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Final Report of the Libya Recovery Trust Fund (LRTF)

March 2012 – December 2014



Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
Bureau of Management
United Nations Development Programme
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*Including all the signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding of the Libya Recovery Trust Fund

Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---------------|---|
| BRIDGE | Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections |
| CDA | Constitutional Drafting Assembly |
| EU EEM | European Union Electoral Evaluation Mission |
| GNC | General National Congress |
| HNEC | High National Elections Commission |
| HoR | House of Representatives |
| LEAP | Libya Electoral Assistance Project |
| LRTF | Libya Recovery Trust Fund |
| LNPd | Libyan Network for the Promotion of Democracy |
| LAD | Libyan Association for Democracy |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEST | United Nations Electoral Support Team |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UNSMIL | United Nations Support Mission in Libya |
| SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency |
| TCC | The Carter Center |

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Executive Summary

The years between 2012 and 2014 were turbulent in Libya as the country struggled to transition to a full democracy, but in spite of the tremendous challenges—circumstances that affected the country’s electoral sector and, by default, UNDP’s Libya Electoral Assistance Project (LEAP)—considerable accomplishments were attained.¹ The only project supported by UNDP’s Libya Recovery Trust Fund (LRTF) between 2012 and 2014, UNDP LEAP provided operational assistance and technical support to three of Libya’s national elections, operating within the framework of the integrated UN Electoral Support Team (UNEST).

Both international and domestic observers commended the management of each electoral process despite the hurdles presented by the prevailing political and security context. The House of Representatives election in June 2014 was followed by a serious deterioration in security that threw Libya’s delicate transition into jeopardy and precipitated the withdrawal of many diplomatic missions and international organizations from the country.

The period between electoral events is typically when entities like the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) work to strengthen its processes and structures in preparation for future demands. In Libya, UNDP LEAP supported intensive capacity development of HNEC during periods between electoral events and implemented initiatives aimed at increasing knowledge and awareness of electoral issues amongst electoral stakeholders; this included legislators, media and civil society.

UNDP LEAP results were spread across seven output areas. Output 1 focused on *strengthening the capacities of HNEC* to plan, prepare and conduct elections, while Output 2 centered on *civic and voter education*, in support of both electoral events and broader principles underpinning elections. The purpose of Output 3 was to *enhance access and participation in the electoral process* by using women’s groups, cultural components, and civil society organizations.

Activities under Output 4 were designed to *strengthen the capacities of national media*, and in Output 5 they sought to *boost the capacity of HNEC to conduct media monitoring*. In Output 6, UNDP LEAP *strengthened capacities in electoral dispute resolution* by ensuring key stakeholders were able to reinforce their comparative knowledge in the field of electoral dispute resolution, and Output 7 was dedicated to *strengthening capacities to coordinate electoral security*.

While several achievements were made in 2014, the situation in Libya remains extremely fluid and presents several risks that could impact the sustainability of project progress. In many cases, risks and issues arose from the broader political situation, which means mitigation measures fall outside the control of UNEST LEAP, UNEST, HNEC or project partners. Though this is the case UNDP LEAP will continue to manage electoral interventions, while UNEST intends to remain in regular contact with partners to ensure they have an accurate picture of the implementation of agreed plans.

¹ *Note: cover page photo of woman after casting ballot in Libya’s Constitutional Drafting Assembly election in February 2014. Taken by Abbas Toumi/UNSMIL.

Introduction

UN electoral assistance for the 2012 election of Libya's General National Congress (GNC) was implemented following mandates delivered through Security Council Resolutions 2040. An integrated electoral team—the UN Electoral Support Team (UNEST)—was deployed to operate under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This team is composed of experts and staff from the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), UNDP, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). UNEST offered strategic and technical advice to those involved in the Libyan electoral process to “improve institutional capacity, transparency and accountability, promote the empowerment and political participation of women and minorities and support the further development of Libyan civil society.” UNDP's vehicle for contributing to this integrated effort was UNDP LEAP, which was established as a multi-partner funded project in March 2012 and that benefited from support provided through the LRTF between 2012 and 2014. The overarching goal of UNDP LEAP is to support Libyan authorities to prepare for, and conduct, well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represent the will of the Libyan people and meets international best practices.

UNDP LEAP was administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through support provided by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office and on behalf of Participating United Nations Organizations, as agreed upon with the Libyan Government. As the Administrative Agent (AA), UNDP prepares and submits annual consolidated narrative and financial reports to LRTF donors and stakeholders, and maintains regular financial statements on the LEAP webpage and the [MPTF Office GATEWAY](#) site.

The goal of UNDP LEAP is to support Libyan authorities to prepare for, and conduct, well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represent the will of the Libyan people and meets international best practices.

Between 2012 and 2014, UNDP LEAP received a total of US\$ 6.44 million in donor contributions through the LRTF, all of which was earmarked for elections-specific programming. As of 31 December 2014, the AA had transferred a total of US\$ 6.44 million to UNDP since it is the Participating Organization implementing UNDP LEAP. This was done based on Steering Committee's approval and as outlined in the LRTF's TOR.

In this final report the MPTF Office provides an assessment of gains made and lessons learned throughout the support of the LRTF to UNDP

LEAP. Also outlined are future resource requirements—information that can be used to mobilize funds to sustain UNDP accomplishments articulated in the UNDP LEAP project document. This report also provides an overview of progress made and results achieved by the High National Elections Commission (HNEC), UNDP LEAP partners and other stakeholders. The MPTF Office hopes this overview will contribute to building a comprehensive understanding of the role UNDP LEAP played in supporting the Government of Libya's electoral and development priorities.

Governance Arrangements

UNDP appointed the MPTF Office to serve as the Administrative Agent for the LRTF. Since the LRTF was established, the MPTF Office concluded Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Participating Organizations, along with five Standard Administrative Arrangements with the Australian Agency for International Development, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom. The UNDP LEAP programme was the only programme funded under the LRTF.

Because UNDP LEAP is resourced in part through LRTF, a Policy Board and Steering Committee allocates resources to UNDP LEAP. The LRTF Steering Committee met several times between 2012 and 2013 and approved funding allocations for United Nations support to the Libyan electoral process. By the end of 2013, four tranches were approved and transferred to the LEAP project. As of 31 December 2014, UNDP LEAP's expenditure was US\$ 6,188,073.

Purpose of LRTF - UNDP LEAP

The goal of UNDP LEAP is to support relevant Libyan authorities (interim government and electoral management bodies)² to prepare for, and conduct, successive, well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represent the will of the Libyan people and meet international best practices. Assistance aimed to legitimate winners, forestall further post-election conflicts, and advance commitment to securing democracy in Libya. At the project level, the overarching outcome supported by UNDP LEAP was to **“enhance national capacity to run inclusive elections,”** with an emphasis on inclusive and participatory processes. The authoritarian nature of the previous system of governance in Libya meant limited experience existed in organizing democratic processes. This called for technical expertise and operational support in the area of elections. In line with the strategic outcomes under UNDP's 2014-2017 Strategic Plan, the LEAP programme sought to meet the goals of ensuring “citizen expectations for voice, development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance.”

