PEACEBUILDING FUND (PBF)
FINALPROGRAMME[1] NARRATIVE REPORT

REPORTING PERIOD: FROM OCTOBER 2008 TO DECEMBER 2010

Programme Title & Project Number	**Country, Locality(s), Priority Area(s) / Strategic Results[2]**
• Programme Title: **Community Empowerment: Peace, Human Rights, and Civic Participation** • Programme Number *(if applicable)* **PBF/LBR/A-1** • MPTF Office Project Reference Number:[3] **00066675**	*Country/Region* **Liberia** **Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh County** *Priority area/ strategic results* **Fostering National Reconciliation and Conflict Management**
Participating Organization(s)	**Implementing Partners**
• Organizations that have received direct funding from the MPTF Office under this programme **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**	• National counterparts (government, private, NGOs & others) and other International Organizations **Justice and Peace Commission** **Justice and Peace Commission Regional Office Gbarnga** **Justice and Peace Commission Cape Palmas**
Programme/Project Cost (US$)	**Programme Duration**
Total approved budget as per project document: MPTF /JP Contribution[4]: **932,400US$** • *by Agency (if applicable)* Agency Contribution: **337,749US$** • *by Agency (if applicable)*	Overall Duration *(months)* Start Date[5]: **31 December 2008** Original End Date[6]: **31 March 2010** Actual End date[7]: **31 December 2010**
Government Contribution: In-kind *(if applicable)*	Have agency (ies) operationally closed the Programme in its (their) system? Yes No ■ ☐
Other Contributions (donors) *(if applicable)* **TOTAL:**	Expected Financial Closure date[8]:
Programme Assessment/Review/Mid-Term Eval.	**Report Submitted By**
Evaluation Completed ■ Yes ☐ No Date: **February 2011, March 2013** Evaluation Report - Attached ■ Yes ☐ No Date:	o Name: o Title: o Participating Organization (Lead): **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** o Email address:

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[1] The term "programme" is used for programmes, joint programmes and projects.

[2] Strategic Results, as formulated in the Performance Management Plan (PMP) for the PBF, Priority Plan or project document;

[3] The MPTF Office Project Reference Number is the same number as the one on the Notification message. It is also referred to as "Project ID" on the project's factsheet page on the MPTF Office GATEWAY.

[4] The MPTF/JP Contribution is the amount transferred to the Participating UN Organizations – see MPTF Office GATEWAY

[5] The start date is the date of the first transfer of the funds from the MPTF Office as Administrative Agent. Transfer date is available on the MPTF Office GATEWAY

[6] As per approval of the original project document by the relevant decision-making body/Steering Committee.

[7] If there has been an extension, then the revised, approved end date should be reflected here. If there has been no extension approved, then the current end date is the same as the original end date. The end date is the same as the operational closure date which is when all activities for which a Participating Organization is responsible under an approved MPTF / JP have been completed. As per the MOU, agencies are to notify the MPTF Office when a programme completes its operational activities. Please see MPTF Office Closure Guidelines.

[8] Financial Closure requires the return of unspent balances and submission of the Certified Final Financial Statement and Report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Liberia's *Community Empowerment, Peace, Human Rights and Civic Participation ("CE") Programme* is a non-formal, community-based peace education programme which was intended to provide the necessary individual tools and community linkages, acceptance and ownership to constructively prevent violent conflict at all levels of society by addressing negative behaviour and power structures which historically led to discrimination and exclusion in the country. The practical end result was to (in the terms of the Libeira Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)) create communities conducive to socially responsible investment and the much sought-after rapid, inclusive, and sustainable growth.

The CE Programme's structure was based on a decade of peace education piloting, experience, and evaluation. The materials and methodology used originated with UNHCR's Peace Education Programme, which in 2001, were endorsed by the members of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), including UNESCO and UNICEF. The materials served as the educational materials for the Liberia Ministry of Education's Formal Peace Education programme.

Forty two (42) CE facilitators conducted 8-day peace education workshops over the course of several weeks in the three worst conflict-affected counties of the country namely; Nimba, Grand Gedeh and Lofa. A total of 9,106 community members were trained in peace education workshops in 67 communities.

A two-year independent impact evaluation[9], which was probably the first of its kind that studied peace education in a large scale and rigorous manner, suggests that towns impacted by the programme had higher resolution of land disputes and lower violence one year after the programme. The research also found unintended consequences –tensions over certain issues, such as more disagreements, mostly peaceful ones, and more extrajudicial punishments. The evaluation concluded that mass education can change high-stakes behaviors such as land disputes, and improving informal bargaining and enforcement behaviors can promote order in weak states.

