable.
<p>IP Outcome 3 Reach out to the wider Iraqi society to increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives</p>						
<p>IP Output 3.1 Greater visibility of the efforts carried out by the Iraqi Government to conduct a transparent, inclusive and consensus-based constitutional review process.</p>	<p>Indicator 3.1.1 Media reports and inserts on project-supported dialogue and reconciliation initiatives.</p>	0	N/A			There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period and no baseline indicator obtainable.
<p>IP Output 3.2 Multi-stakeholder and other initiatives working towards the resolution of divisive constitutional issues, the contribution to cessation of violence in order to provide an environment for constructive dialogue and the support to the national reconciliation plan.</p>	<p>Indicator 3.2.1 Number and type of civil society initiatives supported through grants, and their impact on public's attitude and perceptions of the importance of the constitutional review and national reconciliation.</p>	N/A	N/A	1 Peacebuilding peacebuilding/reconciliation civil society initiative supported in Kirkuk. Four grants implemented under the	NGO reports. UNOPS monitoring report. TA provider reports. Media coverage (TV, radio, newspapers)	There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period and no baseline indicator obtainable.

				Dialogue grant fund launched (Erbil and Kirkuk)		
IP Output 3.3 Empowerment of civil society to advocate their constitutional and national reconciliation concerns.	Indicator 3.3.1 Level of inclusion of civil society proposals in the final draft of the amended constitution.	N/A	N/A	.		There is no Planned Indicator Target for the reporting period and no baseline indicator obtainable.

Independent Evaluation of UNDG ITF Project C9-20

Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional Review and National Dialogue

Produced by Jessica Taublib-Kiriat
UNOPS Programme Evaluation Consultant
January / February 2010

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List of Acronyms

CoR	Council of Representatives
CRC	Constitutional Review Committee
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GoI	Government of Iraq
ITF	Iraq Trust Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCS	Office of Constitutional Support
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq
UNDG ITF	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services

I. Executive Summary

A multitude of United Nations (UN) agencies have implemented projects from the multi-donor United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) over the last six years. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has received more than \$224 million in approved projects from the UNDG ITF since 2004. With the closing of the ITF, UNOPS, along with other UN agencies was tasked to conduct evaluations of specific ITF-funded projects. These evaluations are expected to generate lessons that will feed into the overall UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative for broader international and external information sharing. IT will also aid in the design of future programme and similar engagements. These evaluations should be undertaken in 2009-2010 in a participatory, objective, credible, and impartial manner.¹

The following report is an independent evaluation of the UNDG ITF project “Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional Review and National Dialogue,” project number C9-20. This project was a joint initiative of UNOPS and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq – Office of Constitutional Support (UNAMI-OCS), with an original timeframe of 12 months (October 2006 – September 2007), and a budget of \$6,033,807. This project was selected for evaluation based as per the UNDG ITF criteria, as it had submitted more than three budget revision requests for project revision either for extension of duration, and /or change of scope. The end date of C9-20 now stands at September 30, 2010.

This project was evaluated over a one-month period using a combination of primary and secondary data collection. The consultant recruited to provide an independent evaluation utilised an evaluation approach that was considered feasible given the timeframe and resources available, but also allowed for meaningful project analysis and gathering of lessons learned. The main sources of data used for this evaluation include key informant interviews with project management and partners, a systematic review of all relevant project documents and literature review on relevant articles and published papers on Iraq, constitutional review, governance and other related topics.

This report seeks both to provide recommendations and lessons learned to UNOPS and UNAMI on this specific project’s design and implementation, as well as to the overall UNDG ITF on larger funding mechanism issues. There are project successes that are unique to the Iraq context, but also lessons that can be utilised in future post-conflict programmes. These lessons learned can be found on pages 27-28 under Findings (Section V) and well as in Lessons and Generalisations (Section VI.)

¹ Criteria for the Selection of UNDG ITF Projects to Be Evaluated, September 2009

II. Introduction: Background and Context of the Programme

This project was designed in 2006, three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Iraq in 2006 was marked by a severe deterioration in security, an increase in sectarian violence, and the tenuous creation of a new government in May of that year after intense political negotiations, within the discussions surrounding the set up of the new government, there were serious disagreements on the roles that the various sub-groups (ethnic, sectarian, regional) would play. This ranged from formal administrative issues such as powers of the governorates and ministerial appointments, as well as what constitutes an appropriate Iraqi national identity.

This programme specifically was developed against the backdrop of the newly drafted Iraqi constitution. On-going violence and the short timeframe given to the drafting of the constitution meant the final outcome was not fully accepted by the various political, ethnic, and religious groups in Iraq, and in particular did not satisfy the influential Sunni Arab community. The new constitution failed to resolve a number of key divisive constitutional issues, such as federalism / governance and natural resource management. Many of these topics were very controversial and spoke to the very issue of how the Iraqi government would rule. In addition to national concerns, the draft constitution also required additional amendments to bring it in line with international standards.

The Government of Iraq (GoI) mandated the creation of a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) to help determine how these issues would be addressed. The CRC was created as it was presumed that solving these key constitutional issues through the legislation would be harmful (as the different threshold for agreement through the legislative process could lead to non-participatory decision-making). A lack of buy-in on the final constitution would almost certainly lead to feelings of alienation from the differing Iraqi groups, and potentially cause further instability in the country.

The CRC was to be formed in late 2006, and was to provide input and recommendation on the unresolved constitutional topics (there were at least 60 issues to be reviewed when this project was designed). It was critical for the CRC to work through an open and transparent process to try and bring the conflicting parties to an accepted agreement. Consensus on the constitution could have a major impact on the functionality of the new government, as well as help to foster stability and the spirit of national reconciliation for the average Iraqi citizen. If the concerns of all Iraq's ethnicities, religions, and political affiliations were not effectively addressed and represented by the CRC, the constitutional process and the final constitution would never be fully accepted by the Iraqi people.

UNAMI-OCS had already been supporting constitutional activities since 2005. They saw the urgent need to ensure that the CRC had the necessary technical and operational support to deal with its highly controversial mandate. The underlying logic was that supporting Iraqi initiatives on reconciliation (such as achieving consensus on the constitution) would help to promote stability and mitigate potential conflict.

III. Description of the Project / Programme

a. Logic Theory

This project had a multi-pronged design, seeking to provide support to political processes that would help to contribute towards national reconciliation (through a finalized and inclusive Iraqi constitution). It simultaneously supported civil society groups to conduct community-based projects on constitutional review, as well as advocate with their representatives.

The provision of support to the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) sought to assist with the development of a high-quality constitution that addressed outstanding political issues. In addition to building the capacity of the CRC (and other key officials), it was hoped that the final constitution (addressing all controversial issues) could potentially be seen as a social contract between all of Iraq's people. The project's justification was that if the CRC and parliament members were not adequately supported, this would almost certainly lead to future serious political problems in Iraq, and potentially further conflict. This support included technical experts in areas such as rule of law, human rights, federalism, governance and identity-based issues. The project also sought to complement the technical support with events to facilitate dialogue between dissenting political parties on divisive constitutional issues. This would be done through international study tours as well as workshops and roundtables.

Finally, the project sought to complement its political interventions with i) a grant fund for civil society organizations (CSOs) to raise community awareness on the constitution and the constitution review process and ii) providing opportunities for civil society to meet with the GoI and share their opinions / recommendations. It was hoped that the provision of direct technical and financial assistance to civil society initiatives would both help to ensure that the government was hearing its citizen's voices, but also more broadly help to foster national reconciliation within the divisions of Iraqi society.

There was a large element of flexibility built into project implementation to allow the project team to respond to the changing circumstances on the ground. As with most post-conflict countries in transition, it would be impossible to predict how Iraq would function (or not) during the project's initial 12-month timeframe.

b. External Factors Affecting Success

The project conducted a thorough analysis of the various factors that would have the potential to affect the successful realization of project objectives and activities. As the project planned to operate in a volatile environment with a nascent government and a divided population, it is no surprise that the list of affecting factors is lengthy and complex. The following factors are adapted from page 33 of the original project proposal:

1. The most serious major risk factor militating against the successful implementation of the constitutional process in Iraq and, by extension, this project emanates from the continuing security concerns throughout the country.

2. If the political commitment on the part of the GoI to launch and advance the Constitution Review Process as planned falters, this will have a substantial impact on the project strategy.
3. An essential factor in ensuring the success of this project entails the receptiveness and openness of those positioned at the higher political levels, such as the Iraqi parliamentarians, towards the project's support in the areas of enhanced dialogue between different political groupings, and management of the constitutional review process and the CRC. Should there be a lack of sincere willingness on the part of the political leadership to genuinely address these issues, this would certainly have a negative impact on the potential of the project to realise its objectives and overall development goal.
4. The majority of the Iraqi public still remains convinced that reconciliation and national unity are paramount priorities for the country's future and therefore it is expected that they will provide full support to the project's activities. If this conviction gives way to a feeling of fatalism and hopelessness in the face of an increasing sectarianism, this will be additional challenge for the success of public outreach initiatives. However, current trends show that public support for national reconciliation is still running high and that many groups, both from the civil society as well as local community and religious leaders, are ready to take on reconciliation-related initiatives.
5. The possibility that with all the other concerns they face, that Iraqi politicians, intellectuals and other professionals involved in the Constitutional process might be either unable and/or unwilling to engage fully in this process. In such a situation, it is certain that the overall Constitutional process and the efforts of this project to ensure its success will be damaged.
6. Changes in the overall political environment and other unforeseen developments may require the reconsideration of Programme objectives. Similarly, political parties might not agree on eventual amendments and refuse to discuss these in an open and participatory manner.

c. *Logical Framework*

Please see the project's 11-page logical framework attached as Annex I at the end of this report.

IV. Evaluation Methodology and Approach

The consultant adhered to guidelines as outlined in the UNOPS ITF Evaluation Terms of Reference (attached as Annex II) in order to determine an evaluation approach that was feasible and realistic given the time and resources available, as well as allowed for meaningful project analysis and gathering of lessons learned.

Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of this evaluation is to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) lessons learned initiative for broader internal and external information sharing. It will also aid into design of future programme and similar engagements.² This purpose is the same for all ITF project evaluations and has not been adjusted.

Evaluation Intent

This is a formative project evaluation, and as such will examine aspects of the delivery of the programme, the quality of its implementation, and assess the organizational context, personnel, procedures, inputs, etc. Given the resources available, it is not possible to conduct an investigation into concrete impact or causal linkages.

Evaluation Scope and Methodology

This project was evaluated over a one-month period through a combination of primary and secondary data collection. This included key informant interviews with project management and partners (please see Annex II for the complete list of interviews), a systematic review of all relevant project documents (including the original proposal, all quarterly and bi-annual reports, budget revision request, no-cost extension requests), as well as a literature review on relevant articles and published papers. Specifically the consultant utilized:

- Iraq's National Development Strategy 2005-2007
- The International Compact With Iraq, including its updated Joint Monitoring Matrices of 2007 and 2008
- World Bank's Governance Indicators, Country Data Report for Iraq, 1996-2008
- Report and Lessons Learned, UNAMI/OCS/UNOPS Support to the Iraqi Constitutional Review Process July 2006 – July 2007

Evaluation Objectives

The following are the objectives of all UNOPS ITF project evaluations. They were designed based on the common ITF guidelines³ and take into account evaluation scope, duration, and resources available.

- *Development Results:* To assess the achieved progress and results against stipulated programme / project results and objectives on all stakeholders, especially beneficiary groups

² Ibid

³ UNDG ITG Programme / Project Evaluations, Terms of Reference With Guidance

- *Efficiency and Effectiveness:* To assess the efficiency of the programme / project interventions and understand the effectiveness of programme / project interventions in addressing the underlying problem(s)
- *Relevance:* To assess the relevance of programme / project components in addressing the needs and issues of beneficiary groups
- *Partnership:* To understand the extent to which this programme / project has contributed to forging partnership at various levels with the Government of Iraq, Civil Society and UN/ donors
- *Lessons Learned:* To generate lessons on good practices based on assessment from the aforementioned evaluation objectives.