An integrated team delivered UN electoral assistance in Libya. The UN Electoral Support Team, which consisted of approximately sixty advisors in 2012, was composed of twenty advisors and ten support staff at the end of 2014. The team operated under the overall leadership of UNSMIL and included capacities from UNDP. Between 2012 and 2014, services were also provided by UNOPS and IOM in accordance with directives outlined in successive UN Security Council Resolutions on Libya that specified the UN should assist Libya in its transition to democracy, including by supporting Libyan electoral processes in a manner that promoted the empowerment and political participation of all segments of Libyan society—women, youth and minorities in particular. The principal body through which the UNDP supported integrated election efforts was UNDP LEAP, which operates as a multi-donor funded project benefiting from contributions from LRTF as well as several other development partners.

² HNEC or successor bodies as stipulated in the Constitution.

Overview of LRTF - LEAP Results

The period between 2012 and 2014 presented several opportunities for UNDP LEAP to examine progress towards the goal of assisting Libyan authorities in preparing and conducting well-administered, transparent and credible elections that represented the will of the Libyan people and met international good practices. Between February and July 2012, UNDP LEAP assisted HNEC to manage the election of the GNC, the legislative authority that would oversee the creation of an assembly tasked with drafting Libya's constitution. The following year, HNEC was established as a permanent body and began preparations for the election of the CDA. In 2014, UNDP LEAP provided technical assistance and operational support for two further electoral events: the CDA election in February and the HoR election in June. Following these elections, UNDP LEAP supported HNEC in preparing other electoral events and raising the awareness of institutional, media and civil society actors on electoral issues.

Overall progress related to the conduct of electoral events was positive. In Libya, electoral processes have been governed by the provisions of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration and its amendments along with relevant electoral laws and a small number of other regulations, such as Law No.13/2013 on Political and Administrative Isolation. The electoral legal framework was designed to protect citizen's basic political rights while adhering to international good practices in electoral management. Observers of the GNC and CDA elections acknowledged that key political rights—including free expression and universal and equal suffrage—were protected. That said, several aspects of the legal framework were undermined during the process and resulted in an electoral system that was not conducive to inclusivity, involved a complex apportionment of votes (seat allocation), and had restrictions on candidate eligibility.³

Libya's electoral legal framework → The Constitutional Declaration adopted in 2011 outlined a roadmap for Libya's transition to democracy that would consist of an initial election for an interim legislative body a popular referendum on the constitution, and further elections according to the political system adopted. Discussions in 2013 and 2014 resulted in the addition of two additional electoral events to the calendar: a direct election of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly, which took place in February 2014, and the election of a successor body to the GNC, the House of Representatives, which took place in June 2014. The electoral events to take place during the remainder of Libya's transition remain to be determined, although they are expected to include a constitutional referendum and elections according to the provisions of the constitution.

In the absence of a constitution defining a consistent electoral system, every election between 2012 and 2014 required the adoption of laws laying out the electoral system(s). These included: Law No.4/2012 and amendments for the GNC, Law No.17/2013 and amendments for the CDA, and Law No.10/2014 and amendments for the HoR.

The electoral management body administering these elections is HNEC. HNEC was initially created as a temporary body before being upgraded to a permanent entity in 2013 through Law No.8/2013. Regulations further elaborating elements of each electoral process are determined by HNEC, according to its legal mandate.

UNDP LEAP, operating with the framework of UNEST, is engaging legislators and HNEC on the **development of an electoral legal framework that ensures adherence to Libya's obligations under international conventions and promotes the inclusion of good practices in electoral management and administration.**

Credible elections should be well administered and transparent. Media articles and observer reports from various elections suggest that both processes were well run technically, although political and security factors affected polling in some areas. For instance, in parts of the country polling could not be carried out due to violence or the threat of violence, while in other areas component groups (communities), such as *Amazigh*, boycotted the process. Regardless, UNDP

³ UNDP LEAP knows of no observer reports created regarding the HoR election. Due to the short timeline for the HoR election, no international observer missions were carried out and domestic observer statements were confined to those taken on polling day.

LEAP provided day-to-day assistance through the deployment of between four and ten dedicated advisors for each election, as well as operational support from five experts in sectors such as ballot and graphic design, and procurement of electoral materials for both elections.

Observers noted that voter participation was significantly lower in 2014 compared with 2012. Reasons for this gap were likely caused by several factors. It is probable that 2012 figures were inflated because voter registration was not centralized; therefore, individuals could register in multiple locations. Furthermore, the requirement to use national ID numbers was thought to have disproportionately excluded groups not included in the civil register, like the Tabu and Tuareg. The drop can also be attributed to the prevailing political context, as opposed to technical factors or lack of information on processes. The Carter Center cited that citizens felt a “general fatigue with the country’s political road map,” while the Atlantic Council picked up on “a sense of apathy and despair.” Despite the perceived low levels of participation however, the outcome of 2014 elections appeared to be accepted by the majority of Libyans.

Despite the absence of electoral events throughout much of 2013 and the second half of 2014, HNEC and UNDP LEAP organized several focusing on the capacity development of HNEC and that were meant to strengthen the awareness of electoral stakeholders regarding critical electoral issues. Between 2012 and 2014, nearly 50 electoral events targeted more than 1,200 people (where approximately 24% of the participants were women). These activities addressed topics including voter education, electoral training, calculation and software, and electoral dispute resolution. General topics, like media coverage during elections, were also part of LEAP

programming. Over the course of 2014, HNEC determined that its “self-direction” increased significantly in several areas. This is despite HNEC departmental and sections heads expressing concern about the organization’s ability to administer the constitutional referendum, which would be a first for Libya.

Overall, HNEC adhered to many key principles of electoral administration. Most notably, HNEC remained impartial during the deteriorating security context, and in the face of the country’s prevailing



Staff members of the High National Elections Commission of Libya are accredited as guests to witness historic elections in neighbouring Tunisia, October 2014 (Photo credit: Melissa Rudderham, UN Electoral Support Team/UNDP).

political environment. By the end of 2014, the Commission was one of the few institutions in Libya that maintained its impartiality and independence. For this reason it is likely that HNEC will play an important role in helping the country achieve stability once a political agreement is reached.

Output 1—Strengthened capacities of HNEC

Results under this output focused on strengthening the organizational, management, and operational capacities of HNEC to plan, prepare, conduct and manage elections. In July 2012, nearly 1.8 million Libyans went to the polls to elect 200 members of the GNC. While the election was a technical step in Libya's transition to democracy following the end of the Qadhafi regime the previous year, in the eyes of many Libyans it was a highly symbolic, if hard-earned, victory over the former regime and its supporters.

The process of electing the CDA, responsible for drafting Libya's new constitution, started in 2013. Polling took place in February 2014 with final results announced in March 2014 in areas where polling rolled out as scheduled. The election of the HoR was organized directly afterwards: the electoral law was passed on 31 March 2014 and polling took place less than three months later. HNEC was obliged to accommodate all processes on short timelines and, in the case of the CDA and HoR elections, neither was part of Libya's envisaged transitional timetable. This meant HNEC had to rapidly adapt to evolving circumstances while, at the same time: dealing with complex electoral systems that were difficult for candidates and voters to understand, engaging with an electorate that became increasingly disillusioned with the political process, and coping with worsening security situation that involved flare-ups of violence. Furthermore, HNEC experienced a change of leadership when the chairman and two commissioners resigned in 2013. Three seats on HNEC's Board of Commissioners were vacant as of the end of 2014.