I. Purpose

The programme sought to promote changes in skills, knowledge, behaviour, attitude, values, and acceptance among the targeted population. The main objectives and sought-after peacebuilding impact of the project were two-fold:

1. Empower 15,000 individuals and communities to constructively prevent [latent] violent conflict at all levels of society by addressing negative behaviour and power structures which lead to discrimination and exclusion;

2. Ensure individuals and communities are prepared to constructively get engaged in peacebuilding efforts with opportunities coming from the PRS or other actors.

The above mentioned objectives were to be attained through a widespread and intensive community-based, non-formal peace education programme. Utilizing the established and proven INEE Peace Education

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[9] Blattman.C, Hartman.A and Blair. R. *How to promote order and property rights under weak rule of law?: An experiment in changing dispute resolution behavior through community education.* Available at
http://chrisblattman.com/files/2013/03/BlattmanHartmanBlair-Mar2013-Revision.pdf

materials[10], at least 15,000 community decision-makers were to be provided with CE Programme tools through more than 500 Community Workshops on peace, human rights, and civic participation. The tools sought to provide essential knowledge and skill changes among the beneficiaries. A number of activities were implemented in order to ensure the transfer of individual to socio-political change. This included the training of UN/GoL/CSO stakeholders in the utilization of CE Programme, radio programmes, and the development and presentation to each community-at-large of an "Opportunity Plan" developed during the course of the Community Workshop. The CE Programme also intended to ensure an established and sustained Peacebuilding Support Network through the training of 500 community workshop participants. These participants were to be trained and equipped to become community workshop facilitators and support the MIA Peacebuilding initiatives. Outputs and activities were assumed to have cumulative effects necessary to achieve the intended outcomes and impact.

Specifically, the CE Programme intended to provide the necessary tools and community motivation for individuals and communities to ensure the results indicated above. The CE Programme tools, and the linkages which inform and mobilize the communities-at-large to maximize the use of the tools, sought to remedy the "absence of trust of leadership" and bring about the "inclusive, transparent, and accountable governance" as highlighted in Liberia's Peacebuilding Fund Priority Plan.

The Liberia Peacebuilding Fund Priority Plan articulates one of Liberia's major challenges as "Poor leadership and the misuse of power." This challenge, which perpetuates the precarious position of Liberia's peace, derives from the country's history of social divisions, structural rifts, exclusion, and violence. The problem not only demonstrates a failure "to create inclusive, transparent, accountable governance, political mobilization along non-ethnic lines, and the absence of trust of leadership," but has an important effect on other conflict factors highlighted in the PRS. Land conflicts, mismanagement of natural resources, and perceived and actual divisions due to the relationship between the State and its Citizens were all accentuated in geographic areas hardest hit by the conflict such as Liberia's southeastern region and Lofa County. The degree and likelihood to which these conflict factors could have developed into full-fledged conflict were inextricably linked to the use and misuse of power, and the leadership decisions taken and followed by communities.

The problem mentioned above is particularly significant for Liberia today t particularly so for a country on the brink of development. Liberia presently faces massive shortages in material and human resources, yet the PRS and subsequent donor conferences and appeals have signaled the dawn of a new era – of the opportunity to actually access progress.

However, the reality of Liberia demonstrates a country currently unequipped to put into action the PRS's central and oft-repeated goal of "Rapid, Inclusive, and Sustainable Growth." As a result of poor leadership and misuse of power, progress and funding resulting from the PRS are at risks of morph from development opportunity to potential conflict. It is in this light that Liberia, facing a history of divisions, exclusion, and violence, from the upper echelons of Government to the grassroots, must make a change. In order to do so, Liberians require the proper tools to constructively overcome peacebuilding and development challenges. They require the tools to ensure needless conflicts are avoided, while existing conflicts are constructively addressed. These tools have been delivered in the above-described CE Programme.

The actual subject matter of the workshop lessons are listed below. Each lesson is cumulative, building upon the other to provide the specific causal linkages to the skills and knowledge-related outcomes: Lessons are: 1. Peace and Conflict (including conflict theory); 2. Similarities and Differences; 3. Inclusion and Exclusion; 4. Trust; 5. Active listening; 6. Communication - 1 and 2 way communication,

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[10] Available at http://toolkit.ineesite.org/toolkit/Toolkit.php?PostID=1117

miscommunication; 7. Emotions (including emotional honesty); 8. Perceptions; 9. Bias, Stereotypes, Prejudice and Discrimination; 10. Empathy; 11. Co-operation; 12. Assertiveness; 13. Problem Solving; 14. Negotiation; 15. Mediation; 16. Conflict Management; 17. Human Rights & HR as a Rights-Based Approach; 18. Reconciliation; 19. Civic Participation, Rights, and Duties.

