SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT

Country(ies): Sudan
Project Title: Sudan Youth Citizen Observer Network: Strengthening Youth's Role as Peacebuilders and Promoters of Civic Space in Sudan's Transition   **Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project): N/A**

PBF project modality: ☒ IRF ☐ PRF	**If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):** ☐ Country Trust Fund ☐ Regional Trust Fund **Name of Recipient Fund:**

List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):
 The Carter Center (The Center).
    •   The Carter Center in Khartoum, Sudan is legally registered as an International Organization and is conferred similar status and benefits as other international organizations (IO).
    •   The Carter Center headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, USA is registered as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit, non-governmental organization (INGO).
 	
 List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO):
    •   Sudanese Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports (Government); and
    •   See Annex G for Sudanese partner candidates (local CSOs): The Carter Center conducted consultations to identify and consider which CSOs could play a role as sub-grant recipients (8-10) implementing activities on regional/state level and as focal points (18-20) coordinating activities on state/community level.

Project duration in months[1]: 18 months   **Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation:** 18 states of Sudan: Northern, Red Sea, River Nile, Kassala, Khartoum, El Gazira, Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, West Kordofan, East Darfur, North Darfur, South Darfur, Central Darfur, and West Darfur.

Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below: ☐ Gender promotion initiative[2]   ☒ Youth promotion initiative[3]   ☐ Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions   ☐ Cross-border or regional project

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[1] Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

[2] Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

[3] Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization): The Carter Center: $1,498,341.33
Total: $1,498,341.33
Kindly refer to Annex D1 for the financial breakdown.

> **The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.*

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):
- The estimated total project amount is $2,102,608.
- The Carter Center commits to cost-share in the amount of $604,267 and will continue to explore arrangements to secure additional funding in support of the project over the long term.
- In preparation of the proposed project, The Carter Center invested $628,645 (September 2020—August 2021) to lay the foundation for the project to be implemented from January 2022 onward.

PBF 1st tranche (35%):	**PBF 2nd tranche* (35%):**	**PBF 3rd tranche* (30%):**
The Carter Center: $524,419.47	The Carter Center: $524,419.47	The Carter Center: $449,502.40
Total: $524,419.47	Total: $524,419.47	Total: $449,502.40

Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):
The project goal is to support a nation-wide and multi-faceted corps of youth-based observers, Youth Citizen Observer (YCO) Network, which, through independent grassroots monitoring, local peacebuilding, public reporting and advocacy, will help expand youth political participation and protect civic space.

Drawing on project-led training in citizen observation and conflict mitigation, participants will engage at local and state levels with key stakeholders to observe the transition and key milestones in the Constitutional Charter and Juba Peace Agreement. Through periodic public reporting, the Network will document the process, highlight challenges to the transition and offer recommendations to policymakers at all levels for the full implementation of commitments.

Based on its findings and recommendations, the Network and its partners will advocate on local, state and national levels for political reform and peacemaking/building, including to align Sudan's laws and constitution with international human rights standards. In the absence of multiple organs in the transitional government as well as bodies foreseen in the peace agreement, youth citizen observers (YCO) will fill a critical gap by serving as messengers of credible information about the transition from local communities to Khartoum-based actors, including offering recommendations to improve the inter-linked transition and peace processes.

Conversely, the Network will also allow national stakeholders to convey information through reliable, credible channels to local- and state-level communities, thereby creating constructive feedback loops in support of a successful and peaceful transition.

The Carter Center, its partners and participants would benefit from funding from the UN Peacebuilding Fund to support, through hands-on training and mentorship, the establishment of the YCO Network, including its Khartoum-based secretariat; the training of a first cohort of more than 200 youth and women observers from all 18 states; and the Network's initial reporting and conflict prevention and advocacy efforts. The Carter Center's role is to facilitate the Network's creation; build capacity of its members; and provide mentorship to its leaders in citizen observation methodology, conflict mitigation, civic engagement and public policy advocacy.

Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):

Building on more than 25 years of engagement with Sudan, The Carter Center (The Center) is working under a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2020 with the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports to support increased young women and men's engagement in Sudan's political transition. In the first phase of its work (2020-2021), The Center mapped 7,000+ youth-led civil society groups throughout Sudan; conducted 1,000+ baseline surveys across 500 locations in 18 states from among the groups mapped; conducted more than 100 focus group discussions comprising 400 representatives of the groups mapped; and released its findings and recommendations in English and Arabic with the participation of stakeholder communities. This effort, including the electronic database of youth-led partner organizations created through mapping and surveying, is unprecedented in Sudan.

The survey effort and subsequent consultations established a solid data collection and analysis track record across Sudan with the use of The Center's NEMO tool. Further, The Center has built relationships with the leadership of thousands of young women- and men- led civil society groups across the country. It has liaised with the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) office in Khartoum on multiple occasions and sought the advice and feedback of its team to ensure that the proposed intervention would support UN PBF objectives and meet expectations.

In addition, drawing on the earlier efforts described above, in September—October 2021, The Center conducted comprehensive consultations to assess youth-based organizations in 15 of 18 Sudanese states, with a view to identifying potential regional partner organizations to serve as hubs for the YCO Network. The consultation aimed to (i) foster a sense of ownership and build consensus among youth-led organizations; (ii) consolidate support for the design of the Network and its approach among youth; (iii) continue close communication with youth following the mapping, survey, and reports; and (iv) ensure youth participation and effective collaboration in the process of defining the criteria and guidelines governing the nomination and selection of partner organizations. More than 1,300 youth-led organizations participated in this process to nominate the leading organizations among their ranks that could serve as trusted, regional hubs for the YCO Network.

Preliminary discussions were held remotely in three Eastern states due to security concerns. A comprehensive nomination process will be conducted in these states either in person or remotely as security conditions allow.

Through the project, The Center remains in close consultation and collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports, as well as its state level counterparts and national-level political leaders, including Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who endorsed the project at a public event in September 2021.

Project Gender Marker score[4]: 2
Specify % and $ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment: $608,986 (40%)

Briefly **explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment [5]:** Forty percent of funds will be earmarked for gender equality and women empowerment through gender mainstreaming across the project, targeted training for young women activists and observers, sub-grants to women-led organizations, and advocacy to reform discriminatory laws, reduce cultural and societal barriers to gender equality and effective participation in decision making processes. The Carter Center recognizes the need to amplify women's voices throughout all aspects of project implementation and therefore will work specifically towards the following targets.

> **Project Administration**: The project administration structure maintains 40% to 50% women in key roles on the Sudan project administration team and headquarters staff.

> **Sub-Grant Recipients**: Of the tentative list of local partner candidates, four of 28 youth-led organizations are women-led. These organizations will be given strong consideration during the final selection of partners receiving sub-grants (i.e., those playing leading roles in the implementation of activities at state and/or local levels) and will be selected provided they meet the minimum requirements described elsewhere in this application. An important criterion for the final selection of sub-grant recipients is their inter-sectional diversity, including gender.

> **Observers**: Of the 216 young Sudanese women and men trained as citizen observers, the target it is a minimum of 40% (86) women.

> **Secretariat**: Of the young Sudanese women and men serving in roles within the national secretariat, the target is 40% women.

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[4] **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)
Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE
Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)
[5] Please consult the **PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding**

	Advisory Bodies: Of the young women and men represented in advisory bodies, each participating organization will be asked to respect gender balance when appointing their representatives. This will result in young women constituting 40-50% of the bodies. Kindly refer to Annex G. Many of the partner candidates are already focused on women's rights and empowerment. All organizations selected as partners, and all observers, will be provided training and dialogue on gender issues and an opportunity to work on women's rights, women, peace and security, and women's political participation.

Project Risk Marker score[6]: 2

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project *(select ONLY one)* [7]:
(2.2) Democratic Governance

If applicable, SDCF/**UNDAF outcome(s)** to which the project contributes: Focus Area 4.

Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s) to which the project contributes:
Sustainable Development Agenda 2030: "inclusive, diverse, safe, independent, and meaningful civil society participation in decision-making;" SDG 5: "achieve gender equality and empower all women"; SDG 16: "promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development… and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels."

| Type of submission:

☒ **New project**
☐ **Project amendment** | **If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification: <u>N/A</u>**

Extension of duration: ☐ Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):
Change of project outcome/ scope: ☐
Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%: ☐
Additional PBF budget: ☐ Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX

Brief justification for amendment: N/A
Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required. |

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[6] **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes
[7] **PBF Focus Areas** are:
(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF secretariats)

PROJECT SIGNATURES:

Recipient Organization(s)	Representative of National Authorities
Ms. Paige Alexander Signature ▉ Chief Executive Officer Date & Seal 18/10/21	Mr. Yousef El Def-▉▉▉ Signature ▉ Minister of Youth and Sports, Republic of The Sudan Date & Seal
Head of UN Country Team	**Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)**
Ms. Khardiata Lo N'diaye Signature ▉ Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Republic of Sudan Date & Seal	Awa Dabo Signature ▉ Deputy Head and Officer-in-Charge, Peacebuilding Support Office Date & Seal 22-Dec-2021
Representative of National Authorities Name of Government Counterpart: Dr. Sultman Eldebailo. Peace Commissioner Signature ▉ Title The peace commission chair Date & Seal 18/10/21	

6

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

a) A brief summary of conflict analysis findings as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age-responsive.

Sudanese youth, particularly young women, played leadership roles during the 2018-19 protests that ousted former president Omar al-Bashir. According to a Chr. Michelson Institute report, some 70% of protestors were women. Young women and men rightfully expected to play a significant role in the post-Bashir transition, including serving as watchdogs of the transition to democracy as well as transitional justice measures, facilitating improvements in social services, and helping to resolve longstanding conflicts in their local communities. The Constitutional Charter, the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), the core documents of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), and the civil society coalition that led protests against al-Bashir, recognize the need to promote youth and women. **Yet more than two years into Sudan's transition, youth and women have been largely sidelined politically, their watchdog efforts are atomized, and their work to mitigate or resolve conflicts is disjointed due to a combined lack of opportunity and know-how.**

Youth as Actors and Victims: Al-Bashir and Sudan's Civil Wars

Since independence, civil war has shaped Sudan: The First Civil War (1955-1972), the Second Civil War (1983-2005), the Darfur Civil War (2003-present), and the War in the "Two Areas" (2011-present). At the root of these conflicts lays the alienation of large segments of Sudan's population, particularly in the peripheral areas of southern Sudan and Darfur, from the Khartoum-based central government and its dominant governing class. Grounded in longstanding inequities stemming from the pre-colonial, colonial, and independence eras, the relative exclusion of the peripheral areas and others from political power and economic development has formed, up to the present, the foundation of Sudan's conflicts. This climate of tension and violence has been exacerbated by the inter-section of Sudan's conflicts with regional wars in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, and Libya and international tensions over political Islam and violent extremism.

