



**United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/ Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)**

**PRF REVISED PROJECT DOCUMENT<sup>1</sup>**

<b>Project Title:</b> Peace support project: Supporting Agreements for Peace and a Resumption of the Political Process in Yemen.	<b>Initial Recipient UN Organization(s):</b> UNOPS  <b>Revised Recipient UN Organization(s) (if applicable):</b> N/A
<b>Project Contact:</b> Niels Guenther Address: 1st Avenue at 46th Street, New York, NY 10017, USA Telephone: +1 646 339 9156 E-mail: guenther@un.org	<b>Implementing Partner(s) – name &amp; type (Government, CSO, etc):</b>
<b>Project Number:</b> 00093326 <i>Use project number provided by UNDP MPTF Office</i>	<b>Project Location:</b> Yemen
<b>Project Description:</b> <i>One sentence describing the project focus and purpose.</i>  Empowerment of all actors to agree upon – and to deliver their commitments under - a comprehensive peace and a resumption of the political process in Yemen. This Project will support the design and setup of mechanisms that will monitor the agreements' implementation and its key milestones including on ceasefires, disengagement and DDR (demobilisation, disarmament, and rehabilitation).	<b>Initial approved PBF budget:</b> 796,000 <b>Additional PBF budget requested:</b> 404,000 <b>New Total PBF budget:</b> 1,200,000 <b>Any non-PBF project budget:</b> 2015 SPM budget  <b>Project Start Date:</b> December 2014 <b>Revised End Date (if applicable):</b> December 2015 <b>Initial Project End Date:</b> November 2015
<b>Gender Marker Score<sup>2</sup>:</b> <u>  1  </u> <i>Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective.</i> <i>Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective.</i> <i>Score 1 for projects that will contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly.</i> <i>Score 0 for projects that are not expected to contribute noticeably to gender equality.</i>	
<b>Project Outcomes:</b> Outcome 1: Attainment of agreements that progressively reduce violence, alleviate the humanitarian	

<sup>1</sup> To be used if additional budget is being requested OR if a substantive change to project outcomes is requested. The form must be accompanied by the Transmittal form, signed by the JSC co-chairs – template 3.3.

<sup>2</sup> PBSO monitors the inclusion of gender equality and women's empowerment all PBF projects, in line with SC Resolutions 1325, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122, and as mandated by the Secretary-General in his Seven-Point Action Plan on Gender Responsive Peacebuilding.

situation and eventually achieve a sustained return the political process, along with associated capacity for monitoring of implementation of agreements and support to political engagement and crisis mediation, and technical advice on areas such as ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.

**Outcome 2:** Capacity of all sides to realise their commitments under UN brokered agreements and to engage effectively with all related peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Yemen is increased.

**PBF Focus Area<sup>3</sup>** which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select only one*):

1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)

<i>(for PRF-funded projects)</i>	
<b>Recipient UN Organization(s)</b> <i>(include one signature box per RUND)</i>	
Mr. Farouk Hirzallah UNOPS- Yemen Head of Office	
Signature	
Date & Seal 26/8/15	
<b>Joint Steering Committee Co-Chair</b>	
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	Mr. Paolo Lembo UN Resident Coordinator Yemen
Sign	Signature
Date & Seal 2/9/2015	Date & Seal 26/8/15

<sup>3</sup> PBF focus areas

1. Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue (Priority Area 1)

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) RoL, (1.3) DDR, (1.4) Political Dialogue.

2. Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2)

(2.1) National reconciliation, (2.1) Democratic Governance, (2.3) Conflict prevention/management.

3. Revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends (Priority Area 3)

(3.1) Employment, (3.2) Equitable access to social services

4. (Re-)establish essential administrative services (Priority Area 4)

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity, (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration, (4.3)

Governance of peacebuilding resources (including JSC/PBF Secretariats)



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Length: Max. 15 pages

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## **PROJECT COMPONENTS:**

*(N.B. 1: All the italicized text on the pages below is to be used as guidance for what should be provided. The actual submission does not need to contain the italicized text.)*

