

**LOTFA**

Law and Order Trust  
Fund for Afghanistan



**Annual Report for the  
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan  
Multi-Partner Trust Fund**

**(1 January to 31 December 2022)**

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# INTRODUCTION

This consolidated Annual Report of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Multi-Partner Trust Fund (LOTFA MPTF) is prepared by the LOTFA Project Closure Team, Trust Fund Management Unit (TFMU) and the MPTF Office in fulfillment of their obligations, as per the Fund's Terms of Reference (TOR), the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and the Standard Administrative Arrangement (SAA) signed with contributors. This consolidated report covers the period 1 January until 31 December 2021 and provides narrative and financial data on progress made in the implementation of the LOTFA MPTF. It is posted on the MPTF Office [Gateway](#).

## SECTION 1: PROGRESS REPORT

### LOTFA KEY RESULTS IN 2022

1. The Fund, Fiduciary and Financial Management team under TFMU ensured effective cash management as well as regular reporting to donors, on the close out.
2. Seventy-one pieces of capital assets with a Net Book Value of US\$697,267.15<sup>1</sup> recovered from the MOIA compound were transferred to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for use by Area-Based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives (ABADEI) projects. Three pieces of capital assets, with a Net Book Value of US\$20,588.90 were written off as they could not be recovered.
3. By the end of December 2022, all commitments on all three LOTFA projects were closed and operational closure in the UNDP corporate Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system had begun.
4. The Strategic Assessment of LOTFA funding over the past two decades was completed and presented at the Steering Committee meeting held in December.
5. Final review reports were completed for the Support to Payroll Management (SPM), Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), and MOIA COVID-19 projects.
6. Final evaluations were completed for the COPS and SPM projects.

### FUND OVERVIEW

The Steering Committee meeting of 4 November 2021 resulted in operational foreclosure of the SPM and COPS projects effective 4 December 2021 resulting in UNDP continuing with a lean structure for the LOTFA closure process. Consequently, in 2022 the Fund provided updates on the project closure and the LOTFA Strategic Assessment at four donor meetings (January, March, August and November).

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<sup>1</sup> As of August 2021

## STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Although project implementation discontinued in mid-August 2021 with operational foreclosure in December 2021, the Fund in its frozen state continued to maintain the 10 strategic objectives.

## GOVERNANCE

The Fund's governance structure continued to work with members of the Technical Level and convened four LOTFA donor sessions to discuss the LOTFA project close out and Strategic Assessment. The Trust Fund facilitated one Steering Committee meeting in December 2022.

## LOTFA MONITORING & EVALUATION

The TFMU, based on instructions from the LOTFA Steering Committee launched and completed the Strategic Assessment of LOTFA through an independent third-party firm. The assessment intended to assess and understand the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, including management arrangements and success or failure of LOTFA over more than 20 years of its life through the following key questions:

7. What did LOTFA achieve during its life? This is looked at based on LOTFA's achievements against its strategic objective areas and LOTFA's contribution to A-SDG indicators and other national development frameworks.
8. What are the key lessons that could be learned from LOTFA in terms of what worked and what did not work?
9. What are some of the key gains that the UNDP and the LOTFA contributing donors could further build on in the new political context in Afghanistan?

The Strategic Assessment concluded that during the two decades of operations, LOTFA left a significant positive impact and as with any intervention, this also came with many shortcomings. LOTFA was successful in capacity building, developing legal protections for victims of gender-based violence (GBV), improving opportunities for women in education, employment, and leisure, enhancing the police force with women officers, and finally generating awareness on community policing. However, LOTFA has its share of pitfalls primarily due to its lack of a multi-year strategy and shortsightedness, which did not translate into sustainable long-term reforms.




## LOTFA THEMATIC WINDOWS AND PROJECTS

Following the closure of all LOTFA funded projects in December 2021, UNDP established a dedicated team for the orderly closure of all three projects with the objective to free up all unused funds which could be either returned to respective donors or re-purposed as mutually agreed. The project closure team continued to make progress on the operational closures—i.e., Support to Payroll Management (SPM),



Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), and MOIA COVID-19. The following presents the status as of 31 December 2022:

1. Seventy-one pieces of capital assets with a Net Book Value of US\$697,267.15 recovered from the MOIA compound were transferred to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for use by Area-Based Approach for Development Emergency Initiatives (ABADEI) projects. Only three pieces of capital assets, with a Net Book Value of US\$20,588.90 were written off as they could not be recovered. The assets were not recoverable for reasons articulated below:

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>The fire suppression system (SPM project)</b> was installed in the walls of the project's Disaster Risk Resilience (DRR) site, located at the MOIA's Training General Command. The team was able to retrieve only the control unit while the remaining units remained in the walls and trying to recover those would cause significant damage to the MOIA building.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>The DELL PowerEdge Server R830 (SPM project)</b> was located at the Provincial Police HQ in Kandahar, and under the current circumstance, we are unable to recover the equipment.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>The CISCO Catalyst Switch 3850 (COPS project)</b> was located at the MOIA main compound but was not traced during the recovery process and therefore the equipment not traceable.</li> </ul>	

2. By the end of December 2022, all commitments on all three LOTFA projects were closed and operational closure in the UNDP corporate ERP system had begun.
3. Final review reports were completed for the SPM, COPS, and COVID-19 projects.
4. Final evaluations were completed for the COPS and SPM projects.

The TFMU maintained contact with LOTFA donors, providing updates and clarifications when required.

## STEERING COMMITTEE

In 2022, LOTFA held one Steering Committee meeting in December and deliberated on the five discussion items below:

1. Approval of LOTFA Steering Committee Meeting Minutes of 4 November 2021.
2. Briefing on the LOTFA Strategic Assessment Report.
3. Update on LOTFA Project Closure.
4. Approval of write-off of three project capital assets with a Net Book Value of US\$20,588.90.
5. LOTFA Reprogramming (Access to Justice for Women) and re-establishment of LOTFA Secretariat.



Empowered lives.  
Resilient nations.

# COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) PROJECT

## FINAL REPORT

(1 January 2020 – 04 December 2021)



COVER PAGE PHOTO: A female ANP officer listens to women's challenges at the PD level – Police and Community Consultation Session - Kabul

# UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT

## DONORS

Australia



Canada



Croatia



Czech Republic



Denmark



Estonia



European Union

Finland



Germany



Hungary



Italy



Japan



Netherlands

New Zealand



Norway




Poland



Romania



United Kingdom



United States of America

## PROJECT INFORMATION

Project ID:	Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
Duration:	1 Jan 2020 – 04 December 2021
ANDS Component:	2.3: Political and Security Outlook
Contributing to NPP:	NPP1 Afghan Peace and Reintegration NPP5 Law and Justice for All
CPD Outcome:	CPD Outcome 2 Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increase in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the Government's legal obligations.
UNDP Strategic Plan Component:	Outcome 2: Accelerate structural transformations for sustainable development
Total Budget:	\$ 15,763,832.00
Total Expenditure:	\$ 1,833,430.35
Implementing Partner:	Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)
Key Responsible Parties:	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Project Manager:	Abdul Khalil Haidari, a.i.
Head of Peace Pillar:	Chencho Dorjee a.i.
Responsible Senior Deputy Resident Representative:	Surayo Buzurukova

## ACRONYMS

ANP	Afghan National Police
BoQ	Bill of Quantity
COPS	Community Oriented Policing Services
CPPS	Community and Police Perception Survey
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CPA	Community Policing in Afghanistan
EU	European Union
FD	Facilities Directorate of MoIA
FRU	Family Response Unit
GD	General Directorate
GDIC	General Directorate of International Coordination
GEDA	German Development Agency
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPPT	German Police Team
ICT	Information, Communications, and Technology
IP	Implementing Partner
ITB	Invitation to Bid
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MISP	Ministry of Interior Strategic Plan
MoIA	Ministry of Interior Affairs
MPD	Ministry of Interior Affairs and Police Development
PD	Police District
PeM	Police-e-Mardumi
PHQ	Police Headquarters
PID	Police Information Desk
PMO	Project Management Office
PSC	Police Staff College
Q1	Quarter 1
Q2	Quarter 2
Q3	Quarter 3
RFP	Request for Proposal
RS	Resolute Support
SBCC	Social and Behavior Change Communication
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SoW	Scope of Work
SPSS	Security Police Performance and Safety on Streets
SWTWG	Security Window Technical Working Group
TBD	To be determined
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
TSM	Transitional Support to the MoIA

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Community-oriented Policing Services (COPS) project which is funded through the Security Window of the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), built and expanded on proven methods of improving relations between police and local communities in Afghanistan to improve the delivery of police services at the community level. The project contributed to the overall safety and security environment within communities, resulting in an increased public trust and confidence in the rule of law and security institutions aimed at promoting the work of Community Oriented Policing COP team and its concept integration in the work of Afghan National Police. The project first two years focused collaborating with Kabul's Provincial Headquarters and 19 Police Districts identified in the Annual Workplan 2020 and 2021 mutually agreed by government counterparts.

The project intended to achieve four outputs, namely, improved capacity of Kabul Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform; improved police response to community needs and priorities; constructed/rehabilitated standard Police Districts (PDs) to support community-oriented policing; and, improved administrative services at PD levels to support police services.

The significant accomplishments of the 1<sup>st</sup> year of implementation were completion of the assessment of 13 Police Districts (PDs) in Kabul. Such intended to identify infrastructures that needed repair and replacement with the following identified PDs, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, and 17. Later, the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) requested that the project included PDs 4, 6, 7, and 8 because these PDs were its priorities. The project, which was developed in consultation with the MoIA Infrastructure and Engineering Directorates, the Office of the H.E. Minister of Interior, and the Community Policing Directorates, began with the piloting of four police information centers in the designated Police Districts of Kabul in 2021. Various repairs and minor construction projects were identified as requiring immediate assistance, including security upgrades, electrical and water system upgrades, a sewer system upgrade, and the installation of toilets for males and females. The state of the current Family Response Units (FRUs), female prison cells, and Police-e-Mardumi meeting halls were also examined as part of the assessment. The project construction evaluation of bids was launched overall 13 construction firms paid visit for the site assessment. The team prepared four months implementation plan for the establishment of these centers, the contract was not awarded due to the exceptional circumstances and regime change.

In the first quarter of 2022 a comprehensive Term of Reference to improve police and community partnership was created based on the Community and Police Perception Survey CPSS findings of 2020. Major recommendation provided to roll out contextualized initiatives at the community level aimed at improving trust and confidence building activities. . The project awarded a contract aimed at assisting MoIA-related directorates and police departments (PDs) in developing a sense of duty and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing by piloting Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) campaigns at the 19 PD of Kabul. Those engagements intended to prevent and

reduce crimes by developing key messages offering police tips and advice that are targeted at crime prevention and reduction. The project organized 19 Community and Police Consultation Sessions where 1,200 members of communities from civil society, marginalized groups and women and youth, members of community policing Shuras attended out of which 650 were female members. The activity aimed at developing community and police councils monthly work plan and COP team to organize monthly consultation sessions with less support (logistical part) from the donors. The 60 ANP officers successfully implemented 19 consultation sessions without engagement from any donor.

In addition, contract for functional assessment of the Kabul police departments awarded, aimed to contribute to MoIA's four-year strategic plan (MISP), the project focused reviewing the current training need of ANP, resources for required for the successful integration of COP concept, reporting line and chain of command. This assignment also assessed the current challenges facing PHQ Kabul including administrative procedures, training, and equipment, to provide MISP with the necessary support. The Kabul PHQ and PDs assessment successfully conducted. The assessment covered 680 ANP officers at the PHQ and PD level out of which 220 were female ANP. Several challenges exist in the administrative procedures and other areas of police stations, including, but not limited to, the planning process, resource allocation and deployment, regular oversight and monitoring mechanisms, responsiveness and problem solving, and the ability to assess administrative capacity among others. The gaps in the functionalities of police stations' administrative capabilities were found, and recommendations provided for the on-the-job training and resource mobilization. A proposed action plan was produced in collaboration with PHQ and the 19 PDs to close the gaps and overcome the obstacles identified. As the result of the assessment, the project developed resource mobilization plan of ICT equipment, training guides book and training of trainer's manual for ANP. Both projects (resource mobilization and training manuals) not delivered since the project was closed due to regime change.

Furthermore, the team organized two days of community consultation in Kabul Police Districts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 12 to instill a sense of responsibility and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing by conducting grassroots community and police consultation sessions at the district and district level in the identified PDs of the capital. The Community Consultation assisted in collecting critical suggestions from the PeM Shuras, which were led by the Community Policing Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The events drew 1,800 people from Kabul's six municipal districts, with 730 female and 1170 male participants from Shuras.

During the second year of implementation, the following milestones were being accomplished:

The project organised a four-day cascading training for PD education offices and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors within the Output One. PHQ and PD education officers benefited directly. Eighty-eight participants, thirty-five of the number were female officers. One of the concrete outcomes was, they learned how to manage resources to build trust, provide weekly community consultation reports, and make clear recommendations to



Kabul PHQ for aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.

In addition, based on the recommendations from the PD and PHQ assessment the project developed reporting guidelines for MoIA PDs. The project team drafted SOPs with Kabul PHQ Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Following this, a five-day training was organized at the MoIA headquarters with eighteen (18) senior officials (directors and deputy directors) presenting the draft SOP for feedback and recommendations.

Based on the assessments conducted at the PD level and the CPSS findings the project awarded contract for "Supporting Kabul Police Districts to Improve Community Policing". The project facilitated nineteen (19) community and police consultation sessions. The UNDP COPS local implementing partner organized the two-day community consultation. The activity aimed to bring the police and the community together through SBCC. During the six days of community consultation, 568 community members participated, 255 of whom were female. The final project report and recommendations were handed over to Kabul P.D.s with audiovisuals.

Further, an On-the-job and classroom training in SBCC was completed in two weeks for MoIA personnel in Media and Public Relations, Gender and Human Rights, Religious & Cultural Affairs, Family Response Units (FRU), and Community Policing. It covered MoIA directorates and Kabul 19 P.D.s. For proactive community policing and crime prevention, the training covered SBCC. The training brought together 190 MoIA-related PDs (70 Female ANP Officers and 120 Male ANP Officers). The training was based on the 2019 police perception survey and the five-directorate capacity-building assessments.

1. PHQ and PD level interviewees. The project completed the second round of 60 bi-lateral interviews, 20 of which were female ANP members. Experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers were part of the in-depth interviews to determine what behaviors and situations could lead to or prevent crime. ANP and community input was sought for better programs that could lead to community and police councils and maintain neighborhood security as part of the MoIA's broader public initiative.
2. The project launched three docuseries about police professionalism, the Police Information Center, police impartiality and public trust in law enforcement, police commitment to public safety, police conduct and behavior, police respect for human rights, police and the rule of law, and police ethics. The six P.D.s were equipped with video docuseries showing ANP officers how to gradually integrate community policing concepts into their duties.
3. Based on the assessments of PDs of Kabul, the project completed the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in five Kabul Police Districts (P.D.s 1-5). The training program aimed at uniting police and the community to combat crimes and

insurgencies. The MoIA trained 12 officers and 270 commissioned, non-commissioned, and P.D. personnel, 108 of whom were female police officers. The activity aimed at building sustainability and ownership so that COP team and ANP officers could implement such initiatives without donors' intervention.

## II. CONTEXT

A four-year UNDP project, titled Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS), was approved by the LOTFA Steering Committee in 2020. The project focused on supporting the ANP to (1) increase trust and cooperation between communities and the police through an enhanced Police-e-Mardumi (PeM) methodology, which was prepared based on the Ministry of Interior Strategic Plan (MISP), including piloting new approaches that will allow the ANP to capture the voices of the community, and (2) the establishment Provincial Headquarters and Police Districts in Kabul are the primary focus of the project, and six PDs have been selected to participate in the initial phase of project implementation in Kabul (PD 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12).

Under the Security Window of the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the Community-oriented Policing Services (COPS) project builds and expands on proven methods of improving relations between police and local communities in Afghanistan with the objective of improving the delivery of police services at the community level. It aimed to improve the overall security environment and security within communities, resulting in improved public trust towards accountable rule of law and security institutions. The project focused on Provincial Headquarters and Police Districts and integration of COP concept in the work of 19 PDs and Kabul PHQ in 2021.

The regular shift and replacements in the MoIA leadership and key counterparts i.e the General Directorates GDs, the project couldn't complete the timely consultation and approval of community and police development work in Kabul PDs.

## III. PERFORMANCE REVIEW

Despite the security threats, movement restrictions, and COVID-19 the project implemented community oriented policing training programmes and completed the following major deliverables in Kabul 19 PD and PHQ The Police Perception Survey and findings from the assessments of Kabul PHQ and PDs formed the baselined for implementing the following major deliverables These activities covered the Country Programme Document CPD outcome 2 Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increase in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the Government's legal obligations.

1. The project strengthened collaboration between Police and Community Partnership in the (6) Police Districts PDs of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and

community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication SBCC actions. The training targeted 50 ANP officers and 300 community members in community and police consultations and awareness on the code of conduct.

2. The project implemented the assessment of Kabul Police Headquarter PHQ and Kabul 19 Police Districts PDs. The assessment feed into the development of Community and Police Initiatives for Kabul Police Provincial HQ and inform subsequent HQ actions and decision's in recognizing the current administrative, reporting and community policing challenges Kabul PHQ and PDs faced.
3. The project finalized the scope of work for the establishment of Police Information Desks PIDs in the (6) PDs of Kabul city. The PIDs are smaller in comparison to the Public Information Centers PICs established at the PD level with focus on case referral, case follow-up and particularly focusses on follow up and registration of cases related to women and girls at the PD level. The contract award was affected due to regime change.
4. The project implemented cascading model of training for 290 ANP officers in undertaking community outreach events including 120 school sessions, 12 university sessions, 10 Radio Police Sessions and print and dissemination of outreach materials i.e., notebooks, pen and school bags for school students. The activity aimed at targeting education institutions and building partnership with these institutions for trust and confidence building initiatives.
5. The project organized training of trainers in resource management, reporting and community policing for Kabul Police Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) and Kabul Police District (PDs) personnel. The training was conducted based on the capacity need assessment conducted by PDs education offices and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were PHQ and PDs education officers. A total of 22 participants (8 Female Officers and 14 Male Officers) benefited from the training. As a result of the one-week training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
6. The project completed the Kabul Police Headquarters (PHQ) assessment contract award. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring and implementation of community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ.
7. The project completed desk review of Kabul PHQ and Kabul PDs related to existing reporting, chain of command and community policing. The project team, in consultation with the Kabul PHQ, prepared the draft Standard Operation Procedures (SOP). A 3-day on-the-job training was organized and facilitated by project targeting 112 ANP officers from PDs and PHQ.
8. The project completed a total of six consultations, under the title of "Strengthening Police and Community Partnership Consultations" in Police Districts (PDs) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female, attended these (6) days of community consultation sessions.

9. Based on the findings from PHQ and PDs assessments the project conducted a four-day training in February 2021 from the related departments and headquarters of MoIA; aimed to build the capacity of PDs education officers and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. A total of 88 participants out of which 35 were Female Officers. As a result of the four days training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
10. As the result of the assessment and CPSS findings the project developed reporting guideline for MoIA PDs personnel. The project team, in consultation with the Kabul PHQ, prepared the draft Standard Operation Procedures (SOP). In follow-up a 5-day training organised in the MoIA headquarter with participation of 18 senior officials (directors and deputy directors) in presenting the draft SOP in order to receive feedback and recommendation for finalizing the SOP.
11. The project completed a total of 19 community and police consultation sessions, under the title of "Supporting Kabul Police Districts to Improve Community Policing" The two days community consultation session was organised by UNDP COPS local implementing partner. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female, attended these (6) days of community consultation sessions.
12. The project completed two-week classroom and on-the-job training in Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) to MoIA -related PDs personnel in Media and Public Relations, Gender and Human Rights, Religious and Cultural Affairs, Family Response Units (FRU) and Community Policing. The first training covered the MoIA directorates where the second training targeted Kabul 19 PDs. The training covered how to apply SBCC and the ways it can be utilized for proactive community policing and crime prevention. A total of 190 participants from the MoIA- related PDs attended the training with (70 Female ANP Officers and 120 Male ANP Officers). The training was conducted based on information gathered through the capacity building assessment of the five directorates and the police perception survey of 2019.
13. The project completed the second round of bi-lateral interviews targeting 60 interviews, out of which 20 were female members of ANP. The in-depth interviews were organized with experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers in order to ascertain what behaviours and situations could lead to or prevent crimes. By obtaining insights, from the ANP and the community, for better programmes that could lead to community and police councils and sustain security in the neighborhood, the activity aimed to implement the MoIA's broader public initiative.
14. The project launched three docuseries about Police Professional Behavior, Police Information Center, Police Impartiality, Public Confidence, Police Commitment, Police Conduct and Behavior, Police Respect for Human Rights, Police and the Rule of Law, Police and Fighting Corruption and Ethics. The video docuseries displayed in the six PDs, where ANP Officers learned the gradual integration of community policing concepts into their duties in their respective communities.

15. The project implemented the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in 5 Police Districts of Kabul city (P.Ds 1-5). The training programme was aimed at bringing police and community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MoIA trained 12 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 Commissioned, Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs) and PDs personnel, 108 of whom were female police officers.

## **IV. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW**

### **A. Quality of Partnerships**

The movement restriction and COVID-19 implications caused delay in the implementation of project activities. The project in consultation with MoIA counterparts applied the involvement of third parties i.e., the Civil Society Organizations, Professional Firms and Non-governmental organizations. During the AWP development and consultation, the team along with MoIA counterparts identified the areas that requires partnerships with local CSOs/NGOs and professional firms. This included community consultation sessions in the 19 PDs of Kabul, training of ANP in Social and Behavior Change Communication SBCC, conducting Kabul PDs assessments and PHQ assessments and implementation of outreach activities through the third parties.

### **B. National Ownership**

The project involved MoIA as the key counterparts in the development of project work plan, concept note development and activity implementation. During the course two years, the team immensely involved MoIA directorates of public information and media, community policing and 119, gender and children rights, family response units, Kabul PDs COP officers and deputy ministers at the broader level. The project ensured MoIA aforesaid directorates takes ownership. This included the development of project ownership plan endorsed by directorate of community policing and 119. Following the development of this plan, MoIA took lead in facilitating bi-weekly community policing coordination meetings where national NGOs and international organizations including UNDP was co-chairing these sessions.

### **C. Sustainability**

It is vital to ensure timely implementation of project deliverables and involve MoIA related directorates in the project formulation and implementation. i.e., the project facilitated the implementation of grass-root consultation sessions in three PDs of Kabul city while the remaining 16 PDs were facilitated by MoIA. This way, MoIA was enabled to take lead in any development work. Until 14 August 2021, the project trained 120 MoIA Community Policing Officers in Kabul PHQ and PDs to take lead in implementation of broader outreach and awareness programmes, community consultation sessions and implementation of mosque outreach sessions in Kabul.

## V. RESULTS

### A. OUTPUT 1: Capacity of Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform improved

The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) project intended to build capacities of the Kabul police headquarters in leading and sustaining reform efforts. One of the included activities was the assessment of Kabul PHQ's ability to plan and oversee operations and its ability to collect evidence and data to monitor implementation plans and provide support to local police departments.

The followings are the major results under output 1:

1. The project implemented the assessment of Kabul Police Headquarter PHQ and Kabul 19 Police Districts PDs. The assessment feed into the development of Community and Police Initiatives for Kabul Police Provincial HQ and inform subsequent HQ actions and decision's in recognizing the current administrative, reporting and community policing challenges Kabul PHQ and PDs faced.
2. The project organized training of trainers in resource management, reporting and community policing for Kabul Police Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) and Kabul Police District (PDs) personnel. The training was conducted based on the capacity need assessment conducted by PDs education offices and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were PHQ and PDs education officers. A total of 22 participants (8 Female Officers and 14 Male Officers) benefited from the training. As a result of the one-week training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
3. The project completed the Kabul Police Headquarters (PHQ) assessment contract award. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring and implementation of community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ. As the result, a detailed assessment of PHQ assessment completed, reviewed and approved by MoIA Deputy Minister for Security Affairs. The assessment led to the development of 1 year on the job training of Kabul PHQ staff.
4. The project completed desk review of Kabul PHQ and Kabul PDs related to existing reporting, chain of command and community policing. The project team, in consultation with the Kabul PHQ, prepared the draft Standard Operation Procedures (SOP). A 3-day on-the-job training was organized and facilitated by project targeting 112 ANP officers from PDs and PHQ.

Below is a snapshot of where [COPS] is in relation to its annual targets.

Table 1a. 2020 Annual Targets:

Indicator		Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Comments
1.1.	Availability of Comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments at PHQ	TBD after Organizational review of PHQ planned for July – August 2019	1.1.  Comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments completed, and data inform Capacity Development Plans	0%	Off track – in year 1 due to delay in the staff recruitment and project approval.
1.2.	Extent to which PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs a) Fully aligned b) Partially aligned c) Not aligned Following plans are meant in this indicator: - Budget planning and formulation (including for PDs) - PEM implementation plan - Staffing and change management plans - Infrastructure improvement plan - Procurement of Equipment, PPE and maintenance plans	TBD following assessments of the plans as well as PHQ organizational review	1.2 PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs	0%	Off track – in year 1 due to delay in the staff recruitment and project approval.

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Comments
1.3.# of functions at PHQ and PDs optimized and adjusted to improve coordination between the two	# = 0 functions identified for optimization	1.3 # of functions identified and agreed for optimization	0%	Off track – in year 1 due to delay in the staff recruitment and project approval.

Table 1b. 2021 Annual Targets

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievement	Comments
1.4. Availability of Comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments at PHQ	TBD after Organizational review of PHQ planned for July – August 2019	1.1. Comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments completed, and data inform Capacity Development Plans	100% a) Completed individual and organization capacity assessment b) Completed organizational capacity assessment	
1.5. Extent to which PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs d) Fully aligned e) Partially aligned f) Not aligned Following plans are meant in this indicator: - Budget planning and formulation (including for PDs) - PEM implementation plan	TBD following assessments of the plans as well as PHQ organizational review	1.2 PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs	50% a) First group of PHQ staff trained b) First group of COPS staff trained c) Plans developed for eight PDs out 19	Partially aligned – as the second group of PHQ and COP staff were not trained on remaining 11 PDs



Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievement	Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Staffing and change management plans</li> <li>- Infrastructure improvement plan</li> <li>- Procurement of Equipment, PPE and maintenance plans</li> </ul>				
1.6.# of functions at PHQ and PDs optimized and adjusted to improve coordination between the two	# = 0 functions identified for optimization	1.3 # of functions identified and agreed for optimization	50% <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) First group of PHQ staff trained</li> <li>b) First group of COPS staff trained</li> <li>c) Plans developed for eight PDs out 19</li> </ul>	Total 12 functions identified, needs analysis and assessment. Pending contract award.

## B. OUTPUT 2: Improved Police Response to Community Needs and Priorities

The project worked with MoIA counterparts Kabul PHQ, Directorate of Religious and Culture Affairs, Public Relation and Kabul PD commanders to implement the following as part of improved police response to communities needs and recommendations on the bases of the CPSS findings and the assessments conducted in the 19 PDs of Kabul city.

1. The project strengthened collaboration between Police and Community Partnership in the (6) Police Districts PDs of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication SBCC actions. The training targeted 50 ANP officers and 300 community members in community and police consultations and awareness on the code of conduct.
2. The project implemented cascading model of training for 290 ANP officers in undertaking community outreach events including 120 school sessions, 12 university sessions, 10 Radio Police Sessions and print and dissemination of outreach materials i.e notebooks, pen and school bags for school students. The activity aimed at targeting education institutions and building partnership with these institutions for trust and confidence building initiatives.
3. The project completed a total of six consultations, under the title of “Strengthening Police and Community Partnership Consultations” in Police Districts (PDs) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female, attended these (6) days of community consultation sessions.
4. Based on the findings from PHQ and PDs assessments the project conducted a four days training in February 2021 from the related departments and headquarters of MoIA; aimed to build the capacity of PDs education officers and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. A total of 88 participants out of which 35 were Female Officers. As a result of the four days training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
5. The project completed a total of 19 community and police consultation sessions, under the title of “Supporting Kabul Police Districts to Improve Community Policing” The two days community consultation session was organised by UNDP COPS local implementing partner. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female, attended these (6) days of community consultation sessions.
6. Under output (2), the project completed two-week classroom and on-the-job training in Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) to MoIA-related PDs personnel in Media and Public Relations, Gender and Human Rights, Religious and Cultural Affairs, Family Response Units (FRU) and Community Policing. The first training covered the MoIA directorates where the second training targeted Kabul 19

PDs. The training covered how to apply SBCC and the ways it can be utilized for proactive community policing and crime prevention. A total of 190 participants from the MoIA- related PDs attended the training with (70 Female ANP Officers and 120 Male ANP Officers). The training was conducted based on information gathered through the capacity building assessment of the five directorates and the police perception survey of 2019.

7. The project completed the second round of bi-lateral interviews targeting 60 interviews, out of which 20 were female members of ANP. The in-depth interviews were organized with experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers in order to ascertain what behaviours and situations could lead to or prevent crimes. By obtaining insights, from the ANP and the community, for better programmes that could lead to community and police councils and sustain security in the neighborhood, the activity aimed to implement the MoIA's broader public initiative.
8. The project launched three docuseries about Police Professional Behavior, Police Information Center, Police Impartiality, Public Confidence, Police Commitment, Police Conduct and Behavior, Police Respect for Human Rights, Police and the Rule of Law, Police and Fighting Corruption and Ethics. The video docuseries displayed in the six PDs, where ANP Officers learned the gradual integration of community policing concepts into their duties in their respective communities.
9. The team also organized a two-day community consultation in Kabul Police Districts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 12. At the meetings, 1,800 people participated, including 630 women from Kabul's six district offices (PDs). Part of this output is to develop/strengthen the sense of duty and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing at the grassroots level by conducting community and police consultation sessions in the identified PDs of Kabul. Requests for Proposals (RFPs) were produced, approved, and then launched and contracted in this period.

Based on the outcome of the community consultations, the team generated two Request for Proposals (RFPs) due to the community consultation in the six police departments (PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 12) and the findings from the Community and Police Perception Survey CPSS. The two initiatives were being pursued: first, to assist Kabul Police Districts to provide improved community-oriented policing services; second, to strengthen police and community partnerships. To incorporate community policing into ANP plans and actions, these two efforts engaged the General Directorates of Strategic Communication, Community Policing, Gender, and Children Rights, and Gender and Children Rights of the MoIA.

- A) Implementation of Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) campaigns at the PD level to prevent and reduce crime and producing key messages offering police's tips and advice targeted at crime prevention. Using SBCC actions, the activity aimed to bring the police and the community together. This one-day community consultation included 568 community members, 255 women.

1.1. SBCC Expert Interviewees - Thirty ANP officers (8 females and 12 males) were interviewed in six Kabul PDs. Experts, community members, and ANP male and

female officers underwent in-depth interviews to learn what behaviors and situations could lead to or prevent crimes.

- 1.2. SBCC Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) - Four female and 16 male ANP officers participated at each of the 30 FGDs. Such purpose was to gain insight into what behaviors and situations could lead to or prevent crimes.
- 1.3. The Police Code of Conduct - The project completed the installation of six televisions in Kabul's PDs.
- 1.4. The video docuseries displayed in the six PDs, where ANP Officers will gradually integrate community policing concepts into their duties.

Below is a snapshot of where [COPS] is in relation to its annual targets

Table 2a. 2020 Annual Targets

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Remarks
2.1. Number of assessments and research studies related to community-oriented police services conducted	n/a	2.1 Assessments are completed, and recommendations reflected in PHQ planning (PeM).	%25	On track  Community Police Perception Survey completed for Kabul. Covered 19 PDs, total 7000 respondents, around 20% respondents are police officers.
2.2 % of surveyed community members who participate in PEM councils that are satisfied with the PEM Councils  2.3 % of surveyed community members who participate in PEM councils that are satisfied with the PEM councils (disaggregated by age, gender, businesses, disabilities, other vulnerable groups, PD)	CPPS did not have these indicators, but found that 13% of 5,908 community members knew what police e-mardumi was (Source: LOTFA CPPS)	2.2% of community with satisfaction increases by 10%  2.3 % of community members who express trust increases by 10%	%15	
2.4 % of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)	a) No data b) 30%	a) At least 30% b) At least 30%	0%	Off track  In year 1 due to staff late recruitment and pending TORs for community and police Shura's

2.5 % of security concerns voiced by population addressed and solved (per PD and gender disaggregated)	a) To be determined by the initial PEM Council meetings	a) at least 20% of concerns are solved in Y1	0%	No progress  In year 1 due to staff late recruitment and pending TORs for community and police Shura's
2.6 Level of implementation of a specific communication and behavioural change campaign/training programme targeting ANP staff (completely; partially; not implemented)  2.7 Level of effectiveness of communication products/ campaign elements	To be established following assessments for the behaviour change communication campaign	2.6. Behavioural change campaign/training programme targeting ANP implemented  2.7. to be discussed (linked to indicator)	0%	Off track - pending the implementation of community engagement activities.  The development of TORs for the SBCC 1 and SBCC 2 prepared, reviewed and approved.

Table 2b. 2021 Annual Targets

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Remarks
2.1. Number of assessments and research studies related to community-oriented police services conducted	n/a	2.1 Assessments are completed, and recommendations reflected in PHQ planning (PeM).	%25	On track  Community Police Perception Survey completed for Kabul. Covered 19 PDs, total 7000 respondents, around 20% respondents are police officers.  Community and police consultation sessions report

				Bi-lateral interviews
<p>2.8 % of surveyed community members who participate in PEM councils that are satisfied with the PEM Councils</p> <p>2.9 % of surveyed community members who participate in PEM councils that are satisfied with the PEM councils (disaggregated by age, gender, businesses, disabilities, other vulnerable groups, PD)</p>	<p>CPPS did not have these indicators, but found that 13% of 5,908 community members knew what police e-mardumi was (Source: LOTFA CPPS)</p>	<p>2.2% of community with satisfaction increases by 10%</p> <p>2.3 % of community members who express trust increases by 10%</p>	%15	<p>Community and police consultation sessions report</p> <p>FGD sessions conducted</p>
2.10% of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)	<p>c) No data</p> <p>d) 30%</p>	<p>c) At least 30%</p> <p>d) At least 30%</p>	30%	Community consultation sessions organized in the 19 PDs
2.11 % of security concerns voiced by population addressed and solved (per PD and gender disaggregated)	b)To be determined by the initial PEM Council meetings	b) at least 20% of concerns are solved in Y1	20%	
2.12Level of implementation of a specific communication and behavioral change campaign/training programme targeting ANP staff (completely; partially; not implemented)	To be established following assessments for the behavior change communication campaign	<p>2.6. Behavioral change campaign/training programme targeting ANP implemented</p> <p>2.7. to be discussed (linked to indicator)</p>	Completely	The implementation of SBCC in the targeted PDs of Kabul

2.13Level of effectiveness of communication products/ campaign elements				
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### C. OUTPUT 3: Standard PDs constructed/rehabilitated to support community-oriented policing

The project in consultation with the MoIA DM policy and strategy who was assigned as the focal point from MoIA led the establishment of a working group comprised of MoIA Engineering team and UNDP. The activities in this output were initially the establishment of standard PDs at the district level. Later, reference to the advisory from the MoIA leadership in December 2021, this was changed to establishment of smaller Public Services Centers in the (6) PDs of Kabul city including Kabul PHQ. The idea of smaller PSCs was later approved by donors in LOTFA's Project Steering Committee.

As result of 6 coordination meetings led by DM Policy and Strategy, the followings completed:

- a. Preliminary assessment of PIDs – to establish standard Police Information Centers and ensure every aspect of a standard PID is well reflected in the scope, UNDP technical team completed the assessment of six PIDs; 4,5,6,7 8, and 12 of Kabul city. The assessment covered security requirements, water and electricity availability, toilets (both women and men), kitchens and dining areas, PeM meeting halls, detention cells, and family response units. As the result of the findings from this assessment, the project developed standard PID plan for all the (6) PID centers. This was reviewed and approved by MoIA Engineering Directorate and Deputy Minister. The findings were all feed into the development of the following package for PID.
- b. Development of PIDs - scope of work, drawing and locations PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12 were developed and selected. UNDP and MoIA technical team conducted site visits for the preliminary assessment later developed and finalized the scope of work resulted in finalizing the complete package for PIDs. Total 11 construction firms applied and conducted site visits from PD11 to review the drawings and feasibility assessment i.e., security requirements, water and electricity availability, toilets (both women and men), kitchens and dining areas, PeM meeting halls, detention cells, and family response units.
- c. The project was in the final phases of the tender's evaluation. This was not completed due to the regime change. The expectation for the commencement date of the contract was scheduled February – May 2022 a four-month implementation plan agreed by MoIA and UNDP.

Below is a snapshot of where [COPS] is in relation to its annual targets

Table 3a. 2020 Annual Targets

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievement	Comments
3.1. Number of pilot PDs rehabilitated following assessments and in critical infrastructure areas (to improve security of policewomen and men and general public visiting PD, +FRU)	N/A	Infrastructure rehabilitation roadmap agreed with MOIA  6 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in Y 1  19 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in Y 2	0%	Off track –  while the assessments have been completed and needs identified, further discussions with LOTFA donors and MOIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.  Total 6 PDs selected for the establishment of Police Information Centers.
3.2. Number of PDs with minimum security measures reaching 100% (an index derived as a result of infrastructure survey) Parameters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Electronic access Control System</li> <li>- Steel gates</li> <li>- Boom barriers</li> <li>- Sentry posts</li> <li>- Security Control room</li> <li>- Anti-blast windows</li> <li>- Physical barriers</li> <li>- Perimeter lights</li> <li>- Watch tower</li> </ul>	0 (Source: LOTFA Infrastructure Survey) PD 1 – 40% PD 2 – 70% PD 3 – 80% PD 4 – 80% PD 5 – 70% PD 6 – 70% PD 8 – 60% PD 9 – 90% PD 10 – 60% PD 11 – 80% PD 12 – 70% PD 13 – 40% PD 16 – 60% PD 19 – Not available	TBD upon discussion with MOIA and LOTFA donors  TBD upon finalization of infrastructure survey results	NA	Off track - further discussions with LOTFA donors and MOIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.  This has been changed in line with the consultation and agreement with MoIA. PDs rehabilitation removed from AWP 2021 instead establishment of PIDs were proposed and agreed by donors.

3.3.	N/A		NA	Off track – in year 1
a) % of surveyed PD personnel satisfied with the improved infrastructure in the rehabilitated PDs		a) At least 50%		Due to late staff recruitment Feasibility assessment
b) % of surveyed general public satisfied with the improved infrastructure in the rehabilitated PDs (m/f)		b) At least 50%		off-track - further discussions with LOTFA donors and MoIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.
c) % of general public surveyed reporting that the rehabilitated PDs become more accessible (m/f)		c) At least 50%		

Table 3b. 2021 Annual Target

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievement	Comments
3.1. Number of pilot PDs rehabilitated following assessments and in critical infrastructure areas (to improve security of policewomen and men and general public visiting PD, +FRU)	N/A	Infrastructure rehabilitation roadmap agreed with MOIA  6 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in Y 1  19 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in Y 2	0%	Off track – in year 1  Due to late staff recruitment Feasibility assessment  while the assessments have been completed and needs identified, further discussions with LOTFA donors and MOIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.  Total 4 PDs selected for the establishment of Police Information Centers.

<p>3.2. Number of PDs with minimum security measures reaching 100% (an index derived as a result of infrastructure survey)</p> <p>Parameters:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Electronic access Control System</li> <li>- Steel gates</li> <li>- Boom barriers</li> <li>- Sentry posts</li> <li>- Security Control room</li> <li>- Anti-blast windows</li> <li>- Physical barriers</li> <li>- Perimeter lights</li> <li>- Watch tower</li> </ul>	<p>0 (Source: LOTFA Infrastructure Survey)</p> <p>PD 1 – 40%</p> <p>PD 2 – 70%</p> <p>PD 3 – 80%</p> <p>PD 4 – 80%</p> <p>PD 5 – 70%</p> <p>PD 6 – 70%</p> <p>PD 8 – 60%</p> <p>PD 9 – 90%</p> <p>PD 10 – 60%</p> <p>PD 11 – 80%</p> <p>PD 12 – 70%</p> <p>PD 13 – 40%</p> <p>PD 16 – 60%</p> <p>PD 19 – Not available</p>	<p>TBD upon discussion with MOIA and LOTFA donors</p> <p>TBD upon finalization of infrastructure survey results</p>	NA	<p>Off track – in year 1</p> <p>Due to late staff recruitment Feasibility assessment</p> <p>Off track - further discussions with LOTFA donors and MOIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.</p> <p>This has been changed in line with the consultation and agreement with MoIA.</p>
<p>3.3.</p> <p>d) % of surveyed PD personnel satisfied with the improved infrastructure in the rehabilitated PDs</p> <p>e) % of surveyed general public satisfied with the improved infrastructure in the rehabilitated PDs (m/f)</p> <p>f) % of general public surveyed reporting that the rehabilitated PDs become more accessible (m/f)</p>	N/A	<p>d) At least 50%</p> <p>e) At least 50%</p> <p>f) At least 50%</p>	NA	<p>Off track – in year 1</p> <p>Due to late staff recruitment Feasibility assessment</p> <p>off-track - further discussions with LOTFA donors and MoIA are required to secure resources and approval to implement infrastructure-related activities.</p>

## D. OUTPUT 4: Administrative Services are Improved at the PD Levels to Support Police Services

This Output aimed to improve the administrative services provided by the Kabul Police Districts (PDs). Interventions would involve the development of a capabilities framework, optimizing administrative systems at Police District Stations, the capacity building of police district administrative staff, and the procurement of necessary equipment for these police departments.

The followings were the key achievements under this output:

- a. It was anticipated that the findings and activities of the functional review described in Output 1 would serve as the basis for the work described in this Output. During the 1st quarter of 2020, the project team met with the General Directorate of Project Management of the Ministry of Interior to discuss the specifics of the functional review that would be implemented in the PHQ and target police districts of Kabul (PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12). In early 2021, the project was expected to begin after the TOR development process has been completed and approved.
- b. The project implemented the assessment of Kabul Police Headquarter PHQ and Kabul 19 Police Districts PDs. The assessment feed into the development of Community and Police Initiatives for Kabul Police Provincial HQ and inform subsequent HQ actions and decision's in recognizing the current administrative, reporting and community policing challenges Kabul PHQ and PDs faced. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring and implementation of community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ.
- c. The project organized training of trainers in resource management, reporting and community policing for Kabul Police Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) and Kabul Police District (PDs) personnel. The training was conducted based on the capacity need assessment conducted by PDs education offices and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were PHQ and PDs education officers. A total of 22 participants (8 Female Officers and 14 Male Officers) benefited from the training. As a result of the one-week training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
- d. The project completed desk review of Kabul PHQ and Kabul PDs related to existing reporting, chain of command and community policing. The project team, in consultation with the Kabul PHQ, prepared the draft Standard Operation Procedures (SOP). A 3-day on-the-job training was organized and facilitated by project targeting 112 ANP officers from PDs and PHQ.
- e. Based on the findings from PHQ and PDs assessments the project conducted a four days training in February 2021 from the related departments and headquarters of MoIA; aimed to build the capacity of PDs education officers and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. A total of 88 participants out of which 35 were Female Officers. As a result of the four days training programme, the PDs personnel trained

in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.

- f. The project implemented the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in five Police Districts of Kabul city (P.Ds 1-5). The training programme was aimed at bringing police and community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MoIA trained 12 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and PDs personnel, 108 of whom were female police officers.
- g. The project recruited two local consultants to complete a desk review of MoIA existing administrative and training procedures. As the result, the ICs completed the desk review but couldn't complete the remaining tasks due closing of all on the ground activities including ICs and contractors post 15 August 2021. The project implemented the assessment of Kabul Police Headquarter PHQ and Kabul 19 Police Districts PDs. The assessment feed into the development of Community and Police Initiatives for Kabul Police Provincial HQ and inform subsequent HQ actions and decision's in recognizing the current administrative, reporting and community policing challenges Kabul PHQ and PDs faced.
- h. The project organized training of trainers in resource management, reporting and community policing for Kabul Police Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) and Kabul Police District (PDs) personnel. The training was conducted based on the capacity need assessment conducted by PDs education offices and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were PHQ and PDs education officers. A total of 22 participants (8 Female Officers and 14 Male Officers) benefited from the training. As a result of the one-week training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
- i. The project completed the Kabul Police Headquarters (PHQ) assessment contract award. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring and implementation of community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ.
- j. The project completed desk review of Kabul PHQ and Kabul PDs related to existing reporting, chain of command and community policing. The project team, in consultation with the Kabul PHQ, prepared the draft Standard Operation Procedures (SOP). A three-day on-the-job training was organized and facilitated by project targeting 112 ANP officers from PDs and PHQ.
- k. Based on the findings from PHQ and PDs assessments the project conducted a four days training in February 2021 from the related departments and headquarters of MoIA; aimed to build the capacity of PDs education officers and Police Staff College (PSC) senior instructors. A total of 88 participants out of which 35 were Female Officers. As a result of the four days training programme, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and

providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for on aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.

- I. The project implemented the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in five Police Districts of Kabul city (P.Ds 1-5). The training programme was aimed at bringing police and community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MoIA trained 12 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 Commissioned, Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs) and PDs personnel, 108 of whom were female police officers.

Below is a snapshot of where [COPS] is in relation to its annual targets

Table 4a. 2020 Annual Targets

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Comments
4.1. Availability of Administrative Capacity Framework for PDs Parameters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Asset management (inventory)</li> <li>- Reporting to PHQ</li> <li>- Logistics and supply chain management</li> </ul>	Not available	Administrative Capacity assessments for target PDs completed	NA	Delayed in year 1 – pending assessments and functional review work.
4.2. Availability of improved SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs	SoPs require review and development	SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs reviewed and improved	NA	Delayed in year 1 – pending assessments and functional review work
4.3. Degree to which the core administrative functions in pilot PDs are improved a) Proxy: % of personnel (at PHQ and PD) satisfied with the optimized key functions  b) Time reduced (in %) in the key administrative processes	0%	4.2.a. to be determined  a) Proxy: satisfaction level increased by 50%  b) Proxy: TBD upon functional review.	NA	Delayed in year 1 – pending assessments and functional review work
4.4. Availability of functional Inventory management system at PDs	There is no proper inventory management system	Inventory management system is functional at select PDs	NA	Delayed in year 1 – pending assessments and functional review work



Table 4b. 2021 Annual Report

Indicator	Baseline	Annual Targets	Cumulative Achievements	Comments
4.1. Availability of Administrative Capacity Framework for PDs Parameters: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Asset management (inventory)</li> <li>- Reporting to PHQ</li> <li>- Logistics and supply chain management</li> </ul>	Not available	Administrative Capacity assessments for target PDs completed	Completed administrative capacity assessment of PDs	Completed
4.2. Availability of improved SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs	SoPs require review and development	SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs reviewed and improved	SOPs developed based on PDs administrative functions  Training provided to 270 NCO and non-commissioned personnel	Completed
4.3. Degree to which the core administrative functions in pilot PDs are improved c) Proxy: % of personnel (at PHQ and PD) satisfied with the optimized key functions  d) Time reduced (in %) in the key administrative processes	0%	4.2.a. to be determined  a) Proxy: satisfaction level increased by 50%  b) Proxy: TBD upon functional review.	NA	Not completed as training plan not developed due to August 15 event
4.4. Availability of functional Inventory management system at PDs	There is no proper inventory management system	Inventory management system is functional at select PDs	Assessment completed	Training not provided due to August 15 event

## VI. GENDER SPECIFIC RESULTS

The COPS Project directly promoted policewomen's capacity building and their better working conditions. With Outputs 2, 3, and 4, the COPS Project directly assisted the MOIA in achieving the strategic goal: "by 1402 (solar year), the Ministry of Interior and the ANP will be a more civil, professional and impartial entity capable of enforcing the rule of law without ethnic, language, gender or faith discrimination, reliant on Afghanistan internal resources that will facilitate conditions for the rule of law."

Output 2 also promoted the role of women in the community by involving them in PeM Councils that assist community policing. Their participation ensured that the PeM councils adequately handle women's needs and concerns.

During the 2nd year implementation, under MOIA Inclusive Outreach Initiative and SBCC 1 and SBCC 2 projects, the team ensured the inclusion of both male and female ANP officers equally taking part in the implementation of these three activities.

Furthermore, (UNDP) collaborated with technical teams during the construction process to ensure that the structures are gender-sensitive and responsive to the basic needs of both men and women. As part of SBCC 1, which began in early April 2021, the team started the consultation with the General Directorate of Community Policing to include one male and one female police officer. The team worked also with the Family Response Units (FRUs) to jointly implement the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) broader outreach initiatives under SBCC 2 and the Inclusive Community Outreach Initiative. Both RFPs were evaluated in the first quarter of 2021.

### Box 2. Gender as cross-cutting developmental initiatives in the projects various activities:

1. The project completed six consultations on "Strengthening Police and Community Partnerships" in six Kabul Police Districts (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12 PDs). The activity brought the police and the community together through SBCC. Almost half (44.89%) were women among those who attended the six community consultation sessions out of 568.
2. The project completed 30 interviews with females, ten of which were under output (2). In-depth interviews with experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers to learn what behaviors and situations could lead to or prevent crimes.
3. The project implemented Capacity Building Modular Training in the nine Kabul Police Districts (PDs 1-9). The MoIA trained 22 officers, who then trained 270 commissioned and non-commissioned PD personnel, 108 female officers. The training brought the police and the community together to fight crime and insurgency.

## VII. PARTNERSHIPS

The project facilitated the MOIA and PeM Directorate build an inclusive coordination framework by forming the COPS working group, which included national and international players. The Working Group will oversee the project's implementation and create strategies and initiatives to improve Afghan citizen safety and security.

During the first quarter of 2020, the project identified the national and international partners working in the rule of law, such as RS, CSTC-A, GPPT UNHABITAT, among others. It initiated the active coordination of their efforts. To ensure ownership, efficiency, and timeliness, MOIA PeM Directorate, PMO, and COPS project developed joint implementation.

In the second quarter of 2020, the project pursued the coordination actions with all national and international partners involved in police reform and the rule of law initiatives dynamically and collaboratively.

The three quarters of FY 2021, the team continued to coordinate with the UNDP community policing initiatives under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program with UN-Habitat, the German Development Organization (Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the European Union (EU) Support to Family Response Unit (FRU).

## VIII. ISSUES

The COPS project encountered several issues during its implementation. In the early 1st quarter of 2020, the COPS Project was hiring important positions. One of the challenges encountered was the recruitment of workers. How to hire quickly after posting is critical to lessen project delays. Project posts are published, and the hiring process has begun. Secondly, the threats brought by COVID-19, impeded the establishment of PeM councils, monthly meetings, and trainings for PeM members. Further, the current health pandemic hindered the firming up of the security and health protocols, and the completion of the PD assessments were all.

During the second quarter of the same year, the project has obtained three posts out of twenty available roles, namely a National Project Coordinator, a National Project Coordinator (Policing), and a Project Associate. Delays in the recruitment of project staff hampered the capacity to get the project up and running. Such concern was exacerbated by implementation difficulties, movement restrictions, and the MOIA lockdown due to the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent MOIA lockdown. UNDP utilized existing Country Office staff to boost the COPS project's capacity while awaiting the onboarding of key project personnel.

At the onset of the project, several hindering factors, such as, COVID 19 pandemic, security threats to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA), etc., caused the delay in the recruitment of

its key positions. The majority of its recruitments reached towards the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2020 and completed at the end of that year.

1. Pause – from the 15 of August 2021 all UNDP Community Oriented Policing Services COPS activities, the work of contractors was paused based on the decision from the LOTFA steering committee resulted in closing all Law-and-Order Trust Fund projects by 04 December 2021.
2. Project closure (programme and financial) – based on the decision by LOTFA Steering Committee UNDP management instructed the programme closure of COPS until 4th December 2021.
3. Cancellation – all tendering services or contracts under evaluations such as the construction of five police information desks, implementation of MoIA outreach, technical and logistical support to Kabul PHQ and Kabul PD tenders' evaluations were stopped and bidders were informed of the cancelation.
4. Security– from the start of project implementation till 15 August, based on UN security advisory all MoIA facilities applied movement restrictions. Despite these challenges, the project implemented activities through non-governmental organizations, companies and community-based organisations.
  - a) Coordination- coordination among national and international partners were always an issue. The project organized series of follow-up with MoIA to take leadership role in organizing bi-weekly community oriented policing meetings led by MoIA. Fortunately, this enabled MoIA to take lead and invite all partners including UNDP, UN-Habitat, GiZ and SSMI to gather and share their current and future activities in coordination with partners involved.
  - b) Contextualized programming – each of the community oriented policing partners had their own mandate and implementation strategy. In most cases, MoIA was not properly briefed about those efforts.

## IX. RISKS

The project encountered several risks. One of which was the MOIA leadership changes frequently, and the next president has yet to name his cabinet. The changes in the MoIA leadership affected the activities since they have different priorities. Notwithstanding this, UNDP has been closely coordinating with Kabul PHQ and MOIA. The project team involved deputy directorates and ensured orientation of the project activities with each new appointee. The project provided 2-3 orientation per-week starting from deputy ministers to general directorates.

During the second quarter, the COVID-19 outbreak in Afghanistan seriously risked the project's implementation and capacity to achieve its objectives. The MoIA ordered a nationwide lockdown and a ban on big gatherings that would lead to escalating the health crisis. Additionally, UNDP COPS team have restricted the number of international personnel, while the national staff is also telecommuting. These constraints have hampered the

completion of infrastructure assessments and the capacity to attend discussions with the Ministry of Infrastructure and the ANP regarding the implementation of this project. The project team ensured to adhere to WHP C-19 precautionary measures i.e installing social distancing boards, using face masks and hand sanitizers in it is all events.

The project team is frequently confronted with issues such as delays in the recruitment of project staff, difficulties in the implementation of the project, and restrictions on their freedom of movement. The project team organized several meetings and pointed out the urgency of recruitment for key national staff. Staff priority list was shared with UNDP human resource unit and regular follow-ups was made to ensure the timely onboarding of local staff and ICs.

Second-quarter of the second year of implementation identified the following risks and challenges:

- a) Management of expectations (key risk) – The MoIA's new leadership requested significant changes to the TOR during the final stages of the RFP. This delayed the re-advertising and evaluations by two months.

Contractual services are provided by third-party organizations/firms, which can take up to two months to process

- b) Movement restrictions (key challenge) – evaluating and testing the project team's training program is critical to monitoring PD activities. Preparation of movement lists for upcoming PDs' outreach activities.

To comply with the WHO's health advisory, the project printed COVID-19 awareness billboards, limits community consultations, requires participants to wear face masks, and supplies events with hand sanitizer.

## X. LESSONS LEARNED

The project team documented several lessons learned during the course of project implementation (2) years. One is to sequence the project so that the scheduled activities reflect the available resources. Second, focus on recruitment for the second quarter to free up resources for the project. Third, the continuous COVID-19 pandemic forced the implementers to regularly reconsider the workplan due to issues on accessibility. The initiative is constantly adapting to the changing security and political environment. The team worked with MOIA, PHQ PeM team, and community members to plan the project's deployment once the pandemic is over. The team is in touch with key PHQ and PeM directors to develop SOP, training curriculum, and outreach efforts for the designated PDs.

During the 1st quarter on the FY 2021, the team organized a meeting to ensure long-term sustainability and ownership and avoid duplication and overlap. At this meeting, any

development activity under community policing is reviewed and contextualized in light of the MoIA's broader public outreach strategy plan.

The following documents were shared and reviewed with international partners involved in police professionalization development projects in the Ministry of Interior.

1. Under output (2), Enhancing Police and Community Partnership Project in the (6) Police Districts PDs of Kabul city.
2. Under output (2), Supporting Kabul Police Districts to deliver improved community oriented policing services.
3. Under output (2), MoIA inclusive community outreach inclusive community outreach
4. Under output (3), the establishment of PIDs

In the second quarter of the second year, the project planned to consider the following lessons learned and key highlights:

The UNDP COPS security focal point has been informed that COPS implementing partners should share their risk and mitigation log with UNDP COPS. When working at the PD and community level, each IP should be properly briefed. Insurgents target implementation partners who work in the security sector.

A coordination and debriefing plan was developed to discuss and share activity details with the new MoIA leadership and GDs.

This taught it that any capacity building effort requires planning, coordination, and implementation. The MoIA-related directorates should be properly briefed on training material development. This will help any development project sustain and own.

## XI. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: RISK LOG

#### Annex 1a. 2020 Risk Log

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
1	Little or no political will by the government officials in developing community policing	30/09/18	Political	P= 2 I= 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular Board meetings to discuss/confirm support for community policing reform</li> <li>Dialogue with MOIA, ANP and Community</li> <li>Mid-Term Review (2020) to assess situation</li> </ul>	Project Manager	UNDP	04 December 2021	Closed
2	Strong political leadership to limit any pushbacks and resentment arising from those in the MOIA and non-target areas seeking support from the project in their areas	30/09/18	Political	P=2 I= 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Constant update to MOIA leadership on project progress to re-establish support and reassurance of project impact</li> <li>Communication campaigns to promote project activities within communities</li> <li>Regular meetings and workshops to engage leadership into project implementation</li> </ul>	Project Manager	UNDP	04 December 2021	Closed
3	Limited access to MOIA, ANP and Community facilities by the UNDP Project implementation team members	30/09/18	Institutional	P= 2 I= 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage civil society organizations and ANP personnel as capacity development personnel and project executors</li> <li>Regular security reviews and additional security measures undertaken</li> </ul>	Project Manager	UNDP	04 December 2021	Closed
4	Limited participation of women and other under-represented groups in project activities	30/09/18	Social and environmental	P=3 I=3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish gender and diversity goals with project partners in Project Board for all project activities.</li> <li>Empower women to participate in the community policing activities</li> </ul>	Project Manager	UNDP	04 December 2021	Closed

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Specify targets for gender and under-represented groups to participate in project training activities</li> <li>Collaborate with gender equality advocates in and out of government</li> <li>Targeted community outreach activities to involve women and underrepresented groups to participate in the project</li> </ul>				



## Annex 1b. 2021 Risk Log

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/ MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
1	Little or no political will by the government officials in developing community policing.	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Mid-January 2021	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Political	Q1, Q2, & Q3: P=2; I=5	Q1, Q2, & Q3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meetings are being conducted with MOIA relevant authorities including Kabul Police Chief and MOIA Community policing directorate to resume the paused political support.</li> </ul>	Q1, Q2, & Q3: COPS Project Team	Q1, Q2, & Q3: UNDP COPS Project team	Q1: April 2021  Q2 & Q3: June 2021  04 December 2021	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Changed due to new leadership in the MoIA. Focusing a lot more on community policing and reducing gap between ANP and public.  An order was issued by H.E First Vice President in the 630am Kabul Security Coordination Meeting on 13 January instructing ANP and government officials to avoid attending, facilitating, chairing, and organizing such events until further notice.  This was on the news and posted at FVP official page <a href="https://www.facebook.com/430189117089333/posts/3557042597737287/">https://www.facebook.com/430189117089333/posts/3557042597737287/</a>

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/ MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
2	Strong political leadership to limit any pushbacks and resentment arising from those in the MOIA and non-target areas seeking support from the project in their areas	Q1, Q2, & Q3: 30/09/18	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Political	Q1, Q2, & Q3: P=2; I=5	Q1, Q2, & Q3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constant update to MOIA leadership on project progress to re-establish support and reassurance of project impact</li> <li>• Communication campaigns to promote project activities within communities</li> <li>• Regular meetings and workshops to engage leadership into project implementation</li> <li>• The project team ensures to involve local media outlets through engaging MOIA Strategic Communication directorate to reach out to major provinces through social media, audio and visuals.</li> </ul>	Q1, Q2, & Q3: COPS Project Specialist	Q1, Q2, & Q3: UNDP	Q1: May 2021  Q2 & Q3: June 2021  Q4 December 2021	Q1, Q2, & Q3: It remains a challenge for the project. Example- Recent changes in the MoIA, Deputy Minister's and few General Directors requesting expansion of Community Policing to other provinces in addition to Kabul. The scope of expanding the services is not for all provinces.  Closed

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/ MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
3	Limited access to MOIA, ANP and Community facilities by the UNDP Project implementation team members	Q1, Q2, & Q3: 30/09/18	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Institutional	Q1, Q2, & Q3: P=2; I=5	Q1, Q2, & Q3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engage civil society organizations and ANP personnel as capacity development personnel and project executors</li> <li>Regular security reviews and additional security measures undertaken</li> <li>The project team prepared movement plan in the MoIA, Kabul PHQ and PDs. Follow up with security team for clearance</li> <li>At social gatherings, the project team is reduced to a minimum level, namely, on the councils. The project team ensures the c-19 precautionary</li> </ul>	Q1, Q2, & Q3: CTA Project Specialist	Q1, Q2, & Q3: UNDP	Q1: April 2021  Q2 & Q3: June 2021  04 December 2021	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Increasing because of COVID-19 and security situation. Recent advisories on security restrictions i.e movements to PDs, Kabul PHQ and regular meetings in the MoIA is limited from early this year. The restrictions also apply to projects community and police consultation events.  Closed

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/ MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
					measures guided by WHO. The project team reduces the limit for community consultations, ensures social distancing, wearing masks, C-19 advisory posters and hand sanitizers are equipped at any event.				
4	Limited participation of women and other under-represented groups in project activities	Q1, Q2 & Q3: 30/09/18	Q1, Q2, & Q3: Social and environmental	Q1, Q2, & Q3: P=3; I=3	Q1, Q2, & Q3: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish gender and diversity goals with project partners in Project Board for all project activities.</li> <li>Empower women to participate in the community policing activities</li> <li>Specify targets for gender and under-represented groups to participate in project training activities</li> </ul>	Q1, Q2, & Q3: CTA Project Specialist	Q1, Q2, & Q3: UNDP	Q1: April 2021  Q2 & Q3: June 2021  04 December 2021	Q1, Q2, & Q3: The community and police councils have a smaller number of women representatives in these councils  Closed

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/ MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED/UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaborate with gender equality advocates in and out of government</li> <li>• Targeted community outreach activities to involve women and underrepresented groups to participate in the project</li> <li>• The team, in coordination with GIZ, UN-Habitat and EU support to Family Response Unit works on a mechanism through internal coordination meeting to ensure women participation at any community policing initiatives is revisited.</li> </ul>				

# FINAL REPORT

United Nations Development Programme

Afghanistan

Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP

September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2022



*The fourth police hospital to fight COVID-19 in Kunduz and four North-Eastern regions.  
Photo: MoIA/2021.*

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## PROJECT INFORMATION

<b>Reporting Period</b>	April 2020-October 2021
<b>Donor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LOTFA-MPTF:</li> <li>Croatia</li> <li>Czech Republic</li> <li>Denmark</li> <li>Estonia</li> <li>European Union</li> <li>Finland</li> <li>Germany</li> <li>Hungary</li> <li>Italy</li> <li>Japan</li> <li>Netherlands</li> <li>New Zealand</li> <li>Norway</li> <li>Romania</li> <li>Poland</li> <li>United Kingdom</li> <li>United States of America</li> <li>• Australia</li> <li>• Canada</li> <li>• Korea</li> <li>• United Nations Development Program (UNDP)</li> </ul>
<b>Country</b>	Afghanistan
<b>Project Title</b>	Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP
<b>Project ID (Atlas Award ID)</b>	00126930
<b>Contributing to ANPDF-NPP (2017-2021):</b>	ANPDF: 2.3: Political and Security Outlook New NPP 4: National Justice and Judicial Reform Plan (NJRP)
<b>Contributing to A-SDGS</b>	Goal 3: “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all age.
<b>CPD Outcome</b> ( <i>before 15<sup>th</sup> August 2021</i> ):	Outcome 2: Trust in and access to fair, effective and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government’s legal obligations.
<b>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome:</b>	Outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crisis
<b>Implementing Partner(s)</b> ( <i>until 15<sup>th</sup> August 2021</i> )	Project implemented by UNDP (Fully NIM).
<b>Project Start Date</b>	01 April 2020
<b>Project End Date</b>	Activities frozen after August 15 <sup>th</sup> , 2021. Field monitoring implemented until October 2021.
<b>Total Work Plan Budget</b>	USD 14,274,200
<b>Total resources required</b>	USD 14,274,200
<b>Funded</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Donors:</li> <li>○ LOTFA MPTF Afghanistan: USD 13,319,395.00</li> <li>○ Australia DFAT: USD 954,805.86</li> <li>○ Canada (Government): USD 8,365.21</li> <li>○ Canada (CIDA): USD 40,032.87</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Korea: USD 1,000,000.00</li> <li>○ UNDP (Trac): USD 38,100.00</li> </ul> <p>Total USD 15,360,698.94</p>
<b>Total Spent Resources</b>	USD 10,694,934.95
<b>UNDP Contact Person</b>	<p>Chencho Gyalmo Dorjee  Peace Portfolio Specialist  UNDP Afghanistan  E-mail: <a href="mailto:chencho.dorjee@undp.org">chencho.dorjee@undp.org</a>  Tel.: +93728997216</p> <p>Sainey Ceesay  Team Lead/ LOTFA Project Closure  E-mail: <a href="mailto:sainey.ceesay@undp.org">sainey.ceesay@undp.org</a>  Mobile: +93 (0) 790 320572</p>

## ACRONYMS

ANP: Afghan National Police.