Evaluation Questions

The consultant was provided with fifteen questions that the project evaluation needed to answer and investigate. These questions are in the categories as listed in the above objectives: development results, efficiency and effectiveness, relevance, partnership, lessons learned, as well as the two additional areas of sustainability and operational effectiveness. These questions are listed in the TOR in Annex III and are addressed in section V of this report.

Key Challenges / Limitations

There were three principal constraints that affected the organization and results of this project evaluation.

- *Travel to Baghdad:* The upcoming COR Election scheduled for 7 March 2010 in Iraq has meant that travel to Baghdad has not been possible during the evaluation's allotted time period. This is due both to the UN country team ceiling as well as the fact that government officials are quite busy with election preparation. This meant that the consultant could not meet with UNAMI-OCS team, CRC members, or CSOs in person. Although electronic questions were sent three members of the CRC about the project (one Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish representative), they failed to reply as promised.
- *Evaluation Duration vs. Project Duration:* Four weeks is a limited period of time to properly evaluate a three and half year programme. To conduct a comprehensive evaluation would take anywhere from three to six months, and would likely require additional personnel / financial resources. It is noted that this project was selected for evaluation under the ITF as it had undergone both revision to its technical and financial components. This should have been weighed against the efforts and resources necessary to evaluate a programme of such length and scope.
- *Conducting an Evaluation in an Ongoing Project:* After numerous no-cost extensions and changes of scope, this project is now due to conclude at the end of September 2010 (with project management already thinking about another extension). This means that the evaluation was conducted while there is still at least nine months of implementation remaining, with final results yet to be achieved. However, as activities have been in progress since July 2006, there certainly are trends, outcomes, and lessons learned that can be generated.

V. Findings

This section of the evaluation report will first examine the extent to which this project has achieved its set outputs / outcomes as per its logical framework. As this project is not yet complete (combined with the limited amount of time available), the achievement of the development and immediate objectives cannot yet be fully examined. An assessment of output achievement is therefore a more appropriate barometer for this evaluation's purposes.

It should be noted that the term “outputs” and “outcomes” are oftentimes used interchangeably throughout the different reports and proposal, although the intentions and results remain the same. In addition, the indicators in the logical framework were specific to the entire output section and not disaggregated by specific output. Therefore the consultant used the indicators to guide the analysis on output progress / achievement but could not measure against them to determine actual achievement. This is illustrated in table one below.

Following an analysis of the outputs, the 15 questions as per the UNOPS ITF evaluation guidelines are addressed.

Table 1: Progress on Achievements Per Output

Output	Progress / Achievement to Date
1. Technical and logistical support to the Constitutional Review Committee	
1.1 Iraqi governmental institutions involved in the Constitutional process are presented with an array of viable best practice options to guide the constitutional review and implementation process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ The project appears to have achieved this output. In the first year of implementation, OCS drafted six substantive papers on critical constitutional issues including federalism, judiciary, and human rights. The CRC then used these report to set their agenda and frame their constitutional discussions. Also during year one, a pool of 14 experts was available to provide supports to the CRC and OCS in a variety of fields.▪ OCS met daily with CRC and officials during year one of the project to strengthen their working relationship as well as conduct advocacy on numerous political issues.▪ Continued support has been provided to the CRC throughout the rest of the project implementation period, including access to experts and other technical support. The last year of reports (2009) are very vague about the type and nature of support provided, but the CRC appears to have had access to experts as needed.⁴
1.2 Improved management of the constitutional review process and implementation of constitutional mandated laws.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ It is difficult to measure “improved management” as there were no indicators that specifically looked at this achievement. However, there are a number of examples where “improved management” can be demonstrated as a result of this project.▪ In May 2007, CRC released their draft report on proposed constitutional amendments. This shows that the CRC was able to work together and come to some consensus as a committee (although not on all divisive issues) – which is an achievement in itself. Thus it can be assumed that the management of the review process certainly improved as a result of this project's interventions.▪ It was reported that the review and input to the CRC's work involved a

⁴ This is not surprising given there has been little progress made on the constitutional review process since 2008 (which is also the last time the CRC met).

	<p>larger number of political and ethnic groups, which was not the case in the drafting of the original constitution. This inclusiveness can also be seen as “improved management” of the review process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ At the same time however, the CRC was unable to finalize its recommendation report due factors beyond its control (including the lack of high-level political agreement / consensus on divisive issues, all the way up to the prime ministerial level.) The CRC’s mandate was extended, as was this project’s timeline. It again should be noted that the results of this output thus be attributed solely to the work of this project alone, and so output progress may not be the most appropriate measurement. ▪ Activities are still ongoing and planned for 2010 that may allow for progress to be reached on key constitutional issues (i.e. hydrocarbon and water resource management.) If agreements are reached or progress is made towards resolution, this could lead to a further realization of this output.
1.3 Enhanced capacity, both operational and technical, of the Constitutional Review Committee in order to ensure optimal discharge of its responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ From an operational perspective, there initially appeared to be significant delays in determining and procuring the required equipment asked for by the CRC. However, by spring 2008, all equipment had been procured and delivered. ▪ From a technical perspective, the CRC received significant support, advice and expertise on a variety of constitutional and legislative issues. Although there is no specific data to show an increase / change in knowledge or behaviour, it can be deduced that by producing draft CRC reports and working together to come to a consensus on divisive issues (still ongoing), the CRC has an enhanced capacity to implement its duties.
2. Consensus-driven constitution review through the facilitation of a neutral environment for dialogue	
2.1 Enhanced process of dialogue between political actors, based on an improved understanding, in and out of Parliament, of options available for the resolution of divisive issues, leads to real consensus-based constitution making process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The study tours, dialogues, and seminars that were facilitated with the aims of achieving this output seem to be well organized, and have attendance from a large number of Iraqis across all divisions of society. But starting from the first mention of the outcomes of these events, <u>it is not clear what the real output of these trips and exchanges have been – beyond the actual organization of the event itself.</u> The consultant has found little tangible evidence of what these activities have actually achieved – other than anecdotes and general feelings from the project team that the activities had a positive impact. It would have been beneficial to conduct small surveys or questionnaires to have a sense of what (if any) new knowledge was gained, how the officials planned to use what they learned from the study tours, etc. Given that this project has been conducted for more than three years and still has another year remaining, there would have been enough time to look at how these study tours affected the work of the CRC in a statistically valid manner. ▪ For example, the report from January – July 2007 discusses an inter-party dialogue in Cairo, where “With the support of international experts, participants discussed Iraq’s judicial architecture as well as the constitutional amendments and implementing legislation necessary to create a fully functional federal judicial system”. However nothing is mentioned on what the different parties felt about these issues, how they planned to reach an agreement on their differences, action points that would be implemented once they return to Iraq, <u>or any tangible result other than conversation.</u> Therefore it is difficult to know exact how beneficial these discussion were, as well as if they could be improved or replicated elsewhere. Objective two is to nurture a consensus-based constitution review and implementation process, and while there has been lots of “review”, there has been much less “clear implementation.” ▪ That said, there is certainly value for exposing the newly-elected Iraqi politicians to different forms of functional governments or different ways

	<p>that other countries manage political issues. This is particularly timely, as the Iraqi Government (and people) try to determine (and continue to try to determine) how to govern with different political, ethnic and religious groups; often with competing agendas. In addition, there is also value for creating safe environments that allow for open dialogue outside of the political spotlight. Therefore, it can be stated that events organized under this output contributed to enhancing dialogue and illustrating different political options available to the Iraq administration. However it is not possible to know the to the extent that dialogue was “enhanced” or that understanding has been “improved.” With regards to real consensus-based constitution making, while the CRC has been able to reach some agreements, the real result of this output can only be determined at the end of this project (the roundtables are held on resource management in 2010 and all activities are implemented.)</p>
2.2 Secure the support of influential Iraqi and international actors towards the constitutional process through intense coordination, awareness raising and dialogue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Throughout the life of this project, it has been clear that significant coordination with a variety of UN, Iraqi Government and other international stakeholders was facilitated. This has been through the cluster group on the constitution, as well as active participation in a variety of UN and government meetings. ▪ It appears that more intense efforts were made during the first year of the project, with tangible outcomes including co-chairing sessions on the International Legislative Roundtable, submitting papers on human reports, and presenting papers on freedom of expression at a conference on freedom of expression and media development in Iraq organized in France. ▪ There has been little reported on this output throughout 2009, however the project team continue to report regular liaising with relevant stakeholders throughout Iraq and in Amman.
3. Iraqi society aware and involved in the review process and efforts towards national reconciliation	
3.1 Greater visibility of the efforts carried out by the Iraqi Government to conduct a transparent, inclusive and consensus-based constitutional review process.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It was initially decided not to have significant media coverage of the CRC’s work as originally planned in the proposal. The members of the CRC felt given the highly polarized society in 2007 (more so than in 2010), it would be safer to have their sensitive discussions out of the limelight. ▪ There was some press coverage – especially regarding the various study tours and seminars within year one of the project. ▪ Publications were produced on the National Reconciliation Grant Fund and on the study trip to Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland publication titled “Iraq-Learning Lessons from Northern Ireland” was released and disbursed to a number of stakeholders in autumn 2009.
3.2 Multi-stakeholder and other initiatives working towards the resolution of divisive constitutional issues, the contribution to cessation of violence in order to provide an environment for constructive dialogue and the support to the national reconciliation plan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ This output focused on the NGO grant fund. For the initial round of grants, a total of 118 proposals were received, which is a significant number of applications for any call for proposals. A total of 19 projects were selected, plus one with a local NGO to act as a monitoring agency. Projects covered all 18 governorates in Iraq, an <u>important caveat</u> for a project aiming to support reconciliation across a range of differences. ▪ 215 events were organized under the grant fund in the first six months of implementation to support national reconciliation. This seems to be comprehensive, but there is little information on what was actually achieved as a result of these events in terms of qualitative data. ▪ Support to CSO activities have continued over the last two years, with additional activities implemented as a part of the Grant Fund mechanism. However, it is specifically unclear how they supported the output in providing “an environment for constructive dialogue” “or the national reconciliation plan.” There is only quantifiable evidence provided, such as number of participants, number of events held, number of posters and

	publications distributed.
3.3 Empowerment of civil society to advocate their constitutional and national reconciliation concerns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 36 one-day workshops were organized for CSOs in 2006, with 76 CSO representatives participating. These sessions allowed for the sharing of opinions on divisive constitutional issues from a variety of community / religious / political figures. In addition to discussions, concrete recommendations concerning the constitution developed at the end of each workshop. A series of events followed these discussions providing space and venues for CSOs to talk with government officials on constitutional issues including 5 lobby meetings between CSO representatives and members of the main alliances in the CoR in Baghdad; a one-day conference for CSO representatives to discuss the latest development in the constitution review process and to finalize the CSOs' recommendations and a one-day conference "<i>Civil Society Input on the Constitutional Review Process</i>" in Baghdad, to help deliver the CSOs' recommendations to the MPs and the CRC members. ▪ The above indicates clear and substantive actions that resulted from the workshops, contributing to the overall achievement of the output. ▪ In addition there were also strong media coverage of the 36 workshops, including TV, and radio spots, also contributing to the achievement of output 3.1. ▪ New activities were implemented under this output in June 2008. Regional and national meetings were held to consolidate the recommendations from CSOs (which resulted from the first round of grant funds.) It is not entirely clear what the specific results of these meetings were other than the facilitation of the meetings as such. However, it can be assumed that as a minimum there was benefit from bringing together civil society, government, and academia in an open and neutral environment.

Development Results

1. What have been the specific benefits of the project to different beneficiary groups, including men, women, children, youth, and marginalized population groups?

The original project proposal listed the project's beneficiaries as:

- 275 members of parliament (including the Constitution Review Committee)
- Iraqi politicians and public officials from various institutions, with a special focus on the Chief Justice Office, the HR Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
- Selected staff from the following ministries: Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, State Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry of Human Rights.
- 18 Governors and a number of regional politicians
- At least 25 NGOs / CSOs / academic institutions
- Opinion leaders and intellectuals
- Community and religious leaders participating in the national reconciliation process

However, more recent project reports state, "This project focuses on the support to the political processes, which can benefit the entire state of Iraq. Therefore it is not possible to distinguish particular categories and number of beneficiaries."⁵ Given the multiple changes in the project's scope, it appears that the original beneficiary list is no longer

⁵ These sentences are repeated throughout all four quarterly project reports in 2009.

valid. It is rather more meaningful to divide project beneficiaries into the CRC, CSOs, and more broadly, the general Iraqi population (as outlined in table two below).

