



United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)

<p>Project Title: <i>PBSO Surge Support to Madagascar for preparation of Peacebuilding Priority Plan</i></p>	<p>Recipient UN Organization(s): UNDP</p>
<p>Project Contact: Mr Jonas MFOUATIE Deputy Resident Representative / Programme Email: jonas.mfouatie@undp.org Mobile +261 32 11 108 27 Mr Alessandro BOZZINI Governance Advisor Email: alessandro.bozzini@undp.org Mobile: +261 32 11 108 17</p>	<p>Implementing Partner(s) – name & type (Government, CSO, etc): 1. UN Agencies 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3. Ministry of Economy and Planning 4. Ministry of Interior and Decentralization 5. Ministry of Justice 6. Ministry of Defense 7. Ministry of Population and Gender Affairs</p>
<p>Project Number:</p>	<p>Project Location: Antananarivo, Madagascar</p>
<p>Project Description: <i>One sentence describing the project focus and purpose.</i> The project aims at strengthening the capacities of the Government of Madagascar and the UN Country Team to lead a consultative analysis and develop a strategic Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Madagascar</p>	<p>Total PBF Project budget: USD 507,180 Project Start Date: January 2015 Project End Date: June 2015 (6 months)</p>
<p>Gender Marker Score¹: <u>1</u> <i>Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective. Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective. Score 1 for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly. Score 0 for projects that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality.</i></p>	
<p>Project Outcomes: <i>National Authorities together with UNCT and other relevant partners have successfully achieved, through an inclusive consultation and prioritization process, a Peacebuilding Priority Plan which reflects a common commitment and understanding of the country's critical peacebuilding needs.</i></p>	
<p>PBF Outcome Area² 5.1 PBF management and administration</p>	

¹ The PBSO monitors the inclusion of women and girls in all PBF projects in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1612, 1888, 1889.

² PBF outcome areas

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1):

(1.1) SSR; (1.2) RoL; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2):

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.1) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Management of natural resources;

3: Revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3);

(3.1) Short-term employment generation; (3.2) Sustainable livelihoods

4) (Re)-establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Public administration; (4.2) Public service delivery (including infrastructure).

5: PBF management and administration

(5.1) PBF management and administration

PROJECT DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

(for IRF-funded projects)	
<p>Recipient UN Organization(s) <i>UNDP UNIES POUR LE</i> <i>UNDP Resident Representative</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i> <i>Resident Representative</i></p> <p><i>ANTANANARIVO</i></p>	<p>Representative of National Authorities <i>Arisoa Lala RAZAFITRIMO</i> <i>Ministre</i> <i>des Affaires Etrangères</i> <i>Général</i> <i>Ministre de</i> <i>Herilanto RAVELOHARISON</i> <i>l'Economie et de la Planification</i></p> <p><i>Signature</i> <i>Date & Seal</i></p> <p><i>28 DEC 2014</i></p> <p><i>MAIRIE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES</i></p>
<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>Peacebuilding Support Office, NY</p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i> <i>10 FEB 2015</i></p>	<p>Resident Coordinator (RC)</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p><i>Fatma Sarholtra</i> <i>Resident Coordinator</i> <i>of the United Nations System</i></p> <p><i>Date & Seal</i></p> <p><i>ANTANANARIVO</i></p>

Table of contents:

Length: Max. 15 pages

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support

- a) Peacebuilding context
- b) Rationale for and impact of this project

II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

- a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing
- b) Budget
- c) Capacity of any new RUNO(s) and implementing partners

III. Management and coordination

- a) Project management
- b) Risk management
- c) Monitoring & evaluation
- d) Administrative arrangements (standard wording)

PROJECT COMPONENTS:

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support

a) Peacebuilding context:

Following independence in 1960, Madagascar suffered from a series of crises, notably in 1972, 1991, 1996, 2002 and 2009, that negatively impacted the economy, weakened the sociocultural fabric and led to extreme poverty, which today affects 52.7 per cent of the population. The latest of such crises was triggered in December 2008 when the country experienced a violent political crisis, following the overthrow of the former President by the then Mayor of Antananarivo, backed by some elements in the army. This unconstitutional change of power resulted in the country's suspension from all international fora and led to a significant drop in development aid, from \$750 million between 2005 and 2008 to a yearly average of \$430 million from 2009 to 2012. The freezing of development assistance (70 per cent of government investment in social sectors), combined with poor governance and government's inability to mobilize internal resources contributed to the decline of access to basic social services. After several failed rounds of negotiations, a SADC-brokered roadmap was signed in September 2011 with the international community's (and notably UN's) support.