Issues of war and peace were central to both the rise and fall of al-Bashir. The *Inghaz* regime partially justified the 1989 coup d'état because Islamism would dynamize the government's prosecution of the war against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Then, in November 2018, peace and ending the on-going wars were a central theme of the protest movement that ultimately led to al-Bashir's ouster in April 2019.

Youth have been central actors – and victims – in Sudan's civil wars. Recruited as combatants, "entrepreneurs of violence," and political partisans, they have fueled and sustained the country's wars. Youth in the periphery, especially Darfur, South Kordofan, White Nile, and Blue Nile states, have been particularly impacted by conflict. Youth from disadvantaged socio-economic classes or communities, notably among the Baggara Arab communities, joined or were forced to join pro-government militias. In Darfur and along the Sudan-South Sudan border, youth have long been targeted for enslavement and, particularly in the case of young women, sexual violence. Today, high levels of unemployment, economic vulnerability, displacement, and limited education among a significant percentage of the youth

population reflect these dynamics. Yet to the surprise of many, the 2018-2019 protest movement, largely initiated and led by youth, demonstrated youth's awareness, even in remote peripheral areas, of critical national and regional issues.

The Watchdog Sidelined: Youth, Peacemaking, and Sudan's Transition

The intersection of peace, democracy, and youth lies at the very core of the transition. The Constitutional Charter, signed in 2019 by the Transitional Military Council and the FFC, prioritizes peacemaking and recognizes the **"role of young people in leading the revolutionary movement."** It further commits to **"strengthen[ing] the role of young people of both sexes and expand[ing] their opportunities in all social, political and economic fields**" while "**guaranteeing and promoting women's rights in Sudan in all social, political, and economic fields."**

Since 2019, the government has advanced peace, but progress has in many respects come at the cost of reduced civic space for women and youth, which over the long term endangers the transition to democracy as well as the peace process. In October 2020, the government and several armed groups signed the JPA. While the JPA marked a step toward peace, the subsequent government reshuffle and integration of the signatories (virtually all male, all over 40) into the government, further diminished the official presence of young women. Currently, only one of 14 Sovereign Council members, and two cabinet ministers, are female. Former council member Aisha Musa, a woman, resigned in May 2021 in protest. In an [interview](#) with *Asharo Al-Awsat*, she said the "civilian component in the Sovereign [Council] and at all levels of government has become just a logistical executive body that does not participate in decision-making." Several youth leaders also stepped down in the reshuffle, and today, no youth (under age 35) are in top-level government roles.

Alongside these changes, the 2019 high tide of youth's freedom of expression and organization is potentially ebbing. Civic space for youth is increasingly truncated. For instance, in September 2021 two youth activists were arrested for calling for Rapid Support Forces (RSF) accountability for alleged crimes against civilians. Also, in September, RSF and government officials arrested Aysha El-Majidi, a female youth activist, after she called on Facebook for the dissolution of the RSF and its merger into the Sudanese Armed Forces. Comments in early October 2021 by leading political and military actors, stating their opposition to the transfer of the leadership of the Sovereign Council and security forces to civilian control, as called for by the Charter and the JPA, reinforce these concerns.

Since its signing, the pace of JPA implementation has been slow and many of its commitments remain unfilled. Key commissions and national institutions stipulated in the Constitutional Charter or the JPA to allow citizen participation in the transition and peace process have not been created, including the Transitional Legislative Council (TLC), the Transitional Justice Commission, and the Darfur Land and *Hawakeer* Commission. In their place, a host of new, unofficial, or semi-official bodies – not referenced in the Charter or the JPA and largely excluding civilians – have been created and assumed the roles assigned to the bodies established by the agreements. One example is the Higher Council for Peace, which is not mentioned in the Charter yet has displaced the Peace Commission and leads peace negotiations. According to critics, the Council of Partners has de facto assumed the prerogatives of the TLC, passing laws and decrees. Currently, **no credible, nation-wide citizen watchdog has highlighted the significant straying from the commitments made in the Charter and the JPA.**

Filling this gap is critical because, while the TLC's role as a check on the transitional government remains unfilled, the JPA also extended Sudan's transitional period before elections by an estimated year and a half (moving its endpoint from 2022 to 2024). Other delays may still be added due to the un-resolved negotiations between the government and two allied armed groups, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (al-Hilu) and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid al-Nur.

Monitoring and advocacy around the Constitutional Charter and JPA milestones are even more important because these practices by Sudan's main political forces and armed actors raise significant questions about their fundamental commitment to attain lasting, just and inclusive peace; secure sustainable political stability and civic space; and ensure democratic transformation in the country at the end of the transition.

In sum, Sudan's transition has made significant progress but much remains, and the transition remains extremely fragile. Sudan's civic space falls short of the principles of the revolution and the objectives set in the Constitutional Charter and the JPA. It also **falls short of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030: "inclusive, diverse, safe, independent, and meaningful civil society participation in decision-making" and "… peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development."**

In this critical yet promising context, the empowerment of youth to engage with key stakeholders effectively and constructively on substantive policy issues is crucial to the success of the transition, ending the cycles of war and authoritarianism, and setting Sudan firmly on a peaceful, democratic trajectory. As one participant in recent Carter Center-organized focus groups with youth said: "To achieve justice [peace, and reform], new and innovative means of pressure must be found other than the commonly used methods [sit-ins, marches]. A new method must be found through which we pressure politicians."

Barriers to Action: Entrenched Practices, Disjointed Efforts, and Lack of Know-How

The marginalization of youth and women stems in part from entrenched restrictions on civic space. During al-Bashir's 30-year rule, the government repressed civic space. Independent actors, including youth and women organizations, were blocked from meaningful engagement in public affairs. Exclusionary strategies included preventing organizations from accessing technical and financial support, closing organizations, and expelling international organizations working with local actors. The transitional government has revoked many of these policies. Yet, in practice, many al-Bashir-era laws and practices remain in place, as do enduring exclusionary practices within governing elites, the bureaucracy and the media.

Barriers for women's access to civic space remain high. The obstacles consistently highlighted by organizations such as the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa include: gender discriminatory laws; gender-based violence; wars and instability that have a disproportionally negative impact on women; reduced education and training opportunities; and women's overall marginalization by social and state institutions. These obstacles help explain in part why young Sudanese women have been unable to bring their collective influence to bear on decision-makers during the transition, despite their central role in ousting the previous regime.

Youth efforts are fractured in conflict mitigation and resolution, and participants largely lack core know-how, limiting their effectiveness. For instance, in parts of Darfur, some youth-led organizations, while seeking to support conflict reduction, have come to be identified with a particular armed group; in Blue Nile, youth-led groups are attempting to facilitate peacemaking between the respective rival SPLA-N factions under Malik Agar and Abdulaziz al-Hilu, but with limited ability to reach decision-makers. In other areas, such as Gedaref, activists are investing in development efforts to build social trust and reducing the potential for violence. The scattered nature of these efforts, combined with the general of lack of expertise on conflict resolution – 80% of youth leaders surveyed in March-April 2021 acknowledged their need for training in conflict analysis and mitigation – means that youth peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts stand to benefit greatly from increased connection and more training, thus increasing their reach and effectiveness.

New challenges also pose risks to youth inclusion in the transition and a peaceful process. In its March-April nation-wide survey of more than 1,000 youth groups, 90% of those surveyed said their main source of information is social media and 91% said such information was "very reliable" or "somewhat reliable." Yet misinformation and disinformation campaigns are present in Sudan, as reported by multiple media outlets. Sensitizing youth and others to such digital threats, including in reporting and engagement with policymakers, can help mitigate potential conflict and assist civil society in overcoming these new challenges to its effective participation in the transition.

The Missing Piece – Youth, Women, and Governance in Sudan's Transition and Peace Process

Sudan's transition is increasingly fragile because it lacks meaningful feedback loops between the government and citizens. As demonstrated by sharp public disagreements between civilian and military officials in September and October 2021, various components of the transitional government claim to speak in the name of the Sudanese people. In this context, grassroots watchdog efforts are critical to enhancing citizens' own voices. Greater information flows from the population to the government can provide impetus to push through critical reforms, such as the creation and effective operationalization of the TLC and other organs. In contrast, the government can benefit from a reliable network able to convey accurate information to local communities amidst the highly charged atmosphere of the transitional period. Equally crucial for Sudan's future, by holding policymakers accountable for their stated commitment to inclusion, youth- and women-led watchdog efforts will help catalyze changes in longstanding practices of exclusionary governance, laying the foundation for genuinely sustainable democracy and peace.

   b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports existing Governmental and UN strategic frameworks[8], how it ensures national ownership. If this project is designed in a PRF country, describe how the main objective advances a relevant strategic objective identified through the Eligibility Process

The project concept was conceived and developed in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports and state-level ministries of youth and in consultation with local Sudanese and international civil society organizations (such as the FFC, the Radom Charity Organization, thousands of Sudanese Resistance Committees and youth-led partner organizations, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, and Freedom

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[8] Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc.

House, among others). The Ministry of Youth and Sports will remain an important implementing partner. The Prime Minister and his cabinet are also fully briefed and supportive of the project.

In addition to The Center's efforts to ensure national ownership of the project design, the project also supports several existing strategies and frameworks. The YCO Network elevates young Sudanese women's voices in the civic and political space by creating a platform for them to gain meaningful participation in the intertwined political and peace processes at all levels. The project likewise aligns closely with the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; the UN Women Strategic Plan 2018-2021; the UN Women's Youth and Gender Equality Strategy; and the Secretary-General's Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative.

Highly cognizant of the range of categories among youth – urban and rural; from Khartoum, the mid-periphery, or far periphery; from conflict and non-conflict areas; members of Resistance Committees and those not members of such committees; the variety of religious and ethnic backgrounds; and with special attention to gender concerns in all contexts – the project also broadly engages with a diverse group of youth throughout the country to foster common agenda-setting and their enhanced participation in Sudan's transition and peace process. This effort aligns with the UN Youth Strategy 2030; the UN System-Wide Action Plan on Youth; and the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, as well as youth interventions by the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports.

c) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief summary of existing interventions in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below.