In general it has been difficult to specifically measure the benefit that this project has achieved, as there were no specific targets (numerical or otherwise) in the original design of this project. Therefore this means there are few ways to objectively measure success, (as will be described more in questions 14 and 15 below.) The general benefits however to these three groups can be determined by broadly examining the overall progress made over three years of activity implementation.

Table 2: Beneficiary Overview

Target Group	Benefits Resulting from this Project
CRC Members / GoI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased technical and operational capacities Provided with safe environments to discuss varying political opinions Better working relationship between different political parties Increased knowledge of other models (governance, administration, finance) that worked in countries with similar problems
CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 19 CSOs received funds to conduct local reconciliation projects, helping to serve their own communities as well as increase their own role in Iraqi society Developed / further developed CSO relationships with their national, regional, local government Strengthened their ability to advocate with their elected officials / voice their opinions in a safe environment
General population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within a project targeting decision makers (such as the CRC), it critical to think of the benefits that investing in a government body will have on the population – the government literally being those that determine the fate of a country. It is less meaningful to look at the benefits from an individual citizen’s perspective. Based on the above, it can be stated that this project had a significant impact on the general population of Iraq. But the actual impact will take many more years if not decades to determine. This project has helped to encourage CSOs to play a larger and more active role in Iraqi affairs, engaging with their government and representing their community members. This will help to contribute to more accountable and participatory government in the longer term. The focus of activities for 2010 were narrowed down to two deadlocked key issues – hydrocarbon and water resource management. Although these have yet to be implemented, there is the potential for activities to the GoI reach some resolution – which would be of massive benefit to the general Iraqi population.

2. How the project has contributed to national priorities as identified in the Iraq National Development Strategy (NDS), the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)?

This project aimed to contribute to the following goals:

- MDG 8: “Develop a global partnership for Development”, point 1, which “...includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction
- NDS: “Strengthening good governance and security”
- ICI Benchmarks/Indicators: 4.2.1. Engaging with Civil Society

MDG: With regards to MDG 8, the indicators that the UN provides for measuring achievement of this goal are economically-focussed, and are measured in terms of official development assistance, market access, and debt sustainability⁶. Based on the nature and design of this project, it is obvious that these indicators cannot be an accurate measurement of this project's contribution. Therefore it would be more appropriate to look at how this project contributed towards good governance, which is described in more detail below.

NDS: There were no set indicators within the NDS that dictated how to measure "Strengthening good governance and security." In order to know whether this project contributed to this result, it is important to first define what good governance means. The World Bank states "Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs."⁷ There is documented evidence that this project helped to bring together bureaucrats, oftentimes with very conflicting views, to join efforts and try come to a consensus within the CRC/GoI. While certainly not perfect, the project helped to provide the fora for open dialogue and learning. The project also helped to strengthen the participation of civil society in public affairs, especially with the organization of the constitutional review workshops, follow-up regional and national fora, as well as media and promotional activities. Based on the achievements as described above, it can definitely be said that this project helped to contribute towards strengthening good governance.

The strengthening of security in Iraq is based on a variety of complex factors, and it would be difficult to show any causal link between this project and an improvement (or not) in the security situation. In comparisons with 2006, it is certainly true that the security situation in Iraq has improved. From a theoretical perspective it may be assumed that the project's focus on national reconciliation efforts, from both political and community perspectives, may have been a contributing factor to the decrease in inter-ethnic violence over the last three years, although this is almost impossible to empirically prove.

ICI: For 4.2.1 of the ICI, the Joint Monitoring Matrix⁸ (used by Government and Development Partners to monitor the implementation of the ICI), has the following measurements:

- Benchmark: Adopt and carry out policies to stimulate civil society engagement in reforms
- Indicative Action: By 2008, introduce regulations to ensure an appropriate advisory and consultative role for civil society in legislative, administrative and policy making processes

This project has engaged civil society on reconciliation activities at both the local and national levels. It has organised space for the sharing / gathering of opinions on divisive

⁶ <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm>

⁷ World Bank in Governance: The World Bank's Experience, July 2004

⁸ http://www.iraqcompact.org/ici_document/AnnexIV_JMM_English2008.pdf

constitutional issues, as well as creating fora for civil society to meet/discuss with their elected representatives (and even refine their views as the constitutional process progressed.) Therefore it could be stated that this project has contributed to the realization of 4.2.1 and successfully engaged with civil society throughout the implementation of project activities.

Efficiency and Effectiveness

3. *Has the programme / project responded to the underlying development issues that provided rationale for the programme/project? How?*
4. *How have programme / project results contributed to improved access and utilization of services?*

Question #3 specifically deals with project effectiveness, and examines the degree to which project activities have actually met their targeted goals. Best practice dictates that this can be measured by asking “to what extent were the objectives achieved / are they likely to be achieved?”⁹

Question #4 is difficult to answer for this project because unlike many other development programmes, it was not designed specifically to increase access to, or utilization of, new or improved services. Instead, project activities sought to essentially provide support to the GoI as they undertook the massive task of reviewing and finalizing the constitution. At the same time, it aimed to complement the political work with activities at the grassroots level, encouraging discussion on constitutional review, and building linkages between civil society groups and with their government officials. While it can be argued that both the politicians and CSOs involved are providing a “service” to their communities, this cannot be quantitatively or qualitatively measured as a result of this project, especially as i) activities are still ongoing and ii) it will likely take years for the controversial issues that this project addresses to be resolved.

In order to answer both of these questions to the extent possible, it is helpful to conduct an analysis of progress reached towards the overall objectives, which should be understood as the achievable goals that resulted from this programme¹⁰ (see table three below). Overall objective progress can be measured by examining the achievement made as per their indicator (addressing question #4)¹¹, and then hypothesizing on the likelihood that these objectives will be achieved by the end of the project (addressing question #3). It is noted that measuring indicator progress is not the same as measuring access to / utilization of services, but analysis at this level allows for meaningful evaluation into the tangible results achieved by this particular project.

Before we can address these questions, it is important to again highlight the fundamental

⁹ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC) Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance, http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html

¹⁰ This is different from the development objective or goal, which is the overall purpose that the project contributes to, but could never achieve on its own – other factors and projects also contribute.

¹¹ Please note that there are serious concerns about the indicators for the overall objectives (see questions 14 and 15 for further details) as they leave a great deal of subjectivity to the evaluator’s perception and analysis.

logic to this programme and the underlying development issues it aimed to address. The assumption was that: if you supported a constitutional review process with the hopes of trying to ensure that all divisions of Iraqi society agreed on the constitution + provide support to civil society to get involved in the constitutional review debate + encourage linkages between civil society and their government = this would help to foster national reconciliation and more broadly encourage stability and development in Iraq.

Table 3: Analysis of the Overall Objectives and Indicators

Overall Objective	Indicator	Indicator Progress	Is it likely that this objective will be achieved? Why?
1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the Constitutional Review Committee, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review process and constitution-related legislative work is conducted timely by the Council of Representatives and with minimal occurrence of deadlock situations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Without defining “timely” and “minimal deadlock”, it is difficult to exactly measure this indicator. Nonetheless, the CRC was able to submit their draft report in May 2007, showing their ability to work together and reach some consensus (although the most divisive issues were not addressed and have yet to be resolved.) Additional draft reports were produced in 2008, but nothing has been finalized to date. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The full realization of a final Iraqi constitution goes beyond the work of the CRC (and UNAMI/UNOPS support), involving high-level political negotiations that will likely take years. Currently the constitutional review process has come to a slow halt, with a second CRC draft report submitted to the President, Vice-Presidents and the Prime Minister in July 2008 and little political progress made in the last year. A wide-range of support has been provided to the CRC/GoI, which is the core of the project’s design. Given the myriad of external factors involved, from the project’s perspective it can be assumed that this objective will be achieved.
2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of success of dialogue initiatives supported by the project, or indirectly generated by it, which bring together key political actors to engage positively on divisive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The last three and a half years have seen the organization of numerous study tours, seminars, roundtables and other fora for discussion, learning, and communication. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes it is likely that this indicator will be achieved. The facilitation of workshops, which targeted key divisive issues, provided the space and resources for open dialogue and

such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicized and by providing neutral environments for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors.	constitutionally relevant issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Without hard data (surveys, focus groups) it is difficult to measure the level of success that the dialogue initiatives generated. What can be assumed is that there is strong value for bringing together conflicting political parties in a safe and neutral environment, and this project has certainly provided those opportunities. 	<p>discussion.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The presence of different political parties, religious groups and other sects of society at these events is also an indicator of success. It is hard to measure the exactness of how this project contributed to consensus building. There are no before and after surveys or mechanisms of showing attitude / behaviour change as a result of this project.
3. Reach out to the wider Iraqi society to increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased feeling of ownership of constitutional and reconciliation process by Iraqi public, through the increased involvement of their political representatives. Level of success of civil society initiatives supported by the project in bringing together a broad spectrum of societal groups in discussing constitutional review and reconciliation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is difficult to measure this indicator, as there is nothing that defines what an increase in feeling of ownership looks like, nor any qualitative monitoring to assess how beneficiaries felt before and after project interventions. However it can be assumed that the facilitation of workshops, and roundtables that brought together CSOs and government has helped to increase their involvement in the reconciliation process. The first round of grant projects was implemented in all 18 governorates, benefitting 34,277 people representing all political, religious, and ethnic groups. This alone is a large success, supplemented by additional peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Yes it is likely that this indicator will be achieved. Activities implemented under this objective appear to have been successful in reaching out to all members of Iraqi society, and involved them (to the extent possible) in the constitutional review process. It is unclear as to how much national reconciliation was actually fostered, in the absence of any population-based surveys or other data collection exercise. It can only be assumed on a theoretical basis that these activities have helped to strengthen national reconciliation in Iraq, given their large geographic focus and attempt to include all sects of society.

		building grant activities in 2008 and discussions on hydrocarbon management (2010.)	
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5. *How did the programme / project engage with stakeholders and beneficiaries during project planning and implementation?*

Engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries during project planning: As per the project proposal, it appears that the project team closely coordinated with key GoI officials including the Council of Representatives, Ministry of Justice Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of Interior, State Ministry for National Reconciliation during the original design phase. Page 31 of the proposal states "UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS have extensive experience working with these parties. Already in the preparation of this project, these bodies have been closely involved....Furthermore, UNAMI-OCS is in close contact with former members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, Ministers and party leaders and has an established relationship with all these Iraqi interlocutors, which will also be of significant benefit in the management and implementation of this project."

It is unclear the extent to which CSOs were involved in the actual planning of component three of this project, although activities were designed based on experience that UNOPS had working with CSOs in Iraq.

Engagement with stakeholders and beneficiaries during project implementation: The nature of project activities made it almost impossible for the project team to not be intensively engaged with key project actors and beneficiaries throughout implementation. Specifically, the project team worked very closely with members of the CRC throughout the implementation of all activities under objectives one and two. Provision of technical support was very much linked to the needs as identified by the CRC (and other elected officials). The shape and scope of this support was modified / evolved based on the changing needs of the CRC, GoI, and Iraqi constitutional context.

The most recent project extension / scope revision in November 2009 outlined new activities that would be conducted in 2010, including the prioritization of hydrocarbon and water resource management, and expanded set of stakeholders to include Ministry of Oil Water and Electricity, showing continued engagement.¹²

With regards to engagements with CSOs, project staff appeared to actively engage with civil society partners and representatives throughout the life of the project. This has included the provision of support to initial 19 NGOs under the national reconciliation grant fund, organizing events for CSOs to meet/advocate with elected officials, as well as the provision of additional grant support for CSOs in the areas of peace building (2008) and discussions on resource management (planned for 2010.)