Following political deadlocks, postponements of the election dates and legal and political controversies, presidential and parliamentary elections were finally held in October-December 2013. The elections, backed by UNDP's electoral assistance project PACEM, were held peacefully and were judged as credible and transparent by all international observers. The new President Hery Rajaonarimampianina took office on 25 January 2014, marking a milestone in the country's exit from crisis. Although democratically elected institutions were established, weak governance at all levels remains a challenge. The fragility of national and local institutions is rooted in the excessive centralization of power, weak accountability and a highly politicized and urban-based civil society. Furthermore, persistent collusion between business and politics, the prominent role played by the army in state affairs, and ineffective oversight and control mechanisms are major challenges that continue to affect the country.

Many factors clearly show that conflicts, tensions and cleavages persist in the country, these include the lengthy political negotiations behind the appointment of the Prime Minister (April 2014), the political standstill at the National Assembly which only became fully operational in May, persistent insecurity and criminal activities in the South leading to human rights violations and abuses, the rise in violent crime, chronic impunity, the postponement of local elections, the stalemate of the national reconciliation agenda, the delay in fulfilling all provisions of the SADC-brokered Roadmap and the arrest of Ravalomanana as soon as he came back from exile clearly.

Particularly, three factors would need to be urgently addressed in order to prevent a relapse into crisis. First, the international partners are concerned with the delays in the fulfillment of the remaining provisions of the SADC-brokered roadmap to end the political crisis, mainly with regards to the return of all political exiles, the holding of the local elections and national reconciliation process within political elites that has continued to paralyze the country. Secondly, fully restoring rule of law is key to address citizens' lack of trust in the justice system perceived as corrupt and biased towards elites as well as to prevent human rights violations. Thirdly, the highly politicized security forces with weakened ability to effectively perform expected duties remain a concern:

security sector reform is a critical necessity. If the role, responsibility and accountability of the security forces are not reassessed and their civilian control more effective, they might be tempted to intervene again in the political arena which was one of the facts triggering the 2009 crisis.

The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) carried out in 2010 and the Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA) undertaken in 2013, as well as ongoing research and analysis, show that the root causes of Madagascar's cyclical crises and of the underlying conflict are:

- the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small elite at the central level; this implies glaring inequalities between a tiny rich elite and the mass of poor, conflicts over power and resource sharing within the elites as well as marginalization of the intellectual middle class.
- an urban/rural cleavage which translates into institutional, economic and infrastructural imbalances. Madagascar faces significant inequalities between urban and rural areas where poverty rates stand at 49 and 77 per cent respectively, figures which contrast starkly against the MDG 1 target rate set at 35 per cent.
- a centre/periphery cleavage which means huge differences in many sectors but particularly in terms of access to social services as well as disputes around land, natural resources and environment; tensions between highland and coastal populations and occasional rivalry among ethnic groups are another consequence of this cleavage.

These tensions and conflicts are particularly noticeable in the South, which the CDA defines as an explosive situation due to chronic insecurity, absence of the State and huge interests of mining companies. So far, the conflict in Madagascar has not erupted into violent confrontation; however, the underlying causes of conflict continue to constitute a major threat to the security of the region. Chronic interference and interventionism of the military into politics is symptomatic of the persistence of systemic and structural weaknesses in the organization and functioning of the Malagasy security sector. The weakness of accountability and democratic oversight mechanisms erodes government's ability to address serious security threats and prevent military interferences. In the history of Madagascar, none of the president of the first, second and third republic has completed his tenure. Four different military officers have served as President since 1960 cumulating a total of 25 years of military and unconstitutional regime.