The Youth Citizen Observer Network would be an unprecedented professional and independent watchdog of the Sudanese transition and peace process working through eight to 10 regional partners to cover all 18 states. The Network would fill a strategic gap where youth, particularly women, are currently unable to advocate effectively with policymakers in the transitional government.

Today, youth-led organizations and Resistance Committees are generally atomized, often reproducing historic center-periphery or other divides, such as between Resistance Committees and civil society organizations. The Network will create a unique "connective tissue" that does not currently exist. The need for a connective network is clear in survey response data from youth-led organizations and the recent consultations with more than 1,300 youth-led organizations in 15 states. In the consultations, Resistance Committees and civil society organizations consistently said that the Center-organized meetings were their first-ever meetings together. Likewise, youth leaders surveyed consistently said they had limited interaction with the transitional government or lacked effective access to decision-makers. **Beyond inter-connecting youth, the Network will also foster the expansion of civic space, particularly on key issues of the intertwined peace and transitional processes.** As mentioned, an independent citizen watchdog platform does not currently exist in Sudan.

Through its training of YCO in conflict mitigation, the Network will foster youth's more effective participation in conflict resolution/mitigation at the local level. Drawing on The Center's established expertise in countering digital threats through its world-wide Digital Threats Initiative, trainings will cover ways for observers and youth to conduct neutral, non-biased observation, evaluate information

sources for credibility and accuracy, and conduct fact-checking analysis, including online sources, enabling them to better identify and counter threats to democracy and peace, including rumors, disinformation and hate speech.

In addition, **by holding stakeholders accountable for their commitments in the Charter and the JPA, the Network will promote a rights-based approach to democratic governance throughout Sudan**.

In the same vein, **given the absence of multiple organs of the transitional government and those anticipated by the JPA, the Network would be a unique feedback channel between communities and the government.**

Finally, **the use of real-time data collection through the NEMO software – The Center's free, digital, open-source data collection tool (already used effectively in the mapping and surveying mentioned above) – will create a database for analysis by the Network and the secretariat to make informed decisions on advocacy and action strategies.**

A summary of existing interventions in the proposal's sector is considered in the table below.

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
International Republican Institute (IRI): 1) *Youth Coordination Council; and* 2) *Support to Resistance Committees* (2021-2022)	**Project 1** Donor: USAID Budget: US$10M **Project 2** U.S. Department of State (DRL) Budget: US$1.5M	(1) IRI works with political parties, Resistance Committees, armed groups, and other groups on political inclusion and establishes a platform (the Youth Coordination Council-YCC). (2) IRI supports Resistance Committees only on their internal self-assessment and capacity building.	As part of the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, IRI and NDI (next row) received equal funding for implementation of two projects over 2021-2022. While complementary to The Center's project, there are significant differences. The YCC is a relatively small body of 30-40 individuals exclusively from Khartoum. The Center's YCO Network will target a larger group of Sudanese youth from all 18 states. IRI has a focus on youth wings of political parties, while The Center's Network will be nonpartisan.
National Democratic Institute (NDI): *Political Resilience for Resistance Committees and Youth Groups* (2021-2022)	**Project 1** Donor: USAID Budget: US$10M **Project 2** U.S. Department of State (DRL) Budget: US$1.5M	The project focuses on strengthening the capacity of youth on outreach and civic engagement with local governments.	See comments in row above. Complementary but limited in scope. The NDI project targets youth in four states only (Khartoum, Kassala, North Darfur, and South Kordofan) and provides a forum between young people and local governments.

Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES): *Youth Leaders Program* Duration Unknown	Donor: European Union Budget: Unknown	The program aims at strengthening the participation of young people in decision- making processes. It mobilizes a small, select number of Sudanese youth (activists from civil society, political parties, and youth-led organizations and initiatives) and builds their capacity to tackle some of the country's major political, societal and socio-economic challenges. There are generally about 30 participants per year.	Complementary to The Center's proposal, yet the Network is different in a number of ways because it (i) it is wider in scope and scale since it covers 18 states and targets a larger number of participants (rather than select participants), (ii) the proposal deals with youth-based organizations, which are key partners, and not with youth as individuals; and (iii) it focuses on youth networking and solidarity around issues of common concerns and priorities for youth across historic or current divides.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): *Young peacebuilding volunteers rebuilding Darfur and YPBF* Duration Unknown	Donor: Korean International Cooperation Agency and UN PBF Budget: Unknown	The program works with young people from three states in Darfur (Central, West, and South Darfur). It also provides capacity-building to young people and supports different activities for peacebuilding such as "Art for Peace" and "Sports for Peace". UNDP also has a program with the Peace Research Institute in Sudan that acts as an early-warning system for conflict.	Complementary, yet different in theme, scope, content, and scale of work. The UNDP's young peacebuilding volunteers program appears people-to-people focused.
UN Integrated Transition Assistance Missi on in Sudan (UNITAMS) (2020-2021)	Donor: Unknown Budget: Unknown	Supporting: political stability, constitution-making; electoral and census processes; reforms and the promotion and protection of human rights; an inclusive peace process; implementation of the peace agreement; strengthening of the protective environment, in particular in conflict/post-conflict areas; achievement of peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between communities.	Complementary in goals but different in scope and content of work. The Center's YCO Network focuses narrowly on capacitating youth, including young women, and fostering a nation-wide connective network, to conduct advocacy around the Charter and the JPA. This aligns with UNITAMS' mandate to support youth engagement and the implementation of both documents and robustly fills a niche in which UNITAMS seeks support. For these reasons, the Deputy SRSG has voiced support for the project.

The Carter Center: *Sudan Youth Citizen Observer Network Phase I* (2020-2021)	Donor: Carter Center pool funding Budget: US$ 628,645	Stakeholder outreach, consultation, and listening sessions with 1,300+ Resistance Committees and youth-led organizations (September-October 2021); Mapping of 7,000+ youth groups (March-April 2021); Survey of 1,000+ youth leader respondents (March-April 2021); Publication of mapping and survey results (August 2021).	Phase I of The Center's proposal. Contributed baseline assessment and analysis for future programming; established connection to leadership of thousands of young women' and men-led civil society organizations and Resistance Committees in 18 Sudanese states.
The Carter Center: *Sudan Peace through Health: South Darfur* (2020-2021)	Donor: Canada Fund for Local Initiatives Budget: US$ 27,940	Capacity building: conflict mitigation for public health programs	The Center's conflict mitigation initiative in South Darfur. Radom Peace Council mitigated and reduced tensions in its community, assisted in restarting health programs and other public services.

II. **Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**

a) A brief **description of the project** focus and approach – describe the project's overarching goal, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- responsive).

Preparatory Actions

From August 2020 to August 2021, The Center trained 25 young Sudanese women and men who deployed throughout Sudan. They mapped 7,000+ youth-led groups including 5,000 Resistance Committees, conducted 1,000+ baseline surveys across 500 locations in 18 states from among the groups mapped, and led more than 100 focus groups comprising 400 representatives of the groups mapped. Findings and recommendations from this work were released in English and Arabic.

From September 2021 to October 2021, The Center engaged in a co-design process with regional partners. Center staff visited 15 of 18 states (states in eastern Sudan could not be met due to security conditions) to meet with the youth-based groups mapped and surveyed. Dialoguing with more than 1,300+ groups and using objective criteria, potential regional partners, **nominated and designated through consensus by peer organizations**, have been identified. The Center will consult with these organizations to design the appropriate network configuration and approach in their region. Regional partners will be responsible for hosting trainings, selecting and managing observers, coordinating with the secretariat, and liaising with the advisory bodies. Regional partners will also participate in establishing and choosing the personnel of the secretariat.

The Center has successfully implemented a nationwide mapping, a nationwide survey, and consultations in 15 of 18 states within the context of severe economic scarcity, political tensions, and pandemic-related challenges. The Center has advanced its programming in-person and remotely, having demonstrated conclusively that it is well positioned to address and mitigate operational and environmental challenges.

Project Goal
The project goal is to support the creation of a nation-wide and multi-faceted corps of youth-based observers, a YCO Network, which, through independent grassroots monitoring, local peacebuilding, public reporting and advocacy, will help expand youth participation in the transition and peace processes and protect civic space.

Implementation Strategy
Building upon The Center's mapping, survey research and consultation exercises over the last year, the following interventions were identified as key priorities among youth. Pending UN funding, the project will begin implementing in early 2022.

Phase I: Training Secretariat and Youth-Led Partner Organizations (January-March 2022)
Topics will include citizen observation methodology; nonpartisan observation; gender equality; women, peace and security; conflict resolution and mitigation; as well as others identified through co-design dialogue with selected youth organization. Trainings on advocacy and organizational capacity strengthening, including fundraising, will also take place during this phase.

In addition, youth organizations not serving as regional partners will be able to participate on volunteer **advisory bodies**. Advisory bodies are a critical component of the Network because they will allow for non-partner organizations to participate fully in the Network and hold selected partner organizations accountable. Advisory bodies will be assemblies open to all youth-led organizations in an area. They will monitor and advise the work of the secretariat and the partner organizations.

In the September-October consultations described above, given ongoing mistrust among youth organizations, the advisory bodies emerged as a particularly important feature for building inter-connections within the Network.

Phase II: State-Level Observers (36) (March-April 2022)
In early 2022, the youth-led partner organizations, with assistance from The Center, will each select and train two YCO to serve in their state (each region will consist of two to three states), at least half of whom will be young women. This will total 36 people, two from 18 states, and they will be trained by the partner organizations, with assistance from The Center, on the same topics addressed in Phase I. In addition, advisory bodies will begin to meet and advise the selected partner organizations. The secretariat will also participate in the observer trainings.

Phase III: Monitoring, Reporting, Advocacy, and Action Begin (April 2022-August 2022)
Based on topics and priorities established by the youth-led partner organizations and the secretariat, the Network will begin monitoring and reporting on the interlinked transition and peace process, as described below.

The Network will distribute periodic reports to thousands of stakeholders in Sudan, including but not limited to: 7,000+ youth-led groups and Resistance Committees mapped by The Center and their constituencies; state-level Advisory Committees to the Network; federal, state, and local government entities; political parties in Sudan; peacebuilding mediators; practitioners in Sudan and international; academia in Sudan and international; media in Sudan and international. Distribution channels include email, website, and Facebook (currently nearly 2,000 followers), among other means. These reports further will be integrated in Center outreach in North American and European capitals on policy areas of interest to Sudanese youth.