¹² Request for Project Revision, 9 November 2009, pages 5-12

Relevance

6. *How did the programme/ project contribute to local / national needs and priorities?*
7. *How were project strategies tailored to the current programme / project context?*

In order to assess the relevance of this project, it is first important to understand the conditions in Iraq in 2006 and the general background against which this project designed. Once this is achieved, it can be ascertained as to whether the project contributed to Iraqi priorities at the time it was designed, if the project's objectives are still valid (#6) (in other words does the project continue to make sense) and examine how the project strategy may have adapted to the evolving context in Iraq. (#7.)¹³

Iraq in 2006

- *Upsurge in Violence:* Iraq in 2006 was characterized by rampant violence, increased insecurity, and a massive escalation in inter-communal violence. As OCHA states "In 2006, Iraq has witnessed increasing political fragmentation driven by insurgency and crime, with factional violence escalating sharply throughout the Centre and the South of Iraq. Human rights violations increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, as brutal violence against official targets and civilian populations increased dramatically through the year."¹⁴
- *Newly Formed Government:* In May 2006, the first constitutionally elected Government of Iraq (GoI) was sworn into office. This nascent government, operating democratically for the first time in Iraqi history, was immediately tasked with enormous security, political, economic, and social challenges.
- *National Reconciliation:* There were calls for national reconciliation from various sects of Iraq society. The new GoI released the Iraq National Reconciliation and Dialogue Plan in June 2006, laying out 24 clauses to bring an end to immediate violence and help foster reconstruction. National reconciliation and unity were on the agendas of politicians, religious / community leaders and other prominent Iraqis, as well the UN, donor governments, and of the international community.

Table 4: Analysis of Project Relevance

Objective	Did it contribute to national priorities?	Is the objective still valid?	What has been changed to meet the evolving context?
1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the CRC, to manage the constitutional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes, with appropriate technical and operational support provided by UNAMI/UNOPS to the CRC in 2006/7, as the constitutional review and debates were intensively in process and in the political/media spotlight. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Given that the review process has come to a virtual stalemate, little progress has been made in months, and the CRC has not met since 2008, it is unlikely that this objective is still 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Project activities have been adapted to provide support to the GoI beyond the CRC, including to ministries and other parliament members. ▪ In 2008 and 2009 this appears to have been done in a more ad-hoc and reactive manner, rather than as a strategic review

¹³ Please note that this report will not specifically discuss the project's extension from 12 to 50 months, which is a significant change to the project to meet the evolving context (see the right columns in table 4) yet affected all three objectives equally. Rather an analysis will be conducted of the specific activities that the project undertook to meet the relevant needs / situation on the ground.

¹⁴ UN OCHA, *CERF Funds support Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq 2006*, 20 December 2006

amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.		valid.	<p>or re-design process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ In 2010, activities are more focused, and concentrate on the provision of support to the highly controversial areas of hydrocarbon and water resource management.
2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicized and by providing neutral environments for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes, this project organized numerous events to bring together politicians from all sects of Iraq society, aiming to increase dialogue and learning. Study tours helped to demonstrate examples where counties dealt with similar problems facing Iraq as well as allowed new politicians to practice statesmanship. Inter-party roundtables and seminars provided an open and natural environment to discuss divisive issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Similar to objective one, the lack of progress on the constitutional review process indicates that this objective is no longer valid. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Many of the key issues raised involved departments beyond the CRC, and roundtables in 2008 and 2009 therefore included ministerial officials (including Water Resources, Oil, Finance, Planning, Electricity) and other GoI representatives. ▪ In 2010, the project plans to implement high level discussions on hydrocarbon and water resource management, two key issues that have yet to be resolved and have massive repercussions.
3. Reach out to the wider Iraqi society to increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Yes, the project's national reconciliation grant fund was successful in bringing civil society into the debate surrounding constitutional review, fostering dialogue both at the community level through the first round of grant funds, facilitation of lobbying meetings between CSOs and the GoI, and organizing a conference for CSOs to present their recommendations on the constitutional review to the GoI and media. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The first half of the objective, increasing inclusiveness of the constitutional review is no longer valid (see objectives two and three above.) ▪ Fostering national reconciliation however, by supporting civil society is very much still relevant and important in the current context. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project expanded its original grant to fund to include support to CSO activities in the areas of peace building and conflict prevention in three regions. ▪ In 2010, there will be an additional grant fund for CSOs to conduct roundtables on resource management, complementing similar discussions at the political level.

Partnerships

8. Has the programme / project forged new partnerships / strengthened existing partnerships and how?

In the absence of a survey or other methodical data collection specifically on partnership or how politicians view their opposing colleagues as a result of this project, the analysis on this question generally relies on anecdotal evidence from the project team and stakeholders.

a. Relationship between different political parties: One of the key aims of this project was to help bring together different political groups during the initial constitutional review process. As mentioned in question #7, the new GoI was sworn into office in early 2006. Different political parties almost immediately clashed over a wide range of governance, social and economic issues, with political debates often having violent repercussions in cities and towns through Iraq¹⁵. In the context of Iraq in 2006-7, this project was successful in bringing different political parties whom according to a member of the project team “in other circumstances would not have sat down together.” Getting these different groups to meet and discuss controversial national issues is in itself an achievement towards building the relationship between different political groups.

The project was able to facilitate dialogue and study tours that provided both formal opportunities to learn, but also informal chances for politicians to meet on a personal level. As a project staff member said “There was definitely a benefit from getting people away from the CoR building, to talk as individuals and share discussions – rather than political views.” The facilitation of roundtables in 2008-9 (after the constitutional review process had stalled), also helped to keep the relationships between different parties of the GoI alive and encourage discussion on divisive issues. While progress on constitutional issues has not advanced per se, the organisation of these inter-party dialogues have been beneficial for inter-GoI relationships. Another project staff member said “The benefit of the roundtables is really the dialogue – get them talking about the most controversial issues – such as the hydrocarbon issue – it was impossible to get people to talk about it before. This is the first time people had the opportunity to talk and discuss...they were not used to it under the previous regime...so they actually had to have these discussions facilitated by an outside party.” Numerous project staff told the consultant that they witnessed the politicians meeting outside of UN-facilitated events, and began to function more like a cohesive government rather than individual parties.¹⁶

b. Relationship between civil society and the GoI: The concept of civil society is relatively new in Iraq, especially a civil society that can advocate with its elected officials and hold them accountable to their constituents. According to project staff, there is no

¹⁵ *The Dynamics of Iraq's Media: Ethno-Sectarian Violence, Political Islam, Public Advocacy and Globalization*, Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Open Society Institute, Central European University Centre for Policy Studies, April 2007, *What were the causes and consequences of Iraq's descent into violence after the initial invasion?* Dr. Toby Dodge, 10 November 2009, Department of Politics, Queen Mary University of London and Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

¹⁶ Although according to a project staff member, the CRC members would agree to a compromise, in a meeting, talk to their party the next day, and then public say they never agreed to compromise.

real relationship between civil society and the GoI. There are some relationships between parliament members and their communities– especially when it comes to election time – but there is not much real substance to these relationships. The UN was able to act as a facilitator to bring together CSOs and the GoI in a number of forums under this project, helping to make sure that the recommendations from CSOs on the constitutional review debates were actually received and taken into account. As one staff member said, “the CRC was not really excited to talk to or hear from civil society groups, If not for the UN, they would not really listen – they would hear but not actually consider.”

c. Relationship between the UN and GoI: The success of the project achievements, especially at the political level, can largely be attributed to the strong working relationship between the project team and its GoI partners. As one staff member said, UNAMI/UNOPS had the ability to be a neutral organization, to suggest compromises that the GoI was more open to listening to... They considered us as a reference –someone they can go to with complex political / controversial issues.” As mentioned above, the UN was able to get different political parties around the same table, which is a significant achievement in and of itself. Through the continuous, regular support to the constitutional review process, as well as spreading out to work with other GoI officials (i.e. ministers) and on different issues (hydrocarbon and water management), the UN has been able to strengthen its relationship as a partner that the GoI can trust and can work with.

9. To what extent has the programme / project contributed to capacity development of the involved partners?

In reviews of aid effectiveness, the development of capacity is recognised as one of the most critical issues for both donors and partner countries. For purposes of this evaluation, *capacity* is understood as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. *Capacity development* is understood as the process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.¹⁷

This project did not specifically focus on capacity development directly, although a great number of its primary activities indirectly involved increasing the capacity of both government and civil society partners. There are challenges then to specifically measure and demonstrate actual capacity development at this stage in the project cycle. There are no monitoring activities or mechanisms in place to refer to, and no real data other than narrative reports and anecdotes. However, it is possible to generalise the impact the project had towards the capacity development of its partners by describing i) activities that increased partner capacities and ii) the likelihood that these new capacities (or strengthening of existing capacities) will be sustainable.

¹⁷ *The Challenges of Capacity Development, Working Towards Good Practice*, Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, Development Assistance Committee Reference Document, pages 11-14.

Table 5: Project contributions towards capacity development of partners

Project objective	Project partner	Activities contributing towards capacity development	Likelihood capacity will be maintained over time
1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the CRC, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.	CRC / GoI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project provided continued technical expertise (or access to experts) to assist and mentor the CRC / GoI on a wide range of constitutional and governance issues → increasing individual knowledge / attitudes on divisive issues such as federalism, resource management, and national identity, as well as more indirectly helping the GoI to determine and uphold the rule of the law Provision of core items such as equipment, furniture and CRC staff salaries meant that operational capacities of the CRC to conduct its activities were improved. However this is more of a one-time donation rather than genuine capacity development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is difficult to assess how the involved government partners will act / govern without external support (from the UN or other appropriate agency.) This is valid for both finalizing the constitution as well as implementing it thereafter. As many of the divisive governance issues to be addressed by the CRC are not yet resolved, it makes it even harder to presently determine the chance of sustainability.
2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicized and by providing neutral environments for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors.	CRC / GoI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The facilitation of inter-party dialogues, study tours, roundtables and other fora discussion is similar in nature to objective one → activities may have increased knowledge and attitudes on divisive issues → benefiting both the individual politicians as well as the GoI more generally. In addition to new knowledge of specific issues such as federalism and resource management, the facilitation of dialogue also added to capacity development gains in terms of the overall functionality of the new GoI → bringing conflicting parties together to discuss controversial topics, peacefully share opinions, encourage negotiations → a positive step forward in a new democracy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Similar to objective one, it is hard to predict how the GoI would act without external support. Given that the GoI is at such a nascent stage, and that there will be significant changes with the upcoming March 2010 elections, it is not possible to comment on how/if the development gains made as a result of this project will be sustainable.
3. Reach out to the wider Iraqi society to increase	CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The provision of grants to CSOs can be thought of as a capacity development exercise in itself → as it gives them the opportunity to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Since 2003 Iraq has witnessed an explosive opening up of civic space, as

inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives		<p>practice/ increase their capacities in project and budget management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Grants management often in post-conflict contexts like Iraq often will involve more hands on technical support from the donor. However the remote management of grants in Iraq means this capacity development opportunity could not be fully realized. ▪ CSOs were given the opportunity to meet with and discuss their ideas with government officials, → increasing in theory their capacity to act as advocates for their communities. 	<p>thousands of new Iraqi NGOs were established¹⁸. In a natural process, only time will tell which will “survive” have the capacities to continue implementing projects and raising funds.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As with #2 and #3, it is impossible to determine the sustainability of the capacity developed of CSOs from this project, as it is too early to tell.
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Sustainability

10. What is current status of the programme / project components? Are functions and facilities still maintained? Who is responsible for the management of programme / project facilities after the project closure?

The current status of this programme is ongoing, with activities planned for the next nine months, and a budget of more than \$900,000 remaining. Therefore it is difficult to measure sustainability at the present time. It is more feasible however to examine each of the three key components and the likelihood that an impact will be felt after the project’s closure. In addition, it is also important to remember that the project was designed to effect immediate knowledge / behaviour change – supporting the 2007 constitutional review process, enhancing dialogue on divisive issues, and reaching out to communities during the constitutional review period. The project was not necessarily working to ensure the continued support or facilitation of its activities after they were completed. This key point needs to be considered when evaluating the project’s sustainability.

Support to manage constitutional review: The CRC was provided with technical and operational support from UNAMI/UNOPS for more than three years. They have made progress on finalizing the constitution in terms of working constructively together, and have received equipment and materials to allow them to conduct their work. While they have been able to reach consensus on some issues, they have yet to solve most of the highly divisive areas such as powers of the presidency and resource sharing. Discussions on these issues are ongoing, and it is highly probable that the CRC (along with many departments of the GoI) will require support from the UN or other external bodies to help assist in the finalization of the constitutional review process beyond this project’s end date.