The country's conflicts have an important gender dimension. Women are disproportionately affected by violent crimes. At the same time, they tend to be largely excluded from political participation, have less economic opportunity, have limited access to land and are poorer, which overall make them more vulnerable to conflicts and shocks. Despite improvement in women's participation in politics (19 per cent of ministers and 22 per cent of members of parliament are women, compared to 26 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, before the 2013 elections), the rates remain low. Anthropological and sociocultural considerations such as non-access to land and property (women in the greater South cannot inherit land from their deceased parents); greater vulnerability to external shocks; limited access to education, training, information and credit facilities; discriminatory legal practices; and lack of enforcement of existing laws aimed at promoting women's rights are all considered major barriers to women's economic empowerment and greater participation to decision-making bodies.

The youth are also severely impacted by and involved in conflicts and tension: mass under-employment that currently affects 80 per cent of the population and the lack of

opportunities constitute major impediments for the inclusion of the 400,000 young people who enter the labour market every year. Moreover, youth tend to find it harder to make their voice heard and their concerns are often overlooked.

Despite the long list of challenges and drivers of conflicts, opportunities and champions for peace do exist. The national reconciliation agenda is supposed to be driven by the Council for Malagasy Reconciliation (FFM) but there are doubts over its legitimacy and representativeness since its members were appointed under former Transitional President Rajoelina. Current President Rajaonarimampianina repeatedly stated that he is committed to reconciliation and peacebuilding and recently announced that he would lead this process himself. Churches and federation of churches have in the past played a conflict resolution and peacebuilding role, and while they did take side in the Ravalomanana-Rajoelina dispute, many still look at them as neutral players and potential peacemakers. Some local traditions, such as the Dina (a traditional form of justice) and the fihavanana (a Malagasy concept broadly referring to harmony and goodwill), can also play a conflict prevention and resolution role in some occasions. Similarly, traditional leaders also have the potential to play a positive role. Multi-stakeholder national peace architecture has also been recently set up with UNDP's support as a follow-up to the Maseru declaration. At the end of October 2014, a number of Malagasy stakeholders including representatives from the presidency, prime minister's office, parliament, civil society and the national reconciliation commission conducted, with the support of UNDP, a reconciliation experience sharing mission to learn from the South African and Togolese reconciliation experiences. Finally, there seems to be a growing recognition among local and international actors that inclusive economic growth and participatory governance are key elements to defuse tensions, tackle the root causes of conflict and build peace in the long term.

There are not many comprehensive studies on the Malagasy conflict except for the two mentioned above (PCIA and CDA), hence there are few reliable quantitative indicators; however, other indicators can serve as proxy of the depth of the conflict and its effects.

Poverty indicators speak for themselves. Extreme poverty affects 52.7% of the population and the projection of the 2012 national MDGs survey results shows that Madagascar will not reach any of the MDGs by 2015. The country faces deepened inequalities between urban and rural areas as poverty rates stand at 49% and 77% respectively. 28% of the population is food insecure and there is high chronic malnutrition (47.3%) among children under five. Income poverty rate has remained constantly high at 71.5% (INSTAT, 2012), 70% in 1993 and 69.6 % in 2001. The protracted political crisis led to a decline in private investment from 33.2% of GDP in 2008 to 15.5%; economic growth dropped from a 6.2% pre-crisis level (2003 to 2008) to an average of 2% during the 2009-2013 period. On the Human Development Index, Madagascar is 155th at 0.498. Governance indicators are also overall quite bad. Rule of law is probably the weakest area and the Mo Ibrahim Index (IIAG) shows that Madagascar was the country that had the worst decrease over the 2000-2012 period (mostly because of limited efficiency and independence of the justice system). Corruption is rampant and increasing; Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2013 ranks Madagascar 127th out of 177 countries with a score of 28 on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean). The score of the World Bank's control of corruption has dropped to 31.10 from 54.85 in 2008. As far as conflicts and fragility are concerned, Madagascar is 66th in The Global Peace Index (GPI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), is considered by OECD as one of the world's 51 fragile states and is among the 33 states and territories in fragile situations according to the World Bank.