“Despite political tensions and security challenges in some regions, HNEC completed technical preparations for the elections within the necessary time and in an impartial manner.”

The Carter Center on HNEC electoral management performance

In spite of the challenges, final reports from the European Union and Carter Center's teams commented positively on the performance of HNEC. The EU Electoral Evaluation Mission (EU EEM) stated “the Commission was competent and technically efficient in the delivery of the election, while demonstrating an improvement in its performance since the first elections,” while the Carter Center made the following observation: “Despite political tensions and security challenges that existed in some regions, HNEC completed technical preparations for the elections within the necessary time and in an impartial manner.”

Output 2—Civic and voter education

In terms of voter education, HNEC strove to increase public outreach prior to all electoral events to ensure voters were informed about their right to vote, and knew the locations, times/dates and procedures. In 2014, HNEC succeeded in strengthening the planning and execution of its public outreach processes, and with assistance from UNEST advisors, several awareness-raising campaigns were planned that accommodated different phases of the electoral process.

Several factors impeded HNEC's ability to deliver clear messages in advance of elections. The lack of an established electoral calendar in all three elections was the biggest hurdle to implementing outreach campaigns, as the organization was unable to design materials, organize distribution and commit to a consistent meeting calendar in a timely manner. Rather, HNEC was obliged to react, often on very short timelines. In addition, the high turnover rate of staff also affected operations. In 2014, for instance, the post of the head of HNEC's Awareness

and Relations Department changed hands three times—an occurrence that seriously impacted the department’s ability to deliver consistent results.

Progress was mixed when it came to applying the principles that underpin electoral system design and administration. Electoral systems constituted a point of concern for observers, while electoral administration was cited as one of the strongest elements of the process. The 2012 GNC election made use of a mixed-parallel system where eighty seats were allocated through proportional representation and 120 through a majoritarian system that saw individual candidates, rather than independent ones, run in single and multi-member constituencies (e.g. employing the “First Past the Post” and Single Non-Transferable Voting systems). Feedback from Libyan interlocutors indicated that various electoral systems were considered for the CDA and HoR elections and both relied on a majoritarian system with seats reserved for component groups. Observers noted the complexity of the resulting system and its implications regarding inclusivity.

Observers strongly commended HNEC’s independence and impartiality. Between 2012 and 2014, HNEC demonstrated a strong understanding of principles of electoral administration. In several cases, the Commission successfully resisted pressure to achieve an expedient—and less credible—result. For example, in 2014 HNEC held back in organizing additional elections for the 12 vacant places in the House of Representatives, as requested by the GNC. It did so because it believed the conditions that prevented or restricted voting in some parts of the country were unlikely to change and that polling in these areas would pose a threat to polling staff, voters and the overall credibility of the process. In another example, HNEC members provided feedback to legislators and the general public on the challenges facing the electoral process, and called on the government to step up security planning to ensure that voters could exercise their political rights in an atmosphere free of intimidation.

Output 3—Enhanced access and participation of women in the electoral process

Activities under this result focused primarily on promoting the participation of women in electoral processes. UNDP LEAP, working within the framework of UNEST, provided day-to-day technical advice to electoral authorities on gender mainstreaming in electoral policies and processes. In 2012 and 2013, UNDP LEAP carried out six events with 189 key stakeholders including legislators, civil society, academia and media. These events were meant to generate an increased understanding of women’s political participation in elections (58% women), and the ways participation can be supported through choice of electoral systems, temporary special measures, and campaign strategies.

Despite the effort made, the participation of women in post-revolution elections (and their inclusion in the new political order) followed a similar trajectory to other countries in the region. Special measures were initially adopted to ensure women’s participation in the new legislative body, which led to substantial gains in women’s representation. Over time however, the participation of women in the legislature and other governing bodies diminished, in part, due to political setbacks and conflict that effectively discouraged the participation of women.

In 2012, temporary special measures were adopted to guarantee significant women’s representation in the GNC through implementation of a “zipper” or “zebra” system where men’s and women’s names alternate on closed lists. These measures resulted in the election of 32 women to the 200-member body (16.5%). In 2014, special measures were also implemented for the CDA and HoR elections. Provisions were made (supported by women’s groups, UNDP LEAP and other stakeholders) to emphasize the importance of temporary special measures as part of the electoral system. These provisions resulted in 10% of seats in the CDA and 16% of

seats in the HoR elections being reserved for women.⁴ While this was done, the practice of reserving seats was applied in a manner that did not offer consistent representation to women across the country: reserved seats were allocated to some constituencies but not others. Moreover, the choice of electoral system made it difficult for women to compete than if a different system had been applied.

Linked to this, women candidates registered in slightly lower rates in 2014 than in 2012. The overall proportion of women candidates during the two electoral processes in 2014 was 10% for



Staff at an electoral call centre respond to inquiries on forthcoming elections at the House of Representatives (Photo credit: Noor Tawil, UN Electoral Support Team/UNSMIL).

the CDA elections and 9% for the House of Representative elections. This was compared to 17% during the 2012 GNC election. The drop in candidates was, partly, caused by the change in electoral systems. Whereas 80 seats were selected according to closed lists where women represented every second candidate in 2012, there were no lists in 2014—only temporary special measures were introduced that reserved a number of seats for women. In 2012, 84 women competed for 120 individual seats open to both men and

women in the majoritarian race; a number that dropped considerably when comparing it to the nine women who ran to secure one of the 48 individual seats open to men and women in the CDA election. The same applies to the three women who contested 168 seats in the HoR election.

In the CDA election, only 41% of registered voters were women compared with 45% in 2012. After updating the register prior to the HoR election, the overall proportion of women in the register decreased to 40%.

In order to enhance civil society groups' understanding of the technical electoral process, UNDP LEAP engaged in more frequent dialogue with observers and media in identified areas. Good practice in electoral administration demanded that such exchanges continue throughout the electoral cycles. In 2012, HNEC activities targeting civil society representatives and media on gender issues were limited to the periods directly before and after polling. In 2014, contact between HNEC and external parties (civil society representatives and political parties) was transferred to HNEC's district offices and took place between district offices. HNEC did not provide a regular forum for external parties to provide feedback on the electoral process.

Output 4—Strengthened capacities of the national media

Between 2012 and 2014, UNDP LEAP's inputs in terms of developing the capacity of national media to report on electoral processes in Libya in a balanced and responsible manner were limited. In accordance with good practices in the provision of international technical assistance,

⁴ The inclusion of 16% of reserved seats in the HoR echoes the 16.5% of women elected in the GNC; highlighting the importance of setting precedents when defining electoral legal frameworks.

implementers of electoral assistance programmes in Libya coordinated to avoid duplication of activities. Assistance to the media was led by several media organizations, while a private sector provider gave assistance to HNEC's media centre. In coordination with HNEC, UNDP LEAP supported the provision of a short-term expert to advise on the technical setup of the media centre for the GNC and CDA elections. HNEC responded positively to expert feedback and incorporated it to successfully operate the media centre during the HoR election.