### **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support**

#### **a) Changes to peacebuilding context:**

1. A combination of long-term destabilising trends, unresolved grievances and a stalled political process have led Yemen to the point of country-wide conflict. Previous agreements brokered to initiate a return to the political process, such as the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), for which this project was originally conceived, have been superseded by events and this has necessitated a comprehensive revision of this project and its resourcing levels.
2. Furthermore the events of the past year, including the dramatic increase in violence and the armed air combat involvement of neighbouring states has served to significantly deepen and entrench the animosity and grievances between groups and interests in Yemen. The violent conflict has seen the large scale influx of weapons into a military context that is fragmenting rapidly. Alongside this, there has been widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure as a result of intense urban warfare in Taiz, Aden, Ibb and elsewhere. This violence has also created space that has allowed extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and Daesh (Islamic State) to strengthen their presence with Al Qaeda now controlling a significant portion of Yemeni territory.
3. For the above reasons, the demands and complexity of the post war peacebuilding environment will be much greater than was envisaged at the time the PNPA was signed, and the dimensions of an eventual agreement to return to the political process are not yet specified. This has necessitated a comprehensive revision of this project and its resourcing levels, including building a greater degree of flexibility to support agreement/s as they are concluded.
4. The recent upsurge in violence has had a tragic impact on the already serious humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Since the violence in Yemen escalated in March over 3,083 people have been killed and 14,324 have been injured, while over one million more people have had to flee their homes. Now over 21.1 million people – 4 in 5 Yemenis – are in need some form of humanitarian assistance. In recognition of this, as of 1 July, the UN has declared the humanitarian crisis at the most severe level (Level 3).
5. The current priority of the UN under the leadership of Special Envoy Mr Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed has been to seek initial measures to reduce violence, alleviate the humanitarian situation, and eventually secure a return to a peaceful and orderly political transition. The nature of this incremental approach means that the UN will now likely be facilitating a series of agreements of increasing ambition and scope.
6. Yemenis and capitals in the region will be looking to the UN to provide technical advice and capacity building to help them draw up pathways out of the conflict and back to the political process. They will also expect the UN to provide assurance through leading the international monitoring of the implementation of agreements.

#### **b) Rationale for and impact of this project revision:**

7. UN Leadership: In order to meet expectations for technical leadership on development and monitoring of agreements, there is a strategic gap in resources to provide specialist technical expertise in conflict, security, ceasefires, and DDR. Unlike the original project, these resources will be needed for a longer period of time in order to inform preliminary consultations aimed at restoring a political process and early pause in violence, informing any eventual agreements and comprehensive ceasefires, and managing the early phase of implementation of DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and related activity once a full return to a political process has been achieved.

8. Outcomes/outputs: The outcomes and outputs of the original project remain current to the revised programme as it is highly likely that any new consensus will be built around the National Dialogue outcomes. This includes mechanisms of power sharing, implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes and measures for implementation and monitoring of cease-fire arrangements and subsequent Demobilisation Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). These outcomes and outputs will need to broaden the scope of relevant stakeholders to include new military actors from within the Coalition and the wider region.

9. Time: The original project was planned against the timetable for the PNPA. With the stalling of the political process and descent to conflict, milestones against which the projects resources were planned have been missed. Furthermore with a serious humanitarian crisis unveiling in Yemen, there has been a need to prioritise early agreements and subnational and national level that focus on reducing levels of violence. This raises the likelihood that the pathway out of conflict and back to a political process will be secured through a sequence of mutually supporting agreements rather than a comprehensive single outcome.

10. Budget: Whilst the risk of descent to conflict was acknowledged in the original project, contingency for the costs to the project of a conflict and temporary evacuation of most UN staff from country was not included. Furthermore the costs for staff and technical advisors returning to Yemen now is significantly higher and this needs to be reflected in an enhanced budget.

11. Activities: With the context of war, the costs of getting Yemeni political actors to and from talks and consultations is vastly increased. Currently the only reliable way of bringing participants out of Sana'a has been to charter a special flight. Furthermore within the current security environment it is impossible to hold large-scale consultations inside Yemen, thus there will be a greater reliance of neutral venues outside of country.

## **II. Objectives of PBF support and proposed implementation**

### **a) New Project outcomes, theory of change, activities, targets and sequencing:**

12. The framework of outcomes and outputs and theory of change remains similar to the original project, however they have been amended now to reflect the new operating environment and related challenges. This includes the move away from supporting one known and clearly laid out Agreement and associated mechanisms and timetable, to a series of anticipated but not yet defined agreements and consultations to seek agreement. It also reflects that actors, including Government of Yemen and part of the UNCT, are located outside of Yemen, vastly impacting on the modality and frequency of Special Envoy's consultations.