¹⁸ The International Centre for Non-Profit Law; NGO Law Monitor: Iraq, 13 October 2009

Raise awareness of key issues and provide environments for dialogue: This project has organized numerous study tours, seminars and workshops for members of different political parties to learn, discuss options together, and communicate freely out of the political spotlight. Due to the significant financial resources that these events require, it is unlikely that they would continue without the support of the UN or another donor.

Foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives: The project appeared to successfully enable the involvement of civil society into the constitutional review process. This was achieved through a number of workshops, lobbying meetings and conferences, specifically by giving CSOs the opportunity to provide their recommendations on the constitution review process to lawmakers. Strong democracies rely on partnership between civil society and elected officials, and while Iraq still has a very long road ahead, this project certainly helped to further that partnership.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which national reconciliation was fostered or furthered as specific result of this project, or if it is sustainable. In the absence of hard data demonstrating changes in attitude or behaviour (which could have been conducted through population-based surveys or focus groups), there is no empirically valid way of showing that national reconciliation was fostered as a direct result of this project. Most of the data available on the CSO projects implemented under the national reconciliation the grant fund is quantitative, and focused on numbers of people who attended, gender and age breakdowns etc. This data does show that a large and diverse number of Iraqis participated in the national reconciliation activities, but the medium and longer impacts of such activities are not clear.

Lessons Learned

11. What are the key lessons learned from programme / project implementation?

- *Dialogue with results:* Although there are definite benefits that can result from a workshop or roundtable, there is a need to have such activities with concrete action points or recommended next steps -- not just facilitate / fund discussions for discussion's sake. This may have been more appropriate for the first year of this project when the constitutional review was intensively ongoing, but it became less relevant as the project was extended, and the results of these expensive activities are less apparent.
- *Project re-design:* The project team continually mentions the need to be flexible and to adapt its priorities and plans based on the needs on the ground. The project designed a 12-month logical framework that may have been valid for the first 18 months of implementation, but lost its relevance as the project was continually extended and the scope amended. In order to make the strategy clearer, as well as have an adequate monitoring plan that could be used to both demonstrate results and justify change, the project should have undergone a re-design process, resulting in a clear revised strategy and revised logical framework.

- *Project funds and good will alone are not enough to achieve results:* This project had an ample budget, and was staffed by a qualified team who was committed to their work. Yet despite all of their time and efforts, the constitution is not finalized and many of the key divisive issues are not resolved. As mentioned throughout this report, the constitutional review process is “stuck” at a high political level, and various delays to project implementation were due to the political / security / contextual environment in Iraq. This does not mean that the activities have not been successful, but it does mean that the ultimate aims may not be achieved within the lifetime of this project.

12. *Are there any specific recommendations to be considered when designing similar programme/ projects in the future?*

- *Working simultaneously on the political and local community levels:* There are definite positive benefits from working on divisive national issues by focussing simultaneously on the political and community levels, both in Iraq as well as in other transitional countries. In Iraq specifically, one of the biggest problems is that there is no link between local communities and high-level politicians -- which mean that often decision makers do not hear or take into account the opinions of their constituents. It is very important to ensure that political and community representatives have the fora to meet and at the very least start the build a relationship.
- *In transitioning democracies where there is no history of government and grassroots community relationships, the UN can play an important role in facilitating these linkages:* This was a conclusion provided by almost all members of the UNAMI/UNOPS project team that were interviewed. The previous regime in Iraq meant that there was no history of an elected government serving the citizen's they represent. Project staff reported that the GoI officials they worked with were not so excited about involving civil society in their affairs. As one staff member explained “They were open to *talking* to the CSOs but they never really *heard* what they said. If not for the UN, they would not have taken the time to include the citizens who actually put them in office.” This project was successfully able to facilitate a number of events between civil society and the GoI (although CRC members did not show up to a major event in 2008 at the last minute), using its relationships with broad spectrums of Iraqi society to help build linkages that are critical both for this project's success but also for overall development in Iraq.
- *Projects in transitional contexts should be designed for longer than 12-months:* This project was extremely ambitious from the design phase, and as mentioned further on page 23, it seemed unlikely that the project could realistically achieve its complex and varied interventions in such a short period of time. In addition, this project was targeting political processes that take much more than one year to implement, even in a stable and peaceful country. The project was set for an initial 12-month based on the ITF guidelines, so it is obvious why the design team only had a 12-month work plan. However, given what the international community knows about the time it takes to achieve successful development in a post-conflict society, programmes should not be

limited to a one year time frame. Funds could be given for 18-36 months, with time to readjust interventions if needed if there are major contextual developments or changes.

- *Projects need to set clear targets in order to validly measure and communicate results:* As mentioned throughout this report, it was difficult to evaluate the genuine impact of this project as there were vague targets (or none at all) set in the original project design. This means that the evaluation of the success of this project was very much based on an individual's subjective analysis of what appears to be a "success" rather than a target set by the project team or by international / other accepted standards. Although it may have been difficult to set strict quantitative targets for a project with such qualitative components, there needed to be clearer definition on the type / scope / results that the project was aiming for. In the absence of such specificities, it becomes almost impossible for i) the project team themselves to measure results as they conduct regular monitoring exercises, and ii) even more difficult for an external evaluator to measure success in year four of the project.

Operational Effectiveness

13. How was the programme / project designed? Was any assessment undertaken to inform programming?

The project was designed to allow the UN to continue supporting the constitutional process and the work of the new CRC in 2006. It was designed against the setting of a newly drafted constitution that was not fully accepted by the Iraqi people and did not fully resolve key controversial issues. It was assumed that if the CRC and other involved officials were not adequately supported, this could lead to a constitution that was not accepted by the Iraqi people – which could lead to further instability and potentially violence. There were no specific assessments conducted as such for this programme. The problems as stated in the original proposal were identified through a combination of context analysis, meetings with key GoI officials, and the opinions / research / observations of UN staff.

In general, the project was extremely ambitious for a one-year programme, involving numerous complementary but distinct components that required significant planning and human resources. The success of the project was very much linked to the evolving situation in Iraq, and could only be implemented on time if there were no problems or delays. This was not the case in Iraq, or typically with any other new government in transition, and this ambitious timetable meant that the project had to be extended well beyond the initial end date.

As mentioned previously, the project's design lacked genuine targets or anticipated measureable results. The project proposal maintained the need to be flexible given the changing political and security conditions on the ground, but without strong design, it becomes difficult to know if the project is on track (during implementation and monitoring) and what it has actually achieved (during evaluation.)

After more than three years of project implementation, it seems as if this project may have been designed less to fund a specific set of activities over a certain period of time, but rather to broadly fund activities of UNAMI-OCS. Given the unknown future of the constitutional review process in 2006, this may have been the best scenario available and the consultant cannot comment on the merit of such a decision. This hypothesis stems from the following key facts i) There was lack of specific detail about what the project would actually achieve (and acceptance by the ITF review committee without such targets) ii) There were numerous revisions to the project duration, budget and scope, each of which were accepted without much documented input or questioning from the ITF committee, and iii) OCS support has the potential to help enable a peaceful and functioning Iraq (i.e. resolving key administrative issues, building trust within conflicted political parties), and there was a need to ensure OCS had secured funding to be operational.

14. Was the programme / project results framework clear, logical and focused?

In general, the results framework for this project was not clear or focused. As mentioned numerous times throughout this report, the results framework lacked the specificities required to make it measureable and understandable.

The development objective (or what is called a goal in generic monitoring and evaluation terminology) of the project is “To ensure transparent, inclusive, consensus-based resolution of divisive constitutional issues in Iraq through constitution-making processes, focusing in particular on the rule of law, federalism, governance and identity-based issues, by supporting Iraqi institutions through the review of the Constitution and through the implementation of constitutional mandated laws and by engaging key actors of the Iraqi society into reconciliation initiatives.” This is a complex, confusing, and extremely long sentence. Rather than thinking about the overarching development aim that the project fits into, it basically takes the three immediate objectives and lumps them together into one run-on sentence.

The indicators at the development objective level were very vague and subjective. They looked at things like “actual support provided”, “deeper understanding of key actors” and “constructive participation.” While quantitative indicators are not always appropriate, these qualitative indicators are not designed in a way that is clearly and neutrally measurable. They also seem extremely ambitious for a one-year programme – they are looking at massive behavioural changes, which is rarely achievable in a one-year programme and in such a volatile context. Indicators at this level of project design should not exceed two or three in total, especially again for a 12 month project.

The three immediate objectives were more focused than the goal, but did not provide the required level of detail in order to be clear on what they really intended to do at the completion of this project. The objectives are:

1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, and in particular the Constitutional Review Committee, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws.
2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicised.
3. Increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives.

All of the objectives could have benefited from more detail and planning as to what was trying to be achieved in the one year timeframe. For objective one there could be more detail as to the nature of support that would be provided. For objective two, it is completely unclear as to how key issues would be prioritised, internationalised and technicised (technicised is also not an English word and therefore it was difficult to ascertain what the project was aiming for here.)

The same comments for the development objective indicators are also valid for the immediate objectives. There are only qualitative indicators, and these are vague at best, using undefined terms like “timely” and “minimal.” Ultimately then for the purposes of monitoring and evaluation, it is really up to an individual as to whether or not the indicators have been reached. It would have been better to have at least one or two quantifiable indicators, in addition to being more specific in the qualitative indicators. This same comment can basically be repeated all the way down through the output and activity levels.

There are 32 activities listed in the logical framework, many of which are complex and multi-pronged. This is very high for what was initially supposed to be a 12 month project. It is therefore not surprising that the project has undergone numerous no cost extensions, as it is unlikely that such an ambitious project could have been completed in one year.

As a result, the logical framework, which forms the basis of this project’s design, broadly explains what the project is going to do but fails to provide what the specific and clear results of this project will be. Bearing in mind that project interventions were working with a nascent and less than stable government partner, there is still a need to have more details as to what the project would achieve and how one would measure this – as such causal logic is clearly missing. In addition, given the context of the Iraqi government in 2006, it may have made sense to design a less ambitious project but which had clear objectives and results. This may have resulted in a project without a three year extension.

Finally, the project showed strong analysis within the risks and assumptions section. Many of the topics listed later become obstacles to progress / programme achievements, and it shows solid assessment and awareness of external factors that could affect the project’s success at the design stage.

15. What systems were put in place to monitor programmes and projects? How well did

they responded to UNOPS' and MDTF's reporting requirements? What have been the key challenges in monitoring and evaluation of the programme / project?

Monitor Systems and Key Challenges

The security and operational context of Iraq means that many projects are implemented and managed remotely from Amman. While most of the UNAMI-OCS team is based in Baghdad, the Project Manager for C9-20 (a UNOPS staff member), who was ultimately responsible for monitoring, is based in Amman. This means that project monitoring is difficult at best, without being able to physically travel and interact with partners and beneficiaries on a daily basis.

As per the logical framework, monitoring of project activities was to be conducted through a combination of field visits and observations from UNOPS and UNAMI staff in Baghdad, Erbil, Basra and Amman, feedback from partners, and project reports. The logical framework also had vague terms such as “M&E of activities” and “Actual outcome of IPDs” as mechanisms to monitor and measure success, yet these are not genuine quantitative or qualitative methods of monitoring.

As mentioned throughout this evaluation report, it was difficult to accurately monitor the achievement of this project at all levels – particularly at the objective and output levels. The main reason for this is that the indicators set up at the start of the programme were vague, subjective and did not determine what actually qualified as success. Best practice dictates that indicators should be SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time bound.) Taking the four indicators from the development objective as an example:

1. Review process and constitution-related legislative work is conducted timely by the Council of Representatives and with minimal occurrence of deadlock situations.
2. Level of success of dialogue initiatives supported by the project, or indirectly generated by it, which bring together key political actors to engage positively on divisive constitutionally relevant issues.
3. Increased feeling of ownership of constitutional and reconciliation process by Iraqi public, through the increased involvement of their political representatives.
4. Level of success of civil society initiatives supported by the project in bringing together a broad spectrum of societal groups in discussing constitutional review and reconciliation.