II. Assessment of Programme Results

i) Narrative reporting on results:

County stakeholder workshops were carried out in the three counties in which the programme was implemented. All District Commissioners, high-level county authorities, and paramount chiefs gathered for two-day sessions on the programme and prioritization of the beneficiary communities based on conflict potential/history. The county and district leadership (ministerial and traditional), through these workshops, better understood the contents and methodology of the programme.

Before commencing the CE workshop, 42 CE Workshop facilitators were trained by the UNHCR Programme's Master Trainer. Senior trainers provided ongoing supervision and field support in the form of additional facilitator workshops and

CE workshop facilitators and community leaders after graduation ceremony in Grand Gedeh County

one-on-one guidance. As a result, M&E expert reported that facilitators followed the formal curriculum well. Interviews with facilitators suggest that they believed in the program, had a good understanding of its content, and were eager to introduce the ideas to others. Their positive attitude was essential to the running of successful and engaging workshops.

During the project period, 9,106 community members were trained in peace education workshops in 67 communities; 4,524 including 2,005 women were trained in Nimba; 1,729 including 850 women in Grand Gedeh and 2,853 including 1,338 women in Lofa. The project reached 61% of the initial targeted population.

Among the community workshop participants, 140 persons received facilitator's training and were equipped to become peace education workshop facilitators. Two facilitator's training at induction level were conducted in Lofa and Grand Gedeh counties respectively. It was initially envisioned that the trained facilitators would become community peace education workshop facilitators and form the Peacebuilding Support Network to support the Ministry of Internal Affairs Peacebuilding focal point.

The second project goal of developing 'Opportunity Plans' after completion of the workshop focused on potential opportunities (existing and possible to achieve) and was to orient the workshop participants towards collective actions in the PRS process. However, this goal was not achieved because managing expectations among participants became difficult; the participants saw 'Opportunity Plans' would be actual 'development plans' that would come to fruition with the funding support from this program. It is worth noting that the Opportunity Plan component was incorporated in the final project design at the behest of the PBF consultants who evaluated the proposal and advised that this component be included in the project.

The program was not able to achieve the initial target of 15,000. Notwithstanding, the program yielded some positive impacts on critical issues relating to peace and stability in the targeted communities. A

two-year independent impact evaluation of the programme (Blattman.C, Hartman.A and Blair.R)[11] analyses highlighted that the following factors were crucial to achieve such results:

1. The intensity of the program (engaging people for weeks rather than hours);
2. The reach of the program (targeting a large proportion of community members);
3. An emphasis on safe and non-violent discourse;
4. Concurrent programs that also emphasize alternative dispute resolution as a way of managing conflicts.

Summary finding of the impact evaluation is as follows[12]:
1. Minor improvements in community participation and empowerment among individuals who attend the program, particularly for troublesome individuals.
2. Minor to moderate increases in "liberal attitudes" for program attendees.
3. Little evidence of an impact on political participation, program-specific "knowledge" or perceptions of the com-munity for those who attended the program.
4. Few discernible spillover effects on non-participants in communities where the program took place.
5. Increases in non-violent inter-personal and inter-group disputes, and suggestive evidence of a decrease in violent disputes.
6. Increasing levels of land conflict, though suggestions of lower rates of violence associated with those conflicts. (The evidence here is contradictory depending on whether we are speaking to community members or potential trainees).
7. Where both violent and non-violent conflicts occur, there is evidence that people are slightly more likely to find resolutions in trained communities, and that parties are happier with the outcomes.

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[11] Ibid.

[12] *Evidence from Randomized Evaluations of Peacebuilding in Liberia: Policy Report 2011.2*. Available online at
https://www.poverty-action.org/sites/default/files/blattman_hartman_blair_can_we_teach_peace_ipa_liberia_0.pdf

ii) Indicator Based Performance Assessment:

Using the **Programme Results Framework from the Project Document / AWPs** - provide details of the achievement of indicators at both the output and outcome level in the table below. Where it has not been possible to collect data on indicators, clear explanation should be given explaining why.