The **goal** of this project is to support the UN Special Envoy to empower all actors to achieve agreements towards a lasting peace brought about under a fully inclusive political process.

13. This project aims to support two outcomes:

Outcome 1: Attainment of agreements that progressively reduce violence, build confidence, alleviate the humanitarian situation and eventually achieve a sustained return to the political process and include provisions for monitoring of commitments on ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.

Outcome 2: Capacity of key parties including the GPC, the Houthis, and Government of Yemen to engage effectively with consultations, talks and negotiations and chart pathways towards a full return to the political process increased.

14. The **theory of change** is: If the capacity of all sides to engage effectively with peace processes and associated agreements is increased and confidence building measures are provided then the chances of sustained progress towards a lasting political settlement are increased. If the mechanisms for mediation, ceasefire monitoring and for disarmament are established in an accountable and transparent manner, then trust and confidence of key parties to their agreements will increase and risks to derailment be reduced.

15. The **scope** of this project will include (a) developing capacities of key stakeholders / actors to reach and maintain commitment to agreements for reduction of violence, alleviation of the humanitarian situation, and a return to the political process; and (b) establishing the key components of agreements' implementation infrastructure across technical areas and integrate measures to progressively build confidence between parties.

16. The **geographic focus** will encompass the all of Yemen and has now been broadened to encompass a regional dimension including engagement with Coalition Headquarters in Riyadh, as any lasting return to a political process will be by nationwide agreement and with the acceptance and operational compliance of the Coalition. Initial early agreements for a reduction in violence may well pertain to subnational areas. There will also be activity in key capitals and with the United Nations Security Council. Specific areas of geographic focus will emerge as agreements are signed. For example there may be agreements to demilitarise and allow restoration of government services in certain areas such as Hodeidah, Aden or Taiz.

17. **Target groups** includes key groups including the GPC, the Al Houthi and southern movements, and Government of Yemen. The primary stakeholders will be the appointed/elected representatives of these groups along with the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Government of Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. However the project will encourage widening participation in talks in accordance with the outcomes of the NDC, including with regard to 30% representation of women on all appointed and elected government bodies and 20% representation of youth.

18. New **Activities** will include the following:

- One further consultations/talks exercise in Geneva for around 3-4 days with 30-40 Yemeni participants. Approximately 40% of participants will be flown in from Yemen.

- Additional public outreach and communications. The human resource will be entirely core-funded, however some logistics and materials will be funded through this project.
- Placement of a liaison expert with the Coalition in Riyadh. The expert is already funded under the project, but the costs of relocating to Coalition Headquarters in Riyadh would be additional.

19. In addition to this the following activities from the original project will be continued:

- Facilitate the establishment of a mechanism for mediating any disagreements regarding the interpretation and implementation of the agreements;
- Provide one technical expert to establish implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups and normalization of the local administrative, security and military authorities;
- Provide one technical expert to the establishment of a mechanism for disarmament and recovery of state-owned heavy and medium weapons; and
- Inform and provide advice to political movements/agreement partners to assist them to engage effectively in mediation and peaceful conflict resolution initiatives.

#### b) Revised Budget:

20. The most significant increase in costs in the revised budget is accounted for under 1. Staff and personnel, and under 4. Contractual services. The increased staff cost is consumed by extending the contracts of technical advice on DDR, SSR and conflict/security over the extended life of the project. These are according to contract rates agreed in the original project and the value for money impact from the extensions is therefore neutral.

21. The increase in contractual services reflects the need to move to out of country hosting of mediation and talks, including the provision of highly costly charter flights out of/into Yemen. It is not envisaged that the security situation will change to allow more cost effective methods of transport. However there has been considerable achievement to negotiate down the costs of holding the out of country meetings in Geneva, this has included use of a UN facility at no rental cost, and agreements with the Swiss authorities for a waiver of visa fees, provision of free in-city ground transportation and accommodation for the delegations, and meeting of the costs of participants' commercial flights between Geneva and Djibouti/Muscat and Riyadh. All costs of UN staff attending the conferences have been covered through the office core funds.