Output 5—Strengthened capacity to conduct media monitoring

In 2012, media monitoring efforts verified the conduct of the media during the campaign period preceding polling for the GNC election. Efforts commenced 18 June 2012 and continued until 5 July 2012. Efforts were made to identify media infractions as outlined in HNEC Media Regulation No.64/2012. Monitoring was carried out by HNEC, the Ministry of Culture, and civil society with support from UNDP and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Activities not only included monitoring candidates, but also covered factors that shape a political campaign in the media. By the end of the electoral process, four reports were produced, two of which covered the campaign periods. Reports looked at media coverage across fifteen public media outlets and results were conveyed confidentially to the HNEC Board of Commissioners

In 2013 and 2014, HNEC decided against pursuing regulatory media monitoring for the CDA election or HoR election; therefore, no further activities took place under this output.

Output 6—Strengthened capacities in electoral dispute resolution

Relevant Libyan legal institutions and the HNEC developed regulations and procedures to govern dispute resolution during the elections. The resulting process enabled the Commission to plan for, develop and deliver an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism that processed electoral complaints in a timely and effective manner. In 2012, observers noted that late amendments to the legal and regulatory framework addressing electoral dispute resolution caused confusion amongst plaintiffs. This differs from feedback received in 2014, which indicates an improvement in the overall organization of the process of backstopping electoral dispute resolution. Noting the relatively low rate of complaints and challenges submitted during the electoral process, observers such as the Carter Center and Libyan Association for Democracy recommended HNEC develop a more holistic process for filing complaints.



Outreach efforts by Libya's High National Elections Commission in April and May 2014 (Photo credit: HNEC).

According to sub-sector coordination arrangements that seek to reduce duplication between electoral assistance providers, UNDP LEAP's activities were limited under this output. In 2012, UNDP LEAP supported four workshops on general electoral processes and issues of electoral dispute resolution in April and May. All workshops took place at the Judicial Institute in Tripoli and catered to a total of approximately 220 participants. In the interests of promoting

comparative knowledge and a strong community of practice within the region, LEAP supported an additional 13 participants (2 of which were women) in 2014. These workshops consisted of judges and HNEC staff and during the sessions participants examined comparative experiences from the region and further afield.

Output 7—Strengthened capacities to coordinate electoral security

Under sub-sector coordination arrangements, UNSMIL's Security Sector Advisory and Coordination Division took the lead on providing support to electoral security. In 2012, UNDP LEAP contributed by assisting HNEC in establishing a network of operation rooms for security forces during polling. Constant communication between HNEC and security forces during polling periods contributed to the ability of authorities to identify and address security problems and related media inquiries. After the electoral process concluded, HNEC operations staff deemed the creation of functioning operations rooms as one of their most successful risk mitigation tools. In 2013 and 2014, HNEC focal points and UNSMIL worked together to tackle issues related to security coordination for future elections.

Assessment of Project Management

UNEST's project management unit focused on streamlining and improving its ability to support the LEAP project. In order to support operations for electoral events UNEST carried out a series of tasks critical to the functioning of the project. Tasks included:

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| Conducting planning (Annual Work Plan, procurement plan, human resources plan). |
| Coordinating procurement and delivery of electoral materials in cooperation with UNDP's Procurement Support Office (see Output 1). |
| Initiating and helping manage human resources processes for up to 6 advisors, 3 experts and 14 support staff. |
| Conducting administrative tasks related to logistic/administrative notices, arranging travel, assisting in visa applications, booking venues, accommodations and catering. |
| Contract management, including for UNOPS and IOM agreements. |
| Anchoring coordination of international electoral assistance (22 formal meetings). |
| Translating documents for use by the UNEST team (estimated at over 310 pages/month, in addition to constant supply of consecutive translation). |
| Ensuring financial and programmatic reporting, according to donor agreements and for meetings of the UNDP LEAP Project Board (23 January; 22 May; 22 September) and Project Advisory Committee (24 February). |
| Internal circulation of information (weekly internal UNEST reports; weekly staff meetings). |
| Managing assets and transport on behalf of the UNEST team (3 vehicles and a total of 6-8 drivers). |

Lessons Learned and Ways Forward

Between 2012 and 2014, several key lessons were identified that fall into two categories: lessons related to substantive lessons and the delivery of electoral assistance, and those linked to the management of a development assistance project in a transitional context.

Electoral assistance

- *Effective capacity development requires upon both training and mentoring.* Day-to-day availability of expert advisors is the most effective way to pass on both knowledge and skills.
- *Cultivating knowledge on critical electoral issues amongst stakeholders* should be pursued during operational and non-operational periods to ensure that stakeholders are

able to identify areas where further information or assistance may be required.

- *Efforts to build national capacities in key operational areas* such as ballot design and IT development should be emphasized to ensure that national authorities possess basic capacities to implement activities in these areas.
- *Integration in electoral assistance* proved to be a significant benefit throughout the project's lifecycle. The range of existing capacities available within the UNSMIL-led integrated UNEST enabled managers to quickly adapt to evolving operating contexts and political realities.
- *Technical assistance can be delivered remotely* if relationships and opportunities for in-person consultation exist (i.e. if the pace of operations allows for it).

Management of development assistance

- *Maintenance of capacity to implement (project-level) operations* proved critical during periods of electoral operations and where capacity development and awareness activities moved to the fore. This in-house capacity proved to be essential to UNDP LEAP's rapid re-establishment of operations in neighbouring Tunisia in 2014.
- *Frequent communication with principal counterparts* provided a sense of national ownership over project activities. While this aspect of the project's operations should be continued, the extent of national partners' oversight over some activities and processes should be clarified at the outset.
- *Redoubling of efforts to ensure complementarity* when the operating space narrows. In the Libya context, implementing partners in the field of electoral assistance benefited from existing close working relationships. Close cooperation enabled partners to work effectively together when access to national counterparts was limited, ensuring that counterparts benefited from a cohesive programme of activities.
- *Diversification of activities* was important in the wake of the 2014 withdrawal of much of the international community from Libya. The unreliability of both remote communications (due to problems with networks in Libya and long periods without electricity) and travel (airports and border crossings were not consistently open) meant that the activities envisaged for this period were sometimes postponed. Although such activities were the mainstay of UNDP LEAP's activities, additional types of activities must be considered.

