



## PEACEBUILDING FUND

## PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

<b>Project Title: Peace-building Fund Secretariat</b>	<b>Recipient UN Organization(s): UNDP</b>
<b>Project Contact:</b> Address: Mr. Balazs Horvath  Telephone: Office: Mobile: +211(0)954354830  E-mail: Balazs.Horvath@undp.org	<b>Implementing Partner(s):</b>
<b>Project Number:</b> To be completed by UNDP MDTF Office	<b>Project Location:</b> Juba, South Sudan
<b>Project Description:</b>  The PBF Secretariat provides support to the Steering Committee. A support officer will be recruited to support the Head of the SSRF/PBF Secretariat in managing the PBF. The cost for monitoring and evaluation at the fund level and for hiring a Support Officer are considered as direct cost and covered from the PBF allocation of USD 10 million to South Sudan.	<b>Total Project Cost: \$1,200,000</b> <b>Peace building Fund: \$1,200,000</b> <b>Government Input: n/a</b> <b>Other:</b> <b>Total: \$1,200,000</b>
	<b>Project Start Date and Duration:</b> <b>2013-2015 (24 months)</b>
<b>Gender Marker Score<sup>1</sup>:</b> <i>Score 3 for projects that are targeted 100% to women beneficiaries and/or address specific hardships faced by women and girls in post-conflict situations;</i> <i>Score 2 for projects with specific component, activities and budget allocated to women;</i> <i>Score 1 for projects with women mentioned explicitly in its objectives, but no specific activities are formulated nor is a budget reserved; and</i> <i>Score 0 for projects that do not specifically mention women.</i>	
<b>PBF Outcomes<sup>2</sup>:</b>	
<b>Project Outputs and Key Activities:</b> The project will ensure high-quality secretariat support including monitoring and evaluation at the fund level to the PBF Steering Committee and recipient UN Agencies.	

<sup>1</sup> The PBSO monitors the inclusion of women and girls in all PBF projects in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1612, 1888, 1889.

<sup>2</sup> PBF specific outcome areas: 1 Security Sector Reform; 2 Rule of Law; 3 (DD)R; 4 Political dialogue for Peace Agreements; 5. National reconciliation; 6. Democratic governance; 7. Management of natural resources (including land); 8. Short-term employment generation; 9. Sustainable livelihoods; 10. Public administration; and 11. Public service delivery (including infrastructure)

(for PRF-funded projects)	
<b>Co-chairs of the Joint Steering Committee</b>	
 <p>Toby Lantzer DSRSG/RCA/HC/UNDP RR Co-chair</p> <p>Signature and Date <i>7/05/2013</i></p>	 <p>Hon. Mary Jervase Yak Deputy Minister of Finance and Development Planning / Chair</p> <p>Signature and Date <i>10/05/2013</i></p>
<b>Recipient UN Organization(s)</b>	<b>National Implementing Partner(s)</b>
<p>Balázs Horváth Country Director UNDP South Sudan</p> <p>Signature and Date <i>10/5/2013</i></p>	

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## **COMPONENT 1: (The “WHY”)**

### **a) Situation Analysis/Context**

During the six-year transition period leading to independence, South Sudan has presided over the fastest development of public sector institutions in modern statehood. A national parliament, 37 ministries, 19 commissions, ten state governments and ten state legislatures were established. Rule of law institutions were created and the first steps in transforming the liberation army into a professional force were taken. Despite these achievements, South Sudan is entering statehood with enormous challenges, most of them the legacy of the long civil war.

As part of the analysis in the South Sudan Development Plan, the Government has identified serious threats to peace and development that, if left unaddressed, may undermine progress during the next generation. In the lead-up to the referendum and independence, the Government’s own Bureau for Small Arms and Community Security conducted consultations in more than half of South Sudan’s counties. The results confirmed that violence in the new country is driven by a complex combination of factors including political marginalisation, lack of state authority in remote areas, the absence of a credible justice system, competition over natural resources and inequitable distribution of resources.

*The first key driver of conflict*, associated with the g7+ emphasis on legitimate politics and conflict resolution, is the perception of political marginalization, which opens communities to manipulation by potential “spoilers,” and the weakening of traditional mechanisms to mitigate conflict. The overwhelming majority of South Sudanese remain distant from decision-making and legitimate politics. Limited experience with democratic governance, inter-communal grievances and unresolved issues with Sudan are significant factors driving violence and conflict. This is particularly the case with youth, many of whom are highly militarised and frequently exploited by ethnic elites. With only limited capacity to manage political diversity, state authorities are often unable to provide opportunities for dissent, discussion and reconciliation. The lack of legitimate channels for expressing political aspirations and grievances exacerbates tensions among communities and is a major factor fuelling further tensions and, at times, violence. (Reference SSDP 2.2.1.1). Traditional methods for mitigating and resolving conflicts by respected leaders have increasingly given way to incitement and manipulation of armed conflict for personal gain. (Reference SSDP 2.2.1.2)