GPU: UNDP Global Procurement Unit.

LOTFA: Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

M&E: monitoring and evaluation.

MPTF: Multi Partner Trust Fund.

MoIA: Ministry of Interior Affairs.

MoPH: Ministry of Public Health.

NERP 2020: National Emergency Response Plan against COVID-19.

PPE: personal protective equipment.

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme.

WHO: World Health Organization.

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP” was designed as an emergency response and support project for the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoIA) to implement the Ministry’s Strategy for Combating COVID-19, which aimed to ensure that the spread of the disease was prevented and that adequate treatment was offered to affected police personnel in Afghanistan.

Designed jointly by UNDP and MoIA, the project was implemented with the generous assistance from several donors and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). Its goal was to provide emergency support to respond to the initial immediate and urgent medical needs to diagnose and treat the affected police personnel as well as to ensure their day-to-day safety through adequate and available protective equipment and maintenance of hygiene and health services. Additionally, the second strategic objective of the project was to support the MoIA in raising awareness on preventive measures to be adopted to support infection prevention and control of the COVID-19 virus among the Police in Afghanistan.

Global and national COVID-19 related restrictions, as well as the surge in the global demand for medical equipment and other items, as well as deteriorating internal security, hindered or slowed down the project implementation and monitoring in regards to procurement and distribution of equipment, hygiene kits and supplies. Additional issues stalled the execution of the communications campaign, which focused on supporting awareness on minimum protection, vaccination, and COVID-19 regional hospitals.

Alternative strategies were adopted to overcome these external challenges, such as adapting and diversifying procurement strategies and further improving the coordination with partners by hiring dedicated staff. Additionally, the project, which had an initial duration of eight months was extended twice under a no-cost basis until October 31st, 2021.

The project was able to equip and inaugurate COVID-19 hospitals in five provinces, all of which managed to provide care to all ANP personnel who sought their services, even though activities on the field were closed earlier than expected due to the power shift in Afghanistan on August 15<sup>th</sup> of 2021. These hospitals received almost 30,000 patients, while the testing laboratory in Kabul received over 4,000 visitors. Also, the hygiene kits distributed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among police to some extent helped to equip the police force with prevention measures to protect themselves and the general public from contracting the disease. In addition, information materials were prepared and distributed in 2021 to the ANP to increase awareness of the regional hospitals, basic protection measures, and vaccination.

Sustainability of the project may have been challenged during the last year, yet it is positive that by October 2021 four of the five hospitals established under the project were open and functional, with most of its equipment intact. Considering that the living conditions of the

Afghan people have been deteriorating, with health services under threat<sup>1</sup>, efforts to recover the country's infrastructure and strengthen public services can learn from the experience of this project and build on the infrastructure put in place for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

## II. BACKGROUND

On March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic and urged “countries to take urgent and aggressive action”<sup>2</sup>. The unprecedented public health emergency that followed affected the whole world and prompted the scaling of public health preparedness and response. By August 2021, when the power shift in Afghanistan resulted in the freezing of all projects under the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan – Multi Partner Trust Fund (LOTFA – MPTF), 216 million cases of COVID-19 were reported globally with the cumulative number of deaths reaching 4.5 million<sup>3</sup>.

Afghanistan was significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic<sup>4</sup>, and its ability to deal with a major outbreak was called into question due to weak health infrastructure facilities and limited human resources capacity. Additional challenges further complicated Afghanistan's capacity to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as negligible to non-existent water, health and sanitation facilities across the country, high rates of internal displacement of people due to conflict and insurgency, large influx of returning refugees, compromised immunity due to low access to basic vaccinations, in addition to the four decades of conflict and stress induced and related preconditions affected the outbreak.<sup>5</sup>

Within the framework of the country's National Emergency Response Plan against COVID-19 (NERP 2020), in addition to maintaining the public order, the Afghan National Police (ANP) had a key role in ensuring that prevention measures were effectively implemented, especially those related to lockdowns and movement restrictions, making them especially exposed to COVID-19. Therefore, in a worst-case scenario the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) expected 40,000 police to become infected over a period of 8 months (May – December 2020) with at least 600 severe cases in need of treatment at hospitals during that same timeframe.

Consequently, MoIA required support not only to prevent, detect and treat ANP personnel who could have been infected by the pandemic, but also to promote widespread awareness among the police and general public to facilitate the undertaking of police duties necessary for the prevention and spread of the disease. Thus, building from the framework of the NERP 2020 strategic objectives, the project “Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP” was developed as an emergency

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<sup>1</sup> UNDP, Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022. Available at:

<https://www.undp.org/afghanistan/publications/afghanistan-socio-economic-outlook-2021-2022>

<sup>2</sup> WHO (2020). *WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020*. Available at: <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020>.

<sup>3</sup> WHO (2021). *COVID-19 Weekly Epidemiological Update*. Available at: <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/weekly-epidemiological-update-on-covid-19---31-august-2021>

<sup>4</sup> The National Emergency Response Plan (NERP 2020), developed in March 2020 by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) projected a worst-case scenario where approximately 700,000 people would require hospitalization in Afghanistan, with 220,000 of them requiring ICU treatment, and from that a projected 110,000 people could die due to COVID-19.

<sup>5</sup> COVID-19 Multi – Sector Humanitarian Country Plan, Afghanistan, 24 March 2020, p. 3.

response and support project to the MoIA to implement its Strategy for Combating COVID-19. A concept note for the project was presented by the MoIA before the Security Window Technical Working Group of the LOTFA – MPTF and approved by participants for project development at a meeting dated April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2020.

The project included the emergency support to respond to the initial immediate and urgent medical to diagnose and treat the affected police personnel (ANP) as well as ensure their day-to-day safety through adequate and available protective equipment and maintenance of hygiene. It also encompassed raising awareness on preventive measures to support infection prevention and control of the COVID-19 virus among the police in Afghanistan.

The project document was signed in May 2020, with an initial expected duration of 8 months. The project was further extended until October 2021, given the delays in procuring the necessary equipment and supplies mainly due to disruptions caused by the pandemic itself, as well as issues in transporting the items to the police hospitals, which were caused by increased internal insecurity. After the events of August 2021, field activities were frozen and the project was officially closed along all LOTFA projects by November 2021.

### **III. PERFORMANCE REVIEW**

Developed in response to a request from the Afghanistan government and in line with the country's COVID-19 strategy, the project "Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP" can be considered a key intervention in support of Afghanistan's health system to respond to the specific needs of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force.

Despite global procurement disruptions and internal insecurity, that severely affected procurement and transportation of equipment and supply, given the constant support to the MoIA and adaptative management provided by UNDP, the project did contribute to its expected outcome particularly at the peak of the pandemic infections as it increased access to early diagnosis, quarantine and treatment by establishing COVID-19 hospitals in five out of the targeted seven provinces<sup>6</sup> and supporting the organization of a COVID-19 testing facility for the ANP. It also contributed to increasing awareness of the necessary preventive measures on the disease among ANP not only as procured hygiene kits were delivered to all the target provinces but also because the percentage of police personnel demonstrating good knowledge on how to use them to protect themselves from contracting COVID-19 was quite close to the project's target.

Consequently, it can be said that the project performed satisfactorily on its outcome indicator, that is, "the number of police personnel who remained unaffected or recover from COVID-19 through treatment received from MoIA Health Directorate Hospitals and continue to serve on Tashkil" – even though the project was not able to achieve all its output targets. In that regard, a key success for the project is the fact that 100% of the police who approached the five ANP

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<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that originally the PRODOC registered a target of five regional hospitals – later negotiated to seven, without great impact to the project's budget.


COVID-19 hospitals established by the project were able to receive care for COVID-19. This is highly significant as the proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among the police was higher than that of the general population<sup>7</sup>: as shown in the table below, in 2020 the proportion was 0.69% of ANPs infected, reaching 1.98% during the first semester of 2021.

*Table 1. Summary of COVID-19 spread among ANPs*

Milestone	APPS Strength	C-19 Positive (P)	Quarantined (Q)	Proportion of C-19 infection cases	Recovered (R)	Discharged from Quarantine (Xq)	Deaths (D)	In (Q+P)	Proportion of police affected by C-19 (P+Q)	Out (Xq+R+D)	Active COVID-19 (In-out)	Active quarantine
<b>31 Dec 2020</b>	118,740	828	3,170	0.69%	738	3,146	62	3,998	3.36%	3,950	24	-
<b>30 Jun 2021</b>	118,740	2,354	4,999	1.98%	1,123	4,997	121	7,353	6.19%	6,241	1,110	2
<b>Cumulative</b>	118,740	3,180	8,169	2.68%	1,861	8,143	183	11,351	9.56%	10,191	1,134	-

Even though MoIA's worst case COVID-19 scenario for the police personnel (at least 40,000 positive cases) fortunately did not take place. The higher rate of COVID-19 cases within the ANP was expected as those most exposed to the vulnerable situations of contracting COVID-19 and are on the frontline, such as law enforcement officers, paramedics, firefighters, doctors and nurses.<sup>8</sup> It must be registered that the different proportions of COVID-19 infections can also be attributed to the low rate of COVID-19 testing within the general population<sup>9</sup>.

*Figure 1. COVID-19 cases and deaths in Afghanistan (2020-2022)<sup>10</sup>*



<sup>7</sup> According to the United Nations Population Division ([Data Portal](#)), Afghanistan's population was 38,97 million in 2020 and 40,1 million in 2021. WHO's COVID-19 [Dashboard](#) data registers that the country had 52,330 positive cases in 2020 and 66,390 from January 1<sup>st</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2021. Therefore, the proportion of positive cases against the total of Afghanistan's population was 0,13% in 2020 and 0,16% during the first semester of 2021. Considering total cumulative cases until June 2021 and a population of 40,1 million, the proportion of COVID-19 cases within the population was 0,2959%.

<sup>8</sup> Research published in 2021 with a sample of municipal police officers shows that first responders have a three-fold higher rate of COVID-19 infection compared to members of the general population. Source: McGuire S.S., Klassen A.B., Heywood J., Sztajnkrzyer M.D. Prevalence of COVID-19 IgG Antibodies in a Cohort of Municipal First Responders. *Prehosp. Disaster Med.*2021;36:131–134. doi: 10.1017/S1049023X2000151X.

<sup>9</sup> The likelihood of under-testing of potential cases and under-reporting of confirmed cases of and deaths from COVID-19 was registered, for instance, on the "Strategic Situation Report: COVID-19" published by OCHA and WHO on June 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-strategic-situation-report-covid-19-no-99-17-june-2021>

<sup>10</sup> WHO (2022). *COVID-19 Dashboard: Afghanistan*. Available at: <https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/af>



On the other hand, the proportion of police personnel that was either treated or quarantined represented 3,36% of the total population affected in 2020, reaching a total of 6,19% during the first semester of 2021, when Afghanistan was going through the third and worst COVID-19 wave. This third wave lasted from mid-April to mid-September and reached a peak of 12,314 confirmed cases during the week of June 21<sup>st</sup>, as shown in the Figure 1 above.

Corrective and adaptative measures adopted by UNDP during the implementation of the project contributed to mitigate several challenges caused by local and international COVID-19 related restrictions, such as unavailability of the planned procured items and disruption of international flights, but also by the deteriorating internal security. For instance, due to unavailability of materials locally, it had to be procured globally, therefore routing procurement of COVID-19 items through UNDP Global Procurement Unit (GPU) led to additional steps and increased delivery time but also raised the level of Quality Assurance as no items procured through GPU have been rejected by the end-user. Also, recruiting a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) associate, who worked closely with the third-party monitoring firm for quality assurance and to facilitate data collecting and reporting, helped address the data sharing and reporting constraints by increasing quality and regularity of progress reports to project partners – which, in turn, improved day-to-day decision-making. In addition, UNDP coordinated with the MoIA and MoPH to expedite implementation on regular basis and via its Communications team provided support to MoIA's Directorate of Health and Media and Communications in the development of the COVID-19 awareness campaign.

In conclusion, although the duration of the project needed to be extended due to several global and internal challenges, the project was able to make a moderately satisfactory contribution to the overall safety and security of the country during the COVID-19 pandemic by: i) equipping a testing facility, ii) providing treatment to all police personnel approached the hospitals established by the project received care for COVID-19, and iii) delivering hygiene kits and prevention information for ANPs to protect themselves against the disease. More importantly, such contribution continued as the third-party monitoring services was able to verify that four of the five hospitals were open by October 2021 and most of the equipment donated to the hospitals are intact and might be used for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

## **IV. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW**

### **A. Partnerships**

Throughout implementation, the project coordinated with national and international counterparts engaged in response to COVID-19. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) was the key stakeholder, actively working to ensure that the emergency response support provided under the project was physically made available to the targeted groups. The project also relied on collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and WHO. Procurement of machines, equipment, medicine, and hospital/lab supplies was carried out in consultation with the MoPH and the use of PPE kits and communication materials on COVID-19 was informed by the WHO guidelines.

In general, the relationship with partners performed as expected, with donors providing both resources and feedback in a timely manner, also answering positively to the requests to extend project duration. A more pro-active and constant coordination was required with the Afghan government, which can be attributed to the pandemic constraints and deteriorating internal context. For instance, sample checks done by MoIA and MoPH required active coordination from UNDP to decrease response and prevent further delays in procurement. Continual coordination with and technical support to both the Director for Strategic Communications and the Director of Media of the MOIA was required for the project to be able to deliver on the dissemination of the preventive measures for all ANP in Afghanistan (Output 3).

## **B. Project Management**

The project was implemented by UNDP as part of UNDP Afghanistan COVID-19 Support Package and had as primary stakeholder the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA), Deputy Minister Support and the General Directorate for Health Services. MoIA proposed and in partnership with UNDP the project was designed to contain and control the spread of the COVID-19 among the police personnel.

Regarding the day-to-day project activities, UNDP was responsible for the procurement of services, equipment and supplies, coordinated monitoring services and reporting. MoIA handled the transport and distribution of procured items and, in partnership with MoPH, the sample check process. UNDP hired three (project manager, M&E associate and procurement associate) out of the five staff mentioned in the project document and also hired additional personnel based at the MoIA to assist implementation<sup>11</sup>. As foreseen in the project document, UNDP and MoIA sought to have a direct relationship and constant coordination, which was improved when a dedicated project manager at UNDP was hired.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

The project designed and implemented a detailed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan (Annex 6) that specified activities, responsibilities and tools for project, fund, and third-party M&E, as well as the indicator methodology. The overall implementation of the M&E plan was under the responsibility of the project team.

A third-party monitoring (TPM) company was hired in October 2020 to collect data about progress and results of project activities, as well as to conduct community surveys. The TPM service provider developed the required data collection tools and trained its 41 staff (36 male 5 female) on project's scope and data collections tools. The next table summarizes the tools and frequency adopted by the TPM firm to collect and analyse data for each of the project's outputs. The TPM firm had personnel in or traveling to each of the provinces where regional hospitals were established by the project to gather the required data.

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<sup>11</sup> In total, the project hired a team of seven people to work at MoIA, including, a team leader, reporting specialist, coordination specialist, research and data analyst, logistics specialist, and a medical liaison officer. These personnel played a critical role in the partnership between MoIA and UNDP facilitating a close, coordinated relationship.

Table 2. M&E tools and frequency

OUTPUT	M&E ACTIVITY	DATA COLLECTION TOOL / METHOD	DATA COLLECTION ROUNDS
1	Covid regional police hospital equipment verification as per MoIA distribution list and UNDP procurement list	In-loco verifications	First round: by hospital inauguration. Second rounds: • Balkh: August 2021. • Herat: June 2021. • Kunduz: September 2021. • Nangahar: June 2021. • Paktya: October 2021.
	Capturing COVID-19 regional police hospital specific MIS of COVID-19 patients	In-loco verifications	Daily MIS data will be collected twice to three times per week.
	Assessing functionality of COVID-19 regional police hospital as per WHO standards for secondary care COVID-19 hospital	In-loco verifications	First round: close to hospital inauguration Second round: 3/6 months after first verification.
	Patient satisfaction w.r.t COVID-19 services in COVID-19 regional police hospital.	Exit interviews	• Balkh: February, May, August 2021. • Herat: July, August. • Kunduz: May, July, August. • Nangahar: March, May, August 2021. • Paktya: February, May, August 2021.
2	Hygiene kit verification	In-loco verifications	First round: January 2021 Second round: February – March 2021. Third round: May-June 2021.
	Police Interviews on COVID-19 knowledge	Interviews with randomly selected participants based on availability and consent.	First round: Feb 2021-March 2021: Kabul, Nangarhar and Paktya. Second round: May-June 2021: in 15 provinces where hygiene verification was performed.
	Police observation on COVID-19 prevention steps	In-loco observations.	First round: Feb 2021-March 2021: Kabul, Nangarhar and Paktya. Second round: Apr-May 2021.
3	Community survey	Community perception survey	Round 01: April-May 2021, selected places of Kabul and Nangahar. Round 02: May-June 2021, 12 provinces (Kabul, Parwan, Wardak, Ghazni, Paktya, Nangarhar, Kunar, Badakshan, Takhar, Balkh, Jawzjan, Zabul and Khost)

Procurement and distribution delays, caused by pandemic disruptions in the international and local production chains and internal increased insecurity, affected the M&E by both delaying data collection and reducing the number of verifications, as the next two tables below register regarding each of the project outputs.

Table 3. Progress against target set at the outset of the project (Output 1)

S NO	RESPONDENT	PROVINCE	TOTAL	ACHIEVED	REMARKS
inter1	Health facility in-charge for each hospital in 8 provinces	1	7	5	Hospitals in Helmand and Kandahar were not inaugurated

S NO	RESPONDENT	PROVINCE	TOTAL	ACHIEVED	REMARKS
2	Daily MIS data will be collected twice to three times per week	1	7	5	As above
3	Doctors for each hospital in 7 province (two rounds)	2	14*2	10	As above
4	Nurses for each hospital in 7 province (Two rounds)	4	28*2	10	As above
5	Patient exit interview for each province	48	48 x 7= 336	567	

Disruptions and delays in the distribution of the procured hygiene kits were the main issues affecting the TPM firm's ability to analyze progress on outputs 2 and 3, as registered in the table below.

*Table 4. Progress against targets set out at the outset of the project (Outputs 2 and 3)*

OUTPUT	TYPE OF ACTIVITY	TARGET	ACHIEVED	REMARKS
2	Hygiene kit verification and police interview	473	156	Hygiene kit distribution could not take place to all planned places and hence the reduced number of verifications
	Police officer observation	1892	1601	As above
3	Community survey	10200	1601	Due to ongoing fights in many provinces after July 2021, the community survey on the awareness campaign was not conducted.

Recruiting a M&E associate, who worked closely with the third-party monitoring firm to facilitate data collecting and reporting, helped address the data sharing and reporting constraints noted by the project team and key stakeholders. With the M&E associate and the TPM service in place, and with the support of the M&E focal point in the Trust Fund Management Unit (TFMU), who provided quality assurance, oversight and technical support in the compilation of monitoring instruments and reports, the quality and regularity of progress reports to project partners was increased, which also improved decision-making, even though the heightened insecurity continued to pose obstacles to on site verifications and data collection.

### Timely delivery of outputs

The project faced several issues that has hindered or slowed down the implementation, affecting the procurement process and its interlinked activities. For instance, global and national COVID-19 related restrictions disrupted international production and trade chains while the pandemic itself raised the demand for medical supplies, reducing availability of planned procured items and increasing delivery time<sup>12</sup>. A sluggish sample check process of the procured items by MOIA and Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) caused further delay in procurement, while the disruption of international flights affected delivered of procured items to Afghanistan.

<sup>12</sup> International market delays, due to global shortages of items and disruptions to international logistic networks and delays at borders, led to actual arrival dates exceeding the expected arrival date for 85% of cases – in some cases the difference was 4 to 5 months (for medicines and lab reagents). The average difference between expected delivery date and actual delivery date, across all items, was 44 days. The average duration from starting the procurement process and receiving the items in Kabul is 131 days (or 4.5 months) - this ranged from 45 days (or 1.5 months for syringes and thermometers), 106 days (or 3.5 months) for medical machines (DC Shock Machine Digital, Dry Sterilizing Oven, Nebulizer Machines), to 250 days (or 8 months) for lab reagents.


Insecurity was a key challenge for the project interventions to reach police personnel across the country. Deteriorating security and logistical challenges impacted MoIA's ability to transfer items from Kabul to the regional hospitals and impeded the inauguration of two (Helmand and Kandahar) of the seven hospitals that the project was expected to deliver.

UNDP adopted alternative strategies where possible, such as developing multiple packages of the procured items and contracted several suppliers to make sure that the earliest available items were secured and delivered to the MoIA. International flights were heavily disrupted in the April-July 2020 period, the transportation of the procured items to Kabul was delayed and a few machines had to be transported by sea while UNDP coordinated closely with the different airlines and made sure that earliest available flights were secured for transporting the procured items to Afghanistan.

### Resources allocation

The project did not face issues in allocating financial resources for procurement and other expenses as the necessary funds were readily committed by donors. Financial disbursement and delivery rate, also affected by the challenges that delayed implementation, were monitored and reported regularly to project stakeholders.

*Figure 2. Project quarterly expenses and cumulative disbursement, Apr 2020 – Dec 2021*



Early in 2021, UNDP recruited a dedicated project manager to facilitate completion of tasks under the project. UNDP also recruited a M&E associate to address the data sharing and reporting constraints. The M&E associate and the Third-Party Monitoring firm which was started working in October 2020 worked closely to facilitate data collecting and reporting, which needed constant adaptation given the delays in procurement and transportation, and also made difficult by the deteriorating internal security.

### **Project governance and project board activities**

The Project was implemented under the Security Window of the LOTFA-MPTF and within the framework of the Fund. As the Recipient United Nations Organization (RUNO) for the project, UNDP assumed complete programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to the project.

Project governance included a dedicated team built during the implementation of the project. Operational functions in areas such as procurement, administration, human resources and finance were administered directly from the UNDP Country Office, in partnership with the Global Procurement Unit. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was the main national coordination authority, acting as a key partner to distribute procured items and assign personnel to the regional COVID-19 police hospitals. LOTFA Trust Fund Management Team and Rule of Law Team facilitated meetings with government and donors as needed.

As foreseen in the project document, the approval (by April 2020) and further changes (such as extension) to the project were submitted and approved by the LOTFA Steering Committee. The LOTFA Technical Working Group (TWG) under the Security Window chaired by an MoIA representative convened monthly to assess progress and achievements, as well as to address issues arising during implementation and associated risks, such as capacity challenges.

The project commenced in May 2020 as an emergency project with an initial duration of 8 months (31 December 2020). It was extended for 6 months under a no-cost basis until 30 June 2021, with an additional extension being approved by the Security Window Technical Working Group (SWTWG) and the Steering Committee until October 31<sup>st</sup> 2021.

In summary, project governance performed smoothly, and the project was closed by a decision of the Steering Committee meeting of 4<sup>th</sup> of November 2021, when all LOTFA projects were closed following the government change of August of the same year.

### **Cost-effective use of inputs**

The main challenge in the cost-effective use of inputs was the procurement and items delivery delays caused by issues related to the pandemic itself and to the deteriorating internal security. The COVID-19 pandemic created a high demand for medical equipment, machines, and consumables on the global and national markets. Consequently, throughout project implementation most of the planned procurements were prolonged as some equipment and supplies were out of stock and delivery to the country was affected by disruptions in international flights and subsequent movement restrictions.

While it can be said that this setting did not hamper the project's ability to contribute to its expected outcome as argued in the performance review section of this report, such challenges did raise transportation and overall transaction costs, consequently decreasing the project's overall cost-effectiveness. Therefore, to increase cost-effectiveness in similar highly complex emergency situations, it is recommended that some of the initiatives adopted by UNDP Afghanistan and detailed in the next section, such as soon as possible locally procure nominal quantities of items in the procurement plan, which needs to be prepared earlier in the process



and revised regularly, should be included in the overall planning and risk mitigation strategies of future projects in similar complex emergency situations.

### **Adaptive management using risk informed approach**

Adaptive management using a risk informed approach is about bringing agility to project implementation decision-making based on learning and adapting through a continuously updated risk identification, monitoring and management process.

As registered in several of progress reports, the project made constant efforts not only to monitor any substantial changes in the status of risks, but also to identify new risks and review mitigating measures. The project's capacity to apply adaptive management through a risk informed approach was strengthened with the addition of a dedicated project manager and a M&E associate to the team. Additionally, consistent and extensive monitoring provided by the Third-Party Monitoring firm was key as it provided regular verification and updates regarding on-site progress and performance.

## **C. National Ownership**

National ownership was embedded in the project since its design, as it was not only developed per request of the MoIA but was also planned as an emergency response and support project to the main national strategies for combating COVID-19 among police personnel, that is: the National Emergency Response Plan for COVID-19 in Afghanistan itself, MoIA's Strategy for Combating COVID-19 among Police Personnel, and MoIA's Communication Plan for Combating COVID – 19 among Police Personnel.

The project itself was designed by UNDP in accordance with consultations with the MoIA, based on a concept note presented by that Ministry and approved by the Security Window Technical Working Group of the LOTFA – MPTF on a meeting held on April 1st, 2020.

It should be noted that within the project's governance the MoIA was a primary stakeholder and actively worked to ensure that the emergency response support provided under the project was physically made available to the targeted groups. This included preparing and making available the facilities for establishing the COVID-19 hospitals, as well as transporting the procured items from Kabul to the five targeted provinces i.e., Herat, Balkh, Nangahar, Helmand and Paktiya. Although undisclosed reasons delayed the development and implementation of the awareness raising materials by MoIA's communications department, UNDP worked actively to resume the activities and provide support to the redesign of the campaign, resulting in awareness materials to be developed and distributed by June 2021.

## **D. Sustainability**

According to the project document, sustainability (i.e., in terms of the continued use of the hospital equipment) would be ensured once the procured equipment could be continued to be operated by existing police hospitals, even after the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. This assumption was challenged by power shift of mid-August 2021.

Nevertheless, verifications conducted by the Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) company in October 2021 showed that four of the five COVID-19 hospitals established by the project were open and functional, even though the facilities were facing challenges such as limited supply of water and electricity. The TPM was able to verify that most of the equipment donated to them are intact and might be used for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

## V. RESULTS



Inauguration ceremony of Kunduz Regional Hospital. Photo: MoIA/2021.

### A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The COVID-19 emergency support project can be regarded as a key intervention to assist the country's health system to respond to the needs of the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. Although closed earlier than expected due to changes in the government of Afghanistan in August 15<sup>th</sup> of 2021, the project was able to deliver good results in three key indicators that made contributions not only to project outcomes and outputs, but also to UNDP's global and national goals<sup>13</sup>: regional COVID-19 police hospitals were equipped and inaugurated in five provinces, all of which managed to attend all ANP personnel who sought their services, which totalled almost 30,000 patients during the period of the project's implementation; hygiene kits

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<sup>13</sup> The project was designed to be linked to Outcome 3 of UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021), on strengthened resilience to shock and crisis, and to Outcome 2 of UNDP Country Programme Document for Afghanistan (2015-2019, extended to 2021), about increased trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law.




were distributed to all the provinces included in the project, increasing both police awareness and protection from the disease; and community perception was predominantly positive about the police conducting their duties of COVID-19 prevention.

Therefore, by increasing the MoIA's capacity to both mitigate the spread of COVID-19 among its police personnel and to treat those affected by the disease, the project was able to increase the number of people with access to agile and effective responses to COVID-19, an indicator added to UNDP's Strategic Plan (2018-2021) as the pandemic affected countries worldwide. In additional, the project found that 71% of the people surveyed by the TPM firm perceived that the police conducted their duties of COVID-19 prevention in the community (as detailed in the section on Output 3 below), which shows that the project was also able to contribute to a high percentage of the public who reported confidence in justice and rule of law institutions, an indicator of UNDP's Country Programme for Afghanistan (2015-2019).

As registered before in this document, since it was signed in April 2020, the project faced several issues that hindered or slowed down its implementation, calling for adaptive management and no-costs extensions until October 2021. The procurement process and its interlinked activities were delayed by global and national COVID-19 related restrictions that disrupted production chains and international flights, as well as by a lengthy sample check process of the procured items by the Ministries of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and of Public Health (MoPH). The deteriorating internal security context was a key challenge in reaching the project interventions as it disrupted transportation of equipment and supplies, impeding the inauguration of two of the seven regional hospitals that the project was supposed to deliver.

Nevertheless, until activities were ceased due to the events of August 2021 in Afghanistan, the project managed to achieve totally or partially most of its targets, as registered in the next sections of this chapter.

*Figure 3. Key results delivery timeline*



In what regards project outcome, good results were achieved in three of the four indicators. The best results are related to: i) increasing the capacity of MoIA hospital facilities to treat COVID-19 infected police patients (with six out of the eight expected facilities equipped and inaugurated); ii) the proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among police, with the number

of cumulative cases reaching only 5.8% of MoIA's worst case scenario; and iii) the fact that all five regional hospitals were able to improve their functionality score against WHO standards for COVID-19 hospitals. Unfortunately, only 51% out of the desired 90% target of police were observed to effectively use hygiene kits to protect themselves and citizens against COVID-19, which could be attributed to the delay in implementing the internal and public communications on COVID-19 – as detailed in the section on Output 3.

The project achieved its greatest success in providing the necessary infrastructure to treat COVID-19 infected patients (Output 1). In this regard, as mentioned above the project delivered 6 out of 8 COVID-19 facilities (5 out of 7 regional COVID-19 hospitals and one lab testing facility), while 100% of the police personnel who approached the hospitals received needed care for COVID-19. COVID-19.

In what concerns protecting the Afghan police against COVID-19 in their day-to-day work (Output 2), 100% of the procured hygiene kits were delivered and the percentage of sampled police personnel who demonstrated knowledge on how to use them was close to the target (79% out of 80% target). In turn, a delay in implementing a COVID-19 awareness campaign directed to the ANP most likely influenced the less than desired results on the target pertaining the percentage of police who used hygiene kits while on duty (51% out of 100%).

The project was less successful in public communications for the dissemination of the preventive measures for all ANP (Output 3), due to unforeseen engagements and staff displacements in 2020. With continuous support from the project's team, MoIA managed to develop a new strategy, so UNDP was able to initiate procurement of services to produce the selected communications items as soon as new guideline were received, in April 2021, with distribution starting in June 2021. Additionally, it is necessary to register that in the community perception survey conducted by the TPM company among 12 provinces from May-June 2021, 71% of the respondents stated that police conducted their duties of COVID prevention in the community, which can be said contributed to reducing the spread of the disease in the country.

Lastly, although the change in the government in August 2021 caused most of the health services to substantially decrease or completely cease, the TPM verified that most of the equipment donated to the hospitals were intact by October 2021 and could still be used for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan.

## **B. PROJECT OUTCOME**

The project was designed to deliver “increased access to early diagnosis, quarantine and treatment of all police personnel through health facilities provided by MoIA's Health Directorate on an emergency basis to reduce and control the incidence and effects of COVID-19 on the police in Afghanistan.” Therefore, success in project outcome was to be measured by the number of police personnel who remain unaffected or recover from the disease through treatment received from the COVID-19 hospitals and continue to serve on Tashkil.

MoIA's General Directorate for Health Services estimated that, under the pandemic worst case scenario (high transmission), the number of positive COVID-19 cases could reach 40,000

among the police over the period of 8 months, between May and December 2020. As shows the next table, among the ANP, the MOIA's General Directorate of Health has confirmed that as of 30 June 2021 the cumulative number of positive COVID-19 cases among ANPs was 2,354, of which 121 have deceased and 1,123 have recovered.

It should be noted that the project was indeed able to strengthen MoIA's hospital facilities capacity (indicator 0.1) as six out of the eight health facilities were equipped and inaugurated during implementation. Only two hospitals in Helmand and Kandahar were not inaugurated due to deteriorating security conditions.


*Table 5. COVID-19 spread among ANPs, per provinces*

Milestone	Provinces	APPS Strength	C-19 Positive (P)	Proportion of C-19 infection cases	Quarantined (Q)	Recovered (R)	Discharged from Quarantine (Xq)	Deaths (D)	In (Q+P)	Out (Xq+R+D)	Active C-19 (In-out)	Active quarantine
<b>31 Dec 2020</b>	Kabul	32763	321	0,980%	1471	271	1451	29	1792	1751	21	
	Helmand	5099	45	0,883%	60	35	59	3	105	101	3	
	Cleared Provinces (32)	80878	462	0,571%	1639	432	1636	30	2101	2098	0	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>118740</b>	<b>828</b>	<b>0,697%</b>	<b>3170</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>3146</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>3998</b>	<b>3950</b>	<b>24</b>	
<b>30 Jun 2021</b>	Kabul	32763	1793	5,473%	3287	650	3287	83	5080	4020	1060	-
	Herat	3616	44	1,217%	168	39	168	4	212	211	1	-
	Logar	1164	1	0,086%	19	-	19	-	20	19	1	-
	Faryab	1978	21	1,062%	102	12	102	5	123	119	4	-
	Helmand	5099	47	0,922%	69	43	69	3	116	115	1	-
	Parwan	1863	24	1,288%	55	16	55	3	79	74	5	-
	Jawzjan	1238	19	1,535%	55	13	55	1	74	69	5	-
	Balkh	2522	13	0,515%	60	10	60	2	73	72	1	-
	Ghazni	2232	6	0,269%	46	4	46	1	52	51	1	-
	Nooristan	2411	13	0,539%	31	12	31	-	44	43	1	-
	Badakhshan	2981	13	0,436%	26	8	26	-	39	34	5	-
	Kundoz	2174	24	1,104%	75	21	75	2	99	98	1	-
	Urozgan	2502	4	0,160%	17	2	17	-	21	19	2	-
	Zabul	1796	3	0,167%	29	-	29	2	32	31	1	-
	Nangarhar	4765	24	0,504%	188	18	188	3	212	209	3	-
	Khost	2362	3	0,127%	4	2	4	-	7	6	1	-
	Baghlan	2634	4	0,152%	40	2	40	1	44	43	1	-
	Panjshir	905	21	2,320%	22	19	20	1	43	40	1	2
	Kapisa	1689	19	1,125%	35	12	35	1	54	48	6	-
	Paktia	2572	72	2,799%	54	70	54	-	126	124	2	-
	Badghis	1793	10	0,558%	23	7	23	2	33	32	1	-

Milestone	Provinces	APPS Strength	C-19 Positive (P)	Proportion of C-19 infection cases	Quarantined (Q)	Recovered (R)	Discharged from Quarantine (Xq)	Deaths (D)	In (Q+P)	Out (Xq+R+D)	Active C-19 (In-out)	Active quarantine
	Maidan Wardak	1256	5	0,398%	17	1	17	-	22	18	4	-
	Farah	1922	3	0,156%	4	1	4	-	7	5	2	-
	Cleared Provinces (11)	34503	168	0,487%	573	161	573	7	741	741	-	-
	<b>Total</b>	<b>118740</b>	<b>2354</b>	<b>1,982%</b>	<b>4999</b>	<b>1123</b>	<b>4997</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>7353</b>	<b>6241</b>	<b>1110</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Cumulative</b>		<b>118740</b>	<b>3182</b>	<b>2,680%</b>	<b>8169</b>	<b>1861</b>	<b>8143</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>11351</b>	<b>10191</b>	<b>1134</b>	<b>-</b>

Therefore, even though the percentage of police who effectively use hygiene kits to protect themselves and citizens from contracting COVID-19 (indicator 0.2) was little over half of the project's target, the total number of positive cases among ANPs was only 5.8% of the total estimated in MoIA's worst case scenario. Considering the whole strength of the ANP, the proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among the police (indicator 0.3) was 0.69% in 2020 and reached 1.98% during the first semester of 2021. The spike in number of cases among the ANPs in 2021 coincided with the third wave of the COVID-19 in the country. Nationally, the number of new COVID-19 cases started to increase in early May 2021 and peaked in the third week of June 2021 with an average of 1,845 daily cases (see figure 4 below). During the peak time (20-25 June 2021), with around 81 deaths per day registered in the country.

Figure 4: Confirmed National COVID-19 cases and deaths, Ministry of Public Health



It should be noted that the project also assessed the functionality of the regional COVID-19 hospitals against WHO standards (indicator 0.4)<sup>14</sup>, as registered in the table below. The TPM firm found that all five hospitals established by the project improved their scores as MoIA was

<sup>14</sup> The project adopted WHO standards for level-3 hospitals to assess safety of the facilities.

able to deliver supplies and general practices and processes were improved with training and increased number of available health personnel.

*Table 6. Evolution of the mean functionality score of regional COVID-19 regional police hospitals according to WHO standards*

HOSPITAL	BASELINE SCORE	END-LINE SCORE
Balkh	75%	80%
Herat	54%	58%
Kunduz	90%	90%
Nangarhar	56%	69%
Paktya	73%	81%

Lastly, it is important to register that Afghanistan received 468,000 vaccines from the COVAX Facility in March 2021. As the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSDF) were identified as a priority group, MOIA was allocated 90,000 vaccines, which have been administered. The COVID-19 police hospitals established by the project were used to provide vaccination to the regional police forces.

The detailed performance of the project in what regards its sub-outcome 1 indicators can be found in the table in the next page.

Table 7: Summary of Progress on Fund Sub-Outcome 1 indicators at project closure (August 2021)

<b>PROJECT OUTCOME:</b>	Increased access to early diagnosis, quarantine and treatment of all police personnel through health facilities provided by MoIA Health Directorate on an emergency basis to reduce and control the incidence and effects of C-19 on the police in Afghanistan.
<b>PROJECT OUTCOME INDICATOR:</b>	Number of police personnel who remain unaffected or recover from C-19 through treatment received from MoIA Health Directorate Hospitals and continue to serve on Tashkil.

INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE	COMMENTS
0.1. Extent to which capacities of the MoIA hospital facilities strengthened to treat COVID-19 infected police patients	Insufficient	Capacities of the MoIA hospital facilities strengthened sufficiently to treat COVID-19 infected patients	Somewhat sufficiently strengthened. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 5 out of 7 COVID-19 hospitals inaugurated and functional. 02 hospitals (Helmand and Kandahar) not inaugurated due to increased insecurity.</li> <li>• Testing facility in Kabul equipped and operational.</li> </ul>	Additional hospitals increased total service capacity in 200 beds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nangarhar: 40 beds (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine beds).</li> <li>• Paktya: 40 beds (24 for quarantine, 8 ICU, 8 mild and moderate cases).</li> <li>• Balkh: 40 beds (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine beds).</li> <li>• Kunduz: 40-bed capacity (10 Intensive Care Unit ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine bed</li> <li>• Herat: 40-bed capacity (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine bed</li> </ul>
0.2. % of police who effectively use hygiene kits to protect themselves and citizens from contracting COVID-19	0%	At least 90% of police who received hygiene kits use them correctly and regularly	51% achieved by the suspension of the project based on the report of quarter before. However, data collected and reported was not updated so the percent could have been higher.	Three rounds of police observation were conducted by TPM company (Feb-March 2021, April-May 2021, May-June 2021).

INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE	COMMENTS																														
				<p>In the round three (May-June 2021) with the exception of social distancing and hand washing the police officers exhibited less compliance to standard practices in order to prevent CoVID-19 than in round two observation.</p> <p>Status registered here corresponds to average data gathered during the second quarter of 2021.</p>																														
0.3. Proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among police by province in %	0	100% in consultation with the MOIA	<p>Overall proportion of COVID-19 cases among ANP: 1,982%</p> <p>Proportion per province (as of 30 June 2022):</p> <table><tr><td>Kabul</td><td>5,473%</td></tr><tr><td>Herat</td><td>1,217%</td></tr><tr><td>Logar</td><td>0,086%</td></tr><tr><td>Faryab</td><td>1,062%</td></tr><tr><td>Helmand</td><td>0,922%</td></tr><tr><td>Parwan</td><td>1,288%</td></tr><tr><td>Jawzjan</td><td>1,535%</td></tr><tr><td>Balkh</td><td>0,515%</td></tr><tr><td>Ghazni</td><td>0,269%</td></tr><tr><td>Nooristan</td><td>0,539%</td></tr><tr><td>Badakhshan</td><td>0,436%</td></tr><tr><td>Kundoz</td><td>1,104%</td></tr><tr><td>Urozgan</td><td>0,160%</td></tr><tr><td>Zabul</td><td>0,167%</td></tr><tr><td>Nangarhar</td><td>0,504%</td></tr></table>	Kabul	5,473%	Herat	1,217%	Logar	0,086%	Faryab	1,062%	Helmand	0,922%	Parwan	1,288%	Jawzjan	1,535%	Balkh	0,515%	Ghazni	0,269%	Nooristan	0,539%	Badakhshan	0,436%	Kundoz	1,104%	Urozgan	0,160%	Zabul	0,167%	Nangarhar	0,504%	Overall proportion considers total of COVID-19 positive cases as of 30 June 2021 (3,182) against whole APPS Strength (118,740).
Kabul	5,473%																																	
Herat	1,217%																																	
Logar	0,086%																																	
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
INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE			COMMENTS
				Khost	0,127%	
				Baghlan	0,152%	
				Panjshir	2,320%	
				Kapisa	1,125%	
				Paktia	2,799%	
				Badghis	0,558%	
				Maidan Wardak	0,398%	
				Farah	0,156%	
				Cleared Provinces (11)	0,487%	
0.4. Extent to which hospital facilities of the MOIA are compliant with the MoPH requirements to contain COVID-19	0	All targeted facilities are compliant with MoPH requirements;	Compliance with WHO COVID-19 secondary care hospital standards (end-line score registered by TPM by July/August 2021): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nangarhar: 69%</li> <li>• Paktia: 81%</li> <li>• Balkh: 80%</li> <li>• Kunduz: 90%</li> <li>• Herat: 58%</li> </ul>			The project adopted WHO standards for level-3 hospitals to assess safety of the facilities.



### C. OUTPUT 1: MOIA, General Directorate of Health Services is supported to operationalise a lab testing facility and seven new hospital facilities to diagnose, quarantine and treat Police personnel infected with COVID-19.

Under this output, the project delivered six out of the eight facilities it was supposed to establish (indicator 1.2): five hospitals (Balkh, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Herat) and one COVID-19 testing facility in Kabul. The high levels of satisfaction with the health care received in the hospitals, registered in the graph below, and the fact that all the police personnel who approached the functional hospitals received needed care for COVID-19 confirm that the project was able to strengthen MoIA's response to COVID-19 by providing quality facilities to diagnose, quarantine and treat Police personnel infected with the disease.

*Figure 5. Exit interview with police personnel who used the hospital services*



As seen above, data collected by the TPM from May 11th to June 30th, 2021, registers that almost 100% of respondents in Balkh, Nangarhar and Kunduz expressed that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the care they had received. In Paktya, due to the low number of staff, 56% of the exit interview participants stated that they were neutral on the services they had received.

As detailed in the previous sections of this report, the project faced several issues that hindered or slowed down the implementation, affecting mainly the procurement processes and the transportation of equipment and supplies to target provinces. The operationalization of the hospitals was partly affected by the delay in identifying and taking on board the third-party service provider.

The decreasing security conditions in Afghanistan not only caused additional delays to the inauguration of hospitals as also impeded the inauguration of the COVID-19 regional hospitals in Helmand and Kandahar. Attacks to convoys transporting equipment and supplies also caused

shortage of medicines, while the increased number of war casualties affected the availability of medical staff.

It should be noted that the TPM company found that the five regional COVID-19 police hospitals received almost 30,000 patients since their inauguration, while the Kabul testing laboratory received over 4,000 visitors, as registered in the table below. All visitors received the necessary care in accordance with the results of their health screening (indicator 1.2).

*Table 8. Number of police personnel who visited health facilities established by the project (cumulative data (October 2020-october 2021))*

Province	Number of police personnel visited in C19 OPD (Male)	Number of police personnel visited in C19 OPD (Female)	No of patients quarantined	Total # of C19 Suspected cases in HF	No of patients tested +ve	No of patients admitted in C19 ward	No of patients' sample send to lab for RDT/RT-PCR	No of patients intubated /transferred to ICU	No of patients discharged	No of patients expired
<b>Kabul (Lab)</b>	4231	NA	1211	NA	1070	NA	3978	166	NA	71
<b>Paktya</b>	8987	7	396	476	27	59	93	0	108	1
<b>Nangarhar</b>	14167	0	272	272	6	6	0	0	164	0
<b>Balkh</b>	2312	12	217	231	13	2	69	21	95	3
<b>Kunduz</b>	1970	2	72	352	2	1	34	5	45	0
<b>Herat</b>	2021	23	0	86	0	0	10	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	33,688	44	2,168	1,417	1,118	68	4,184	192	412	75

It should be registered that the TPM firm found that the deteriorating security context, especially from July 2021 onwards, resulted in declining care due for instance to power shortages (Nangarhar) and active fighting (Kunduz and Herat), causing large referrals and early discharges as well as the closure of the hospitals. Yet, four of the five regional COVID-19 police hospitals were found open to the public by TPM verifications conducted in October 2021 (only the Nangarhar hospital was not operational at the time).

In the next page, a table registers the results achieved by the project in relation to its Output 1 targets at closure.

Table 9: Summary of Progress on Output 1 Indicators at project closure (August 2021)

INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE	COMMENTS
1.1. Number of new facilities established/activated <sup>15</sup> that are ready to treat COVID-19 patients	0	Five in total: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One 100-bed hospitals established/ activated in Herat</li> <li>• Four 50 bed hospitals established /activated in Balkh, Nangarhar, Helmand and Paktiya.</li> </ul>	5 out of 7 COVID-19 hospitals inaugurated and functional.  02 hospitals (Helmand and Kandahar) not inaugurated due to the deteriorating security situation, which hindered transportation of equipment and consumables despite progress in renovating the hospital buildings.  Testing facility in Kabul operational.	Additional hospitals increased total service capacity in 200 beds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nangarhar: 40 beds (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine beds).</li> <li>• Paktya: 40 beds (24 for quarantine, 8 ICU, 8 mild and moderate cases).</li> <li>• Balkh: 40 beds (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine beds).</li> <li>• Kunduz: 40-bed capacity (10 Intensive Care Unit ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine bed</li> <li>• Herat: 40-bed capacity (10 Intensive Care Unit (ICU), 15 treatment beds, 15 quarantine bed</li> </ul>
1.2. % of police tested positive for COVID-19 who received appropriate treatment in a timely manner in targeted facilities of the MOIA	0%	100%	100%	100% of the police who approached the hospitals received needed care for COVID-19.  TPM reports show increased patient satisfaction (March-June 2021) in Nangarhar, Paktya, Balkh, stable high satisfaction in Kunduz and low/decreasing satisfaction in Herat caused by high insecurity due to armed conflicts.

<sup>15</sup> These health facilities are adequately staffed with well-trained doctors and health staff – this will not be measured as part of this indicator.

During the first year of project implementation, the original PRODOC registered target of five new facilities (One 100-bed hospitals established/ activated in Herat, plus Four 50 bed hospitals established /activated in Balkh, Nangarhar, Helmand and Pakiya) was expanded to eight facilities in total (encompassing: Seven 40-bed hospitals established/ activated in Herat, Helmand, Kandahar, Balkh, Kunduz, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces, plus a laboratory in Kabul). Such change did not increase project costs and was made to expand the reach of COVID-19 care to additional regions in the country as was approved by LOTFA Steering Committee.

#### D. OUTPUT 2: Police personnel are protected and aware of minimum risk reduction measures to prevent COVID-19 in the course of their day-to-day work



ANP wearing PPE in Nangarhar.


This output focused on immediate provision of medical equipment and protective, sanitary kits for all police personnel in Provincial Police Head Quarters (PPHQs) and Police Districts (PDs) with primary focus on the 13 most affected provinces. Success in the protection of police personnel was to be measure by the percentage of ANPs who received hygiene kits, demonstrated good knowledge on how to use them and actually used the kits while performing their duties.

The project achieved moderate success in this output. According to data collected by the Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) service, all the procured hygiene kits were delivered to the provinces (indicator 2.1). For instance, during the third round of verification conducted from May-June 2021 in 15 provinces police units, the TPM verified the amount received against supplied by the index unit. Due to ongoing fights in many provinces, the distribution of hygiene kits by MoIA stopped in July 2021.

The percentage of sampled police personnel who demonstrated knowledge on how to use them was close to the target, that is 79% out of 80% during the second quarter of 2021 (indicator 2.2). It should be noted that to assess the perception (attitude) of the police personnel to COVID-19, as well as their specific knowledge about infection prevention and control, the TPM team evaluated police personnel in pre-selected police posts in 15 provinces from May 11 to end of June 2021.


As depicted in the figure below, in four provinces almost all the police who were interviewed expressed that they received training in COVID-19; the rest of the responses were between 0% to 50%. Availability and application of infection measures were generally low ranging between 20% in Ghazni and 60% in Daikundi, Jawzjan and Logar provinces. Except for Jawzjan where knowledge was 44% in the rest both knowledge and perception scored between 62% and 100%.

Figure 6. Results from Interview of Police Personnel in 15 Provinces



Regarding the last indicator in this output, a delay in implementing a COVID-19 awareness campaign directed to the ANP most likely influenced the less than desired results on the target pertaining the percentage of police who used hygiene kits while on duty, which reached only 51% out of 100% (indicator 2.3), according to a round of community perception survey that was conducted from May to June 2021<sup>16</sup>.

Figure 7. Police practice observation results



In addition to the community perception survey, three rounds of police observation were conducted by the TPM to assess the percentage of police who use hygiene kits and adopted other prevention practices while performing their duties. As can be seen in the above figure,

<sup>16</sup> The community survey was conducted with a total sample size of 1440 people in 12 provinces from May to June 2021. In the survey 62% of the respondents stated that police were wearing masks while 51% mentioned police were using masks properly.

except for social distancing and hand washing, the police officers expressed less compliance to standard practices (shaking hands, using hand sanitizer, and covering coughing) in order to prevent COVID-19 in round two observation.

Considering the good results in the indicator regarding knowledge on how to use hygiene kits (indicator 2.2), the TPM assessed that the reduced use of the hygiene kits could be attributed to a lack of taking the COVID-19 serious, which could be a consequence of the delay in the project's awareness campaign that was supposed to target ANPs, or it might be due to lack of PPE kits due to delays in their delivery to provinces caused by security issues already mentioned on this report.

In the next page, the table registers the success achieved by the project in relation to its Output 2 targets at closure.

Table 10: Summary of Progress on Output 2 Indicators at project closure (August 2021)

INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE	COMMENTS
2.1. % of police in the targeted provinces receive hygiene kits (masks, hand sanitisers, gloves, etc.)	0	100% of police in the targeted provinces	100%	As per TPM Final Report, the third round of verification exercise (May-June 2021) conducted in 15 provinces registered that the amount supplied was received by the index unit, with small variation in one province.
2.2. % of sampled police in the targeted provinces demonstrating good knowledge on how to use hygiene kits to protect themselves from contracting COVID-19	0	80%	79%	Two rounds of interviews were conducted by TPM company (Feb 2021-March 2021 and May-June 2021).
2.3. % of police (sample based) who use hygiene kits while performing their duties	0	100% of police who receive the hygiene kits	51%	<p>Peoples' Opinion on the adherence of Police to prevention measures of COVID 19: 62% of the respondents stated that police were wearing masks; while 51% said that police were using masks properly.</p> <p>Considering the good results in indicator 2.2, the reduced use of the hygiene kits could be attributed to a lack of taking the COVID-19 serious, which could be a consequence of the delay in the awareness campaign, or it could be due to lack of PPE kits due to delays in their delivery to provinces caused by security issues.</p>



## E. OUTPUT 3. MOIA internal and public communications on COVID-19 supported for extensive dissemination of the preventive measures for all ANP in Afghanistan

This output goal was to contribute to raising awareness on preventive measures against COVID-19 among the police in Afghanistan, as well as on informing the public on the roles and responsibilities of the ANP in the effective implementation of the nationwide “containment strategy” against COVID-19 in Afghanistan. Initiatives under this output were based on the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) Communication Plan for Combating COVID-19 and led by MoIA’s General Directorate for Strategic Communications (GDSC), with support from UNDP Afghanistan.

Unforeseen engagements and staff displacements in 2020 delayed the implementation of communications activities. Hiring a dedicated project manager allowed for increased engagement with MOIA’s directors for Strategic Communications and for Media for the development of a concept note to guide interventions. By May 2021, MoIA’s General Directorate of Health team had designed and implemented awareness messages to circulate via email across ANP. The messages shared with 1,600 e-mail accounts information on the basic principles to protect themselves against COVID-19.

UNDP commenced the procurement for the items to support the development of the awareness activities as soon as the concept note was received in April 2021. Four COVID-19 Prevention and Infection control posters that had 6,400 copies of each poster were produced and distributed across the provinces to the ANP police offices. UNDP also developed tweets of the posters and referenced them in the press releases to support awareness and advocacy.

Figure 8: Awareness posters designed, printed and disseminated to the provinces.




Given the limited progress regarding this output, one of the conditions of the project extension approved in June 2021 was to discontinue Output 3 from July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2021. Additionally, due to the events of August 2021, it was not possible to assess the reach of the awareness campaign that was deployed by the project in June 2021. Therefore, the great delay in the development of the campaign, due to unforeseen circumstances within the MoIA greatly affected progress of the awareness campaign, which most likely caused the less than desired results regarding output 2 target on the percentage of police personnel who use hygiene kits while performing their duties.

It should be noted that under this output the TPM also assessed community perception about the police force and COVID-19. The data collection took place from April to May 2021 in the selected places of Kabul and Nangarhar. Asking the opinion of community members on seriousness of COVID-19 pandemic, Kabul residents (63%) as against Nangarhar residents (24%) consider it a serious threat, although Kabul residents were found to have poor knowledge as compared to Nangarhar. According to interviewed community members the adherence by police on COVID-19 was limited to wearing mask.

The next round of community perception survey was conducted among 12 provinces from May to June 2021, with total sample size of 1440. In the survey 62% of the respondents stated that police were wearing masks while 51% mentioned police were using masks properly but only 40% police were wearing all the time. COVID-19

Lastly, it is important to register that the communities served by the ANPs encompassed in the project showed a positive perception of both the activities of the project and the behaviour of the ANPs regarding COVID-19. When the fourth fully equipped police hospital to fight COVID-19 was inaugurated in Kunduz, Haji Mohammad Laghmani, member of provincial council stated that "This is exactly the right support, in the right region", referring to the untimely passing of the former Provincial Chief of Kunduz, who lost his life to COVID-19. Also, the TPM final report registers that 71% of the respondents of the community perception survey stated that police conducted their duties of COVID prevention in the community, as shows the graph in the next page – which can be considered a positive result for the project.

Figure 9: Community Perception Regarding Police Personnel During the Pandemic



Below is a snapshot of where Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP is in relation to its project targets at closure.

*Table 11: Summary of Progress on Output 3 Indicators at project closure (August 2021)*

INDICATORS (as per ProDoc)	BASELINE	TARGETS	STATUS AT CLOSURE	COMMENTS
3.1. % of police reached through awareness campaigns	0	100% of the police centres intended by MoIA will receive awareness materials	Four COVID-19 Prevention and Infection control posters developed and 6,000 copies produced and distributed across the provinces to the ANP police offices.	Awareness products prepared in Q2 and distributed end of Q2.  Due to the events of August 2021, it was not possible to assess the reach of the awareness campaign.
3.2. % of sampled police who is aware of what to do if they themselves get sick due to C-19	0	100% of the sample police aware of what to do if infected	All police personnel covered before July 2021, made aware could follow the prevention and treatment protocol and able to sensitize police colleagues.	Awareness product related to the hospitals prepared in Q2 and distributed end of Q2. Based on the conditions of the project extension, Output 3 will be discontinued from the 1 July 2021.  Due to the events of August 2021, it was not possible to assess the reach of the awareness campaign.
3.3. % of public (sampled based) who is aware and has positive perceptions about MOIA/ANP communications contents/materials regarding police roles and responsibilities in COVID-19 response	0	100%	71% reported at the time of project suspension and activity was also suspended.	In the community perception survey conducted by the TPM company among 12 provinces from May-June 2021, 71% of the respondents stated that police conducted their duties of COVID prevention in the community.

Based on the conditions of the project extension, Output 3 will be discontinued from the 1 July 2021. Also, due to the delays in implementing the activities in this output and the events of August 2021, it was not possible to define targets and assess the reach of the awareness campaign.

## VI. CROSS CUTTING RESULTS

### A. GENDER SPECIFIC RESULTS

The Afghan national Police (ANP) and their family members were direct beneficiaries of the project. Within ANP, which has a team of almost 119,000 members, approximately 2% are female and potential users of the project services.

Based on data collected from interviews conducted by the TPM with the Head of Regional Hospitals of Nangarhar, Paktia, Balkh, Kunduz and Herat, from 14,284 visitors by June 2021, approximately 8% of them are female police or female family member of ANPs.

It should be noted that, although the project's main objective was to support MoIA to respond and treat police personnel infected with COVID-19, the five hospitals established during the implementation of the project were able to play a wider role in health care. This is illustrated by the case of Ms. Aisha Rahimi<sup>17</sup>, one of female police officers who work with the Provincial Police Headquarter in Herat province.

Mr. Rahimi suspected she had contracted COVID-19 and sought medical care at the Herat hospital, where after the initial screening, the on-duty medical practitioner asked to conduct additional medical tests. Although all ANP health services are free as stated in police inherent law, in many instances due to poor facilities, ANP were referred to other health providers where costs would be incurred. Nevertheless, with the use of the new machines in the COVID-19 regional hospitals, the local staff were able to diagnose and treat Ms. Rahimi's problem, who reported that she was delighted with the diagnosis procedure and the quality of treatment she received at the newly established COVID-19 hospital in her province. *"The services have improved here. Previously they used to give medicine only, but now they carry out medical tests and diagnosis... I thank those responsible and those who funded this hospital"* Ms Aisha Rahimi reported.