Phase IV: Local-Level YCO (180) (August 2022-June 2023)
With assistance from The Center, the YCO, along with the secretariat and the youth-led partner organizations, will select, train, deploy, and manage 180 (10 additional observers per state) local-level YCO, at least 90 of them will be young women.

Throughout each phase, The Center will support careful assessments of how local-level conflict impact women and men, girls and boys in different ways. Findings in the past have shown that men, especially youth, are more directly involved as combatants, leading to a greater likelihood of death, injury, stigma, and trauma, while women and girls face increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence as well as greater difficulty accessing economic resources, healthcare, and education.

To address these differential impacts, the project will promote a gender-sensitive approach to conflict mitigation and conflict assessment, including by 1) involving boys and men in specific conflict mitigation trainings; 2) empowering women and girls to significantly impact peacemaking and conflict mitigation efforts; 3) specifically training women and girls as conflict mediators; and 4) promoting a gender-sensitive approach in all aspects of our partners' work.

These efforts by the Network will help address the following conflict causes and sources of potential violence:

- Sense of alienation and exclusion from decision-making in the transition among young people, representing 60% of the population. In The Center's March-April 2021 survey, for example, 41% of youth leaders surveyed said they had little or no say in the transitional process. Such levels of alienation are danger signals for long-term, peaceful support for the transition.

- Historic lack of dialogue/inter-action between Khartoum/central areas, the near periphery (i.e., within 120 kilometers of Khartoum), and far periphery areas such as Darfur, White Nile, West and South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. The Network provides an innovative means for young people in Sudan to interact around a common agenda, potentially leading to lasting changes in engrained Sudanese political practices.

- Through conflict mitigation/resolution, advocacy and reporting training, a core cohort of 200+ youth will address conflict more effectively in their local areas, improve access to decision-makers, and connect peacemaking/building efforts at the local level with national processes. For example, reporting on the JPA might include a description of best practices/lessons learned from implementation (or lack thereof) in local communities as well as observers' efforts to address issues that emerge.

During program implementation, The Center will also train citizen observers on the importance of international principles guiding election observation and encourage its partners to endorse and abide by the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations.

b) Provide a **project-level** '**theory of change'** – explain the assumptions about why you expect the project interventions to lead to changes in the conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis. What are the assumptions that the theory is based on? Note, this is not a summary statement of your project's outcomes.

(Note: Change may happen through various and diverse approaches, i.e. social cohesion may be fostered through dialogue or employment opportunities or joint management of infrastructure. The selection of which approach should depend on context-specific factors. What basic assumptions about how change will occur have driven your choice of programming approach?)

Part A: If Sudanese youth-led organizations are connected in a nation-wide reporting, advocacy, and conflict mitigation network, including YCO, then they will be able to dialogue more effectively with local, state, and national authorities on key issues in their communities and in the ongoing transition to democracy and sustainable peace.

The Network produces this change because it (a) provides a multi-constituency platform with inter-sectional diversity (e.g., gender, geography, ethnicity, class, religion, ideology), meaning that its interventions benefit from high credibility with a range of authorities and policymakers and (b) develops skills in public communication, advocacy, and conflict resolution for the organizations and individuals within the Network, increasing their efficacy.

Part B: If government and other authorities regularly engage with a nation-wide reporting, advocacy, and peacebuilding network of youth-led organizations and highly skilled YCO, then they will be more responsive to the appeals and perspectives of youth.

The Network produces this change because, by crystalizing important youth perspectives, it holds authorities accountable for commitments made in the Charter, the JPA, and other public declarations supporting integration youth into decision-making during the transition.

Assumption: **The exclusion of youth from decision-making undermines their support for the transition.**
Supporting evidence: In The Center's March-April survey, 41% of youth-led groups said that they had little or no voice in the transitional government, including 14% who said youth lacked any voice at all. Eighty percent said they had not had any contact with the transitional government. Further, in more than 100 focus groups, participants emphasized that when they can meet with government officials their views are not taken seriously or acted upon. Relatedly, nearly 50% of youth said that the goals of the revolution were met to a "small degree" (33%) or not at all (17%). Virtually the same figure (52%) had confidence in the transitional government and a similar percentage (55%) were "somewhat" or "very" dissatisfied with the progress in putting in place the institutions called for by the Charter. In short, youth's sense of exclusion and their support for the transition are closely inter-connected.

Assumption: **Many youth and youth-led organizations currently lack the advocacy, reporting, and peacebuilding skills necessary to engage with governmental and other authorities more effectively.** *Supporting evidence:* Nearly a quarter (23%) of 1,000 survey respondents – who are leaders of and represent youth-led organizations – stated they were not familiar with the timetable set for the transitional period. Nearly one-third stated they "not very familiar" with the Charter and the JPA or did "not know it at all." Regarding access to decision-makers and information, more than 90% of youth organizations surveyed said they were "somewhat" or "very" interested in improving their knowledge of whom to contact to share their views and how to do so more effectively. Nearly 100% of youth-led groups prioritize transitional justice and lack confidence in established mechanisms, yet nearly the same percentage also acknowledged their current inability to impact decision-making in this realm. Focus group participants consistently stated they support the government's peacemaking efforts but are not at the table or influential in this realm. In sum, youth-led organizations in Sudan are keenly aware of their need for technical support and skill-building to break through entrenched barriers to participation in policy-setting and peace-making/building.

c) ***Provide a narrative description of key project components*** *(outcomes and outputs), ensuring sufficient attention to gender, age and other key differences that should influence the project approach. In describing the project elements, be sure to indicate important considerations related to sequencing of activities.*

   Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.

NB: The process and sequencing of project activities is outlined in detail in the "implementation strategy" section above.

Outcome 1: Increased coordination among youth-led organizations, resulting in integration of youth perspectives on key political and peacemaking processes and public policy as well as the empowerment of young women to fully participate in monitoring and reporting.

Through the formation, mentorship and deployment of a functioning nation-wide observer Network, the project will enhance youth knowledge, coordination and capacity to assess, report on and engage collectively with decision makers on youth perspectives regarding the interlinked transition and peace processes. Led by a national secretariat and eight to 10 youth-led partner organizations identified through an extensive consultative process, the 216-observer Network will create a credible nation-wide platform for youth to disseminate fact-based information about the transition and peace process, highlight key priorities and recommendations, and advocate effectively for reform. It will enable and empower youth, particularly young women, to engage with key stakeholders at all levels and influence public debate, resulting in policy change.

Training for observers will be offered at the regional and state levels. To better enable the participation of young women, per diem funds will be offered to those traveling to enable a male family member to accompany the trainee. Youth-led partner organizations will demonstrate an increase in technical and operational capacity, as measured by periodic technical and organizational capacity assessments (TOCA) conducted on the basis of an in-house Carter Center tool designed to evaluate similar projects and refined for implementation in Sudan. Planned areas of assessment may include organizational

governance, leadership, and strategic management; program development, management and implementation; monitoring and evaluation (M&E); communications, media and public information; financial and administrative management; and human resources management. Partner organizations will also be asked to conduct self-assessments of their strengths and weaknesses.

At the end of the 18-month period, the Network would have a clear organizational structure; improved internal administrative management and financial processes; and nation-wide coverage that allows for diversity in membership and overcomes historic center-periphery divides, among other milestones. It would be able to register as an independent NGO in Sudan. Overall, the goal is to position the YCO Network to scale up its membership and observation activities exponentially in anticipation of assessing key milestones in the transition, including national electoral processes, pending continued financial and technical support.

Outcome 1a: Enhanced youth capacity and coordination because of Network formation to report on transition priorities and form recommendations reflecting youth perspectives that influence public dialogue, policy, and the transition.
Outcome 1b: Female YCO Network members are empowered to monitor and report on key political and peacemaking processes.
Outcome 1c: Improved understanding among project beneficiaries of neutral, non-biased observation methodology and key, interlinked political and peacemaking/building issues in the transition.

Output 1.1: Youth-led partner organizations participate actively in national observer network; and state advisory bodies coordinate and represent youth perspective at state and national level.
Output 1.2: Youth-led partner organizations and YCO are trained to conduct non-partisan observation related to key, inter-connected political and peacemaking/building milestones in the transition, and apply their skills collect data and report on transition milestones and key events.
Output 1.3: YCO Network, managed by national secretariat and youth-led partner organizations, produces public reports based on observer data regarding key political and peacemaking/building developments in the transition.
Output 1.4: Facilitate establishment of the YCO Network components – the secretariat, the linkages between youth-led partner organizations, and the advisory bodies in order to create sustainable observer Network capable of increasing scale of observation activities.

Outcome Two: Through coordinated YCO Network efforts, civic space for young women and men promoted and expanded.

Through expanded coordination and technical assistance, youth-led organizations will become more confident and effective in forming a common agenda, issuing public statements and press releases, and advocating for their priorities. Joint action and nation-wide coordination will enhance youth influence with decision-makers, which will promote and expand civic space for youth to engage with government officials on key issues. Network leaders will also encourage the participation of some 7,000+ youth-led organizations and Resistance Committees through an advisory body structure, expanding the credibility, reach, and influence of the YCO Network. Impact will be measured through the dissemination and coverage of press releases and statements; interaction with the media, policy makers and the public; and policy recommendations acted upon by government officials.

Outcome Indicator 2a: Percent increase of youth-led organizations participating in the initiative that feel their perspectives are heard in the interlinked political and peacemaking/building processes during the transition.

Outcome Indicator 2b: Percent change of youth participating in the initiative who feel the transition/peace process reflects their needs and requirements.

Output 2.1: Improved confidence and ability among YCO partner organizations and youth to conduct effective outreach and public communications.

Output 2.2: YCO Network engages with stakeholders and policy makers on process, key findings and recommendations for political reforms and peacemaking/building processes.

Outcome Three: Improved capacity of YCO and the representatives of youth-led partner organizations, particularly young women, to identify and mitigate conflict at a local and national level.

Through training and mentorship, Network observers, particularly young women, will sharpen their skills and understanding of best practices in conflict mitigation, in order to identify early warning signals, highlight challenges and develop possible mitigation strategies, and engage the appropriate officials and policy makers to address and reduce potential conflict within their communities.

Outcome Indicator 3a: Situations of violence or potential violence are mitigated directly or indirectly by the YCO Network.

Outcome Indicator 3b: Credible and fact-based information made available by the Network to inform conflict mitigation efforts involving potential violence influenced by mis/disinformation.

Output 3.1.a: Observers are trained in conflict mitigation which they share with YCO.