**Table 1: Project Activity Revised Budget**

Outcome 1: Attainment of agreements that progressively reduce violence, build confidence, alleviate the humanitarian situation and eventually achieve a sustained return to the political process and include provisions for monitoring of commitments on ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.				
Output number	Output names	Output budget by RUNO	UN budget category	Any remarks



1.1	Advice to aid the incorporation of mechanisms of dispute and conflict resolution regarding the interpretation and implementation of the agreements.	\$ 69,165	1,5,7,8	
1.2	Provision of technical expertise to establish implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups and normalization of the local administrative, security and military authorities	\$ 41,842	1,8	
1.3	Provision of technical expertise to integrate disarmament mechanisms into agreements	\$ 77,842	1,8	
1.4	Facilitation of consultations and talks aimed at reaching agreements for a reduction in violence, ceasefires and an eventual return to a political process, including mechanisms to involve external participants to the conflict, including the Coalition	\$ 114,820	4,5,8	
<b>Outcome 2:</b> Capacity of key parties including the GPC, the Houthis, and Government of Yemen to engage effectively with consultations, talks and negotiations and chart pathways towards a full return to the political process.				
2.1	Political movements/agreements' partners have increased capacity to engage effectively in UN sponsored talks, including understanding technical issues such as ceasefires, DDR and SSR.	\$ 86,302	1,5,8	
2.2	Public understanding of the agreements' implementation increased through targeted outreach and communication activities [note: subject to at least one agreement being agreed to in 2015]	\$ 14,029	4,7,8	

**Table 2: Project budget by UN categories by RUNO**

<b>PBF PROJECT BUDGET - UNOPS</b>			
<b>Categories</b>	<b>Original Budget</b>	<b>Proposed increase / decrease</b>	<b>Proposed new budget</b>
1. Staff and other personnel	354,000	212,922	566,922
2. Supplies, Commodities, Material	17,625	0	17,625
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture	45,000	0	45,000
4. Contractual Services	8,500	97,716	106,216
5. Travel	273,800	38,460	312,260
6. Transfer and Grants to Counterparts	0	0	0
7. General Operating and other Direct Costs	45,000	28,472	73,472
8. Indirect support Costs 7%	52,075	26,430	78,505
<b>Total</b>	<b>796,000</b>	<b>404,000</b>	<b>1,200,000</b>

**c) Capacity of any new RUNO(s) and implementing partners:**

22. There are no new RUNOs or implementing partners.

**III. Management and coordination**

**a) Project management:**

23. There are no new project management arrangements. After closure of programme, the costs of the project will be absorbed into a successor two-year project to be developed under the IRF project format and to be funded by PBF and bilateral donor contributions.

**b) Risk management:**

24. There are two new risks (highlighted) and the rest of the risks have been updated.

**Table 3 – Risk management matrix**

<b>Risks to the achievement of PBF outcomes</b>	<b>Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)</b>	<b>Severity of risk impact (high, medium, low)</b>	<b>Mitigating Strategy (and Person/Unit responsible)</b>
Parties to conflict persist to see advantage in continuing fighting and do not engage in good faith with OSESG political facilitation efforts.	H	H	Intensive and continues engagement with key Yemeni belligerents to the conflict and influential governments and actors in the region and at the UNSC.
Fragmentation of the conflict and entrenchment of war economy diminish capacity of key Yemeni belligerents to deliver commitments they sign up to.	M	M	Monitoring of conflict on a region by region basis to anticipate and manage this risk. Understand sub-regional power brokers and seek to engage those in the ceasefire dialogue.

			(OESG)
The implementation of agreements is undermined by political actors, whose interests and agendas do not align with the peace process	M	H	Monitoring and reporting of agreements by OESG.
Failure of ceasefires to hold leading to renewal of all-out war (rather than controlled, localised fighting) between various armed factions and militias and government	H	H	Close monitoring by OESG. Connecting the political facilitation to complementary efforts in other forums such as G10+, Friends of Yemen, and UNSC (OESG)
Insecurity in some areas throughout the Yemen could threaten project implementation and staff safety	H	L	Operations will commence based in Sanaa. Establishing presence in other regions would be ideal, but is not critical to the success of the implementation methodology (UNOPS)
Insecurity in Sanaa/rest of Yemen causes another full withdrawal of UN from Yemen	M	H	Some project operations can continue remotely. workshops and facilitation meetings can be conducted in a 3 <sup>rd</sup> country in the region (UNOPS)
Collapse of national consensus behind the National Dialogue outcomes	L	H	Be prepared to secure a new consensus on principles amongst key government and non-state actors, using the National Dialogue outcomes as a launchpad for discussion (OESG)
Decrease in attention to Yemen at the UNSC	L	M	Utilise other international forums to buttress involvement by the UNSC (OESG)
Government fails to meet minimum standards of inclusiveness and ND implementation.	L	H	Monitor inclusiveness of the appointed bodies. SEG to raise concerns with the President as and if they arise. Have a clear understanding of minimum standards and plans to withdraw support should these fail to be adhered to and mitigation efforts fail (OESG)
Economic collapse of the country owing to lack of donor funding and/or continued fighting and economic blockade.	M	H	Special Envoy to raise in bilateral meetings and integrate into statements (OESG).