### B. HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH

As defined by the UN Sustainable Development Group, the human rights-based approach "is a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights. It seeks to analyse inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress and often result in groups of people being left behind."<sup>18</sup>

As registered in the project's document, the promotion of human rights was to be included in the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) that MoIA should to develop as part of the dissemination of the preventive measures to be adopted by all police in Afghanistan (Output

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<sup>17</sup> Name changed to protect individual.

<sup>18</sup> UNSDG, "Human Rights-Based Approach". Available at: <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/human-rights-based-approach>

3). Among other things, the SOP was to make specific emphasis on human rights-based issues that need to be observed by all police personnel in Afghanistan, during the maintenance of law and order as well as the enforcement of the containment strategy through movement restrictions.

As the planned awareness initiatives suffered extensive delays to unforeseen engagement issues of MOIA staff responsible for communications, progress on this issue was greatly compromised. The awareness materials that the project was able to design in partnership with MoIA focused on COVID-19 prevention and infection control.

## **C. SOCIAL and ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Social and environmental sustainability was embedded in project design and implementation through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).

## **VII. PARTNERSHIPS**

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) of Afghanistan was the main stakeholder in both the design and the implementation of the project, providing solutions to mitigate several of the challenges faced by the project regarding transportation and internal security. The project provided MoIA with a dedicated team that worked closely with UNDP in implementing the activities on the ground.

Additionally, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) was a key partner in supporting the procurement of machines, equipment, medicine, and hospital/lab supplies<sup>19</sup>. Samples of the planned procured items, for instance, were submitted to both the MoIA and MoPH for quality check and verification before the purchase order could be issued. Due to unclear reasons, the sample check of specific items took more time than expected in MoPH, so UNDP coordinated with both ministries on a regular basis to expedite the sample check process.

As the Project was implemented under the Security Window of the LOTFA-MPTF and within the framework of the Fund, close coordination with LOTFA was required. Changes in the project, such as the required extension, were discussed with and approved by the Security Window Technical Working Group. The services provided by the third-party monitoring company required close coordination with the UNDP programme and project teams, the MoIA project team and relevant MOIA/ANP units as well as the LOTFA M&E team in the Trust Fund Management Unit. Also, regular LOTFA donor meetings provided platforms for reporting and feedback from contributors<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> Also, information provided by MoPH on the progress of the pandemic in Afghanistan and MoPH protocols were used by the project team in monitoring, reporting, and decision-making.

<sup>20</sup> In addition to aid collaboration and coordination, in 2021 the frequency of reporting to partners was increased to bi-weekly, to enable the sharing of the most up to date information on implementation.

It should be noted that, as registered in the project document, project activities were coordinated and implemented closely with the UN Country Team and Humanitarian Response teams. The project coordinate with the German Police Project Team in Afghanistan and other international partners to MoIA to ensure there were no duplication and synergies are maximized.

Lastly, WHO guidelines informed the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) kits and communication materials on COVID-19.

## VIII. RISKS

Given the highly complex context of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as changing internal situation in Afghanistan, risk management proved to be difficult and yet key in making the necessary adjustments and adaptations for the project to be able to deliver its results. The updated full risk log can be found in Annex 4 of this document, yet it is important to highlight that the following issues and risks had the greatest impact to project implementation:

- a) **Delays in procurement and transportation impact the operationalization of the hospitals:** The delay in operationalization of hospitals was linked with delayed procurement of the planned hospital equipment, machines, consumables, medicines, and PPE kits. Several planned equipment were out of stock for a longer period despite placing purchase orders for this equipment. Also, as international flights were heavily disrupted during the April-July 2020 period, transportation of the procured items to Kabul was also delayed. Moreover, increasing insecurity on highways and limited transportation options (i.e., by air) to the regions have stalled the MoIA plans to distribute the procured items to the hospitals. Lastly, the delay in identifying and taking on board the third-party monitoring service provider partly impacted the operationalization of the hospitals as items procured could not be verified *in loco*.

### **Response:**

- The MOIA has requested UNDP and international community to assist with transporting the procured items to the planned provinces. Also, UNDP worked with MoIA to assist in identifying solutions to any travels, within the remit of the project.
- Procurement of the TPM services were expedited and the firm was hired by October 2020.
- UNDP developed multiple packages of the procured items and contracted several suppliers to make sure that the earliest available items were secured and delivered to the MOIA. To ensure a bridging supply while waiting on international supply, UNDP also procured locally nominal quantities of lab and PPE items.
- Re-engagement of previous suppliers for repeat orders sped up the process by not needing to repeat Quality Assurance exercises and competitive procurement processes.
- A few machines (i.e., X-Ray machines, and Ultrasonographic machines) could not be transported by air and had to be transported by sea – which is time consuming. UNDP coordinated closely with the different airlines and made sure that earliest available flights were secured for transporting the procured items to Afghanistan.



- UNDP in Afghanistan reached out to the Global Procurement Unit to support expediting the procurement process, organizing weekly standing meeting to facilitate the process.
- MoIA initiated the process of transporting the required machines, equipment, and consumables to the provincial centres while renovation of hospital buildings was still ongoing in four provinces.
- MoIA also implemented a quarterly distribution of medicines and consumables to mitigate transportation and security challenges.
- The 2021 procurement items were shared with UNDP's Global Procurement Unit, and the majority of correspondence between MoIA and the procurement teams was completed to ensure specifications are correct and items are appropriate.
- The project was also extended twice, first from January to June 2021, then until October 2021. Due to the events of August 2021 activities were frozen and then officially closed due to decision regarding all LOTFA-MPTF projects.

- b) **Delays in the distribution of personal hygiene kits:** The distribution of the PPE kits was delayed until December 2020 due to insufficient transportation options to the provinces and unavailability of third-party monitoring agent of UNDP to assess the use and effectiveness of PPE kits in preventing the spread of COVID-19 among the police.

**Response:**

- The MOIA has requested UNDP and international community to assist with transporting the procured items to the planned provinces.
- Procurement of the TPM services were expedited and the firm was hired by October 2020.

- c) **Stalled communication activities (including printing and developing the COVID-19 awareness raising materials):** The MOIA was not able to develop the planned awareness raising materials on prevention and control of COVID-19 spread due to undisclosed reasons.

**Response:**

- UNDP increased coordination with the MOIA to identify the reasons for stopping the communication activities so as to resume them ASAP.
- UNDP also provided technical support to the development of awareness materials.

- d) **Sluggish sample check process:** Delays in approval of samples of planned procured items affected the procurement of the planned items. Samples of the planned procured items were submitted to the MOIA and MOPH for quality check and verification before the purchase order (PO) of these items could be procured. However, due to unclear reasons, the sample check of specific items took more time than expected in MOPH.

**Response:**

- UNDP coordinated with the MoIA and MoPH to expedite the sample check process on regular basis.



- e) **Delay in confirming the 2021 procurement:** Several challenges in finalising the 2021 procurement plan impacted the procurement schedule.

**Response:**

- The project team worked closely with the MOIA team to finalise procurement plan, and the final plan was received in March 2021, when procurement process begun.

- f) **Stronger wave of COVID-19 impacts project implementation:** the third wave of COVID-19 impacted the project delivery as it affected the wellness of staff and their families and spiked in demand for local procurement items.

**Response:**

- Country Office followed global UNDP procedures regarding prevention of COVID-19, including the use of online tools to keep the team engaged while keeping social distancing. Support and care to staff and their families were also provided in accordance with UNDP global guidelines.

It should be noted that delays in the selection of the Third-Party Monitoring services hindered data collection and risk analysis during the first few months of project implementation. Risk monitoring and management were improved after the project hired the TPM, a dedicated project manager and an M&E associate. All the major risks and the adopted mitigation initiatives were duly registered in the project's progress reports.

## IX. LESSONS LEARNED

The project commenced in May 2020 as an emergency project with an initial duration of 8 months (31 December 2020). Facing several issues that has hindered or slowed down its implementation, the project was extended twice under a no-cost basis, until October 2021. Several lessons can be drawn for the highly uncertain, complex and rapidly changing context in which the project was implemented, such as:

**a) Dedicated staff was key to project performance:** to expedite implementation of the emergency project, the initial arrangement was to assemble a team composed of staff on a voluntary basis in addition to fulfilling their core duties. This led to staff juggling multiple tasks and demands in a very complex 2020 environment. Donors also registered that the government views and project issues were not quickly communicated back to them. Hiring a dedicated project manager, a procurement associate and an M&E associate contributed to speeding up processes, better engagement with key stakeholders and improved data sharing and reporting.

**b) Adopting several procurement strategies at once may increase complexity but can also result in faster delivery:** UNDP's requirement that all UNDP Country Offices route procurement of COVID-19 items through the Global Procurement Unit (GPU). This reduced the control of the Country Office in the procurement process and led to additional steps impacting delivery time but at the same time increased the level of Quality Assurance, as no items procured by the project through GPU have been rejected by the end-user. This compares with the experience of using local procurement modalities, which did ensure bridging supply while waiting on international supply but also presented multiple incidences of supplies not

meeting Quality Assurance requirements, samples being rejected by the end-user, and local suppliers unable to deliver agreed quantities. It should be noted that organizing standing weekly meetings between the project team and the GPU helped decrease delays. Lastly, re-engagement of previous suppliers for repeat orders sped up the process by not needing to repeat Quality Assurance exercises and competitive procurement processes.

## **X. CONCLUSIONS & WAY FORWARD**

The project “Support to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan in efforts to contain & respond to COVID-19 situation for ANP” was a key intervention to support the health system to respond to the needs of the country’s police force. It faced several issues in both the procurement and the distribution of equipment, PPEs and supplies, which greatly delayed project implementation and frustrated the achievement of several targets. Yet, the project did help to establish and equip hospitals in five provinces that could then provide medical services to the Afghan National Police and their families. Also, all the police who approached the five ANP COVID-19 hospitals established by the project were able to receive the necessary care, while the hygiene kits distributed helped to some extent to equip the police force with prevention measures to protect themselves and the general public from contract the disease.

During implementation, UNDP learned that mixing diverse procurement strategies may increase complexity but can also result in faster delivery. UNDP also learned that, even though using its own staff to compose a project team under a voluntary basis may expedite the beginning of implementation, an exclusive team is necessary to guarantee swifter and improved results in the medium and long term.

Sustainability of the project may have been challenged during the last year, yet it was quite positive that by October 2021 four of the five hospitals established under the project were open and functional, with most of its equipment intact. Considering that Afghanistan’s health services were regarded as being “under threat, including those aiming to contain the pandemic, eradicate polio and cater for maternal and child health”<sup>21</sup>, efforts to recover the country’s infrastructure and strengthen public services can learn from the experience of this project and build on the infrastructure it put in place.

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<sup>21</sup> UNDP, Afghanistan: Socio-Economic Outlook 2021-2022. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/afghanistan/publications/afghanistan-socio-economic-outlook-2021-2022>

## XI. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: RISK LOG

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/MNGT. RESPONSE	SUBMITTED/ UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE	STATUS
1	Delays in procurement of the necessary items identified by MoIA Health directorate under output 1 of consolidated procurement list	PRODOC	Procurement	L=3 / I=5	The project is working with international bidders to ensure required items are delivered	Project Manager	August 31 2021	Complete
2	Procured items do not match the quality / standards that can be used in Afghanistan	PRODOC	Procurement	L=1 / I = 5	The project is developing mechanisms to ensure standards is maintained in all procurement cases	PRODOC	August 31 2021	Complete
3	The items to be procured are unavailable in sufficient quantity as requested by the MoIA Health Directorate in accordance with the consolidate procurement list.	PRODOC	Procurement	L=5 / I=2	The project is working with international bidders	Project Manager	August 31 2021	Complete
4	Due to global demand, the necessary quantity of hygiene kits is unavailable.	PRODOC	Procurement	L = 4 / I = 5	The project is working with other UNDP offices in the region to identified existences of bidders to provide the required items	Project Manager	August 31 2021	Complete

## ANNEX 2: M&E PLAN

### 1. Purpose of M&E:

The M&E mechanisms for the project will aim to serve the following key purposes:

- Guide on what outcomes and outputs the project could realistically achieve
- Establish effective M&E mechanisms within the project to ensure accountability and delivery of key project results
- Assess and understand project progress and results, explain what tangible results the project has achieved
- Contribute to improve project outcomes. Guide on what worked and what did not work, ultimately recommend areas for improvement in project operational strategy

### 2. What Do We Monitor?

The M&E system will mainly focus to collect evidence based to confirm progress and results of the project against project outcomes and the extent to which the project abides the process requirements of UNDP and quality requirements of the WHO and MoPH.

The project Results Framework (RF)- ANNEX 1 will be used as the reference to guide on data collection requirements and data collection mechanism under the project M&E plan.

The project RF include one outcome, three outputs and a total of 12 performance indicators (4 outcome level and 8 outputs levels). The outcomes and outputs of the project include:

#### **Project Outcome:**

**Outcome 1:** MOIA/ANP's preparedness and response capacity is improved to mitigate risks and impact of COVID-19 facing Afghan police forces

#### **Project Output:**

**Output 1:** Strengthening police healthcare facilities and capacities for better preparedness and more effective response to COVID-19

**Output 2:** Enhancing ANP personnel's safety while performing their duties

**Output 3:** Strengthening MOIA/ANP internal and public communications about COVID-19

Please refer to ANNEX 1 – Project Results framework for more details on project results and indicators.

### 3. M&E Activities and Roles and Responsibilities:

M&E will be done at three levels:

#### 3.1.1. Project Level M&E:

The project will put in place a detailed M&E plan at the project design stage. The project level M&E plan will guide on the M&E requirements, including the key performance indicators and the M&E resources that will be mobilized by the project to conduct the day to day M&E of the project progress and results. The project level M&E team will be responsible for the overall implementation of M&E plan. This will also include coordination, facilitation and quality control of M&E work at all levels. the project level M&E will mainly focus on the following key activities:

- Conduct day to day monitoring of the project activities and results
- Provide oversight and quality control of the M&E activities conducted at the project level, including the activities conducted by the third-party M&E
- Coordinate with the TFMU M&E team to ensure the day to day M&E activities will met the quality standards and process requirements of the fund level M&E
- Produce project progress reports
- Work with the TFMU communications expert on key project results and events to be communicated with the internal and external audience
- Organize project internal review sessions to discuss project performance and results

It is anticipated that recruitment of the project level M&E team may not be feasible at the outset of the project.

#### 3.1.2. Fund level M&E:

The TFMU M&E team will be responsible for fund level M&E of the project activities. The fund level M&E will mainly focus to:

- Assess and understand the progress against project outcomes and outputs
- Provide technical support, oversight and quality control to support the conduct of project level M&E
- Communicate project results, challenges and areas for improvements with the project team, the security window Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Steering Committee (SC)
- Fill the project level M&E capacity gaps at the initial stage of the project implementation

The specific areas of responsibilities under the fund level M&E will include:

- Design of project M&E mechanisms

- Support the project M&E and program team in collecting the baseline data
- Developing data collection tools
- Training and mentorship of project level and third-party M&E staff on data collection and other project M&E mechanisms
- Providing technical support to the project M&E team during the project implementation stage. The TFMU M&E team will also lead the project level M&E at the initial stage of project implementation until the project level M&E is on board.
- Conducting data quality control throughout the project lifecycle
- Communicating project results and key events with the project internal and external audience.
- Sharing project progress and results with the TWG and SC

#### 4. Third-Party Monitoring:

During the first month of its implementation the project will hire a third-party M&E service provider who will be responsible to collect data about progress and results of project activities in the following areas:

- The extent to which the new healthcare facilities are established, equipped and ready to treat COVID-19 patients
- The extent to which the Hygiene kits are transparently disseminated and effectively used by police
- The extent to which police staff are trained to use the hygiene kits
- The quality and distribution of the awareness campaign materials

The third-party M&E service provider will be responsible to mobilize the following key resources and capacities to support the project M&E work:

1. Establish M&E teams in Herat, Kabul and Balkh provinces who will regularly collect data about quality, preparedness and service delivery of the COVID-19 treatment centers.
2. Establish 20 mobile data collection teams at regional levels who will be traveling to selected police centers in the targeted provinces. The third-party M&E team will be responsible to send mobile data collection teams to at least 25% of the targeted police stations across the country (including a decent sample of those in remote areas) to collect data about the progress and results of the project activities
3. Conduct interviews with expert medical staff in the healthcare centers to confirm quality and compliance of healthcare products with the MoPH and WHO standards.

#### **Duty of Care:**

Considering the risks of COVID-19 across the country, it is understood that the travel of the third-party M&E staff could carry potential risks of their staff contacting the virus. UNDP will make sure to include duty of care clauses in UNDP contracts to protect service providers from contracting the virus. The

third-party service provider will have to assume full responsibility for the duty of care of its staff while performing their duties under this project. In order to ensure this, specific clauses will be included in the service contract that will clarify:

1. The service provider will be solely responsible for the duty of care of its staff this will include, but not limited to:
  - a. Put in place all the necessary security protocols to ensure overall safety and security of its staff;
  - b. Provide all the necessary tools and protective equipment (masks, gloves, hand sanitizers, PPEs, etc.) to protect its staff from contracting the COVID-19 while conducting their duties under the project;
  - c. Make sure staff of the service provider follow instructions and protocols to protect informant, interviewees, respondents from contracting the virus while interacting with staff.
2. The service provider will also ensure to abide by all the relevant instructions and guideline put in place by the government to prevent the spread of the virus in the country

Breach of any of the above terms and condition will result in administrative actions against the service provider including the possible immediate termination of the contract.

## 5. M&E Tools

The project team with the support of TFMU M&E team will introduce sweet of innovative tools that will be used to support the project M&E mechanisms throughout the project life cycle. Followings are the tools recommended under this project:

### 5.1. Hotline Mobile Numbers:

The project will assign hotline numbers that will be shared with the relevant police stations. The hotline numbers will be used to allow police staff to share requests, concern, complains and other issues related to access and quality of PPEs and access to COVID-19 treatment centers. This information will be the key to guide on project performance in the following areas:

- The extent to which the project support reaches the police staff in the targeted provinces
- MOIAs capacities to respond and mitigate the risks of COVID-19 facing by Afghan police forces
- The quality of service delivery by the Health facilities established/activated by the project

The hotline will be managed by the project team and the follow-up and verification of the complains will be done through third-party M&E teams.

### 5.2. Task Based Data Collection Tool:



The project will use Task-Based Data collection tool that will enable responsible police staff in the targeted police stations to send tasked based data relevant to the key performance indicators of the project.

- The project team will identify the data collection needs and will develop data collection questionnaires.
- The project team will serve as the administrator and will deploy questionnaires for data collection
- Selected police staff will be trained and allowed access to collect and send data to the system online, using their smart phones
- Once the data entry is completed, the system administrator will conduct data quality control and will approve or reject the data subject to the confirmation of the quality
- Once the data is approved, it will be analyzed and visualized through an M&E dashboard

The task-based data collection tool will be relevant to confirm the progress and results of the project in the following areas:

- Establishment and activation of health care facilities to treat COVID-19 patients (output 1)
- Collecting evidence to confirm use of hygiene kits by police staff while performing their duties (Output 2)
- Reach of media and communication materials to the police centers (Output 3)

### **5.3. COVID-19 Dashboard:**

The project M&E team will work with the MOIA to collect data about number police infected by COVID-19 and number of police treated. The states will be visualized through a specific dashboard on M&E Results and Impact platform. The dashboard will be updated real time based on the updates received from the MoIA. The data on the COVID-19 dashboard will serve as the reference source to confirm progress against outcome indicator 0.3.

### **5.4. Closed Facebook Group<sup>25</sup>:**

The project will establish and manage a closed Facebook group that will allow medical professional from different healthcare facilities to share their expert views about the quality of facilities and tools delivered by the project. This information will be the key to confirm the quality of support provide by the project to respond to COVID-19 cases within police force.

### **5.5. LOTFA M&E Results and Impacts Platform (R&IP)**

All data collection under the project will be conducted online using the R&IP of LOTFA. The system will also visualize project M&E data real time. The use of LOTFA R&IP will work as following:

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<sup>25</sup> This will be subject to consent of the MoIA.

- The project team with the support from the TFMU M&E team will identify the data collection needs and will develop data collection questionnaire
- TFMU M&E team will digitize and upload the questionnaire into LOTFA M&E R&IP.
- Based on the advice of the project team, the TFMU M&E Team will create users for the enumerators to enable data collection
- The enumerators will collection and process data to the LOTFA M&E R&IP using mobile phones/ tablets.
- The project team with the support of TFMU M&E team will conduct regular data quality control and will provide feedback.
- The data will be visualized through digital M&E dashboard. The dashboard will be accessible real-time to the relevant staff based on their level of access granted by the system administrator.

## 6. ANNEX1 – Project Results Framework:

<b>Project title: Support to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Afghan National Police in their efforts to contain and respond to COVID-19 situation</b>					
<b>Fund Outcome to which the JP/project will contribute:</b>	<b>Outcome 2: Stable conditions of safety and security (Law and Order) established in targeted provinces</b>				
<b>Fund Outcome indicators:</b>	<b>Geographic areas</b>	<b>Baseline data</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Responsible organization</b>
2.1. Perception of public on their overall safety and security.	Activity cancelled due to project suspension	0	% of safety and security	NA	UNDP
2.2 Perception of public on the safety and security in relation to policing.	Activity cancelled due to project suspension	0	% of safety and security related to policing	NA	UNDP
<b>Project Outcome</b>	<b>MOIA/ANP's preparedness and response capacity is improved to mitigate risks and impact of COVID-19 facing Afghan police forces</b>				
<b>Fund Sub-Outcome 1 indicators:</b>	<b>Geographic areas</b>	<b>Baseline data</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Responsible organization</b>
0.1. Extent to which capacities of the MoIA hospital facilities strengthened to treat COVID-19 infected police patients.	Kabul, Herat and Balkh provinces	0	Capacities of the MOIA hospital facilities strengthened sufficiently	▪ Project reports	▪ Project team

			to treat COVID-19 infected patients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third-party and MOIA monitoring reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third-party M&amp;E team</li> <li>MOIA</li> </ul>
0.2.% of police who effectively use hygiene kits to protect themselves and citizens from contracting COVID-19	Afghanistan (Country wide)	0%	At least 90% of police who received hygiene kits use them correctly and regularly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Task based monitoring data (videos and photos)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Task based monitoring team</li> </ul>
0.3.Proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among police by province in %	Afghanistan (Country wide)	0	- 100% in consultation with the MOIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M&amp;E dashboard</li> <li>Health center reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LOTFA M&amp;E Team</li> </ul>
0.4.Extent to which hospital facilities of the MOIA are compliant with the MoPH requirements to contain COVID-19	Kabul, Herat and Balkh provinces	0	All targeted facilities are compliant with the MoPH requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MoPH compliance review</li> <li>Expert views of doctors and professional staff</li> <li>Closed Facebook group analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MoPH review of compliance</li> <li>LOTFA M&amp;E Team</li> </ul>
<b>Output 1</b>	<b>Strengthening police healthcare facilities and capacities for better preparedness and more effective response to COVID-19</b>				
<b>Immediate results indicators</b>	<b>Geographic areas</b>	<b>Baseline data</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Responsible organization</b>

1.1. Number of new facilities established/activated <sup>26</sup> that are ready to treat COVID-19 patients	Kabul, Herat and Balkh provinces	0	<p>Eight in total:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Three 100-bed hospitals established/activated in Herat, Balkh and Kabul</li> <li>Five temporary health care centers (medical tents) established</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO/third party monitoring reports</li> <li>Task-based monitoring reports</li> <li>Project Reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LOTFA M&amp;E Team</li> <li>Third party M&amp;E team</li> </ul>
1.2. % of police tested positive for COVID-19 who received appropriate treatment in a timely manner in targeted facilities of the MOIA	Afghanistan (Country wide)	0	100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health center reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project team</li> </ul>
<b>Output 2</b>	<b>Enhancing ANP personnel's safety while performing their duties</b>				
<b>Immediate results indicators</b>	<b>Geographic areas</b>	<b>Baseline data</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Responsible organization</b>
2.1. % of police in the targeted provinces receive hygiene kits (masks, hand sanitizers, gloves, etc.)	Country wide	0	100% of police in the targeted provinces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third-Party M&amp;E reports</li> <li>Task based monitoring data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third party M&amp;E</li> <li>Task based monitors</li> </ul>
2.2. % of sampled police in the targeted provinces demonstrating good knowledge on how to use hygiene kits to protect themselves from contracting COVID-19	Country wide	0	80%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third party M&amp;E reports</li> <li>MoIA reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Third party M&amp;E</li> <li>Task based monitors</li> </ul>

<sup>26</sup> These health facilities are adequately staffed with well-trained doctors and health staff – this will not be measured as part of this indicator.

2.3.% of police (sample based) who use hygiene kits while performing their duties	Country wide	0	100% of police who receive the hygiene kits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Task based monitoring data (videos and photos)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Task based monitoring team</li> </ul>
<b>Output 3:</b>	<b>Strengthening MOIA/ANP internal and public communications about COVID-19</b>				
<b>Immediate results indicators</b>	<b>Geographic areas</b>	<b>Baseline data</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Responsible organization</b>
3.1. % of police reached through awareness campaigns	Country wide	0	100% of the police centres indented by MOIA will receive awareness materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third party M&amp;E reports</li> <li>▪ Awareness campaign reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third-party M&amp;E team</li> <li>▪ Project team</li> </ul>
3.2. % of sampled police who is aware of what to do if they themselves get sick	Country wide	0	100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third party M&amp;E reports</li> <li>▪ Awareness campaign reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third-party M&amp;E team</li> <li>▪ Project team</li> </ul>
3.3. % of public (sampled based) who is aware and has positive perceptions about MOIA/ANP communications contents/materials regarding police roles and responsibilities in COVID-19 response	Country wide	0	100%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third party M&amp;E reports</li> <li>▪ Awareness campaign reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third-party M&amp;E team</li> <li>▪ Project team</li> </ul>

## 7. ANNEX 2. Indicator Methodology.

### I. Sub-Outcome indicators

<b>Indicator 0.1. Extent to which capacities of the MoIA hospital facilities strengthened to treat COVID-19 infected police patients.</b>	
<b>Level</b>	<b>Criteria</b>
<b>1. Insufficiently</b>	<p>Hospital facilities have</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Insufficient number of beds (less than 60% of estimated required capacity),</li> <li>- Insufficient number of PPEs,</li> <li>- Testing systems. Medical staff have not received necessary treatment and did not fully implement MOPH protocols</li> </ul> <p>Medical staff do not follow fully MOPH protocols</p>
<b>2. Somewhat sufficiently</b>	<p>Hospital facilities have</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sufficient number of beds for the ANP personnel to be treated (more than 60% of estimated required capacity),</li> <li>- Sufficient and regularly supplied PPEs for medical staff,</li> <li>- Sufficient and regularly supplied testing systems received periodically.</li> </ul> <p>Medical staff follow MOPH protocols.</p>
<b>3. Sufficiently</b>	<p>Hospital facilities have</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sufficient number of beds for the ANP personnel to be treated (more than 80% of estimated required capacity),</li> <li>- isolation facilities</li> <li>- regular supply of sufficient numbers of test systems and PPEs.</li> </ul> <p>Medical staff of the MOIA are well trained and capacitated to carry out treatment following MOPH protocols</p>
<p><b>Means of data collection:</b>  <b>Data on this indicator will be collected jointly with the MOIA medical staff, compiled from third-party monitoring as well as MOPH assessments.</b></p>	

<b>Indicator 0.2. % of police who effectively use hygiene kits to protect themselves and citizens from contracting COVID-19.</b>	
<b>Indicator calculation</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>a) Numerator</b>	Number of police who were verified to regularly and effectively use the hygiene kits (PPE)

	X 100
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of police chosen through random sampling methods
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> <b>Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams and extrapolated to the ANP.</b>

<b>Indicator 0.3. Proportion of COVID-19 infection cases among police by province in %</b>	
<b>Indicator calculation</b>	Description
<b>a) Numerator</b>	
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of police personnel infected with COVID-19 throughout the country (Disaggregated by number of women and men for absolute numbers)
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by using the statistics shared by the MoIA. The data will be verified using the services of third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project team.

<b>Indicator 0.4. Extent to which hospital facilities of the MOIA are compliant with the MoPH requirements to contain COVID-19</b>	
<b>Level</b>	<b>Criteria</b>
<b>1. Not compliant</b>	MOPH assessment concluded that the MOIA facilities targeted through this project are not compliant with the requirements put in place to contain the COVID-19
<b>2. Somewhat compliant</b>	MOPH assessment concluded that some of the MOIA facilities targeted through this project (at least 50%) are compliant with the requirements put in place to contain the COVID-19
<b>3. Compliant</b>	MOPH assessment concluded that some of the MOIA facilities targeted through this project (at least 80%) are compliant with the requirements put in place to contain the COVID-19
<b>Means of data collection:</b>	

Data on this indicator will be collected jointly with the MOIA medical staff as well as MOPH to assess compliance with COVID-19 related requirements to handle cases. However, this indicator will not be assessment the treatment quality of patients.

Output indicators.

**Output 1. Strengthening police healthcare facilities and capacities for better preparedness and more effective response to COVID-19**

**Indicator 1.1. Number of new facilities established/activated that are ready to treat COVID-19 patients**

**Means of data collection:**

In consultation with the MOIA, eight facilities have been selected for establishment/ activation as follows:

- Three 100-bed hospitals established/ activated in Herat, Balkh and Kabul;
- Five temporary health care centres (medical tents) to be established

Data collection will be done by verifying completion of work package which will be defined in conjunction with the MOIA and this will bring an update to the methods of data collection for this indicator.

**Indicator 1.2. % of police tested positive for COVID-19 who received appropriate treatment in a timely manner in targeted facilities of the MOIA**

Indicator calculation	Description
<b>a) Numerator</b>	Number of police personnel who were tested positive with COVID-19 X 100
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of police personnel tested positive with COVID-19 who received appropriately treatment in a timely manner (Disaggregated by number of women and men for absolute numbers)
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<p><b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by verifying medical records of the MOIA statistics and hospital facilities.</p> <p>! Clarification needed on appropriate treatment for patients with different symptoms/ severity of condition</p>



## Output 2: Enhancing ANP personnel's safety while performing their duties

Indicator 2.1. % of police receive hygiene kits (masks, hand sanitizers, gloves, etc.)	
Indicator calculation	Description
c) Numerator	Total number of police personnel working in the targeted provinces X 100
d) Denominator	Number of police who receive the hygiene kits
=a*100/b	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams and extrapolated to the ANP.

Indicator 2.2. % of sampled police in the targeted provinces demonstrating good knowledge on how to use hygiene kits to protect themselves from contracting COVID-19	
Indicator calculation	Description
a) Numerator	Total number of police personnel working in the targeted provinces X 100
b) Denominator	Number of police who receive average score of four (04) on a scale 1 (as the lowest) and 5 (as the highest) in using the hygiene kits and use of protective measures to avoid contact with virus
=a*100/b	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams and extrapolated to the ANP.

Indicator 2.3. % of police (sample based) who use hygiene kits while performing their duties	
Indicator calculation	Description
a) Numerator	Total number of sampled police personnel received hygiene kits X 100
b) Denominator	Number of sampled police who will be confirmed using hygiene kits while performing their duties

<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected using task-based data collection tool to collect evidence of police staff using the hygiene kits.
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### Output 3: Strengthening MOIA/ANP internal and public communications about COVID-19

<b>Indicator 3.1. % of police reached through awareness campaigns</b>	
<b>Indicator calculation</b>	Description
<b>a) Numerator</b>	Total number of police personnel working in the targeted provinces X 100
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of police participate in the awareness raising activities or confirm receiving the awareness raising materials in those targeted provinces
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams

<b>Indicator 3.2. % of sampled police who is aware of what to do if they themselves get sick</b>	
<b>Indicator calculation</b>	Description
<b>a) Numerator</b>	Total number of police personnel working in the targeted provinces X 100
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of police who receive average score of four (04) on a scale 1 (as the lowest) and 5 (as the highest) in demonstrative their knowledge about measure to apply if they get sick.
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams

<b>Indicator 3.3. % of public (sample based) who is aware and has positive perceptions about MOIA/ANP communications contents/materials regarding police roles and responsibilities in COVID-19 response</b>	
<b>Indicator calculation</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>a) Numerator</b>	Number of people who participate in M&E data collection initiatives X 100
<b>b) Denominator</b>	Number of people who confirm the role of police as positive or very positive using the following criteria: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Very Positive</li> <li>2. Positive</li> <li>3. Neutral</li> <li>4. Negative</li> <li>5. Very Negative</li> </ol>
<b>=a*100/b</b>	<b>Means of data collection:</b> Data on this indicator will be collected by third-party monitoring services provider jointly with the project and the MOIA teams

## ANNEX3 : PHOTOGRAPHS

*Photograph 1. Paktia regional hospital, waiting room.*



*Photograph 2. Balkh Regional Hospital, patient registration.*



*Photograph 3. Nangarhar Regional Hospital, patient screening.*



*Photograph 4. Kunduz Regional Hospital, COVID-19 ward.*



*Photograph 5. Herat Regional Hospital, facilities.*



*Photograph 6. Herat Regional Hospital, patient care.*





*Photograph 7. Kunduz Regional Hospital, inauguration ceremony.*



*Photograph 8. Kunduz Regional Hospital, inauguration ceremony.*



*Photograph 9. Kunduz Regional Hospital, inauguration ceremony.*



*Photograph 10. Kunduz Regional Hospital, facilities.*



*Photograph 11. UNDP Resident Representative presenting framed awareness posters to the Acting Minister of Interior*





**Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan  
(LOTFA)  
Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF)  
Payroll Window  
Support to Payroll Management (SPM) Project  
Final Report  
(1 July 2015 – 4 December 2021)**



UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

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## PROJECT INFORMATION

<b>Project ID:</b>	SPM (95495, 95840, 95844, 95849, 95846, 95848)
<b>Duration:</b>	01 July 2015 – 04 December 2021
<b>Contributing to ANPDF-NPP:</b>	ANPDF: 2.3: Political and Security Outlook New NPP 4: National Justice and Judicial Reform Plan (NJRP)
<b>CPD Outcome:</b>	Outcome 2: Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations.
<b>UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) Outcome:</b>	Outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crisis
<b>Total Budget:</b>	USD 2,561,634,611
<b>Total Expenditure</b>	USD 2,303,416,990
<b>Implementing Partner:</b>	Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan (MOIA)
<b>Responsible Parties:</b>	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
<b>Project Manager:</b>	Mr. Sainey Ceesay
<b>Head of Peace Pillar a.i.:</b>	Ms. Chencho Gyalmo Dorjee
<b>Responsible Senior Deputy Resident Representative:</b>	Ms. Surayo Buzurukova

COVER PAGE PHOTO: Police outside Nili Prison in Nili City, Capital of Daikundi Province.

## ACRONYMS

ABP	Afghan Border Police
AFMIS	Afghan Financial Management Information System
AHRIMS	Afghanistan Human Resource Information Management System
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANPDF	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
APPS	Afghanistan Personnel and Pay System
AWCC	Afghan Wireless Communication Company
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DCMF	Donor Conditions Monitoring Framework
DRR	Disaster Resilience and Recovery
DSCMO-A	Defense Security Cooperation Management Office – Afghanistan
EFT	Electronic Fund Transfer
GD	General Directorate
GDPDC	General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres
GIROA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HR	Human Resources
ID	Identification Number
JTC	Joint Technical Committee
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
M16	Payment voucher for salary disbursements
M41	Payroll list with information about personnel in the payroll
MA	Monitoring Agent
MCA	Micro-Capacity Assessment
MM	Mobile Money
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOIA	Ministry of Interior Affairs
MPD	MOIA and Police Development
NIM	National Implementation Modality
PAI	Personnel Asset Inventory
PERSTAT	Personnel Statistics
PFO	Provincial Financial Officer
PHQ	Police Headquarters
PHRO	Provincial Human Resource Officer

PMPM	Payroll Management Procedures Manual
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPM	Support to Payroll Management
TA	Trusted Agent
ToT	Training of Trainers
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WEPS	Web-based Electronic Payroll System

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project, which started in July 2015 and ended in December 2021, was a continuation of UNDP's support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) from 2002, under the umbrella of the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). The 2015-LOTFA support emerged as a result of H.E. President Ghani's approval to proceed with the restructuring of LOTFA and the development of a new programme document that included the design of a LOTFA Transition Plan to succeed the LOTFA *Akheri*, beginning 1 July 2015. The plan was for such transition to ensure the full handover of the payroll functions to the GIROA and to develop national capacity for its effective, efficient, and accountable management. Accordingly, LOTFA donors and GIROA agreed on a three-phased, conditions-based transition—i.e., July 2015 to December 2016—with clear targets and deliverables for each phase. Some 23 conditions were agreed—see [ANNEX 6: LOTFA DONOR CONDITIONS](#)—for all the four parties<sup>1</sup>—which set out the conditions for the transition of payroll management to GIROA (MOIA).

To streamline support, two complimentary projects were designed—namely, the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) and Police Development (MPD) project, which would focus on developing national capacity for self-sustained reform and improvement of the MOIA as an institution, as well as police professionalisation; and the Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project, which would focus on supporting MOIA payroll management and transition by December 2016. The SPM project was a dedicated payroll management project – operated as a stand-alone Window under the new LOTFA MPTF – providing support to the MOIA staff from the General Directorate of Budget & Finance, Human Resources (HR) and Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) departments to ensure timely payment of salaries and incentives to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate of Prison and Detention Centres (GDPDC) personnel. The project was divided into 6 outputs as follows:

- i. Output 1 ensured that updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA payroll management.
- ii. Output 2 entailed building the capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources, Finance, ICT, etc.) to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards.
- iii. Output 3 covered MOIA's payroll systems update and reconciliation to support independent assurance work of the Monitoring Agent on the MOIA payroll expenditure and personnel headcount, which would also facilitate data migration from the current payroll system to the upcoming one.

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<sup>1</sup> The four parties: MOIA, MOF, UNDP, CSTC-A

- iv. Output 4 covered the provisions of the necessary infrastructure to support the full functionality of MOIA payroll systems during and after the transition of payroll management from the SPM project to the MOIA.
- v. Output 5 was the core function of the SPM project as it entailed the transfer of funds, on a timely and regular basis, to MOF for Police Pay.
- vi. Output 6 is the SPM project management component which was to ensure that the rest of the outputs got implemented in accordance with the project document and in a timely, efficient, accountable, and effective manner.

The expected outcome of the SPM project was *GIROA's (i.e., MOIA) ability to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll for the Afghan national Police (ANP) and General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC), including producing reports for donors in their specified formats*. MOIA should also be able to manage the full range of functions related to payroll management, i.e., human resources, accounting, and information and communication technology in a seamless manner.

By the end of the 18-month long phase of the project, while SPM project made progress against the outputs in the work plan, not all the 23 donor conditions were met—as confirmed in an independent assessment conducted by Grant Thornton (GT) (an independent Audit firm). The GT report can be accessed [here](#). As a result, LOTFA donors, in consultation with GIROA, approved the extension of SPM project until 31 December 2017, for a continued support to the MOIA for payroll management of ANP and GDPDC. In line with this decision, a revision to the LOTFA SPM Project Document was made to reflect the following changes:

- i. Extend SPM Project until 31 December 2017.
- ii. Increase the total amount of resources required for the SPM project.
- iii. Revise the LOTFA Project Document to reflect SPM related results and activities.
- iv. Revise the SPM Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and accompanying Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan to reflect changes at the level of outputs and activity results, due to changes in the implementation content throughout 2015-2016.

Apart from the above changes, the overall implementation strategy and outcome under the SPM project remained unchanged. From the end of 2017, until the closure of the project, similar annual/biannual extensions were granted to SPM project, with the above-listed changes being reflected in the project document. For each extension, changes to outputs would only be recommended where necessary due to the changed implementation context of the project.

A key highlight of the project's implementation for 2021 was the live operation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), replacing the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) as the primary payroll system within the MOIA. In 2020, the Steering

Committee had approved a decision for the APPS Time and Attendance (T&A) to inform WEPS payroll—marking the beginning of the operationalization of APPS. Worthy to note that, while APPS covered the ANP salaries in its scope, it left out that of the personnel of GDPDC. Moreover, earlier in 2020, a Presidential Decree, number 106, was issued, requiring the transfer of all personnel of the GDPDC to be transferred to the newly established authority called the Office of Prisons Administration (OPA). By the end of the year 2020, that decree was not fully operationalized.

Apart from the inclusion of relevant aspects of Human Rights and Gender Activities on the project's work plan, there was no further substantive changes made to the SPM PRODOC and the accompanying Results Framework (RF) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan was fully updated to reflect and cater for the extension period.

As part of the US-Taliban peace deal, the US and NATO forces began their withdrawal from Afghanistan from May 2021 which saw the dwindling of security situation in Afghanistan as a consequence. As the Taliban's offensive continued, many districts and provincial capitals started to fall to the Taliban, further worsening security in most parts of the country. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021 there came the invasion of Kabul and the overthrow of the Ghani-led government and the consequent taking over of the government by the *De facto* Authority. As the consequence of this, UNDP immediately suspended all LOTFA related projects which was subsequently unanimously approved by LOTFA donors. At the time of this suspension, there was no LOTFA fund in the hands of the former government (Ministry of Finance) since the latest advance request made by the MoF was not processed. Based on the suspension of project activities, both APPS and WEPS systems were shut down. For 2021, police payrolls were processed for only January to July 2021. At its meeting of 4<sup>th</sup> November 2021, the LOTFA MPTF Steering Committee decided to foreclose all LOTFA projects, including SPM, effective 4<sup>th</sup> December 2021, and subsequently the trust fund itself will be closed.

Output 1: The SPM project supported the MOIA in having in place updated legislative, policy and regulatory framework and improved HR, finance and budget business processes, etc., for the effective and efficient service delivery, vis-à-vis MOIA payroll management. The project spearheaded the development and or revision of policies including the HR policy, finance policy, Payroll Management Procedures Manual (PMPM), the internal controls policy, etc. In addition, procedural documents such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)—including WEPS-AFMIS reconciliation SOP, Pay and Compensation process flows; back-pay checklist, etc. These SOPs helped in streamlining the processes and ultimately improving the capacities of users as well as reduce undue errors—i.e., by the end of the project MOIA staff could independently perform AFMIS – WEPS reconciliation; conduct trainings independent of the project team, etc.



Output 2: Over the duration of the project, SPM project supported the capacity building of MOIA staff by training over 2,000 personnel of the MOIA, across various departments—Finance and Budget, Personnel directorate, provincial finance and HR officers, civilian deputy commanders, etc. The overarching objective was to ensure that MOIA had sufficient capacity to undertake all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management.

Another notable result achieved by the project was the innovative approach to support the establishment of a core team of accounting and finance technicians within MOIA's General Directorate of Finance and Budget (GD-F&B). The project partnered with the prestigious American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)—through a Responsible Party Agreement (RPA)—in 2018—to run Foundation in Accountancy (FIA)<sup>2</sup> certificate programme for the MOIA staff. The FIA certificate provided the staff with the requisite technical competencies to be able independently and professionally manage payroll functions and therefore strengthen the overall financial management capability of the MOIA—addressing one of the weaknesses identified by the Grant Thornton MCA in 2015. By the end of the program (FIA) in 2020, five staff (all males) completed and were awarded FIA certificate by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA-UK), while 2 staff were left with only one paper to qualify for the FIA certificate.

Output 3: SPM project ensured that the Web-enabled Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) was operational, and its capabilities improved to support the payroll processes and that funds could be disbursed to ANPs and GDPDCs on a timely basis. The project successfully connected all 34 Provincial Headquarters (PHQs) to WEPS single platform, leveraging the web—from a stand-alone platform, ensuring that MOIA's electronic payroll systems were functional on real-time basis, nationwide. This milestone greatly caused improvement of speed in processing, overall improvement in the integrity of the reports, timely reporting, etc.

Some other improvements made included the implementation of QR code to verify whether a particular M41 and or *Tawheed* have been generated through WEPS, to deter falsification by finance officers; introduction of a new enrolment module requiring the prior uploading and certification before a new payroll ID could be generated by finance officers, to prevent creation of fictitious payroll profiles; restriction of number of days to only 365 days so that a finance officer would not be able to pay anyone beyond 365 days as was previously found to be the case; etc.

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<sup>2</sup> Foundation in Accountancy (FIA) is an internationally recognized Diploma in Accountancy and Business Management, offered by the Association of the Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) U.K. FIA provides technical proficiency in accountancy and financial management equivalent to the U. K's Higher National Diploma. There is a total of 7 subjects (papers) required to complete FIA

Another result under output 3 related to the increase of police salary disbursement through Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) payments/mobile banking from 85% in 2015 to 95% in 2021, thereby reducing salary payment through direct cash payment from 15% in 2015 to 5% in 2021. This mitigated the risk of cash payments which was marred with some malpractices—such one person signing for many—as identified by the Monitoring Agent’s field reviews.

Output 4: Under this output, SPM project ensured that intranet connectivity, power, other logistics needs, and disaster recovery capability were in place for WEPS for a timely payroll processing. By the end of the first phase of the project (December 2016), SPM achieved the full integration of all the stand-alone electronic payroll systems into one centrally managed system leveraging the web. While the project managed to connect the system to the MOIA’s Network Operating Centre (NOC) for the ANP payroll, it achieved connectivity for the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC) through the use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The successful integration of all the stand-alone systems into a single central system helped the project to have a good grip of the payroll and significantly improved the reporting capability and the overall integrity of police payroll.

Moreover, to ensure continued availability of the WEPS system across all 34 provinces, SPM project, procured SolarWinds application as the core application for the real-time monitoring and management of the WEPS servers. Prior to deploying SolarWinds, there was no way the technical team could monitor the functioning of the servers located in the provincial headquarters and whenever a server went down, it took long before the team could fix it.

Another milestone achieved by the SPM project was the establishment of a Disaster Resilience and Recovery (DRR) site for WEPS. Establishing the DRR site enabled business continuity of MOIA’s payroll operations as it would minimize any downturn in police salary payment in case of a disaster on the MOIA’s primary information technology infrastructure, which was hosted at the MOIA compound.

Output 5: The SPM project disbursed funds to the MOF for the timely payment of ANP and GDPDC salaries and incentives. The project also provided independent Monitoring Agent (MA) services to provide the GIROA and donors with assurance over the use of LOTFA funds, by ensuring compliance with established payroll policies and in monitoring personnel and payroll data to identify discrepancies, prevent and/or detect fraud, waste and abuse, and correct errors and deficiencies.

Over the duration of the SPM project—July 2015 to December 2021<sup>3</sup>, UNDP advanced a total of US\$2.17bn, all of which was expended by the MOF on the salary payment of ANP and GDPDC uniformed personnel. By the time of the abrupt suspension of the project’s operations as a consequence of the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021 incident, the previous government had expended all of the funds advanced by UNDP; implying that the de facto authorities did not inherit any LOTFA funds. The total spent on police payrolls compared to the total expenditures incurred by the project, over the duration of the project, represents 94.22%.

As highlighted above, the use of the third-party MA represented a key aspect of the SPM project’s operation as a mechanism to provide assurance to the donors that the funds were being used for the intended purpose. On a monthly basis, the MA visited the provincial Police Headquarters and examined, verified, and validated based on the 60 percent randomly generated sample, ensuring that only physically active personnel and eligible persons were recipients of salary payments. From 2018, the percentage was increased to 75 percent while the physical verification<sup>4</sup> was dropped. The work of the MA conformed to the International Standard on Assurance Engagement (ISAE 3000)—assurance engagements other than audits or reviews of historical financial information. Throughout the duration of the project, the MA certified ineligible expenditures of US\$18.82m<sup>5</sup>. All but the 2020 amount was recovered from the advances given to the MOF and are therefore not included in the payroll expenditures reported under this output.

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<sup>3</sup> Actual payroll processing ended in July 2021

<sup>4</sup> The reason for dropping physical verification (1%) was that the MOIA—with support from CSTC-A—had initiated the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) which was a comprehensive physical and biometric verification of each police personnel, in preparation for the Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS)

<sup>5</sup> This covers MA reports from July 2015 to March 2021

## II. CONTEXT

In April 2015, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), UNDP and the Donors supporting the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) received H.E. President Ghani's approval to proceed with the restructuring of LOTFA and the development of a new programme document that included the design of a LOTFA Transition Plan to succeed the LOTFA *Akheri* beginning 1 July 2015. The LOTFA transition would ensure the full handover of the payroll functions to the GIROA and to develop national capacity for its effective, efficient, and accountable management. They agreed on a three-phased, conditions-based transition from July 2015 to December 2016, with clear targets and deliverables for each phase. Some 23 conditions were agreed in a *Donor Conditions document* – for all the four parties<sup>6</sup>— which set out the conditions for the transition of payroll management to GIROA (MOIA). For more details about Donor Conditions, refer to [ANNEX 6: LOTFA DONOR CONDITIONS](#).

To allow for more targeted and streamlined support, two complimentary projects were launched, namely, the Support to Payroll Management (SPM) project which would focus on supporting MOIA payroll management and transition by December 2016; and the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) and Police Development (MPD) project, which would focus on developing national capacity for self-sustained reform and improvement of the MOIA as an institution, as well as police professionalisation.

The expected Outcome of the SPM project is GIROA's (i.e., MOIA) ability to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll for the Afghan national Police (ANP) and General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC), including producing reports for donors in their specified formats. MOIA should also be able to manage the full range of functions related to payroll management, i.e., human resources, accounting, and information and communication technology in a seamless manner.

By the end of the 18-month long phase of the project, while SPM project made progress against the outputs in the work plan, but not all the 23 donor conditions were met—as confirmed in an independent assessment conducted by Grant Thornton. As a result, LOTFA donors, in consultation with GIROA approved the extension of SPM project until

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<sup>6</sup> The donor conditions document was meant for the full transition of all payroll management functions to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). It outlined the consensus reached by the MOIA, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) responsibilities, and donors' expectations to deliver an integrated human resources and payroll system.

31 December 2017, for a continued support to the MOIA for payroll management of ANP and GDPDC. In line with this decision, a revision to the LOTFA SPM Project Document was made to reflect the following changes:

- i. Extend SPM Project until 31 December 2017.
- ii. Increase the total amount of resources required for the SPM project.
- iii. Revise the LOTFA Project Document to reflect SPM related results and activities.
- iv. Revise the SPM Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and accompanying Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan to reflect changes at the level of outputs and activity results, due to changes in the implementation content throughout 2015-2016.

Apart from the above changes, the overall implementation strategy and outcome under the SPM project remained unchanged. Changes to outputs would only be recommended where necessary due to the changed implementation context of the project.

By the end of 2017, no agreement was reached for the transition of SPM from UNDP to GIROA (MOIA). Consequently, at its meeting on 17 December 2017, the LOTFA project board approved the extension of the SPM project for one more year, to 31 December 2018. In line with that extension, the only change effected on the project document was to extend the end date to 31 December 2018 and increase its funding with USD495,732,913 to reflect the 2018 budget (due to the extension), representing an increase from the original budget (July 2015 - December 2017) of USD 1,124,213,696 to the newly revised budget (July 2015 - December 2018) of USD1,619,946,609. Apart from the above highlighted changes, no further substantive changes were made to the SPM project document or accompanying Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan. Also, the overall implementation strategy and outcome under the SPM project remained unchanged.

Again, by the end of 2018, LOTFA donors had still not yet reached consensus regarding the decision to allow for Payroll Transition by 31 December 2018, the projected end date of the SPM project. Donors as of 25 November 2018 had not yet communicated their decision to H.E. President Ghani. Notwithstanding, following very wide consultations on the LOTFA Terms of Reference (TOR)—beginning from 2017, UNDP, LOTFA Donors and the government of Afghanistan (GIROA) agreed to revise the TOR to turn it into a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF).

Consequently, the LOTFA Steering Committee unanimously approved the MPTF TOR at its meeting on 25 November 2018. The new LOTFA MPTF TOR allowed LOTFA funds to be channelled through the spectrum of the Rule of Law and Justice sectors via four distinct Windows: Police Payroll (SPM project), Justice Window, Security Window, and

Anti-Corruption Window. The rationale for upgrading LOTFA to MPTF status was to make it more flexible, responsive, and adaptable to serve the people of Afghanistan effectively and efficiently. Simultaneously, in 2018, the implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) would replace the Web-based Electronic Payroll system (WEPS) as the primary payroll system within the MOIA. However, the timing and conditions under which the WEPS-to-APPS transfer would take place was not yet clearly defined.

This lack of Donors' decision on Payroll Transition (whether transferring WEPS from UNDP to MOIA or APPS replacing WEPS as the primary payroll system within the MOIA) placed UNDP and the MOIA in a difficult position as both UNDP and MOIA needed to ensure business continuity and ensure the continuation of payment of salaries of Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate for Prison and Detention Centres (GDPDC) officers in 2019. Subsequently, Donors, UNDP and MOIA agreed to extend the SPM Project for two additional years until 31 December 2020, and that extension was approved during the LOTFA Steering Committee meeting on 25 November 2018. The common understanding the time was that, once Donors and the Government agreed on confirmed date for Payroll Transition, UNDP would be able to make the required arrangements to transfer the non-fiduciary payroll management responsibilities to the MOIA and make the corresponding changes to the SPM project consequently. Finally, in line with the extension decision, the project document was changed to note the two-year extension and to increase its funding with USD566,023,492.00 to reflect the 2019-2020 budget (due to the extension), representing an increase from the original budget (July 2015 - December 2018) of USD USD1,619,946,609 to the newly revised budget (July 2015 - December 2020) of USD2,185,970,101.00. As with previous extensions, apart from the above highlighted changes, no further substantive changes were made to the SPM project document or accompanying Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan. The overall implementation strategy and outcome under the SPM project also remained unchanged.

By the end of 2020, Donors had still not yet reached consensus regarding the decision to allow for payroll transition by 31 December 2020, the projected end date of the SPM project. Donors and the Government had however agreed to undertake a full re-assessment of the 23 Donor Conditions to determine whether those conditions had been met, to pave the way for the non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management to be transferred to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA).

Through the collaboration of LOTFA donors, GIROA and UNDP, a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) was formed, comprising technical staff from MOIA, MOF and UNDP. The mandate of the JTC was to review the scope of work of the SPM project and identify

non-fiduciary related activities with a view to transferring those to the MOIA to mark the first phase of the SPM project's transition—i.e., non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management. The JTC completed its work and presented its findings to the LOTFA donors and Technical Working Group (TWG). Meanwhile, the implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) would replace the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) as the primary payroll system within the MOIA. However, as stated earlier, the timing and conditions under which the full WEPS-APPS transfer would take place had not yet been clearly defined. The Steering Committee had however approved a decision for the APPS Time and Attendance (T&A) to inform WEPS payroll—marking the beginning of the operationalization of APPS. Also, while APPS covered the ANP salaries in its scope, it left out that of the personnel of GDPDC. Moreover, earlier in 2020, a Presidential Decree, number 106, was issued, requiring the transfer of all personnel of the GDPDC to be transferred to the newly established Authority called the Office of Prisons Administration (OPA). By the end of the year 2020, that decree was not fully operationalised.

Based on the above situations, Donors, UNDP and MOIA agreed to extend the SPM Project for one additional year until 31 December 2021. The LOTFA MPTF Steering Committee approved the decision at its meeting of 15 December 2020. Consequently, the following revisions to the LOTFA SPM Project Document (PRODOC) were made to reflect the new changes:

1. Extend SPM Project until 31 December 2021.
2. Increase the total amount of resources required for the SPM project with USD 350,000,000.00 to reflect the 2021 budget (due to the extension). This is an increase from the original budget (July 2015 – December 2020) of USD 2,185,970,101.00 to the newly revised budget (July 2015–December 2021) of USD 2,535,970,101.00.

Apart from the inclusion of relevant aspects of Human Rights and Gender Activities on the projects work plan—to support the MOIA in those areas, there was no further substantive changes to the SPM PRODOC and the accompanying Results Framework (RF) and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) plan were fully updated to reflect and cater for the extension period. The overall implementation strategy and outcome under the SPM project remained unchanged.

As part of the US-Taliban peace deal, the US and NATO forces began their withdrawal from Afghanistan from May 2021 which saw the dwindling of security situation in Afghanistan as a consequence. As the Taliban's offensive continued, many districts and provincial capitals started to fall to the Taliban, further worsening security in most parts of the country. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021 there came the invasion of Kabul and the

overthrow of the Ghani-led government and consequent taking over of the government by the *De facto* Authority. As the consequence of this, UNDP immediately suspended all LOTFA related projects which was subsequently unanimously approved by LOTFA donors. At the time of the suspension, there was no LOTFA fund in the hands of the former government (Ministry of Finance) since the latest advance request made by the MoF was not processed. Based on this suspension of project activities, both APPS and WEPS systems were shut down. For 2021, police payrolls were processed for only January to July 2021. At its meeting of 4th November 2021, the LOTFA MPTF Steering Committee decided to foreclose all LOTFA projects, effective 4th December 2021, and subsequently the trust fund itself will be closed.



### III. PERFORMANCE REVIEW

While not a typical development project for UNDP—the LOTFA-SPM project proved that UNDP as an organization is able to operate effectively (rendering both fiduciary services and development implementation) within a conflict-country context such as Afghanistan—in partnership with a national implementing partner, the MOIA and other key government entities, and alongside a U.N. political mission and international partners. Overall, SPM project achieved high level of effectiveness and efficiency across almost all outputs of the project’s log-frame, which was confirmed in the successive annual audit reports; two independent mid-term evaluations; and various other independent reports, such as the Torchlight risk assessment report, etc. For example, the 2017 mid-term evaluation report reflected this as follows:

*“Overall, we find the SPM Project achieving or exceeding its benchmarks for the development of MOIA policies and procedures related to the payroll process; strengthening LOTFA governance and oversight mechanisms (such as the Monitoring Agent and Thematic Working Groups); building WEPS systems architecture, data entry, reconciliation and verification via innovations such as the “Digital M16” form and bar code; supporting the expansion of pay distribution modalities such as Electronic Funds Transfer and Mobile Money; and supporting CSTC-A in data for the Afghanistan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).”*

Successful results on all five outputs over the duration of the project’s life are summarised below:

On Output 1, the project rendered significant strategic, tactical, and operational support to the MOIA throughout its life. For example, during the first phase of the project’s operations—i.e., July 2015 to December 2016, the project undertook a Micro-Capacity Assessment (MCA) of the Ministry’s capacity with a view to plan appropriate support mechanism to catalyse the ministry to deliver on improved policies and processes which can contribute to the overall improvement of rule of law in the country. It was based on the that MCA that the project offered a twinning scheme to the MOIA whereby four staff of the MOIA (2 finance and 2 HR officers) were seconded to the project to work alongside for skills transfer. Various policy documents were also developed on behalf of the MOIA all of which aimed to improve the overall performance of the MOIA as a rule of law institution. These policies include the HR policy, the finance policy, the Payroll Management Procedures Manual (PMPM), the internal controls policy, etc. In addition, procedural documents such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)—including WEPS-AFMIS reconciliation SOP, Pay and Compensation process flows; back

pay checklist, etc. These SOPs were helpful in streamlining the processes and helped to improve the capacities of users as well as reduce undue errors.

Under Output 2, over the duration of the project, SPM project supported the capacity of MOIA staff by delivering trainings to over 2,000 staff of the MOIA, across its various departments—Finance and Budget, Personnel directorate, provincial finance and HR officers, civilian deputy commanders, etc., all with the objective to ensure that MOIA built capacity to undertake all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management.

Another notable success registered by the SPM project was its innovative approach to support the establishment of a core team of accounting and finance technicians within MOIA's GD-F&B. SPM project engaged the prestigious American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)—through a Responsible Party Agreement (RPA)—in 2018—to run Foundation in Accountancy (FIA)<sup>7</sup> certificate programme for the staff. The FIA certificate provided the staff with the requisite technical competencies to be able independently and professionally manage payroll functions and therefore strengthens the overall financial management capability of the MOIA—addressing one of the weaknesses identified by the Grant Thornton MCA on payroll management at MOIA in 2015. By the end of the program in 2020, five of the staff (all males) completed and were awarded FIA certificate by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA-UK), and two staff were left with only one paper to qualify for the FIA.

Under Output 3, one key success registered was the remarkable migration of the stand-alone Electronic Payroll System (EPS) to a Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) thus easing the pain that such situation caused, coupled with the various delays, vulnerabilities, etc. The upgrading to WEPS helped to produce real time reports and improve the overall performance of the system. The project went further to procure and install SolarWinds application which facilitated the real time monitoring of the payroll process across the country thus helping to reduce downtime and make efficient payroll processing.

Another notably success under this output relates to the increase of the percentage of police salary payment through Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) payments/mobile banking from 85% in 2015 to 95% in 2021, thereby reducing salary payment through direct cash payment from 15% in 2015 to 5% in 2021. The result of this achievement was the mitigation of risks associated with cash payments thus improving the overall credibility of the payroll management.

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<sup>7</sup> Foundation in Accountancy (FIA) is an internationally recognized Diploma in Accountancy and Business Management, offered by the Association of the Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) U.K. FIA provides technical proficiency in accountancy and financial management equivalent to the U. K's Higher National Diploma. There is a total of 7 subjects (papers) required to complete FIA

On Output 4, SPM project ensured that intranet connectivity, power, other logistics needs, and disaster recovery capability were in place for WEPS for a timely payroll processing. The project achieved the full integration of all the stand-alone electronic payroll systems into one centrally managed system leveraging the web. It also successfully connected ANP payroll system to the MOIA's Network Operating Centre (NOC) and achieved the same for General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC) through the use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The successful integration of all the stand-alone systems into a single central system helped the project to have a good grip if the payroll and significantly improve the reporting capability and the overall integrity of police payroll.