It is clear that none of these indicators are written SMARTly or in an objectively measurable manner. There is nothing that defines or describes what it means to have the review process conducted in a “timely” way with a “minimal occurrence of deadlock” (#1.) Similarly, what constitutes an “increased set of ownership” (#3) or what is the “level of success of civil society initiatives”? (#4) These indicators, which have a massive impact on the ability to adequately monitor a project, fail to capture the ways in which we can know if this project was successful and leaves much to the individual opinion of the reviewer. Similar statements can be made for the design of the monitoring plan all the way down to the activity level.

Project reports consistently state that remote management and an unstable security situation made it difficult to adequately monitor NGO activities on the ground. This is understandable given the conditions on the ground in Iraq. For the national grant reconciliation fund, the NGO Al Yaqueen was contracted to monitor NGO activities for the first year, generally looking at whether or not activities were actually held, and if they were compliant with their proposal. A review of the final monitoring report from Al Yaqueen shows some insight into the NGO activities, yet it is difficult to ascertain the direct impact that these interventions had towards achieving the project's overall aim. UNOPS has undergone a number of internal lessons learned activities to improve its grants management system, most recently developing new manuals for both its staff and NGO partners. These may help with the monitoring of future similar interventions.

Reporting Requirements

The consultant found that the reporting template required for use by ITF projects through the end of 2008 did not accurately capture information to demonstrate whether or not the project was meeting its goals. The first two sections of the template (covering project purpose and human resources) are very repetitive, and provide little new information. Section four on results asks for progress made towards achieving outcomes, but does not specify using indicators to show this progress. Therefore most of the data provided in the reports is subjective, shows little statistical validity, and does not measure against the targets or anticipated results as per the original project's design. While it can be argued that the nature and scope of the project changed within the evolving political environment in Iraq, then indicators and set targets should have also evolved as well.

The reporting framework introduced for 2009 was a slight improvement as it asks the project to report upon both quantitative and qualitative achievements. However, the consultant found reports for 2009 to be even more vague than the previous two years. For example, in almost all quarterly reports for 2009, the achievement reported for all four quarters under output one is "In the reporting period, the OCS team based in Baghdad has provided ongoing support to the CRC or CoR". There is no data provided at all to show this achievement, and the donor should have asked for additional clarifications.

VI. Lessons and Generalisations

The following are the four main lessons learned that can be gleaned from this project's evaluation and applied on a broad scale. These points should be taken into consideration along with seven points on lessons learned and good practice detailed in questions 11 and 12 to provide an overall illustration of i) what interventions or approaches have worked well for this project, ii) what should be replicated / capitalized on for future interventions in Iraq, and iii) generalisations on good practice for similar development programmes.

Lessons 1: Project logical frameworks must be measurable, objective and specific enough to demonstrate genuine change or results.

As mentioned in more detail in question #14, the vague and generally weak design of this project's logical framework has made it difficult i) to monitor and measure success throughout the implementation process, ii) to explicitly communicate achievements internally over time and iii) to externally evaluate the project's tangible results. It is critical that projects have clear and specific designs from the very beginning in order for the project team to know if their activities are on the right track or if they need to be re-adjusted (as was the case for this project numerous times.) A clearer and more developed project design will also make it easier to gather real lessons learned on the type and scope of interventions that actually work (or should be avoided) for future projects.

Lesson 2: Projects must have some degree of quantifiable measurement.

This project sought to facilitate discussions on inclusive governance, as well as foster national reconciliation amidst a climate of violence and inter-ethnic distrust. These are intangible concepts, the results of which are difficult to measure with numbers or pure quantitative data. However, given the large size of the project budget, and the need to truly measure the impact of development projects, it is suggested that projects use both quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure their activities. As with lesson one above this would have been very helpful both internally for the project team to monitor and communicate their success, but also for the donors to measure the impact of allocated resources. There is a need to have some quantifiable evidence of success, and not merely an intuitive feeling or observation that that results have been achieved.

Lesson 3: Project design and budgets for an uncertain post-conflict environment should be appropriate and feasible for the timeframe.

This is a lessons learned both from a project design and implementation perspective, but also for future multi-donor trust funds that may be set up in other UN peacekeeping missions or countries in transition. This project addressed highly complex and political issues that would never have been solved in one-year time frame, even in the safest and most stable of countries, not to mention post-conflict and post-dictatorship Iraq. From the donor perspective, there should be recognition of the time required to address political concerns, and either allow for projects to have a minimum of 18-24 months timeframe, or

require that implementation be designed for an appropriate time period (i.e. only funding activities that can be realistically achieved in 12 months.) In the absence of this logic, there will be either numerous extensions or changes in scope (as is the case for this project) and/or scenarios where funds cannot be spent or returned. In a transitional context where project success is impacted by so many factors, it is critical that UN projects have the ability to plan without an arbitrary timeframe imposed upon them – this helps to make sure that projects are not set up to fail right from the start.

Lesson 4: As a neutral and international body, the UN can play a powerful facilitating role in bringing together different political, religious and community groups.

While this is likely not the first time that the UN's neutral role has been commented on, it is important that project design in the future (both for Iraq and elsewhere) fully capitalize on the meditative ability of the UN to work between different political / ethnic / religious groups. A large portion of this project's success has been its ability to build linkages between different political parties, different government departments, and between civil society and the GoI. As stated previously, the project was able to encourage these relationships both through individual rapport of UNAMI/UNOPS staff, as well as through the facilitation and funding of actual events for discussion and meetings to occur. It is unlikely that the different parties of the GoI, and that the GoI and CSOs, would have ever met without the encouragement and support of the project staff.

Annex I: Logical Framework

Objectives	Measurable indicators	Means of verification	Important assumptions
<p>Development Objective</p> <p>To ensure transparent, inclusive, consensus-based resolution of divisive constitutional issues in Iraq through constitution-making processes, focusing in particular on the rule of law, federalism, governance and identity-based issues, by supporting Iraqi institutions through the review of the Constitution and through the implementation of constitutional mandated laws and by engaging key actors of the Iraqi society into reconciliation initiatives.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Actual support provided by the project in the development of transparent and inclusive processes to resolve divisive constitutional issues, in particular through a formal constitution-review process and/or through other processes, including legislative implementation, focusing in particular on the rule of law, federalism, governance and identity-based issues. 2. Actual support made available to Iraqi institutions, including the Constitutional Review Committee and other relevant project partners and stakeholders 3. Constructive participation in the constitution-review process and in the process to draft relevant enabling legislation by divergent and oppositional political bodies, particularly in activities organised and/or sponsored and supported by the project 4. Key actors become engaged in the Iraqi reconciliation process through or with the support of the project 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UNAMI/OCS and UNOPS staff and experts on the ground in Iraq 2. Degree and variety of public participation in reconciliation activities, in the constitution-making process and other project activities 3. Final report from the project based on achievements of the project in relation to its development objective 4. Financial reconciliation reports 5. Feedback from the project partners and stakeholders on the overall performance and impact of the project 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. While Iraq is currently in an extremely volatile situation, given recent events there, the project is assuming that despite the present security situation, it will be able to operate in a relatively unhindered manner, to provide the support outlined in its development objective. In order to mitigate the security risks the project will identify and select its project partners on the ground in Iraq according to the local realities so that threats to personnel will be minimised. 2. The political will on the part of the GoI to resolve divisive constitutional issues through a constitutional review process, and that formal or informal negotiations in this regard commence from September, remains steady. 3. Key issues requiring constitutional resolution are not addressed speedily without full consultation through legislation passed in an unsatisfactory manner. 4. The majority of the Iraqi public remains convinced that reconciliation and national unity are paramount priorities for the country's future and therefore provides support to the

	5. Deeper understanding by key actors of ways of resolving divisive constitutional issues in accordance with best practice and of solutions to meet each party's needs.		<p>project's activities.</p> <p>5. Project is approved in time to enable it to commence on schedule</p> <p>6. Rapid and timely mobilisation and access to required resource</p> <p>7. Excellent cooperation and coordination with and between all project partners and other relevant UN agencies and those working in the same area in Iraq,</p>
<p>Immediate Objectives:</p> <p><i>The immediate impact on the programme/project area or target group i.e. the change or benefit to be achieved by the programme/project:</i></p>	<p><i>Quantitative ways of measuring or qualitative ways of judging timed achievement of purpose:</i></p>	<p><i>Cost-effective methods and sources to quantify or assess indicators:</i></p>	<p>(Immediate Objective to Development Objective)</p> <p><i>External conditions necessary if achieved programme/project purpose is to contribute to reaching programme/project goal:</i></p>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide support to key Iraqi governmental institutions, parliamentarians and politicians, and in particular the Constitutional Review Committee, to manage the constitutional amendment process and implement constitutional mandated laws. 2. Nurture a consensus-based constitution-review and implementation process by raising the awareness of the key issues in such a way that they are prioritised, internationalised and technicized and by providing neutral environments for and facilitation of dialogue between political actors. 3. Reach out to the wider Iraqi society 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review process and constitution-related legislative work is conducted timely by the Council of Representatives and with minimal occurrence of deadlock situations. 2. Level of success of dialogue initiatives supported by the project, or indirectly generated by it, which bring together key political actors to engage positively on divisive constitutionally relevant issues. 3. Increased feeling of ownership of constitutional and reconciliation process by Iraqi public, through the increased involvement of their political representatives. 4. Level of success of civil society 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Media reports, UNAMI/POL reports, Official Gazette. 2. UNAMI/OCS and UNOPS personnel in the ground on Iraq and Field visits to the project's locations throughout Iraq 3. Feedback and evaluation from project partners, such as the Constitutional Review Committee, and stakeholders on the support provided by the project to the constitutional process. 4. Monitoring and evaluation of project activities in order to ensure that project objectives are on track to be realised according 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate identification and liaison with all project partners and stakeholders and their full cooperation with the project. • The prevailing security conditions, in terms of how the researchers involved with the project and its partners perceive their own personal safety and thence ability to discharge their duties in a relatively safe and secure manner. • Restrictions which might be imposed on the movement of the project's field officers, which might hinder the execution of their project responsibilities • Prevailing political environment remains conducive to resolution of

to increase inclusiveness and transparency of the constitutional review and implementation process and foster national reconciliation through public outreach and support to civil society initiatives	initiatives supported by the project in bringing together a broad spectrum of societal groups in discussing constitutional review and reconciliation.	to schedule. 5. Evaluation of and feedback from participants on dialogues organised and supported by project to bring together divergent political groupings to discuss the Constitution 6. Actual outcomes and reports on inter-party dialogues 7. Opinion polls on constitutional review process. 8. Impact assessment reports on civil society initiatives funded by project (independent review on a selected number of projects).	constitutional issues through a formal review process <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unexpected political developments, which might arise and thus prevent due and proper consideration of proposed constitutional amendments.• A further increase of militant opposition, targeting parliamentarians, the government, and the constitutional review process more directly• An increase in human rights violations could work against full participation by all sectors of the Iraqi population in the Constitution review and implementation process• Receptiveness and willingness to take into account at the political level the contributions and input of the general public into the constitutional process• Excellent communication between all project partners in order to ensure the effective and successful implementation of the project's objectives
Outputs: <i>The specifically deliverable results expected from the programme/project to attain the objectives:</i>	<i>Quantitative ways of measuring or qualitative ways of judging timed production of outputs:</i>	<i>Cost-effective methods and sources to quantify or assess indicators:</i>	(Outputs to immediate objective) <i>Factors out of programme/project control which, if present, could restrict progress from outputs to achieving programme/project objectives:</i>