*The second key driver of conflict*, associated with the g7+ emphasis on security, is weak state authority in remote areas, combined with the proliferation of small arms. Community consultations repeatedly highlight the sense of insecurity felt by most South Sudanese. After decades of armed conflict, South Sudan has one of the largest armies in the region. The widespread availability of arms in both rural and urban areas has made it possible for communities to arm unemployed and illiterate young men and has eroded the authority of traditional leaders, state governments and the national government. Living in inaccessible villages with only limited state authority and protection, communities have come to rely on their weapons, and youth, for protection. Efforts to disarm civilians in the past six years have been uneven and incomplete, creating perceptions of bias and increasing the risk of violence rather than reducing it. (Reference SSDP 2.2.1.2).

*The third key driver of conflict*, associated with the g7+ emphasis on justice, is the absence of a functioning and credible justice system capable of breaking the cycle of revenge and

retaliation. The diminishing authority of traditional leaders combined with the limited reach of the formal justice system provides citizens few opportunities to seek redress and resolve their grievances through institutional mechanisms, rather than violence. Unable to re-establish a sense of justice based on restitution and compensation, communities are easily trapped in cycles of attack and counterattack. The absence of law enforcement allows impunity for the perpetrators of violent attacks and precludes redress for victims. (Reference SSDP 2.2.4).

*The fourth key driver of conflict*, associated with the g7+ emphasis on economic foundations, is the competition over scarce resources and the absence of economically productive activities for youth. Communities frequently cite conflict over grazing land and access to water points, including between agriculturalists and pastoralists, as a major cause of violence. Lack of Government capacity to mediate between communities and regulate access to resources has played a significant role in escalating levels of inter-communal violence, particularly along the borders between counties and states. In a context where rural areas will need to absorb high numbers of returnees and ex-combatants, pressure on access to land and water is expected to increase further. More than half of South Sudan's population relies on cattle as the currency for socio-cultural interaction and exchange, as well as for social-economic status, rather than for more economically productive use. The primary use for cattle in this respect is payment of dowry. Marriage is seen as a rite of passage for both male and female youth, and young men are under severe pressure to meet escalating dowry costs. The consequence is the involvement of youth in raids of neighbouring communities during which massive numbers of cattle are appropriated and widespread civilian casualties occur, triggering reprisal attacks to recoup lost cattle and loss of life. The cycle is exacerbated by the absence of other livelihood or employment opportunities for youth. (Reference SSDP 2.2.1.4; 2.2.1.2)

*The fifth key driver of conflict*, associated with the g7+ emphasis on basic services, is the inequitable distribution of resources and lack of tangible peace dividends for the population. The results of the 2008 Sudan Census remain heavily contested in South Sudan due to perceptions of political bias. In the absence of agreed census data, authorities have struggled to distribute resources equitably (Reference SSDP 6.5). Populous areas are chronically under-resourced, resulting in tensions between communities and ethnic groups. Where services reach local levels, they are largely provided through non-state entities with little state ownership. The absence of tangible peace dividends including education, health, and water/sanitation, visibly provided by the State, fuels perceptions of exclusion from post-independence gains, contributing to resentment and diminishing confidence in government. (Reference SSDP 2.2.4; 8.5.7).

#### **b) Project Justification and Core Strategy (Theory of Change)**

A key driver of conflict in South Sudan is the competition over scarce resources and the absence of economically productive activities for youth. Communities frequently cite conflict over grazing land and access to water points, including between agriculturalists and pastoralists, as a major cause of violence. Lack of Government capacity to mediate between communities and regulate access to resources has played a significant role in escalating levels of inter-communal violence, particularly along the borders between counties and states. In a context where rural areas will need to absorb high numbers of returnees and ex-combatants, pressure on access to land and water is expected to increase. More than half of South Sudan's population relies on cattle as the currency for socio-cultural interaction and exchange, as well as for social-economic prestige and status, rather than for more

economically productive use. The primary use for cattle in this respect is payment of dowry. Marriage is seen as a rite of passage for both male and female youth, and young men are under severe pressure to meet escalating dowry costs. The consequence is the involvement of youth in raids of neighbouring communities during which massive numbers of cattle are appropriated and widespread civilian casualties occur, triggering reprisal attacks to recoup lost cattle and loss of life. The cycle is exacerbated by the absence of other livelihood or employment opportunities for youth.