To ensure continued availability of the WEPS system across all 34 provinces, SPM project, utilised SolarWinds application as the core application for the real-time monitoring and management of the WEPS servers. Prior to deploying SolarWinds, the project could not monitor the functioning of the servers located in the provincial headquarters such that whenever a server went down, it took long before the technical team could fix it.

Another key result achieved by the SPM project was the establishment of the Disaster Resilience and Recovery (DRR) site for WEPS which assured business continuity of MOIA's payroll operations as it would minimize any downturn in police salary payment in case of a disaster on the MOIA's primary information technology infrastructure which was hosted at the MOIA compound.

On Output 5, that represented the core of SPM project's mandate, and it entailed the disbursing of funds to the MOF for the timely payment of ANP and GDPDC salaries and incentives. The project also provided independent Monitoring Agent (MA) services to assure the donors that the funds were used for the intended purpose. The MA service ensured compliance with established payroll policies; identified discrepancies, which helped the project to prevent and/or detect fraud, waste and abuse, and correct errors and deficiencies.

During the project's life—July 2015 to December 2021<sup>8</sup>, UNDP advanced a total of US\$2.17bn, all of which was expended by the MOF on the salary payment of ANP and GDPDC uniformed personnel. This meant that by the suspension of the project's operations—as a result of the 15th of August 2021 incident—the previous government had expended all of the funds advanced by UNDP, and the de facto authorities did not inherit any LOTFA funds. The total spent on police payrolls compared to the total

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<sup>8</sup> Actual payroll processing ended in July 2021

expenditures incurred by the project, over the duration of the project, represents 94.22%.

As highlighted above, the use of the third-party MA represented a key aspect of the SPM project's operation as a mechanism to provide assurance to the donors that the funds were being used for the intended purpose. The project ensured the monthly MA field visits to the provincial Police Headquarters to examine, verify, and validate payroll expenses thereby ensuring that only physically active personnel and eligible personnel were recipients of salary payments. The work of the MA was required to conform to the International Standard on Assurance Engagement (ISAE 3000)—assurance engagements other than audits or reviews of historical financial information. In total, the MA certified ineligible expenditures of US\$18.82m<sup>9</sup> and all but the 2020 ineligible amount was recovered from the advances given to the MOF.

## **IV. IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW**

### **A. Quality of Partnerships**

SPM project collaborated with other parties and stakeholders for a harmonious project implementation. Such partnership arrangements created synergies which benefited the project, not only by way of results, but also efficiency gains, which ultimately contributed to achieving trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations.

At the strategic level, the Donor Conditions Document approved by the President (Ghani) on 21 November 2015, provided the overarching partnership framework for the project. It outlined the consensus reached by the Government and LOTFA donors for MOIA, MOF, CSTC-A and UNDP and the responsibilities of each to deliver an integrated human resources and payroll system, for the benefit of the Government.

UNDP/SPM, through the commitments in its approved AWP, supported the MOIA in building capacity for payroll management. The project carried out technical analyses and reviews of policies and legal frameworks leading to the development and implementation of HR and finance policies and quality assurance through the Monitoring Agent. CSTC-A fully funded and managed the development of the APPS through MOU between MOIA and CSTC-A.

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<sup>9</sup> This covers MA reports from July 2015 to March 2021

The SPM project worked under the leadership of the MOIA on two important fronts. Firstly, the project's Capacity Building team actively participated in the Policy Review Commission meetings that had been reviewing payroll related policies. They also regularly met with DM Support and DG Finance and Budget and discussed strategies on how to work together in the policy reviews of those policies that were part of the conditions for payroll transfer. The project also closely worked with MOIA in the development of the Payroll Unit plan as part of the 2016 transition arrangements, although the transition did not happen. Secondly, the SPM project partnered with the Monitoring Agent (MA) and MOIA in identifying issues and resolving the findings with a view to further strengthen the internal control systems for MOIA.

Moreover, during the first phase of the project—i.e., 2015-2016—internally, the two projects SPM and MOIA Police Development (MPD) were mutually reinforcing each other. The MPD's institutional development component was intended to help the MOIA to develop the capacity to conceptualise, lead and manage reforms, while at the same time improving administrative and support services' performance and accountability, which were also critical expectations from the SPM project. Thus, the MPD intended to ensure national and self-sustained capacity development to achieve a critical mass of capacity so that MOIA can independently take forward the effective implementation its functions.

## **B. National Ownership**

MOIA being the key implementing partner, had the prime leadership and ownership role for the realisation of the project's overarching objective. During the early days of the implementation, the deputy minister for Strategy and Policy was nominated as the National LOTFA Director who served as the interface between MOIA and UNDP and LOTFA donors. He served as the Chairperson of the Technical Working Group for the Security window while the deputy minister for Support served as the Chairperson for the Payroll window and the Honourable Minister served as the Chairperson of the Steering Committee. MOIA led the policy development and implementation, facilitated, and supported the development of Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), and facilitated and provided the enablers for the achievement of the transition process.

The Ministry of Finance (MOF), through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the central bank worked with the commercial banks to facilitate the expansion of EFT, Mobile banking, or other commercial bank payment services available.

On an annual basis, the SPM project actively engaged with the leadership of the MOIA in its annual work planning process and the agreed plan was subjected to the

deliberations of the technical working group—chaired by deputy minister for support—and the steering committee—chaired by the honourable minister.

### C. Sustainability

By its nature, the question of sustainability for the results of SPM project is somewhat moot, particularly given the events of 15th of August 2021 when the project's operations were abruptly terminated—and subsequently foreclosed on 4 December 2022—by the taking over of the de facto authorities. Given that the overarching objectives of the project's outputs were directed at building the capacity of the staff of the MOIA (outputs 1 and 2), building and maintaining systems for efficient and effective payroll administration (outputs 3 and 4), and providing funding for police payroll (output 5), and the fact that most of the staff that benefitted from the capacity building activities of the project had either left the country and/or removed by the de facto authorities, much of the gains made have been somewhat washed off. For example, both WEPS and APPS had been shut down and taken out of service immediately following the 15th of August 2021 event.

Looking at sustainability from the viewpoint of whether the government could carry the financial burden of police payroll after taking over SPM—with an estimated annual programmable budget of US\$320m, it was clear from the Payroll Structure and Sustainability Strategy report (2017), that considering the government of the day's revenue projections, it could not sustain such endeavour. The above-mentioned study reviewed payroll sustainability from the viewpoint of four macro factors—i.e., security situation and subsequent size of ANP forces; economic growth and domestic revenue generation; Government of Afghanistan budget priorities; and donor support and priorities. And, it concluded that, as such factors were very difficult to predict in both the medium- and long-term horizons, a mere conclusion could not be made, especially considering two key questions: First, what amount of funds would be available to the Government of Afghanistan to pay for ANP/CPD salaries (fiscal space), and second, what decisions would be made by the Government of Afghanistan and the international donors on the allocation of the funds between the MOIA, MOD and the civilian sectors.

As the project ceased prematurely, the project team has prepared appropriate documentations of all project processes, final review report and lessons learned report which will be reviewed by UNDP's senior management and the project's steering committee, hoping that such outputs could yield knowledge on future similar interventions.

However, from the design angle of the project, the SPM project document had clearly identified the beneficiaries and indicated how their engagement should take place. It also outlined the layers of coordination and prioritised their engagement in the project implementation. The project's main approach to sustainability was to strengthen the institutional, legislative (police inherent law), and human capacities (of relevant departments) for continuing the maintenance of the ANP through the introduction of consultation/coordination mechanisms between UNDP and MOIA and MoF as well as among the larger stakeholders. The project was therefore designed and formulated particularly with the inkling of empowering the national authorities to take over the initiatives of the project after UNDP's exit. A leading role was allocated to the representatives of the MOIA in the management of the project which aimed towards increasing their involvement. For example, at the onset, the MOIA's Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy served as the National Director for LOTFA, and the Deputy Minister for Support served as the Chairperson of the Payroll window technical working group meeting as well as the Chairperson of the Pay and Compensation Board (PCB).

## V. RESULTS

This section presents the summary and assessment of the output level results which have been achieved against the approved results frameworks considering the whole implementation period of July 2015-December 2021. The project was expected to contribute towards: Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations as defined in the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD 2015-2019<sup>10</sup>).

### OUTPUT 1: Updated Policies Implemented, Business Processes Developed and Applied to Support Independent MOIA Payroll Management

Output 1 entailed having in place updated legislative, policy and regulatory frameworks and business processes, implemented and functional in support of independent MOIA payroll management. To achieve output 1, relevant activity results were developed as indicators of progress toward achieving the output, with each activity result having a set of activities to be carried out.

The project's approach to achieving this output started with the conduct of a compressive review of MOIA's Human Resources (HR) and finance policies with a view to identifying gaps and attendant solutions to close those gaps. During the first phase of the project—i.e., July – December 2015—the project team completed review of HR and payroll policies and procedures, and the legal analysis of entitlements and deductions within MOIA. The review revealed many issues, potential impacts, and recommendations for improvement. Extract of some of the issues highlighted is can be seen below:

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Impacts</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<b>Lack of data reliability</b> Errors may occur in attendance records for the sign-in and sign-out or one signature per day (either at the start of the working day or at the end) and unclear oversight in place to check entries made. In some districts, manual additions are made for newly engaged personnel.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Risks of absenteeism to go unrecorded</li><li>• Negative impact on personnel fidelity</li><li>• Demotivation in case of data manipulation</li></ul>	Pilot fingerprint-based time and attendance recording in Kabul, where electricity is available, most districts have internet connectivity, and where the biggest concentration of ANP exists. This would begin to mitigate the risks of absenteeism and ghost ANP. A separate form should be prepared for late arrivals. For example, an ANP with 2 (or more) cumulative late

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<sup>10</sup> The CPD was extended through to 2021



<i>Issues</i>	<i>Impacts</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<b><i>Late arrivals unnoticed</i></b> Lack of clarity and lack of oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deterioration of discipline</li> </ul>	arrivals could be penalized with one day's absence recorded. A separate column should report the late arrivals in EPS. Separate HR forms should be used to report newly recruited ANP.
<b><i>Weak verification procedure</i></b> A lack of clarity about the distinction between those who complete HR forms and those who authorise them. In many districts, the same person fulfils both roles.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If completion and authorisation is undertaken by the same person, scope for error, fraud, or coercion is possible</li> </ul>	Payroll policy guidelines and procedures encompassing the roles and responsibilities of HR Officers and District Finance Officers should be introduced and enforced. Full segregation of duties should be applied through appointment of different officers to each position.
<b><i>District Finance Officer reviews and approves HR forms</i></b> Lack of clarity of verification approach and process. Same person fulfils both roles in Finance as well.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential scope for error, fraud, or coercion</li> </ul>	MOIA to confirm data verification processes. There needs to be validation and verification guidelines in several stages.
<b><i>No separate reports about female police employees</i></b> There were no reports identifying female police officers in Balkh province, Nahre Shahi district, the Bagrami district of Kabul province, Daikundi province, or Herat province.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOIA does not have concrete or accurate numbers on female ANP personnel.</li> </ul>	MOIA should develop separate forms to report on monthly basis the numbers of female police personnel registered.

Source: Consultancy on HR/Payroll and Reconciliation Processes (Rohina Samim - 29/09/2015-21/10/2015)

In the same 2015, the SPM project completed the legal review and analysis of pay entitlements and deductions of the ANP as recorded in the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS). From the legal review and analysis, some inconsistencies were found—for instance, the Inherent Law did not capture some of the policies and incentives such as cadre incentives. Also, there were some incentives in the Police Inherent Law which were not captured in WEPS—for example, incentive pay during appointment and employment, contract renewal incentive, and educational diploma Incentive.

Having studied the issues and challenges within MOIA's policies, processes and procedures, the SPM, in 2016, in its efforts to streamline the payroll management led the establishment of the LOTFA Pay and Compensation Board (PCB) and the development of its guidelines, which was subsequently approved by the steering committee at the time. The main objective of setting up the PCB is set out in the below text box as extracted from the PCB Guidelines of April 2016. The guidelines of the PCB clearly stated the membership composition, ensuring donor representation and representation from the MOIA to ensure the ministry's ownership of the whole arrangement. Along the years, the PCB registered remarkable successes, having presided over the pay review of the Police, and recommending the merging of base

pay with temporary duty incentive and the increase of the hazard duty allowance. In a nutshell, the introduction of the PCB streamlined MOIA's payroll processes vis-à-vis the review and standardization of Police payroll.

Another key result under output one was the launch of payroll sustainability review. Prior to this review, the usual practice was that MOIA issued pay scales annually together with the approved Tashkil which was used as the basis for preparing annual budgets and commitment letters used by UNDP, and the donors committed funds to the MOIA accordingly. The basis for determining pay scale, its fairness or sustainability was not clear, and it was on this background that SPM project sought to conduct such review. The general objective of the study was to carry out a review which would ensure rationalisation of the pay structure and determine the sustainability of the existing salary structure of the ANP and GDPDC, established by the current salary scales and incentive rates. The study would provide recommendations to the MOIA, on how to rationalise the remuneration structure, making it more transparent, reducing the dependence on incentives and improving the relationship between pay and performance.

The study produced several findings and options for resolving the pay structure anomalies. Three options were presented—i.e., Option 1: Performance based management with longevity pay; Option 2: Alignment of ANP to civil service spine structure; and Option 3: Simple alignment of ANP pay to Afghan National Army (ANA) salary. It was based on this study and its recommendations that the PCB recommended the restructuring of the Police pay—merging base pay with temporary incentive, awarding 5% pay increment, etc.

In 2017, the SPM project successfully developed a Payroll Management Procedures Manual (PMPM) and rolled out the training to MOIA staff responsible for payroll management. The aim of the PMPM was to address the issue of low awareness of the policies and procedures at central and provincial levels which was identified in 2016 as

#### 1. OBJECTIVE

*The objective of establishing the Pay Board is to streamline and institutionalize the process of reviewing and approving new or changes to the existing pay and incentives for LOTFA funds. Any new or changes to the ongoing payments and incentives, or other compensation shall be brought to the pay board. The pay board will thus provide checks and balances to changes in the use of the trust fund*


*Source: LOTFA Pay and Compensation Board (Pay Board) Operational Guidelines (April 2016)*

Specific objectives of the pay structure study included, to:

1. *Assess the basis for the current pay structure of the Police salary scale considering best practices in similar sector and context, and provide recommendations for improvement*
2. *Identify and propose alternative ANP pay structures*
3. *Assess the implications of changes in pay structure, and the challenges for implementation.*
4. *Facilitate determination of pay budgets, planning for recruitment, promotions, and salary increments,*
5. *Propose a pay structure for MOIA that align with those of other security sector institutions such as the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD)*

one of the main risk factors contributing to ineligible salary payments. Another major aim of the PMPM was to standardise payroll processing and practices across all the payroll stations to improve efficiency and effectiveness. To roll out the PMPM and ensure its use by all users, the SPM project conducted training for 251 MOIA staff in payroll operations and management<sup>11</sup>. The pre- and post-training assessments showed 18.2% increase in their skills and knowledge in payroll procedures and operations<sup>12</sup> – see **Error! Reference source not found..**

Figure 1: Pre- and Post- Assessment Results for PMPM Training



This improved capacity translated into more efficient and timely processing of payroll and subsequent reduction in ineligible payroll expenditures. The PMPM was finally approved by the Honourable Minister of Interior Affairs in February 2018.

Moreover, by the first quarter of 2018, UNDP/SPM project had completed the revision of the MOIA's Finance and Internal Control Policies to provide structured guidance on proper accounting of Police pay and correct use of each source of funds, including the LOTFA fund code. The SPM project, in close consultation with relevant MOIA Directorates and other key stakeholders, successfully developed the Finance Policy for the MOIA, which was approved by the Minister of Interior Affairs in February 2018. The revised Finance Policy covered the restructuring of the policy document to improve the flow of chapters, a revision of existing chapters, and adding linkages to the Afghan legal and institutional frameworks as defined in the Public Expenditure and Financial Management Law (PEFML), Finance Regulations and Treasury Accounting Manual of the Ministry of Finance. The project delivered one Training of Trainers (ToT) to 15 MOIA staff—14 males and 1 female—who were responsible for finance controls, including Provincial Human Resource Officers (PHROs), Provincial Financial Officers (PFOs),

<sup>11</sup> Of 251 personnel trained on PMPM, 35 were trained as Trainers. Trainees included Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs), Financial Analysts and staff of payroll management section from General Directorate of Budget and Finance and General Directorate of Personnel. The remaining 216 participants mainly comprised Provincial Finance Officers (PFOs) and Provincial Human Resource Officers (PHROs) from all 34 provinces. They were trained in 4 different batches, over a training duration of 3 days for each batch.

<sup>12</sup> The training covered the following topics: Legal & Regulatory Framework for Payroll Management; Tashkil for Payroll Management; ID Database for Personnel of the ANP; Support Systems for Payroll Management (including AHRIMS, WEPS, and AFMIS with a focus on system procedures, responsibilities, key control processes, and reference documents); Initiating Payroll Preparation; Personnel Attendance List at District and Provincial Level; Payroll Computation; LOTFA Commitment Letter, Ineligible Payroll Expenses; Payroll Accountability Reports

MOIA Finance Analysts, MOIA Internal Auditors at the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and other relevant MOIA staff.

The Internal Control Policy for the MOIA was developed, reviewed, and finalised in consultation with relevant MOIA Directorates and other key stakeholders. The policy defined the responsibilities of senior leadership, Provincial Police Commanders, and managers of MOIA units within payroll management, including the General Directorate of Policy and Strategy (GDPS), Office of Deputy Minister for Support, General Directorate of Finance and Budget (GDFB), ID Card Department, and the General Directorate of Personnel (GDOP). The revised Internal Control Policy was based on the globally recognised internal control framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)'s Integrated Internal Control Framework. The COSO framework enables organizations to effectively and efficiently develop systems of internal controls that adapt to changing business and operating environments, mitigate risks to acceptable levels, and support sound decision making and governance of the organization. The previous Internal Control Policy was not comprehensive and did not cover most of the internal control aspects of MOIA business processes. These gaps had been addressed in the revised internal control policy. However, it was only in August 2020 that the internal control policy was approved by the honourable Minister of Interior Affairs—after many months of collaborative work between the SPM project team and the MOIA's General Directorate of Policy and Strategy, to ensure ownership of the final product.

To make the Police personnel to be fully conversant with their pay and entitlements as well as to understand the mechanisms for complaints of non-receipt of pay or abuse by superiors, SPM project developed and distributed 30,000 booklets and 6,000 posters. These materials were distributed across all 34 provinces in collaboration with the MOIA's Provincial Education Commands, General Directorate of Logistics and Provincial Police Headquarters (PHQs)

With the project's experience on payroll management issues over the years, the remuneration packages for police personnel of the MOIA had gradually evolved and increased in difficulty as several issues continued to accumulate throughout the years—including lack of the requisite documentation regarding their basis, eligibility, frequency, rates, and triggers, etc. Therefore, the SPM project commissioned a holistic review of the Police incentives with the objective to conduct a study that could shed light on the existing incentive system, review the remuneration packages and bring out more coherence through a set of options and recommendations. Following a competitive procurement process, BDO Jordan (Saman and Co) was contracted to undertake the review. However, due to the November 2019 fatal incident which claimed the life of one UNDP staff, the consequent security restrictions and the COVID19

pandemic, the activity stalled until around quarter 3 of 2020 when BDO could present their draft report. After thorough review by the SPM project team, BDO's report was accepted and finalised in November 2020. During 2021, SPM project team presented the findings of the MOIA incentives review—conducted by BDO Jordan (Saman & Co)—to the Payroll Window Technical Working Group (PWTWG) meeting. The aim of the presentation to the PWTWG was to apprise members of the findings on the incentives review and the scale of deficiencies—i.e., gaps in documentation and triggers for some incentives—and how SPM project intended to fix the deficiencies. A comprehensive action plan, which aimed to rationalise the incentives, was also presented at the same meeting. SPM project, in collaboration with the MOIA and the CSTC-A's Ministerial Advisory Group – Interior (MAG-I) had embarked on the incentive rationalisation work. Along the same partnership, SPM project had produced a back-pay policy for the MOIA with a view to standardise the policy around Police personnel claiming back-pays—i.e., salary/incentive areas. A proposal for a maximum of 4 months claim was presented which was

**Some of the incentive report's findings include:**

- Insufficient legal, regulatory or policy documentation for determining the eligibility, relevant supporting documents, triggers for, and frequency of payment of some incentives.
- Current appointment and selection practice tend to automatically assign some incentives to a staff member once the individual is appointed, the basis for which are unclear.
- No clear policy or regulation describing how potential candidates are selected, evaluated, and appointed.
- The role of MOIA's General Directorate of Personnel (GDOP) in determining eligibility for an incentive or qualification, triggers those conditions have been met for payment, etc. is not documented.
- A year is too long a period before updating the Hazard Duty Incentive Pay (HDIP) Map as sometimes, the level of threat changes through the year. Kabul for instance, is currently one of the most insecure places and yet it is considered one of the low threat areas on the HDIP Map.
- Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) incentives and bonuses, triggers, eligibility criteria and supporting documents that make the staff members eligible for all incentives under this group are not documented.
- For medical incentives, the Presidential Decrees and/or other legal documents—which are the basis of awarding such incentives—do not clarify whether these incentives are automatically dedicated to all nurses, physicians, and other health personnel of ANP and GDPDC.

later approved by the LOTFA Steering Committee—to take effect from 1st August 2021. Resolving the deficiencies in the incentives and instituting a back-pay policy were expected to directly contribute to the strengthening of MOIA's human resources and payroll internal controls hence improving the ministry's overall credibility.

As part of the payroll transition plans, and following the recommendation of the LOTFA donors, SPM project launched the re-assessment of the 23 donor conditions using the Donor Conditions Monitoring Framework (DCMF). The contract was awarded to BDO Jordan (Saman & Co) through a competitive procurement process. The aim of the assessment was for the firm (BDO) to provide a compliance assessment of MOIA, MOF,

CSTC-A, and UNDP against the DCMF. The assignment was expected to inform an evidence-based decision of LOTFA Donors and the GIROA to transfer to MOIA, the non-fiduciary payroll management functions being performed by UNDP SPM project. The compliance assessment was cumulative—detailing progress made, taking into account progress achieved during the previous assessment(s). The final report submitted by the firm reflected the main findings and recommendations to the partners on capacity development and recommendations to the respective entities on the risk mitigation.

SPM project started implementing the recommendations of the incentives review, with the streamlining of all the incentives and making sure that they were fully accounted and well planned. The project requested MOIA's General Directorate of Finance and Budget (GD-F&B) to provide justifications for the huge numbers of incentives for 2021 so that it could be fully documented and agreed by all parties. The explanations were submitted by GD-F&B, and the project had reviewed those, and it was discussed at the weekly technical meetings with Defense Security Cooperation Management Office – Afghanistan (DSCMO-A) for a common understanding and effective implementation. The foregoing activities—i.e., resolving the deficiencies in the incentives and implementing the four-month-maximum back-pay policy—were expected to directly contribute to the strengthening of MOIA's human resources and payroll internal controls thereby improving the ministry's overall credibility. The work on the incentives was expected to be fully implemented during quarter three of 2021, however, due to the suspension of LOTFA project activities post 15th August, the project had abandoned implementation altogether.



Below is a snapshot of where SPM project is in relation to its project targets at closure.

*Table 1: Summary of Progress on Output 1 (00095495) Indicators as of 05 December 2021*

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual	Comments
<b>B: Policies and procedures documents developed and in use by applicable MOIA staff at national and subnational levels and made available to all personnel for reference</b>	Nil	Develop/revise all relevant policy and procedures documents and avail to all users	The following documents were developed and in use by users: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PCB Guidelines-2016</li> <li>• Payroll Management Procedures Manual (PMPM)-2017</li> <li>• Finance and Internal Control Policies-2018</li> <li>• WEPS-AFMIS reconciliation SOP-2019</li> <li>• back-pay checklist-2020</li> </ul>	
<b>D: Number of communication products (charts/ leaflets/ posters/ brochures, etc.) on compensation, remunerations, and entitlements produced and disseminated to provincial payroll stations</b>	Charts distributed to about 60 payroll stations	160,000 copies of communication products on compensation, remunerations, and entitlements produced and disseminated to provincial payroll stations	120,000 copies of communication products (charts/leaflets/posters/brochures, etc.,) were produced and disseminated to all 138 payroll stations across the country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due to the foreclosure of LOTFA the 2021 target of 40,000 comms products could not be achieved.</li> <li>• Due to the delayed introduction of APPS and the foreclosure of SPM project, these targets could not be achieved</li> </ul>
<b>H: Payroll Standard Operating Procedures manual revised per APPS application and distributed to users</b>	No	YES (the revised Manual is printed and distributed to users)	No	
<b>I: Number of MOIA staff trained on revised Payroll manual as per APPS</b>	0	150	0	
<b>J: Percentage of payroll stations using revised Payroll manual as per APPS</b>	0%	100%	0%	

<b>K: MOIA incentives streamlined and updated in the revised Payroll manual</b>	NO	YES	No	
<b>L: % of MOIA payroll stations using APPS T&amp;A</b>	100%	100%	100%	
<b>M: Number of awareness / outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police</b>	0	10	0	
<b>N: National Conference on “HR, IHL, and Police” held</b>	No	Yes	No	
<b>O: Support provided to the implementation of MOIA’s Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024</b>	No	Yes	No	



## OUTPUT 2: Capacity of MOIA Personnel (in Payroll, ICT Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate) Improved to Undertake all Payroll Processes and Tasks to Agreed Standards

Output 2 entailed MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate) being able to independently undertake all payroll inputs, processing, and validation tasks to agreed and measurable standards, using the reliability, accuracy and timeliness of personnel data and payroll to support improved evidence-based planning, prioritization, and decisions.

From the onset SPM project understood the significance of capacity building for the staff of the MOIA, with focus on the ultimate objective to enable MOIA staff to undertake all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management and the related financial and budgetary management tasks should the project hand over to the Government. The most appropriate approach at the time was for the project to conduct a Micro Capacity Assessment (MCA) of the MOIA, which effectively set the baselines for the payroll capacity development for the staff of the MOIA. The MCA was conducted by an independent firm called Grant Thornton.

The MCA report found the overall risk rating for MOIA's payroll capacity to be "Significant"<sup>13</sup> highlighting several weaknesses as presented on the table below.

It was on the basis of the above findings that SPM project quickly prepared a plan to guide the structured establishment of a payroll unit within the MOIA, along with a detailed capacity development plan which aimed to address the main

weaknesses highlighted above. The table below presents the summaries of the various training programs conducted for the MOIA staff, between 2016 and 2020. As seen on the table, due to the security restrictions and COVID-19 lock downs, physical training activities became difficult to hold from 2020 hence the low number. These trainings

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However, there are limitations and weaknesses, which should be eliminated if further responsibilities and obligations are to be delegated to the IP. Those weaknesses include, but are not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– absence of precise policies and procedures</li><li>– failure to make reconciliations between EPS and AFMIS</li><li>– Unsound internal control environment, which still needs to be sophisticated, absence of effective monitoring controls over the operations in provinces</li><li>– failure to reconcile actual and budgeted costs; failure to prepare general or special purpose financial statements under the cash basis of accounting</li><li>– absence of financial management reporting responsibilities, etc.</li></ul>
Source (The report on the results of Micro Capacity Assessment of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan – October 2015)

<sup>13</sup> Indicates an underdeveloped financial management system or control framework with a significant likelihood of potential negative impact on the IP's ability to execute the programme in accordance with the work plan


exclude ad hoc trainings that were delivered outside of the annual training schedules. Such trainings were delivered to the staff of the Inspector General's Office, newly recruited finance officers, etc.

*Table 2: Summaries of Trainings conducted SPM project in 2016-2020*

Training Description	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WEPS practical training and helpdesk online ticketing</li> <li>• Digital M-16 and help desk support</li> <li>• Introduction to Payroll Management Procedure Manual (PMPM)</li> <li>• Law and regulatory framework for payroll management</li> <li>• Payroll computations; Ineligible payroll expenses; and Payroll accountability reports</li> <li>• Payroll processes, finance forms, budget codes, internal controls, and verification methods</li> <li>• Time and attendance and PERSTAT (Personnel Statistics) forms</li> <li>• WEPS-AFMIS reconciliation training</li> <li>• Budgeting and allotments</li> <li>• Public financial management</li> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Foundation in Accountancy (international qualification)</li> </ul>	<b>366</b> (All males)	<b>524</b> (Including 5 females)	<b>811</b> (Including 27 women)	<b>372</b> (Including 7 females)	<b>20</b> (All males)

The general approach for conducting training for the MOIA staff mostly followed a pre- and post- training assessment to try to understand the level of understanding of the subject by the trainees. For example, in 2017, following the development of a comprehensive Payroll Management Manual (PMPM), the training conducted showed increase in the skills and knowledge participants in payroll procedures and operations<sup>14</sup> by 18.20% as shown in figure 2:

*Figure 2: Pre- and Post-Assessment PMPM*




<sup>14</sup> The training covered the following topics: Legal & Regulatory Framework for Payroll Management; Tashkil for Payroll Management; ID Database for Personnel of the ANP; Support Systems for Payroll Management (including AHRIMS,

The same practice was done during three critical training programmes in 2019 as presented below:

- Payroll management training (186 participants including two females): The training participants on average scored 46% in pre-test and 71% in post-test indicating a 25% increase in participants' knowledge.
- Digital M16 and Financial Management training (66 participants including five females): The training participants on average scored 71% in pre-test and 91 in post-test indicating a 20% increase in participants' knowledge.
- DDR Orientation training (10 participants, all male): The training participants on average scored 70% in pre-test and 91 in post-test indicating a 21% increase in participants' knowledge. Please see Figure 1 below for the summary of pre- and post-assessment results.

*Figure 3: Results of pre- and post-Assessment trainings conducted in 2019*



The development of the PMPM and MOIA Finance Policy and the SPM project's continued effort in training and capacity building for MOIA staff aimed at reducing ineligible expenditures within payroll, particularly reducing the number of duplicate M16s as well as M16s generated outside WEPS as the participants developed better understanding of the procedures, rules and policies governing payroll funded by LOTFA funds.

One of the very successful trainings administered to the MOIA's staff of the GD-F&B—10 staff (9 male and 1 female) was the customised training on budget allotments which

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WEPS, and AFMIS with a focus on system procedures, responsibilities, key control processes, and reference documents); Initiating Payroll Preparation; Personnel Attendance List at District and Provincial Level; Payroll Computation; LOTFA Commitment Letter, Ineligible Payroll Expenses; Payroll Accountability Reports

was conducted during quarter one of 2021. The objective of the training was to enhance the staff's ability to better understand the following topics:

- Budget preparation
- Budget allotments
- Budget re-alignments
- Budget reporting
- Control points on budget expenditure
- LOTFA Commitment letter 2021
- Mid-year budget review
- Process flow for pay and incentive adjustments in MOIA
- Roles and responsibilities of LOTFA/SPM, MOIA & MOF

*Figure 4: Participants' comments and training session on the tailored training on Budgeting and Allotments*



Through its innovative approach to strengthen the capacity of MOIA's GD-F&B, to ensure that they have a core team of accounting and finance technicians, with world-class skills, UNDP SPM project engaged the prestigious American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)—through a responsible Party Agreement (RPA) modality—in 2018, to run Foundation in Accountancy (FIA)<sup>15</sup> certificate programme for them. The approach applied for selecting the participants in this program was to have the MOIA to choose the staff to encourage ownership from their side. The program targeted 24 participants with the first batch comprising 8 candidates (all males). Completing the FIA certificate course would provide the staff with the requisite technical competencies to be able to

<sup>15</sup> Foundation in Accountancy (FIA) is an internationally recognized Diploma in Accountancy and Business Management, offered by the Association of the Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) U.K. FIA provides technical proficiency in accountancy and financial management equivalent to the U. K's Higher National Diploma. There is a total of 7 subjects (papers) required to complete FIA

manage payroll functions independently and professionally and therefore strengthens the overall financial management capability of the MOIA—addressing one of the weaknesses identified by the Grant Thornton MCA on payroll management at MOIA.

By the end of the RPA arrangement with the AUAF—31 December 2020, the program produced five fully qualified Accounting Technicians (all male), who served as role models within the GD-F&B. Two staff were left with one paper to qualify for the FIA.

In 2019, to further improve the internal controls around payroll, SPM project installed Barcode readers in 31 more provincial MOF Offices (*Mustofiats*) and trained the MOF's Provincial Finance Officers in Digital M16 approval process and utilisation of Barcode technology. The Barcode readers provided an additional layer of validation of salary payment vouchers at the *Mustofiats* to address the incidence of 'M16 forms generated outside WEPS'. The new template of M16 form contained a unique barcode which should be scanned at the *Mustofiats* to validate all WEPS payment transactions prior to capturing them in AFMIS. The technology improved the integrity of the WEPS system and helped the MOF to prevent duplicate payments and/or payments outside WEPS system

Table 3: Summary of Progress on Output 2 (00095840) Indicators as of 05 December 2021

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual	Comments
C: Number of MOIA staff trained in Payroll Management, WEPS/APPS (disaggregated by gender)	300 (all male)	1310 (Cumulative)	1,010 (999 males, 11 females)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to COVID-19 pandemic and foreclosure of the project, the 2021 target of 300 could not be achieved.</li> </ul>
G: Number of MOIA staff enrolled in professional certification programmes (disaggregated by gender)	0	24 (all males)	24 (5 fully qualified, 2 were left with only 1 paper, and rest dropped out)	
O: Number of provinces/Mustofiats using the provided barcode readers to approve digital M16 to facilitate data verification and reconciliation	0	34	34	
X: Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual for reconciliation updated in accordance with APPS	NO	YES (Updated SOP manual for reconciliation was distributed among relevant personnel)	No	
Z: Number of MOIA (OIG) staff provided orientation training on payroll processes to facilitate their audit work	0	15	15	
AA: Number of MOIA staff trained on inactive backpay module (disaggregated by gender)	0	21	21	
AB: Number of OIG staff enrolled in Professional audit training (CIIA) (disaggregated by gender)	0	10	0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to COVID-19 pandemic and foreclosure of SPM</li> </ul>

AC: Number of MOIA staff trained in tailor made public financial management course (disaggregated by gender)	0	15	0	project, the CIA and tailor-made public financial management trainings could not take place
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### OUTPUT 3: MOIA Payroll System (WEPS) and HR System (AHRIMS) Fully Updated and Reconciled to Support the MA's Assurance Work and Facilitate Data Migration to APPS

The SPM project ensured that the WEPS system was operational and improved to support the payroll processes and ensured that funds were disbursed to ANPs and GDPDCs on a timely basis. All 34 PHQs were connected to WEPS, ensuring that MOIA's electronic payroll systems were functional on real-time basis, nationwide.

At the launch of the project in July 2015, through to 2016, the WEPS application operated on a stand-alone basis at each of the 34 provinces—hence it was simply referred to as “Electronic Payroll System (EPS)”. The pain that such situation caused, coupled with the various delays, vulnerabilities, etc., was enormous. At the time, the only way to produce a consolidated payroll report was to collate reports from all 34 provinces into a single report which was quite prone to errors and the potential for manipulation was high.

To tackle this situation, SPM project set out a comprehensive plan to try to improve the WEPS application by bringing all payroll stations on one platform, leveraging the web. By the end of the first quarter of 2016, the project managed to connect all payroll stations through the web—hence Web-enabled Electronic Payroll System (WEPS). As a consequence, all stand-alone systems were switched off to allow for 100% WEPS functionality. The benefits of reaching this milestone included the improvement of speed in processing, overall improvement in the integrity of the reports, timely reporting, etc. Ever since the achievement of WEPS, the project continued to improve the overall capability of the system as presented on table 4 below:

*Table 4: Summary of Improvements introduced in WEPS to improve its capability*

Previous settings	New system improvements	Results
<b>Improvement Introduced in 2017</b>		
<b>M41 and Tawheed (Summary of the M41 Payment) were being generated through the system without any verification mechanism</b>	QR Code has been implemented in the system that can verify whether or not an M41 and/or Tawheed have been generated through WEPS or not	MOIA Finance Department can check/validate whether M41s and Tawheeds have been generated by WEPS System or not.
-	Verification and approval of M41 and Tawheed in WEPS	MOIA Finance Department can now verify and approve the M41 and Tawheed in WEPS based on their barcodes. Once verified and approved, they cannot be modified. PFOs can then proceed with generating M16s.



-	M16 Online Approval by <i>Mustofiats</i>	<i>Mustofiats</i> can now check and verify a printed copy of M16 with the WEPS System. PFOs cannot process out-of-system M16s.
<b>Generating Temporary IDs without any supporting documents</b>	New Enrolment Module which requires supporting documents to be uploaded to the system before an ID can be generated.	While registering a new police officer or patrolman who does not have an ID card, the system will generate a Temporary ID for him/her, but will require four documents to be uploaded, namely <i>Tazkira</i> , contract letter, bank card, and photo. Once the request is submitted along with supporting documents, the SPM team would match the documents against the details entered. If matched, request is approved, otherwise, it's rejected and PFO would be requested to amend the details and/or submit the required documents.
<b>PFOs could only log tickets with descriptive text in the Online Ticketing System (OTS)</b>	OTS has been improved to allow PFOs to also upload screenshots.	WEPS team can easily understand the problem and solve it.
<b>WEPS Salary payments were based on old salary scale, Temporary Pays, Incentives and HDIP</b>	WEPS has been reconfigured to calculate salaries based on 5% increment in base salary merged with Temporary Pay and revised, Incentives and HDIP	5% of increment in base salary and Temporary Pay incentive is merged with Base salary and total payable salary amount is calculated based on revised incentives.
<b>Improvement Introduced in 2018</b>		
<b>New User Encryption policy</b>	User credentials were two-way encrypted. This allowed the technical team to de-crypt the credentials and change PFO passwords at any time.	The user credentials are now one-way encrypted. The technical team cannot de-crypt the credentials. The technical team can only reset password for PFOs when they forget the password. The system encrypts the password entered by user and matches it with the encrypted passwords available in the system.
<b>365 days validation and back pay for 1397</b>	The WEPS users could manually enter the number of days for a single payee. As a result, some payees could be paid for more than 365 days in one year.	The WEPS users were disallowed to manually enter the number of days for a single payee beyond 365 days in a year.

<b>Pension Calculation Revised</b>	Audit trails did not exist for individual transaction.	Pension calculations were revised to allow effective audit trail tracking.
<b>Global Information System (GIS) Portal Upgraded</b>	GIS portal was only accessible from MOIA Intranet (local network).	GIS Portal was upgraded to online GIS and can be accessible both from public internet and Intranet (local network) to authorized WEPS users.
<b>Improvement Introduced in 2019</b>		
<b>Re-engineered Back Pay Module</b>	Back Pay Module was not programmed to calculate payroll deductions classified by categories	Back Pay Module can calculate payroll deductions by category to mitigate payroll calculation errors
<b>Improved the Digital M16 Performance</b>	Digital M16 was not able to accept new changes introduced by the MOF	Digital M16 can accept new changes proposed by the MOF
<b>Enhanced Income Tax Calculation Scope</b>	The income tax calculator could manage one record at a time only	Income tax calculator can manage all records at once
<b>Enhanced Pension Calculations Scope</b>	Pension calculator could manage one record at a time	Pension calculator can manage all records at once
<b>Bug-free WEPS User Interface</b>	Only WEPS users could note the user-friendly alerts when incorrect Password was entered	System administrators and WEPS Users can note user friendly alerts, which resulted in limited calls to Help Desk

At the time of launching the project, the rate of Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) payments stood at 85%, while the remaining 15% was on the basis of Trust Agents (cash). As required by one of the LOTFA donor conditions (see ANNEX 6: LOTFA DONOR CONDITIONS), the percentage of Police personnel receiving salary through electronic means should be at least 90%. The project, through its innovative strategies, engaged the MOF and MOIA to introduce Mobile Money (MM)/Mobile Banking as a way to boost the EFT rate. A Letter Of Exchange (LOE) was signed among the three Parties—i.e., MOF, MOIA, and UNDP, which facilitated the piloting of Mobile Banking for around 6,000 ANPs in ten provinces. By the end of the project, over 4,000 ANPs were receiving their salaries through the MM mechanism. As a result, the percentage of Police personnel receiving salaries through electronic means reached 95%, leaving only about 5% of Police personnel taking salaries through Trusted Agents (cash) thus reducing the risk of funds falling into wrong hands. This percentage surpassed the 90% requirement set out in the donor conditions of 2015.

As a way to sanitise the ANP payroll and pave the way for the implementation of the APPS which integrated HR with payroll, the MOIA, with support from CSTC-A, launched

the Personnel Assets Inventory (PAI)<sup>16</sup> process 2017. LOTFA donors used this opportunity to align the WEPS payments with the PAI process so that only Police personnel that were verified through the PAI process would be paid through WEPS. Against this donor-directive, UNDP/SPM project ran a reconciliation process and a data cleansing exercise that would enforce the adherence to PAI standards. As a result of this exercise, some 8,257 Police personnel were removed from payroll.

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<sup>16</sup> PAI was a process to identify and verify (physically and biometrically) MOIA's personnel throughout Afghanistan. The PAI process was administered by the MOIA with the support of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

Below is a snapshot of where SPM project is in relation to its project targets at closure.

*Table 5: Summary of Progress on Output 3 (00095844) Indicators as of 05 December 2021*

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual	Comments
C: Number of new initiatives/improvements introduced in WEPS to function optimally	0	20	18	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to the introduction of APPS, foreclosure of SPM project, the 2021 target could not be implemented</li> </ul>
D: Percentage of ANPs paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	94%	96%	95%	
E: Percentage of GDPDC paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	100%	100%	100%	
F: Percentage of Payroll stations that processed salaries on time	99%	100%	99%	
I: Number of registered personnel paid through Mobile Banking	4,400	4,600	5%	

## **Output 4: MOIA Infrastructure Provision Supports 100 per cent Functionality of MOIA Payroll Systems**

Output 4 ensured that intranet connectivity, power, other logistics needs, and disaster recovery capability were in place for WEPS. Activities under this output were predominantly recurrent to allow WEPS network performance and functionality across the country to be monitored on a real-time basis, thus improving the reliability of system, the timeliness of data inputs, as well as minimising the downtime of the system.

As highlighted in output 3 above, by the end of the first phase of the project, SPM project achieved the full integration of all the stand-alone electronic payroll systems into one centrally managed system leveraging the web. Such integration of all the stand-alone systems into a single central system helped the project to have a good grip of the payroll and significantly improve the reporting capability and the overall integrity of police payroll.

To ensure continued availability of the WEPS system across all 34 provinces, SPM project, in 2016, procured SolarWinds application as the core application for network monitoring and management of the WEPS servers on real-time basis. Prior to deploying SolarWinds, there was no way the technical team could monitor the functioning of the servers located out in the provincial headquarters and whenever a server went down, it took longer before the team could fix it.

Following over a year of engagement with the MOIA authorities, in 2019, the SPM project finally completed the establishment of a Disaster Resilience and Recovery (DRR) site for WEPS—see below for details. The purpose of establishing the DRR site was to assure business continuity of MOIA's payroll operations and minimise any downturns in Police salary payments in case of a disaster occurrence on the MOIA's information technology infrastructure (primary site), which was hosted at the MOIA compound.

Mainly, the core function of the SPM project's WEPS technical team under Output 4 related to maintaining the WEPS infrastructure. Throughout its existence, the project team maintained the WEPS platform and infrastructure and enabled all 138 payroll stations across the country to process payroll for their respective staff—for both ANP and GDPDC. While the ANP end-users were connected through a fixed internet connectivity, riding on the MOIA's Network Operating Centre (NOC), the GDPDC end-users were connected through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) secured by the SPM project as GDPDC offices were not directly linked to the MOIA's NOC.

On 28 September 2015, Anti-Government Elements attacked and seized control of Kunduz city, including the Police Headquarters (PHQ). In the attack, all the PHQ ICT equipment were either completely destroyed or badly damaged. The ICT equipment at Kunduz GDPDC and MOF's sub-treasury (*mustofiat*) were also set on fire thus affecting salary payment to at least 2,560 ANP and 136 Prison personnel. In response to the devastating effects of the incident, within two weeks, SPM project had swiftly restored the equipment and brought normalcy to operations.



*Figure 5: Picture of destroyed ICT equipment at Kunduz PHQ in 2015*

Learning from this experience was what precipitated SPM project to arrange the establishment of a Disaster Risk and Resilience (DRR) as part of its business continuity plan. After series of negotiation and follow ups, the MOIA senior leadership allocated a space within its Training General Command compound—located some 20 kilometres from the main MOIA compound. In 2019, the project completed the establishment of the DRR site for the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) which assured business continuity.

Below is a snapshot of where SPM project is in relation to its project targets at closure.

*Table 6: Summary of Progress on Output 4 (00095849) Indicators as of 05 December 2021*

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual	Comments
A: Percentage of ANP payroll stations with fixed MOIA intranet connectivity	90% (ANP), 0% (GDPDC)	100%	100% (ANP) 100% (GDPDC)	
C: Number of payroll stations with delayed salaries due to connectivity issues	0	0	0	Under APPS regime we cannot measure this indicator as APPS used UIC instead of payroll station
E: DRR site is up and running 100% of the time	0%	100%	100%	

## Output 5: Funds Transferred by UNDP to MOF for Police Pay

The SPM project disbursed funds to the MOF for the timely payment of ANP and GDPDC salaries and incentives. The project also provided independent Monitoring Agent (MA) services to provide the GIROA and donors with assurance over the use of LOTFA funds, by ensuring compliance with established payroll policies and in monitoring personnel and payroll data to identify discrepancies, prevent and/or detect fraud, waste and abuse, and correct errors and deficiencies.

For the duration of the SPM project—July 2015 to December 2021<sup>17</sup>, UNDP advanced a total of US\$2.17bn<sup>18</sup>, all of which was expended by the MOF on the salary payment of ANP and GDPDC uniformed personnel as presented on the Table 7 below.

Year	Opening uncleared balances	New Advances to MOIA (including bank charges)	Advance Liquidation (including bank charges)	Uncleared Balances
<b>Jul-Dec 2015</b>	\$29,086,080	\$205,211,521	\$225,418,923	\$8,878,677
<b>Jan-Dec 2016</b>	\$8,878,677	\$404,169,317	\$406,043,988	\$7,004,006
<b>Jan-Dec 2017</b>	\$7,004,006	\$399,500,000	\$404,271,703	\$2,232,303
<b>Jan-Dec 2018</b>	\$2,232,303	\$346,500,000	\$336,741,766	\$11,990,537
<b>Jan-Dec 2019</b>	\$11,990,537	\$301,000,000	\$305,189,959	\$7,800,577
<b>Jan-Dec 2020</b>	\$7,800,577	\$321,700,000	\$329,246,728	\$253,849
<b>Jan-Aug 2021</b>	\$253,849	\$163,000,000	\$163,253,849	-
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$2,141,080,838</b>	<b>\$2,170,166,917</b>	

*Table 7: Summary of Advances and Liquidations (Output5 of SPM project)*

From table 7 above, it is clear that by the time of the abrupt suspension of the project's operations as a consequence of the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021 incident, the previous government had actually expensed all of the funds advanced by UNDP; implying that the *de facto* authorities did not inherit any LOTFA funds. The total spent on Police payrolls compared to the total expenditures incurred by the project, over the duration of the project, represents 94.22%.

As highlighted above, the use of the third-party Monitoring Agent (MA) represented a key aspect of the SPM project's operation as a mechanism to provide assurance to the donors that the funds were being used for the intended purpose.

<sup>17</sup> Actual payroll processing ended in July 2021

<sup>18</sup> Includes opening balances



At the beginning of engaging the MA's services, expenditure verification was set at only 60 per cent, per month, per province, while physical verification was set at 1 per cent. The MA's physical visits to each of the 34 province's payroll office had become a routine part of the payroll process, serving as a deterrent to abuses and manipulations of payroll documents for fraudulent purposes. As a routine, the MA visited the provincial Police Headquarters and examined, verified, and validated, based on the 60 percent randomly generated sample, ensuring that only physically active personnel and eligible persons were recipients of salary payments. The work of the MA was required to conform to the International Standard on Assurance Engagement (ISAE 3000)—Assurance Engagements other than audits or reviews of historical financial information.

In the renewal of the MA's contract for 2018 onward, the contract was amended to increase the percentage of expenditure verification from 60 per cent to 75 per cent of each province's monthly payroll expenditure while the physical verification was dropped. The reason for dropping physical verification was that at the same time, the MOIA—with support from CSTC-A—had initiated the Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) which was a comprehensive physical and biometric verification of each Police personnel, in preparation for the Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS). The table below (Table 8) presents summary of the amounts of MA-certified ineligible expenditures from 2015 to 2020, with a note that the MA work could not be completed beyond March 2020 due to the incompleteness of contracting process which was terminated in August 2021 when project operations were abruptly stopped, and the project was subsequently closed. A total of USD 18.82million was certified by the MA as ineligible expenditures incurred by the MOIA. All but the 2020 amount was recovered from the advances

**A summary of the scope of MA services is presented below:**

- Verify payments of ANP remuneration and remuneration for Central Prison Department (CPO) uniformed personnel salaries based on established eligibility criteria and documents provided by the MoIA and LOTFA.
- Verify transactions between UNDP LOTFA and MoF related to request for advance and expense report for eligible and accurate expenses based on documents provided by the MoF and LOTFA.
- Undertake sample physical verification of personnel and compare the police headcount with reference to the Tashkil (MoIA HR database) based on documents provided by MoIA;
- Assess adherence to internal controls established by MoIA
- Prepare monthly, quarterly, and annual analytical reports summarising results of above monitoring activities, highlighting challenges and recurring issues identified for correction, areas of vulnerability and possible actions, and aged status of unresolved issues previously identified; and
- Bring critical issues to the immediate attention of UNDP LOTFA and the MoIA as identified, outside the regular reporting cycles

*Source: (2015 TOR for MA Service)*

given to the MOF and are therefore not included in the payroll expenditures reported under this output.

*Table 8: Summary of MA-certified ineligible expenditures incurred by MOIA from 2015-2020*

Year	MA-certified Ineligibles	Remarks
<b>2015</b>	USD 4.48 million	Entirely due to over payment to reservists beyond the committed numbers
<b>2016</b>	USD 1.67 million	
<b>2017</b>	USD 2.69 million	
<b>2018</b>	USD 2.55 million	Largely due to <i>Out of WEPS payments (50.73%) whereby salaries were paid manually</i>
<b>2019</b>	USD 4.93 million	Largely due to <i>Paid to ANPs Not Included in PAI (65.90%)—a condition for receiving salary as agreed by LOTFA donors and MOIA; No Acknowledgement Receipt Obtained By TA; etc.</i>
<b>2020<sup>19</sup></b>	USD 2.50 million	Largely due to <i>Payment without supporting documents (48.49%), Trusted agent related issues (27.08%)</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>USD 18.82 million</b>	

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<sup>19</sup> Only Q1 (January – March 2020) MA reports were completed. No MA reports could be produced due to contracting process which could not proceed as the project suspended operations and subsequently closed

Below is a snapshot of where SPM project is in relation to its project targets at closure.

*Table 9: Summary of Progress on Output 5 (00095846) of SPM Project as of 05 December 2021*

Indicator	Baseline	Target	Actual	Comments
A: Percentage of payroll stations able to process monthly salary within 15 days of close of solar month	98%	100%	100%	
C: Number of police personnel paid disaggregated by gender	106,420 ANP (103,559 males; 2,861 female); 7,016 GDPDC (6,693 males; 323 female)	136,177 (Full Tashkeel): ANP 124,628+ ALP 11,549; (Full Tashkeel): GDPDC 7,456	125,868 ANP: (114,850 males, 4071 females)  6,947 GDPDC: (6,620 males; 327 female)	Using June 2021 <sup>20</sup> figures from APPS for ANP and WEPS for GDPDC

<sup>20</sup> Because July 2021 disaggregated report was not available at the time of the closure.

## VI. GENDER SPECIFIC RESULTS

While SPM project by its design is a GEN<sup>21</sup> project, it made various attempts to support MOIA's Gender mainstreaming activities throughout the project's life. For example, in 2017, the project enabled gender disaggregated reporting and data entry in WEPS, which has allowed WEPS reports to track the number of female police within the ANP, and therefore bring to light the rate of intake of female police. Prior to this initiative, it was not possible to readily avail such information. In addition, the SPM project supported the MOIA in developing new *leave request forms* which captured different types of leave, including *maternity leave*. Based on the *Police Inherent Law*, the *maternity leave* is a paid leave and Article 36 of the Law grants a Police officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) *maternity leave* of 90 days for female officer and NCO, and a further 4-day *incentive leave*. The new leave form not only ensured that leave information was accurately captured in the pay run, but it also raised awareness for the female Police on these benefits and entitlements.

In 2021, the project also planned support to the MOIA's Directorate of Human Rights, Women and Children Affairs in the implementation of the *Empowering the Women in Police: From Words to Action - Roadmap 2020-2024*. However, as the Director of this unit left office, and there was no substantive replacement, the project could not support until the suspension of operations on 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021. The main objective of the planned support to the MOIA was to change the organisational culture to improve conditions for policewomen within MOIA and to change the perception of the public about women-in-ANP so that more females could enroll in the ANP.

## VII. PARTNERSHIPS

By the very nature of the SPM project—it came about through a very collaborative partnership among the key stakeholders—i.e., GIROA, UNDP, LOTFA donors, and CSTC-A. Throughout the project's various phases, the partnership arrangements remained essentially strong and vibrant. Such partnerships was articulated in the various documents, such as the Donor Conditions document; the project document; the 2018 terms of reference which upgraded LOTFA to a Multi-Partner Trust Fund, etc.

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<sup>21</sup> According to UNDP's Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP), GEN 1 = limited contribution to gender equality

At the commencement of the project in 2015, the MOIA's Deputy Minister (DM) for Policy and Strategy, acted as the National Director for LOTFA and focal point for both LOTFA projects—providing strategic guidance, leading partnerships, collaboration, and coordination between MOIA and UNDP and donors, to ensure the project achieved the planned results. In addition, the MOIA's Deputy Minister for Support—under whom the SPM project operated with MOIA, along with high level representatives from the President's Office, and the MOF, all actively collaborated on the various governance platforms of the SPM project to steer it towards the achievement of its objectives. It is important to note that keen participation of the Presidency helped to quickly resolve some of the strategic issues which helped greatly.

A typical example of how partnership helped the SPM project could be seen in the manner the project leveraged the strategic position of the MOF to help with the meeting of donor conditions, one of which required that, at least 90% of the ANP should receive their salary through electronic means instead of cash. In 2016, SPM signed a Letter of Exchange which required MOF to engage with a private telecoms company—Afghan Wireless and Communications Company (AWCC) and a private commercial bank—New Kabul Bank, to operationalise the piloting of Mobile Banking/Mobile Money facility, which pushed the percentage of police receiving salary through electronic means—EFT and MM—to 95%, above the 90% required by the donor condition.

Another good example of the project's excellent partnership could be demonstrated in the implementation of the Personnel Assets Inventory (PAI)<sup>22</sup>. In 2018, MOIA embarked on the PAI registration, with a view to set ground for the APPS. LOTFA donors decided to align the funding for the ANP salaries paid through LOTFA with the personnel data verified through PAI. The objective of this decision was to improve the transparency and sustainability of LOTFA and to prevent any misuse of LOTFA funds. This decision was fully implemented from the pay cycle of May 2018. The project worked with the MOIA General Directorate of Personnel (GDOP), GD-F&B, ID Cards Department, and CSTC-A; receiving regular batches of verified individuals and reconciling those with the WEPS system and regularly reporting at the technical working group.

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<sup>22</sup> The Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) is a process to identify and verify (physically and biometrically) MOIA's personnel throughout Afghanistan. The PAI process has been administered by the MOIA with the support of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

## VIII. ISSUES

During the project's six-year operation, various issues were encountered, many of them offering very good lessons to both UNDP and key partners—MOIA and LOTFA donors. Notable among these issues, the following are worthy of note:

- Implementation of APPS: As part of the 2015 Donor-Conditions, it was agreed as follows:

*CSTC-A will fully fund and manage the development of an integrated Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS).*

The APPS systems was supposed to replace the legacy system which was developed by UNDP—i.e., WEPS. However, the APPS system could not be deployed until July 2020 (only time and attendance module was used), and it effectively came into full-blown operation from February 2021. The implication for such a long delay meant that UNDP/SPM could not make heavy investments on WEPS—legacy system during the long waiting period. Notwithstanding, SPM project ensured that system improvements that could improve the WEPS's security, controls, and reporting, were implemented regardless of when it would be retired by the APPS as highlighted below:

- In 2018, SPM introduced encryption such that user credentials were one-way encrypted, and the system encrypted the password entered by users and matched it with the encrypted passwords available in the system, thus strengthening system security. Another feature introduced was the restriction of number of days so that PFOs could not pay anyone beyond 360 days in a 12-month period.
  - In 2019, the project introduced five new improvements in WEPS to strengthen system controls and ensure its optimal performance. The new system improvements included re-engineered back-pay module, improved digital M16 performance, enhanced income tax calculation scope, enhanced pension calculation scope, and bug-free WEPS user interface.
  - In 2020, the SPM project team utilised the *SolarWinds* software as the core application for network monitoring and management of the WEPS servers on real-time basis. No downtime for any payroll station was recorded throughout the year.
- One topical issue during the early stages of the project was the issue of MOIA making ineligible payments to Reservists. During 2016, the Monitoring Agent (MA) had certified and reported findings of MOIA's persistent overpayment of Reservists,

month on month, to the tune of US\$4.48 million, using LOTFA funding, for the period January- December 2015. These payments were in clear violation of the LOTFA Commitment Letter, which clearly indicated that LOTFA could fund only 284 Reservists per month with a monthly ceiling of AFN 923,000.00 (approximately US\$14,200), for six months (i.e., January-June 2015). Extrapolating the ineligible payments MOIA actually paid some 1,704 Reservists with a total ceiling of AFN 5,538,000.00 (approximately US\$85,200 for January – June 2015). It is important to note that the \$4.48 million is the amount over and above the Commitment Letter ceilings.

Following several discussions on the matter MOIA leadership sought audience with the LOTFA donors where they tried to justify the ineligible overpayments to their Reservists. In the end, LOTFA donors resolved that the Commitment Letter should stand, implying that UND/SPM should recover the total ineligible payments. Accordingly, the first tranche of deduction from MOIA's advances was applied in December 2015 where an amount of AFN214, 801,135.00 (approximately US\$3.02m) was recovered. The second tranche of deduction, amounting AFN65,877,546.00 (approximately US\$0.99m), was recovered from January 2016 advance, and the balance of AFN17, 274,501.00 (US\$0.26m) was deducted from the February 2016 advance. To get over the issue of Reservists, LOTFA donors had issued a letter to the MOIA leadership, through the Canadian Ambassador (dated 6<sup>th</sup> December 2015), indicating that LOTFA would cease funding Reservists after 3 months of 2016 fiscal year, after which MOIA should remove them from the tashkil totally.

## **IX. RISKS**

- For the SPM project, security remained one of the highest risks, negatively impacting on overall implementation of the project. Security problems had caused delays in salary processing in provinces such as Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand provinces throughout the project's life. The security situation had also jeopardised the piloting of mobile money (e.g., Helmand), and the work of the MA as they could not cover all 34 provinces during the expenditure and physical verifications. Moreover, due to the 24 November 2019 incident which took the life of one UNDP staff, project staff could not have regular visits to the MOIA compound which affected the conduct of critical project activities such as training, coordination meetings with MOIA on MA findings, helpdesk support to users, etc.
- As detailed under lessons learned section, at the later stage of the project's operation, the project faced liquidity risk as donor-contributions reduced due to

changing priorities of some of the donors and/or earmarking of funding away from payroll to other windows such as justice and anticorruption.

From the beginning of the project, the project team prepared a comprehensive risk log (see ANNEX 4: RISK LOG below) which was continually updated and communicated to stakeholders.

## **X. LESSONS LEARNED**

Lessons learned include the following:

- While not a typical development project for UNDP—as a development organisation—the LOTFA-SPM Project proved that UNDP as an organisation is able to operate effectively (rendering both fiduciary services and development implementation) within a conflict-country context such as Afghanistan—in partnership with a national implementing partner, the MOIA— and alongside a U.N. political mission and international partners.
- Coordination: For a project the size of SPM project, effective coordination requires investments of time, funding and commitment and transactions costs, particularly in the establishment of oversight and enforcing systems of controls and protecting the reputation of UNDP and its partners.
- Sustainability: It is critical to ensure that exit and sustainability strategies are built into projects from the design stage, to guarantee the sustainability of interventions after donor funding ceases and project closure. The SPM project became some sort of a ‘*perpetual*’ undertaking in the hands of UNDP and for the donors while the funding reached an unsustainable level, one which GIROA could not sustain.
- Limitation of project scope: From its inception in July 2015, SPM project was limited to a narrow scope—limited to supporting MOIA in payroll management—while leaving out other complementary scope, such a human rights and gender. Following the completion of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) risk assessment, Donors and UNDP recommended for SPM project to include Human Rights and Gender activities in its 2021 Annual Work Plan. These two activities could have been integrated/mainstreamed in the project’s AWP and tied to payroll, which could help to encourage the implementing partner, MOIA, to adhere to the international standards and principles to promote human rights, gender equality and the full realisation of women’s rights and freedoms.