Output 3.1b: Observers put their conflict mitigation training into practice by, for example, conducting outreach to government officials regarding early warning signs of potential violence.

   d) *Project targeting – provide a justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, expected number and type of stakeholders/beneficiaries (must be disaggregated by sex and age). Indicate whether stakeholders have been consulted in the design of this proposal. Do not repeat all outputs and activities from the Results Framework.*

Geographic Zones:

The project targets all 18 states of Sudan: Northern, Red Sea, River Nile, Kassala, Khartoum, El Gazira, Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, West Kordofan, East Darfur, North Darfur, South Darfur, Central Darfur, and West Darfur.

Criteria for the Selection of Partner Organizations (Beneficiaries):

A key selection criterion for partner organizations is that the organization must be youth-led, meaning that most of its leadership and membership represent young men and women. Another key criterion is

that organization's mission, vision, objectives, and overall goal – that is, its programs and activities – must aim to empower youth organizations and individuals. These are reframed in the following five essential criteria, which are adapted to the specific, current Sudanese context. The organization must:

1. **be led by and focused on youth**. Youth should represent a minimum of 60% of its management and leadership team. The organization's mandate, programs and key activities should focus on youth priorities and issues of common concern among youth.

2. have broad base **social legitimacy and acceptability** among majority of its peer youth organizations active in the geographic areas and thematic sphere of activity.

3. have sensitivity to the **question of diversity,** manifested in a varied membership and leadership that represent different ethno-cultural and geographic groupings. It must also be sensitive to issues related to gender.

4. be **legally registered** and complies with relevant laws, and the registration documents of the organization must be available upon request.

5. have a wide **geographic scope,** preferably covering at least two neighboring states or more than 50% of municipalities within a state.

Nominated Partner Candidates:

In September—October 2021, The Center conducted a comprehensive consultation to assess youth-based organizations and groups in 15 of 8 Sudanese states, with a view to identifying potential regional partner organizations to serve as hubs for the YCO Network. The consultation aimed to (i) foster a sense of ownership and build consensus among youth-led organizations ; (ii) consolidate support for the design of the Network and its approach among youth; (iii) continue close communication with youth following the mapping, survey, and reports; and (iv) ensure youth participation and effective collaboration in the process of defining the criteria and guidelines governing the nomination/selection of partner organization. The Center conducted preliminary discussions remotely in three Eastern states due to security concerns and will undertake a comprehensive assessment either in person or remotely as security conditions allow. Kindly refer to Annex G for a list of 28 candidate partners which received the most nominations from among their peers.

Narrowing Down the List of Candidate Partners:

During October—November 2021, the nominated list of 28 groups will be narrowed to 8-10 sub-grant recipient candidates and 18-20 focal points who will implement activities on a national, regional, state, and community level. The selection process will be based on: one-on-one interviews and site visits with the nominated organizations; background and vetting regarding the organizations' impartiality, independence, and inclusiveness; final decisions regarding regional/multi-state coverage, i.e., partners will divide coverage of the 18 states.

Selecting the Secretariat and the YCO:

From November to January 2022, mentored by The Center, the partner organizations will choose and hire the secretariat staff, likely from among their membership.

Whether at the state- or local-level, youth-led partners organizations will choose YCO acting as focal points, combined with input from the secretariat and The Center.

Youth-led organizations will lead the process, including establishing impartial criteria and a transparent, open selections process. Factors that could be considered include gender, diversity of experience/knowledge within the designated geographic area (state, administrative area, *payam*), experience with impartial observation, problem-solving skills, pre-existing knowledge of the Charter and the JPA, and other considerations.

Advisory Bodies

As mentioned, those youth-led organizations not acting as regional partners points will be invited to participate in the state-level advisory bodies. The advisory bodies, open to all youth-led organizations including Resistance Committees, serves to input into YCO Network planning, support outreach to communities, and provide feedback to the youth-led partner organization as activities advance.

Number and Type of Beneficiaries:

Direct beneficiaries include:
➢ Eight to 10 regional focal point organizations (average membership of the organization is 50, thus 400 to 500 total individuals), their direct members, and designated representatives who will serve on the secretariat.
➢ Two-hundred and sixteen YCO.
➢ Local communities in which conflict monitoring and early intervention take place (populations TBD).
➢ It is expected that, through the various entities described above, nearly all the 7,000 mapped organizations will have direct or indirect contact with the YCO Network, either as dialogue partners, participants in data collections (e.g., participate in stakeholder observation meetings and/or surveys), readers of YCO Network reports and public communication materials, or members of advisory bodies.

Thus, aggregate beneficiaries are estimated at 7,000(+/-) youth-based groups, thus potentially more than 350,000 individuals; disaggregated, the project targets youth between 18 and 34 years old and a minimum 40% (140,000) women participation.

Indirect beneficiaries include:
➢ The youth population of Sudan (estimated at roughly 26 million) would gain a platform for raising their voices on critical issues at the national and local levels.
➢ The Sudanese population as a whole, as the YCO Network helps fill a watchdog role during the transition and peace process that is currently under-resourced.

Have Stakeholders Been Consulted?

Youth and other stakeholders have been consulted extensively, as follows:

➢ March 2021: Mapping of 7,000+ youth-led organizations throughout Sudan, producing the most comprehensive mapping to date. This included collecting basic information on each organization (location, leadership, priorities, contact information).

➢ March and April 2021: Surveying 1,000 organizations (60 question survey) and conducting more than 100 focus groups with 400+ participants.

➢ August 2021: Publication of research and liaison with key Khartoum-based stakeholders on youth issues (see above).

➢ September-October 2021: Consultations in 15 of 18 states (preliminary discussions in 3 Eastern states due to security concerns) to assess potential youth-led organizational partners. Nominations from peer organizations are a core feature of this process.

➢ Since 2019: Continuous dialogue with the Federal Ministry of Youth and Sports, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding. The Carter Center has briefed the Prime Minister's office as well as shared a presentation and hosted a panel discussion with Prime Minister Hamdok. Prime Minister Hamdok is aware of the initiative and supports it.

In addition, there is continuous dialogue with the UN PBF and UNITAMS leadership.

III.   Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list all direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local knowledge and existing capacity.

Kindly refer to Annex G for a list of candidate partners, to Annex I for the structure of project administration including Carter Center and secretariat roles, and to Annex J for the organizational structure of the Network.

As the Convening Organization, The Center will play a lead role in the implementation of the Network. However, most project funding from UN PBF will go toward the youth-led partner organizations who will select the secretariat and the YCO. The youth-led partner organizations are nominated and selected based on the process and criteria stated above, including their ability to represent youth groups in their areas, respect for diversity and inclusivity, legal registration, and administrative capacity.

This funding to Sudanese-based organizations, including women-led organizations, will build on existing efforts by these groups to hold their government accountable for commitments made during the transition.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
Convening Organization: **The Carter Center** Implementing partners: N/A in previous calendar year	**Approx. US$ $628,645**	**Carter Center internal pool funding**	**Khartoum**	**6**	**Guma Kunda Komey (Sudan); David Carroll, Stacia George (HQ)**

b) **Project management and coordination** – Indicate the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explicitly indicate how the project implementation team will ensure sufficient gender or youth expertise. Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements and ensure link with PBF secretariat if it exists. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex A.1** and attach key staff TORs.

The project design has benefited from The Center's liaison with UN staff in Sudan, including consultations with Deputy SRSG Khardiata Lo N'Diaye, Ulan Shabynov, and Kara Johnston since 2020 which featured regular briefings and updates, visits with survey managers, attendance at public events, brainstorming, and advice on the project design and development. The Carter Center has also been in touch with multiple UNITAMS departments to identify issues of common concern. **Continued collaboration with the UN on these fronts will be vital to the success of project.**

Kindly refer to Annex E for the complete Terms of Reference for staff positions envisaged in the project administration and in the secretariat. A minimum of 40% of the project administration structure will be staffed by women.

Kindly refer to Annexes I-J for project coordination and oversight arrangements.

The following positions are in the proposed project, with UN PBF-funded positions marked in red.

LEVEL OF EFFORT *(estimated over 18 months)*		
STAFF	**UN PBF**	**Carter Center**
Based in Sudan		
Program Officer	2.0%	46%
Finance Manager	2.0%	46%
Administrative Assistant	2.0%	46%
Logistics Lead	0%	38%
Executive Assistant / Receptionist	0%	38%
Public Communications	0%	38%
IT Support / Monitoring	0%	38%
Office Maintenance and Grounds Upkeep	0%	38%
Based in Carter Center Headquarters		
Director	0%	7%
Associate Director	0%	45%
Senior Program Associate	5%	46%
Program Assistant	5%	3%
Data Analyst	1.5%	0%
CONSULTANTS	**UN PBF**	**Carter Center**
Based in Sudan		
Head	26%	0%
Deputy – Project Lead	46%	0%
Deputy - Strategy and Operations	46%	0%
Senior Political Analyst	17%	0%
Based in Carter Center Headquarters		
N/A	0%	0%

Below is an explanation of key positions for which funding is requested from UN PBF.

Head (National Staff)
- Manages all aspects of The Center's planned civil society support project for the entirety of its duration and represents The Center's program activities in Sudan.
- Manages an office of eight to 10 domestic and international staff, providing direction toward the completion of project milestones and objectives.

- Oversees support to the secretariat, the youth-led partner organizations, and the advisory bodies.
- Ensures that women, youth, and other vulnerable populations are included in agenda-setting, the conduct of workshops/dialogues, and other activities as appropriate.
- Oversees a series of nationwide cascade trainings, gathering feedback, and periodically assessing their success to improve their effectiveness.
- Particular focus on the conflict mitigation/resolution aspects of the initiative, including gender inclusion, as well as inter-section of the initiative and on-going peace processes.
- Forges, maintains, and leads relations with key political, government, electoral, and civil actors in the country; acts as a point of contact with the UN PBF secretariat, international community, and donor contacts in Khartoum, as well as The Center's management in the headquarters in Atlanta.
- Monitors political, economic, security, and peace process, and electoral and constitutional developments in Sudan in the transitional period, providing political analysis, assessing the role of civil society organizations in shaping Sudanese democracy, and helping envision potential future programming and project continuation.