The elections at the end of 2013, judged as transparent and credible by all international observers, raised hopes for Madagascar's peace and development. The new authorities, starting with the President himself, publicly engaged to make national reconciliation one of the top priorities of their mandate. However, several months later, such agenda seems at a standstill, the limited legitimacy and popular support of the national reconciliation body (FFM) whose members were appointed by former Transition President Rajoelina and are thus widely perceived by the general public as not representative. This situation led the President to publicly announce that he will be driving the reconciliation agenda himself from now on. At a standstill is also the fulfillment of some provisions of the 2011 SADC-brokered roadmap, especially article 20 on the return of all political exiles and amnesty which is yet to be implemented. Moreover, while attention is on the national reconciliation process and particularly on disputes among political elites, little has been done to address community conflicts and insecurity as well as root causes of tensions which sometimes translate into violent crime.

Regional bodies, particularly the SADC, have played an important mediation role after the 2009 coup and remain engaged in supporting the country's peacebuilding efforts. The African Union and the United Nations have backed and still back SADC's role. The UN also plays an advisory role to the government and has placed peace and reconciliation at the core of its new 2015-2019 UNDAF, UNDP being the lead agency on this topic. In the same vein, during the transition, the UN Resident Coordinator, the UNCT and the international community have played a pivotal and catalytic role in ensuring the protection of civilian through encouraging continued dialogue among all political actors. In 2014 Madagascar has progressively been readmitted to regional bodies including AU and SADC and has consequently improved relations with its neighbors, South Africa being particularly engaged in supporting peacebuilding and reconciliation.

b) Rationale for PBF support

In preparation for a potential eligibility of Madagascar to the Peacebuilding Fund, existing country capacities would need to be strengthened and complemented. Indeed, UNDP and OHCHR were mandated to lead, on behalf of the UNRC and the UNCT, on the initial steps such as the engagement with the government to prompt their inputs on the process, the development of the eligibility note and the preparation of the joint PBSO-DPA-UNDP mission which took place on 8-11 December 2014. In turn, the government has showed great interest in the PBF and has supported the process so far, most notably during the PBSO presence on the ground.

However, should Madagascar be declared eligible, substantial additional capacity would be needed to prepare for PBF funding. First of all, recent assessments including from the UN showed a general limited capacity of the Government to collect and analyse data, mobilize and manage internal resources and external aid, as well as to plan, roll out, monitor and evaluate development interventions and public policies, thus significant additional capacity would be needed. More specifically, neither the UN nor the government have the capacity to plan, organise and conduct the participatory analysis and consultative process which is crucial to develop a comprehensive and relevant Peacebuilding priority plan (PPP). For such a process to be inclusive, both additional financial resources and dedicated human resources are needed. Moreover, while both UN agencies and government counterparts do boast significant technical capacities in a wide range of areas, there is lack of the specific expertise needed to help identify key peacebuilding priorities as well as appropriate planning tools such as peacebuilding

indicators to measure progress in the achievement of outcomes of the PPP. Similarly, there is no high-level negotiation and mediation capacity which would be needed to help conduct dialogue among representatives of national institutions and other senior stakeholders in order to establish a Joint Steering Committee and agree on peacebuilding priorities. Finally, the presence of a dedicated team of technical experts tasked with leading the PBF process forward, would be important to show that such a process engages a range of government, UN, civil society and other partners and despite the potential sensitivity of the issues involved, is politically neutral.

For all these reasons, it is recommended to establish a small technical pre-secretariat led by an international expert as well as to deploy a Peace and Development Advisor, which will be co-funded by the PBF (50%) and UNDP (50%).

II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation

a) Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing:

The outcome of the present surge project is that National Authorities together with UNCT and other relevant partners have successfully achieved, through an inclusive consultation and prioritization process, a Peacebuilding Priority Plan which reflects a common commitment and understanding of the country's critical peacebuilding needs.