Please refer to the [Lessons Learned Report](#)



## XI. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: RISK LOG

#	DESCRIPTION	DATE IDENTIFIED	TYPE	IMPACT & PROBABILITY	COUNTERMEASURES/MNGT. RESPONSE	OWNER	SUBMITTED /UPDATED BY	LAST UPDATE D	STATUS
1.	GIROA does not have sufficient funding to sustain institutional development and reform and police professionalization efforts	1 July 2015 (start project)	1. d Contextual Risks/Financial & Economical	Current number of ANP cannot be funded and therefore not sustained; in worst case insecurity/looting by unpaid armed police may occur	Support to cost-effective ways to provide security (such as through community security methods including but not solely by police).	UNDP Country Office TFMU, LOTFA donors	Project Manager	4-Dec-21	All of LOTFA is suspended making this irrelevant
2.	Not sufficient funding, support, or political will to strengthen other GIROA institutions or achieve broader MOIA reform jeopardizing support to payroll management	1 July 2015 (start project)	1. d Contextual Risks/Financial & Economical/Political	MOIA vision and MOIA Five Year Strategy Goals will not be achieved, and gains made will be jeopardized by dysfunctional other institutions, in particular a dysfunctional justice sector	As LOTFA has been suspended, perhaps better if new investments could be made to have a functioning security sector taking a comprehensive approach and involving elements of the justice sector, sub-national governance system, human rights institutions, civil society.	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	This item has become moot due to the events of 15th August 2021 and the subsequent project closure
3.	Security situation decreases and/or COVID-19 disrupts operations	1 July 2015 (start project)	1.a Contextual Risks/Security environment	Decrease of donor funds, support may not reach sub-national level; goals related to democratic policing will be affected. Donor contributions may be reduced due to impacts of COVID-19 on global GDP	UNDP can only mitigate this risk through solid development support which will improve security in the long run; and awareness raising on importance of democratic security including in countering insurgency. UNDP adopts alternative solutions for COVID-19 such as utilising online platforms; closely work with GD	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	The 15 August incident has actually derailed the whole security system in Afghanistan and the de facto authority is now in charge without functioning police or prison personnel.

					&B to monitor PFOs and utilize support systems.				
4.	(Managing) misunderstandings and perceptions and negative press on UNDP or MOIA/Afghan police	1 July 2015 (start project)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	Delay in implementation, decrease of donor funds	UNDP has already invested significantly in tightening controls. Internal control policy for MOIA has been approved. Strengthened management and oversight.	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Following the suspension of LOTFA and its closure, UNDP and donors have issued a clear message on their position
5.	Afghan police violates human rights	1 July 2015 (start project)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Negative press, decrease of donor funds, UNDP may withdraw based on human rights due diligence policy; outcome results not achieved	UNDP is implementing the human rights due diligence policy which includes supporting and promoting human rights through capacity development; Other UNDP Afghanistan projects support strengthening of human rights institutions sector wide in Afghanistan; UNDP works with UNAMA to monitor human rights violations and bring these to the attention of relevant authorities; awareness raising in LOTFA governance bodies	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	As LOTFA projects have been closed this activity has been abandoned.
6.	Corruption	1 July 2015 (start project)	1.a Contextual Risks/Socio-economic environment	Negative press, decrease of donor funds, not achieving outcome results	Capacity development support to reduce corruption in MOIA institution and strengthen police discipline under both SPM and COPS projects; advocacy and support through other UNDP	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Until closure on 15 August, this risk level reduced due to improved system controls and continuous capacity

					projects for addressing corruption issues sector wide. Improved WEPS controls to prevent corrupt practices. Expand MA's scope of work to cover 75% of each province's payments				building reform processes to address issues of corruption.
7.	Travel restrictions on project staff in order to comply with Security advisories impacts on project delivery	1-May-16	1.a Contextual Risks/Security environment	Restrictions on travel to MOI work sites reduces ability to interact with counterparts, ultimately negatively impacting on project delivery, particularly following the 24 November 2019 incident	Online meetings and events prioritized. Where no direct interaction with MOI counterparts is needed alternate sites utilized. Exposure is reduced by only attending at sites subject to security restrictions for the maximum time required.	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Following the 15 August incident all LOTFA projects have closed
8.	MOIA and other partners do not make available relevant documents and access to online systems, as well as statements of transfers from UNDP fund code to the pension fund code and other Government accounts for reconciliation (PAP 4.1)	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP unable to provide reporting to donors concerning Government use of funds.	Utilization of APPS HR module to inform WEPS and grant access to SPM project staff so that necessary reconciliations can be done	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	No change as of 15 August 2021. Project has been closed
9.	MOIA and other Government partners (e.g., MOF and MOLSAMD) are not able to act to approve and implement	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP not able to implement audit recommendations	MOIA to engage actively with MOF, MOLSAMD, and other ministries as needed.	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	No more relevant as project has been closed as of 4 December 2021

	recommended practice changes.		in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)						
10.	MOIA and third-party commercial vendors are not able to support changes needed to implement approved process changes and expansion of AHRIMS.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	Systems will not be electronically linked or integrated	UNDP supports CSTC-A to implement the HR module of APPS	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	This risk is no longer relevant as CSTC-A had developed APPS which replaced AHRIMS thereby making the required changes to the system.
11.	All stakeholders do not proactively share planned activities.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	Partners fail to address development needs or waste resources	UNDP to continue sharing planned activities as openly as possible and engage with key stakeholders especially under the framework of the LOTFA MPTF TOR	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	No more relevant following project closure
12.	MOIA is not able to identify personnel with actual or potential knowledge, skills, and abilities for tailored payroll training	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA staff will not be trained to assume payroll management	SPM to continue capacity building for staff of MOIA, particularly building a core team of accounting technicians with the MOIA_B&F directorate	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant from 15 August 2021 when operations stopped
13.	MOIA is not able to commit staff to be full-time mentored	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing	Insufficient capacity within MOI payroll to take over LOTFA payroll	LOTFA to coordinate with partners to identify human	Planning, monitoring, and	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.

	engagement with UNDP staff.		Partners / Responsible Parties	responsibilities by end June 2016	resources to support the payroll unit	reporting specialist			
14.	MOIA is not able to provide access for UNDP staff to all systems used for Tashkeel, ID cards, AHRIMS, others for HR and payroll management	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments.	Ensure that UNDP SPM staff, MAS and Auditors can have access to APPS reports as required to be able to produce the necessary reports for donors and other stakeholders	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
15.	MOIA is not able to support modification of AHRIMS to accommodate possible recommended changes	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	System capability is not sufficient to support auditable, accountable payments. UNDP's fiduciary risk is heightened	UNDP will be pushing for a proper documentation of its roles and responsibilities under the APPS regime and ensure that its fiduciary roles and responsibilities are not compromised	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	closure
16.	All stakeholders do not proactively share with MOIA detailed information concerning specific activities and advising objectives	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same /related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	Capacity building activities are uncoordinated	UNDP to continue sharing planned activities as openly as possible and meet frequently with partners and collaborators	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	UNDP and donors have communicated their decision to close the project on 4 December 2021
17.	MOIA is not able to effectively communicate processes and	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing	Insufficient capacity within MOI payroll to take over LOTFA payroll	UNDP to facilitate the assessment of the LOTFA donor	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.

	procedures to staff at the national and sub-national level		Partners / Responsible Parties	responsibilities when the donor conditions are met	conditions as well as a HACT assessment				
18.	MOIA is not able to internally survey training needs and ensures alignment with partner offerings (ensure demand-driven assistance)	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Capacity building activities are uncoordinated	UNDP Project to support MOIA to coordinate training needs identification and ensure targeted training	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
19.	MOF is not able to provide sufficient numbers of MOIA and UNDP staff read-only usernames and passwords to AFMIS data	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/ related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments.	UNDP to ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities under changes that will be replacing WEPS--i.e., APPS and other systems	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
20	MOF and commercial banks are not able to make EFT information available to UNDP for reconciliation	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g., other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP unable to provide reporting to donors concerning Government use of funds.	LOTFA to share with donors and partners reports on progress to attain access. SPM to share with MOF/MOIA auditors' findings and recommendations on this subject	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project suspension.
21.	MOIA is not able to establish a unique identifier for	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.d Stakeholder Risks/Other stakeholders (e.g.,	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources	LOTFA to share with donors and partners reports on progress so	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project suspension.

	reconciliation across databases (i.e., biometric ID card) linked to allocation of unique ID cards		other aid or government agencies working in the same/related field; CSOs; vendors; explicit adversaries)	data and accuracy of payments.	that donors and partners can engage with MOIA to assist.				
22	MOIA is not able to complete 100 per cent Tashkeel slotting.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments.	SPM to work closely with APPS technical team to ensure that all ANPs are fully slotted in APPS Tashkeel module	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project suspension.
23	MOIA and Netlinks are not able to support UNDP requirements to include all necessary data fields in AHRIMS/APPS.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	System capability is not sufficient to support auditable, accountable payments	UNDP to ensure that all it requires are fully met prior to the utilization of APPS for payroll processing	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	UNDP did not receive the detailed reports for July 2021 payroll processed on APPS
24	GDPDC is not fully supported by AHRIMS/APPS.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Multiple systems in operation creating overload	UNDP to continue using WEPS for GDPDC	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
25	Commercial banks and MOIA are not able to make available to UNDP bank statement information for data verification purposes.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP unable to provide reporting to donors concerning Government use of funds.	LOTFA to share with donors and partners reports on progress so that donors and partners can engage with MOIA to assist.	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
26	Commercial banks and MOIA are not able to work together to resolve issues such as return of	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP unable	LOTFA to share with donors and partners reports on progress to attain access.	Planning, monitoring, and	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.

	inactive bank account balances to MOIA			to provide reporting to donors concerning Government use of funds.		reporting specialist			
27.	MOIA does not expand AHRIMS, MOIA does not work with Netlinks to ensure expansion of AHRIMS capability, to include General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC).	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	System capability is not sufficient to support auditable, accountable payments	UNDP to explore direct contractual relationship with third party vendors and MOU with HQ RS / CSTC-A	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	This risk is dead since APPS has replaced AHRIMS and APPS does not cover GDPDC
28.	MOIA is not able to ensure HR staff / systems users at the national and subnational level receive support services for non-UNDP managed HR systems	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	MOIA payroll unit not able to verify human resources data and accuracy of payments. UNDP unable to provide reporting to donors concerning Government use of funds.	UNDP to seek inputs from CSTC-A / RS for inclusion in reports	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	This risk is dead with the utilization of APPS HR module which is all automated
29.	Netlinks cannot support linked solution with WEPS.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	System capability is not sufficient to support auditable, accountable payments	UNDP to explore direct contractual relationship with third party vendors and MOU with HQ RS / CSTC-A	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	This risk is dead with the introduction of APPS which required no links to WEPS
30.	MOIA, MOF, RS, and UNDP are not able to successfully conclude agreement for delivery of linked systems and capacity building activities.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Systems will not be electronically linked or integrated	UNDP to ensure the full clarification and documentation of its roles and responsibilities under APPS regime	UNDP Country Office TFMU	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.



31.	MOF and commercial banks are not able to establish EFT banking services for all police	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	CSTC-A milestone for transition will not be met	UNDP to report on progress of EFT expansion	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
32.	MOIA building move is not completed in time for preparation and installation of DRR site.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	No DRR capability in place at the time of UNDP project completion	MOIA to identify mitigation measures	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	This risk has died. The MOIA has moved to the new compound.
33.	MOIA is not able to maintain the intranet and Network Operations Centre	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Web-enabled systems cannot function	UNDP to report on intranet availability to donors and partners	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
34.	MOIA-ICT is not able to ensure alignment of DRR Plan with other MOIA systems	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	DRR plan is not implemented or is costly / inefficient	UNDP to include systems integration support to MOIA-ICT	Planning, monitoring, and reporting specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
35.	Commercial banks are not able to collaborate with MOIA over requirements to expand bank services and EFT	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	EFT expansion planning fails to progress	UNDP to report on progress of EFT expansion. UNDP supports MOIA/MOF through a Letter of Engagement on the MM project	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
36.	Commercial banks are not sharing EFT expansion plans.	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	EFT expansion plans are unknown	UNDP to report on progress of EFT expansion	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
37.	MOIA is not able to expand fibre or other improved connectivity between the central and	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Web-enabled systems cannot function	UNDP to report on intranet availability to donors and partners. UNDP supports alternative solutions such as VPN	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.

	sub-national levels, where needed.								
38	MOIA is not able to ensure demand-driven assistance	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	Capacity building activities are uncoordinated	UNDP establishes closer collaboration with the MOIA through the TFMU and other governance structures such as MST	HR and Payroll specialist	Project team	4-Dec-21	Not relevant again following project closure.
39	MOIA is not able to make available to system users adequate facilities, power, and other needs for web-enabled system usage	1 July 2015 (project start)	2.a Stakeholder Risks/Implementing Partners / Responsible Parties	System capability is not sufficient to support auditable, accountable payments	MOIA to identify mitigation measures	WEPS Manager	Project team	<b>4-Dec-21</b>	Not relevant again following project closure.

## ANNEX 2: LOTFA DONOR CONDITIONS



### Introduction

#### Purpose

This document acknowledges the donor conditions for the full transition of all payroll management functions to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOIRA). It outlines the consensus reached by the MOIA, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) responsibilities, and donors' expectations to deliver an integrated human resources and payroll system. It further proposes a conditions-based approach to transitioning payroll management to the MOIA by 31 December 2016, while preserving donor-desired benchmarks. Donors, through the UNDP Oversight Committee, will commission an independent audit to assess the achievement of the conditions set forth in this document prior to the transition.

#### Administrative Notes

- 1) Throughout this document, where individual staff members of each organization are named, the organization (directorate, department, section, etc.) bears the responsibility of designating a successor or temporary replacement empowered to conduct implementation in the event of long-term absences, resignations, etc.
- 2) Deputy Ministers, Directors, and Deputy Directors may delegate tasks, but retain full responsibility for implementation of actions plans under their purview.
- 3) MOIA shall develop and provide to the donors, an action plan for the realisation of conditions within 30 days of the acceptance of this document.
- 4) MOIA will provide incremental assessments towards the realisation of the conditions; at a minimum, by the end of each phase of the LOTFA Successor Project Document.
- 5) UNDP will accomplish document translation.

### Donor Conditions

The Government of Afghanistan acknowledges the donor conditions required for the full assumption of management of payroll by MOIA staff.

**I. Conditions for the Ministry of Finance (MOF)**

- 1) MOF, in cooperation with the Da Afghanistan Bank and commercial banks, will expand the Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT), Mobile Money, or other commercial bank payment services available to serve at least 90% of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Central Prison Department (CPD). MOIA will extend full support to MOF for achievement of this condition.
- 2) MOF will ensure that commercial banks contracted to provide Electronic Fund Transfer, Mobile Money, or commercial bank payment services, deposit funds in individual Police accounts by the 1<sup>st</sup> of each month (solar calendar) for the previous month's pay. MOIA will extend full support to MOF for achievement of this condition; and
- 3) Upon the acceptance of the conditions, MOF will conclude a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the central bank and MOIA to ensure that pay documents are automatically transferred without separate manual entry.

**II. Conditions for the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA)**

***Policy development and implementation***

- 1) MOIA will have developed and implemented Human Resources (HR) policies at the National and sub-National levels, that clearly and comprehensively address Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC) recruitment, promotion, termination, and transfer. The policies will define:
  - i. Internal Control Management.
  - ii. Incentives, bonuses, and award pay.
  - iii. Deductions.
  - iv. Special categories of Police (Very Important Person Protection (VIPP), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and other special categories of forces).
  - v. Special statuses of Police (Reserve, retired, in training, cadet).
  - vi. On-Tashkil, off-Tashkil, and over-Tashkil.
  - vii. Recruitment.
  - viii. Hiring.
  - ix. Termination.
  - x. Vetting.
  - xi. Time and attendance; and

- xii. Issuance and control of identification cards.
- 2) MOIA will develop and revise existing Finance policies for the proper accounting of Police pay, including guidance to direct the source of funds to be used for each category and status of Police and the use of the LOTFA fund code.
- 3) MOIA will ensure adherence to the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for data entry into the Afghanistan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS), including slotting of all police;
- 4) MOIA will maintain a valid, biometric identification card for at least 90% of Police and will ensure that no personnel will be entered into the Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS) without a valid ID card.
- 5) MOIA will extend full support to MOF for achievement of the MOF conditions set out in Section I above.

#### ***Support to CSTC-A for System Development and Implementation***

- 6) MOIA will provide CSTC-A with its requirements for the development of the system in accordance with Afghan law and MOIA policies.
- 7) MOIA will participate in CSTC-A system acceptance, and implement (install and use) the APPS system to standards agreed with CSTC-A. These standards will account for variations across Afghanistan in security, electricity availability, network connectivity and system availability.

#### ***Reduction in Trusted Agent Payments and Corresponding Increase in EFT, Mobile Money, or Other Commercial Service Provider Payments to Police***

- 8) MOIA will use only EFT, mobile money, or commercial bank payment service in areas where it is available, without any Police pay disbursement by Trusted Agents. If the listed services do not exist in an area, Trusted Agents may be utilized with written authorization from the Director General under the supervision and accountability of the Provincial Chief of Police or the Commanding Officer of the provincial prison.

#### ***Network Infrastructure***

- 9) The MOIA will expand network connectivity to all Provincial Headquarters to support usage of the implemented system, with support from CSTC-A.

### ***Monitoring and Evaluation, Inspection and Audit***

- 10) MOIA will assess compliance with established policies and will share assessment results with donors.
- 11) MOIA will regularly monitor personnel and payroll data according to established monitoring plans, to identify discrepancies, detect and avoid fraud, waste and abuse, correcting errors and deficiencies within 60 days of detection; and
- 12) MOIA will take administrative, disciplinary or legal action, as appropriate, in response to detected payment anomalies.

### **III. Conditions for UNDP to Support the Payroll Management (SPM) Project**

- 1) UNDP/SPM support MOIA in the development and implementation of HR and finance policies mentioned in Part II # 1 above. UNDP/SPM will also conduct technical analyses (reports and studies) concerning existing legal and policy documents related to Payroll (HR and finance) and make recommendations for improvement.
- 2) UNDP/SPM will provide independent Monitoring Agent services, and provide regular reports to donors and MOIA, with findings and recommendations.
- 3) UNDP/SPM will build capacity of MOIA in payroll management in accordance with its approved Annual Work Plan; and
- 4) UNDP/SPM will contract an independent audit firm to conduct an assessment of MOIA's compliance with the donor conditions listed in Part II above.

### **IV. Conditions for the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)**

- 1) CSTC-A will fully fund and manage the development of an integrated Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS).
- 2) CSTC-A will ensure the APPS system accommodates all MOIA employees.
- 3) CSTC-A will develop the interface between APPS to the MOIA Identification Card System. The system will rely on the MOIA biometric, vetted identification card as the single unique identifier of Police in personnel and pay records. The system will also perform integrity checks of the identification cards against payroll records; and
- 4) Details of the technical specifications of APPS will be reflected in an MOU between MOIA and CSTC-A



# **Final Evaluation: Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM)**

## **Final Report**

Langnan Chen, Evaluation Consultant

11 November 2022

## PROJECT DATA:

PROJECT/OUTCOME INFORMATION		
<b>Project title</b>	<b>Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM)</b>	
<b>Atlas ID</b>	00089137	
<b>Objective/Outcome</b>	MOIA ability to independently manage all non- fiduciary aspects of payroll for the ANP and CPD, including producing relevant reports for donors in their specified formats.	
<b>Country</b>	Afghanistan	
<b>Region</b>	Asia Pacific	
<b>Date project document signed</b>	June 2015	
<b>Project dates</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>Planned end</b>
	July 2015	December 2021
<b>Project budget</b>	USD 2,561,634,611	
<b>Project expenditure at the time of evaluation</b>	USD 172,145,244.26	
<b>Funding source</b>	LOTFA Trust Fund	
<b>Implementing party</b>	Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan (MOIA)	

Evaluation information		
<b>Evaluation type</b>	Project evaluation	
<b>Final/midterm review/ other</b>	Final evaluation	
<b>Period under evaluation</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>End</b>
	26 July 2022	17 November 2022
<b>Evaluators</b>	Langnan Chen	
<b>Evaluator email address</b>	3107412837@qq.com	
<b>Evaluation dates</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>Completion</b>
	26 July 2022	17 November 2022



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## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The consultant would like to express special thanks for the assistance of the following persons during the assignment:

Sainey Ceesay

Anisha Thapa and DEU team

Chencho Dorjee

Hiroko Massey

Edrees Hakimee

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AABIS	Afghanistan Automated Biometric Identification System
AFG	Afghanistan
AFMIS	Afghan Financial Management Information System
AHRIMS	Afghan Human Resource Information Management System
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANPDF	Afghan National Policy Development Framework
ANSDF	Afghan National and Security Defence Forces
APF	Afghan Partnership Framework
APPS	Afghan Personnel and Pay System
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CA	Central Asia
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
DMPS	Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy
DMPS	Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy
EFT	Electronic Fund Transfer
FE	Final Evaluation
GDPDC	General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Centres
GDS	General Directorate for Strategy
GIROA	Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HR	Human Resources
ICT	Information Communication Strategy
ID	Institutional Development
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MA	Monitoring Agent
MISP	MOIA Strategic Plan
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOIA	Ministry of Interior Affairs
MPTF	Multi Partner Trust Fund
NIM	National Implementing Modality
NPS	National Police Strategy

PAI	Personnel Asset Inventory
PD	Project Document (LOTFA/UNDP)
PHQ	Police Head Quarter
PMS	Project Management Support
QA	Quality Assurance
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SPD	Strategic Planning Directive
SPM	Support to Payroll Management
SSMI	Strategic Support to Ministry of Interior
TA	Trusted Agent
TOR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Work Group
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WEPS	Web- based electronic Pay System

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GIROA had requested that LOTFA completed its handover of payroll support duties by December 2016 based on agreed upon conditions. Further, the donors had required that the handover should be conditions-based and not timeline-based. In response to these challenges and in support of the handover of payroll management to GIROA, under joint financial resources from the LOTFA Trust Fund and donors, the Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM) (the Project) was established and approved by UNDP in July 2015.

The objective/outcome of the Project was to develop the required capacity for GIROA (i.e., MOIA) to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of its pay budget for Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC), including reports for donors. The project objective/outcome would be achieved through six outputs.

The final evaluation (FE) followed the evaluation objectives as indicated in the Terms of Reference (TOR, Annex 1), which included: Purpose of Accountability; Purpose of Learning and Contribution to higher level results.

The FE was undertaken against the evaluation criteria as defined by OECD/ DAC.

The methodology included: Desk study, Development and finalization of methodology, and Interviewing stakeholders.

The assessment of project achievements and performances was in accordance with the parameters in the Results and Resources Framework (RRF), which consisted of Project objectives, targets and indicators with corresponding baseline and target values.

The summary evaluation results against criteria with rationale are presented below:

### Evaluation Results

Project Element	Evaluation Rating	Reasons for Rating
Project Design	Moderately Unsatisfactory	The Project RRF did not provide detailed activities so as to achieve a set of expected outputs. Output 6 was redundant as this was only a UNDP internal management issue. The indicators for some outputs were not well designed. It was not good to drop or add indicators in the RRF frequently after certain period (for example after inception report) particularly before last year of the Project implementation.
Project Implementation	Satisfactory	The Implementation Modality and Project governance structures ensured a proper project management and implementation, strategic decision-making, and alignment with the project objectives and annual working plans.
Relevance	Highly Relevant	The Project's objective was also aligned with the Afghan Government's requirements vis-à-vis security and rule of law, the Afghanistan A-SDG, ANPDFII, NPP 4, National Strategy for

		Combatting Corruption (2017), National Action Plan, and MOIA'S Strategic Plan - MISP (2018-2021).
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	Output 1: moderately satisfactory Output 2: moderately satisfactory Output 3: satisfactory Output 4: satisfactory Output 5: highly satisfactory
<b>Efficiency</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	A relatively higher rate of the expected outputs has been achieved as planned in the Project Document relative to staff, time and budget constraints.
<b>Impact</b>	<b>Significant</b>	When comparing key results with the intended outputs, the Project has definitely produced a significantly positive impact on the payroll system of MOIA. The Project has, to great extent, strengthened the MOIA's payroll management capacity and supported the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA although some outputs remain to be achieved. As such, the Project has significantly contributed to the enhanced MOIA credibility, overall state security and improved Rule of Law.
<b>Sustainability</b>	<b>Unlikely</b>	Both WEPS and APPS had stopped to provide service immediately since 15 August 2021. As a consequence, the benefits from building the capacity of the staff of the MOIA (outputs 1 and 2), building and maintaining systems for efficient and effective payroll administration (outputs 3 and 4), and providing funding for police payroll (output 5), would not be extended beyond the Project period. Further, the financial and economic resources will not be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the Project.
<b>Overall Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	All above

The analysis of the findings above lead to the following core conclusions:

1. The Project lacked a detailed theory of change (ToC) which clearly defined the logical chains, addressed the issues and gaps, and made the assumptions although there was a simple description of ToC in the Project Document. As a result, it was extremely difficult to see the interconnections between the focus areas, issues and gaps, and assumptions.
2. The RRF provided a good instrument for Project implementation and M&E during the design phase. However, the Project RRF was not well equipped with a clearly logical chain from planned activities to outputs/outcomes and to objective as the planned activities were missing in the RRF and Project Document although planned activities are not required in RRF based on the UNDP template.

3. The RRF also provided a set of indicators with baseline and target values to be achieved by the end of the Project for each output. However, the RRF was not equipped with a set of indicators for final objective/outcome. Further, some indicators were not sufficient or adequate in many cases to measure the progress or verify the achievements for some outputs particularly for Output 1 and Output 2. In addition, all baseline values and target values were not accurately calculated and verified respectively during the Project design phase. Finally, it is not good to update the indicators with baseline and target values frequently particularly at the latter stage of Project life.
4. The risks were well identified during the project design and their impact and mitigation measures were also adequate as well as the assumptions (risk descriptions) made. However, despite this good set of risks being identified, it appeared that the security risk that had a significant impact on the termination of the Project was not timely projected in the Risk Framework.
5. The LOTFA/MPTF Steering Committee and LOTFA Project Management Support were well-functioning to serve as an executive and implementing body respectively during the project implementation. The LOTFA/MPTF Steering Committee provided a strategic direction and management guidance for the Project while PMS managed daily activities.
6. UNDP/LOTFA and MOIA were found to be adaptive and responsive partners despite that there were some cooperation/communication issues during the implementation. UNDP long-term presence and partnership with MOIA and other ministries, technical capacities of the staff and strong accountability for results were recognized as the crucial elements for successful implementation of the Project.
7. The Project was relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and challenges and UNDP objectives. It provided GIROA with additional resources to strengthen the MOIA's payroll management capacity and support the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA. The Project was established by following a detailed analysis of barriers, issues, capacity gaps and priorities.
8. The Project was implemented as effectively as expected in delivering planned outputs since the major indicators, particularly under Output 2 and 5 (contributed

to strengthened MOIA's payroll management capacity and the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA), have been achieved.

9. The Project was in general efficient since several factors although staff turn-over, and implementation delays had resulted in the delayed decision-making processes and delayed achievements of the project results. The Project implementation efficiency was further undermined by the replacement of the WEPS system by the Afghan Personnel and Payroll Systems (APPS) which was funded and managed by the US Government through the CSTC-A starting from 15 February 2021 due to lack of communication and consultation with MOIA.
10. The Project made a reasonable contribution towards an improvement in the 6 output areas by implementing a series of activities as the target values of many output indicators have been achieved. The impact perspective remains the same while the impact potential of the Project remains very relevant and urgently needed for GIROA. However, at the time of the final evaluation, the impact of the Project is still at its earlier stages.
11. In theory, the Project was sustainable as it made contributions to a range of products and long-term capacity development of national implementing partners. These products and capacity development, particularly in Output 2 and Output 5, will ensure the national sustainable development agenda after the Project ends. In practice, some of the most important outputs that have been produced by the Project need to be finalized and fully implemented by national implementing partners and additional resources need to be provided for the next phase of the Project. These were not possible due to foreclosure of the Project.
12. The human rights and gender equality issues were well addressed in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions. In particular, both issues were clearly indicated in RRF, quarterly and annual progress reports, and implementation. Nevertheless, there was still a demand for designing human rights and inclusive gender specific logical chains targeting the Afghan National Police (ANP) during the Project design.

The recommendations based on the findings and conclusions above are given below:

1. The future similar project must develop a detailed Theory of Change (ToC) where



the issues and gaps are appropriately addressed and assumptions are adequately made. In particular, the issues and gaps should be linked to the independent logical chains (outcome areas) while the assumptions should include the risks and the preconditions needed to be met before going to next phase of logical chains.

2. The future similar project must include a comprehensive RRF (logical framework) based on the ToC to promote the transparency and efficiency of periodic monitoring and evaluation of the progress achieved by the Project during the design phase.
3. The future similar project should update the RRF by:
  - Adding indicator for the objective/outcome;
  - Moving Indicator B, E (dropped in 2019), I (added in 2019) and N (added in 2021) represented training and capacity under Output 1 to Output 2;
  - Moving Indicator H (Dropped in 2019] and X (New added in 2019) under Output 2 to Output 1;
  - Moving Indicator M (Number of awareness / outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police) and Indicator O (Support provided to the implementation of MOIA's Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024) out of Output 1;
  - Moving Indicator O and Indicator X out of Output 2;
  - Improving Output 3 statement or improve indicators under Outputs 3; and
  - Updating the baseline values that are equal to target values.
4. The implementation of future similar project must take into account the logical chain from activities to outputs/outcomes, and to objective; and also the logical chain from output/outcomes, to indicators and to targets since both logical chains offer a valuable tool for managing and monitoring the project implementation. Any updates on indicators with target values must take into account another logical chain: from activities to output/outcomes, and to objective, and vice versa. In particular, any updates on indicators must also update the activities.
5. In addition to Project specific types of risks, the future similar project must work with other professional institutions to develop an approach to identifying, measuring and managing the macro types of risks such as security risk that has significant impact on the survival of the Project and on the country so that the Project can develop its national ownership plan as early as possible.

6. The future similar project must focus on the outputs/outcomes that are highly relevant to donor's focus areas and GIROA priorities and policies, and UNDP Objectives, as well as target group needs. In particular, the Project must concentrate on Output 2 and Output 5 as they are highly relevant.
7. As presented in Section 3 of this report, for each output, there are still gaps of implementation, and % of targets that have not been reached. The future similar project should concentrate on the gap after the end of the Project in order to enhance the effectiveness.
8. In order to increase the effectiveness and impact of the Project, the future similar project should keep the indicators unchanged after inception report so the results progressed can be timely and accurately measured and verified during the implementation. In case that the indicators need to be updated, the Project should design and include appropriate tools to quantify the outputs/outcome indicator values.
9. Many of the most important outputs that have been produced by the Project remain to be finalized and fully implemented by MOIA. To ensure that the Project activities to date have the intended beneficial impact, it is essential that additional resources be provided for a post-Project to enable the much-needed operationalization and realization.
10. Given that the Project experienced a major delay and staff turnover during the implementation, the Project must focus on sustainability during the upcoming period. The Project is encouraged to develop a timely and pragmatic exit strategy along with a financial sustainability plan in a participatory manner with key stakeholders involved in the Project as well as close coordination with the donors to the Project. It must be outlining the issues, ways and means to smoothly phase-out and hand over the Project to national partners, to ensure sustainability and continuity.
11. The future similar project must design the activities to foster awareness of human rights, women empowerment and mainstreaming within MOIA, such as capacity building for female employees to increase their participation in decision-making and in policy formulation associated with payroll management. More importantly, the Project must include more elaborate human rights and gender-specific indicators and targets in the RRF, M&E Plan, and in the preparation of progress and annual reports.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background

Afghanistan is a mountainous and landlocked country. It is situated in the center of Central Asia and is becoming a hub between north–south and east–west regional economic cooperation corridors. Afghanistan shares borders with Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to the north and Xinjiang, an autonomous region of China to the east. It has a population of about 35.5 million people and a surface area of 652,000 km,

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Based on the Afghan Living Conditions Survey for 2016-2017, 55% of the population lived below the poverty line, and the women accounted for only 11% of wage employment in the non-agricultural sector. Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) faced depressed trade, investment, and incomes that had adversely affected local economies and capacity at all levels of government was weak due to civil war, multiple natural disasters, economic downturn, and others for last decades.

Since 2002, LOTFA has been responsible for payroll data across the 34 provinces of Afghanistan for MOIA. Its detailed responsibilities included technical support, user training, help desk provision, systems maintenance and payroll reporting. LOTFA has also been in charge of fiduciary management of donor funding and oversight of the monitoring agent, including disclosure of findings to donors. In 2015, GIROA, donors and UNDP agreed that the time was then right for UNDP to transfer the support functions for payroll management to GIROA.

GIROA had requested that LOTFA completed its handover of payroll support duties by December 2016 based on agreed upon conditions. Further, the donors had required that the handover should be conditions-based and not timeline-based.

In response to these challenges and in support of the handover of payroll management to GIROA, under joint financial resources from the LOTFA Trust Fund and donors, the Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM) (the Project) was established and approved by UNDP in July 2015.

### 1.2 Project Descriptions

The objective/outcome of the Project was to develop the required capacity for GIROA (i.e., MOIA) to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of its pay budget for Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC), including reports for donors.

The project objective/outcome would be achieved through six outputs:

Output 1: Updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management.

Output 2: Capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate) improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards.

Output 3: MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS) fully updated and reconciled to support the MAs' assurance work and facilitate data migration to APPS

Output 4: MOIA infrastructure provision supports payroll system (WEPS) across all 34 provinces.

Output 5: Funds transferred by UNDP to MOF for police pay.

Output 6: Governance and accountability of LOTFA management and implementation improved.

The WEPS system has been substituted by the Afghan Personnel and Payroll Systems (APPS) which was financially supported and managed by the US Government through the CSTC-A since 15 February 2021. The scope of APPS included only the ANP payroll while WEPS remains to be used for the salaries of personnel of the GDPDC. After the De facto authority (Taliban) took over the government on 15 August 2021, LOTFA donors decided on 4 November 2021, to stop all LOTFA projects and close the trust fund itself starting on 4 December 2021.

Following the closure of the project and based on the UNDP project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) policies and procedures, the Project is required to undergo a final evaluation (FE) covering a period 1 July 2015 through 4 December 2021.

### 1.3 Structure of the Report

This final evaluation report is organized as follows. Chapter one provides a description of the country and the project context. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the evaluation

objectives, scopes and methodology. Chapter 3 presents the main findings and consists of three parts: project design, project implementation, and project results against the standard dimensions of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. Chapter 4 summarizes the major conclusions and key lessons learned drawn from the experience of the Project. Chapter 5 provides a set of recommendations for the consideration of project stakeholders.

## **2. Evaluation Objectives, Scope and Methodology**

### **2.1 Evaluation Objectives and Scope**

#### **1. Evaluation Objectives**

The final evaluation (FE) followed the evaluation objectives as indicated in the Terms of Reference (TOR, Annex 1), which included:

- Purpose of Accountability - to account for the results achieved with the resources allocated to the SPM project. Specifically, the FE assessed the extent to which the design or the implementation process of a development intervention had contributed to its success, identified the failure or success factors, and identified the conditions in which the SPM project can be successfully replicated.
- Purpose of Learning – to learn from experience by understanding whether the SPM project has worked or not and the reasons for its failure or success. Specifically, the FE assessed whether the resources allocated to the intervention had resulted in the planned outputs, outcomes and eventually impacts and whether the resources had been spent efficiently.
- Contribution to higher level results – to evaluate how the project contributed to Afghanistan Country Programme Document (CPD) Outputs and Outcomes and as well as relevant UNDP Strategic Plan Outcomes.

The FE assessed the relevance, performance, management arrangements and success or failure of the project. The FE assessed the potential impact of project activities on beneficiaries and sustainability of results, including the impact on capacity development.

#### **2. Evaluation Scope**

The FE followed the evaluation scope as defined in the TOR. The FE assessed the project design, scope, implementation status and the capacity to achieve the project objectives. It presented lessons learned, challenges faced, and best practices obtained during implementation which could inform the programming strategy of similar interventions in the future.

The FE covered all project's outputs, particularly:

- Status of coordination pursuant to the ANP Human Resources Management, ANP IDs issuance by the MOIA, issue of “ghost police” and the payroll system.
- Effectiveness of WEPS system's transition into APPS.
- Status of “Payroll Unit Plan” and accompanying “Payroll Unit Capacity Building Plan” including a detailed “blueprint” for staffing of a new Payroll developed with the support of the project.
- Status of Training and Capacity Building of MOIA staff to fully assume responsibilities of the Payroll Unit.
- Payroll transition issues and status of outstanding donor conditions (three of the twelve conditions remained unmet as at last assessment—February 2021).
- Status of training for female MOIA personnel to perform payroll functions. Assess the status of recommendation of the mid-term evaluation
- Assess the project design in terms of its relevance to the overall development situation at the national level, relevance to national strategies, and relevance to beneficiaries.
- Assess the cost-efficiency of project interventions.
- Assess the project impact on MOIA's IT development, transparency, and efficiency.
- Assess relevance and effectiveness of the project's strategy and approaches for the achievement of the project objectives.
- Assess performance of the project in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of producing the expected outputs.
- Assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, the reporting and monitoring system and extent to which these have been effective.
- Assess relevance of the project's management arrangements; identify advantages, bottlenecks and lessons learn with regard to the management arrangements.
- Analyze underlying factors beyond UNDP control that affect the achievement of the project results.

- Provide recommendations to key project stakeholders for future projects/ programme development.

The FE was undertaken against the evaluation criteria as defined by OECD/ DAC.

## 2.2 Evaluation Methodology

The FE engaged in a consultative process with the relevant stakeholders, and assessed the challenges and processes and provided recommendations.

The methodology included:

**Desk study:** The FE examined all relevant SPM documents (including project design, work plans, progress, quarterly and annual progress reports, assessments, board documents, monitoring reports, etc.) provided by UNDP.

**Development and finalization of methodology:** The FE had a kick-off meeting with relevant counterparts and finalized the tools for collection and analysis of data. This was done in close consultation and discussion with UNDP CO, SPM project management, and donors.

**Interviewing stakeholders:** The FE also held interviews with key focal points in SPM, senior management and other key focal points in UNDP, key managerial and advisory staff in LOTFA TFMU, and representatives of donor partners contributing to SPM were interviewed.

The assessment of project achievements and performances was in accordance with the parameters in the Results and Resources Framework (RRF), which consisted of Project objectives, targets and indicators with corresponding baseline and target values.

The FE utilised a rating system for the project's results based on the framework in Table 1 and the rating scales as shown in Table 2.

**Table 1: Ratings Framework**

Project Element	Evaluation Rating	Reasons for Rating
	(from Table 2)	(Each rating must be justified)
Project Design		
Project Implementation		
Relevance		
Effectiveness		
Efficiency		
Impact		
Sustainability		
<b>Overall Rating</b>		

**Table 2: Rating Scales**

Ratings against			
Project Design, Implementation, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Overall	Sustainability	Relevance	Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Highly Satisfactory:</b> No shortcomings.</li> <li>• <b>Satisfactory:</b> Minor shortcomings.</li> <li>• <b>Moderately Satisfactory:</b> Some shortcomings.</li> <li>• <b>Moderately Unsatisfactory:</b> Significant shortcomings.</li> <li>• <b>Unsatisfactory:</b> Major problems.</li> <li>• <b>Highly Unsatisfactory:</b> Severe problems.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Highly Likely:</b> Negligible risks.</p> <p><b>Likely:</b> low risks.</p> <p><b>Moderately likely:</b> Moderate risks.</p> <p><b>Unlikely:</b> significant risks.</p>	<p><b>Highly Relevant</b></p> <p><b>Relevant</b></p> <p><b>Moderately Relevant</b></p> <p><b>Not relevant</b></p>	<p><b>Highly significant</b></p> <p><b>Significant</b></p> <p><b>Moderately Significant</b></p> <p><b>Negligible</b></p>

## 2.3 Evaluation Limitations

The travel restrictions posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the security situation limited the capacity of the FE consultant to conduct face-to-face interviews and consult with different stakeholder groups and beneficiaries in the country. To overcome these limitations, the FE consultant broadened the range of documentation included in the desk review, including data and reports from the Government, UNDP, donors, and others. The FE consultant expanded the horizon of its stakeholders and key informants to ensure the coverage and diversity of views and triangulation of evidence from multiple sources. In addition, the FE consultant undertook extensive context analysis, and engaged virtual meeting with the UNDP officers to discuss some of the emerging findings, check accuracy of evidence and fill any data gaps due to the limitations. Finally, unavailability of the government counterparts for consultations is another important limitation. To address this issue, the FE consultant used extended google search for the beneficiaries' information.



## 2.4 Guidelines and Ethics

The FE was conducted by following the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Ethical Guidelines for Evaluators in 2008 and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in particular being sensitive to and addressing issues of discrimination and gender equality.

In addition, the FE ensured the anonymity and confidentiality of individuals who were interviewed and surveyed.

## 3. Findings

### 3.1 Project Design

#### 1. Results and Resources Framework

The Project Results and Resources Framework (RRF) during the design stage, As presented in Annex 5, included a detailed set of objective/outcome, outputs, and activities and a detailed set of indicators with baseline and target values. The targets were further detailed for each phase and would be concluded by a joint review by MOIA, UNDP and international partners. The Project RRF presented an useful instrument to support the management, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting during the Project implementation.

In principle, the RRF provided a logical chain, i.e. from activities to outputs, to outcomes and to objective. The Project resources were employed to implement the intended activities in order to achieve a set of expected outputs, which resulted in achieving a set of expected outcomes, which in turn contributed to achieving the overall objective of the Project. As suggested in Section 1.1, the Project was established in response to capacity and institutional gaps and priorities that were initially identified in the payroll management in MOIA, Afghanistan.

However, the Project RRF did not provide the activities so as to achieve a set of expected outputs, and thus a set of expected outcomes. As a consequence, the logical chain was disconnected between activities and outputs and also between outputs and objective/outcome. In addition, it appeared that Output 6 (Governance and accountability of LOTFA management and implementation improved) was redundant

as this was only a UNDP internal management issue rather than a development issue related to the Project.

The poor project design was also reflected in the frequent updates of RRF for at least three times as the project had been subject to one revision and four extensions since the Project started in 2015. For the first extension in 2017, the outputs and activities were updated in the RRF by considering the changing implementation context during 2015-2016. This revision also covered the support in the management of the reform implementation at MOIA, donor coordination, as well as functional and operational improvements in technical, financial, human resources, and promotion of the employment of female and trained civilian personnel, planning, training, education, and leadership development of the workforce at MOIA. Nevertheless, the subsequent project extensions did not have the significant changes as the objective, outcome, and outputs of the Project with indicators remained unchanged. The main reason for the Project extensions was due to dissatisfaction of donors for not being able to transfer the payroll to GIROA. Thus, UNDP and MOIA decided to extend the Project until December 2021.

## **2. Monitoring and Evaluation Design**

The RRF during the design phase also comprised a set of indicators with baseline and target values to be achieved by the end of the Project for each output. As presented in Annex 5, these indicators with baseline and target values were used to monitor the performance of the Project.

However, the indicators for some outputs were not well designed. First of all, there was no an unique indicator for the objective/outcome.

Second, for Output 1 as an example, Indicator B, E (dropped in 2019), I (added in 2019) and N (added in 2021) represented training and capacity building and should be under Output 2: Capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, ICT Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate) improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards.

For Output 2 as an example, Indicator H (Dropped in 2019] and X (New added in 2019) did not represent capacity building and should be under Output 1: Updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management.

Third, some of the output indicators were not the good parameters for measurement and monitoring in practice. For Output 1 as an example, Indicator M (Number of awareness/outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police) and Indicator O (Support provided to the implementation of MOIA's Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024) were not the good indicators for Output 1.

Similarly, Indicator O (Number of provinces/Mustofiates using the provided barcode readers to approve digital M16 to facilitate data verification and reconciliation), Indicator S ([New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of PPHQs submitting new PERSTAT template on monthly basis), and Indicator Y (New added in 2019) [Achieved in 2020] Time and attendance monthly reporting template developed for MoIA to improve the quality of HR reports) under Output 2 were not appropriate for measuring Output 2.

Except for Indicator B (Percentage of ANPs matched with HR System (AHRIMS)), almost all indicators were not a direct measure of Output 3 as electronic payment does not mean integration of WEPS with HR system (AHRIMS).

Fourth, the baseline values of some indicators were not rationale. The target values for Indicator L under Output 1, Indicator O in 2019, 2020 and 2021 under Output 2, Indicator E and F under Output 3, Indicator A and E under Output 4, Indicator A under Output 5 were exactly the same as (or close to) baseline values. For Indicator C, D, F, and I under Output 3, the target values are almost equal to the baseline values, suggesting a poor design of target indicators and values.

Finally, it was not good to drop or add indicators in the RRF frequently after certain period (for example after inception report) particularly before last year of the Project implementation.

More importantly, as shown in Annex 5, the Project only updated the indicators with baseline and target values but did not update the related activities and outcome/objective. This resulted in confusion in the activities undertaken by the Project Management Support Team and the expected outcome/objective that would be achieved.

In addition, the continuous monitoring was conducted undertaken by the TWGs and sub-working groups guided by the Project Board/Steering Committee. Based on this joint monitoring of progress against indicators with target values, and after the satisfaction of the conditions for transition, the role of UNDP in the non-fiduciary payroll

management functions would be transferred to GIROA.

### **3. Risk and Assumptions**

Since the risk framework was established in 2015, it was updated on 25 November 2018 and 26 October 2020 respectively. As shown in updated risk framework in the project documents, 6 major types of risk were identified during the project design: 1 associated with outcome/objective and 5 with outputs. The risk description, impacts of risks and corresponding risk mitigation measures were also presented for each type of risk.

In general, the risks were well identified during the project design and their impact and mitigation measures were also adequate as well as the assumptions (risk descriptions) made. Annex 5 incorporated all key risk areas related to the implementation of the Project.

However, despite this good set of risks being identified, it appeared that the security risk that had a significant impact on the closure of the Project was not timely projected in the Risk Framework.

### **4. Stakeholder Participation**

During the design phase, the project stakeholders were identified, but not extensively consulted based on the Project Document and consultations. The major target stakeholders consisted of the government line ministries and their subsidiary agencies and departments responsible for Payroll Management as well as the institutions responsible for public financial management. These stakeholders participated in design of Project within the country's sustainable development framework. They also participated in discussing recommendations for policies, business processes associated with MOIA Payroll management, capacity of personnel, MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS), infrastructure provision, funds transferred, and governance and accountability of LOTFA.

The following ministries were identified as major stakeholders:

- Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA): This ministry was identified as the key national executing agency to play the key coordination role in the implementation of the Project.
- Ministry of Finance (MOF): This ministry was identified as the key national

agency to be involved in the monitoring the progress of the Project.

Other agencies that were also identified as beneficiaries of the Project include:

- Afghan National Police (ANP); and
- General Directorate for Prisons and Detention Centres (GDPDC).

The roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, including UNDP Country Office, LOTFA and Technical Working Group (TWG) were also clearly defined in the Project Document.

However, the Project Document did not present detailed process of stakeholder consultations during the development of the project concept and during the formulation stage of the Project funded by LOTFA. As a consequence, the WEPS system had been replaced by the Afghan Personnel and Payroll Systems (APPS) which was funded and managed by the US Government through the CSTC-A since 15 February 2021 although the scope of APPS covered the ANP payroll, but not the GDPDC.

## **5. Human Rights and Gender Equality Issues**

The promotion and adherence to human rights and gender equality was the most important donor's request to the Project. The gender dimension was taken into consideration during the design phase. The Project Document clearly indicated that LOTFA would adopt a cross-cutting approach to promote the human rights and gender equality issues. Human rights and gender equality issues would be mainstreamed in the Project and incorporated in the RRF where the indicators are included to adequately monitor progress against human rights and gender equality issues.

As shown in RRF, Indication M under Output 1 [New added in 2021] clearly indicated that Number of awareness/outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police. Indicator C under Output 5 was Number of police personnel paid disaggregated by gender. It was expected that that the human rights and gender indicators would be used for project monitoring and evaluation purpose.

The overall design of the Project was rated as “moderately unsatisfactory”.

## **3.2 Project Implementation**

### **1. Implementation Modality**

There are two types of implementation modalities adopted by UNDP for national-level development projects: Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) and National Implementation Modality (NIM). DIM is referred to UNDP direct involvement in project implementation, consisting of project management support (PMS) establishment, procurement, disbursements and M&E. In contrast, NIM is referred to UNDP agreement with a relevant national government agency that is responsible for project implementation, including PMS establishment, procurement, disbursements and M&E. In principle, the Project was implemented under the modality of NIM called LOTFA Implementation Approach which is characterised by phased approach with joint monitoring and evaluation and one fund two projects.

### **(1) Phased Approach with Joint Monitoring**

The Project was implemented over an 18-month period in three phases. At each phase there was a review on progress conducted jointly by MOIA, donors and UNDP as presented in the RRF, and risks were analysed jointly wherever they have impacts on the overall achievement of outputs. After each review, the Project Document and/or annual workplan and implementation plans were updated, as needed.

### **(2) One Fund with Two Projects**

Under the new LOTFA, SPM and MOIA & Police development are divided into two separate Projects under one Trust Fund. The UNDP Country Office will transfer funds to MOF for police salaries under SPM Project.

This method allowed better handover of the UNDP-supported payroll management functions to GIROA in short term while implementing MOIA & Police development interventions in long term. This method also allowed more focus of technical personnel on the two separate areas under one Project Board and Fund structure, and same security sector objectives.

In practice, UNDP provided support services upon requested from the implementing partner for the activities as determined in the Project Document or/and annual work plan. Nevertheless, the handover of the UNDP-supported payroll management functions to GIROA was not realised in short term, but was delayed to the end of 2021.

The document review and consultations with stakeholders suggested that the implementation modality worked well although the staff of Project Management Support (PMS) some time had difficulties understanding the procedures.

## **2. Institutional Arrangements**

### **(1) Project Board/Steering Committee**

The LOTFA Board/Steering Committee was the highest body governing the Project implementation. It consisted of all LOTFA donors, MOIA, MOF, the UNDP Resident Representative and Country Director, the CO ROL Unit representative, and LOTFA international and national Project Managers.

The Steering Committee was responsible for providing overall strategic direction in order to achieve the Project's objectives. It approved the AWP and any updated plans and ensured that the required resources were committed to achieving the results. It was also in charge of strategic decisions, risks, conflicts and other issues that emerged during implementation and could not be solved at the TWG level. A board meeting was held for the members to review the progress and financial reports.

As originally planned, an oversight committee was set up as a sub-committee of the LOTFA Project Board. During the implementation, Oversight Sub-Committee was dropped.

Through the detailed review of meeting minutes and other documents of the Project, and consultations with the stakeholders, it appeared that the Steering Committee was in general effective in risk management, control and governance processes for the Project.

In particular, the Steering Committee:

- ensured a high level of involvement by Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) during the project implementation;
- enabled close communication between LOTFA donors, MOIA, MOF, UNDP and other stakeholders at a senior level;
- ensured the ownership and implementation of the exit strategy; and
- steer the Project in response to changing circumstances, needs and priorities.

## **(2) UNDP Country Office Rule of Law Programme Unit (CO ROL Unit)**

The Country Office Rule of Law Unit (or Peace Pillar) was responsible for supporting LOTFA in the operations of the Steering Committee, overseeing the proper administration of the TWG meetings by LOTFA, and offering quality assurance services.

## **(3) Technical Working Groups (TWGs)**

The TWGs was responsible for reviewing the implementation of the AWP, and proposing revisions as needed. They provided recommendations to the Steering Committee through the Project Manager. The regular general TWGs meetings worked as the sole opportunity for each Project to advise the Steering Committee. TWGs met at least once a month to review the progress and plan for the upcoming month.

Through the detailed review of meeting minutes, Project Document, and consultation with the stakeholders, it appeared that TWGs worked well in general although there were implementation delays due to monitoring issue during the Project period.

## **(4) Project Management Support**

The LOTFA Project Management Support (PMS) was responsible for dealing with all aspects of administration for the Steering Committee and TWG meetings, including preparation of the draft agenda in coordination with committee members and the Programme Unit, background materials for agenda items, arrangements of meeting and minutes of Board meetings and circulation of the minutes of Board meeting for comments. It was also in charge of other related activities, such as keeping Project files and data, and helping update the Project plans, documents, and drafting the Project reports. In addition, It made comments on the TWG technical reports and arranged TWG technical activities.

The LOTFA Project Manager was responsible for day-to-day management and decision-making for the Project on behalf of the Implementing Partners. The Project Manager ensured that the Project produced the expected results with required standard of quality, and within the specified constraints of time and cost as defined in the Project Document and AWP. The Project Manager submitted the progress reports to Steering Committee and the UNDP CO ROL Unit and UNDP senior management



on a quarterly basis. The Project Manager took full responsibilities for UNDP based on its rules and regulations.

Through the detailed review of meeting minutes, Project Document, and consultations with the stakeholders, it appeared that the PMS was an effective unit to undertake the daily activities of the Project.

In general, the Project governance structures ensured a proper project management and implementation, strategic decision-making, and alignment with the Project objectives and annual working plans.

### **3. Financial Performances**

As defined in the UNDP evaluation guidelines, an overall assessment of the financial performances of the Project is required. In addition, the project's financial statements need to be audited by an independent auditor within two months following the fiscal year.

The Project commenced implementation on 1 July 2015 with total source of financing of US\$2.65 from Afghanistan (Govt), Denmark, Canada DFATD, Croatia, Czech Republic, EC, UNDP TRAC (EC Debit Note Adj.), Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, UK (FCO), CSTC-A, USA (INL) , UNDP TRAC, and LOTFA MPTF - Afghanistan.

Table 3 presents the annual budget and expenditures during the implementation period. The last column shows the expenditure ratio for each year. The expenditure ratios were 84%, 95%, 94%, 96%, 93%, 99%, 46% from 2015 and 2021 respectively, with average expenditure ratio of 87% during the implementation period. The results suggested that the amount of expenditures was less than the amount of budgets for all years. In particular, the ratio in 2021 was significantly lower than 1 due to closure of the Project in the year. The last row shows that the remaining balance accounted for 13% of the total budget, meaning that the budget amount that had not been spent and committed at the end of the Project.

As the final financial audit was undertaken during the final evaluation, any issues related to financial performance would be found after the financial audit.

#### **Table 3: Annual Budget and Expenditure**

Year	Yearly Approved AWP (US\$)	Yearly Expenses (US\$)	Delivery%
FY2015 (Jul-Dec)	283,773,090	237,051,422	84%
FY2016	454,518,241	429,951,342	95%
FY2017	459,089,901	431,678,493	94%
FY2018	377,920,000	361,707,637	96%
FY2019	349,003,616	323,644,239	93%
FY2020	350,000,000	346,092,045	99%
FY2021	375,664,510	173,291,812	46%
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2,649,969,358</b>	<b>2,303,416,990</b>	<b>87%</b>

Source: SPM

#### 4. Adaptive Management

The Project has been implemented based on the activities as defined in the Project Document. Nevertheless, the Project employed adaptive management to provide good flexibility in utilising Project resources and undertaking activities in order to respond to stakeholders' updated needs and changing conditions. The project had been subject to one revision and four extensions since the Project started in 2015. It is worth noting that, despite changing conditions, the Project was still able to deliver most of its expected outputs on time and on budget particularly during the early stages of implementation..

For example, as originally designed, the Project was implemented in three phases over an 18-month period. During the implementation, the indicator targets were updated at the output- and activity results-levels for several time. In each phase, there was a review on progress against targets conducted jointly by GIROA, donors and UNDP. The data and information in the RRF, and the risk framework were reviewed, and risks were analysed jointly wherever they had effects on the overall achievement of outputs. Based on the review and analysis, the Project Document and/or annual workplan and implementation plans were updated, wherever needed. This guaranteed that the Project outcomes were achieved as per the intent of the Project partners and were in line with the realities of the situation at the conclusion of each phase.

Other examples included

- The LOTFA had a prompt response to an identified need for additional funds and approved the project extension.
- The PMS had a rapid response to an identified need for additional funds for additional activities and delete some activities wherever needed.
- The Steering Committee had a prompt response to a request for

approving the updates of some outputs and related indicators with targets.

- The Project Team had been able to go through one government change in 2021.

The Project benefited from an excellent support from the UNDP officers and their leadership to guide the Project.

## **5. Project Risk Monitoring and Management**

As the risk environment is constantly changing, risk assessment and management decisions had been an ongoing process, but not a one-off exercise. The LOTFA governance structure established an instrument for information sharing, technical revision, analysis and decision-making to implement coordinated management of both the programmatic and fiduciary risks associated with the Project.

After the governance structure had been established and updated, the risks were managed at a set of governance bodies at four levels: Project Board/Steering Committee, UNDP CO (CO ROL Unit), the Technical Working Groups and PMS. These four levels offered a more direct and effective system for risk identification, monitoring, and management. Each level of governance body undertook specific roles and responsibilities based on the Terms of Reference.

In particular, as shown in the quarterly and annual report, the PMS reported on the risks. It tracked the progress on previously identified risks in the Project Risk Plan, and also brought newly identified risks to the attention of the TWG and UNDP CO for their respective analysis, documentation and action. Some important types of risks, such as corruption and mismanagement, would be brought to the direct attention of the donors through the TWGs and to the direct attention of UNDP CO for immediate response.

The RRF provided additional output (Governance and accountability of LOTFA management and implementation improved) with indicators and targets against which the progress toward management results and related risks could be assessed.

However, when the risks became reality, the governance bodies did not take immediate actions or measures to ensure the sustainability of the Project.

## **6. UNDP Contributions**

UNDP supported the project implementation with its own resources and expertise. UNDP assisted GIROA in applying its project implementation procedures such as procurement, employment and contract management as well as reporting. UNDP also provided the required quality assurance over the implementation of the Project, ensuring that the required quality for Project results.

UNDP helped develop the capacity building and support the payroll transfer by adopting the demand-driven approaches and needs assessment strategy which ensured that the activities undertaken contributed to the desired outputs.

For example, the Project was developed by the demand from GIROA rather than enforced by UNDP. The project was established due to the GIROA's demands for the transfer of the SPM to GIROA/MOIA. In fact, most donors were not willing to hand over the overall SPM project management to GIROA at the beginning. The GIROA considered that UNDP did not follow its interests and showed dissatisfaction that the payroll had not been transferred to GIROA. Finally, an agreement on the payroll transfer from SPM to GIROA was reached between the donors and GIROA.

The Project implemented through UNDP benefitted from UNDP's comparative advantage, which was based on long time physical presence in the country and global network. This comparative advantage was also represented by its long history and extensive experience in supporting on a wide range of development issues, particularly the public financial management in the country. UNDP has been trusted in the country as a development partner with neutrality and without political bias, as well as its strong capacity to find funding sources and consultants, and provide cost-effective technical inputs.

The overall implementation of the Project was rated as "Satisfactory".

### **3.3 Project Results**

The project results toward outcome/objective are assessed against the standard evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and cross-cutting issues.

#### **1. Relevance**

The Project's objective was fully consistent with the Afghan Government's requirements vis-à-vis security and rule of law. The Project's objective was also

aligned with the Afghanistan Sustainable Development Goal (A-SDG)<sup>1</sup>, Afghan Nation National Peace and Development Framework II (ANPDF): 2.3: Political and Security Outlook<sup>2</sup>, National Priority Programmes (NPP) 4: National Justice and Judicial Reform Plan (NJRP), National Strategy for Combatting Corruption (2017), National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325-Women, Peace and Security (2015)<sup>3</sup>, MOIA'S Strategic Plan - MISP (2018-2021) and the former leader's letter to the LOTFA donors on priorities for MOIA and ANP reform.

The Project was under the UNDP Country Programme Document' Outcome 2: Trust in and access to fair, effective and accountable rule-of-law services are increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations.

The Project's objective was also highly relevant to the LOTFA Trust Fund' Strategic Objectives, which were organised according to the four established 'Thematic Windows: 1) Security, 2) Justice, 3) Anti- Corruption, and 4) the MOIA Payroll. The Project was part of a set of projects/programmes funded by the LOTFA Trust Fund under the strategic approach to meeting the financial requirements of MOIA Payroll.

In general, the Project was relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and challenges and UNDP objectives. It provided GIROA with additional resources to develop and strengthen the capacities in Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM). The Project concept was drafted from national priorities to strengthen this area. The Project was established based on a detailed analysis of barriers, issues, capacity gaps and priorities.

The overall project was rated as "highly relevant".

## **2. Effectiveness**

The Project was implemented through 6 outputs. The implementation effectiveness was assessed through a set of indicators with target values to be achieved by the end of the Project. Annex 5 presents a list of key results achieved by the Project against each expected output, using the corresponding targets to measure the

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<sup>1</sup> <http://sdgs.gov.af/232/a-sdgs-national-document>

<sup>2</sup> ANPDF II, per its guiding principles, is to articulate, integrate, and roll out the processes of peacebuilding, state-building, and market-building as instruments of nation-building, and be operationalised through a realistic monitoring and results framework, with clear annual indicators lending themselves to effective monitoring and verification.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

effectiveness/progress made over the whole project period (from 2015 to 2021). Table 4 through 8 present the key results achieved by the Project for output 1 through Output 5 respectively only in 2021. In addition, a rating system was employed to assess the extent of progress achieved for each output.

**Output 1:** Updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management.

The evaluation results of Output 1 are presented in Table 4. Column Indicators and Targets are from logical framework in Annex 5. Column % of completion is verification based on the assessment of the results in Annex 5. Column Rating is a comprehensive assessment of % of completion for all indicators under Output 1 as presented in Table 4 in 2021 and in Annex 5 over the whole project period.