The situation in Libya remains extremely fluid and presents several risks that could impact the sustainability of progress made during the project. In many cases, risks and issues arose from the broader political situation, which mean mitigation measures fall outside the control of UNDP LEAP, UNEST, HNEC or project partners. UNDP LEAP as part of UNEST intends to remain in regular contact with partners to ensure they have an accurate picture regarding the implementation of agreed plans.

| Risk | Response |
|--|---|
| Changes to the electoral calendar arising from the evolving transitional context in Libya. | Indicative work plans include provision for robust assistance to all phases of the electoral cycle, permitting UNDP LEAP to adjust. Detailed work plans to be agreed each quarter. |
| Significant changes to the legal framework governing | Monitor progress in the development of the |

| electoral administration | constitution; prepare contingency plans. |
|---|---|
| Significant changes in access to counterparts (particularly during the period when UNDP LEAP should provide operational assistance to future elections) | Plans focus ensuring HNEC is increasingly capable of operating independently. Plans to be reviewed regularly. |
| Lack of time, capacity, or willingness of partners to implement activities as outlined in the UNDP LEAP workplan. | UNDP LEAP to explore a substantive revision to its project document to ensure relevance to the evolving context. |
| Partners' ability to operate compromised by political, financial or security factors | A variety of partners are identified in work plans. In the case of HNEC, ensure plans are amended in case operations are reduced. |
| Inadequate financial resources to meet 2015-16 budget requirements | Anticipate resource gaps and consult with development partners at the earliest opportunity. |
| HNEC experiences difficulties performing its duties in a non-neutral and partial manner | Ensure key parties are informed regarding the importance of impartiality to credible electoral processes. Work with partners to alleviate pressure on the institution. |
| Issue | Response |
| Changes to the HNEC Board of Commissioners and/or administration | Concentrate on knowledge strengthening within the administration. Adjust plans to the existing level of capacity |
| Groups such as women, youth, internally displaced persons, or diaspora not effectively targeted in electoral activities. | Encourage HNEC to ensure that measures for vulnerable groups receive extra emphasis during lessons learned and planning processes |
| Turnover amongst HNEC personnel results in loss of knowledge and skills acquired | Assist HNEC in implementing measures designed at retaining institutional knowledge and capacity. |
| Activities of UNEST partners impact UNDP LEAP plans or activities. | Regularly consult other assistance providers in development and execution of work plans. |
| Working-level counterparts within HNEC change or are not identified | Identify areas where working-level counterparts are not in place and communicate it to HNEC. |
| Stakeholder expectations: there remains some misunderstanding regarding the role of the UN in Libyan electoral processes. | Regular meetings with partners are being pursued to clearly explain the role of UNDP LEAP and UNEST and update on their activities. |
| Further deterioration of political/security situation | Continue to plan for electoral assistance but continuously review the security situation. |

Financial Section

2014 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

This chapter presents financial data and analysis of the Libya Recovery Trust Fund using the pass-through funding modality as of 31 December **2014**. Financial information for this Fund is also available on the MPTF Office GATEWAY, at the following address: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/LBY00>.

1. SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

As of 31 December **2014**, five contributors have deposited US\$ **6,500,573** in contributions and US\$ **8,037** has been earned in interest,

bringing the cumulative source of funds to US\$ **6,508,610** (see respectively, tables 2 and 3).

Of this amount, US\$ **6,441,524** has been transferred to **one** Participating Organizations, of which US\$ **6,188,073** has been reported as expenditure. The Administrative Agent fee has been charged at the approved rate of 1% on deposits and amounts to US\$ **65,006**. Table 1 provides an overview of the overall sources, uses, and balance of the Libya Recovery Trust Fund as of 31 December **2014**.

Table 1. Financial Overview, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)*

| | Annual 2013 | Annual 2014 | Cumulative |
|--|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| Sources of Funds | | | |
| Gross Contributions | 1,829,520 | - | 6,500,573 |
| Fund Earned Interest and Investment Income | 1,086 | 6 | 8,037 |
| Total: Sources of Funds | 1,830,606 | 6 | 6,508,610 |
| Use of Funds | | | |
| Transfers to Participating Organizations | 1,815,000 | - | 6,441,524 |
| Refunds received from Participating Organizations | - | - | - |
| Net Funded Amount to Participating Organizations | 1,815,000 | - | 6,441,524 |
| Administrative Agent Fees | 18,295 | - | 65,006 |
| Bank Charges | 28 | 0 | 56 |
| Total: Uses of Funds | 1,833,324 | 0 | 6,506,585 |
| Change in Fund cash balance with Administrative Agent | (2,717) | 6 | 2,025 |
| Opening Fund balance (1 January) | 4,737 | 2,019 | - |
| Closing Fund balance (31 December) | 2,019 | 2,025 | 2,025 |
| Net Funded Amount to Participating Organizations | 1,815,000 | - | 6,441,524 |
| Participating Organizations' Expenditure | 2,761,102 | 1,698,649 | 6,188,073 |
| Balance of Funds with Participating Organizations | | | 253,451 |

* Due to rounding of numbers, totals may not add up. This applies to all numbers in this report.

LIBYA RECOVERY TRUST FUND
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT **2014****2. PARTNER CONTRIBUTIONS**

Table 2 provides information on cumulative contributions received from all contributors to this Fund as of 31 December **2014**.

Table 2. Contributors' Deposits, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)

| Contributors | Prior Years as of 31-Dec-2013 | Current Year Jan-Dec-2014 | Total |
|---|--|--------------------------------------|------------------|
| Australian Agency for Int'l Development | 1,001,700 | - | 1,001,700 |
| DENMARK, Government of | 264,494 | - | 264,494 |
| NETHERLANDS, Government of | 500,000 | - | 500,000 |
| SWISS AGY FOR DEVELOPMENT & COOPERATION | 528,709 | - | 528,709 |
| UNITED KINGDOM, Government of | 4,205,670 | - | 4,205,670 |
| Grand Total | 6,500,573 | - | 6,500,573 |

LIBYA RECOVERY TRUST FUND
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT **2014****3. INTEREST EARNED**

Interest income is earned in two ways: 1) on the balance of funds held by the Administrative Agent ('Fund earned interest'), and 2) on the balance of funds held by the Participating Organizations ('Agency earned interest') where their Financial Regulations and Rules allow return of interest

to the AA. As of 31 December **2014**, Fund earned interest amounts to US\$ **8,037** with no interest received from Participating Organizations, bringing the cumulative interest received to US\$ **8,037**. Details are provided in the table below.

Table 3. Sources of Interest and Investment Income, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)*

| Interest Earned | Prior Years as of 31-Dec-2013 | Current Year Jan-Dec-2014 | Total |
|--|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Administrative Agent | | | |
| Fund Earned Interest and Investment Income | 8,031 | 6 | 8,037 |
| Total: Fund Earned Interest | 8,031 | 6 | 8,037 |
| Participating Organization | | | |
| Total: Agency earned interest | | | |
| Grand Total | 8,031 | 6 | 8,037 |

LIBYA RECOVERY TRUST FUND
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT **2014****4. TRANSFER OF FUNDS**

Allocations to Participating Organizations are approved by the Steering Committee and disbursed by the Administrative Agent. As of 31 December **2014**, the AA has transferred US\$ **6,441,524** to **one** Participating Organizations (see list below).

Table 4 provides additional information on the refunds received by the MPTF Office, and the net funded amount for each of the Participating Organizations.