Deputy Heads (2) – Project Leads – Strategy, Operations and Implementation (1 National Staff)
- Designs and oversees the overall plan and vision of work.
- Working closely with youth-led partner organizations and the secretariat, assists the selection and management of the Youth Independent Observers.
- Provide support at all project phases, including networking, data collection, and reporting.
- Liaise on a day-to-day basis with the secretariat and youth-led partner organizations.
- Ensure close follow-up that women, youth, and other vulnerable populations are included in agenda-setting, the conduct of workshops/dialogues, and other activities as appropriate.
- Coordinate trainings, including content, timelines, and staffing.
- Contribute substantively to the development, drafting, editing, production, and distribution of reports and other materials.
- Contribute to public advocacy around reports, as necessary. This includes but is not limited to programmatic planning, budgeting, meetings with interlocuters, and strategizing with the Atlanta and Khartoum teams.
- Conduct regular consultations and provides briefings and updates to UN Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat, as well as other UN agencies and personnel in Sudan regarding project implementation.
- Serve as the lead reference point for human resources and legal compliance issues for The Center's Peace Program office in Sudan.
- Supervise monitoring and evaluation, as well as budget/finance compliance and reporting.
- Provide strategic guidance to the Youth Citizen Observer Network, including hands-on mentoring to staff and network members as necessary.
- Work closely with the Program Officer – Public Communication Lead, supervises public communication/dissemination aspects of The Center's Peace Program operations in Sudan.
- Conduct regular missions throughout Sudan to coordinate programming.
- In coordination with the Head of Peace Programs, liaise with donors, including on donor reporting, and other matters.

Senior Political Analyst (National Staff)
- In coordination with program staff, represents the YCO program and The Center in Sudan as necessary.
- Advises The Center on relevant political, economic, social and security developments, The Center's overall presence in Sudan and programming.
- Tracks legal and legislative developments of concern to The Center and its programming.
- Meets regularly and maintains good relations with governing bodies, youth groups of all leanings, civil society organizations, political parties, armed movements, and long-term Center interlocutors.
- Working closely with the secretariat, the youth-led partner organizations, and the Deputy Head– Project Lead, supports the preparation of all reports, public communication, and other written materials.

Finance Manager (National Staff)
- Under the direction of the Deputy Head– Strategy and Operations, manages all financial activity for The Center's field office.
- Manages the accounts for the operations of the YCO Network in Sudan.
- Tracks and documents all expenses of The Center's Peace programs in Sudan. Maintains a ledger of these expenses, working with Finance staff in headquarters to reconcile at the end of every month the receipts and expenses.
- Seeks and incorporates input from The Center's Finance staff in Atlanta and coordinates on financial matters with colleagues in The Center's Health office in Khartoum.
- Trains staff, project personnel, and partners on good financial practices and ensures consistent implementation of those practices.

Program Officer - Public Communications Lead (National Staff)
- Supports project staff and partners, including youth-led partner organizations observers, and advisory bodies, throughout the YCO project. This should include actively listening to their needs from Khartoum and involves periodic visits to the field.
- Liaises with key stakeholders and groups in Khartoum and around Sudan to communicate the purpose, process, and desired outcome of the YCO Network.
- Contributes to monitoring that women, youth, and other vulnerable populations are included in agenda-setting, the conduct of workshops/dialogues, and other activities as appropriate.
- Contributes to assisting the secretariat, the youth-led partner organizations, and the advisory bodies to produce reports and other advocacy materials.
- Drafts and submits regular reports on project activities. Contribute material to donor reports and other documentation, as requested.
- Liaises with the Grants Manager and Finance Manager of the secretariat to ensure proper financial practices and reporting, especially regarding sub-grants.
- Special focus on liaising with the Khartoum and Atlanta teams about the public relations of the YCO Network, its needs, and strategies.
- Assists the secretariat, the youth-led partner organizations, and the observers to develop and disseminate key public communication messages and documents including but not limited to in-person briefings, press conferences, social media, radio, and television.

- Assists the secretariat, the youth-led organizations, and the observers to organize press events, as appropriate.
- Monitors media as relates to developments of concern to the YCO project and assists the secretariat, the youth-led partner organizations, and the observers to develop a wide-range of media-related contacts.

c) **Risk management** – Identify project-specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include a Do No Harm approach and risk mitigation strategy.

Kindly refer to Annex H for The Carter Center's Conflict Sensitive Approach "Do No Harm". The risks mentioned below will be reviewed on a quarterly basis and may include new risks as country and project context may change during implementation.

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
The political environment prevents Center personnel and YCO from engaging with transitional government activities and functions. Safe space for and growth of civil society is also prevented.	Medium	The Center will continue to engage in intense networking with key government and civil society personnel to build trust and understanding, and push for greater protections for civil society, including through public statements and advocacy.
Sudan's transitional government and other authorities lack the political will to implement recommendations from the project's reports and advocacy	Medium	This project prioritizes capacity development of civil society and close contact with transitional government institutions to improve accountability and inclusivity.
YCO are not perceived as credible or fail to establish national reach.	Medium	Balanced recruitment of secretariat; transparent, consensus-driven process to identify youth-led regional partner organizations

Youth-led organizations and secretariat choose the observers, based on impartial criteria and a transparent selection process (with input/mentoring from The Center). This step will enhance the perception of the citizen Network as credible and impartial. |

Sudan's macro-economic situation deteriorates, affecting the availability of cash and other essentials, such as fuel and electricity. Bureaucratic and political processes hinder accreditation and other processes necessary to engage in observation.	Medium	Sustained presence in Sudan and legal status as an International Organization (as opposed to an NGO) position The Center to overcome political and bureaucratic hurdles. Experience in working in challenging work environments, including recently conducting surveying, mapping, and consultations in a context of severe economic crisis, will help to overcome challenges.
Partners engage with bias, fail to manage data securely, and mismanage other project resources.	Medium	The Center will emphasize the principles of non-partisan observation and require all observers to sign a code of conduct. The Center will engage in extensive training of personnel to operate impartially and to protect data; The Center will also monitor personnel performance related to data and other project resources.
Hot war returns to Sudan's regions and/or instability increases in cities.	Low	Under the direction of the Security Company (security contractor), The Center will continuously monitor the security context and coordinate with security agencies and other NGOs. In proportion to the threats presented, The Center would be prepared to halt travel, remove personnel, and alter activities in certain areas or nationwide. Activities may be restricted to certain areas.
COVID-19 (novel coronavirus) continues to spread; governments maintain restrictions on public gatherings and travel (in Sudan and internationally), perhaps varying in time and scope based on the course of the pandemic.	High	Introduce remote alternatives, train personnel and partners on remote work tools, including NEMO, an open-source data collection and reporting system, The Center's learning hub, and using online resources. Further restriction of movement or large in-person gatherings may impact activities, resulting in reduction of project objectives, decreasing M&E targets, and re-designing programming timeline; these modifications would be communicated to and approved by donors and partners.

Sudanese voice concerns about a US-based NGO supporting efforts for youth to serve as a watchdog of the inter-connected peace and transition processes.	Medium	Maintain regular, ongoing communication with stakeholders on national, regional, and community levels. Raise awareness of Carter Center commitment to Sudan as an independent, nonpartisan organization. Emphasize Carter Center impartiality and neutrality in project design and methodology. In accordance with UN "Do No Harm" principles, The Carter Center acts to prevent and mitigate any negative impact of its actions and interventions. The Center places the highest priority on the safety of staff, partners, and beneficiaries. Equally important is its commitment to rights-based and community-based approaches that include efforts to engage and empower persons of concern in decisions that affect their lives. Carter Center actions are designed to complement and support government obligations.

d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – Describe the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include: a budget break-down for both monitoring and evaluation activities, including collection of baseline and end line data and an independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Fund recipients are obligated to reserve at least 5-7% of the project budget for M&E activities, including sufficient funds for a quality, independent evaluation.

A. Monitoring and Evaluation by the Secretariat and Youth-Led Partner Organizations

The Center and its youth-led partner organization partners will manage M&E processes to gauge progress against the expected results outlined in the logic model using the indicators and targets provided in the table. Partner organizations will be responsible for primary data collection and monthly submission of narrative progress and data reports directly to The Center, as required in anticipated sub-grant agreements, for project activities under their direct control. Interviews with staff working with partner organizations and quality checks will ensure that captured data is uniform, accurate, complete, and representative of program efforts and activities.

All partner staff responsible for project monitoring and evaluation will be provided a hands-on learning opportunity to develop their M&E skills. Center staff based in Khartoum and Atlanta will be jointly responsible for data entry, cleaning, and verification; database maintenance; analysis; and reporting on indicators in the monitoring and evaluation plan. It is anticipated that the YCO Network secretariat staff

will assume a progressive degree of independence in collecting and managing project M&E data as they acquire confidence in reporting during the implementation period and their activities take on greater scope.

B. Collection of Data

Collection of data will include checklists, focus group guidelines, survey questionnaires, and pre- and post-training questionnaires, as well as innovative data collection methods, including use of the NEMO system.

The Center will hold targeted trainings for sub-grantee staff in using NEMO data collection technology, including how to create checklists and surveys, clean data, analyze reports, generate graphics and manage the backend server data. The skills acquired will be applied for internal monitoring and evaluation of the project's implementation.

C. Baseline Data and Evaluating Progress

Through extensive survey research and consultative processes, The Center has established in-depth baseline data to support project implementation. The 60+ question survey of 1,000 youth-led organizations established detailed baseline data on youth knowledge and attitudes across a wide range of issues pertaining to Sudan's democratic transition. For instance, there are literally millions of data points assessing their role in the transition; training and support needs and interests; confidence levels in the transitional government and its openness to youth; and a range of public attitudes about the transition, among dozens of others. These data points will be tracked over time through periodic surveys.

To evaluate the efficacy of trainings, The Center will administer pre- and post- TOCA and surveys to measure change in knowledge, technical skills and organizational capacity.

Other forms of data collection include activity evaluations, participant lists, tracking logs, citizen observer reports, and Center and partner reports. Such data will be disaggregated by age, gender, geographical location on the state level, and training topic and/or type of activity, as relevant. Data will also be collected on number of observers trained, the number of people reached in advocacy activities and/or participants taking part as respondents in field-based survey research. Focused attention will be given to disaggregating data whenever possible on gender and youth targets for all training, survey research, and monitoring activities.

Certain activities depend on specific milestones in the Charter and the JPA and may be affected by factors outside of The Center's control; monitoring activities will be informed by events on the ground and adjusted as appropriate.