As shown in Annex 5, although only Indicator L (% of MOIA payroll stations using APPS T&A) was completed in 2021 due to the suspension of LOTFA all SPM project activities, Indicator A, B, C, and D were completed during the early stage of the Project life as presented in Annex 5.

The results suggested that Output 1 was rated as “moderately satisfactory”.

**Table 4: Results of Output 1**

Output	Indicator	Baseline	Annual Target	Actual	% of Completion	Results	Rating
Output 1: Updated policies implemented, and business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management.	<b>Indicator D:</b> Number of communication products (charts/leaflets/posters)	0 copies distributed	120,000 copies distributed	0	0%		Moderately Satisfactory
	<b>Indicator H:</b> Payroll Standard Operating Procedures manual revised per APPS application and	NO	YES (The revised Manual is printed and distributed to users)	NO	0%		
	<b>Indicator I:</b> Number of MOIA staff trained on revised Payroll manual as per APPS	0	150	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator J:</b> Percentage of payroll stations using	0%	100%	0%	0%		
	<b>Indicator K:</b> MOIA incentives streamlined and	NO	YES	NO	0%		
	<b>Indicator L:</b> % of MOIA payroll stations using APPS T&A	100%	100%	100%	100%	Implementation of APPS: As part of the 2015 Donor-Conditions, it was agreed as follows: CSTC-A will fully fund and manage the development of an integrated Afghan Personnel and Payroll System (APPS). The APPS system was supposed to replace the legacy system which was developed by UNDP—i.e., WEPS. However, the APPS system could not be deployed until July 2020 (only time and attendance module was used), and it effectively came into full-blown operation from February 2021. The implication for such a long delay meant that UNDP/SPM could not make heavy investments on WEPS—legacy system during the long waiting period. Notwithstanding, SPM project ensured that system improvements that could improve the WEPS's security, controls, and reporting, were implemented regardless of when it would be retired by the APPS.	
	<b>Indicator M:</b> Number of awareness / outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police	0	10	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator N:</b> National Conference on "HR, IHL, and Police" held	NO	YES	NO	0%		
	<b>Indicator O:</b> Support provided to the implementation of MOIA's Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024	NO	YES	NO	0%		

**Output 2:** Capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, ICT Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate) improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards.

Similar to assessment of Output 1, Column Rating is a comprehensive assessment of % of completion for all indicators under Output 2 as presented in Table 5 in 2021 and in Annex 5 over the whole project period.

As shown in Annex 5, although only Indicator O was completed in 2021 due to the suspension of LOTFA all SPM project activities, Indicator A, B, C, E, F, H, I, J, K, and L were completed or partially completed over the Project period.

The results suggested that Output 2 was rated as “moderately satisfactory”.

**Table 5: Results of Output 2**



Output	Indicator	Baseline	Annual Target	Actual	% of Completion	Results	Rating
<b>Output 2:</b> Capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources, ICT, Finance and Budget as appropriate) improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards.	<b>Indicator C:</b> Number of MOIA staff trained in Payroll Management, WEPS/APPS	1010 (Cumulative)	1310 (Cumulative)	0	0%		Moderately Satisfactory
	<b>Indicator O:</b> Number of provinces/Mustofiats using the provided barcode readers to approve digital M16 to facilitate data verification and reconciliation	34	34	34	100%	In 2019, to further improve the internal controls around payroll, SPM project installed Barcode readers in 31 more provincial MOF Offices (Mustofiats) and trained the MOF's Provincial Finance Officers in Digital M16 approval process and utilisation of Barcode technology. The Barcode readers provided an additional layer of validation of salary payment vouchers at the Mustofiats to address the incidence of 'M16 forms generated outside WEPS'. The new template of M16 form contained a unique barcode which should be scanned at the Mustofiats to validate all WEPS payment transactions prior to capturing them in AFMIS. The technology improved the integrity of the WEPS system and helped the MOF to prevent duplicate payments and/or payments outside WEPS system	
	<b>Indicator X:</b> Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual for reconciliation updated in accordance with APPS	NO	YES (Updated SOPs manual for reconciliation is distributed)	NO	0%		
	<b>Indicator Z:</b> Number of MOIA (OIG) staff provided orientation training on payroll processes to facilitate their audit work	0	15	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator AA:</b> Number of MOIA staff trained on inactive backpay module	0	21	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator AB:</b> Number of OIG staff enrolled in Professional audit training (CIIA) (disaggregated by gender)	0	10	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator AC:</b> Number of MOIA staff trained in tailor made public financial management course (disaggregated by gender)	0	15	0	0%		

**Output 3:** MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS) fully updated and reconciled to support the MA's assurance work and facilitate data migration to APPS.

Similar to assessment of Output 1 and 2, Column Rating is a comprehensive assessment of % of completion for all indicators under Output 3 as presented in Table 6 in 2021 and in Annex 5 over the whole project period.

As shown in Annex 5, although only Indicator D, E and F were completed in 2021 due to the suspension of LOTFA all SPM project activities, Indicator A, B, C, G, H, and I were completed or partially completed over the Project period.

The results suggested that Output 3 was rated as “satisfactory”.

**Table 6: Results of Output 3**

Output	Indicator	Baseline	Annual Target	Actual	% of Completion	Results	Rating
Output 3: MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS) fully updated and reconciled to support the MAs' assurance work and facilitate data migration to APPS.	Indicator C: Number of new initiatives/improvements introduced in WEPS to	18	20	0	0%		Satisfactory
	Indicator D: Percentage of ANPs paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	94%	96%	95%	100%	As required by one of the LOTFA donor conditions (see Annex 6: LOTFA Donor Conditions), the percentage of Police personnel receiving salary through electronic means should be at least 90%. The project, through its innovative strategies, engaged the MOF and MOIA to introduce Mobile Money (MM)/Mobile Banking as a way to boost the EFT rate. A Letter Of Exchange (LOE) was signed among the three Parties—i.e., MOF, MOIA, and UNDP, which facilitated the piloting of Mobile Banking for around 6,000 ANPs in ten provinces. By the end of the project, over 4,000 ANPs were receiving their salaries through the MM mechanism. As a result, the percentage of Police personnel receiving salaries through electronic means reached 95%, leaving only about 5% of Police personnel taking salaries through Trusted Agents (cash) thus reducing the risk of funds falling into wrong hands. This percentage surpassed the 90% requirement set out in the donor conditions of 2015.	
	Indicator E: Percentage of GDPDC paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	100%	100%	100%	100%	The SPM project ensured that the WEPS system was operational and improved to support the payroll processes and ensured that funds were disbursed to ANPs and GDPDCs on a timely basis. All 34 PHQs	
	Indicator F: Percentage of Payroll stations that processed salaries on time	99%	100%	99%	0%	were connected to WEPS, ensuring that MOIA's electronic payroll systems were functional on real-time basis, nationwide.	
	Indicator I: Number of registered personnel paid through Mobile Banking	4,400	4,600	7 (5%)	5%		

**Output 4:** MOIA infrastructure provision supports payroll system (WEPS) across all 34 provinces.

Similar to assessment of Output 1, 2 and 3, Column Rating is a comprehensive assessment of % of completion for all indicators under Output 4 as presented in Table 7 in 2021 and in Annex 5 over the whole project period.

As shown in Annex 5, although only Indicator A and E were completed in 2021 due to the suspension of LOTFA all SPM project activities, Indicator B and D were completed or partially completed over the Project period.

The results suggested that Output 4 was rated as “satisfactory”.

**Table 7: Results of Output 4**

Output	Indicator	Baseline	Annual Target	Actual	% of Completion	Results	Rating
<b>Output 4:</b> MOIA infrastructure provision supports payroll system (WEPS) across all 34 provinces	<b>Indicator A:</b> Percentage of ANP payroll stations with fixed MOIA intranet connectivity	100%	100%	100%	100%	Mainly, the core function of the SPM project's WEPS technical team under Output 4 related to maintaining the WEPS infrastructure. Throughout its existence, the project team maintained the WEPS platform and infrastructure and enabled all 138 payroll stations across the country to process payroll for their respective staff—for both ANP and GDPDC. While the ANP end-users were connected through a fixed internet connectivity, riding on the MOIA's Network Operating Centre (NOC), the GDPDC end-users were connected through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) secured by the SPM project as GDPDC offices were not directly linked to the MOIA's NOC.	Satisfactory
	<b>Indicator C:</b> Number of payroll stations with delayed salaries	0	0	0	0%		
	<b>Indicator E:</b> DRR site is up and running 100% of the time	100%	100%	100%	100%	Learning from this experience was what precipitated SPM project to arrange the establishment of a Disaster Risk and Resilience (DRR) as part of its business continuity plan. After series of negotiation and follow ups, the MOIA senior leadership allocated a space within its Training General Command compound—located some 20 kilometres from the main MOIA compound. In 2019, the project completed the establishment of the DRR site for the Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) which assured business continuity.	

**Output 5:** Funds transferred by UNDP to MOF for police pay.

Similar to assessment of Output 1, 2, 3, and 4 Column Rating is a comprehensive assessment of % of completion for all indicators under Output 5 as presented in Table 8 in 2021 and in Annex 5 over the whole project period.

As shown in Annex 5, although only Indicator A and C were completed in 2021 due to the suspension of LOTFA all SPM project activities Indicator B was completed (or partially completed) over the Project period..

The results suggested that Output 5 was rated as “highly satisfactory”.

**Table 8: Results of Output 5**

Output	Indicator	Baseline	Annual Target	Actual	% of Completion	Results	Rating
Output 5: Funds transferred by UNDP to MOF for Police Pay	<b>Indicator A:</b> Percentage of payroll stations able to process monthly salary within 15 days of close of solar month	100%	100%	100%	100%	For the duration of the SPM project—July 2015 to December 2021, UNDP advanced a total of US\$2.17bn, all of which was expended by the MOF on the salary payment of ANP and GDPDC uniformed personnel. By the time of the abrupt suspension of the project's operations as a consequence of the 15th of August 2021 incident, the previous government had actually expended all of the funds advanced by UNDP; implying that the de facto authorities did not inherit any LOTFA funds. The total spent on Police payrolls compared to the total expenditures incurred by the project, over the duration of the project, represents 94.22%.	Highly Satisfactory
	<b>Indicator C:</b> Number of police personnel paid disaggregated by gender	106,420 ANP (103,559 male; 2,861 female); 7,016 GDPDC (6,693 male; 323 female)	136,177 (Full Tashkeel): NP 124,628+ ALP 11,549; GDPDC (Full Tashkeel): 7,456	125,868 ANP: (114,850 males, 4071 females) 6,947 GDPDC: (6,620 males; 327 female)	100%		

**Output 6:** Governance and accountability of LOTFA management and implementation improved.

Output 6 was assessed in Section 3.2: Project Implementation above and was rate as satisfactory.

The assessment of results above suggested that the Project was able to achieve most of what it intended to achieve, and thus was an effective one. It is on track to deliver its most expected results by the end of 2021.

The overall effectiveness of the Project was assessed as “satisfactory”.

### 3. Efficiency

Based on the consultations and document review, implementation delays and staff turnover had the significantly negative impacts on the delayed decision-making processes, delayed achievements of the project results, and thus the Project implementation efficiency.

First, the Project experienced a significant staff turnover, especially at the MOIA' senior level, such as DG of Finance and Budget, deputy minister, minister, etc. For instances, the Project had been with six different finance directors over the implementation period, resulting in loss of the institutional memory at the beneficiary side as the previous directors did not pass the Project information to the subsequent directors within MOIA. Thus, the Project had to provide training courses for the new officers again within MOIA. The Project wasted lots of financial resources to train the officers from various regions, many of which were afterwards relocated to other positions and no longer worked in the activities related to the payroll.

Second, the Project's efficiency was further affected by the implementation delay. The Project was extended by more than four extra years to the end of 2021 with original outputs and targets unchanged, which significantly undermines its efficiency. As originally designed, the Project intended to support in the transition of the MOIA payroll management from UNDP/SPM to MOIA, which was supposed to be completed by December 2016. Nevertheless, the projected transition had not been completed as GIROA had not yet met all donor requirements. As such, the Project had undergone one revision and four extensions since 2015 when the Project was established.

Provided that a relatively higher rate of the expected outputs has been achieved as planned in the Project Document relative to staff, time and budget constraints, the overall efficiency of the Project was rated as "satisfactory".

#### **4. Impact**

The Project has produced most of its intended results as assessed above. However, it is extremely difficult to measure the impact due to the sudden changes of government. In case that the Support to Payroll Management Project is actually implemented and 6 outputs are achieved, the Project is likely to have a significantly positive impact on MOIA's payroll system, the country's public financial management, and the economy. As there were not indicators for the overall objective/outcome and the targets of some indicators were not timely achieved before the end of the Project due to the closure of the Project, the impacts were assessed in terms of the quality of results.

When comparing key results with the intended outputs, the Project has definitely produced a significantly positive impact on the payroll system of MOIA. The Project has, to great extent, strengthened the MOIA's payroll management capacity and

supported the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA although some outputs remain to be achieved. As such, the Project has significantly contributed to the enhanced MOIA credibility, overall state security and improved Rule of Law. Thus, the implementation of the Project was successful and met the expected outputs planned at the outset of the Project. MOIA's payroll management system is now better off with its capacity and system because of the Project.

In particular, the Project supported the introduction and development of WEPS, which significantly improved the MOIA's payroll system and reduced the possibilities for corruption, misuse, etc. At the end of the Project, MOIA assumed almost all aspects of the payroll management, which could be considered as a tangible and significant improvement. Therefore, the Project has a significant impact on the payroll management and public financial management system and overall security situation in the country.

At the same time, the increased institutional and technical capacity supported by the Project to MOIA has resulted in improvement in payroll management, better planning and more efficient use of financial, human and technical resources. As such, the accountability, operational efficiency, IT capacities, and sustainability of MOIA have been significantly increased. Therefore, the Project contributed to better accountability, transparency, and auditability in the MOIA payroll process and decreased the opportunities for internal corruption and fraud.

In particular, by the time of suspension of the project's operations on 15th of August 2021, the previous government had allocated all of the funds delivered by UNDP. The expenditure ratio over the duration of the project was relatively high.

The overall impact of the Project was rated as "significant".

## **5. Sustainability**

Overall, the Project made important contribution to the MOIA's payroll management capacity and the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA. As indicated in the annual progress reports, the Project produced a wide range of quality outputs across all 6 outputs. These outputs, particularly Output 1 (updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management), Output 2 (Capacity of MOIA personnel improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards), Output

3 (MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS) fully updated and reconciled to support the MAs' assurance work and facilitate data migration to APPS) and Output 4 (Output 4: MOIA infrastructure provision supports 100 per cent functionality of MOIA payroll systems) produced by the Project will guide the MOIA's payroll management or/and be used beyond the Project period.

In addition, the Project's national ownership was also ensured by strengthening the institutional, legislative, and human capacities of relevant departments through the introduction of consultation/coordination mechanisms between UNDP and MOIA and MoF. The purpose was to enable the national authorities to assume the initiatives of the Project after the end of the Project. Some key positions were taken over by the MOIA staff in the management team so as to encourage their early involvement. For example, during the early stage of the Project implementation, the MOIA's Deputy Minister for Strategy and Policy acted as the National Director for LOTFA, and the Deputy Minister for Support acted as the Chairperson of the Payroll window technical working group meeting as well as the Chairperson of the Pay and Compensation Board (PCB). The Minister worked as the Chairperson of the Steering Committee. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), the central bank and the commercial banks worked together to facilitate EFT, Mobile banking, or other commercial bank payment services available.

Finally, the Project actively worked with the leadership of the MOIA in many aspects such as annual work planning process. In addition, the annual work plan was submitted to the technical working group—chaired by deputy minister and to the Steering Committee—chaired by the minister.

However, the actual sustainability for the Project results of the Project is somewhat questionable, particularly after 15 August 2021 when the project was abruptly suspended and subsequently terminated on 4 December 2022. Both WEPS and APPS had stopped to provide service immediately since 15 August 2021. As a consequence, the benefits from building the capacity of the staff of the MOIA (outputs 1 and 2), building and maintaining systems for efficient and effective payroll administration (outputs 3 and 4), and providing funding for police payroll (output 5), would not be extended beyond the Project period.



Further, the financial and economic resources will not be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the Project. Obviously, GIROA will not be able to afford the financial burden of police payroll after taking over SPM with an estimated annual programmable budget of US\$320m. It is certain that the amount of funds will not be available for GIROA to pay for the salaries based on the current fiscal condition in the country.

The overall sustainability of the Project was rated as “unlikely”.

## **6. Human Rights and Gender Equality Issues**

Although human rights and gender equality issues is not a OECD-DAC standard evaluation criteria, it is important that the FE utilises it as a criterion given one of the main objectives of the Project is inclusivity. The FE assessed the efforts of human rights made to committed crimes and/or violated human rights. The FE also assessed the efforts of gender made to (i) interventions for women and other marginalised groups; and (ii) mainstreaming women and marginalised groups into all activities and outputs.

### **(1) Human Rights**

Human rights had not been sufficiently included in the design and implementation of the Project. Although indicator M under Output 1 (Number of awareness/outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police) provided a baseline, there were no target and actual values as indicated in Annex 5.

The Project did not introduce the 2016 UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in the Project document. HRDDP had not been taken into account during the implementation of the Project. The Project had not taken appropriate and sufficient measure to avoid donors' fund to police officers that committed crimes and/or violated human rights. In addition, the training reports of the Project did not cover the information associated with corruption and/or human rights issues that would have been incorporated in the training programmes.

The MPTF Office intended to develop and introduce HRDDP in the project together with UNAMA, UNODC, UNDP and UNOPS by establishing a task force and a secretariat to support the implementation of HRDDP. However, no implementation results were reported.

In general, the Project did not have a more comprehensive oversight and monitoring mechanism to avoid and investigate the human rights violations by the police officers on the payroll.

## **(2) Gender Equality**

There were no pilot projects that specifically targeted women's participation in the similar project. However, the Project did focus on gender equality and its role in payroll management system during design, implementation and reporting.

For design, as shown in Annex 5, for Indicator C of Output 5 as an example the RRF contained sex-disaggregated baseline data or any other measurable objective by taking into account women's participation in the Project.

For reporting, the quarterly and annual progress report of the Project did provide sex-disaggregated data. In particular, some indicators under Output 3, 4 and 5 had actual gender information. For example, under Indicator C and D, Male 97.34% (2.66% Female) and 100% (Male 95.38% 4.62% Female) of ANPs and GDPDC were paid by EFT respectively.

For implementation, the Project intended to support MOIA's Gender mainstreaming activities over the project's life. For instance, the Project initiated gender disaggregated reporting and data entry in WEPS, which enabled WEPS reports to record the number of female police within the ANP, and therefore brought to attention the rate of intake of female police in 2017. Further, the Project helped the MOIA design the new leave request forms which recorded various types of leave, covering maternity leave.

The summary evaluation results against criteria with rationale are presented in Table 9.

**Table 9: Evaluation Results**

<b>Project Element</b>	<b>Evaluation Rating</b>	<b>Reasons for Rating</b>
<b>Project Design</b>	<b>Moderately Unsatisfactory</b>	The Project RRF did not provide detailed activities so as to achieve a set of expected outputs. Output 6 was redundant as this was only a UNDP internal management issue. The indicators for some outputs were not well designed. It was not good to drop or add indicators in the RRF frequently after certain

		period (for example after inception report) particularly before last year of the Project implementation.
<b>Project Implementation</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	The Implementation Modality and Project governance structures ensured a proper project management and implementation, strategic decision-making, and alignment with the project objectives and annual working plans.
<b>Relevance</b>	<b>Highly Relevant</b>	The Project's objective was also aligned with the Afghan Government's requirements vis-à-vis security and rule of law, the Afghanistan A-SDG, ANPDFII, NPP 4, National Strategy for Combatting Corruption (2017), National Action Plan, and MOIA'S Strategic Plan - MISP (2018-2021).
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	Output 1: moderately satisfactory Output 2: moderately satisfactory Output 3: satisfactory Output 4: satisfactory Output 5: highly satisfactory
<b>Efficiency</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	A relatively higher rate of the expected outputs has been achieved as planned in the Project Document relative to staff, time and budget constraints
<b>Impact</b>	<b>Significant</b>	When comparing key results with the intended outputs, the Project has definitely produced a significantly positive impact on the payroll system of MOIA. The Project has, to great extent, strengthened the MOIA's payroll management capacity and supported the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA although some outputs remain to be achieved. As such, the Project has significantly contributed to the enhanced MOIA credibility, overall state security and improved Rule of Law.
<b>Sustainability</b>	<b>Unlikely</b>	Both WEPS and APPS had stopped to provide service immediately since 15 August 2021. As a consequence, the benefits from building the capacity of the staff of the MOIA (outputs 1 and 2), building and maintaining systems for efficient and effective payroll administration (outputs 3 and 4), and providing funding for police payroll (output 5), would not be extended beyond the Project period. Further, the financial and economic resources will not be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the Project.
<b>Overall Rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	All above

## 4. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

### 4.1 Conclusions

The analysis of the findings above lead to the following core conclusions:

1. The Project lacked a detailed theory of change (ToC) which clearly defined the logical chains, addressed the issues and gaps, and made the assumptions although there was a simple description of ToC in the Project Document. As a result, it was extremely difficult to see the interconnections between the focus areas, issues and gaps, and assumptions.
2. The RRF provided a good instrument for Project implementation and M&E during the design phase. However, the Project RRF was not well equipped with a clearly logical chain from planned activities to outputs/outcomes and to objective as the planned activities were missing in the RRF and Project Document although planned activities are not required in RRF based on the UNDP template.
3. The RRF also provided a set of indicators with baseline and target values to be achieved by the end of the Project for each output. However, the RRF was not equipped with a set of indicators for final objective/outcome. Further, some indicators were not sufficient or adequate in many cases to measure the progress or verify the achievements for some outputs particularly for Output 1 and Output 2. In addition, all baseline values and target values were not accurately calculated and verified respectively during the Project design phase. Finally, it is not good to update the indicators with baseline and target values frequently particularly at the latter stage of Project life.
4. The risks were well identified during the project design and their impact and mitigation measures were also adequate as well as the assumptions (risk descriptions) made. However, despite this good set of risks being identified, it appeared that the security risk that had a significant impact on the termination of the Project was not timely projected in the Risk Framework.
5. The LOTFA/MPTF Steering Committee and LOTFA Project Management Support were well-functioning to serve as an executive and implementing body respectively during the project implementation. The LOTFA/MPTF Steering

Committee provided a strategic direction and management guidance for the Project while PMS managed daily activities.

6. UNDP/LOTFA and MOIA were found to be adaptive and responsive partners despite that there were some cooperation/communication issues during the implementation. UNDP long-term presence and partnership with MOIA and other ministries, technical capacities of the staff and strong accountability for results were recognized as the crucial elements for successful implementation of the Project.
7. The Project was relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and challenges and UNDP objectives. It provided GIROA with additional resources to strengthen the MOIA's payroll management capacity and support the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA. The Project was established by following a detailed analysis of barriers, issues, capacity gaps and priorities.
8. The Project was implemented as effectively as expected in delivering planned outputs since the major indicators, particularly under Output 2 and 5 (contributed to strengthened MOIA's payroll management capacity and the envisaged transfer of LOTFA payroll management functions to MOIA), have been achieved.
9. The Project was in general efficient although staff turn-over and implementation delays had resulted in the delayed decision-making processes and delayed achievements of the project results. The Project implementation efficiency was further undermined by the replacement of the WEPS system by the Afghan Personnel and Payroll Systems (APPS) which was funded and managed by the US Government through the CSTC-A starting from 15 February 2021 due to lack of communication and consultation with MOIA.
10. The Project made a reasonable contribution towards an improvement in the 6 output areas by implementing a series of activities as the target values of many output indicators have been achieved. The impact perspective remains the same while the impact potential of the Project remains very relevant and urgently needed for GIROA. However, at the time of the final evaluation, the impact of the Project is still at its earlier stages.
11. In theory, the Project was sustainable as it made contributions to a range of products and long-term capacity development of national implementing partners.

These products and capacity development, particularly in Output 2 and Output 5, will ensure the national sustainable development agenda after the Project ends. In practice, some of the most important outputs that have been produced by the Project need to be finalized and fully implemented by national implementing partners and additional resources need to be provided for the next phase of the Project. These were not possible due to foreclosure of the Project.

12. The human rights and gender equality issues were well addressed in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the interventions. In particular, both issues were clearly indicated in RRF, quarterly and annual progress reports, and implementation. Nevertheless, there was still a demand for designing human rights and inclusive gender specific logical chains targeting the Afghan National Police (ANP) during the Project design.

## 4.2 Lessons Learned

The following lessons learned have been drawn from the findings and conclusions:

1. A systematic design of resources and results framework (RRF) consisting of a set of activities (which was not the case of the Project), outputs, outcomes, and indicators with baseline and target values based on the Theory of Change enhances the transparency and efficiency of periodic monitoring and evaluation of the progress achieved by the Project.
2. Any updates in output/outcome indicators should require updates in activities, outputs/outcomes and objective; and vice versa. The output/outcome indicators with baseline and target values should remain unchanged after certain implementation period (e.g. Inception Phase), which was not the case of the Project.
3. Adoption of a pure UNDP DIM/LOTFA as an implementation modality with regular involvement of professional staff from national implementing partners in the Steering Committee/PMS team (which was the case of the Project) is an effective management instrument to ensure the contribution to good national ownership. Inclusive engagement of stakeholders, alignment with national priorities, and strong collaboration between PMS and technical divisions/agencies in the national implementing partners will ensure the ownership of the Project outputs for future

sustainability.

4. A project that is aligned with the national priorities, strategic plan and development goal of national implementing partner is often highly relevant. Responsiveness and consistency with the development demand of national implementing partner is among the most important factors that have successfully contributed to the achieved results.
5. The effectiveness and impact of the Project in forms of NIM/LOTFA modality is difficult to be measured and verified if the output indicators with baseline and target values keep changing during the implementation (which was the case of the Project), particularly in case that the project design does not include appropriate tools to quantify the outputs/outcome indicator values.
6. A well-functioning Project Steering Committee/board as an executive agency and a professional Project Management Support (PMS) as an implementing agency will ensure the project efficiency. The PSC/board supervises the project through providing a strategic direction and guidance while PMS manages the project through undertaking the routine daily activities.
7. It is important that the cross-cutting based expected results be part of the project activities, and outputs/outcomes with clear indicators in the RRF as well as part of reporting requirements in quarterly and annual reports in order to ensure the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issue in a project.

## 5. Recommendations

The recommendations based on the findings and conclusions above are given below:

1. The future similar project must develop a detailed Theory of Change (ToC) where the issues and gaps are appropriately addressed, and assumptions are adequately made. In particular, the issues and gaps should be linked to the independent logical chains (outcome areas) while the assumptions should include the risks and the preconditions needed to be met before going to next phase of logical chains.
2. The future similar project must include a comprehensive RRF (logical framework) based on the ToC to promote the transparency and efficiency of periodic monitoring and evaluation of the progress achieved by the Project during the design phase.
3. The future similar project should update the RRF by:
  - Adding indicator for the objective/outcome;
  - Moving Indicator B, E (dropped in 2019), I (added in 2019) and N (added in 2021) represented training and capacity under Output 1 to Output 2;
  - Moving Indicator H (Dropped in 2019] and X (New added in 2019) under Output 2 to Output 1;
  - Moving Indicator M (Number of awareness / outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police) and Indicator O (Support provided to the implementation of MOIA's Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024) out of Output 1;
  - Moving Indicator O and Indicator X out of Output 2;
  - Improving Output 3 statement or improve indicators under Outputs 3; and
  - Updating the baseline values that are equal to target values.
4. The implementation of future similar project must take into account the logical chain from activities to outputs/outcomes, and to objective; and also, the logical chain from output/outcomes to indicators and to targets since both logical chains offer a valuable tool for managing and monitoring the project implementation. Any updates on indicators with target values must take into account another logical chain: from activities to output/outcomes, and to objective, and vice versa. In particular, any updates on indicators must also update the activities.



5. In addition to Project specific types of risks, the future similar project must work with other professional institutions to develop an approach to identifying, measuring and managing the macro types of risks such as security risk that has significant impact on the survival of the Project and on the country so that the Project can develop its national ownership plan as early as possible.
6. The future similar project must focus on the outputs/outcomes that are highly relevant to donor's focus areas and GIROA priorities and policies, and UNDP Objectives, as well as target group needs. In particular, the Project must concentrate on Output 2 and Output 5 as they are highly relevant.
7. As presented in Section 3 of this report, for each output, there are still gaps of implementation, and % of targets that have not been reached. The future similar project should concentrate on the gap after the end of the Project in order to enhance the effectiveness.
8. In order to increase the effectiveness and impact of the Project, the future similar project should keep the indicators unchanged after inception report so the results progressed can be timely and accurately measured and verified during the implementation. In case that the indicators need to be updated, the Project should design and include appropriate tools to quantify the outputs/outcome indicator values.
9. Many of the most important outputs that have been produced by the Project remain to be finalized and fully implemented by MOIA. To ensure that the Project activities to date have the intended beneficial impact, it is essential that additional resources be provided for a post-Project to enable the much-needed operationalization and realization.
10. Given that the Project experienced a major delay and staff turnover during the implementation, the Project must focus on sustainability during the upcoming period. The Project is encouraged to develop a timely and pragmatic exit strategy along with a financial sustainability plan in a participatory manner with key stakeholders involved in the Project as well as close coordination with the donors to the Project. It must be outlining the issues, ways and means to smoothly phase-out and hand over the Project to national partners, to ensure sustainability and continuity.
11. The future similar project must design the activities to foster awareness of human

rights, women empowerment and mainstreaming within MOIA, such as capacity building for female employees to increase their participation in decision-making and in policy formulation associated with payroll management. More importantly, the Project must include more elaborate human rights and gender-specific indicators and targets in the RRF, M&E Plan, and in the preparation of progress and annual reports.

## **Annex 1: Terms of Reference**

### **1. Background**

#### **UNDP Global Mission Statement**

UNDP is the UN's global development network, an organization advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience, and resources to help people build a better life. We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with national counterparts on their own solutions to global and national development challenges.

#### **UNDP Afghanistan Mission Statement**

UNDP supports stabilization, state-building, governance, and development priorities in Afghanistan. UNDP support, in partnership with the Government, the United Nations system, the donor community and other development stakeholders, has contributed to institutional development efforts leading to positive impact on the lives of Afghan citizens. Over the years, UNDP support has spanned such milestone efforts as the adoption of the Constitution; Presidential, Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections; institutional development through capacity-building to the legislative, the judicial and executive arms of the state, and key ministries, Government agencies and commissions at the national and subnational levels.

UNDP has played a key role in the management of the Law-and-Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) which, until 15<sup>th</sup> August 2021, supported the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in developing and maintaining the national Police force in efforts to stabilize the internal security environment. Major demobilizations, disarmaments and rehabilitations and area-based livelihoods and reconstruction programmes have taken place nationwide. UNDP Programmes in Afghanistan have benefited from the very active support of donors. UNDP Afghanistan is committed to the highest standards of transparency and accountability and works in close coordination with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the UN system as a whole to maximize the impact of its development efforts on the ground.

#### **Organizational Context**

##### **Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)**

UNDP has been supporting the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Implementing Partner (IP), since 2002 to manage the non-fiduciary and fiduciary functions of the Payroll Management of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC) through the Support to Payroll Management (SPM) Project. The SPM Project Document was approved by the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPFT) (formerly called LOTFA) Steering Committee (formerly called Project Board) on 30 June 2015. The Project Document was subsequently revised in December-2016, -2018, and -2020. The project contributes to UNDP's CPD Outcome 2: Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations. The SPM project aims to develop the required capacity for the MOIA to independently manage all non-fiduciary functions of the ANP and GDPDC payroll management including the management of Web-based Electronic Payroll System (WEPS). While UNDP operated and maintained WEPS on behalf of the IP, the IP has carried the majority of the non-fiduciary functions of the MOIA Payroll Management independently.

##### **Support to Payroll Management Project (SPM)**

The SPM is a dedicated payroll management project with approximately 40 national staff and 2 international staff working closely together with MOIA staff from the Budget & Finance, HR, and ICT departments to ensure timely payment of Salaries and incentives to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Central Prison Department (CPD) officers.

The expected outcome of the SPM project is GIROA's (i.e., MOIA) ability to independently manage all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll for the ANP and CPD, including producing relevant reports for donors in their specified formats. MOIA should also be able to manage the full range of functions related to payroll, i.e., human resources, accounting, and information and communication technology in a seamless manner.

Since its development the project has been divided into six outputs as follows:

- Output 1 entails having in place updated legislative, policy and regulatory framework and business processes, implemented and functional in support of independent MOIA payroll management.
- Output 2 entails MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources (HR), Finance and Budget as appropriate) being able to independently undertake all payroll inputs, processing and validation tasks to agreed and measurable standards, using the reliability, accuracy and timeliness of personnel data and payroll to support improved evidence-based planning, prioritization and decisions.
- Output 3 covers MOIA's payroll systems which should electronically be linked with HR systems, implemented and operational nationwide, and covers all pertinent and validated personnel. Three interconnected activity results are to be achieved for the overall achievement of this Output.
- Output 4 covers the provisions of the necessary infrastructures to support the full functionality of MOIA payroll systems during and after the SPM project.
- Output 5 is the core function of the SPM project as it entails the transfer of funds, on a timely and regular basis, to MOF for Police Pay.
- Output 6 is the SPM Project management component which is to ensure that the rest of the outputs get implemented in accordance with the Project Document and in a timely, efficient, accountable, and effective manner.

From 15 February 2021, the WEPS system was replaced by the Afghan Personnel and Payroll Systems (APPS) which was funded and managed by the US Government through the CSTC-A. The scope of APPS covered only the ANP payroll and therefore WEPS continued to be used for the salaries of personnel of the GDPDC.

Following the 15 August 2021 incident whereby the *De facto* authority (Taliban) took over the government, LOTFA donors decided on 4 November 2021, to foreclose all LOTFA projects and the trust fund itself. The closure takes effect on 4 December 2021.

Basic project information is as follows:

PROJECT/OUTCOME INFORMATION	
<b>Project/outcome title</b>	MOIA independently manages all non-fiduciary aspects of its payroll for the Afghan National Police and General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers, including human resources, finance and ICT functions related to payroll operations, as well as reports for donors.
<b>Atlas ID</b>	00089137
<b>Corporate outcome and output</b>	Outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crisis
<b>Country</b>	Afghanistan
<b>Region</b>	Asia Pacific

<b>Date project document signed</b>	June 2015	
<b>Project dates</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>Planned end</b>
	July 2015	December 2021
<b>Project budget</b>	USD 2,561,634,611	
<b>Project expenditure at the time of evaluation</b>	USD 172,145,244.26	
<b>Funding source</b>	LOTFA Trust Fund	
<b>Implementing party<sup>39</sup></b>	Ministry of Interior Affairs of Afghanistan (MOIA)	

## 2. Purpose of the Evaluation

Following the closure of the project, UNDP requires a **final evaluation** of the SPM project to cover the period 1st July 2015 to 4th December 2021, for two major purposes and derived research questions:

- i. Purpose of Accountability - to account for the results achieved with the resources allocated to the SPM project. Specifically, to assess the extent to which the design or the implementation process of a development intervention has contributed to its success, to identify the failure or success factors, identifying the conditions in which the SPM project can be successfully replicated
- ii. Purpose of Learning – to learn from experience by understanding whether the SPM project has worked or not and the reasons for its failure or success. Specifically, to assess whether the resources allocated to the intervention have resulted in the planned outputs, outcomes and eventually impacts and whether the resources have been spent efficiently
- iii. Contribution to higher level results – to evaluate how the project contributed to Afghanistan Country Programme Document (CPD) Outputs and Outcomes and as well as relevant UNDP Strategic Plan Outcomes

This Evaluation is planned to be end-of project and independent as well as intended to assess the relevance, performance, management arrangements and success or failure of the project. It looks at signs of potential impact of project activities on beneficiaries and sustainability of results, including the impact to capacity development.

## 3. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation is forward looking and will capture effectively lessons learned and provide information on the nature, extent and where possible, the potential impact of the SPM project. The evaluation will assess the project design, scope, implementation status and the capacity to achieve the project objectives. It will collate and analyse lessons learned, challenges faced, and best practices obtained during implementation which could inform the programming strategy of similar interventions in the future.

The evaluation is expected to cover all project's outputs (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), and specifically review the mid-term evaluation recommendations and evaluate progress made since it was carried out, particularly:

- a) Status of coordination pursuant to the ANP Human Resources Management, ANP IDs issuance by the MOIA, issue of “ghost police” and the payroll system.
- b) Effectiveness of WEPS system's transition into APPS.
- c) Status of “Payroll Unit Plan” and accompanying “Payroll Unit Capacity Building Plan” including a detailed “blueprint” for staffing of a new Payroll developed with the support of the project.
- d) Status of Training and Capacity Building of MOIA staff to fully assume responsibilities of the Payroll Unit.

- e) Payroll transition issues and status of outstanding donor conditions (three of the twelve conditions remained unmet as at last assessment—February 2021).
- f) Status of training for female MOIA personnel to perform payroll functions. Assess the status of recommendation of the mid-term evaluation
- g) Assess the project design in terms of its relevance to the overall development situation at the national level, relevance to national strategies, and relevance to beneficiaries.
- h) Assess the cost-efficiency of project interventions.
- i) Assess the project impact on MOIA's IT development, transparency, and efficiency.
- j) Assess relevance and effectiveness of the project's strategy and approaches for the achievement of the project objectives.
- k) Assess performance of the project in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of producing the expected outputs.
- l) Assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, the reporting and monitoring system and extent to which these have been effective.
- m) Assess relevance of the project's management arrangements; identify advantages, bottlenecks and lessons learned with regard to the management arrangements.
- n) Analyze underlying factors beyond UNDP control that affect the achievement of the project results.
- o) Provide recommendations to key project stakeholders for future projects/programme development.

Specific attention must be given to the evaluation criteria as defined by OECD/ DAC: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The Evaluation should answer the following evaluation questions:

**Relevance.** The extent to which the objectives of the SPM project are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities (SDGs) and partners' and donors' policies. This includes looking whether the overall objectives of the intervention conformed to existing policies, whether this policy represents a priority for the partner country and, for intervention targeted to the administration, the extent to which the design of the intervention and its implementation take into account the actual functioning of the administrative system.

- What is the value/relevance of the intervention in relation to the national and international partners' policies and priorities?
- How effective was SPM in garnering national ownership of the activities?
- What were good practices? Where was the project not able to deliver on enhancing national ownership and why?
- How much support did the Government provide to SPM's efforts to garner national ownership?

**Effectiveness.** The extent to which the SPM's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Provide a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of implementation of SPM, with regards to the relation between the inputs, outputs, and activities, analyzing whether these are logical and commensurate with the needs and resources allocated to the project. Analyze the quality of program design. Analyze whether activities are achieving satisfactory results in relation to stated objectives short and long term. The evaluation should review all outputs of SPM and respond to the below questions:

- Has SPM successfully delivered on the results as identified under each of the project outputs? What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- Did the ANP and GDPDC personnel funded through SPM received their monthly remunerations in a timely and effectively manner in all 34 provinces.

- How has sustained salary payment of ANP led to increased presence of ANP across the country? Is there a logical correlation between the amount of funding towards salary payment and growth of the police force over time?
- Has the Web-enabled Electronic Payroll System (WEPS) and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) contributed towards accountability and transparency in police salary payment at police payroll stations (PHQs, ANCO, ABP and CPD)?
- How effective was the governance arrangement of the project? To what extent has there been collaboration and communication among UNDP, donors and MOIA at the central level? How effective have the capacity development initiatives undertaken by SPM been? Have the initiatives been adequate and resulted in sustainable capacity in the target MOIA departments at the central, provincial and regional offices?
- How effective has SPM been in addressing the challenges in salary payments through different mechanisms i.e., WEPS/ APPS, Trusted agent and mobile money?
- Has the capacity development support of SPM to the ANP led to an increased public financial management capability within MOIA?
- How effective and efficient were the lines of reporting between UNDP and MOIA, and how clear was the division of responsibilities and accountability of various functions and activities between the government and UNDP?
- How was the overall project designing process? Was it designed through a consultative process with MOIA counterparts, donors and other stakeholder?
- Was the oversight role provided by the UNDP country office effective? Were there oversight control mechanisms in place and was UNDP successful in fulfilling this function?
- How effective was the international partners' role in SPM including funding, implementation of activities, communication and overall coordination?

**Efficiency is assessed** through a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. Particularly,

- How efficiently were funding, staff, and other resources used to achieve the expected results of the project?
- Based on cost-benefit analysis what conclusions can be drawn regarding 'value for money' and cost related efficiencies or inefficiencies in implementing SPM?
- What was the quality and timeliness of the implementation of activities and the responsiveness of the project to adapt and respond to changes and challenges?
- What were the risks and how effective was expectation management?
- Were the organizational structures, management, planning and implementation processes effective and efficient?
- Did the project/intervention use the resources in the most economical manner to achieve its objectives? Have the resources invested led to the achievement of the intended results?
- How effective and efficient was UNDP's support in each of the various areas where UNDP was involved (UNDP support at the central, provincial, operational and technical level)?

**Sustainability.** Sustainability is understood as the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed.

- What is the sustainability of the results achieved, with focus on capacities built and ability of the institutions to operate with reduced international technical assistance in the future?
- How predictably and regularly had resources been supplied to SPM?
- To what extent were SPM capacity building initiatives/trainings sustainable and what are the longer- term effects?

**Impact.** Positive or negative, primary or secondary long-term effects produced by the SPM project interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

- What were the unintended effects from the SPM project interventions (negative and positive<sup>14</sup>)?
- What are the results of intervention in terms of changes in the lives of beneficiaries against set indicators?
- To what extent has SPM impacted the wider objective of re-building the ANP? What changes, both positive and negative, both intended and unintended, can be attributed to the interventions?
- What is the estimated impact of the SPM funding on overall security in the country?
- What were the intended and unintended aspects of the program related to the political, security and developmental dimensions?

#### 4. Methodology

One International Consultant (IC) will be hired to engage in a consultative process with the relevant International Community, LOTFA Project Board members, UNDP Country Office (CO), and to assess the challenges and processes and provide recommendations.

The IC will propose an evaluation methodology and agree on a detailed plan for the assignment as part of the evaluation inception report. The methodology will include:

- **Desk study:** The IC should examine all relevant SPM documents (including project design, work plans, progress, quarterly and annual progress reports, assessments, board documents, monitoring reports, etc.). These documents will be provided by UNDP.
- **Development and finalization of methodology:** The IC will have a kick-off meeting with relevant counterparts and will finalize the tools for collection and analysis of data. This will be done in close consultation and discussion with UNDP CO, SPM project management, and donors.
- **Interviewing stakeholders:** The evaluator should also hold interviews with key focal points in SPM, senior management and other key focal points in UNDP, key managerial and advisory staff in LOTFA TFMU, and representatives of donor partners contributing to SPM need to be interviewed.
- **Review and finalization of report:** The draft of the evaluation report will be shared with all stakeholders for feedback/ comments and inputs incorporated as applicable in the final report.

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<sup>14</sup> The qualification of positive versus negative effects of an intervention requires a normative judgement. This judgement should be made clear in the evaluation



## Annex 2: List of Documents Reviewed

1	Terms of Reference
2	Project Action Document
3	Project revisions (4x)
4	UNAMA 2020 Report
5	SIGAR Report 1 <sup>st</sup> quarterly 2021
6	Annual Progress Report 2016-December 2016
7	Annual Progress Report January 2017–December 2017
8	Annual Progress Report January 2018–December 2018
9	Annual Progress Report January 2019–December 2019
10	Annual Progress Report January 2019–December 2019
11	Annual Progress Report January 2020–December 2020-
12	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANFDP II) 2021 to 2025
13	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANFDP) 2017 to 2021
14	MOIA Strategic Plan (MISP) 2018-2021
15	Terms of Reference Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 2018
16	Project Action Document
18	UNAMA 2020 Report
18	SIGAR Report 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2021
19	SIGAR Report 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2020
20	Annual Progress Report 2016-December 2016
21	Annual Progress Report January 2017–December 2017
22	Annual Progress Report January 2018–December 2018
23	Annual Progress Report January 2019–December 2019
24	Annual Progress Report January 2019–December 2019
25	Annual Progress Report January 2020–December 2020-
26	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANFDP II) 2021 to 2025
27	MA reports 2020
28	Mission Reports
29	Training Reports
30	LOTFA MPTF TOR
31	Monitoring Agent Report January February 2020
32	SPM Organogram
33	SPM Annual Work Plan, 2021
34	AFG Strategic Plan 2020-2025
35	Global Peace Index 220
36	Interagency HRDPP Guidance Note
37	UNAMA 2020 Report
39	Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan, Department of Defense Report to US Congress, 2020
40	Support to Payroll Management SPM Project Extension, Signed 18 December 2016
41	SPM Extension No. 2
42	SPM Extension No.3
43	Ministry of Interior Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Compliance Assessment with Donor Conditions on Payroll Transition Report, RSM , 2017
44	Mid-term Evaluation of the SPM Project, Report, 2018
45	MOIA_HACT- MCA Report, Grant Thornton, 2015
46	National Implementation by the Government of UNDP Supported Projects: Guidelines and Procedures, 2011
47	Project Management Implementation Guidelines, UNDP, 2009
48	Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), 1 July 2015–December 2016

49	SPM Transition Plan Donors Condition Monitoring Framework Progress Report, 2019
50	UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules, 2012
51	Management Response to the Mid Term Evaluation of UNDP SPM Recommendations

### Annex 3: List of Persons Interviewed

Name	Position	Organization	Addresses	Role in the Project	Email and Phone Number
Sainey Ceesay	Project Manager, SPM	Project Manager			Sainey.ceesay@undp.org
Anisha Thapa and DEU team	Head of DEU	UNDP, Afghanistan			<a href="mailto:anisha.thapa@undp.org">anisha.thapa@undp.org</a>
Chencho Dorjee	Portfolio Specialist	UNDP, Afghanistan			<a href="mailto:chencho.dorjee@undp.org">chencho.dorjee@undp.org</a>
Senior Management	Resident Representative and Senior Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP, Afghanistan			<a href="mailto:Abdallah.Aldardari@undp.org">Abdallah.Aldardari@undp.org</a> Surayo.buzurukova@undp.org
Hiroko Massey	LOTFA Trust Fund Manager	LOTFA Trust Fund			hiroko.massey@undp.org

## Annex 4: Evaluation Matrix

Parameter	Evaluation Question	Source of Evidence	Data collection method
<u>Relevance:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To what extent was the Project in line with the national development priorities, the country programme's outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and the SDGs?</li> <li>2. To what extent does the Project contribute to the theory of change for the relevant country programme outcome especially in addressing SPM ?</li> <li>3. What comparative advantages did UNDP bring to the SPM/public finance in Afghanistan?</li> </ol>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>theory of change</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Efficiency:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. To what extent have resources been used efficiently? Have activities supporting the payroll management been cost-effective?</li> <li>5. To what extent was the Project management structure as outlined in the Project Document efficient in generating the expected results?</li> <li>6. To what extent have Project activities been delivered in a timely manner?</li> <li>7. To what extent do the M&amp;E systems utilized by UNDP ensure efficient Project management?</li> </ol>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly and annual progress reports</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Effectiveness:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. To what extent were the project outputs achieved especially in achieving desired outcome based on approved results framework? What factors contributed to effectiveness or ineffectiveness?</li> <li>9. In which areas did the Project have the greatest achievements? Why and what have been the supporting factors? How can the Project build on or expand these achievements?</li> <li>10. In which areas did the Project have the fewest achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can or could they be overcome?</li> <li>11. What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the Project's objectives?</li> </ol>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Impacts:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How have the Project deliverables impacted SPM/public finance?</li> <li>2. Has the Project helped make a significant impact on the way the national partners perform their expected objectives?</li> <li>3. Was capacity (individuals, institution, systems) built through the actions of the Project?</li> </ol>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>

Parameter	Evaluation Question	Source of Evidence	Data collection method
	<p>4. Could observed changes in capacities (human, institutional, etc.) at country/local level be linked to the contribution of the UNDP?</p> <p>5. Could any unintended positive or negative impacts be observed as a consequence of the Project?</p>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Sustainability:</u>	<p>6. To what extent does the national ownership of the results and the likely ability of project-supported interventions to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion are ensured?</p> <p>7. To what extent will financial and economic resources be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the Project?</p> <p>8. Are there any financial, social, economic, environmental, or political risks that may jeopardize sustainability of Project outputs?</p> <p>9. To what extent did UNDP interventions have well-designed and well-planned exit strategies?</p>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Project Design:</u>	<p>10. To what extent did the design of the Project help in achieving its own goals?</p> <p>11. Were the context, problems, needs and priorities well analysed while designing the Project?</p> <p>12. Were there clear objectives and a clear strategy?</p> <p>13. Were there clear baselines indicators and/or benchmarks for performance?</p> <p>14. Was the process of Project design sufficiently participatory? Was there any impact of the process?</p>	<p>PD and questionnaire</p> <p>PD and questionnaire</p> <p>PD and questionnaire</p> <p>PD and questionnaire</p> <p>PD and questionnaire</p>	<p>desk study</p> <p>desk study</p> <p>desk study</p> <p>desk study</p> <p>desk study</p>
<u>Project Implementation:</u>	<p>15. Were the Project management arrangements appropriate at implementation and strategic level?</p> <p>16. How responsive has the management been to the changing needs of the Project?</p> <p>17. How adequate was the M&amp;E system in measuring the progress towards achieving objectives</p>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>

Parameter	Evaluation Question	Source of Evidence	Data collection method
	<p>18. How have in-country stakeholders been involved in project implementation?</p> <p>19. To what extent were Project management and implementation participatory and is this participation contributing towards achievement of the Project objectives?</p>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Promotion of human development</u>	<p>20. To what extent have poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the work of UNDP in the country?</p> <p>21. To what extent have gender equality and the empowerment of women been addressed in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the Project?</p> <p>22. To what extent has the Project contributed to gender equality, the empowerment of women and the realization of human rights? To what extent women are involved in the implementation of the Project indirectly or directly.</p>	<p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p> <p>PD, questionnaire, quarterly, annual progress reports, Final Evaluation Report, and Final Report</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>
<u>Lesson learned from past experience</u>	<p>23. What are the lessons learned, good practices, innovations, and challenges from the project implementation?</p> <p>24. Do you have any additional comments, ideas or suggestions about how to improve similar Project?</p>	<p>Questionnaire</p> <p>questionnaire</p>	<p>desk study and consultation</p> <p>desk study and consultation</p>

## Annex 5: Results and Resources Framework

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	BASELINE										
		Years										
		Value	Target 2017	Actual 2017	Target 2018	Actual 2018	Target 2019	Actual 2019	Target 2020	Actual 2020	Target 2021	Actual 2021
<b>Output 1:</b> Updated policies implemented, business processes developed and applied to support independent MOIA Payroll management.	A: [Achieved in 2017] Payroll Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual in place	No SOPs /operations manual in place/30 (2018)	Yes, PMPM in place and distributed to all relevant departments	PMPM finalised and endorsed.			n/a		n/a		n/a	
	B: [Dropped in 2019] Number of MOIA staff trained on Payroll SOPs manual	0	200	251	230 (All relevant trained staff able to apply the manual).	251 (including 3 women).	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	C: [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of payroll stations using approved payroll SOPs manual	Communication products printed (2018)	At least 75% compliance	80% compliance	At least 75% compliance	100%	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	D: Number of communication products (charts/leaflets/posters/brochures etc.) on compensation, remunerations, and entitlements produced and disseminated to provincial payroll stations	40,000 copies/8,000 copies (2020)/120,000 (2021)/0 (2018)	All payroll stations receive communication products; and an assessment of police	0 (Outreach and awareness package finalised)	All payroll stations receive communication products; and an assessment of police	74,000 communication products printed and distributed to all 144 payroll stations.	80,000 copies distributed	80,000 copies distributed	120,000 copies	120,300	40,000	0

			awareness of the compensati on and entitlement s conducted		awareness of the compensati on and entitlement s conducted.							
	E: [Dropped in 2019] Number of TV and Radio programmes/ spots to educate the ANP and CPD on their benefits, entitlements, complaints etc produced and broadcasted	0	36 Radio broadcasts , 9 TV broadcasts (by region), disseminati on of radio spots (270 times) to regional radio stations and TV spots (90 times)	0 (Procuremen t process finalised.)	6 radio spots produced, disseminati on of radio spots (21 times) to regional radio stations.	0 (Off- track: The relevant activities have been cancelled due to potential vendors' high proposed costs.)	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	F: [Dropped in 2018] Percentage of MOIA police personnel in receipt of monthly pay slips and current annual pension statement (disaggregated by gender)	0%	50%	n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	G: [Dropped in 2018] Number of pay structure review recommendations adpoted and implemented	TBD (currently N/A)	1-2 to be implement ed (Same as baseline)	5 recommenda tions reviewed,		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	

			none implemented									
	H: [New added in 2019] Payroll Standard Operating Procedures manual revised per APPS application and distributed to users	No		n/a		n/a	YES (The revised Manual is printed and distributed to users)	NO (APPS has not been operationalized)	NO	NO	Yes	NO
	I: [New added in 2019] Number of MOIA staff trained on revised Payroll manual as per APPS	0		n/a		n/a	150	0	150	0	150	0
	J: [New added in 2019] Percentage of payroll stations using revised Payroll manual as per APPS	0%		n/a		n/a	50%	0%	50%	0%	100%	0%%
	K: [New added in 2019] MOIA incentives streamlined and updated in the revised Payroll manual	No		n/a		n/a	Yes	NO	NO	NO	Yes	NO
	L: [New added in 2021] Percentage of payroll stations using APPS T&A	100%		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		100%	100%%
	M: [New added in 2021] Number of awareness / outreach sessions on Human Rights and Police	0		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		10	0



	N: [New added in 2021] National Conference on "HR, IHL, and Police" held	No		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		Yes	NO
	O: [New added in 2021] Support provided to the implementation of MOIA's Gender Action Roadmap 2020-2024	No		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		Yes	NO
<b>Output 2:</b> Capacity of MOIA personnel (in Payroll, ICT Human Resources, Finance and Budget as appropriate ) improved to undertake all payroll processes and tasks to agreed standards	A:[Dropped in 2018] Number of MOIA staff trained in finance (disaggregated by gender)	90 (all male)/150 (all male) (2018)	190	163 (males)	190 (Cumulative)	258 (including 7 women)	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	B: [Dropped in 2018] Number of MOIA staff trained in human resource functions (disaggregated by gender)	150 (all male)/2018	190	167 (163 males, 4 females)	190 (Cumulative)	258 (including 7 women)	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	C: [Wording changed in 2019] Number of MOIA staff trained in Payroll Management, WEPS/APPS (disaggregated by gender)	300/1010 (2021)/14 (2018)	180	163 (163 males)	190 (Cumulative)	258 (including 7 women)	868 (Cumulative)	1090 (including 42 females)	1310 (Cumulative)	20	1310 (Cumulative)	0
	D: [Dropped in 2018] Number of MOIA ICT staff trained on WEPS network monitoring (disaggregated by gender)	0	68 (34 provinces)	n/a					n/a		n/a	
	E: [Achieved in 2020] Number of MOIA staff co- located with SPM staff	4/0 (2018)	10	14	20	14	20	17	17	0	n/a	

F: [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of the twinning and mentoring programme workplan implemented (Q1=25%; Q2=50%; Q3=75%; Q4=100%)	0% (draft detailed twinning programme developed)	100% implementation of work plan	100%	100%	100%	n/a		n/a		n/a	
G: [Dropped in 2019] Number of MOIA staff enrolled in professional certification programmes (disaggregated by gender)	50% (2017 average)	20%	5.71%	10 (cumulative)	16	n/a		n/a		n/a	
H: [Dropped in 2019] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual for reconciliation in place	50%	SOPs manual on reconciliation in place	Yes, SOPs manual on reconciliation in place			YES (The revised Manual is printed and distributed to users)	NO (APPS has not been operationalized)	n/a		n/a	
I: [Achieved in 2020] Number of MOIA staff trained on validation and reconciliation (disaggregated by gender)	0	10	11	20	6	23	21 (All Male)	23	0	n/a	
J: [Dropped in 2018] Number of provinces with WEPS Payroll/AFMIS expenditure fully reconciled by year to date	15 provinces partially reconciled/100% (2018)	34	34	34	3	n/a		n/a		n/a	
K: [Achieved in 2017] Standard data collection tools and methodology for MOIA PERSTAT in place	No standard data collection tool in	Yes, Standard data collection tool for	80% of PPHQs completed and			n/a		n/a		n/a	

	PERSTAT/0 (2018)	PERSTAT in place (Monthly TWGs include fully reconciled WEPS and PERSTAT statistics)	submitted the template								
L: [Dropped in 2019] Number of MOIA staff trained on payroll related internal control policy/framework to improve transparency and accountability (disaggregated by gender)	0	190	163			n/a		n/a		n/a	
M: [Dropped in 2018] Percentage of ineligible expenses identified by MA	59%	15% decline in annual figures	0.4%			n/a		n/a		n/a	
N: [Dropped in 2018] Percentage reduction in quarterly MA findings ( total of EV, PV and Systems findings)	50% (average)	20% cumulative decline	0% (cumulative)			n/a		n/a		n/a	
O: [Wording changed in 2019] Number of provinces /Mustofiates using the provided barcode readers to approve digital M16 to facilitate data	0/34 (2021)	34	2			34	34	34	34	34	34

verification and reconciliation											
P: [New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] Number of MOIA staff trained on finance, HR and payroll management (disaggregated by gender)	163 (all male)		n/a			n/a		n/a		n/a	
Q: [New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] Number of MOIA 'twinning' staff with SPM staff	14		n/a			n/a		n/a		n/a	
R: [New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] M16s generated outside WEPS as a % average of variances with AFMIS	13% (2017 average)		n/a			n/a		n/a		n/a	
S: [New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of PPHQs submitting new PERSTAT template on monthly basis	50%		n/a			n/a		n/a		n/a	
T: [New added in 2018] [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of 'resolved' MA findings out of total findings	100%		n/a			n/a		n/a		n/a	
U: [New added in 2019] [Achieved in 2020] Number of MOIA staff trained in Professional accountancy (disaggregated by gender)	24 males enrolled (8 have passed 4 out 7 papers, 16 have passed		n/a		n/a	At least 5 completed all the 7 papers and 10	20 males enrolled; 2 completed all 7 papers; 3 completed	12 completed all 7 papers	4 completed all 7 papers	n/a	

	2 out of 7 papers)					completed 4 papers	at least 4 papers.				
V: [New added in 2019] [Achieved in 2020] Number of MOIA staff trained in leadership and change management courses (disaggregated by gender)	25		n/a		n/a	100	0	100	0	n/a	
X: [New added in 2019] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual for reconciliation updated in accordance with APPS	No		n/a		n/a	YES (Updated SOPs manual for reconciliation is distributed among relevant personnel)	NO (APPS is not operational yet)	YES	NO	YES	NO
Y: [New added in 2019] [Achieved in 2020] Time and attendance monthly reporting template developed for MoIA to improve the quality of HR reports	Not developed		n/a		n/a	Developed	Developed	Developed	Developed	n/a	
Z: [New added in 2019] Number of MOIA (OIG) staff provided with orientation training on payroll processes to facilitate their audit work	10/0(2021)		n/a		n/a	20	0	20	0	15	0

<b>Output 3:</b> MOIA payroll system (WEPS) and HR system (AHRIMS) fully updated and reconciled to support the MAs' assurance work and facilitate	AA: [New added in 2021] Number of MOIA staff trained on inactive backpay module (disaggregated by gender)	0		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		21	0
	AB: [New added in 2021] Number of OIG staff enrolled in Professional audit training (CIA) (disaggregated by gender)	0		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		10	0
	AC: [New added in 2021] Number of MOIA staff trained in tailor made public financial management course (disaggregated by gender)	0		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		15	0
	A: [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of ANPs with valid ID Cards in Payroll System	63%	100% and continuous updating	81%	100%	100%	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	B: [Dropped in 2018] Percentage of ANPs matched with HR System (AHRIMS)	24%	100%	51%		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	C: Number of new initiatives/ improvements introduced in WEPS to function optimally	3 (GIS, online ticketing system, Digital M16, software upgrade implemented); 18	8	8	8	9	12	15	20	2	20	0

data migration to APPS		(2021)/5 (2018)										
	D: Percentage of ANPs paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	88%/94% (2021)	95%	90%	95%	93.22%	99%	92.78% (2.34% female)	95%	Male 97.34% (2.66% Female)	96%	95%
	E: Percentage of GDPDC paid by EFT (disaggregated by gender)	86%/100%(2021)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100% (4.68% female)	100%	100% (Male 95.38% 4.62% Female)	100%	100%
	F: Percentage of Payroll stations that processed salaries on time	98%/99% (2021)	100%	99%	99%	98.7%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%
	G: [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of police salary paid through mobile banking	2%	6%	2%	6%	2.52%	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	H: [New added in 2019] [Dropped in 2020] Number of PAI-verified ANPs enrolled in WEPS	107487		n/a		n/a	124,629	114,663 (December)	124629	113436 (September 2020)	n/a	
	I: [New added in 2019] Number of registered personnel paid through Mobile Banking	2710/4400 (2021)		n/a		n/a	3,710	4,279	4,279	4,083	4,600	5%
<b>Output 4:</b> MOIA infrastructure provision supports	A: Percentage of ANP payroll stations with fixed MOIA intranet connectivity	95%/100% (2021)	100%	100%			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	B: [Dropped in 2019] Percentage of GDPDC	0%	100%	40%	100%	0%	n/a		n/a		n/a	

100 per cent functionality of MOIA payroll systems	payroll stations with fixed MOIA intranet connectivity											
	C: Number of payroll stations with delayed salaries due to connectivity issues	3/0 (2021)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	D: [Dropped in 2019] Indicator D: Percentage rating of the DRR Plan implemented: Phase-1: Site Inspection and Selection; Phase-2: Contract Formulation; Phase-3: System Commissioning; Phase-4: Documentation & Training; Phase-5: Handover	40% (Phases 1 & 2)	100% (Phase 4 & 5)	40% (Phases 1 & 2), Same as baseline	100% (Phase 4 & 5)	90%	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	E: [New added in 2021] DRR site is up and running 100% of the time	100%		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		100%	100%
<b>Output 5:</b> Funds transferred by UNDP to MOF for Police Pay	A: Percentage of payroll stations able to process monthly salary within 15 days of close of solar month	98%/100 (2021)	100%	99%			100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
	B: [Dropped in 2018] Percentage of expenditure outturn over cash made available to MOF	77%	80%	99%		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	C: Number of police officers paid disaggregated by gender	149,718 ANP (147,400	157,000 (ANP Full Tashkil)	147,308 ANP; 5,742 GDPDC			124,629 (ANP Full Tashkeel);	Total ANP and GDPDC	124,629 (ANP Full Tashkeel);	Total ANP within Tashkeel):	136,177 (Full Tashkeel):	125,868 ANP: (114,850



		males; 2,318 females); 5,743 CPD (5,536 males; 207 females); 106,420 ANP (103,559 males; 2,861 female); 7,016 GDPDC (6,693 males; 323 female) (2021)		(ANP: 144,347 males; 2,961 females; GDPDC: 5,462 males, 280 females)			7,456 CPD (Full Tashkeel)	paid within Tashkeel (December 2019): 121,779  Total ANP: 114,663 (111,980 male; 2,683 female)  Total GDPDC: 7,116 (6,783 male; 333 female)	7,456 CPD (Full Tashkeel)	106,475 (103,648 male; 2,827 female)  Total GDPDC within Tashkeel: 7,126 (6,797 male; 329 female)	ANP 124,628+ ALP 11,549; (Full Tashkeel): GDPDC 7,456	males, 4071 females)  6,947 GDPDC: (6,620 males; 327 female)
<b>Output 6:</b> Governance and accountability of LOTFA management and implementation improved	A: [Dropped in 2018] Level of donor satisfaction on LOTFA reporting and information sharing (on a 10 points scale)	7 out of 10		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	B: [Dropped in 2018] Level of donor satisfaction on effective functioning of LOTFA governance structure (on a 10 points scale)	7 out of 10		n/a		n/a	n/a		n/a		n/a	
	C: Project budget financial delivery rate	0%		n/a		n/a	80%		80%		80%	

Source: Annual Progress Report and Final Report, SPM

# **“Community-Oriented Policing Services” Project (COPS) in Afghanistan**

January 2020 – December 2021

## **FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT**

**Evaluation commissioned by UNDP**

**Evaluation prepared by Andrei IOVU,**  
Juris Doctor, International evaluation consultant

**KABUL, AUGUST 2022**

Evaluation information		
<b>Final/midterm review/ other</b>	Final project evaluation	
<b>Evaluator</b>	Andrei Iovu, Juris Doctor	
<b>Evaluator email address</b>	andrei_iovu@ymail.com	
<b>Evaluation dates</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>Completion</b>
	1 March 2022	15 August 2022

Project Information		
<b>Project title</b>	Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS)	
<b>Country</b>	Afghanistan	
<b>Project dates</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>Planned end</b>
	1 <sup>st</sup> of January 2020	31 <sup>st</sup> December 2023
<b>Total committed budget</b>	\$ 15,763,832.00	
<b>Funding source</b>	LOTFA – MPTF	

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## List of acronyms and abbreviations

<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>AWP</b>	Annual Work Plan
<b>COPS</b>	Community-Oriented Policing Services Project
<b>CPD</b>	UNDP Country Programme Document
<b>CPSS</b>	Community and Police Perception Survey
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>CSTC-A</b>	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GD</b>	General Directorate
<b>GIZ</b>	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit/ German Agency for International Cooperation
<b>GPPT</b>	German Police Team
<b>HACT</b>	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
<b>IATI</b>	International Aid Transparency Initiative
<b>IC</b>	Individual Contract
<b>LFA</b>	Logical Framework Analysis
<b>LNOB</b>	Leave No One Behind
<b>LOTFA</b>	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MOIA</b>	Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Affairs
<b>MPD</b>	Project “MOIA Police Development”
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NPP</b>	Afghanistan National Priority Programme
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PD</b>	Police District
<b>PeM</b>	Police-e-Mardumi
<b>PHQ</b>	Police Headquarters
<b>PMU</b>	Project Management Unit
<b>POPP</b>	Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures
<b>ProDoc</b>	Project Document
<b>RBAP</b>	Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific of UNDP
<b>RS</b>	Resolute Support
<b>SBCC</b>	Social and Behavior Change Communication
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedures
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNDSCF</b>	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### *Intervention summary*

The “Community-Oriented Policing Services” project was designed to be a 4-year long intervention that was officially launched on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2020 and was expected to be finalized on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2023. The intervention focused on supporting the Afghan National Police (ANP) with an initial emphasis on the PHQ and PDs in Kabul, with further extension to other provinces of Afghanistan. The project was supported by LOTFA and managed by UNDP. The COPS project aimed to contribute to the achievement of SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

The project has focused on achieving deliverables on 4 outputs:

- (1) Improved capacity of Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform.
- (2) Improved police response to community needs and priorities.
- (3) Constructed/ rehabilitated standard Police Districts to support community-oriented policing.
- (4) Improved administrative services at Police Districts’ levels to support police services.