Table 4. Transfer, Refund, and Net Funded Amount by Participating Organization, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)*

| Participating Organization | Prior Years as of 31-Dec-2013 | | | Current Year Jan-Dec-2014 | | | Total | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------|------------------|---------------------------|---------|------------|------------------|---------|------------------|
| | Transfers | Refunds | Net Funded | Transfers | Refunds | Net Funded | Transfers | Refunds | Net Funded |
| UNDP | 6,441,524 | | 6,441,524 | | | | 6,441,524 | | 6,441,524 |
| Grand Total | 6,441,524 | | 6,441,524 | | | | 6,441,524 | | 6,441,524 |

LIBYA RECOVERY TRUST FUND
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2014**5. EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL DELIVERY RATES**

All final expenditures reported for the year **2014** were submitted by the Headquarters of the Participating Organizations. These were consolidated by the MPTF Office.

As shown in table below, the cumulative net funded amount is US\$ **6,441,524** and cumulative expenditures reported by the Participating Organizations amount to US\$ **6,188,073**. This equates to an overall Fund expenditure delivery rate of **96.07** percent.

Table 5. Net Funded Amount, Reported Expenditure, and Financial Delivery by Participating Organization, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)*

| Participating Organization | Approved Amount | Net Funded Amount | Expenditure | | | Delivery Rate % |
|----------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | | | Prior Years as of 31-Dec-2013 | Current Year Jan-Dec-2014 | Cumulative | |
| UNDP | 6,441,524 | 6,441,524 | 4,489,424 | 1,698,649 | 6,188,073 | 96.07 |
| Grand Total | 6,441,524 | 6,441,524 | 4,489,424 | 1,698,649 | 6,188,073 | 96.07 |

Table 6. Expenditure by Project within Sector, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)

| Sector / Project No. and Project Title | | Participating Organization | Total Approved Amount | Net Funded Amount | Total Expenditure | Delivery Rate % |
|--|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Electoral Support | | | | | | |
| 00082052 | LBY 1 Elections support | UNDP | 6,441,524 | 6,441,524 | 6,188,073 | 96.07 |
| Electoral Support: Total | | | 6,441,524 | 6,441,524 | 6,188,073 | 96.07 |
| Grand Total | | | 6,441,524 | 6,441,524 | 6,188,073 | 96.07 |

LIBYA RECOVERY TRUST FUND
CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2014**5.4 EXPENDITURE REPORTED BY CATEGORY**

Project expenditures are incurred and monitored by each Participating Organization and are reported as per the agreed categories for inter-agency harmonized reporting. In 2006 the UN Development Group (UNDG) established six categories against which UN entities must report inter-agency project expenditures. Effective 1 January 2012, the UN Chief Executive Board (CEB) modified these categories as a result of IPSAS adoption to comprise eight categories. Table 7 reflects expenditure reported in the UNDG expense categories. Since the Fund became operational post 1 January 2012, only the new categories are used.

In 2014, the highest percentage of expenditure was on General Operating costs with 37%. The second highest expenditure was on Contractual Services Costs with 33%, and the third highest expenditure was on Staff & Personnel Costs with 19%.

Table 7. Expenditure by UNDG Budget Category, as of 31 December 2014 (in US Dollars)*

| Category | Expenditure | | | Percentage of Total Programme Cost |
|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Prior Years as of 31-Dec-2013 | Current Year Jan-Dec-2014 | Total | |
| Staff & Personnel Cost (New) | 849,089 | 201,539 | 1,050,628 | 18.18 |
| Suppl, Comm, Materials (New) | 3,911 | 1,598 | 5,509 | 0.10 |
| Equip, Veh, Furn, Depn (New) | 346,257 | 83,116 | 429,374 | 7.43 |
| Contractual Services (New) | 1,483,605 | 525,479 | 2,009,084 | 34.77 |
| Travel (New) | 141,723 | 52,539 | 194,262 | 3.36 |
| Transfers and Grants (New) | - | - | - | |
| General Operating (New) | 1,355,340 | 733,418 | 2,088,758 | 36.15 |
| Programme Costs Total | 4,179,926 | 1,597,689 | 5,777,615 | 100.00 |
| ¹ Indirect Support Costs Total | 309,499 | 100,960 | 410,459 | 7.10 |
| Total | 4,489,424 | 1,698,649 | 6,188,073 | |

¹ **Indirect Support Costs:** The timing of when Indirect Support Costs are charged to a project depends on each Participating Organization's financial regulations, rules or policies. These Support Costs can be deducted upfront on receipt of a transfer based on the approved programmatic amount, or a later stage during implementation. Therefore, the Indirect Support Costs percentage may appear to exceed the agreed upon rate of 7% for on-going projects, whereas when all projects are financially closed, this number is not to exceed 7%.

6. COST RECOVERY

Cost recovery policies for the Fund are guided by the applicable provisions of the Terms of Reference, the MOU concluded between the Administrative Agent and Participating Organizations, and the SAAs concluded between the Administrative Agent and Contributors, based on rates approved by UNDG.

The policies in place, as of 31 December 2014, were as follows:

- **The Administrative Agent (AA) fee:** 1% is charged at the time of contributor deposit and covers services provided on that contribution for the entire duration of the Fund. In the reporting period no amount was deducted in AA-fees. Cumulatively, as of 31 December 2014, US\$ 65,006 has been charged in AA-fees.
- **Indirect Costs of Participating Organizations:** Participating Organizations may charge 7% indirect costs. In the current reporting period US\$ 100,960 was deducted in indirect costs by Participating Organizations. Cumulatively, indirect costs amount to US\$ 410,459 as of 31 December 2014.
- **Direct Costs:** The Fund governance mechanism may approve an allocation to a Participating Organization to cover costs associated with Secretariat services and overall coordination, as well as Fund level reviews and evaluations. These allocations are referred to as 'direct costs'. In 2014, there were no direct costs charged to the Fund.

7. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

In order to effectively provide fund administration services and facilitate monitoring and reporting to the UN system and its partners, the MPTF Office has developed a public website, the MPTF Office Gateway (<http://mptf.undp.org>). Refreshed in real time every two hours from an internal enterprise resource planning system, the MPTF Office Gateway has become a standard setter for providing transparent and accountable trust fund administration services.

The Gateway provides financial information including: contributor commitments and deposits, approved programme budgets, transfers to and expenditures reported by Participating Organizations, interest income and other expenses. In addition, the Gateway provides an overview of the MPTF Office portfolio and extensive information on individual Funds, including their purpose, governance structure and key documents. By providing easy access to the growing number of narrative and financial reports, as well as related project documents, the Gateway collects and preserves important institutional knowledge and facilitates knowledge sharing and management among UN Organizations and their development partners, thereby contributing to UN coherence and development effectiveness.