The outcome will be achieved through the two following outputs:

1. Relevant staff is in place and JSC Secretariat fully operational
2. A Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) is developed through a participatory process

In order to achieve the outputs, the main activities are the following:

Output 1

- 1.A. Recruitment and deployment of staff (one international Peace and Development Advisor (co-financed by the PBF (50%) and UNDP (50%)), one international P4 Peacebuilding Coordinator, one national Peacebuilding Officer, one national M&E officer and one national administrative assistant) and establishment of a JSC Secretariat.
- 1.B. Rent and equipment of office space
- 1.C. Support to the organization of consultation workshops, meetings and discussions with relevant stakeholders

Output 2

- 2.A. Establish a Joint Steering Committee (JSC)
- 2.B. Conduct a consultative conflict and peacebuilding analysis and prioritization exercise
- 2.C. Draft and validate the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), including a peacebuilding results framework that clearly identifies baselines, targets and indicators of progress for the peacebuilding outcomes identified in the PPP.
- 2.D. Facilitate the process of projectisation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan
- 2.E. Support resource mobilization

The sequence of activities will follow the order in which such activities are presented: relevant staff will be recruited and deployed while office space is identified and necessary office equipment is purchased; then the JSC will be established and further to this a large consultative, analysis and prioritization exercise will be carried out; this in

turn will allow the drafting of the PPP which will be eventually validated by stakeholders.

The main beneficiaries of the proposed project are:

1. UN Agencies
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. Ministry of Economy and Planning
4. Ministry of Interior and Decentralization
5. Ministry of Justice
6. Ministry of Defense
7. Ministry of population and Gender Affairs
8. Relevant state institutions
9. Civil society

The proposed project is based on a theory of change. If an inclusive analysis and prioritization exercise is carried out, facilitated by a professional team, then a relevant and appropriate PPP will be developed which in turn will ensure that PBF resources are allocated in line with the country's actual priorities, needs and funding gaps, and are used efficiently thanks to clear expected results and monitoring by the PBF Joint Steering Committee.

b) Budget:

Table 1: Project Activity Budget

<p>Outcome: National Authorities together with UNCT and other relevant partners have successfully achieved, through an inclusive consultation and prioritization process, a Peacebuilding Priority Plan which reflects a common commitment and understanding of the country's critical peacebuilding needs.</p>				
Output number	Activity name	Activity budget by RUNO	UN budget category (see table below for list of categories)	Any remarks (e.g. on types of inputs provided or budget justification)
Output 1 Relevant staff is in place and a JSC Secretariat is fully operational	1.A. Recruitment and deployment of staff (one PDA (P5), one P4 Peacebuilding Coordinator, one Peacebuilding Officer, one national M&E officer and one national administrative assistant)	<p>- Recruitment of a PDA (P5) for 6 months USD 125,000</p> <p>- Recruitment of a P4 PBF Coordinator for 6 months USD 109,000</p> <p>- Recruitment of a PBF officer for 6 months USD 18,000</p>	Staff and other personnel	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recruitment of a national M&E officers for 6 months USD 18,000 - Recruitment of a national administrative assistant for 6 months USD 5,000 		
	1.B. Rent and equipment of office space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Office rent USD 9,000 - Laptop and other office equipment USD 12,000 	<p>General Operating and other Direct Costs</p> <p>Supplies, Commodities, Materials</p>	
	1.C. Support to the organization of consultation workshops, meetings and discussions with relevant stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Running costs for the office USD 8,000 - Car rent and fuel for 2 vehicles USD 30,000 	<p>Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture</p>	
Output 2. A Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) is developed through participatory analysis and consultation	2.A Establish of a Joint Steering Committee (JSC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consultation workshop USD 20,000 - Public launch in Tana USD 20,000 	<p>Contractual services</p>	
	2.B. Conduct a consultative conflict and peacebuilding analysis and prioritization exercise	<p>PBSO staff return trip NY-TNR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - flight - DSA 10 days USD 5,000 <p>5 analysis and consultation workshops:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - conference room - flights from Tana - DSA USD 75,000 	<p>Travel</p> <p>Contractual services</p>	
	2.C. Draft and validate the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP), including a peacebuilding	<p>1 validation workshop in Tana USD 20,000</p>	<p>Contractual services</p>	

	results framework that clearly identifies baselines, targets and indicators of progress for the peacebuilding outcomes identified in the PPP			
	2. D. Facilitate the process of projectisation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan	Consultative meetings with UN agencies and other stakeholders Screening of projects proposals		
	2.E. Support resource mobilization	Advocacy meetings with potential donors	General Operating and other Direct Costs	

Table 2: Project budget by UN categories by RUNO

CATEGORIES	Budget
1. Staff and other personnel	275,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	12,000
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture	38,000
4. Contractual services	135,000
5. Travel	5,000
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	0
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	9,000
Sub-Total Project Costs	474,000
8. Indirect Support Costs*	33,180
TOTAL	507,180

**Indirect support costs must not exceed more than 7% if the project cost.*

c) Capacity of RUNO(s) and implementing partners:

The Receiving UN Organization, UNDP, has some technical and organizational capacity which will be complemented by the staff that will be recruited in the framework of this project.