The COPS project represented an attempt to tackle some of the essential challenges that the ANP faced toward becoming a better security provider for the public in Afghanistan. However, a series of turbulent events have challenged the implementation and the duration of the project. In the first months of the project implementation, following an unfortunate staff security incident, UNDP put in place stricter security rules which limited the mobility of the project team and interaction with the stakeholders and beneficiaries. Later, restrictions were applied due to COVID-19. Over the following months, the political instability in Afghanistan has deepened the obstacles to the project implementation.

The events that culminated on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021 when the Taliban took over the government in Afghanistan, have determined the LOTFA donors to foreclose all projects and the trust fund itself, a decision that took effect on the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 2021. This affected the implementation of the COPS project which had to close prematurely.

Respectively, out of the 4-year timeframe, approximately 48 months, the project duration comprised approximately 20 months, which is 42% of the entire project lifespan. Due to challenges that the project has faced as part of the implementation process, none of the 3 outcome indicators was achieved. Equally, none of the 4 outputs and the total of the 17 output final targets were fulfilled. However, the analysis performed as part of the present evaluation report has indicated that the project has undertaken significant steps toward implementation. The findings are further presented in this final evaluation report.

### *Evaluation context and purpose*

Following the UNDP requirements, the COPS project had to go through an evaluation process performed by an external evaluator. The present report represents the independent judgement of the evaluator based on a set of criteria and benchmarks which are expressly regulated by the UNDP independent evaluation policy and guidelines.

The purpose of the present evaluation was defined in the Terms of Reference of the assignment outlining two main directions:

- First, the purpose of accountability is by exploring why certain aspects of the COPS project have or have not been implemented as planned, by looking at the project design and prospects for successful replication.
- Second, the purpose of learning is by exploring the lessons learned in the evaluation to support a better understanding of future interventions.

Through the generation of evidence and objective information, the report shall enable program managers and other stakeholders to make informed management decisions and plan strategically if future interventions will be resumed in Afghanistan. The specific objectives of the assignment are further presented in the report.

## *Methodology overview*

The methodology has been structured around the revised OECD/ DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the intervention. All these criteria are in full arrangement with the provisions of the UNDP guidelines, notably with the provisions of the revised UNDP Evaluation Guidelines. The report ensures alignment with the new UNDP Evaluation Policy and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

The evaluation was designed to employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, by putting forward a participatory and consultative approach that sought to ensure close engagement with the monitoring personnel, project management, implementing partners, and male and female beneficiaries. However, following the adjustment of the methodology to the limitations related to the country context, the report has employed the following methods:

- *Structured document review*: the respective method comprised examination of the project documentation and reports compiled through the implementation process.
- *Semi-structured interviews*: this method was meant to be employed with selected stakeholders to explore the questions put forward in the ToR by addressing questions in a conversational format, around the evaluation criteria.
- *Direct observation during the meetings*: this method was meant to be applied as a complementary source of gathering information, including documentary evidence, interviews, and observations compiled, summarized, and organized according to the questions asked in the evaluation.

In the context of the present report, the aspects of gender, disability, vulnerability, and social inclusion were specifically evaluated and reflected in a separate chapter. The gender profile of interview respondents from the total of 4 people interviewed, included 3 males and 1 female. The validation of the report was conducted by 2 representatives of the UNDP Afghanistan, involving 1 male, and 1 female.

## *Main conclusions, recommendations, and good practices*

The project evaluation purpose that was reflected in the ToR of the assignment expressly stated: to explore why certain aspects of the COPS project have or have not been implemented as planned, by looking at the project design and prospects for successful replication of the intervention. In this context, the evaluator came to the following **conclusions**:

- The COPS project design fulfilled most of the requirements regulated by the UNDP POPP on project development. The project described comprehensively the partnerships with other development partners. It assigned the roles as well as the prioritization of building the partnerships for the COPS project implementation.
- The ProDoc identified the beneficiaries and indicated how their engagement should take place. It also outlined the layers of coordination and prioritized their engagement in the project implementation.
- The scaling-up and sustainability aspects of the intervention were included in the project design by indicating how the responsibility for overseeing and monitoring will gradually be transferred to the PHQ.
- The Multi-year work plan was structured following the UNDP requirements.
- The Monitoring Plan was in line with the UNDP's programming policing and procedures. The monitoring activities, purposes, frequency, and expected results were clearly defined and structured.
- The COPS project built upon the previous UNDP and international partners' knowledge and experience in the field of community policing in Afghanistan. The ProDoc expressly presented the lessons learned from other projects which were incorporated into the project design.
- The analysis of the Results Framework formulation indicated that from point of view of its

structure, it fulfilled most of the UNDP requirements by presenting the intended outcome and its indicators, baseline values, targets, and means of verification. The analysis of the Outcome Indicators concluded that all three indicators fit the S.M.A.R.T criteria.

At the same time, the examination of the project design outlined several *limitations*:

- In the description of the project strategy, the project should have explained how the intervention was aligned with the UNDSCF/ CPD outcome. The COPS project strategy design was mostly focused on the intervention's approach with limited analytical coverage of the strategic frameworks of UNDP.
- In the description of the expected results, there was no nexus to the higher-level results (provisions of the strategic frameworks of MOIA and UNSDCF) nor the analysis of these policies.
- The presentation of the project partnerships should have indicated a clear linkage with the project's Theory of Change, by outlining what assumptions and expected results achieved by partners were critical for the fulfillment of the project results. In the case of the COPS project, there was only a broad description of the assigned roles.
- The analysis of the Results Framework formulation outlined some limitations in the formulation of the Outcome Indicators:
  - Even though the project anticipated further extension outside Kabul in other districts, the geographic focus of all Outcome Indicators was only on Kabul.
  - The baseline for the third Outcome Indicator was not identified by being prescribed that it will be decided by August 2019 following ANP satisfaction survey completion (while the respective data was not untimely reflected in an updated version of the Results Framework).
  - The final targets for the Outcome Indicators were also facing inexactitudes. It was indicated that these targets will be decided after the pilot period based on 500 interviews in the intervention area (while the respective data was not untimely reflected in an updated version of the Results Framework).
  - The second and third Outcome Indicator prescribed a percentual increase in beneficiaries' perception, respectively by a 10% increase in satisfaction among the people in the intervention areas on security and safety perception, and at least by 25% increase in satisfaction of PD personnel with the support services received by the PHQ in the second year of project implementation. Respectively, the final targets were identified rather ambiguous and without a clear methodological explanation that would support such a percentage increase in the intervention area (by keeping also in mind that the overall context may vary for each of the districts which also could impact the achievement of the indicators).
  - The analysis of the COPS's output indicators against the IATI standards indicated that the same limitations were further transposed in this context, notably:
    - Kabul was indicated as the sole geographic area.
    - Baseline data on most of the indicators specified "TBD" and has not been further presented in other documents of the project that would indicate updates to the Results Framework.
    - Final targets were indicating an increase in the percentage of trust and satisfaction with limited explanation and clarity on how methodologically the respective benchmarks were established (i.e., indicators 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3), while other indicators were not aligning with the SMART criteria (i.e., Indicator 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.6, 2.7, 3.2, 4.2).
  - The analysis of the project progress reports (quarterly, annual, and final draft) has indicated that the Results Framework was not updated on the missing data, and the respective limitations were not ultimately addressed.
  - Another shortcoming of the Results Framework formulation represented the fact that



most of the results indicators (i.e., especially the ones under Output 2 – 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and Output 3 – 3.3) were bound to public opinion polls, which could challenge the objective assessment of indicators fulfillment as no other methods of verification were included.

The examination of the implementation process outlined the following *conclusions*:

- The COPS project has followed the spirit of the lessons that were reflected in the ProDoc. Notably, the key-intervention instrument for strengthening community trust in ANP was further reflected in supporting the PeM councils and CSOs (by introducing the small grants' funding mechanism for engaging CSO through micro-projects on community security identified through the police districts' PeM Councils). In the context of the COPS project, the iterative approach was realized through the introduction of gradual steps for the implementation of the outputs based on preliminary assessments, surveys as well as comprehensive consultations with the MOIA. The COPS project has followed the lessons on the importance of providing comprehensive support, by introducing activities on capacity building, infrastructure assessment, and equipment provision. However, the CSO micro-project scheme was removed from the implementation plan at the insistence of the MOIA.
- The analysis of the total cumulative expenses in comparison with the total budget of the COPS project indicated a low delivery rate. During the implementation timeframe, the project has absorbed approximately 12% of the total committed budget.
- The analysis indicated that the COPS project has started to implement measures toward the achievement of the Output Indicators, however, due to the situation that the project has faced which led to premature closure, the final targets were not fulfilled.
- At the same time, the key results of the COPS project implementation comprised:
  - Under output 1, the project completed the Kabul PHQ assessment. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring, and implementation of community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ. Following the assessment, a detailed reporting mechanism was developed for Kabul PDs to report challenges and recommendations undertaken by PDs at the district police and community consultation sessions.
  - Under output 1, following the recommendation from the capacity assessment of the MOIA a four-day cascading training was organized for the PDs education offices and Police Staff College senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were the PHQ and PDs education officers.
  - Under output 2, the project strengthened the Police and Community Partnership in 6 PDs of Kabul city.
  - Under output 2, the project completed a total of 19 community and police consultation sessions. The activity brought the police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication actions.
  - Under output 2, the project completed a two-week classroom and on-the-job training on Social and Behavior Change Communication to the MOIA-related from PDs in media and public relations, gender and human rights, religious and cultural affairs, family response units, and community policing. The first training covered the MOIA directorates while the second training targeted Kabul's 19 PDs.
  - Under output 2, the project completed the second round of 60 bilateral interviews. The in-depth interviews were organized with experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers to ascertain the behaviors and situations that could lead to or prevent crimes.
  - Under output 2, the project launched three docuseries about the police professional behavior, police information center, police impartiality, public confidence, police commitment, police conduct and behavior, police respect for human rights, police and the rule of law, police and fighting corruption and ethics. The video docuseries were

displayed in 6 PDs, where ANP officers learned the gradual integration of community policing concepts into their duties in their respective communities.

- Under output 2, the project implemented the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in 5 PDs in Kabul city. The training brought police and the community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MOIA trained 12 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and PDs personnel.

The main **obstacles** that the project faced in the implementation process:

- From the beginning of the project implementation, following an unfortunate staff security incident, UNDP put in place stricter security rules which limited the mobility of the project team and interaction with the project partners.
- There was a high turnover of staff within the MOIA leadership, which impacted the timeliness of activities. Whereby the moment when some activities would be agreed on with the MOIA, the leadership would change again, and the process of coordination would start over from the beginning with significant changes to the project implementation approach.
- Another factor that negatively impacted the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation related to understaffing of the project. The project's initial HR Plan included a total of 24 staff members. The COPS project planned a P-4 International Project Manager and a P-5 Chief Technical Advisor. However, the leadership of the MOIA insisted that these two positions should be abolished, and the budget transferred to other project activities. This led to the situation where the project staff members had to do “double-hatting”, meaning that they were performing several roles at once that were not initially plotted in the project design.
- The breakout of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in late March 2020 delayed the implementation of the project activities. Due to the pandemic, the authorities have imposed a lockdown across the country. Given the magnitude of the pandemic, the MOIA has been focusing its attention and resources on addressing COVID-19, specifically within the police force, instead of prioritizing the project implementation.
- Due to the pandemic, UNDP has limited the numbers of international staff in the country, while the national staff was telecommuting. The restrictions have disrupted the organization of the infrastructure assessments and impeded the ability to hold meetings with MOIA and ANP on the implementation of the project.

### *Gender-specific conclusions*

Project design:

- It is plausible that the Risk Log of the COPS project has identified out of the 4 risks, one related to “Limited participation of communities, particularly women and other underrepresented groups in project activities”. There were 6 measures put forward to mitigate the respective risk. It was pertinent to include this risk in the Risk Log, as the environment of the project context was mostly “male-dominated” as emphasized by the interview respondents.
- The analysis of the Results Framework outlined that out of the 3 outcome indicators, 2 were gender sensitive (by indicating the percentage of males and females expressing (a) trust toward the ANP in Kabul and (b) positive perceptions of the safety and security in their respective PDs). However, the third outcome indicator did not include disaggregated data on sexes (by indicating the percentage of PD personnel reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ). This indicator could have also been sensitive to gender, by indicating the percentage of males and females reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ.
- None of the outcome targets presented in the Results Framework was gender sensitive as the indicators were not disaggregated on sexes, disability, and other vulnerable groups.
- At the output level, out of the total number of 17 output results indicators, there were only 3 indicators that were disaggregated on sexes. There was only 1 output result indicator

specifically targeting women – “2.4. % of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)”, which is insufficient if taken into account that the COPS project was targeting communities.

- In the output final targets, only one target related to the output result indicator 2.4 presented above, which indicated an increase of 30% in women attending PeM meetings, and 30% in women represented at the PeM.
- The baseline data did not contain any data on gender, except on the output indicator 2.4. indicating 30% of women represented at the PeM and no data on the women attending the PeM meetings.
- The focus-group interview with the representatives of the UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan that were associated with the implementation of the COPS project indicated that the project design could have placed a bigger emphasis on gender mainstreaming. This was particularly relevant as the COPS project focused on direct interaction with communities.

#### Project implementation:

- The focus-group interview highlighted that although the project design has not made the necessary focus on gender, the implementation of the project was focused on gender mainstreaming, and the inclusion of women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups in the project activities.
- The analysis of the progress reports has confirmed that the project activities were involving women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups. Moreover, the collection of data was disaggregated by sexes (the specific activities related to the training of women police are presented further in the report).
- Respectively, in the first year of the implementation, the project finalized the assessment of 13 PDs in Kabul city. The aim of the assessment was to identify infrastructure requiring rehabilitation. The assessment also covered the situation of the existing Family Response Units, female detention cells, and Police-e-Mardumi meeting halls.
- The project organized a two-day community consultation in Kabul PDs 4, 5, 6, 7 8 & 12 to develop a sense of duty and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing by undertaking community and police consultation sessions at the grassroots level in the identified PDs of Kabul. A total of 1,900 participants from the 6 PDs of Kabul attended the events. There were 730 female participants (approximately 38%) and 1170 male participants (approximately 62%) from Shura's. The community consultation collected key suggestions from the PeM Shura's led by the Community Policing Directorate of MOIA.
- The project organized a total of 6 consultations, under the title of “Strengthening Police and Community Partnership Consultations” in PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12 of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female (approximately 45%), attended the six-day community consultation sessions.
- The project started consultations with the Community Policing Directorate to include one male and one female police officer under SBCC 1 planned in early April 2021 as well as involving the Family Response Units to jointly implement the MOIA broader outreach initiatives under SBCC 2 and Inclusive Community Outreach Initiative.
- Following the community consultations, the project identified gender-specific challenges and has put forward recommendations to overcome them. As an example, it has identified that there was an absence of dedicated female police officers whereas a recommendation was put forward to increase women's presence in the police stations and that the female police officers should conduct outreach initiatives in the girls' schools.

To improve the project design, especially in the context of future interventions, it is **recommended**:

- To annex to the ProDoc the Partner Capacity Assessment Tool and HACT Micro Assessment

when the project employs the HACT modality. In the case of the COPS project, this was particularly relevant as the ProDoc indicated that the assessment of the MOIA capacities concluded that the institution was not able to meet the standards to undertake financial services.

- To improve the contingency planning during the project design. Conducting a comprehensive risk analysis could provide viable mitigation measures during the project implementation phase.
- To elaborate an exit strategy from the beginning of the intervention. The project design should reflect the vision of how the results will be secured and what follow-up actions are expected from the authorities following the project's finalization. This aspect could improve sustainability and national ownership.

To improve implementation, it is **recommended**:

- To enhance the planning and hands-on monitoring of the project implementation. Many of the staffing and recruitment challenges could have been addressed through better project oversight. Respectively, to tackle the recruitment challenge, UNDP has various modalities in place, such as sourcing people from other country offices to provide initial support to projects. Another recommendation to tackle this challenge is the prioritization of project staff recruitment at the operationalization/ inception phase of the project. Alternatively, when the project is continuously facing “double-hatting”, the project team could receive on-the-spot training that allows increasing capacities to take over the tasks or positions that remain vacant or the ones that were annulled/ canceled.
- To strengthen the risk management of interventions, especially in complex security contexts. This should represent a continuous exercise involving an adaptive management approach. The provisions of the UNDP Guidance Note “Managing Risks Across UNDP Programming and Operations” as well as other resources could help the project teams in better understating the importance of risk management.
- To prepare methodologies and guidance documentation for the monitoring practices at the project level to empower the project team to perform efficient M&E functions.
- To assign a gender and LNOB focal point in the project team that will assure the mainstreaming of the respective aspects in the project activities and documents.
- To improve the monitoring of the project reports’ quality. This recommendation concerns the quarterly, annual, and final project reports that were provided by the COPS project. Good quality reports improve the evaluation of the project and provide useful insight into the project implementation. Unfortunately, in the case of the COPS project, the reports contained mostly repetitive information that was formulated in a rather abstract manner which made the extraction of information for conducting the final evaluation challenging.
- To collect data and report on the progress toward SDG achievement. The ProDoc indicated that the COPS project aimed to contribute to the achievement of SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

To summarize the *good practices*:

- One of the good practices of the project design was to provide a comprehensive framework of cooperation with various projects and international organizations in Afghanistan by also defining the type of relationship/ interaction that the COPS project should maintain. The respective approach replicated to other interventions, could facilitate swift cooperation and fruitful communication of projects with other initiatives. It also contributes to the achievement of the coherence criteria of interventions.
- The application of the iterative approach in the project design represented both an innovation and a solution to improve the quality of the intervention, by the means of emphasizing that “one size will not fit all”. This approach helps increase the trust of local beneficiaries in the intervention and builds up the ownership on the side of the national counterparts.

- Speaking about the project implementation process, to mitigate the delays in project delivery, as well as to respond to the fluctuation of staff in the key positions of the MOAI, the COPS project team developed a coordination and debriefing plan that helped to easier present the details on the project implementation to the partners.
- Another good practice of the project implementation concerned the strong cooperation and regular exchanges with other international development partners. This helped the team to mitigate overlap of activities, exchange valuable information on the implementation of projects, as well as built networks of cooperation.
- In terms of the achieved results, the COPS project implementation has prioritized gender despite the obstacles that the project has faced and the limited gender guidance of the ProDoc. This represented an application of adaptive management to align the implementation of the project with the corporate values as the promotion of gender equality, human rights, and disability concerns are guiding principles for all United Nations entities.

## 1. OBJECT OF EVALUATION

In this chapter, the evaluator will analyze the development context of the COPS project, the expected results chain of the intervention, resources allocated for the implementation, key-stakeholders involved, as well as the implementation status of the project.

### 1.1. Country and development context

The Government of Afghanistan has assumed full responsibility for the safety and security of its citizens since 2014 when this responsibility transitioned from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to the Afghan National Security Forces. This made security, especially the government's ability to provide security-related services, a key factor in gaining the people's confidence in, and support of, the government. As the primary provider of internal security, the ability of the Afghanistan National Police to provide quality services was thus directly linked to people's support for the government.

The worsening security conditions have caused the militarization of police and this has led to less contact with communities, thereby further contributing to their ineffectiveness as a police force. The emphasis on military tactics has resulted in a police force that was not prepared to undertake basic police services nor to engage with the communities. This inability to serve the public has made it difficult for the police to be trusted, thereby limiting their ability to obtain vital information, and further preventing effectiveness in providing security and enforcing the rule of law.

The MOIA, as the main public entity responsible for policies in the field of public security and policing, has recognized in its Strategic Plan the challenges faced by the ANP in its relation to the community. It expressed the goal of transforming the ANP from a paramilitary force into a professional police institution that would be able to respond to the needs of the public far more appropriately and be capable of providing the rule of law to the people of Afghanistan.

To achieve this transformation, the MOIA has approached the LOTFA with the request to support a project that would tackle the issue of police-community relations and enhancement of ANP capacities, which further lead to the conceptualization of the COPS project.

### 1.2. Summary of the intervention

The project "Community-Oriented Policing Services" represented a multi-donor intervention supported under the LOTFA and implemented by UNDP that targeted security and community trust in the government and ANP. The COPS intervention hypothesized that insecurity harms Afghans' views toward their country's future and confidence in the government. This assumption was supported by the results of several surveys conducted in Afghanistan which indicated that resolving the safety and security challenges is central to people's confidence in the government. The surveys that were conducted to assess the trust and expectations of people from the government have indicated that people tend to trust non-governmental entities when reporting crimes more than government bodies.

The intervention was meant to be piloted first in the PHQ and PDs in Kabul. After the achievement of results at this level, further geographical replication was anticipated.

The *Outcome* of the COPS project was: "Stable conditions of safety and security (Law and Order) established across all provinces". Three main Outcome Indicators were referring to the baseline data presented in the project's Results Framework:

- *Percentage of people (male and female) expressing trust toward the ANP in Kabul*, by taking as reference the baseline data presented by the Asia Foundation where 38% of respondents expressed "relations between police and public are very well", where the final project target was to achieve at least 5% annual increase of positive perception in the areas of intervention. The means of verification toward the achievement of this Outcome Indicator was the organization of the Community and Police Perception Survey.
- *Percentage of people (male and female) expressing positive perceptions of the safety and security in their respective police districts (in selected key engagement/ intervention areas)*, by taking as reference the baseline data presented in the UNDP's (LOTFA) Community and

police perception survey, where the final target was to achieve an increase by at least 10% security and safety perception in key intervention areas that shall be measured by the means of Community and police perception survey.

- *Percentage of surveyed PD personnel reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ*, by indicating that the baseline data will be determined by August 2019 following ANP satisfaction survey completion, where the final target was indicated as at least a 25% increase of satisfaction in year two in the target PDs, which was expected to be verified by the means of the ANP satisfaction survey completion and Rapid Pro reports from police personnel at PD.

All three Outcome Indicators have set Kabul as a geographical area. The same geographic area was set for the output indicators which are further presented.

Output 1. The capacity of the Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform improved comprised 3 results indicators:

1. *Availability of comprehensive individual and institutional capacity assessment at PHQs* (including institutional planning capacity needs assessment at PHQ and the capacities to deal with PeM issues). The baseline data was not indicated, as it was expected to be decided after an organizational review of the PHQs planned for July – August 2019. As the final target was set the completion of the comprehensive individual and institutional capacity assessments and data information on capacity development plans. As a means of verification was expected to serve the Organizational/ Functional Review.
2. *The extent to which PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs* (with the following options: fully aligned, partially aligned, not aligned). As mentioned above, the baseline data was expected to be identified following assessments of the plans and the PHQ organizational review. The final target was set that PHQ plans shall be aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs. The verification means indicated the elaboration of the Organizational/ Functional Review, assessments of existing plans, monitoring of implementation, and racking systems.
3. *The number of functions at PHQ and PDs optimized and adjusted to improve coordination between the respective two institutions*. The baseline indicated equal to zero functions identified for optimization. The target was expected to be determined per PD and PHQ. The verification was anticipated to be conducted based on the Organizational/ Functional Review.

Output 2. Improved police response to community needs and priorities comprised 8 results indicators:

1. *The number of assessments and research studies related to community-oriented police services conducted*. The baseline data was anticipated to be filled based on the community and police perception survey for Kabul while the final targets were expected to include assessments and recommendations reflected in PHQ planning. The means of verification indicated final reports and publications.
2. *The percentage of surveyed community members who participate in PeM councils that are satisfied with the PeM Councils*. The baseline data was not indicated while the final targets were set to the indicators of percentage of community satisfaction growth by 10% increase of satisfaction in the first year, 15% in the second year, and 20% by the third year. The means of verification included the organization of the Community and Police Perception Survey.
3. *The percentage of surveyed community members who participate in PeM councils and express trust toward PeM councils* (disaggregated by age, gender, businesses, disabilities, other vulnerable groups, PD). The baseline was not indicated while the final targets were set to indicate the percentage of community satisfaction increase by 10% in the first year, 15% in the second year, and 20% in the third year.
4. *The percentage of women attending and represented at the PeM (by target PD)*. The baseline data for women's attendance was not available due to the lack of data while the representation was set as a target of a 30% increase. The final targets for both attendance and representation were set to a 30% increase while the verification means included the data of the official statistics from the PeM meetings and verification exercise, population satisfaction survey with PeM as

a regular source of information, especially after the project launch.

5. *The percentage of security concerns voiced by the population addressed and solved* (per PD and gender disaggregated). The baseline data was expected to be determined after the organization of the initial PeM Council meetings while as final targets were set at least 20% of concerns were solved in the first year, 30% in the second year, and 40% in the third year of the project implementation. The verification means included the comparison of minutes of community consultation meetings with the PD Security Plans and the Community and Police Perception Survey.
6. *The level of implementation of a specific communication and behavioral change campaign/ training program targeting ANP staff* (completely, partially, not implemented). The baseline data indicated that the campaign was not implemented while the final target was set as the implementation of the behavioral change campaign/ training program targeting ANP. The verification means indicated the organization of a regular monitoring system and the organization of communication campaign activities.
7. *The level of effectiveness of communication products/ campaign elements*. The baseline data indicated that the campaign was not implemented. The final target was set as moderately effective to very effective (KPIs to measure communication effectiveness to be established) while the verification means were set to a regular monitoring system of communication campaign activities to be established later after the project launch.
8. *The percentage of ANP officers trained and enabled to integrate the PeM concept into the work of PDs*. This indicator was added in the second year of the project implementation.

Output 3. Standard PDs constructed/ rehabilitated to support community-oriented policing outlined 3 results indicators:

1. *The number of pilot PDs rehabilitated following assessments and in critical infrastructure areas* (to improve the security of police of women, men, and public visiting PD). The baseline data indicated that 19 Kabul city PDs stations were assessed, and the infrastructure gaps were identified while the final targets were set that 6 PDs shall be rehabilitated in Kabul in the first year of implementation, and 19 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in the second year. The means of verification were established based on the infrastructure survey reports as well as the monitoring of the rehabilitation process, UNDP reporting, and agreements with the MOIA and the PHQs. Additionally, it included the post-implementation monitoring system and verification of investment plans for PD rehabilitation.
2. *The number of PDs with minimum security measures reaching 100%* (an index derived as a result of the infrastructure survey) with the following parameters: electronic access control system, steel gates, boom barriers, sentry posts, security control room, anti-blast windows, physical barriers, perimeter lights, and watch tower). The baseline data indicated that none of the 19 Kabul city PDs stations met the minimum security measures. The final target was set to be determined upon the finalization of the infrastructure survey results. The verification means indicated the data included the Annual PD Infrastructure Assessments.
3. *The percentage of surveyed police PD personnel satisfied with the infrastructure in target PD police stations, the percentage of surveyed public satisfied with the infrastructure in target PD police stations* (disaggregated on sexes male and female), and *the percentage of surveyed public reporting that their PD police station is accessible* (disaggregated on sexes m/f). The baseline data was expected to be decided later. The target indicators were set to at least a 50% increase of the baseline value while the verification means were the Annual Community and Police Perception Survey.

Output 4. Administrative services are improved at PDs levels to support police services outlined 4 results indicators:

1. *The availability of Administrative Capacity Framework for PDs Parameters* (asset management, reporting to PHQ, logistics, and supply chain management). The baseline data was not available while the final targets were set to the administrative capacity framework for PDs developed by PHQ. The verification means included the results of the institutional and



individual capacity assessment and the ANP satisfaction survey results that were expected to inform the selection of the administrative services.

2. *The availability of improved SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs.* The baseline data indicated that SOPs require review and development while the final targets included the review and improvement of the SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs. The verification means were expected to be performed based on the Results of the Functional Analysis of PDs.
3. *The degree to which the core administrative functions in pilot PDs are improved* by (a) the percentage of personnel (at PHQ and PD) satisfied with the optimized key functions and (b) time reduced (in %) in the key administrative processes. The baseline data was set to 0% while the final targets were set to increase by 50% the satisfaction level. The means of verification was set to be determined based on the post-satisfaction survey of the MOIA – PHQ – PD and the follow-up functional review of the optimized functions.
4. *The availability of functional inventory management systems at PDs.* The baseline data indicated that there is no proposed inventory management system while the final target was set that the inventory management system is functional at selected PDs. The verification means were expected to be determined after the implementation of the task-based survey mobile app.

### 1.3. Implementation approach of the intervention

The project was set to be realized in a phased approach over the course of 4 years by following 2 directions:

- (a) *Community-oriented policing is being used to transform community-police relations.* This was the centerpiece of the project and it aimed to apply the four essential elements of Community Policing which are reflected in the Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in UN Peace Operations: (1) Consultations with communities; (2) Responding to communities; (3) Mobilizing communities; (4) Solving recurring problems. When implementing the respective provisions, the project committed to focusing on the inclusion of women, youth, and marginalized groups.
- (b) *Establishing an enabling environment* through infrastructure and administrative capacity-building to ensure the ANP has the means to implement Community-oriented policing, by providing capacity-building to the District Police Stations in Kabul, maximizing national ownership by increasing the leadership capacity of the Kabul PHQ.

The *national ownership* of the project results was anticipated to be secured through closely engaging the Kabul PHQ in taking the lead in planning, monitoring, and rolling out the project across all police districts in Kabul.

The project **strategy** focused on building upon the high-level commitments of the Government, and notably of the MOIA, to pursue the country's demilitarization of police services and improving the overall communities' trust in ANP. The barriers to good community-police governance for the national security in Afghanistan were fundamental issues of demonstrating the viability of the government and overall capacity to realize legitimate power. Through improved planning and decisions consistent with the principles reflected in the Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in UN Peace Operations the overall public trust in the government to assure security could increasingly grow and built-up social cohesion in Afghanistan.

The **phased approach** of the project implementation anticipated the support of 19 District Police Stations in Kabul. A further extension to Herat and Mazar was also one of the options for increasing the project's intervention area in the second year of implementation. The realization of the phased approach was planned to be conducted in the following sequencing:

- In the first phase of the project implementation – approximately 20 months – the project was anticipating supporting 6 PDs in Kabul.
- In the second phase of the project, another 6 PDs were expecting to receive support.
- The final third phase of the project was planned to cover the remaining 7 PDs.

At the same time, the phased approach was meant to serve both as a prerequisite and motivation

for the MOIA to enhance sustainability, project absorption, and compliance with the declared commitments on police reform.

The **Theory of Change** of the COPS project was built on the idea that strengthening community-police relations shall lead to an effective and responsive ANP capable of protecting and serving the public.

The Theory of Change of the COPS project was developed on the following logic:

- If the ANP is provided with support to improve their capacity to engage and serve their community (through the establishment of engagement mechanisms and the means to serve the community by having adequate personnel, infrastructure, training, and equipment)
- Then the ANP will be more capable and confident to professionally serve the communities they are resolving issues that are relevant to the community
- All of these should result in increased safety and stability within communities and increased acceptance and trust of the ANP as an integral part of the community and as the primary provider of safety and security
- This will turn into contributing to creating public trust in the government and security institutions improving stability for the country.

The ProDoc emphasized the fact that the Theory of Change design has taken into consideration the challenging and constantly changing security environment within Afghanistan, which has made it difficult to introduce changes to make the ANP into a professional police force focusing on law and order. It stressed that the Theory of Change reflected the need to focus on a bottom-up and people-centered approach while being part of a comprehensive package of projects supporting the MOIA and ANP to better serve the people of Afghanistan.

#### 1.4. Roles of the national counterparts

The ProDoc regulated that the project's key counterpart was the MOIA with the relevant agencies responsible to implement parts of the COPS project. Respectively, good coordination among the respective actors was crucial for the success of the project.

The main project stakeholders (including the MOIA, subordinated agencies, and development partners) identified in the ProDoc at the inception phase to be actively involved in the implementation are presented in the table below.

**Table 1. COPS project stakeholders and roles**

Stakeholder	Stakeholder role as regulated in the Project Document
MOIA	The main institutional counterpart of the COPS project responsible for the coordination and supervision of the implementation process
Deputy Minister for Security	Provision of strong leadership over provincial and district-level activities
PeM Directorate	Project partner
Kabul Provincial Police Headquarters	Project partner, ownership in relation to community-oriented policing's administrative functions
Deputy Minister for Support	Project partner
Provincial Coordination Directorate under the Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy	Project partner
Kabul Police Chief	Provision of regular engagement with the project
Deputy Civilian Police Chief	Leading the community-oriented policing's administrative functions

Stakeholder	Stakeholder role as regulated in the Project Document
ANP officers (selected number of personnel based on the project team recommendation)	Serving as advisors and technical experts while community-oriented policing is implemented and further extended to other regions

The MOIA as the national implementing partner of the COPS project agreed to take full programmatic, financial responsibility and accountability for the effective use of UNDP resources and delivery of the project outputs, by assuming:

- Programmatic responsibilities that involved setting policy direction, reviewing, developing, and approving strategies, policies, work processes, concept notes, terms of reference, and meeting agendas.
- Financial responsibility and accountability by agreeing that UNDP would provide funding only after the successful conclusion of the standardized capacity development assessment (through the HACT modality).

However, the ProDoc indicated that the assessment of the MOIA capacities concluded that the institution was not able to meet the standards to undertake financial services.

## **2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY**

This chapter explains the evaluation objectives and scope, by elaborating on the limitations in the application of some evaluation methods. It presents the criteria, performance standards, and other measures that were used in the context of the evaluation, by also taking into consideration the available information that was possible to collect during the assignment.

### **2.1. Evaluation purpose and objectives**

The evaluation purpose was defined by the provisions of the Terms of Reference, by indicating the following:

- *Purpose of accountability*, by exploring why certain aspects of the COPS project have or have not been implemented as planned, by looking at the project design and prospects for successful replication of the project.
- *Purpose of learning*, by exploring the lessons learned in the evaluation and supporting a better understanding of future interventions.

The assignment defined 14 specific objectives for the COPS project evaluation which are further detailed in *Annex 2* of the present report. In sum, the evaluation objectives were formulated to assess the coordination among international partners and COPS project, activities toward the provision of capacity-building to MOIA staff to assume the Community Policing Initiatives, training provided to female MOIA personnel, implementation of the CPSS findings, supporting the Kabul PDs activities, assessing the project design and quality and timeliness of the inputs, efficiency, relevance, effectiveness, management arrangements, identification of advantages, bottlenecks and lessons learned, as well as provide recommendations.

### **2.2. Methodology overview**

In line with the UNDP evaluation policies and procedures, the COPS project was required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon its premature completion. This report concerns the terminal evaluation of the project to assess the results achieved from its commencement on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2020 to the finalization on the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 2021.

The methodology has been structured around the OECD/ DAC revised evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the intervention. All these criteria are in full alignment with the provisions of the UNDP standards, notably with the provisions of the revised UNDP Evaluation Guidelines. The reflection of the respective Guidelines in the present report ensures affiliation with the new UNDP Evaluation Policy and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

Additionally, as prescribed by the OECD/ DAC guidelines and the UNDP requirements, the evaluation of the COPS project was performed by a qualified external expert, by seeking to analyze the complex issues and capture the intended and unintended effects of the COPS's development intervention in Afghanistan.

The evaluation is referring to the UNDP Quality Standards for Programming which defined the following criteria: strategic, relevant, principled, management and monitoring, efficient, effective, sustainability, and national ownership. In this sense, an adapted scorecard has been applied to evaluate of the COPS project.

The report synthesizes lessons learned from the project design and implementation process to help guide future UNDP interventions in Afghanistan or other locations that face similar challenges, notably, lack of trust between communities and police. The application of the revised OECD/DAC criteria has allowed a better assessment of the report's alignment to the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports by including the critical indicators for a high-quality evaluation report. Additionally, the evaluation has employed the UNDP Quality Standards for Programming as a complementary list of criteria for the assessment of the COPS project.

The report is also based on the performance assessment approach guided by the principles of results-based management. The evaluation tracks the impact per the project's Results Framework. The contribution of project outputs and project management is evaluated concerning

the achievement of the project outcomes and overall objective. It reviewed the implementation experience and achievement of the project results against the Project Document, including any changes made during implementation, by looking at the overall application of the adaptive management as part of the COPS project.

### **2.3. Data available for conducting the evaluation**

The inception phase of the evaluation has started by addressing the evaluation objectives' information needs. Respectively:

- *To evaluate the status of coordination among international partners such as the Community Policing for Afghanistan CPA project funded by the German and UN-Habitat policing program, the evaluator requested:*
  - CPA project contact persons' details (e-mails and phone numbers).
  - Contact details of any other relevant partners involved in Afghanistan on similar policing programs.
  - Any relevant documentation on the coordination process among international partners.
- *To evaluate the status of the training and capacity building of MOIA staff to fully assume responsibilities of the Community Policing Initiatives, the evaluator requested:*
  - MOIA contact persons' details (e-mails and phone numbers) responsible for the Community Policing Initiatives.
- *To evaluate the UNDP COPS intervention to the capacity-building demand of MOIA staff, Kabul PHQ, and PDs staff, the evaluator requested:*
  - MOIA staff, Kabul PHQ, and PDs staff contact persons' details (e-mails and phones).
- *To evaluate the status of training for female MOIA personnel to perform policing functions, the evaluator requested:*
  - MOIA contact persons' details (e-mails and phones) responsible for the training.
  - List of participants at the training.
  - Agenda of the training.
  - Other relevant documentation on the training organization.
- *To assess the status of recommendations of CPSS findings the evaluator requested the following information:*
  - Presenting the CPSS recommendations.
  - Contact persons' details of the Kabul PD responsible for the incorporation of the CPSS recommendations.
- *To evaluate the support for the Kabul Police District activities implemented by local implementing partners was requested information on:*
  - Contact persons' details of the relevant Kabul PD representatives.
  - Contact persons' details of the local implementing partners.
- *To assess the project design in terms of its relevance to the overall development situation at the national level, relevance to national strategies, and relevance to beneficiaries the evaluator requested:*
  - English translation of the following documents: Afghan National Peace and Development Framework 2017-2021; Afghanistan National Priority Program; Afghan Ministry of Interior Strategic Plan (2018-2021), UNDP Country Program Document.
- *To assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, the reporting, and monitoring system, and the extent to which these have been effective the evaluator requested:*
  - Information on the implementation of the Monitoring Plan.
  - Contact details of the persons responsible for collecting monitoring information and further conducting the monitoring of the project.
- *To assess the cost-efficiency of the project interventions, the relevance, and effectiveness of the project's strategy, approaches for the achievement of the project objectives,*

*performance of the project in terms of timeliness of producing the expected outputs, the project's management arrangements, achievement of the project results as well as seeking to identify recommendations to key project stakeholders for future projects/ program development, the evaluator requested:*

- Contact details of the MOIA staff dealing with the monitoring of the project's activities.

Due to the context of the COPS project's premature closure and the consequences following the regime change in Afghanistan, most of the requested information was not available. Equally, the organization of the interviews with the project beneficiaries was not possible.

At the inception phase of the assignment, the evaluator received the following documents on the COPS project:

- COPS Project Document
- Human Resource Plan 2021 (version revised April 2021)
- Annual Working Plan for January – December 2021 (version revised in April 2021)
- Procurement Plan for January – December 2021 (version revised in April 2021)
- Organigram COPS dated from 17<sup>th</sup> August 2021
- COPS 2020 First Quarterly Project Progress Report (January – March 2020)
- COPS 2020 Quarterly Project Progress Report (April – June 2020)
- COPS 2020 Quarterly Project Progress Report (July – September 2020)
- COPS 2020 Annual Project Progress Report
- COPS 2021 Quarterly Project Progress Report (January – March 2021)
- COPS 2021 Second quarter Progress Report (April – June 2021)
- COPS 2021 Third Quarter Progress Report (1<sup>st</sup> of July – 15<sup>th</sup> of August 2021)

After the submission of the draft evaluation report, the following list of documents was made available:

- COPS Final Report (draft version)
- Design and Appraisal Stage Quality Assurance Report
- COPS Output and Activity Description
- Human Resource Plan 2021
- Organigram COPS dated from 19<sup>th</sup> February 2020
- Annual Working Plan for January – December 2020
- Summarized COPS Project Budget
- Revised Annual Working Plan for January – December 2020
- COPS Revised HP Plan 2020
- COPS revised Procurement Plan 2020
- Meeting minutes of the LOTFA Steering Committee from 11<sup>th</sup> December 2019

Additionally, after the submission of the draft evaluation report, one of the former COPS's national project coordinators was delegated for a semi-structured interview and 3 representatives of the UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan were available for a focus-group discussion.

## **2.4. Overview of the methodological approach**

The overall design of the present evaluation has been built on the explicit provisions of the Results Framework and the Theory of Change of the COPS project. This approach aligns with the requirements put forward in the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines revised in 2021.

The report was prepared in full correspondence with the UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation (2016). The norms include internationally agreed principles, goals and targets, utility, credibility, independence, impartiality, ethics, transparency, human rights and gender equality, and professionalism. The present evaluation follows the principles outlined in the 2019 Evaluation Policy which stem from the General Assembly resolutions and the UNDP Executive Board's decisions.

In this sense, the present evaluation was realized in alignment with the directions put forward in the IC with the Ref. No. 2022/009 and the Terms of Reference for the COPS project evaluation being conducted in the following phases:

- Desk review.
- Preparation of the evaluation design and methods.
- Preparation of the detailed Inception Report.
- Application of the evaluation methodology.
- Analysis of the collected data.
- Presentation of the preliminary findings and validation of the draft evaluation report.
- Submission of the Final Evaluation Report.

The evaluation report was drafted in alignment with the following regulatory framework for conducting external evaluations:

- UNDP, 2021, Evaluation Guidelines.
- UNDP, 2019, Revised UNDP Evaluation Policy.
- UNDP, 2020, Social and Environmental Standards.
- UNDP, 2018, Disability Inclusive Development in UNDP. Guidance Note.
- United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), 2020, Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation.
- UNEG, 2018, Guidance on Evaluating Institutional Gender Mainstreaming.
- UNEG, 2016, Norms and Standards for Evaluation.
- UNEG, 2014, UNEG Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equity in Evaluations.
- United Nations, 2018, System-Wide Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (SWAP) Evaluation Performance Indicator. Technical Guidance.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Development Evaluation, Better Criteria for Better Evaluation, 2019, Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use.
- UNDP, 2018, Updated UNDP programme and operations policies and procedures (POPP) for project and programme management (PPM).
- United Nations, 2019, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.
- UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports (UNEG/G (2010)/2).

## 2.5. Overview of tools and methods

The evaluation has employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The evaluation design has been put forward to follow a participatory and consultative approach that sought to ensure close engagement with the monitoring personnel, project management, implementing partners, and male and female direct beneficiaries. An overview of the methodological tools is reflected in the table below.

The evaluation was designed to be conducted in a participatory and consultative manner by seeking to ensure close engagement with key counterparts. In this sense, the pool of methods for fulfilling the assignment comprised the following:

- *Structured document review*: the respective method examined the project documentation and reports compiled through the implementation of the intervention.
- *Structured and semi-structured interviews*: this method was meant to be employed with selected stakeholders to explore the questions put forward in the ToR, by applying questions in a conversational format, around the evaluation criteria.
- *Direct observation during the meetings*: this method was meant to be commissioned as a complementary source of extracting information, including documentary evidence, interviews, and observations compiled, summarized, and organized according to the questions asked in the evaluation.
- *Focus group*: organization of structured discussions on the project topics with various groups comprising multiple respondents with the purpose to examine and refine individual and collective perspectives and experiences on the COPS project.

**Table 2.** *Overview of the methodological tools and available information for conducting the evaluation*

Methodological tools	(Yes/No)	Comments
Document review		
COPS ProDoc	Yes	The information was provided before the kick-off meeting
Annual workplans	Yes	
Theory of change and results framework	Yes	
Consolidated quarterly and annual reports	Yes	
Project quality assurance report	Yes	The reports were made available after the submission of the draft evaluation report
Final project report	Yes	
Activity designs	No	The information was not available
Results-oriented monitoring report	No	
Highlights of project board meetings	No	
Technical/financial monitoring reports	No	
Interviews and meetings (by the means of semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions)		
Meetings with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Key stakeholders of the COPS project (men and women)</li><li>- MOIA and other government counterparts (men and women)</li><li>- Donor community</li><li>- CSO representatives (men and women)</li></ul>	No	Meeting the COPS project stakeholders and beneficiaries was not possible due to the regime change in Afghanistan.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- UNDP Country Office</li></ul>	Yes	Interviews conducted after the submission of the draft evaluation report.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- COPS project team</li></ul>	Yes	
Surveys and questionnaires	No	Conducting questionnaires and surveys of male and female stakeholders of the COPS project was not possible due to the regime change in Afghanistan.
Field visit	No	
Data review and analysis	Yes	Review of alternative sources and methods to ensure maximum validity, and reliability of data.
Gender and human rights lens	Yes	All the evaluation products have addressed gender, disability, and human rights dimension.

## 2.6. Addressing gender equality, disability, vulnerability, and social inclusion in the evaluation methodology

Since the promotion of gender equality, human rights and disability concerns are guiding principles for all United Nations entities, these interrelated issues are incorporated in the respective evaluation as well. This is a requirement that is expressly reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Policy. The gender-responsive approach represents a requirement in the UNEG “Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations”, even for project evaluations that were not gender-responsive in their design.

As prescribed in the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines, all evaluations commissioned by UNDP must



integrate human rights and gender equality, by aiming to meet the requirements of the United Nations System-wide Action Plan on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Evaluation Performance Indicators.

In the context of the present report, the aspects of gender, disability, vulnerability, and social inclusion were specifically evaluated and reflected in a separate chapter. The gender profile of the interview respondents from the total of 4 people engaged, included 3 males and 1 female. The validation of the report was conducted by 2 representatives of the UNDP Afghanistan, involving 1 male, and 1 female.

### 3. FINDINGS

This chapter addresses the evaluation criteria and evaluation objectives put forward in the Terms of Reference of the evaluation assignment, by looking at the COPS project design and implementation process. The findings are based on evidence derived from the data collection and analysis of the methods described in the methodology section of the report.

#### 3.1. Assessing the project evaluability

The very context and circumstances of the COPS project evaluation make it relevant to first explore the extent of its evaluability. The checklist that is being put forward by the revised UNDP Evaluation Guidelines is further applied to assess the evaluability of the project.

The assessment is conducted with the purpose to measure the decision to conduct a project evaluation even though the project has ceased implementation prematurely by reaching approximately 42% of the expected total duration. It also contributes to putting forward recommendations for conducting evaluations in similar situations.

**Table 3. Evaluability checklist**

Assessment questions*		(Y) Yes	(N) No
1.	Does the subject of the evaluation have a clearly defined theory of change? Is there a common understanding as to what initiatives will be subject to evaluation?	Y	
2.	Is there a well-defined results framework for the initiative that is subject to evaluation? Are goals, outcome statements, outputs, inputs, and activities clearly defined?	Y	
3.	Is there sufficient data for evaluation? This may include baseline data, data collected from monitoring against a set of targets, well-documented progress reports, field visit reports, reviews, and previous evaluations.		N
4.	Is the planned evaluation still relevant, given the evolving context? Are the purpose and scope of the evaluation clearly defined and commonly shared among stakeholders? What evaluation questions are of interest to whom? Are these questions realistic, given the project design and likely data availability and resources available for the evaluation?		N
5.	Will political, social, and economic factors allow for effective implementation and use of the evaluation as envisaged?		N
6.	Are there sufficient resources (human and financial) allocated to the evaluation?	Y	
<i>*The checklist is presented based on the evaluator's assessment in accordance with the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines</i>			

The UNDP Evaluation Guidelines prescribe that if the answers to one or more of the questions included in the checklist under no. 1 to 3 are 'no', the evaluation can still go ahead. Respectively, despite the complex situation for conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the COPS project and the limited information, the COPS project qualifies for a final project evaluation.

#### 3.2. Analysis of the project design

##### ***Project design and formulation***

The project design and formulation were screened through the provisions of the UNDP POPP on the development of project documents and quality standards. Respectively, the results of the analysis indicated the following findings:

- In general terms, the ProDoc fulfills the requirements for the project design regulated by the POPP on project development.
- The project describes comprehensively the partnerships with other development partners. It assigned the roles as well as the prioritization of building the partnerships for the project implementation.
- The Project Document identified the beneficiaries and indicated how their engagement should take place. It also outlined the layers of coordination and prioritized their engagement in the project implementation.
- The scaling-up and sustainability aspects of the intervention were included in the project design by also indicating how the responsibility for overseeing and monitoring will gradually be led by the PHQ.
- The Multi-year Work Plan was structured following the overall UNDP requirements.
- The Monitoring Plan was in line with the UNDP's programming policies and procedures. The monitoring activities, purposes, frequency, and expected results were clearly defined and structured.

However, the analysis has also outlined several limitations:

- In the description of the project strategy, the project should have explained how the intervention is aligned with the UNDSCF/ CPD outcome. The COPS project strategy design was mostly focused on the intervention's approach with limited analytical coverage of the strategic frameworks of UNDP.
- In the description of the expected results, there was no nexus to the higher-level results (provisions of the strategic frameworks of MOIA and UNSDCF) nor the analysis of these policies.
- The presentation of the project partnerships should have indicated a clear linkage with the project's Theory of Change, by outlining what assumptions and expected results achieved by partners were critical for the fulfillment of the COPS project results. In the case of the COPS project, there was a broad description of the assigned roles.

To improve the project design, especially in the context of future interventions, it is *recommended*:

- To annex to the ProDoc the Partner Capacity Assessment Tool and HACT Micro Assessment when the project employs the HACT modality. In the case of the COPS project, this was particularly relevant as the ProDoc indicated that the assessment of the MOIA capacities concluded that the institution was not able to meet the standards to undertake financial services, it was particularly relevant to annex.

### ***Lessons from other projects incorporated into project design***

The COPS project built upon the previous UNDP and international partners' knowledge and experience in the field of community policing in Afghanistan.

The COPS project has learned from the earlier LOTFA engagement during the community policing initiative in Phase VI (2011-2014) which supported the development of a Community Policing Model. From the respective intervention, the COPS project has learned that further assistance to strengthen the capacities of police forces is needed by providing financial and operational support to the establishment of the Community Policing Secretariat in the MOIA.

From Phase 1 of the Police Development Project (2015-2016) and Phase 2 (2017-2018), the COPS project learned that overemphasis at the MOIA level and provision of equipment support without a clear understanding of the intended results at the community level is not yielding the expected results.

From the GIZ interventions to the community policing in Afghanistan, especially in the northern region, the project has learned that strong national ownership was a key element for the success of the GIZ's intervention. Some of the successful approaches to assure such ownership included close involvement of MOIA in all steps of the project implementation, which also helped to

guarantee the sustainability of the approach. It also learned about the engagement with local NGOs which were more accepted by the communities than the national NGOs.

The COPS ProDoc summarized that the UNDP's previous experience with the PeM Councils has formed the following conclusions that shall be further replicated in the COPS project:

*(1) Community Policing and the PeM councils are relevant*

This finding was based on the MPD Project that established that further support to the ANP shall continue to facilitate public participation, notably as part of the PeM Community, Police Partnership Committees, and CSOs.

*(2) Iterative approach*

The iterative approach toward the implementation of the COPS project was built on the knowledge of previous UNDP experience in Afghanistan indicating wide diversity of the public which shall be implicated and taken into consideration when establishing the goals and targets of the project. Respectively, local solutions should be encouraged to assuring local sustainability. The main learning of this approach was that "one size will not fit all".

*(3) Comprehensive support*

The COPS project has learned from the previous LOTFA interventions on community policing that focusing only on establishing PeM Directorate under the MOIA in Kabul as well as the PeM Department at the PHQ had only limited impact on service delivery at the community level.

From the analysis of the project progress reports and the interview with the project team representative, it was learned that the COPS project has followed in general terms the lessons that were reflected in the ProDoc. Notably, the key-intervention instrument for strengthening community trust in ANP was further reflected in supporting the PeM councils and CSOs (by introducing the small grants' funding mechanism for engaging CSO through micro-projects on community security identified through the police districts' PeM Councils).

The COPS project design and implementation combined the "soft" and the "hard" components that were put forward in the lessons learned from other projects. It included a wide variety of activities targeting the capacity-building of the ANP and MOIA as well as the activities that aimed to improve the police infrastructure and equipment provision.

Speaking about the iterative approach in the context of the COPS project, it was realized through the introduction of gradual steps for the implementation of the outputs based on preliminary assessments, surveys as well as comprehensive consultations with the MOIA. It is important to outline that the iterative approach is a relatively new presence in the frame of project management which required balancing the UNDP's corporate and country's needs. This approach implies that at the corporate level, requirements must be kept to the minimum level necessary to integrate information and present results.

***Analysis of the Results Framework formulation***

The Results Framework formulation fulfilled most of the UNDP requirements by presenting the intended outcome and its indicators, baseline values, targets, and means of verification. These criteria are indispensable for the formulation of Results Frameworks in the UNDP projects, as the organization seeks to meet the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards.

Another requirement of IATI is to make sure that indicators presented in the Results Framework are S.M.A.R.T (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound), provide accurate baselines, targets underpinned by reliable evidence and data, and avoid acronyms so that external audience clearly understand the results of the project.

Respectively, the analysis of the Outcome Indicators against these requirements indicated that all 3 indicators fit the S.M.A.R.T criteria with some limitations:

- Even though the project anticipated further extension outside Kabul in other districts, the geographic focus of all Outcome Indicators was only on Kabul.
- The baseline for the third Outcome Indicator was not identified by being prescribed that it will

be decided by August 2019 following ANP satisfaction survey completion (while the respective data was never introduced in an updated version of the Results Framework).

- The final targets for the Outcome Indicators were also facing inexactitudes. It was indicated that these targets will be decided after the pilot period based on 500 interviews in the intervention area (while the respective data was not reflected in the Results Framework).
- The second and third Outcome Indicator prescribed a percentual increase in beneficiaries' perception, respectively by a 10% increase in satisfaction among the people in the intervention areas on security and safety perception, and at least by 25% increase in satisfaction of PD personnel with the support services received by the PHQ in the second year of project implementation. Respectively, the final targets were identified rather ambiguous and without a clear methodological explanation that would support such a percentage increase in the intervention area (by keeping also in mind that the overall context may vary for each of the districts which also could impact the achievement of the indicators).

The analysis of the COPS's output indicators against the IATI standards indicated that the same limitations were further transposed in this context, notably:

- Kabul was indicated as the sole geographic area.
- Baseline data on most of the indicators specified "TBD" and has not been further presented in other documents of the project that would indicate updates to the Results Framework.
- Final targets were indicating an increase in the percentage of trust and satisfaction with limited explanation and clarity on how methodologically the respective benchmarks were established (i.e., indicators 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3), while other indicators were not aligning with the S.M.A.R.T. criteria (i.e., Indicator 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.6, 2.7, 3.2, 4.2).

The analysis of the project reports (quarterly, annual, and final draft) has indicated that the Results Framework was not updated on the missing data, and the respective limitations were not ultimately addressed.

Additionally, another shortcoming of the Results Framework formulation represented the fact that most of the results indicators (i.e., especially the ones under Output 2 – 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and Output 3 – 3.3) were bound to public opinion polls, which could challenge the objective assessment of indicators fulfillment as no other methods of verification were included.

To conclude, the formulation of the Results Framework was compliant with the template requirement of UNDP, however, the IATI standards were only partially met. The most problematic areas concerned the formulation of indicators based on the S.M.A.R.T. criteria and the provision of accurate targets supported by reliable evidence and data.

### ***Analysis of assumptions and risks***

The Risk Log that was annexed to the ProDoc identified 4 risks all of which were updated on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September 2018. These were:

1. *Little or no political will by the government officials in developing community policing.* This risk is marked with the grading of Likelihood<sup>1</sup> – 2 and Impact<sup>2</sup> – 5.

The main countermeasures to address this risk were identified as:

- Regular Board meeting to discuss/confirm support for community policing reform.
  - Dialogue with MOIA, ANP, and community.
  - Mid-Term Review (2020) to assess the situation.
2. *Strong political leadership to limit any pushback and resentment arising from those in the MOIA and non-target areas seeking support from the project in their areas.* This risk was marked with the grading of Likelihood – 2 and the Impact – 5.