	Achieved Indicator Targets (Cumulative over funding period)	Reasons for Variance with Planned Target (if any)	Source of Verification
Outcome 1[13] Skills/Knowledge: Problem-solving, negotiation, and mediation are understood by the community to address [potential] conflicts. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Little evidence of an impact on political participation, program-specific "knowledge" or perceptions of the community for those who attended the program.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 2 Behaviour: Problem-solving, negotiation, and mediation are used by the community to address [potential] conflicts and move toward reconciliation. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Land disputes are resolved at higher rates, less violently, with more satisfactory outcomes, especially the longstanding land disputes.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 3 Skills: Individuals have improved communication skills. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Land disputes are resolved at higher rates, less violently, with more satisfactory outcomes, especially the longstanding land disputes.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 4 Knowledge: Citizenry understands civic rights and duties, and human rights [and responsibilities]. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Little evidence of an impact on political participation, program-specific "knowledge" or perceptions of the community for those who attended the program.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 5 Knowledge: Increased understanding of what is accountability and transparency. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**		N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 6 Knowledge: Increased understanding of harm caused by bias, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. **Indicator:**		N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA

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[13] Note: Outcomes, outputs, indicators and targets should be **as outlines in the Project Document/Priority Plan or PMP specific** so that you report on your **actual cumulative achievements against planned targets**. Add rows as required for Outcome 2, 3 etc.

Baseline: **Planned Target:**			
Outcome 7 Attitude/Value: Increased cooperation through trust-building and understanding of similarities and differences. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Small to moderate increases in "liberal attitudes" for program attendees.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 8 Behaviour: Increased participation and inclusiveness in community decisions. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Small improvements in community participation and empowerment among individuals who attend the program, particularly for troublesome individuals	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 9 Attitude/Value: Increased empathy through respect, openness, and understanding. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	The CEP training did not transform attitudes in all program outcome areas.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Outcome 10 Skills: Programmatic/ Administrative/ Peacebuilding capacity of local IP, JPC, increased. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	While CE facilitators technical skill have been greatly improved over the course of the project, strengthening managerial and administrative(financial) skill has been quite challenging as evidenced in changing implementation arrangement.	N/A	
Outcome 11 Knowledge/Acceptance: Increased understanding and community consensus on those [potential] conflicts hindering "inclusive growth" in their community. **Indicator:** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Little evidence of an impact on political participation, program-specific "knowledge" or perceptions of the community for those who attended the program.	N/A	Impact evaluation by IPA
Output 1.1 JPC trained and equipped to implement CE Programme. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	JPC office was equipped and staff trained.	N/A	Financial and narrative reports
Output 2.1 40 facilitators trained and equipped to become ToT **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	42 Facilitators are the trained and equipped.	N/A	Information from the master trainer

Output 3.1 90 GoL/UN/CSO stakeholders in the target counties are fully aware of CE Programme and ways it can be utilised to enhance their work. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	GoL/UN/CSO Stakeholder workshops were held in district and county level and approximately 300 people were sensitized about the peace education workshops in Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh.	N/A	Workshop reports
Output 4.1 15,000 community members trained in Community Workshops **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	From the beginning of the project, 9,101 citizens were trained in 307 workshops in Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh.	Non-achievement of the target can attribute to various reasons; unexpected delay in receiving funding from UNHCR HQ to country office; change of implementing partner; seasonal rain.	Training tracking records
Output 5.1 Opportunity Plan developed after each training at the community level. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	79 Opportunity Plan have been developed.	Opportunity Plans were discontinued as this raised expectation of actual project with the funding support from this program.	Opportunity Plans
Output 6.1 All Communities where Workshop is implemented are abreast of the Community Workshop graduates, content, and the Opportunity Plan. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Graduation ceremonies were held after each workshop and participants were given certificates.	N/A	Training tracking records
Output 7.1 5 minute trailer (to radio programme) on CE Programme (narrated by a high-profile, national KEY person) played at least five times in target communities. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	The trailer was done by community leaders, government officials and a master trainer of peace education and disseminated through radio.	N/A	Radio listening
Output 8.1 3 hours of radio programmes per target community broadcast with discussion re Comm. Workshop and the "Opportunity Plan". **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Completed.	N/A	Radio listening
Output 9.1 500 standout community workshop participants trained and equipped to become community workshop facilitators and form the PB Support Network to support the MIA PB Focal Point. **Indicator 1.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	In total, 4 standout workshops (2 each in Lofa and Grand Gedeh) were conducted and 140 community members received advanced training on Peace Education.	No funding received from UNHCR HQ.	Training reports

Output 10.1 Established and sustained Peacebuilding Support Network throughout the field. **Indicator 10.1.1** **Baseline:** **Planned Target:**	Not done.	Not sufficient participants were trained to become community facilitators.	

iii) Evaluation, Best Practices, and Lessons Learned

Challenges

The project experienced interruptions and difficulties at the roll-out of the program, which ultimately resulted in some of the outputs not being realized as planned.