Annex

UNDP LEAP Indicator Based Performance Assessment

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p>Outcome 1⁵: Enhanced national capacity to run inclusive elections</p> <p><i>Indicator(s):</i> Transitional authorities have managed fair and inclusive democratic processes</p> <p><i>Baseline:</i> HNEC established in March 2012. Prior to this, Libya did not have a national capacity to run inclusive elections.</p> <p><i>Planned target:</i> In context of deteriorating political and security environment, satisfaction of at least 84% of the population with conduct of electoral event.</p> | <p>2012. 84% of Libyans feel the 2012 elections for GNC were conducted in a free and fair manner (NDI public opinion survey, 2013).</p> <p>2013. Organisational and operational capacities of HNEC to implement credible electoral processes increased from 2012, however institution remains reliant on UN in certain areas (UNDP LEAP survey, 2013)]</p> <p>2014. Reliable surveys not conducted following the 2014 CDA and HoR polls however news media articles suggest both elections considered well run technically, with political and security factors affecting polling in some areas.</p> | <p>Voter participation was significantly lower in 2014 as compared with 2012, a drop attributed to the prevailing political context: “general fatigue with the country’s political road map” (TCC)⁶; “a sense of apathy and despair” (Atlantic Council).⁷</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback</p> |
| <p>Output 1. Strengthen organizational, management, and operational capacities of HNEC to plan, prepare, conduct and manage elections</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Capacity of HNEC: resources, systems, procedures and organizational capability to administer elections</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> HNEC newly established with no previous institutional track record of holding</p> | <p>2012. HNEC mobilised for 2012 elections on time, however capacities in critical areas such as procurement, logistics and general electoral administration remained fragile.</p> <p>2013. No elections in 2013. Extensive discussions took place on the mandate and structure of HNEC, culminating in the adoption of Law No.8/2013 in April 2013. HNEC operations/awareness & relations staff felt increasingly comfortable in their</p> | | <p>Observer reports Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes Semi-structured qualitative interviews</p> |

⁵ Note: LEAP-LRTF Project document specified output indicators/targets for 2012 only. 2013 output indicators/targets drawn from 2013 LEAP annual workplan.

⁶ The Carter Center. *The 2014 Constitutional Drafting Assembly Elections in Libya: Final Report*, June 2014.

⁷ Atlantic Council & Rafik Hariri Centre for the Middle East. *Libya’s Faustian Bargains: Breaking the Appeasement Cycle*, May 2014.

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|---|--|--|--|
| <p>elections.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Voter registration and elections successfully held on time. In context of deteriorating political and security environment, overall positive reports by at least 75% of impartial observers on administration of electoral events.</p> | <p>roles however continued to rely on technical assistance and advice from LEAP advisors. Advisory, procurement, training and conferences/workshops targets achieved, however roundtables target not achieved</p> <p>2014. Voter registration and elections held on time. EU and TCC final reports from the CDA election commented positively on the performance of HNEC: “The Commission was competent and technically efficient in the delivery of the election, while demonstrating an improvement in its performance since the first elections.” (EU)⁸: “Despite political tensions and security challenges that existed in some regions, the HNEC completed technical preparations for the elections within the necessary time and in an impartial manner” (TCC). The Arab League commented in its CDA polling day statement that “...the HNEC role has been exceptional in this election, given the difficult conditions and the big challenges⁹; final report not disseminated. LNPd/LAD (key domestic observer umbrella group) did not provide an overall evaluation on HNEC’s performance in polling day statements from CDA or HoR elections; final report not disseminated.”¹⁰</p> | | |
| <p>Output 2. Comprehensive civic and voter education conducted to ensure that voters are educated about broader principles of democracy and inclusive elections, and informed about their right to vote, as well as where, when and how to vote</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> 2.1. Civic and voter education takes place. Strengthened planning and execution of external communication processes administered</p> | <p>2012. Nationwide voter education/information campaign conducted in 2012; observers noted a slow start with the pace of information improving towards polling; observers noted a further desire for information on all aspects of the electoral process (EU EAT)</p> <p>2013. Planning and implementation of awareness campaigns were increasingly led</p> | <p>Key observer groups during the CDA election called for increased efforts in the areas of voter information/education: “Expand and strengthen voter and civic education efforts well in advance of the elections” (TCC); “HNEC to envisage an inclusive and extensive voter information and civic education awareness programme” (EU).</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |

⁸ European Union Election Expert Mission. *Constitutional Drafting Assembly Election 20 February 2014: Final Report*, accessed June 2014.

⁹ Arab League. *The Arab League Role in Observing the CDA Election Conducted on 20 Feb 2014*. Statement, made 20 February 2014.

¹⁰ Libyan Association for Democracy. *Statement on the (CoR) election*, accessed June 2014. Libyan Network to Promote Democracy. *First Statement on the CDA Election*, accessed February 2014.

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|--|--|---|---|
| <p>by HNEC</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No civic and voter education in place.</p> <p><i>Planned Target.</i> Complete nationwide civic/voter information/education conducted in a timely manner that meets the needs of Libyans as identified through evaluation</p> | <p>by HNEC in preparation for 2014 elections, however several factors impeded HNEC's ability to deliver clear messages in advance or in a timely manner, including a flexible timeline for stages of the electoral process and unclear internal arrangements.</p> <p><i>2014.</i> Voter information/ education campaigns for two electoral processes undertaken in 2014.</p> | | |
| <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> 2.2. Evidence of application of the principles that underpin ethical electoral system design and electoral administration</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> Not defined.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Key stakeholders consider implications of different electoral administration models and electoral systems in their decision-making and advocacy processes</p> | <p><i>2012.</i> New legislative body with little knowledge of electoral systems or electoral administration</p> <p><i>2013.</i> Law No.8/2013 adopted on 28 March, confirming HNEC as a permanent, professional body that is independent and neutral</p> <p>An assessment by Democracy Reporting International concluded that the law contains many provisions that adhere to international standards but suffered from inter alia a lack of clarity regarding electoral systems, and that measures implemented are unlikely to result in adequate representation of women and ethnic/cultural component groups.</p> <p><i>2014.</i> Feedback from Libyan interlocutors indicate that various electoral systems were considered for the CDA and HoR elections despite observer feedback on the complexity of the resultant system.</p> <p>Observers commended HNEC's independence and impartiality, with recommendations to increase transparency. In late 2014, HNEC was able to retain its impartiality in the face of increased polarization. Finally, HNEC's decision to retain indicates it understands the importance of retaining a professional core</p> | | <p>Media reports</p> <p>Semi-structured qualitative interviews</p> <p>International coordination forums</p> |