<p>1.1 Iraqi governmental institutions involved in the Constitutional process are presented with an array of viable best practice options to guide the constitutional review and implementation process.</p> <p>1.2 Improved management of the constitutional review process and implementation of constitutional mandated laws.</p> <p>1.3 Enhanced capacity, both operational and technical, of the Constitutional Review Committee in order to ensure optimal discharge of its responsibilities</p> <p>2.1 Enhanced process of dialogue between political actors, based on an improved understanding, in and out of Parliament, of options available for the resolution of divisive issues, leads to real consensus-based constitution making process.</p> <p>2.2 Secure the support of influential Iraqi and international actors towards the constitutional process through intense coordination, awareness raising and dialogue.</p> <p>3.1. Greater visibility of the efforts carried out by the Iraqi Government to conduct a transparent, inclusive and consensus-based constitutional review process.</p> <p>3.2. Multi-stakeholder and other initiatives working towards the</p>	<p>1. Actual support provided to key Iraqi governmental institutions in managing the constitutional amendment and relevant legislative process (number and kind of experts, duration of assignments).</p> <p>2. Legal texts, policy papers, working papers, and other documents produced by project team and expert consultants to advise key players and institutions.</p> <p>3. Direct support provided to CRC and other relevant parliamentary committees / structures, in terms of equipment, staffing, capacity-building.</p> <p>4. Level of participation (number, seniority, representation) from politicians, governmental representatives and independent experts, to seminars, workshops, conferences and study tours.</p> <p>5. Level of participation in coordination meetings, task group meetings, presentations by project team, from influential Iraqi and international actors.</p> <p>6. Media reports and inserts on project-supported dialogue and reconciliation initiatives.</p> <p>7. Number and type of civil society</p>	<p>1. UNAMI-OCS and UNOPS personnel in the ground on Iraq and Field visits to the project's locations throughout Iraq</p> <p>2. Feedback and evaluation from project partners, such as parliamentarians, the Constitutional Review Committee, and other stakeholders on the support provided by the project to the constitutional process.</p> <p>3. M & E of project activities in order to ensure that project objectives are on track to be realised according to schedule.</p> <p>4. Evaluation of and feedback from participants on dialogues organised and supported by project to bring together divergent political groupings to discuss the Constitution</p> <p>5. Actual outcomes and reports on inter-party dialogues.</p> <p>6. Press reviews (Local, regional and international media).</p> <p>7. Grant fund reports (from recipient organizations).</p> <p>8. Independent review reports, on a selected number of civil society</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate identification and liaison with all project partners and stakeholders and their full cooperation with the project. • The prevailing security conditions, in terms of how the researchers involved with the project and its partners perceive their own personal safety and thence ability to discharge their duties in a relatively safe and secure manner • Restrictions which might be imposed on the movement of the project's field officers, which might hinder the execution of their project responsibilities • Prevailing political environment remains conducive to resolution for constitutional issues through a formal review process • Unexpected political developments, which might arise and thus prevent due and proper consideration of proposed constitutional amendments. • A further increase of militant opposition, targeting parliament members, the government, and the constitutional review process more directly • An increase in human rights violations could work against full participation by all sectors of the Iraqi population in the
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<p>resolution of divisive constitutional issues, the contribution to cessation of violence in order to provide an environment for constructive dialogue and the support to the national reconciliation plan.</p> <p>3.3. Empowerment of civil society to advocate their constitutional and national reconciliation concerns.</p>	<p>initiatives supported through grants, and their impact on public's attitude and perceptions of the importance of the constitutional review and national reconciliation.</p> <p>8. Level of inclusion of civil society proposals in the final draft of the amended constitution.</p>	<p>projects.</p> <p>9. Final draft of amended constitution.</p>	<p>Constitutional Review process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receptiveness and willingness to take into account at the political level the contributions and input of the general public into the constitutional process • Excellent communication between all project partners to ensure the effective and successful implementation of the project's objectives
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Activities: <i>Tasks to be done to produce the outputs</i>	Inputs: <i>This is a summary of the programme/project budget (sub-budgets and total as in Annex B)</i>	Financial report	(Activity to output) <i>Factors out of programme/project control which, if present, could restrict progress from activities to achieving outputs:</i>
1.1.1 Provide knowledge-based support to key Iraqi institutions (Parliamentary Committees, Chief Justice, Gas and oil sector, etc.)	INPUTS: US\$ 1. Personnel - 1,013,800 2. Contracts - 3,775,000 3. Training - 530,000 4. Equipment - 19,500 5. Supplies - 60,800 6. Transport (WFP) - 0 7. Travel - 132,800 8. Pro Sub-tot - 5,531,900 9. Misc - 79,200 10. Security - 67,777 11. Agency Mgmt 354,930 Support (6.25 %)	UNOPS shall, on behalf of UNAMI-OCS, submit narrative and financial reports in line with UNDG ITF Steering Committee requirements.	Again the major risk here would be that the evolving security situation would prevent or result in the delay of project activities, thereby retarding the realisation of the project outputs. However, the project, as noted above, will minimise these risks by keeping abreast of security trends through the UN and its Iraqi partners.
1.1.2 Elaborate alternative textual formulations for provisions on various key subjects (Human Rights, Judiciary, civil-military relations / militias, civil service, codes of conduct) as options for discussion and submission to the Constitutional Review Committee			
1.1.3 Commission or draft documents as requested on specified and agreed constitutionally-mandated legislation in the field of Rule of Law.			
1.1.4 Develop panel of experts who can contribute to elaboration of papers / present options on <i>ad hoc</i> workshops.			
1.1.5 Organise workshops/experts			
	12 Total Project Budget - US\$6,033,807		A further important risk would be a deterioration of the political environment away from support for constitutional review and implementation. If the review committee is delayed the project will still the project will usefully support informal dialogue over the divisive

<p>presentations on short-notice on relevant topics to the Constitution process when proposed by Iraqis counterparts</p> <p>1.2.1. Monitor development of legislation and institutions related to the Constitutional process (HR Commission, Chief Justice Office, Civil Service Commission, etc.)</p> <p>1.2.2. Monitor parliamentary activity in all relevant areas.</p> <p>1.2.3. Strategise passing of reports and textual formulations</p> <p>1.3.1. Discuss options for establishment, institutional structure and management of the CRC.</p> <p>1.3.2. Organize secretarial support to CRC, if necessary, through the Parliament's permanent secretariat.</p> <p>1.3.3. Provide infrastructure support to the CRC, including the Secretariat, if requested and after careful assessment of needs and existing resources.</p> <p>1.3.4. Establish and support a Public Outreach Unit, housed by the Parliament's Research Directorate, to advice the CRC on outreach activities (opinion polls, media campaigns, civil society engagement and public participation).</p> <p>2.1.1. Organise study tours relevant to the Constitutional process (constitutional courts, judicial institutions, federalism, etc.) in country /ies such as India, Germany, Portugal, Nigeria, etc.</p>			<p>issues which can feed into a formal review process at a later date. If an aggressive legislative programme is embarked upon which interprets the constitution, complicating the effectiveness of a review process, the project allows for a targeting of o programme of work to support that process, i.e. legislative implementation of the constitution.</p>
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<p>2.1.2. Organise second-generation multiparty thematic dialogues on relevant topics, including: (i) Judiciary in a federal State/federalism related jurisprudence, architecture of judiciary in a federal system; (ii) public service / militias / de-Baathification; (iii) reconciliation to promote an environment for discussion of divisive issues; (iv) covering all issues but directed particularly at civil society, etc as appropriate and necessary.</p> <p>2.1.3. Organise second-generation multiparty dialogues at the governorate level on relevant topics, including, but not limited to, the Kirkuk issue, a Governors Conference, and meetings in particular in Erbil and Basra, on general constitutional issues.</p> <p>2.1.4. Assist in organizing meetings between committee meetings by political party</p> <p>2.1.5. Organise issue-based meetings between key actors, as and when required</p> <p>2.1.6. Utilise third party good offices role of UNAMI to bridge consensus when requested and as required, including organising meetings to effect this end in and outside of Iraq.</p> <p>2.1.7. Raise the capacity of CRC and other negotiators through expert advice and training workshops on negotiation skills.</p> <p>2.2.1. Engage on constitutionally-related reconciliation and transitional justice issues with UNAMI-HRO, POL, Human</p>		
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<p>Rights NGOs, other UN agencies, the Ministry of State for National Reconciliation and other relevant Iraqi ministries and institutions</p> <p>2.2.2. Share information accumulated through the project with project partners, stakeholders and other relevant bodies and liaise with relevant UNAMI sections / UNCT.</p> <p>2.2.3. Organise international coordination meetings and prepare substantive engagement with other international actors</p> <p>2.2.4. Participate in relevant Working Groups and meetings on constitutional issues (Hydro-Carbon Law, Rule of Law, US-Sponsored Law Group, USIP-sponsored Iraqi Lawyers Group, Academics, Deans of Law Faculties, etc.)</p> <p>3.1.1. Edit, translate, publish and distribute papers on constitutional issues.</p> <p>3.1.2. Edit, translate, publish and distribute First Generation of Multi-party Dialogues</p> <p>3.1.3. Elaboration of pieces on constitutional and related transitional justice and reconciliation issues for publication in Constitutional Corners in various newspapers</p> <p>3.1.4. Organise “Meet the media” event in order to present conclusion of multiparty dialogues and on ad-hoc themes as deemed relevant.</p> <p>3.1.5. Ensure participation in and coverage of project activities by media stakeholders that are involved in other</p>			
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UN initiatives towards press freedom and freedom of expression.			
3.2.1 Receive proposals from NGOs, CSOs and academic institutions interested in carrying out initiatives of National Reconciliation, in particular of a multi-stakeholder nature and community-based, and focusing on bridging societal divides and creating a peaceful environment necessary for the resolution of divisive issues.			
3.2.2 Support technically / financially selected proposals emanating from such organisations / groups.			
3.2.3 Foster broad-based participation of key actors to events / campaigns / other activities developed by supported organisations.			
3.3.1. Ensure consistent participation of CSOs to multiparty dialogues and other types of seminars so that they can contribute their constitutional concerns into the review process.			

Annex II: List of Key Informant Interviews

1. Adam Styp-Rekowski, UNOPS, Project Manager Governance
2. Sven Spengemann, UNAMI OCS, Senior Constitutional Officer
3. Khawla Shaia, UNAMI OCS, Legal Officer
4. Nassire Ghaddire, UNAMI OCS, National Political and Outreach Officer
5. Ahmed Salman, UNOPS, Project Officer

Annex III: Terms of Reference (TOR) for UNOPS ITF Programme Evaluations, January 2010

This TOR is valid for the evaluation of the following ITF-funded UNOPS projects:

- Rehabilitation of Water Distribution Systems in Sidakan and Rawanduz
- Rehabilitation of Takia Water Distribution System
- Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional Review and National Dialogue

Purpose of evaluation: The evaluations are expected to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative for broader internal and external information sharing. It will also aid into designs of UNOPS future programme and similar engagements.

Intent of the evaluation: It is expected that the consultant will conduct *formative* project evaluations, examining the delivery of the programme, the quality of its implementation, and an assessment of the organizational context, personnel, procedures, inputs, etc.

Evaluation Scope: The consultant will conduct an evaluation of each of the three aforementioned projects, allotting no more than one month per project. Due to both time and travel constraints, the consultant will utilize project proposals, reports, and other project-collected information as well as key informant interviews (either in person or by phone) as the primary sources of data for the project evaluations. Based on time and UN ceiling space available, the consultant may also travel to Erbil to visit the water projects (due to the upcoming elections it is not feasible for the consultant to travel to Baghdad.)

Evaluation Objectives: As per the general ITF evaluation guidelines, the following objectives have been specifically customized for the UNOPS ITF project evaluations:

- **Development Results:** To assess the achieved progress and results against stipulated programme / project results and objectives on all stakeholders, especially beneficiary groups
- **Efficiency and Effectiveness:** To assess the efficiency of the programme / project interventions and understand the effectiveness of programme / project interventions in addressing the underlying problem(s)
- **Relevance:** To assess the relevance of programme/ project components in addressing the needs and issues of beneficiary groups
- **Partnership:** To understand the extent to which this programme / project has contributed to forging partnership at various levels with the Government of Iraq, Civil Society and UN/ donors
- **Lessons Learned:** To generate lessons on good practices based on assessment from the aforementioned evaluation objectives.

Evaluation Questions: The consultant should seek to address the following questions (as appropriate / relevant) when conducting the project evaluations:

Development results

1. What have been the specific benefits of the project to different beneficiary groups, including men, women, children, youth, and marginalized population groups?

2. How the project has contributed to national priorities as identified in the Iraq National Development Strategy (NDS), the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)?

Efficiency and Effectiveness

3. Has the programme/ project responded to the underlying development issues that provided rationale for the programme/ project? How?
4. How have programme / project results contributed to improved access and utilization of services?
5. How did the programme / project engage with stakeholders and beneficiaries during project planning and implementation?