UNHCR initially partnered with JPC National Office to implement the program. After a number of consultation meetings between JPC and UNHCR, both JPC and UNHCR agreed that the project would be implemented directly by JPC Regional Office Gbarnga (overseeing Lofa and Nimba Counties implementation) and JPC Regional Office Harper (overseeing Grand Gedeh County) in 2010. Both Offices are autonomous from JPC National Office when it comes to administration of funds under the CE Programme. JPC National Office concentrated on advocacy work. UNHCR signed new agreements to operationalize the new administrative structure with JPC Gbarnga and JPC Cape Palmas. The new arrangement was intended to streamline an administrative/ financial process and was expected to accelerate the implementation toward the project target of 15,000 for the next reporting period.

The major challenge encountered was to ensure funding was available on time at the country office level. At the same time, UNHCR went through financial system reform, which introduced new procedures to secure carry-over funding within the operational budget which caused delays in delivering funding to the field office. When it became clear that UNHCR would not meet the target of 15,000 trainees by the established target date of 31 March 2010, UNHCR submitted a request to the PBF Joint Steering Committee (JSC) that the end-date be moved to 31 December 2010 without any additional funding and the request was granted. Notwithstanding, unexpected length of delay in funds transfer continued. This also impacted the outcome of the evaluation as the sample size became smaller than it was anticipated in the evaluation design.

Evaluation

UNHCR and JPC partnered with the Monitoring and Evaluation expert team, Yale University/Innovation for Poverty Action (IPA) lead by Professor Chris Blattman and their local partner, NEPI to gauge the impacts of the program. The M&E expert team carried out a rigorous impact evaluation[14] during and beyond the project period.

The team employed a randomized controlled trial as research methodology and compared trends in attitudes, participation, and conflict in 67 communities to more than 170 control communities. They also used quantitative analysis with detailed qualitative research in more than 20 communities in combination with the trial. The M&E team worked closely with UNHCR and JPC in order to provide quality and substantial impact analysis in order to determine added-value, importance of replication/expansion, and needs, to adjust the programme to maximize impact. Due to the stringent criteria and procedures surrounding the RIE, Yale/NEPI took a key role in the final selection and ultimately led the randomization of the beneficiary communities after the initial communities were selected by local leaders, authorities and protection/human rights stakeholders in the target areas.

The M&E experts regularly updated UNHCR and JPC on the progress of the evaluation and programmatic feedbacks, which were quite informative. The independent impact evaluation is crucial in gauging impact

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[14] Ibid.

thoroughly and provided valuable information for future peacebuilding intervention using peace education.

The M&E experts made the following recommendations for future reconciliation and dialogue programming in Liberia[15]:

1) The emphasis on constructive skills for dispute resolution and the philosophy of non-violent, non-punitive, non-retributive solutions seems to have been internalized by communities;

2) It may not be enough to educate individuals, even leaders, in dialogue and dispute resolution. Sustained engagement with the community to create generalized knowledge is important as well;

3) Generalized, intensive engagement is expensive and time-consuming, and will need to be targeted to the communities and individuals with the most need and the most potential to benefit;

4) A few towns with widely recognized conflicts are over-programmed by diverse, inconsistent and often non-intensive programs. A more consistent, intensive approach may be more useful in these areas, if they are to continue to be (over)served;

5) Promising candidates include underserved communities (i.e. those away from truck roads) and underrepresented people in the over-served communities, who rarely benefit from typical NGO interventions that focus heavily on community leaders;

6) If dialogue and reconciliation programs cannot be done smartly and safely then we question whether such interventions should be attempted at all;

7) Finding cost-effective means to promulgate these skills will be crucial. Intensive facilitation by expert trainers may only be sustainable for high-risk communities. Options for expanding include: (a) training of volunteer trainers and facilitators; (b) radio programming and education; and (c) collaboration with churches, mosques, schools and other existing community institutions;

8) Close monitoring and evaluation of success, and of different approaches, is needed to learn and improve the approach. We recommend continued experimentation with intensity, reach, curriculum, out-of-classroom facilitation, economic components, and other program aspects.

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[15] Ibid.