**c) Monitoring & evaluation:**

No changes proposed.

**d) Administrative arrangements:** (This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

25. The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF,

MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

#### **AA Functions**

26. On behalf of the Participating Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate narrative reports and financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is notified by the RUNO (accompanied by the final narrative report, the final certified financial statement and the balance refund);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

#### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

27. Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

28. Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

29. Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

- Bi-annual progress reports to be provide no later than 15 July;
- Annual and final narrative reports, to be provided no later than three months (31 March) after the end of the calendar year;

- Annual financial statements as of 31 December with respect to the funds disbursed to it from the PBF, to be provided no later than four months (30 April) after the end of the calendar year;
- Certified final financial statements after the completion of the activities in the approved programmatic document, to be provided no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.
- Unspent Balance at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

30. Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

#### **Public Disclosure**

31. The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (<http://unpbf.org>) and the Administrative Agent's website (<http://mptf.undp.org>).

PRF Project Results Framework (including any changes due to this revision)

PRF Results Framework						
Country name: Yemen						
Project Effective Dates: December 2014 – December 2015						
PBF Focus Area: 1: Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue						
Project Goal: Support the UN Special Envoy to empower all actors to achieve agreements towards a lasting peace brought about under a fully inclusive political process.						
PRF Theory of Change: If the capacity of all sides to engage effectively with peace processes and associated agreements is increased and confidence building measures are provided then the chances of sustained progress towards a lasting political settlement are increased. If the mechanisms for mediation, ceasefire monitoring and for disarmament are established, then trust and confidence of key parties to their agreements will increase and risks to derailment be reduced..						
Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Progress to date	Year 1	Year 2	Milestones
Outcome 1: Attainment of agreements that progressively reduce violence, build confidence, alleviate the humanitarian situation and eventually achieve a sustained return to the political process and include provisions for monitoring of commitments on ceasefires, disengagement, and DDR.	Output 1.1 Advice to aid the incorporation of mechanisms of dispute and conflict resolution regarding the interpretation and implementation of the agreements.	Outcome Indicator 1 Agreements contain robust monitoring mechanisms (source: UNSE convened panel) (see note 1). Baseline: 0 – No agreements for ceasefire or return to political process in place (Q2, 2015) Target: 1 (Q4, 2015) Output indicator 1.1.1				
		Advice prepared on options for monitoring agreements. (source: OSESG). Baseline: 0 (2014). Target: Written advice drafted (Q4, 2015) Output indicator 1.1.2				
		Regular reporting on status of talks/progress to agreements (source: OSESG/UNSC) (see note 2). Baseline: 6 reports to UNSC (2014) Target: 4 (2015)				

	<p><b>Output 1.2</b></p> <p>Provision of technical expertise to establish implementation mechanisms for monitoring and verification of ceasefires, disengagement of armed groups and normalization of the local administrative, security and military authorities.</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.2.1</b></p> <p>Number of technical expert positions identified (TOR), candidates selected and mobilized (source: OSESG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 3 (2015)</p>	
<p><b>Output 1.3</b></p> <p>Provision of technical expertise to integrate disarmament mechanisms into agreements</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.2.2</b></p> <p>Plan in place with timetable to reflect ceasefire aspects of agreements (source: OSESG).</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: plan drafted (2015)</p>		
	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.1</b></p> <p>Number of technical expert positions identified (TOR), candidates selected and mobilized (source: OSESG)</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 1 (2015) (complete)</p>		
	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.2</b></p> <p>Number of technical briefing papers and position papers prepared by technical team (source: OSESG)</p> <p>Baseline: 1 (Q2, 2015)</p> <p>Target: 2 (Q4, 2015) (cumulative)</p>		
<p><b>Output 1.4</b></p> <p>Facilitation of consultations and</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.3.3</b></p> <p>Technical advice input to DDR aspects agreements (source: OSESG).</p> <p>Baseline: 0 – no agreements in place (2014)</p> <p>Target: DDR aspects reflected in any agreements (Q4, 2015)</p>		
	<p><b>Output indicator 1.4.1</b></p> <p>Out of country consultations and talks to</p>		