Relevance

6. How did the programme/ project contribute to local / national needs and priorities?
7. How were project strategies tailored to the current programme / project context?

Partnerships

8. Has the programme/ project forged new partnerships / strengthened existing partnerships and how?
9. To what extent has the programme / project contributed to capacity development of the involved partners?

Sustainability

10. What is current status of the programme / project components? Are functions and facilities still maintained? Who is responsible for the management of programme / project facilities after the project closure?

Lessons Learned

11. What are the key lessons learned from programme / project implementation?
12. Are there any specific recommendations to be considered when designing similar programme/ projects in the future?

Operational Effectiveness

13. How was the programme / project designed? Was any assessment undertaken to inform programming?
14. Was the programme / project results framework clear, logical and focused?
15. What systems were put in place to monitor programmes and projects? How well did they responded to UNOPS' and MDTF's reporting requirements? What have been the key challenges in monitoring and evaluation of the programme / project?

The Dialogue Grant Fund (DGF)

The Dialogue Grant Fund is a component of the project “*Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional Review and National Dialogue*” funded by the European Union through the Iraq Trust Fund and implemented by UNOPS and UNAMI.

Rationale

1. The development of constitutional and legislative mechanisms to support the distribution of water resources and hydrocarbon management, with a focus on revenue sharing as well as other institutional, operational and exploration-related aspects, remain among the key objectives of the UN in Iraq. Another vital area of UN interest is the situation of minority groups in the country. These areas are seen as the principal cornerstones of the efforts towards national reconciliation and political agreement and equally important, economic reconstruction, and diversification in Iraq. It was in this context that the goals of the Dialogue Grant Fund were developed. Through supporting four projects: two in each of the two governorates of Kirkuk and Erbil, (each project implemented by one civil society organization (CSO)), the grant fund worked towards establishing effective dialogue and debate among various stakeholders at a local, grass roots level; in order to sustain and support a broader, national dialogue over vital issues.
2. Through the provision of funds to selected NGOs in these governorates, the DGF: (i) raised awareness and understanding among Iraqis of issues related to constitutional-democratic government, including particularly: the distribution of water resources, hydrocarbon management, and the situation of minorities in Iraq ; (ii) promoted an open discussion about these issues among Iraqi citizens including student groups; (iii) gathered recommendations of civil society regarding the best solution for the discussed issues. These recommendations were presented to GoI/CoR and KRG/KP.

Selection Process

1. A Request for Proposals (RfP) was launched in December 2009 to identify an NGO. It was published in UNOPS website and advertised electronically to NGOs across Iraq, using several channels: (i) UNOPS distribution list, (ii) NCCI (NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq); (iii) Other UN agencies. Interested NGOs had one month to prepare and send their technical proposal. A budget not exceeding 33,000 USD per grant and allocation of maximum two grants per community for each governorate was requested in the RfP.
2. A total of six proposals were received and reviewed by an evaluation panel at UNOPS.

Implementation period

3. The implementation period of the projects ranged from three to five months depending on the grant activities, starting in March 2010 and ending in July 2010.

Monitoring modalities

4. Continuous support was provided by UNOPS to the implementing partners and regular coordination was upheld between UNOPS field staff, UNOPS Amman office, and the external monitoring agent and implementing partners. The NGO projects were directly monitored through the following mechanisms:

- UNOPS staff in Amman (with visits to Erbil) closely liaised with all partners, field staff, and the monitoring agent, supervised, and cross-checked activity reporting and monitoring as well as developments in the field.
- UNOPS staff located in Erbil and Kirkuk regularly visited the offices of NGO partners and attended their activities.
- External Monitoring Agent: UNOPS hired an external company to provide liaison, monitoring, and evaluation services in order to ensure coordination of activities between UNOPS and the implementing Iraqi NGOs in the selected locations. Their work required direct, on-the-ground, daily coordination and monitoring of NGOs grantees activities. One monitoring officer per governorate was assigned by the Monitoring Agent. Monitoring officers attesting the events organised. In addition they assessed the quality of the activities conducted and their compliance with project proposals, as well as evaluating the immediate impact on the participants to these activities. The Monitoring Agent played a complementary role to the monitoring carried out by UNOPS staff on the ground.

Annex 1

List of Projects funded through the Dialogue Grant Fund

1. **Al Mesalla Organization for Human Resources Development** proposed to implement a project in the governorate of **Erbil**. The project aimed at bringing together Iraqis to discuss vital issues including the sharing of natural resources and minority issues. In order to achieve this goal, the NGO planned to build partnerships between the KRG Ministry of Oil and Natural Resources, the government, and the parliament in the Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq, Erbil governorate. NGOs were to form a committee to discuss and compile the recommendations for this specific project. The project proposed to plan lectures in Erbil on laws and constitutions regarding oil and gas in Iraq and the KRG region. Additionally, they planned to have radio programs on laws and constitutional aspects of regulations regarding oil and gas in Iraq and KRG aired on Erbil local radio. Moreover, they proposed to have focus groups with students from Salahaden University in Erbil. A meeting with NGOs in Erbil City was planned to be organised to discuss hydrocarbon as a tool to be used for bringing Iraqis together, live in coexistence, and build peace in the country. A committee of 5 NGOs was planned to be elected and prepare to follow up with the concerned sides regarding the suggestions. A final one-day conference was proposed.

Final Achievements of Al Mesalla Organization for Human Resources Development: The NGO presented three lectures on oil and gas laws in Iraq and the Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq, in addition to minority's issues. 47 people attended these lectures across

the Kurdish, Assyrian, Turkmen and Kildani communities. They also gathered six focus groups of 149 participants on the topics of oil and gas laws in Khabat, Shaqlawa and the Erbil City centre. Four series of radio programs were broadcasted, which aimed at raising awareness on the articles of hydrocarbon revenue in the Constitution. 500 beneficiaries were targeted. A survey was conducted among 1,000 of students in the Art and Language, Law, and Management and Economics faculties of Salahaddin University. The NGO also conducted a meeting with 20 local NGOs in Erbil which discussed issues related to oil and gas. At the end of its project, Al Mesalla organized a final conference with 96 people from NGOs, parliaments, media, and government. The conference focused on displaying the outcomes of the focus groups, radio programs, and the referendum.

2. The Ainkawa Centre for Employment (ACE) planned to implement a project in the **Erbil** governorate. The NGO proposed to work closely with international organizations that are implementing similar initiatives in the region to sustain and support a broader national dialogue over vital issues like water, oil resources, and the situation of minorities in Iraq. They planned to conduct dialogue sessions through a series of meetings at the community level and among stakeholders at grass roots level. ACE proposed to select communities to host meetings to discuss key national issues. ACE proposed to develop materials for participants on the current constitutional and legislative situation on each issue for discussion. Participants of the meetings were to develop strategies to raise community awareness on key issues. In addition to the mentioned points, the NGO planned to provide technical support to agreed awareness raising strategies in communities and work for continued discussion and debate. Synthesized community concerns and recommendations consolidated into five to ten points were planned to be shared with to KRG/GoI.

Final Achievements of Ainkawa Centre for Employment:

ACE conducted a ToT training course for 15 facilitators in the ACE office to facilitate and supervise the implementation of the awareness raising sessions and project activities in 15 different communities. They also conducted 20 community meetings and held ten focus group meetings with 429 participants discussing and raising awareness of constitutional issues, particularly the situation of minority groups in the Iraqi permanent constitution, Kurdistan proposed constitution, and KRG oil law. In addition, discussions were moderated among key stakeholders and relevant issues of concern to local communities were identified and recommendations provided to address them with concrete suggestions to the relevant parties. ACE coordinated with IKNN and Koye NGOs to conduct focus groups with NGOs interested in the selected three subjects. Moreover, these meetings and focus groups included various groups like Christians, Mandeens, Turkumans, Arabs, IDPs and returnees in seven districts of the Erbil Governorate. ACE organized a one day final workshop in Erbil to bring the results of the project to the attention of 26 community decision makers. The meeting also finalized a synthesis report with recommendations discussed with the participants which was later shared with decision-makers of relevant KRG departments and the Kurdistan parliament. Participants of the workshop included: ACE facilitators, NGOs, governorate level representatives from Erbil, including the Ministries of Natural Resources, Education, and Environment. After the workshop was completed, the final results and recommendations of the project were shared with the KRG/GoI. Civil society associations such as IKNN have shared the final recommendations with 200 local NGOs and ACE shared it with

approximately 40 NGOs and associations. They also distributed 403 copies of a project report.

3. Iraqi Human Rights Establishment (IHRE) in **Kirkuk** governorate focused its project in the city centre of Kirkuk, the districts of Al-Hawiga and Al Zab, and the sub districts of Ar Riyad and Al Rashad. IHRE planned to focus on bridging the existing gaps among various political blocs, ethnic groups, religious groups, and vulnerable groups. This goal was planned to be achieved by promoting understanding of the areas in the constitution that should be subject to constitutional review, including water management, hydrocarbon revenue sharing, and tensions between different minority groups. A roundtable was planned to be organised in each of the selected districts. 20 sessions were planned to take place. Booklets containing information about training modules, conflict resolution, and peaceful coexistence were planned to be printed and distributed to the participants. Questionnaires were also planned to be distributed to the participants asking them about the reasons behind conflict and the best approach to address it. Lastly, a conference was planned in order to discuss the reasons behind existing disputes, the types of disputes, and the best means to address them.

Final Achievements of Iraqi Human Rights Establishments (IHRE):

IHRE conducted 20 workshops about reconciliation in Iraq through constitutional review and national dialogue in Al Zab, Al Hawija, Ar Riyad and Al Rashad. 449 people participated in these conferences. The NGO also conducted workshops trying to build national dialogue between local community members, tribal leaders, influential individuals in the community, community representatives, and local members of the community. These workshops focused on: minimizing violence between farmers and tribes, raising awareness of conflict management and resolution by peaceful approach in the country side and rural areas, and accepting different opinions of the others in rural areas. Throughout the implementation of its project, IHRE printed and distributed 500 leaflets about human rights, 500 leaflets on human rights issues, 500 leaflets on a water dispute resolution lecture, and 500 leaflets on the water crisis between Iraq and its neighbouring countries. By the end of its project IHRE organized a final conference; 124 people from local community attended this conference.

4. Civil Development Organization (CDO) proposed to implement a project in the **Kirkuk** governorate. The NGO primarily planned to raise the awareness and understanding among Kirkuk inhabitants about issues related to a constitutional-democratic government, including: the distribution of water resources, hydrocarbon management, and the situation of minority rights. Dialogue meetings were planned to be held. The agenda of meetings were planned to cover topics including: the distribution of natural resources in the federal government, democratic governance, and minority rights. Workshops were planned to be organized addressing key stakeholders in the communities. Debate sessions were also planned to be organised; the first one would bring together members of the Kirkuk Provincial Council and the second would host university teachers and civil society activists. Water distribution, hydrocarbon revenue sharing, and minority rights in Iraq were proposed to be discussed in a final conference. This information together with the recommendations collected from the dialogue sessions, workshops, and seminars was planned to be the base for the discussions during



the conference.

Final Achievements of Civil Development Organization (CDO):

CDO conducted eight awareness raising community meetings in Rahimawa, Domez and Al Wasiti areas with a total of 154 participants. They also organized two debate sessions with nine participants. The debate results were published in two newspapers, one in Arabic and one in Kurdish, to raise the awareness and understanding among Kirkuk inhabitants about issues related to a constitutional-democratic government. Copies of the results of the debate were distributed to approximately 3,000¹ beneficiaries. Moreover, the NGO conducted eight meetings with six NGOs to promote open discussions about natural resources distribution and the minority situation among Kirkuk. The results from these discussions helped organize five seminars with a total of 95 participants to discuss the distribution of natural resources and the situation of minorities in Kirkuk, particularly among youth and student minorities. They also conducted two meetings with researchers who gathered recommendations from civil society, outcomes from open discussions, and meetings regarding solutions of discussed issues. This information was presented to the GoI, KRG, the Iraqi Parliament, and Kurdistan Parliament. CDO shared the final outputs with 124 people from the local community through a final conference on the project.

¹ This number was provided by the CDO in their final report