Additionally, The Center will hire an independent evaluator to conduct a project evaluation at the conclusion of the project. The evaluation will take place over one month with deployment to Sudan, including to interview key project partners and stakeholders. Such a review will include a comprehensive reflection of project activities and deliverables; achievement of expected results and impact; challenges and lessons learned; as well as recommendations for follow-on programming and to

sustain project impacts. This analysis will be shared with the grant officer and disseminated among project partners and stakeholders.

C. Data Protection and Privacy Protocols

During its monitoring and related data collection, The Center will establish and implement protocols for YCO and youth-led partner organizations to protect the privacy of persons interviewed and information collected. Focus group and participants and survey respondents will be advised of the confidentiality of their participation and asked to sign consent forms as appropriate. Many of these procedures have already been field-tested through the mapping and surveying in March-April 2021.

Likewise, personal data collected during survey research will be kept confidential and will not be released using any characteristics that could identify any individual respondents. All hard copy files that contain sensitive and/or personal information will be stored in a lockable filing cabinet or safe with limited access. A document access log will be established. Cabinet keys will remain with the Head of Peace Programs and a spare key kept in the office safe within a sealed and marked envelope.

The Center maintains data security protocols and requires staff to complete periodic online courses pertaining to the protection of data and online threats. Atlanta and Khartoum staff will be required to complete these courses. Furthermore, all computers will be password protected as will any computer files or folders that contain sensitive information. Any sensitive document disseminated from a secure server/hard drive will remain password protected. Passwords will be changed regularly. Center staff, observers and youth-led partner organizations will be advised on the correct handling of protected digital files.

e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project's exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do concretely and pro-actively to try to ensure this support from the start. Consider possible partnerships with other donors or IFIs.

By the end of the 18 months, The Center will have created a functioning, independent YCO Network with a short but significant track record of action. These efforts will enable the YCO Network to possibly access funding from other donors. The Network will have managerial and administrative capacity that actively monitors the transition and the peace process. The Network will also be publishing reports, conducting advocacy, public communication, and community outreach based on training put into practice over the previous 18 months. These skills are themselves a solid, sustainable investment in youth, as are the inter-connections and networking.

The Center understands that a strong Network requires several years of support to be efficient and effective. The Center plans to continue its engagement with the YCO Network after 18 months. In future phases, the core team of 216 YCOs may conduct additional cascading training on the state and village level. Pending additional funding being secured for this purpose, the Network could be expanded at peak points to 20,000 in 2023-2024, drawing from grassroots communities across the country to observe critical stages of the transition, including key aspects of the elections, e.g., voter registration, electoral

legal framework developments, election administration preparations, and related political party activities, as well as other transition milestones. However, initial steps need to be taken starting in 2021-2022, in line with this project proposal, to prepare the Network for engagement in 2022 and beyond.

The Center's goal is to help the established Network gradually become a vibrant and self-sustaining entity able to contribute to all stages of the transition and beyond.

IV.   Project Budget

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every GEWE allocation (e.g. training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
Planning			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	X		Nationwide partner consultation and nomination, September 2021. Partner selection, November 2021.
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	X		See Annex E.
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		Focal points in 18 states. 8-10 regional centers. Secretariat in Khartoum.
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		Consultations with Transitional Government since August 2019. Regular contact with governors. March-April 2021: Survey. September 2021: Consultations.
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		Two nationwide consultations and surveys conducted in challenging operational environment.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	X		Elaborated in project document.
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	X		MOU, Ministry of Youth and Sports, August 2020
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		September 2021 consultations with prospective partners, co-created and co-defined nature of arrangements.
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?	N/A		
Gender			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	X		UN PBF consultations. Internal Carter Center gender advisor input.
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?	X		Since 2019.
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	X		Per UN guidance.
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	X		Per UN PBF guidance.

Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	X		Per UN PBF guidance.
2. Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	X		The Carter Center benefits from more than 25 years' experience Sudan, which improves our cost-estimation and cost-effectiveness as well as implementation success.
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	X		The project is nationwide in scale and scope, and uniquely addresses center-periphery divides.
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	X		
5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	X		The Carter Center's staffing in Khartoum and project model nationwide is heavily centered around Sudanese leadership – the Country Representative, Head, Deputy Head– Project Lead, and other key positions are held by Sudanese.
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		X	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		X	Maintenance and fuel costs only. No vehicle.
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	X		The Carter Center has invested resources since 2019 and will provide cost-share.

Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;

- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;

- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations' headquarters);

- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent's website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Annex B.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in

	annual report if timing coincides)	consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
28 February	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
30 April	Report **Q1 expenses** (January to March)
31 July	Report **Q2 expenses** (January to June)
31 October	Report **Q3 expenses** (January to September)
Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will

use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

➢ Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation.
➢ Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE**: If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches).
➢ Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant.
➢ Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE**: If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the youth-led partner organizations will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
➢ Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project.[9]
➢ Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought.
➢ Provides a clear explanation of the youth-led partner organizations's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

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[9] Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age-disaggregated targets)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
Outcome 1: **Increased coordination among youth-led organizations, resulting in integration of youth perspectives on key political and peacemaking processes and public policy as well as the empowerment of young women to fully participate in monitoring and reporting.** Sustainable Development Goals addressed: • **16.6** Develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels. • **16.7** Ensure responsive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels. • **16.10** Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements • **16.A** Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.		Outcome Indicator 1a: Enhanced youth capacity and coordination because of network formation to report on transition priorities and form recommendations reflecting youth perspectives that influence public dialogue, policy and the transition. Baseline: 0 Target: 1 network, 1 national secretariat, 5 recommendations reflected in policy and practice	Means of verification/Source: National secretariat and youth-led partner organization network formed. Government reports and/or key informant interviews Collection: # of recommendations made that are reflected in Government of Sudan policy, laws, and practices as assessed by TCC and partners. Collection: Quarterly Analysis Quarterly	
		Outcome Indicator 1b: Female YCO Network members are empowered to monitor and report on key political and peacemaking processes. Baseline: 0 Target: 50% increase Disaggregation: Sex Age	Means of verification: Self-reported on survey of female YCO members. Collection: before training, at project mid and end points. Analysis: immediately after training, mid and end of term.	• 50% increase in trained female YCO members who report increased capacity and engagement in monitoring and reporting on key transition processes.

Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) goals addressed: • Innovative approach to youth empowerment and participation with the potential for catalytic effect and peacebuilding outcomes. • Enhance support for youth civil society organizations and facilitate their partnership with international youth-led partner organizations, governments, and UN entities in their country. • Support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security. • Innovative projects, focused on gender equality and empowerment, with the potential for catalytic effects and peacebuilding outcomes. 2021 Sudan Universal Periodic Review: • Create an independent National Human Rights Commission and designate sufficient resources for it to operate and to obtain accreditation under the Paris Principles • Adopt a comprehensive Anti-Discrimination or Equalities law, which should include, as grounds of discrimination, race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,		Outcome Indicator 1c: Improved understanding among project beneficiaries of neutral, non-biased observation methodology and key, interlinked political and peacemaking/building issues in the transition. Baseline: pre-training surveys Target: 30% increase Disaggregation: 1. Gender 2. Age 3. Geographic locations (region)	Source: Self-reported – measured on March-April 2021 survey, pre-training, and post-training tests. Collection: March-April 2021, before training, immediately after training, four months after training. Analysis: Immediately after training and four months after training.	• 30% increase in knowledge about the events and political issues related to the transition process • Data will also be compared against data set from March-April 2021 survey (e.g., familiarity with transitional bodies, timeline).
	Output 1.1 Youth-led partner organizations participate actively in national observer network; and state advisory bodies coordinate and represent youth perspective at state and national level.	Output Indicator 1.1.1: Number of sub-grant recipients that implement project activities and number of youth-led partner organizations and Resistance Committees that participate in advisory bodies on state level. Baseline: 0 Target: 8-10 partner youth-led partner organizations, 1750 advisory body participants Disaggregation: 1. Geography (state and/or region)	Means of verification: Memoranda of understanding with youth-led partner organizations; # of observers deployed; attendance lists at sessions of advisory bodies. Collection: quarterly Analysis: immediately after collection	• 8-12 capacitated youth-led partner organizations, representing youth organizations in their area of responsibility. Partners identified through consultative process including nomination by peer organizations. • 25% of mapped youth-led organizations participate in the advisory bodies.
	Output 1.2: Youth-led partner organizations and YCO are trained to conduct non-partisan observation related to key, inter-connected political and peacemaking/building milestones in the transition, and apply their skills collect data and report on transition milestones and key events.	Output Indicator 1.2.1 Using a training of trainer's model, number of YCO recruited, trained and deployed through youth-led partner organizations. Baseline: 0 Target: 216 YCO, including 36 state-level observers and 180 local-level observers.	Means of verification: number of youth deployed as observers Collection: Observer reports submitted. Analysis: Monthly	• Total of 216 YCO, beginning with 36 state-level observers, followed by recruitment, training and deployment of 10 local-level observers in each state by January 2023

		Disaggregation: 1. Gender 2. Geography (region) 3. Age 4. Persons with disabilities (PWD)		
• Criminalize hate speech and racism; adopt public policies to promote human rights and peaceful coexistence, including in educational curricula, and raise community awareness • Grant UNITAMS unfettered access to monitor and report on human rights abuses in conflict areas; issue clear, public orders to all government forces to stop attacks on civilians, and rein in militias; and embark on security sector reform in particular for security forces tasked to provide protection of civilians • Strengthen the judicial system and its independence, to intensify the fight against impunity, including for gender-based violence and the violations of economic, social and cultural rights • Ensure full access to justice for women, including by ensuring that victims of sexual violence receive protection and support to access justice	Output 1.3: YCO Network, managed by national secretariat and youth-led partner organizations, produces public reports based on observer data regarding key political and peacemaking/building developments in the transition.	Output Indicator 1.3.1 Total number of press releases and public reports published by the YCO Network. Baseline: 0 Target: 5 Disaggregation: 1. Publication Date 2.Thematic or Geographic Focus	Source: Press releases and reports will be saved within TCC and YCO Network database. Final versions will be scanned and logged. Collection: Quarterly Analysis: Quarterly	• 5 YCO Network press releases, public statements and reports.
	Output 1.4: Facilitate establishment of the YCO Network components – the secretariat, the linkages between youth-led partner organizations, and the advisory bodies in order to create sustainable observer network capable of increasing scale of observation activities.	Output Indicator 1.4.1: Application facilitated for official Government of Sudan registration as an independent youth-led partner organization Baseline: 0 Target: 1 Network formed and registration process initiated	Source: self-reported Collection: Midpoint and end of project. Analysis: mid-point, end of project term	
		Output Indicator 1.4.2: Increase in TOCA measurements on reporting, advocacy, and monitoring and evaluation among partner youth-led partner organizations. Baseline: TOCA Target: Percentage of increase of TOCA measurements	Source: Self-assessments, Center TOCA assessment of sub-grant youth-led partner organizations, Interview with secretariat staff, TOCA tool Collection: Biannual Analysis: Biannual	• Tool and percentage targets to be defined in co-design phase with partner organizations, based on baseline assessment during first quarter 2022 (initial project phase).