Current UNDP country office's capacity includes the Deputy Resident Representative Programme who will ensure leadership of the whole PBF process, under the overall guidance of the Resident Representative / UN Resident Coordinator, and who has a background on conflict and security issues. The UNDP CO also boasts an international governance advisor and a peacebuilding specialist while a P5 Peace and Development Advisor is currently being recruited. The CO has also operations capacity in terms of procurement, human resources, finance and administrative support.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is also closely involved and its country presence includes an international human rights advisor, a national officer and an assistant.

This capacity is estimated to be enough to kick start the process but will be complemented by the international and national staff that will be recruited and who will work full-time on the PBF surge project.

III. Management and coordination

a) Project management:

The day to day management of the project will be ensured by the technical secretariat which will be put in place as the first activity of the project itself. The secretariat will be led by an international PBF coordinator supported by a PBF officer, a national M&E staff and an administrative assistant. The secretariat will receive regular guidance and feedback from the Joint Steering Committee which will ensure the overall leadership of the whole process leading to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan.

b) Risk management: This section outlines any new risks, their likelihood and risk management strategies. Please reflect these in the table below. Please include any new Do No Harm issues in selecting specific target groups and geographic areas.

Table 3 – Risk management matrix

Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)
Political tensions among stakeholders hampering the process.	Medium	Medium	The President of the Republic himself expressed repeatedly and officially his backing for the PBF. The process leading to the PPP will be as large and inclusive as possible in order for all different views to be considered
Limited in-country human capacity at Government and UN level to organize all the PPP logistics and lead the process.	Medium	Medium	The technical secretariat will complement existing Government and UN human resources both at technical level and on logistics

c) Monitoring & Evaluation:

UNDP, as the Recipient UN Organization for this project, will be responsible for monitoring the progress of the project against the Results framework and for producing the projects reports for PBSO and MPTF-O. The technical secretariat will feature two staff in charge of M&E.

d) Administrative arrangements:(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Participating Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing

procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than 15 July;
- Annual and final narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year;
- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

IRF Results Framework						
Country name: MADAGASCAR						
Project Effective Dates:						
IRF Theory of Change: If an inclusive analysis and prioritization exercise is carried out, facilitated by a professional team, then a relevant and appropriate PPP will be developed which in turn will ensure that PBF resources are allocated in line with the country's actual priorities, needs and funding gaps, and are used efficiently thanks to clear expected results and monitoring by the PBF Joint Steering Committee.						
Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Indicator progress	Means of Verification	Year 1	Milestones
Outcome Statement : National Authorities together with UNCT and other relevant partners have successfully achieved, through an inclusive consultation and prioritization process, a Peacebuilding Priority Plan which reflects a common commitment and understanding of the country's critical peacebuilding needs.		Outcome Indicator The Peacebuilding Priority Plan is endorsed by all key stakeholders including Government, UNCT, key bilateral and multilateral partners. Baseline: No PPP in place. Target: PPP endorsed by all parties.		PPP document Report and attendance list of the validation workshop		Draft PPP
	Output 1 Relevant staff is in place and a JSC Secretariat is fully operational	Indicator 1.1 Number of PBF staff recruited Baseline: 0 Target: 5		Reports of recruitments		

		<p>Indicator 1.2 Number of laptops and vehicles in place</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5 laptops and 1 vehicle</p>						
	<p>Output 2 A Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) is developed through participatory analysis and consultation</p>	<p>Indicator 2.1 Number of consultation workshops</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5</p>						
		<p>Indicator 2.2 The Joint Steering Committee is established and operational</p> <p>Baseline: no JSC is in place Target: JSC established and its first meeting held</p>						
		<p>Indicator 2.2 A draft PPP is available</p> <p>Baseline: no PPP Target: a draft PPP completed</p>						