The proposed activities for PRF funding include (i) counteracting the militarization and marginalisation of uneducated, unemployed youth by helping the Government to launch employment and livelihood programmes; (ii) introducing vocational training and establishing and supporting the running of literacy centres in priority counties; and (iii) improving access to water in rural areas for grazing and in human settlements. Implementation of these activities will address the issue of inter communal violence, contribute to sustainable provision of peace dividends and improve the relationship between the Government and society as situation improves. It is therefore important that PRF resources should be allocated to a limited number of priorities that are based on needs identified by communities and not influenced by pressure to distribute resources equally among 15 deliverables. In addition, programmes that align with Government priorities will be likely more effective as alignment allows for synergies between PRF activities and those funded by other resources from Government or international community. The expected outcomes of the programme are: ***“Improved economic and employment opportunities for young people and access to water resources for both human and livestock consumption”***.

#### **COMPONENT 2: (the “What”)**

The PBF Steering Committee will be provided with the service of a Secretariat. For practicality and cost efficiency considerations, the PBF secretariat will be embedded in the South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) Secretariat structure. The secretariat is responsible for:

- Periodically reviewing the Rules of Procedure of the SC and in consultation with the Head of the Secretariat recommending changes or revisions to the SC.
- Liaising with the Technical Quality Assurance Group on project proposal review and analysis.
- Providing guidance to PUNOs on common methodology for project costing, staffing and related issues.
- Organising meetings of the SC including developing, circulating meeting agendas, minutes and other relevant documents.
- Documenting, communicating and ensuring follow-up of the SC’s decisions particularly ensuring the submission – no later than one business week after the SC meeting – of appropriately signed and complete documentation on approved projects to the Administrative Agent (MPTF Office, NY).
- Follow up and ensuring PUNOs meet the quarterly and annual reporting requirements on time
- Organize independent “lessons learned review” of the Fund; ensure the implementation of recommendations as identified in periodical reports by PUNOs.

### **COMPONENT 3: (the “How”)**

#### **Implementation Strategy**

To facilitate the work of the secretariat, a planning officer will be recruited. The cost for hiring the Planning Specialist is considered as direct cost and covered from the PBF allocation to South Sudan.

The PBF Secretariat will benefit from existing capacity of a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, an Administrative assistant and a driver provided by the South Sudan Recovery Fund Secretariat.

#### **a) Target Groups/Key actors and Geographic Criteria:**

Peace Building Fund Steering Committee, Recipient UN Organizations and Government of South Sudan at national and state levels.

#### **b) Duration**

The project will be implemented over 24 months (2013-2015)

#### **c) Approach**

Following the MPTF procedures

#### **d) Sustainability and Catalytic effect**

Using already existing fund management arrangements in country (SSRF), enhances the sustainability effect and reduces costs by providing economies of scale.

#### **e) Project Activities:**

Please fill in this Activity Log Frame (*This table describes what will be implemented, by whom, how, and how much*).

Project Output: Secretariat support to the PBF Steering Committee

<b>Planned Activities</b>	<b>Inputs</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Responsible party for mobilizing inputs</b>
Operations Costs	Supplies Procurement	21,495	Secretariat
Monitoring and Evaluation	Fund level monitoring and evaluation	500,000	Secretariat
Support Officer	Planning and Oversight	600,000	Secretariat

#### **f) Analysis of risks and assumptions**

<b>Risks/Assumptions</b>	<b>Mitigating Strategy</b>
Lack of local stakeholder capacity to supporting peace-building goals	PBF Secretariat will ensure wide range of opportunities for effective stakeholder engagement and championing relevance of planned objectives

**g) Budget:**

<b>PBF PROJECT BUDGET</b>	
<b>CATEGORIES</b>	<b>AMOUNT</b>
1. Staff and other personnel	600,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials (includes: Office stationary, airtime, fuel, vehicle maintenance)	21,495
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	-
4. Contractual services	0
5. Travel: Project site visits/Monitoring and Evaluation/assets hand-over trips (including Secretariat/SC/donors/GoSS etc.)	500,000
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	0
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	0
<b>Sub-Total Project Costs</b>	
8. Indirect Support Costs**	78,505
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,200,000</b>

**COMPONENT 4: (The “How”)**

**a) Management Arrangements:**

The PBF Steering Committee (SC) will be responsible for managing the Peace Building Fund allocation and resulting programme at the country level, and ensuring the results set out in the Priority Plan are achieved. All project approvals will be carried out by the SC, as well as overseeing coordination of PBF projects, and monitoring project progress and amendments.

**1. Project Coordination**

The SC will be provided with the service of a Secretariat. For practicality and cost efficiency considerations, the PBF secretariat will be embedded in the South Sudan Recovery Fund Secretariat structure. To facilitate the additional work that relates to the PBF, a support officer will be recruited to support the Head of the SSRF/PBF in managing the PBF.

**2. Project Implementation modalities**

DEX modality

**3. Capacity of RUNOs**

UNDP is the Administrative Agent of the UN-administered MPTF, globally, including the Peace Building Fund.

**b) Monitoring and evaluation:**

The M&E will be part of the Peace Building Support Plan and the Priority Plan for South Sudan