		Disaggregation: 1. Gender 2. Age 3. Training focus		
Outcome 2: **Through coordinated YCO Network efforts, civic space for young women and men promoted and expanded.** Sustainable Development Goals addressed: • **16.3** Promote the rule of law and equal access to justice (related to youth's emphasis on transitional justice, per March-April 2021 survey). • **16.6 & 16.7** (see above)		Outcome Indicator 2a: Percent increase of youth-led organizations participating in the initiative that feel their perspectives are heard in the interlinked political and peacemaking/building processes during the transition. Baseline: pre-project survey with sub-grant partner orgs and observers Target: 10% improvement Data Disaggregated: Size of youth-led partner organization Geographic location	Source: Surveys Collection: first quarter 2022, mid-point of project, end-point. Analysis: Immediately after surveys conducted (includes comparative analysis over time).	Comparisons will also be drawn against March/April 2021 Center survey data among youth orgs to measure targeted partners against findings from larger youth-led partner organization community.
Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) goals addressed: See above. Universal Periodic Review – August 2021: • 52. JS6 was concerned by continued restrictions on the rights to freedoms of opinion and expression, association, and peaceful assembly. *This aligns with the need for networks and coalitions to protect civil space and fundamental freedoms.*		Outcome Indicator 2b: Percent change of youth participating in the initiative who feel the transition/peace process reflects their needs and requirements Baseline: pre-training survey of sub-grant partners and youth-led partner organization activists who participate in observer training Target: 10% improvement Data Disaggregated: Age Gender Persons with Disabilities	Source: Surveys Collection: first quarter 2022, mid-point of the project, end-point. Analysis: Immediately after surveys conducted (includes comparative analysis over time.)	Comparisons will be drawn against March/April 2021 Center survey data among youth orgs to measure targeted partners against findings from larger youth-led partner organization community.

• **34.** ACHPR called on the Transitional Authorities in Sudan to: strengthen the judicial system and its independence, to intensify the fight against impunity, including for gender based violence and the violations of economic, social and cultural rights, and to ensure that those responsible for past and present crimes are held accountable; finalize the Bill establishing the Transitional Justice Council in consultation with all sectors of society and affected communities and in line with the African Union Transitional Justice Policy and guided by the Commission's Study on Transitional Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights in Africa. *This aligns with the nearly 100% of youth organizations surveyed in March-April 2021 that support enhanced transitional justice efforts.* **38.** Elizka Relief Foundation recommended to allow international observers to participate with the Sudanese government in investigating the facts on the violations that occurred against the peaceful demonstrators Fundamental Freedoms: • Refrain from shutting down the internet and blocking social media and make a state pledge to refrain from imposing any future restrictions on internet	Output 2.1 Improved confidence and ability among YCO partner organizations and youth to conduct effective outreach and public communications.	Output Indicator 2.1.1: Youth participants in project implementation express increased confidence in ability to meet and dialogue with stakeholders. Baseline: Established by pre-training survey of representatives of youth-led partner organizations and observers in first quarter 2022. Target: 25% increase in confidence levels among trained participants.	Source: Pre-training responses, re-testing at the mid- and end-points of the project. Collection: Initial phase, mid-point, and end-points. Analysis: Immediately after responses provided, including comparatively over time.	
		Output Indicator 2.1.2: Increase in TOCA measurements in media and communications outreach. Baseline: Survey of representatives of youth-led partner organizations and secretariat in first quarter 2022. Target: 25% increase of TOCA measurements Disaggregation: 1. Gender 2. Age 3. Training focus	Source: TOCA assessment Collection: Interview with secretariat staff, TOCA tool Analysis: Biannual	Mid-point responses. 25% increase in TOCA measurements related to media, public information and communications.
	Output 2.2 YCO Network engages with stakeholders and policy makers on process, key findings and recommendations for political reforms and peacemaking/building processes.	Output Indicator 2.2.1: Number of advocacy meetings held with stakeholders. Individual stakeholder meetings, public forums and/or public online discussions including government officials or other stakeholders on issues related to YCO findings and recommendations regarding political and peace processes during the transition. Baseline: 0	Source: Weekly reports Collection: Weekly Analysis: Quarterly	2.2: Number of advocacy meetings with policymakers/stakeholders and/or public forums (on-line or in-person) at the project mid-point.

access and telecommunication • Adopt a comprehensive national strategy and a draft law to combat all forms of violence against women, including women's rights female defenders, • Low rate of female representation in the current cabinet is a violation and contravention of the Constitution; Juba Agreement stipulates women's representation in the cabinet be 40%		Target: 10 advocacy meetings and/or public discussions, with minimum 600 participants in total. Disaggregation: 1. Number of attendees 2. Organization or institution represented	
Outcome 3: **Improved capacity of YCO and the representatives of youth-led partner organizations, particularly young women, to identify and mitigate conflict at a local and national level.** Sustainable Development Goals addressed: • **16.6 & 16.7** (see above) Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) goals addressed: See above. Universal Periodic Review – August 2021: • **19.** NHRC noted with concern the growth of hate speech, racism and racial discrimination and the rise of ethnic conflicts, in the absence of relevant legislative and administrative		Outcome Indicator 3a: Situations of violence or potential violence are mitigated directly or indirectly by the YCO Network. Baseline: 0 Target: 2 incidents/flashpoints are identified with follow-on engagement. Disaggregation: 1. Location.	Source: Reports by YCO and youth-led partner organizations; reports of meetings. Collection: Weekly Analysis: Monthly	Number of incidents/flashpoints identified, with follow-on engagement, at the project mid-point.
		Outcome Indicator 3b: Misinformation/disinformation awareness strengthened. Baseline: 0 Target: steps taken to inform stakeholders and Sudanese citizens of early warning signs to counter misinformation/disinformation. Disaggregation: 1. Location. 2. Gender.	Source: Reports and observations Collection: Weekly Analysis: Monthly	Number of incidents identified.

measures and public policies.	Output 3.1 Observers are trained in conflict mitigation which they share with YCO; together, these young people put their conflict mitigation training into practice by, for example, conducting outreach to government officials regarding early warning signs of potential violence.	Output Indicator 3.1.1: (a) Percentage of YCO and representatives of youth-led partner organizations trained on conflict mitigation who report improved understanding of conflict mitigation best practices. (b) Number of meetings held with stakeholders to inform interlocutors, discuss potential flashpoints, and offer recommendations. Baseline: Zero Target: (a) 90% of YCO and representatives of youth-led partner organizations; 30% of members of advisory bodies (representatives); (b) 5 meetings. Disaggregation: 1. Gender 2. Age 3. Location	(a) Source: Feedback information sheets (self-reporting). Collection: Before training, immediately after training, four months after training. Analysis: Immediately after training and four months after training. (b) Weekly, monthly and/or quarterly reports.	(a) Percentage of YCO and representatives of youth-led partner organizations trained in conflict mitigation, at the project mid-point. (b) Number of meetings with policymakers and/or other stakeholders at the project mid-point.

December 16, 2021

Re: PROPOSED UPDATE TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND 2021 GYPI AWARDED PROJECT: *Sudan/ YPI/ The Carter Center, Inc./Sudan Youth Citizen Observer Network: Strengthening Youth's Role as Peacebuilders and Promoters of Civic Space in Sudan's Transition/ Civic Space/ $1,498,342*

The Carter Center proposes the following updates to the awarded project referenced above.

1. **Project document and implementation will reflect PAC recommendations**.

PAC Recommendation	Status
Closely consult with PBF Secretariat on alignment with existing and planned PBF and other UN initiatives	Ongoing
Develop a detailed activity-based workplan that clarifies how gender-responsiveness is ensured beyond representation of women, by addressing structural barriers; how government change in behavior and openness/responsiveness to network is targeted	Project planning workshop with partners, January 2022
Start conversations early about sustainability, potential future funding	Initiated in 2021
Ensure sufficient budget for final evaluation of at least $30,000 (currently lumped together with monitoring, total budget $112,000)	Confirmed

2. **Project documents will be updated in light of events since the submission of the application.**
   Specifically:
   ▪ The Peacebuilding Context and Rationale (Section I) will be updated to account for the October 25 coup and the November 21 political agreement and capture youth reactions to these developments.
   ▪ Risk mitigation: The need to train staff as well as program participants should be included in the workplan; official support of the transitional government to engage youth has been secured.
   ▪ Implementation planning (Section II): adjust timelines.
     o Complete comprehensive partner recruitment and selection assessment in eastern states, which was delayed due to October 25 coup and the general fluidity of the security situation.
     o Complete administrative and financial capacity assessment of sub-grant recipients.
   ▪ Annexes B (Budget) and C (Log Frame) will reflect any changes above.
   ▪ Annex J (YCO Network structure) could emphasize that "beneficiaries" include Resistance Committees.

3. **Articulate immediate priorities in first three months of implementation.**
   ▪ Finalization of consultation meetings (eastern states).
   ▪ Administrative and financial capacity assessment and selection of partners.
   ▪ Establishment of the YCO Network secretariat.
   ▪ Liaise with UN PBF in Sudan.
   ▪ Recruitment and selection of key project personnel.
   ▪ Orientation and planning workshop with partners.
   ▪ Preparation of detailed work plan with partners.
   ▪ Project launch with partners and the UN PBF.

Totals	
	Carter Center
1. Staff and other personnel	$ 26,664.00
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	$ 13,500.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	$ -
4. Contractual services	$ 361,184.00
5. Travel	$ -
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	$ 868,371.00
7. General Operating and other Costs	$ 130,600.00
Sub-total	$ 1,400,319.00
7% Indirect Costs	$ 98,022.33
Total	$ **1,498,341.33**

Performance-Based Tranche Breakdown		
	Carter Center	**Tranche %**
First Tranche:	$ 524,419.47	**35%**
Second Tranche:	$ 524,419.47	**35%**
Third Tranche:	$ 449,502.40	**30%**
TOTAL	$ 1,498,341.33	