	<p>talks aimed at reaching agreements for a reduction in violence, ceasefires and an eventual return to a political process, including mechanisms to involve external participants to the conflict, including the Coalition</p>	<p>facilitate development of political agreements.</p> <p>Baseline: 1 (Q2, 2015)</p> <p>Target: 2 (Q4, 2015) (cumulative)</p> <p>Output indicator 1.4.2</p> <p>Establishment of a permanent technical advisory presence at Coalition headquarters in Riyadh.</p> <p>Baseline: 0.5 (temporary liaison established)</p> <p>Target: 1 (liaison maintained for the remainder of the project)</p>	
<p>Outcome 2: Capacity of key parties including the GPC, the Houthis, and Government of Yemen to engage effectively with consultations, talks and negotiations and chart pathways towards a full return to the political process.</p>	<p>Output 2.1</p> <p>Political movements/agreements: partners have increased capacity to engage effectively in UN sponsored talks, including understanding technical issues such as ceasefires, DDR and SSR.</p>	<p>Outcome Indicator 2</p> <p>Milestones of the agreements are met or revised through participatory processes, and implementation represents good practice in peacebuilding (source: OSESG) (see note 3).</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (Q2, 2015)</p> <p>Target: 1 (Q4, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.1.1</p> <p>Number of talks structured to allow for mentoring and advising parties on thematic issues. (source: OSESG).</p> <p>Baseline: 1 (Q2, 2015)</p> <p>Target: 2 (Q4, 2015) (cumulative)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.1.2</p> <p>Participants in talks score them as relevant to their needs. (Source: Post-talks canvassing of opinion) (see note 4)</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2014) (no workshops)</p> <p>Target: Average score 3 (Q4, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.2.1</p> <p>Political update on implementation of agreements provided to UNCT and HCT</p>	
	<p>Output 2.2</p> <p>Public understanding of the agreements implementation</p>		



	<p>increased through targeted outreach and communication activities [note: subject to at least one agreement being agreed to in 2015]</p>	<p>meetings (source: OSESG). Baseline: 0 (Q2, 2015) Target: 2 (Q4, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.2.2</p> <p>Briefings/Consultations with local NGOs and other non-state actors on implementation of agreements (source: OSESG). Baseline: 0 (Q2, 2015) Target: 1 (Q4, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.2.3</p> <p>Regular briefings by the UN Special Envoy to local and international political forums on agreements' progress, monitoring and implementation (briefings to ambassadors, Friends of Yemen Security Sector Working Group, etc.) (source: OSESG) Baseline: 0 (Q2, 2015) Target: 1 (Q4, 2015)</p> <p>Output Indicator 2.2.4</p> <p>Agreements and monitoring of their progress and challenges documented on OSESG website Baseline: 0 (Q2, 2015) Target: website established (Q4 2014 (complete)); 2 news postings (2015)</p>	
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Notes:

1. For the purposes of this indicator, a good monitoring mechanism for ceasefires and a return to the political process includes i) a role for UN, ii) a timetable of regular reporting, and iii) broad participation of stakeholders. To be assessed by UN Special Envoy (0 = no mechanism in place; 1 = mechanism in place and satisfies 2 out of 3 criteria; 2 = mechanism in place and satisfies 3 out of 3 criteria.
2. Frequency of required reporting by SEG to UNSC assumed to remain at once every 60 days.
3. Assessment by SEG. Scoring: 0 – no milestones met, any revisions taken without an inclusive process; 1 – some milestones met, any revisions taken with some inclusive processes; 2 – several milestones met, any revisions taken with sufficiently inclusive processes; 3 – all milestones met, any revisions taken with fully inclusive processes.

4. Talks canvass for opinion scores: advice bears 1 – no relevance; 2 – some relevance; 3 – relevant; 4 – highly relevant.