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|---|--|--|--|
| | of staff. | | |
| <p>Output 3.1. Enhanced access to and participation in electoral process of vulnerable groups, including women, youth, minorities, and other groups, in rural and urban areas alike</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Number of group access. In particular, evidence of increased understanding of stakeholders regarding issues affecting women's participation in electoral processes</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No participation in any meaningful elections in 42 years.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Healthy participation of vulnerable groups, particularly women, in electoral processes.</p> | <p>2012. In 2012, women's participation (45% of voters registered; 39% of turnout) was considered successful, however the Cairo sub-regional forum (9-10 December 2012) highlighted serious access issues for women candidates and civil society representatives in particular</p> <p>2013. Greater though still modest representation of women within senior ranks of HNEC. Temporary special measures guaranteeing that at least 20% of the CDA would be composed of women (10%, a decrease from 2012) and/or members of component groups (10%)</p> <p>By the close of the year women constituted 41% of registered voters and 10% of candidates, a decrease from 2012.</p> <p>2014. Both Law No.17/2013 on the CDA election and Law No.10/2014 on the HoR election included temporary special measures for women (quotas of 10% and 16% respectively), following campaigns by women CSOs.</p> | <p>The proportion of women as candidates, registered voters and voters decreased from the GNC election of 2012.</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback International coordination fora</p> |
| <p>Output 3.2. Enhanced access to and participation of Libyans displaced by conflict inside and outside of Libya (out of country)</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> No. of IDP's access. Evidence of increased understanding of stakeholders regarding issues affecting the participation of displaced persons/diaspora in electoral processes</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No participation in any meaningful elections in 42 years.</p> | <p>2012. In 2012, 8,012 Libyans in six countries participated in the GNC election</p> <p>2013. Scope of OCV coverage is increased, from 6 to 19 voting locations in preparation for 2014 elections, notably including neighbouring countries Egypt and Tunisia.</p> <p>2014. No activities planned; the International Organization for Migration led in this area.</p> | <p>Participation of vulnerable groups, women and IDPs in electoral processes not assessed.</p> <p>In accordance with good practice in the provision of international assistance, implementers of electoral assistance in Libya agreed on sub-sector leads, thereby avoiding overlap or duplication in the provision of technical assistance. In 2014, the International Organization for Migration led in this area.</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|---|---|---|--|
| <p><i>Planned target.</i> Healthy participation of vulnerable groups, women and IDPs in electoral processes.</p> | | | |
| <p>Output 3.3. Enhanced understanding of and access to the technical electoral process of civil society groups and political parties including observer accreditation, candidate registration, and gender and minority representation</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Understanding grows between CSO and political parties. Evidence of earlier and more frequent dialogue with observers and media</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No participation in any meaningful elections in 42 years.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> High level of understanding expressed between CSO and political parties. Activities targeting CSOs and media on gender issues occur throughout the electoral cycle.</p> | <p>2012. In 2012, coordination with observers during the operational period was largely undertaken in an <i>ad hoc</i> manner</p> <p>2013. HNEC increased frequency of dialogue with observers and media and engagement with related processes (e.g. training in media and elections; earlier publication of regulations; earlier accreditation, etc.). HNEC addressed 62% of observer recommendations that fell within its area of responsibility, covering the entire spectrum of its operations.</p> <p>2014. Reports from two Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) workshops addressing media and elections strengthened relationships between media/CSO participants and HNEC participants</p> | <p>Understanding of political parties not assessed. In accordance with good practice in the provision of international assistance, implementers of electoral assistance in Libya agreed on sub-sector leads, thereby avoiding overlap or duplication in the provision of technical assistance. Support related to political parties was led by the National Democratic institute.</p> | <p>Press conference schedules Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes Weekly reports Event reports</p> |
| <p>Output 4. Strengthened capacities of the national media to report on electoral processes throughout Libya in a balanced and responsible manner, and promote issue-based reporting on political competition.</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Quality and quantity of media coverage. Level of compliance with LEAP responsibilities articulated within HNEC media centre plans</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No previous media engagement in democratic processes.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> National media provide effective messages to population on electoral processes. Positive evaluation by HNEC and end users of LEAP's support to media centre</p> | <p>2012. LEAP provided overall coordination of the different actors involved in the national media centre in cooperation with HNEC and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The quality of service was acknowledged as high by participants</p> <p>2013. In coordination with HNEC and the sub-sector lead, LEAP's support consisted of a short-term expert to advise on the technical setup of the media centre. Recruitment was underway at the close of 2013.</p> <p>2014. HNEC was content with assistance provided during the CDA election, responding positively to advice provided. HNEC was able to operate the media centre independent of international expertise during the HoR election.</p> | <p>Quality and quantity of media coverage not assessed. In accordance with good practice in the provision of international assistance, implementers of electoral assistance in Libya agreed on sub-sector leads, thereby avoiding overlap or duplication in the provision of technical assistance. Support related to national media was led by the European Union.</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |
| | | | |

| Outputs and Indicators | Achieved Indicator Targets | Reasons for Variance with Planned target (if any) | Source of Verification |
|--|--|---|--|
| <p>Output 5. Strengthened capacity of the Libyan HNEC (or media commission) to conduct media monitoring.</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Effect of HNEC media outreach. Media monitoring effort facilitated through provision of information and resources</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No media campaigns yet undertaken by HNEC.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Effective media outreach of HNEC reaches nationwide population, in particular targeted population groups.</p> | <p><i>2012.</i> In 2012, a media-monitoring project was established in coordination with HNEC, IDEA and the Libyan Ministry of Culture and Civil Society in order to monitor the campaign period and silence period.</p> <p><i>2013.</i> Regulatory media monitoring was not conducted in support of the CDA election, following a decision by HNEC in October 2013.</p> <p><i>2014.</i> Support was not planned in this area in 2014.</p> | | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |
| <p>Output 6. Strengthened capacities of Libyan relevant legal institutions or commission to plan for, develop and deliver an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism and process electoral complaints in a timely and effective manner</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Enhanced ability among legal institutions to play a role in the electoral process, as required. Mechanisms developed to coordinate on challenges, complaints and appeals related to electoral processes</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> Lack of clarity and capacity on the role of legal institutions in the electoral process.</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Legal institutions are able to deal efficiently, fairly and effectively with electoral issues.</p> | <p><i>2012.</i> In 2012, coordination on electoral dispute resolution was largely undertaken in an <i>ad hoc</i> manner</p> <p><i>2013.</i> Consistent with agreements, in 2013 LEAP did not provide assistance in this area of assistance</p> <p><i>2014.</i> Limited support was provided in this area in 2014. LEAP supported 13 participants (2 women) to attend workshops examining comparative experienced from the region.</p> | <p>Ability of legal institutions to deal efficiently, fairly and effectively with electoral issues not assessed.</p> <p>In accordance with good practice in the provision of international assistance, implementers of electoral assistance in Libya agreed on sub-sector leads, thereby avoiding overlap or duplication in the provision of technical assistance. Support related to electoral dispute resolution was led by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems.</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |
| <p>Output 7. Strengthened capacities of HNEC to coordinate electoral security with stakeholders</p> <p><i>Indicator(s).</i> Electoral security satisfactorily organised. Evidence of alignment of plans between HNEC and applicable security authorities vis-à-vis electoral administration</p> <p><i>Baseline.</i> No electoral security undertaken. In 2012, electoral and security authorities established a network of operations to ensure constant communication</p> <p><i>Planned target.</i> Electoral security is well co-ordinated.</p> | <p><i>2012.</i> In 2012, electoral and security authorities established a network of operations to ensure constant communication</p> <p><i>2013.</i> Consistent with agreements, in 2013 advisors focused on day-to-day physical security measures in coordination with HNEC counterparts.</p> <p><i>2014.</i> Consistent with agreements, in 2014 advisors focused on day-to-day physical security measures in coordination with HNEC counterparts.</p> | <p>No assessment made of co-ordination of electoral security.</p> <p>In accordance with good practice in the provision of international assistance, implementers of electoral assistance in Libya agreed on sub-sector leads, thereby avoiding overlap or duplication in the provision of technical assistance. Support related to security coordination was led by UNSMIL's Security Sector Advisory and Coordination Division.</p> | <p>Media reports Semi-structured qualitative interviews Advisor feedback HNEC evaluation processes</p> |