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<sup>1</sup> The risk probability is graded based on a 1-5 scale (1 = Not likely; 5 = Expected)

<sup>2</sup> The risk impact is graded based on 1-5 scale (1 = Negligible; 5 = Extreme)

The main countermeasures to address this risk were identified as:

- Constate update to MOIA leadership on project progress to re-establish support and reassure of project impact.
  - Communication campaigns to promote project activities within communities.
  - Regular meetings and workshops to engage leadership in project implementation.
3. *Limited access to MOIA, ANP, and Community facilities by the UNDP Project implementation team members.* This risk was also marked with the grading of Likelihood – 2 and the Impact – 5.

The proposed countermeasures to address this risk comprised:

- Engage civil society organizations and ANP personnel as capacity development and project executors.
  - Regular security reviews and undertaking additional security measures.
4. Limited participation of communities, particularly women and other underrepresented groups in project activities. This risk was marked with the Likelihood of 3 and the Impact of 3.

The mitigation measures put forward included:

- Establish gender and diversity goals with project partners on Project Board for all project activities.
- Empower women to participate in community policing activities.
- Specify targets for gender and underrepresented groups to participate in project training activities.
- Collaborate with gender equality advocates in and out of government.
- Community outreach activities involving women and underrepresented groups participating in the project.
- Working with credible partners/ interlocutors who have legitimacy and access in target communities, where UNDP may not otherwise have access.

The Risk Log maintained in the First Quarterly Report of 2020 all four risks indicated in the ProDoc, as well as the countermeasures (with only one exception, the fourth risk' countermeasure was removed "Working with credible partners/ interlocutors who have legitimacy and access in target communities, where UNDP may not otherwise have access."

At the same time, the analysis of the First Quarterly Report of 2020 on the section that described the risks has indicated opposing information. Notably, it described 3 new risks that were not reflected in the Risk Log:

- a) The report indicated frequent changes in the MOIA leadership. It specified that the newly elected president has not appointed the cabinet and the MOIA leadership may impact the implementation of activities because of divergent perceptions of the project priorities. However, UNDP has been closely working with Kabul PHQ and MOIA to keep the activities running smoothly.
- Secondly, the report described that the breakout of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in late March delayed the implementation of project activities. Due to the pandemic, the authorities have imposed a lockdown across the country. Given the magnitude of the pandemic, the MOIA has been focusing its attention and resources on addressing COVID-19, specifically within the police force, instead of prioritizing the project implementation.
- b) Thirdly, the report indicated that UNDP has also limited the numbers of international staff in the country, while the national staff was telecommuting. The restrictions have disrupted the organization of the infrastructure assessments and impeded the ability to hold meetings with MOIA and ANP on the implementation of the project.

Respectively, even though the Risk Log has been updated in the timeframe of drafting the First Quarterly Report of 2020, it did not include the new (actual) risks that the project was facing in the implementation process.

The same tendency was observed in the upcoming reports of the COPS project. As follows:

- The second Quarterly Report for 2020, described the COVID-19 outbreak as posing significant risks to the project. However, the Risk Log was not updated, by maintaining the same risks and countermeasures as indicated above.
- The third Quarterly Report for 2020, described COVID-19 and delays in staff recruitment as posing significant risks to the project implementation. However, as indicated, no updates to the Risk Log were introduced.
- The Annual Report for 2020 did not contain any risk analysis, by only annexing the Risk Log that reflected the limitations presented above.
- The first quarterly report for 2021, described administrative risks and the procurement process as risks to the project, and it annexed the Risk Log from the previous year.
- The second Quarterly Report for 2021 indicated management of expectations, procurement delays, movement restrictions, and COVID-19 as project risks. The Risk Log was adjusted on the chapters referring to the countermeasures while maintaining the same risks as in the previous reports.
- The third Quarterly Report for 2021 included the same/ identical information on the risk description and in the Risk Log as the one presented in the Second Quarterly Report for 2021.

The analysis of these reports indicated that there was no connection between the narrative part of describing the risks and the information in the Risk Log annexed to the reports. The countermeasures were also not updated and were maintained the same in the quarterly reports, even though the project was facing challenges due to risks in the implementation process.

Additionally, speaking about the project implementation and the challenges that the project has faced, the representatives of the UNDP Afghanistan affiliated with the COPS project implementation have mentioned that following an unfortunate staff security incident, UNDP put in place stricter security rules which limited the mobility of the project team and interaction with the project partners. This was also not reflected in the Risk Log, nor suitable mitigation measures were identified.

### 3.3. Evaluation of the implementation process

#### **Project Finance**

The actual expenditure and the leverage of co-financing have been difficult to assess due to the limited information available for analysis. However, by accumulating the data from the available material, the expenses per output are presented in the table below.

**Table 4. Expenses by Output (1<sup>st</sup> of January 2020 – 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2021)**

Output & Description	Total Cumulative Expenses (in USD)
Output 1: Capacity of Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform improved	354,052.97
<b>Sub-total Output 1</b>	<b>354,052.97</b>
Output 2: Improved police response to community needs and priorities	1,003,657.60
<b>Sub-total Output 2</b>	<b>1,003,657.60</b>
Output 3: Standard PDs constructed/ rehabilitated to support community-oriented policing	254,450.16
<b>Sub-total Output 3</b>	<b>254,450.16</b>
Output 4: Administrative services are improved at PD levels to support police services	221,269.62
<b>Sub-total Output 4</b>	<b>221,269.62</b>

<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1,833,430.35</b>
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The analysis of the total cumulative expenses in comparison with the total budget of the COPS project indicated a low delivery rate. During the implementation timeframe, the project has absorbed approximately 12% of the total committed budget.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

The monitoring framework that was put in place for the project was reflected in the ProDoc in Annex 4. The overall design and formulation of the Monitoring Plan of the COPS project were in line with the UNDP's programming policing and procedures. The monitoring activities, purposes, frequency, and expected results were clearly defined and structured.

The main role for performing the monitoring and evaluation was attributed to LOTFA with the following main responsibilities:

- Development and application of relevant M&E activities including overall frameworks, tools, data collection, and analysis.
- Providing real-time data back to project implementers on the project implementation.
- Working with the COPS team to provide support in critical design, planning, and piloting activities, notably to provide (1) police and community perception surveys in Kabul; (2) provincial and district police station mapping; (3) infrastructure and capacity assessments of the COPS project.

However, the evaluator could not verify the application of the Monitoring Plan as additional documents were not available. The draft of the COPS Final Project Report that was submitted for review did not reflect the results of the monitoring activities.

### **Overall results (attainment of objectives)**

The assessment of progress was based on data provided in the quarterly progress reports for 2020, the annual report for 2020, and the quarterly progress reports for 2021 as well as the final draft report.

**Table 5. Analysis of the Results Framework achievement**

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Final targets</b>	<b>Means of verification</b>	<b>Status</b>
<b>Project Outcome:</b> Stable conditions of safety and security (Law and Order) established across all provinces.			
% of people (m/f) expressing trust toward the ANP in Kabul	At least 5% annually in the areas of intervention	Community and police perception survey (annual)	Due to the premature closure of the project, the final targets of the Outcome Indicators were not achieved.
% of people (m/f) expressing positive perceptions on the safety and security in their respective police districts in Kabul	By at least 10% security and safety perception in key intervention areas have been increased	Community and police perception survey (annual)	
% of surveyed PD personnel reporting satisfaction with the support services received by the PHQ in Kabul	At least 25% if Y2 in the target PDs	ANP satisfaction survey completion Rapid Pro reports from police personnel	



Indicators	Final targets	Means of verification	Status
		at PD	
<b>Output 1:</b> The capacity of the Police Provincial Headquarters to lead and sustain reform improved.			
1.1. Availability of comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments at PHQs in Kabul	Comprehensive individual and institutional Capacity Assessments completed, and data inform Capacity Development Plans	Organizational/ Functional Review	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed.  The final target was not achieved.
1.2. Extent to which PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs a) Fully aligned b) Partially aligned c) Not aligned  Following plans are meant in this indicator: Budget planning and formulation (including for PDs) PeM implementation plan Staffing and change management plans Infrastructure improvement plan Procurement of Equipment, PPE, and maintenance plans	PHQ Plans are aligned with the needs and priorities of PDs	Organizational/ Functional Review Assessment of existing plans; monitoring of implementation and tracking systems	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., preparation of the terms of reference).  The final target was not achieved.
1.3. # of functions at PHQ and PDs optimized and adjusted to improve coordination between the two	Target TBD per PD and PHQ	Organizational/ Functional Review	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., in total 12 functions were identified for the needs analysis and assessment).  The final target was not achieved.
<b>Output 2:</b> Improved police response to community needs and priorities			

Indicators	Final targets	Means of verification	Status
2.1. Number of assessments and research studies related to community-oriented police services conducted	Assessments are completed and recommendations are reflected in PHQ planning	Final Reports/ Publications	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., Community Police Perception Survey completed for Kabul which covered 19 PDs and a total number of 7000 respondents, around 20% respondents were police officers).  The final target was not achieved.
2.2. % of surveyed community members who participate in PeM councils that are satisfied with the PeM Councils	% of community with satisfaction increases: By 10% in Y1 By 15 % in Y2 By 20 % in Y3	Community and Police perception survey	Little progress for achieving the target.  The final target was not achieved.
2.3. % of surveyed community members who participate in PeM councils and express trust toward PeM councils (disaggregated by age, gender, businesses, disabilities, other vulnerable groups, PD)	% of community members who express trust increases By 10% in Y1 By 15 % in Y2 By 20 % in Y3	Community and Police perception survey	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., organization of community consultations in 6 PDs of Kabul where a total of total 1900 Kabul citizens participated).  The final target was not achieved.
2.4. % of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)	(a) at least 30% (b) at least 30%	Official statistics from PeM meetings and verification exercise Population satisfaction survey with PeM	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., the level of women attending the Shura meeting increased to 35% based on the Community and Police Consultation Sessions organized in the PDs 4, 5, 6, 7 8 & 12).  The final target was not achieved.

Indicators	Final targets	Means of verification	Status
2.5. % of security concerns voiced by population addressed and solved (per PD and gender disaggregated)	At least 20% of concerns are solved in Y1 and 30% in Y2 40% in Y3	Comparison of the minutes of community consultation meetings with the PD Security Plans	Some activities for the achievement of the indicator were completed (i.e., assessment of the level of public's satisfaction of police and behavior and response to community's needs increased by to 5%, based on the Community and Police Consultation Sessions).  The final target was not achieved.
2.6. Level of implementation of a specific communication and behavioral change campaign/ training program targeting ANP staff (completely; partially; not implemented)	Behavioral change campaign/ training program targeting ANP implemented	A regular monitoring system of communication campaign activities will be established	Some activities for the achievement of the indicators were completed (i.e., preparation of TORs for the SBCC 1 and SBCC 2 prepared, reviewed and approved; work has started on the implementation of the SBCC; training for ANP started by involving 48 officials in 19 PDs).  The final targets were not achieved.
2.7. Level of effectiveness of communication products/ campaign elements	Moderately effective to very effective (KPIs to measure communication effectiveness to be established)	Regular monitoring system of communication campaign activities will be established	
2.8. # of ANP officers trained and enabled to integrate PeM concept into the work of PDs (Newly added in 2021)			Some activities for the achievement of the indicators were completed (i.e., training for the ANP started).  The final target was not achieved.
<b>Output 3: Standard PDs constructed/ rehabilitated to support community-oriented policing</b>			

Indicators	Final targets	Means of verification	Status
3.1. Number of pilot PDs rehabilitated following assessments and in critical infrastructure areas (to improve the security of policewomen and men and the general public visiting PD, +FRU)	6 PDs rehabilitated in Kabul in Y1 19PDs Rehabilitated in Kabul in Y 2	An infrastructure survey report as well as monitoring of the rehabilitation process. UNDP reporting; Agreements with MOIA and PHQs Post implementation; Monitoring system in place; Verification of investment plans on PD rehabilitation	Some activities for the achievement of the indicators were completed (i.e., the project conducted the assessments, the bills of quantity were completed with reaching to final stage for contracting the construction company, most of the preparatory activities for procurement had almost been completed including the launch of the Invitation to Bid, the project received bids under evaluation stage).  The final target was not achieved.
3.2. Number of PDs with minimum security measures reaching 100% (an index derived from the infrastructure survey)	TBD upon finalization of infrastructure survey results	Annual PD infrastructure assessments/ verification	The activity was planned for the Q4 of 2021, when the project ceased the implementation.  The final target was not achieved.
3.3. (a) % of surveyed police PD personnel satisfied with the infrastructure in target PD police stations (b) % of surveyed general public satisfied with the infrastructure in target PD police stations (m/f) (c) % of surveyed general public reporting that their PD police station is accessible (m/f)	At least 50% At least 50% At least 50%	Annual community and police perception survey	Little progress for achieving the indicator.  The final target was not achieved.
<b>Output 4: Administrative services are improved at PD levels to support police services</b>			

Indicators	Final targets	Means of verification	Status
4.1. Availability of Administrative Capacity Framework for PDs Parameters - Reporting to PHQ - Logistics and supply chain management	Administrative Capacity Framework for PDs developed by PHQ	Results of Institutional and individual capacity assessment  ANP satisfaction survey results will inform the selection of admin services	All the activities under this output were planned in the 2nd half of 2021.  The final targets were not achieved.
4.2. Availability of improved SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs	SOPs for key administrative functions at PDs reviewed and improved	Results of Functional Analysis of PDs	
4.3. Degree to which the core administrative functions in pilot PDs are improved (a) Proxy: % of personnel (at PHQ and PD) satisfied with the optimized key functions (b) Time reduced (in %) in the key administrative processes	Proxy: satisfaction level increased by 50% Proxy: TBD upon functional review	Post satisfaction survey on MOIA – PHQ – PD and the follow-up functional review on optimized functions	
4.4. Availability of functional inventory management systems at PDs	Inventory management system is functional at selected PDs	Task-based survey – mobile app	

Respectively, the COPS project has started to implement measures for the achievement of the Output Indicators, however, due to the challenges that the project has faced as well as the premature closure, the final targets were not fulfilled.

### ***Assessment of interaction with other stakeholders and beneficiaries***

Speaking about the assessment of interaction with the key stakeholders, including the project beneficiaries, the COPS project reports provided a rather limited perspective on the respective topic.

Respectively, the analysis of the COPS project's quarterly, annual, and final report (draft) yielded the following findings:

- First and Second Quarterly Project Progress Reports for the year 2020 (covering January – March 2020 and April – June 2020) on the partnership section were containing nearly the same text, meaning that the COPS project in the reporting period, assisted MOIA and PeM Directorate to establish an inclusive coordination mechanism by setting up the COPS working group with representation from all national and international stakeholders. The Working group

had the task to oversee the implementation of the project and the development of strategies and activities to enhance the safety and security of the citizens of Afghanistan.

- In the first quarter, the report indicated that the project was dynamically coordinating activities with all national and international partners working in the rule of law area (RS, CSTC-A, GPPT UN-HABITAT, etc.). At the same time, the MOIA PeM Directorate, PMO, and COPS project were developing a joint implementation plan to ensure ownership, effectiveness, and timely implementation of the project. While for the Second Quarterly Report, was only indicated that the project was dynamically coordinating activities with all national and international partners working in police reform and rule of law sector, without providing more insights.
- Third Project Quarterly Project Progress Report for the year 2020 (covering July – September 2020), repeatedly indicated the same information from the First and Second Quarterly Project Progress Reports for the year 2020.
- The COPS 2020 Annual Project Progress Report copied again the same text as in the Third Project Quarterly Project Progress Report for the year 2020, only by adding that the team has built partnerships with UN-HABITAT, GIZ's largest Community Policing Project for Afghanistan CPA, and NATO advisory team by undertaking monthly coordination meetings.
- First Quarterly Project Progress Report for the year 2021 (covering January – March 2021), broadly indicated that in this reporting period, the team had several coordination meetings with the international partners who were involved in supporting the Community Policing Initiatives in Afghanistan, by involving GIZ's largest Community Policing Project, UN-HABITAT technical assistance to community policing and the EU funded project that supported the Family Response Units.
- Second and Third Project Quarterly Project Progress Reports for the year 2021 (covering April – June 2021 and July – August 2021) contained the same text.
- COPS Final Project Report (draft) although it introduced a section on the quality of the partnerships, it has not reflected the overall interaction and the character of the engagement with the partners. In the respective section, there were reflected aspects that were not related to this matter such as movement restrictions, COVID-19 implications, community consultations in 19 PDs of Kabul, training of ANP in Social and Behavior Change Communication SBCC, conducting Kabul PDs assessments and PHQ assessments and implementation of outreach activities through the third parties.

At the same time, the answers to the semi-structured interview with the COPS project representative have yielded the following findings which are further presented in the table below.

**Table 6. Assessing interaction with other stakeholders**

Relevant actors/ intervention	Assigned role in the ProDoc	Findings
NATO, Resolute Support (RS) Mission and Central Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, described as key partners of MOIA and ANP	The ProDoc indicated that COPS shall cooperate with the respective actors through MOIA Support Team Forum via regular meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COPS conducted technical working meetings with this team.</li> <li>- The interaction was frequent, almost on a weekly basis.</li> </ul>
UN-HABITAT	Close work due to its extensive experience in PeM in Kabul	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COPS team met the UN-HABITAT frequently.</li> <li>- COPS project team members working on the implementation of the Output 2 have stayed in close touch with this team.</li> </ul>

Relevant actors/ intervention	Assigned role in the ProDoc	Findings
GIZ	To assure close work and uniformity of PeM approaches and exchange of lessons learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- COPS team met the GIZ team frequently.</li> <li>- The main interaction was focused on the implementation of Output 2.</li> </ul>
German Policing Project Team	Closely working with the mission due to the leading role in support of the ANP's training and education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The meetings were organized on average once per month.</li> <li>- The interaction was mostly on the organization of the training for ANP.</li> <li>- The cooperation was mostly focused on the implementation of Output 1 and 4.</li> </ul>
EU Police Team	Working closely on gender and police reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The COPS project team representatives met the EU Police Team several times.</li> <li>- The cooperation was focused on the gender aspects mainly.</li> </ul>
Afghan CSOs	Running the small grants' funding mechanism for engaging CSO through micro-projects on community security identified through the police districts PEM Councils	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The cooperation with the Afghan CSOs was organized through the cooperation of the NGO consortium comprising approximately 8-9 organization, mostly located outside Kabul.</li> <li>- The consortium's thematic work was focused on community policing, gender, and safe shelters for women.</li> <li>- The small grants mechanism was not implemented by the COPS project since the MOIA did not agree on the respective component. The focus of MOIA was to have spending focused on infrastructure interventions rather than on supporting the CSO.</li> </ul>

In conclusion to this section, the project team has built partnerships with the main stakeholders that were identified in the ProDoc. However, the reports compiled by the project team on the analysis of partnership provided limited information and insights. The quarterly progress reports should have provided more comprehensive information on the established partnerships and overall interaction with other stakeholders. The Final Project Report should have provided an overall assessment of the quality of partnership through the implementation timeframe of the project.

### ***Assessment of the project's adherence to the Quality Standards***

The adherence of the project to the UNDP Quality Standards for Programming was performed based on the checklist presented in Table 7. The evidence of criteria fulfillment was assessed based on the project's progress reports as well as from the interviews.



**Table 7. Assessment checklist of project's adherence to the Quality Standards for Programming and Projects**

Overall rating scale		
Highly Satisfactory ⊙⊙⊙	Satisfactory ⊙⊙○	Inadequate ⊙○○
More than 80% of the answers are rated with "3", no answers rated with "1"	More than 50% of the answers are rated with "2"	More than 50% of the answers are rated with "1"
Rating criteria (by presenting the option that best reflects the COPS project)		
<b>Strategic</b>		
<b>1. Is the project aligned with the UNDP Strategic Plan?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> The project responds to at least one of the development settings as specified in the UNDP Strategic Plan and adapts at least one UNDP Signature Solution. The project's RRF includes all the relevant SP output indicators.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project responds to at least one of the development settings as specified in the Strategic Plan<sup>4</sup>. The project's RRF includes at least one SP output indicator, if relevant.</li> <li><b>1:</b> The project responds to a partner's identified need, but this need falls outside of the UNDP Strategic Plan. Also select this option if none of the relevant SP indicators are included in the RRF.</li> </ul>	3	<u>2</u>
		1
<b>Relevant</b>		
<b>2. Do the project target groups leave furthest behind?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> The target groups are clearly specified, prioritizing discriminated and marginalized groups left the furthest behind, identified through a rigorous process based on evidence.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The target groups are clearly specified, prioritizing groups left furthest behind.</li> <li><b>1:</b> The target groups are not clearly specified.</li> </ul>	3	<u>2</u>
		1
<b>3. Have knowledge, good practices, and past lessons learned of UNDP and others informed the project design?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> Knowledge and lessons learned backed by credible evidence from sources such as evaluation, corporate policies/strategies, and/or monitoring have been explicitly used, with appropriate referencing, to justify the approach used by the project.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project design mentions knowledge and lessons learned backed by evidence/sources but have not been used to justify the approach selected.</li> <li><b>1:</b> There is little, or no mention of knowledge and lessons learned informing the project design. Any references made are anecdotal and not backed by evidence.</li> </ul>	3	<u>2</u>
		1
<b>4. Does UNDP have a clear advantage to engage in the role envisioned by the project vis-à-vis national/regional/global partners and other actors?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> An analysis has been conducted on the role of other partners in the area where the project intends to work, and credible evidence supports the proposed engagement of UNDP and partners through the project, including identification of potential funding partners. It is clear how results achieved by partners will complement the project's intended results and a communication strategy is in place to communicate results and raise visibility vis-à-vis key partners.</li> <li><b>2:</b> Some analysis has been conducted on the role of other partners in the area where the project intends to work, and relatively limited evidence supports the proposed engagement of and division of labor between UNDP and partners</li> </ul>	3	<u>2</u>
		1



<p>through the project, with unclear funding and communications strategies or plans.</p> <p><b>1:</b> No clear analysis has been conducted on the role of other partners in the area where the project intends to work. There is a risk that the project overlaps and/or does not coordinate with partners' interventions in this area.</p>					
<b>Principled</b>					
<p><b>5. Does the project apply a human rights-based approach?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> The project is guided by human rights and incorporates the principles of accountability, meaningful participation, and non-discrimination in the project's strategy. The project upholds the relevant international and national laws and standards. Any potential adverse impacts on enjoyment of human rights were rigorously identified and assessed as relevant, with appropriate mitigation and management measures incorporated into project design and budget.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project is guided by human rights by prioritizing accountability, meaningful participation, and non-discrimination. Potential adverse impacts on enjoyment of human rights were identified and assessed as relevant, and appropriate mitigation and management measures incorporated into the project design and budget.</li> <li><b>1:</b> No evidence that the project is guided by human rights. Limited or no evidence that potential adverse impacts on enjoyment of human rights were considered.</li> </ul>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>3</td><td><u>2</u></td></tr> <tr> <td></td><td>1</td></tr> </table>	3	<u>2</u>		1
3	<u>2</u>				
	1				
<p><b>6. Does the project use gender analysis in the project design?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> A participatory gender analysis has been conducted and results from this gender analysis inform the development challenge, strategy and expected results sections of the project document. Outputs and indicators of the results framework include explicit references to gender equality, and specific indicators measure and monitor results to ensure women are fully benefitting from the project.</li> <li><b>2:</b> A basic gender analysis has been carried out and results from this analysis are scattered (i.e., fragmented and not consistent) across the development challenge and strategy sections of the project document. The results framework may include some gender sensitive outputs and/or activities but gender inequalities are not consistently integrated across each output.</li> <li><b>1:</b> The project design may or may not mention information and/or data on the differential impact of the project's development situation on gender relations, women, and men, but the gender inequalities have not been clearly identified and reflected in the project document.</li> </ul>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>3</td><td><u>2</u></td></tr> <tr> <td></td><td>1</td></tr> </table>	3	<u>2</u>		1
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	1				
<p><b>7. Did the project support the resilience and sustainability of societies and/or ecosystems?</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> Credible evidence that the project addresses sustainability and resilience dimensions of development challenges, which are integrated in the project strategy and design. The project reflects the interconnections between the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Relevant shocks, hazards and adverse social and environmental impacts have been identified and rigorously assessed with appropriate management and mitigation measures incorporated into project design and budget.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project design integrates sustainability and resilience dimensions of development challenges. Relevant shocks, hazards and adverse social and environmental impacts have been identified and assessed, and relevant management and mitigation measures incorporated into project design and budget.</li> <li><b>1:</b> Sustainability and resilience dimensions and impacts were not adequately considered.</li> </ul>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>3</td><td><u>2</u></td></tr> <tr> <td></td><td>1</td></tr> </table>	3	<u>2</u>		1
3	<u>2</u>				
	1				

Management & Monitoring		
<b>8. Does the project have a strong results framework?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> The project's selection of outputs and activities are at an appropriate level. Outputs are accompanied by SMART, results-oriented indicators that measure the key expected development changes, each with credible data sources and populated baselines and targets, including gender sensitive, target group focused, sex-disaggregated indicators where appropriate.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project's selection of outputs and activities are at an appropriate level. Outputs are accompanied by SMART, results-oriented indicators, but baselines, targets and data sources may not yet be fully specified. Some use of target group focused, sex-disaggregated indicators, as appropriate.</li> <li><b>1:</b> The project's selection of outputs and activities are not at an appropriate level; outputs are not accompanied by SMART, results-oriented indicators that measure the expected change and have not been populated with baselines and targets; data sources are not specified, and/or no gender sensitive, sex-disaggregation of indicators.</li> </ul>	3	<b>2</b>
		1
<b>9. Is the project's governance mechanism clearly defined in the project document, including composition of the project board?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> The project's governance mechanism is fully defined. Individuals have been specified for each position in the governance mechanism (especially all members of the project board.) Project Board members have agreed on their roles and responsibilities as specified in the terms of reference. The ToR of the project board has been attached to the project document.</li> <li><b>2:</b> The project's governance mechanism is defined; specific institutions are noted as holding key governance roles, but individuals may not have been specified yet. The project document lists the most important responsibilities of the project board, project director/manager and quality assurance roles.</li> <li><b>1:</b> The project's governance mechanism is loosely defined in the project document, only mentioning key roles that will need to be filled later. No information on the responsibilities of key positions in the governance mechanism is provided.</li> </ul>	3	<b>2</b>
		1
<b>10. Have the project risks been identified with clear plans stated to manage and mitigate each risk?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>3:</b> Project risks related to the achievement of results are fully described in the project Risk Log, based on a comprehensive analysis drawing on the program's theory of change, Social and Environmental Standards and screening, situation analysis, capacity assessments, and other analyses such as funding potential and reputational risk. Risks have been identified through a consultative process with key internal and external stakeholders. Clear and complete plan in place to manage and mitigate each risk, reflected in project budgeting and monitoring plans (<i>both must be true</i>).</li> <li><b>2:</b> Project risks related to the achievement of results are identified in the initial project Risk Log based on a minimum level of analysis and consultation, with mitigation measures identified for each risk.</li> <li><b>1:</b> Some risks may be identified in the initial project Risk Log, but no evidence of consultation or analysis, and no clear risk mitigation measures are identified. This option is also selected if risks are not identified and/or no initial Risk Log is included with the project document.</li> </ul>	3	<b>2</b>
		1
<b>Efficient</b>		
<b>11. Is the budget justified and supported with valid estimates?</b>	3	<b>2</b>
		1

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>3:</b> The project's budget is at the activity level with funding sources and is specified for the duration of the project period in a multi-year budget. Realistic resource mobilization plans are in place to fill unfunded components. Costs are supported with valid estimates using benchmarks from similar projects or activities. Cost implications from inflation and foreign exchange exposure have been estimated and incorporated in the budget. Adequate costs for monitoring, evaluation, communications, and security have been incorporated.</li><li>• <b>2:</b> The project's budget is at the activity level with funding sources, when possible, and is specified for the duration of the project in a multi-year budget, but no funding plan is in place. Costs are supported with valid estimates based on prevailing rates.</li><li>• <b>1:</b> The project's budget is not specified at the activity level, and/or may not be captured in a multi-year budget.</li></ul>		
<b>12. Is the Country Office/Regional Hub/Global Project fully recovering the costs involved with project implementation?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>3:</b> The budget fully covers all project costs that are attributable to the project, including program management and development effectiveness services related to strategic country program planning, quality assurance, pipeline development, policy advocacy services, finance, procurement, human resources, administration, issuance of contracts, security, travel, assets, general services, information and communications based on full costing in accordance with prevailing UNDP policies (i.e., UPL, LPL.)</li><li>• <b>2:</b> The budget covers significant project costs that are attributable to the project based on prevailing UNDP policies (i.e., UPL, LPL) as relevant.</li><li>• <b>1:</b> The budget does not adequately cover project costs that are attributable to the project, and UNDP is cross subsidizing the project.</li></ul>	3	<b>2</b> 1
<b>Effective</b>		
<b>13. Have targeted groups been engaged in the design of the project?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>3:</b> Credible evidence that all targeted groups, prioritizing discriminated and marginalized populations that will be involved in or affected by the project, have been actively engaged in the design of the project. The project has an explicit strategy to identify, engage and ensure the meaningful participation of target groups as stakeholders throughout the project, including through monitoring and decision-making (e.g., representation on the project board, inclusion in samples for evaluations, etc.)</li><li>• <b>2:</b> Some evidence that key targeted groups have been consulted in the design of the project.</li><li>• <b>1:</b> No evidence of engagement with targeted groups during project design.</li></ul>	3	<b>2</b> 1
<b>14. Does the project plan for adaptation and course correction if regular monitoring activities, evaluation, and lesson learned demonstrate there are better approaches to achieve the intended results and/or circumstances change during implementation?</b>	Yes 3	<b>No</b> 1
<b>Sustainability &amp; National Ownership</b>		
<b>15. Have national/regional/global partners led, or proactively engaged in, the</b>	3	<b>2</b> 1

<b>design of the project?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>3:</b> National partners (or regional/global partners for regional and global projects) have full ownership of the project and led the process of the development of the project jointly with UNDP.</li> <li>• <b>2:</b> The project has been developed by UNDP in close consultation with national/regional/global partners.</li> <li>• <b>1:</b> The project has been developed by UNDP with limited or no engagement with national partners.</li> </ul>	
<b>16. Are key institutions and systems identified, and is there a strategy for strengthening specific/ comprehensive capacities based on capacity assessments conducted?</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>3:</b> The project has a strategy for strengthening specific capacities of national institutions and/or actors based on a completed capacity assessment. This strategy includes an approach to regularly monitor national capacities using clear indicators and rigorous methods of data collection and adjust the strategy to strengthen national capacities accordingly.</li> <li>• <b>2:</b> A capacity assessment has been completed. There are plans to develop a strategy to strengthen specific capacities of national institutions and/or actors based on the results of the capacity assessment.</li> <li>• <b>1:</b> Capacity assessments have not been carried out.</li> </ul>	3   <b>2</b>
	1
<b>17. Is there a clear transition arrangement/ phase-out plan developed with key stakeholders to sustain or scale up results (including resource mobilization and communications strategy)?</b>	Yes 3 <b>No 1</b>

Respectively, the application of the checklist indicates that the COPS project assessment is “satisfactory”, as more than 50% of the answers were graded with “2”. This means that there is room for improvement on most of the criteria. However, it also shows that despite the challenges the project has faced, the intervention managed to ensure the UNDP quality standards. Further, in the last chapter, the evaluator will present the recommendations which derive from the findings deriving from this checklist.

### 3.4. Application of the OECD/DAC criteria

#### **Relevance**

The focus-group interview with the representatives of the UNDP Afghanistan that were associated with the implementation of the COPS project outlined unanimously the high relevance of the project. The main arguments were the following:

- The relevance of the intervention derived from the results of surveys that were conducted prior to the project implementation, which showed a high level of mistrust of the population in the police. The surveys indicated that the population perceived the police as a force affiliated with criminality.
- The project aimed to close the gap of trust between the community and the police, by improving its services to the population.
- The project strategy consisted in piloting the intervention approach in 19 PDs in Kabul by developing model police stations, where people could feel secure to walk inside and report the security challenges that they face.

The analysis of the relevant documentation supported the conclusion that the COPS project had a high degree of relevance for Afghanistan. Respectively, in addition to the results of the opinion polls, the project was also based on the provisions of sectoral public policies in Afghanistan that were outlining the importance of such intervention.

- The MOIA Strategic Plan for 2018-2021 highlighted the priorities for enhancing the police-community relationship. The areas affiliated with the COPS project intervention were reflected in the Plan’s Strategic Goal no. 2: Provide Law Enforcement Through Detecting Crime and Countering Criminal Activity, and Strategic Goal no. 1: Strengthen Public Order and Ensure

Security. The Strategic Plan outlined the same approach as the COPS project has shough to implement, meaning the reforming of police, improvement of internal operational processes, and changing the behavior of police in the interaction with the communities.

- Afghan National Peace and Development Framework for 2017-2021, Section 2.3. Political and Security.
- National Priority Programs of Afghanistan: NPP 1 Afghan Peace and Reintegration and NPP5 Law and Justice for All.
- Afghanistan National Priority Program, Section 2.6. Urban governance and Institutions.
- UNDP Strategic Plan Outcome: Outcome 2: Accelerate structural transformations for sustainable development.
- UNDP Country Program Document: Outcome 2. Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased by applicable international human rights standards and the Government's legal obligations.

Respectively, the COPS project relevance was high for Afghanistan as it clearly responded to the needs of beneficiaries. It was relevant both at the level of the governmental policies as it addressed a highly regarded topic – the trust in the Government of Afghanistan as well as for the public – increasing public security. Additionally, the project was intended for the achievement of SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, which is particularly relevant for post-conflict societies.

### ***Coherence***

The assessment of the COPS project's compatibility with other interventions in Afghanistan has indicated that it has been well integrated with other partner projects and priorities of the Government. The analysis conducted as part of this report in the sub-chapter “Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design” concluded that the COPS project built upon the previous UNDP and international partners' knowledge and experience in the field of community policing in Afghanistan. It has been learned from the earlier LOTFA engagement as well as from the GIZ interventions to community policing in Afghanistan, especially in the northern region.

Additionally, the analysis presented in the sub-chapter “Assessment of interaction with other stakeholders and beneficiaries” concluded that the project has built and maintained partnerships with the main stakeholders that were identified in the ProDoc.

The examination of the project progress reports for 2020 indicated that the project supported MOIA and PeM Directorate to establish an inclusive coordination mechanism through the setting up of the COPS working group with representation from all national and international stakeholders. The working group had the role to oversee the implementation of the project and the development of strategies and activities to enhance the safety and security of the public. Such a platform, along with the cooperation and partnerships with UN-HABITAT, GIZ's Community Policing Project for Afghanistan, and NATO advisory team, served as a plausible mechanism for assuring the coherence of the intervention.

Finally, the coherence of the intervention was also assured through the project coordination mechanisms that were established. The LOTFA donors along with the MOIA leadership were organizing monthly technical meetings on the progress of the projects supporting security in Afghanistan. The interview with the UNDP Afghanistan representatives has confirmed that in terms of coherence and coordination with other interventions, the project was well established, by maintaining regular communication with the government actors, donors, and CSOs.

### ***Effectiveness and efficiency***

The effectiveness of the COPS project, as a criterion that explores the extent to which the intervention achieved its objectives and its results, has been limited. The achievement of intended results at the level of Project Outcome Indicators and Outputs Indicators was not performed. The analysis conducted in the previous section indicated that some progress took place toward achieving the Output Indicators, but none of the COPS project Output Indicators were ultimately achieved. The same applied to the achievement of the project's Outcome Indicators. Most of the factors that determined this situation were beyond the control of the COPS project (i.e., regime change, political instability, COVID-19 pandemic).

The interview with the UNDP Afghanistan representatives outlined that:

- Speaking about the value for money, the project was prepared as a result of an evidence-based decision, notably, the gap in the relations between the community and police. The funding that was approved for the project was well thought through.
- There was a high turnover of staff within the MOIA leadership, which impacted the timeliness of activities. Whereby the moment when some activities would be agreed on with the MOIA, the leadership would change again, and the process of coordination would start over from the beginning with significant changes to the project implementation approach. As an illustration, in 2020, the COPS project Steering Committee could not approve the AWP because the MOIA considered that some activities had to be changed. To overcome this situation, the project team had to go back and restart the coordination of the AWP with the MOIA.
- Another factor that negatively impacted the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation related to understaffing of the project. The project's initial HR Plan included a total of 24 staff members. The COPS project planned a P-4 International Project Manager and a P-5 Chief Technical Advisor. However, the leadership of the MOIA insisted that these two positions should be abolished, and the budget transferred to other project activities. This led to the situation where the project staff members had to do “double-hatting”, meaning that they were performing several roles at once that were not initially plotted in the project design.

To conclude, the effectiveness and efficiency of the project were affected by a myriad of factors and contingencies that took place in the timeframe when the project was implemented. There were also intrinsic factors that could have improved the overall organization of the project, which were described in the previous chapters.

### ***Impact***

The project design aimed toward making an unprecedented advance in the provision of security services by the ANP to the public. This is especially true considering the starting point and the baseline data indicating low trends in the attitudes toward the government and police from the side of communities.

The positive trends of the project's impact were observed through the following:

- The project conducted the assessment of 13 PDs of Kabul city which identified the infrastructure requiring rehabilitation. It further extended to the assessment for the renovation of the Family Response Unit, female detention cells, and PeM meeting halls.
- The project team drafted the terms of reference for enhancement of police and community partnership and for supporting Kabul PDs to deliver improved community-oriented policing partnerships.
- The project conducted community consultations in six Kabul PDs to encourage a proactive community-policing approach and support police consultations at the grassroots level. The consultations were attended in total by approximately 1900 participants, while the data on participation rate was also disaggregated by gender (730 females and 1170 males).

Consequently, since the project has ceased prematurely, the possibilities to evaluate the impact are limited. However, the potential impact that the project could have had is significant. The intervention anticipated having a holistic approach by changing how the ANP worked and could have also impacted aspects related to human rights, gender equality, and inclusion.

### ***Sustainability and National Ownership***

The project's main approach to sustainability was to strengthen the institutional, legislative, and human capacities for continuing the reform of the ANP through the introduction of consultation mechanisms between the communities and the ANP.

The project intended to develop both the infrastructure and the capacities of people involved in increasing the police-community relationships, by reducing the risks of unrest and military conflict over the long term.

The project design was formulated expressly with the idea of increasing and empowering the national authorities to take over the initiatives of the project. It allocated a leading role to the representatives of the MOIA to manage the project, which aimed to increase their involvement. A comprehensive analysis of the assigned roles and responsibilities to the national counterparts is presented in the chapter “Roles of the national counterparts”.

The interview with the UNDP Afghanistan representatives outlined that:

- The implementation of the COPS project used the national structures to enhance sustainability and national ownership of the project.
- It was very much bound to the institutional setting, where the leadership in the implementation was handled by the MOIA. As an example, the MOIA was at the forefront in the preparation of the AWP whereas the UNDP was allocated a facilitation role.

However, the change of regime in Afghanistan has completely jeopardized the prospects for sustainability of the COPS project. The institutional framework and governance model have changed which ultimately has reduced to zero the sustainability and ownership that was established as part of the COPS project.

### **3.5. Findings on gender, disability, vulnerability, and social inclusion**

The analysis of the aspects related to gender, disability, vulnerability, and social inclusion focused on the evaluation of the project design and the implementation of the initiative.

The findings regarding the project design outlined the following:

- It is plausible that the Risk Log of the COPS project has identified out of the 4 risks, one related to “Limited participation of communities, particularly women and other underrepresented groups in project activities”. There were 6 measures put forward to mitigate the respective risk. It was pertinent to include this risk in the Risk Log, as the environment of the project context was mostly “male-dominated” as emphasized by the interview respondents.
- The analysis of the Results Framework outlined that out of the 3 outcome indicators, 2 were gender sensitive (by indicating the percentage of males and females expressing (a) trust toward the ANP in Kabul and (b) positive perceptions of the safety and security in their respective PDs). However, the third outcome indicator did not include disaggregated data on sexes (by indicating the percentage of PD personnel reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ). This indicator could have also been sensitive to gender, by indicating the percentage of males and females reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ.
- None of the outcome targets presented in the Results Framework was gender sensitive as the indicators were not disaggregated on sexes, disability, and other vulnerable groups.
- At the output level, out of the total number of 17 output results indicators, there were only 3 indicators that were disaggregated on sexes. There was only 1 output result indicator specifically targeting women – “2.4. % of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)”, which is insufficient if taken into account that the COPS project was targeting communities.
- In the output final targets, only one target related to the output result indicator 2.4 presented above, which indicated an increase of 30% in women attending PeM meetings, and 30% in women represented at the PeM.
- The baseline data did not contain any data on gender, except on the output indicator 2.4. indicating 30% of women represented at the PeM and no data on the women attending the PeM meetings.
- The focus-group interview with the representatives of the UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan that were associated with the implementation of the COPS project indicated that the project design could have placed a bigger emphasis on gender mainstreaming. This was particularly relevant as the COPS project focused on direct interaction with communities.

The findings regarding the implementation of the project outlined the following:

- The focus-group interview highlighted that although the project design has not made the necessary focus on gender, the implementation of the project was focused on gender mainstreaming, and the inclusion of women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups in the project activities.
- The analysis of the progress reports has confirmed that the project activities were involving women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups. Moreover, the collection of data was disaggregated by sexes (the specific activities related to the training of women police are presented further in the report).
- Respectively, in the first year of the implementation, the project finalized the assessment of 13 PDs in Kabul city. The aim of the assessment was to identify infrastructure requiring rehabilitation. The assessment also covered the situation of the existing Family Response Units, female detention cells, and Police-e-Mardumi meeting halls.
- The project organized a two-day community consultation in Kabul PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 12 to develop a sense of duty and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing by undertaking community and police consultation sessions at the grassroots level in the identified PDs of Kabul. A total of 1,900 participants from the 6 PDs of Kabul attended the events. There were 730 female participants (approximately 38%) and 1170 male participants (approximately 62%) from Shura's. The community consultation collected key suggestions from the PeM Shura's led by the Community Policing Directorate of MOIA.
- The project organized a total of 6 consultations, under the title of "Strengthening Police and Community Partnership Consultations" in PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12 of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female (approximately 45%), attended the six-day community consultation sessions.
- The project started consultations with the Community Policing Directorate to include one male and one female police officer under SBCC 1 planned in early April 2021 as well as involving the Family Response Units to jointly implement the MOIA broader outreach initiatives under SBCC 2 and Inclusive Community Outreach Initiative.
- Following the community consultations, the project identified gender-specific challenges and has put forward recommendations to overcome them. As an example, it has identified that there was an absence of dedicated female police officers whereas a recommendation was put forward to increase women's presence in the police stations and that the female police officers should conduct outreach initiatives in the girls' schools.

Respectively, the COPS project at the level of implementation has focused on involving marginalized communities, women, and disadvantaged groups. However, in the project design phase, the focus on this component was insufficient, especially by keeping in mind that the project anticipated implementation at the community level. The project design could increase the emphasis on tackling gender stereotypes among the ANP officers and at the level of communities and include more targets specifically designed to tackle this component.

### **3.6. Addressing the evaluation objectives**

The assignment's ToR has put forward the list of evaluation objectives that the COPS Final Evaluation Report was expected to cover.

**Objective 1.** Evaluating the status of coordination among international partners such as the Community Policing for Afghanistan CPA project funded by German and UN-Habitat policing program

The respective information was reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 2.** Evaluating the status of the training and capacity building of MOIA staff to fully assume responsibilities of the Community Policing Initiatives

There was not enough data provided to conduct the respective assessment.

**Objective 3.** UNDP COPS intervention to the capacity-building demand of MOIA staff, Kabul



PHQ, and PDs staff

COPS project provided several on-request trainings, focused on gender and human rights (information provided during the interview with the COPS project representative).

**Objective 4.** Status of training for female MOIA personnel to perform policing functions

The Second Quarterly Report for Quarter 2021 indicated that:

- Under output 1, the project organized a six-day training of trainers in resource management, reporting, and community policing for Kabul PHQ and Kabul (PDs personnel. The training was conducted based on the capacity needs assessment conducted by PDs education offices and Police Staff College senior instructors. A total of 22 participants (8 female officers and 14 male officers) benefited from the training. As a result of the one-week training program, the PDs personnel trained in integrating community policing (professional policing), managing available resources to build trust, providing weekly community consultation reports, and providing clear recommendations to Kabul PHQ for aligning resources for tackling crime and insurgency in their respective neighborhood.
- Under output 2, the project completed a one-week of classroom and on-the-job training in Social and Behavior Change Communication to MOIA-related directorates personnel in media and public relations, gender and human rights, religious and cultural affairs, family response units, and community policing. The training covered how to apply SBCC and the ways it can be utilized for proactive community policing and crime prevention. A total of 40 participants from the MOIA-related directorates attended the training (18 female ANP officers and 22 male ANP officers).
- Under output 2, the project implemented the Capacity Building Modular Training in 9 PDs of Kabul city. The training program focused on bringing police and community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MOIA trained 22 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 commissioned, non-commissioned officers, and PDs personnel, 108 of whom were female police officers.

**Objective 5.** Assess the status of recommendations of CPSS findings

Based on the findings of the interview with the COPS project representative, it was mentioned that two projects were developed based on the results of the CPSS findings. COPS further recruited NGOs to implement the respective initiatives.

**Objective 6.** Supporting Kabul Police District activities implemented by local implementing partners

Based on the findings of the interview with the COPS project representative, it was mentioned that some of the Kabul PDs activities were implemented by NGOs supported by the COPS project.

**Objective 7.** Assess the project design in terms of its relevance to the overall development situation at the national level, relevance to national strategies, and relevance to beneficiaries.

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 8.** Assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, the reporting, and monitoring system, and the extent to which these have been effective

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 9.** Assess the cost-efficiency of the project interventions

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 9.** Assess the cost-efficiency of the project interventions

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 10.** Assess the relevance and effectiveness of the project's strategy and approaches for the achievement of the project objectives.

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 11.** Assess the performance of the project in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of producing the expected outputs.

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 12.** Assess the relevance of the project's management arrangements; identify advantages, bottlenecks and lessons learned concerning the management arrangements.

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 13.** Analyze underlying factors beyond UNDP control that affect the achievement of the project results.

The findings are reflected in the previous sections.

**Objective 14.** Provide recommendations to key project stakeholders for future projects/program development.

Recommendations are provided in the next chapter.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND GOOD PRACTICES

### 4.1. Conclusions

Addressing the project evaluation purpose that was reflected in the ToR of the assignment: to explore why certain aspects of the COPS project have or have not been implemented as planned, by looking at the project design and prospects for successful replication of the intervention, the evaluator came to the following **conclusions**:

- The COPS project design fulfilled most of the requirements regulated by the UNDP POPP on project development. The project described comprehensively the partnerships with other development partners. It assigned the roles as well as the prioritization of building the partnerships for the COPS project implementation.
- The ProDoc identified the beneficiaries and indicated how their engagement should take place. It also outlined the layers of coordination and prioritized their engagement in the project implementation.
- The scaling-up and sustainability aspects of the intervention were included in the project design by indicating how the responsibility for overseeing and monitoring will gradually be transferred to the PHQ.
- The Multi-year work plan was structured following the UNDP requirements.
- The Monitoring Plan was in line with the UNDP's programming policing and procedures. The monitoring activities, purposes, frequency, and expected results were clearly defined and structured.
- The COPS project built upon the previous UNDP and international partners' knowledge and experience in the field of community policing in Afghanistan. The ProDoc expressly presented the lessons learned from other projects which were incorporated into the project design.
- The analysis of the Results Framework formulation indicated that from point of view of its structure, it fulfilled most of the UNDP requirements by presenting the intended outcome and its indicators, baseline values, targets, and means of verification. The analysis of the Outcome Indicators concluded that all three indicators fit the S.M.A.R.T criteria.

At the same time, the examination of the project design outlined several *limitations*:

- In the description of the project strategy, the project should have explained how the intervention was aligned with the UNDSCF/ CPD outcome. The COPS project strategy design was mostly focused on the intervention's approach with limited analytical coverage of the strategic frameworks of UNDP.
- In the description of the expected results, there was no nexus to the higher-level results (provisions of the strategic frameworks of MOIA and UNSDCF) nor the analysis of these policies.
- The presentation of the project partnerships should have indicated a clear linkage with the project's Theory of Change, by outlining what assumptions and expected results achieved by partners were critical for the fulfillment of the project results. In the case of the COPS project, there was only a broad description of the assigned roles.
- The analysis of the Results Framework formulation outlined some limitations in the formulation of the Outcome Indicators:
  - Even though the project anticipated further extension outside Kabul in other districts, the geographic focus of all Outcome Indicators was only on Kabul.
  - The baseline for the third Outcome Indicator was not identified by being prescribed that it will be decided by August 2019 following ANP satisfaction survey completion (while the respective data was not untimely reflected in an updated version of the Results Framework).
  - The final targets for the Outcome Indicators were also facing inexactitudes. It was

indicated that these targets will be decided after the pilot period based on 500 interviews in the intervention area (while the respective data was not untimely reflected in an updated version of the Results Framework).

- The second and third Outcome Indicator prescribed a percentual increase in beneficiaries' perception, respectively by a 10% increase in satisfaction among the people in the intervention areas on security and safety perception, and at least by 25% increase in satisfaction of PD personnel with the support services received by the PHQ in the second year of project implementation. Respectively, the final targets were identified rather ambiguous and without a clear methodological explanation that would support such a percentage increase in the intervention area (by keeping also in mind that the overall context may vary for each of the districts which also could impact the achievement of the indicators).
- The analysis of the COPS's output indicators against the IATI standards indicated that the same limitations were further transposed in this context, notably:
  - Kabul was indicated as the sole geographic area.
  - Baseline data on most of the indicators specified "TBD" and has not been further presented in other documents of the project that would indicate updates to the Results Framework.
  - Final targets were indicating an increase in the percentage of trust and satisfaction with limited explanation and clarity on how methodologically the respective benchmarks were established (i.e., indicators 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3), while other indicators were not aligning with the SMART criteria (i.e., Indicator 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.6, 2.7, 3.2, 4.2).
- The analysis of the project progress reports (quarterly, annual, and final draft) has indicated that the Results Framework was not updated on the missing data, and the respective limitations were not ultimately addressed.
- Another shortcoming of the Results Framework formulation represented the fact that most of the results indicators (i.e., especially the ones under Output 2 – 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and Output 3 – 3.3) were bound to public opinion polls, which could challenge the objective assessment of indicators fulfillment as no other methods of verification were included.

The examination of the implementation process outlined the following conclusions:

- The COPS project has followed the spirit of the lessons that were reflected in the ProDoc. Notably, the key-intervention instrument for strengthening community trust in ANP was further reflected in supporting the PeM councils and CSOs (by introducing the small grants' funding mechanism for engaging CSO through micro-projects on community security identified through the police districts' PeM Councils). In the context of the COPS project, the iterative approach was realized through the introduction of gradual steps for the implementation of the outputs based on preliminary assessments, surveys as well as comprehensive consultations with the MOIA. The COPS project has followed the lessons on the importance of providing comprehensive support, by introducing activities on capacity building, infrastructure assessment, and equipment provision. However, the CSO micro-project scheme was removed from the implementation plan at the insistence of the MOIA.
- The analysis of the total cumulative expenses in comparison with the total budget of the COPS project indicated a low delivery rate. During the implementation timeframe, the project has absorbed approximately 12% of the total committed budget.
- The analysis indicated that the COPS project has started to implement measures toward the achievement of the Output Indicators, however, due to the situation that the project has faced which led to premature closure, the final targets were not fulfilled.
- At the same time, the key results of the COPS project implementation comprised:
  - Under output 1, the project completed the Kabul PHQ assessment. The assessment reviewed the existing coordination, planning, mentoring, and implementation of

community policing initiatives at the district level at the Kabul PHQ. Following the assessment, a detailed reporting mechanism was developed for Kabul PDs to report challenges and recommendations undertaken by PDs at the district police and community consultation sessions.

- Under output 1, following the recommendation from the capacity assessment of the MOIA a four-day cascading training was organized for the PDs education offices and Police Staff College senior instructors. The direct training beneficiaries were the PHQ and PDs education officers.
- Under output 2, the project strengthened the Police and Community Partnership in 6 PDs of Kabul city.
- Under output 2, the project completed a total of 19 community and police consultation sessions. The activity brought the police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication actions.
- Under output 2, the project completed a two-week classroom and on-the-job training on Social and Behavior Change Communication to the MOIA-related from PDs in media and public relations, gender and human rights, religious and cultural affairs, family response units, and community policing. The first training covered the MOIA directorates while the second training targeted Kabul's 19 PDs.
- Under output 2, the project completed the second round of 60 bilateral interviews. The in-depth interviews were organized with experts, community members, and ANP male and female officers to ascertain the behaviors and situations that could lead to or prevent crimes.
- Under output 2, the project launched three docuseries about the police professional behavior, police information center, police impartiality, public confidence, police commitment, police conduct and behavior, police respect for human rights, police and the rule of law, police and fighting corruption and ethics. The video docuseries were displayed in 6 PDs, where ANP officers learned the gradual integration of community policing concepts into their duties in their respective communities.
- Under output 2, the project implemented the second round of Capacity Building Modular Training in 5 PDs in Kabul city. The training brought police and the community together to fight crime and insurgency in their neighborhoods. This was a cascading training where the MOIA trained 12 officers, and they provided on-the-job training to 270 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and PDs personnel.

The main **obstacles** that the project faced in the implementation process:

- From the beginning of the project implementation, following an unfortunate staff security incident, UNDP put in place stricter security rules which limited the mobility of the project team and interaction with the project partners.
- There was a high turnover of staff within the MOIA leadership, which impacted the timeliness of activities. Whereby the moment when some activities would be agreed on with the MOIA, the leadership would change again, and the process of coordination would start over from the beginning with significant changes to the project implementation approach.
- Another factor that negatively impacted the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation related to understaffing of the project. The project's initial HR Plan included a total of 24 staff members. The COPS project planned a P-4 International Project Manager and a P-5 Chief Technical Advisor. However, the leadership of the MOIA insisted that these two positions should be abolished, and the budget transferred to other project activities. This led to the situation where the project staff members had to do "double-hatting", meaning that they were performing several roles at once that were not initially plotted in the project design.
- The breakout of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in late March 2020 delayed the implementation of the project activities. Due to the pandemic, the authorities have imposed a lockdown across the country. Given the magnitude of the pandemic, the MOIA has been focusing its attention

and resources on addressing COVID-19, specifically within the police force, instead of prioritizing the project implementation.

- Due to the pandemic, UNDP has limited the numbers of international staff in the country, while the national staff was telecommuting. The restrictions have disrupted the organization of the infrastructure assessments and impeded the ability to hold meetings with MOIA and ANP on the implementation of the project.

### *Gender-specific conclusions*

#### Project design:

- It is plausible that the Risk Log of the COPS project has identified out of the 4 risks, one related to “Limited participation of communities, particularly women and other underrepresented groups in project activities”. There were 6 measures put forward to mitigate the respective risk. It was pertinent to include this risk in the Risk Log, as the environment of the project context was mostly “male-dominated” as emphasized by the interview respondents.
- The analysis of the Results Framework outlined that out of the 3 outcome indicators, 2 were gender sensitive (by indicating the percentage of males and females expressing (a) trust toward the ANP in Kabul and (b) positive perceptions of the safety and security in their respective police districts). However, the third outcome indicator did not include disaggregated data on sexes (by indicating the percentage of PD personnel reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ). This indicator could have also been sensitive to gender, by indicating the percentage of males and females reporting satisfaction with the support services received by PHQ.
- None of the outcome targets presented in the Results Framework was gender sensitive as the indicators were not disaggregated on sexes, disability, and other vulnerable groups.
- At the output level, out of the total number of 17 output results indicators, there were only 3 indicators that were disaggregated on sexes. There was only 1 output result indicator specifically targeting women – “2.4. % of women (a) attending, (b) represented at the PeM (by target PD)”, which is insufficient if taken into account that the COPS project was targeting communities.
- In the output final targets, only one target related to the output result indicator 2.4 presented above, which indicated an increase of 30% in women attending PeM meetings, and 30% in women represented at the PeM.
- The baseline data did not contain any data on gender, except on the output indicator 2.4. indicating 30% of women represented at the PeM and no data on the women attending the PeM meetings.
- The focus-group interview with the representatives of the UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan that were associated with the implementation of the COPS project indicated that the project design could have placed a bigger emphasis on gender mainstreaming. This was particularly relevant as the COPS project focused on direct interaction with communities.

#### Project implementation:

- The focus-group interview highlighted that although the project design has not made the necessary focus on gender, the implementation of the project was focused on gender mainstreaming, and the inclusion of women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups in the project activities.
- The analysis of the progress reports has confirmed that the project activities were involving women, marginalized communities, and disadvantaged groups. Moreover, the collection of data was disaggregated by sexes (the specific activities related to the training of women police are presented further in the report).
- Respectively, in the first year of the implementation, the project finalized the assessment of 13 PDs in Kabul city. The aim of the assessment was to identify infrastructure requiring rehabilitation. The assessment also covered the situation of the existing Family Response

Units, female detention cells, and Police-e-Mardumi meeting halls.

- The project organized a two-day community consultation in Kabul PDs 4, 5, 6, 7 8 & 12 to develop a sense of duty and commitment to proactive community-oriented policing by undertaking community and police consultation sessions at the grassroots level in the identified PDs of Kabul. A total of 1,900 participants from the 6 PDs of Kabul attended the events. There were 730 female participants (approximately 38%) and 1170 male participants (approximately 62%) from Shura's. The community consultation collected key suggestions from the PeM Shura's led by the Community Policing Directorate of MOIA.
- The project organized a total of 6 consultations, under the title of "Strengthening Police and Community Partnership Consultations" in PDs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12 of Kabul city. The activity aimed at bringing police and community together by implementing the Social and Behavior Change Communication (SBCC) actions. A total of 568 community representatives, of whom 255 were female (approximately 45%), attended the six-day community consultation sessions.
- The project started consultations with the Community Policing Directorate to include one male and one female police officer under SBCC 1 planned in early April 2021 as well as involving the Family Response Units to jointly implement the MOIA broader outreach initiatives under SBCC 2 and Inclusive Community Outreach Initiative.
- Following the community consultations, the project identified gender-specific challenges and has put forward recommendations to overcome them. As an example, it has identified that there was an absence of dedicated female police officers whereas a recommendation was put forward to increase women's presence in the police stations and that the female police officers should conduct outreach initiatives in the girls' schools.

#### 4.2. Recommendations

To improve the project design, especially in the context of future interventions, it is **recommended**:

- To annex to the ProDoc the Partner Capacity Assessment Tool and HACT Micro Assessment when the project employs the HACT modality. In the case of the COPS project, this was particularly relevant as the ProDoc indicated that the assessment of the MOIA capacities concluded that the institution was not able to meet the standards to undertake financial services.
- To improve the contingency planning during the project design. Conducting a comprehensive risk analysis could provide viable mitigation measures during the project implementation phase.
- To elaborate an exit strategy from the beginning of the intervention. The project design should reflect the vision of how the results will be secured and what follow-up actions are expected from the authorities following the project's finalization. This aspect could improve sustainability and national ownership.

To improve implementation, it is **recommended**:

- To enhance the planning and hands-on monitoring of the project implementation. Many of the staffing and recruitment challenges could have been addressed through better project oversight. Respectively, to tackle the recruitment challenge, UNDP has various modalities in place, such as sourcing people from other country offices to provide initial support to projects. Another recommendation to tackle this challenge is the prioritization of project staff recruitment at the operationalization/ inception phase of the project. Alternatively, when the project is continuously facing "double-hatting", the project team could receive on-the-spot training that allows increasing capacities to take over the tasks or positions that remain vacant or the ones that were annulled/ canceled.
- To strengthen the risk management of interventions, especially in complex security contexts. This should represent a continuous exercise involving an adaptive management approach. The provisions of the UNDP Guidance Note "Managing Risks Across UNDP Programming and Operations" as well as other resources could help the project teams in better understating the

importance of risk management.

- To prepare methodologies and guidance documentation for the monitoring practices at the project level to empower the project team to perform efficient M&E functions.
- To assign a gender and LNOB focal point in the project team that will assure the mainstreaming of the respective aspects in the project activities and documents.
- To improve the monitoring of the project reports' quality. This recommendation concerns the quarterly, annual, and final project reports that were provided by the COPS project. Good quality reports improve the evaluation of the project and provide useful insight into the project implementation. Unfortunately, in the case of the COPS project, the reports contained mostly repetitive information that was formulated in a rather abstract manner which made the extraction of information for conducting the final evaluation challenging.
- To collect data and report on the progress toward SDG achievement. The ProDoc indicated that the COPS project aimed to contribute to the achievement of SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

#### **4.3. Good practices**

- One of the good practices of the project design was to provide a comprehensive framework of cooperation with various projects and international organizations in Afghanistan by also defining the type of relationship/ interaction that the COPS project should maintain. The respective approach replicated to other interventions, could facilitate swift cooperation and fruitful communication of projects with other initiatives. It also contributes to the achievement of the coherence criteria of interventions.
- The application of the iterative approach in the project design represented both an innovation and a solution to improve the quality of the intervention, by the means of emphasizing that "one size will not fit all". This approach helps increase the trust of local beneficiaries in the intervention and builds up the ownership on the side of the national counterparts.
- Speaking about the project implementation process, to mitigate the delays in project delivery, as well as to respond to the fluctuation of staff in the key positions of the MOAI, the COPS project team developed a coordination and debriefing plan that helped to easier present the details on the project implementation to the partners.
- Another good practice of the project implementation concerned the strong cooperation and regular exchanges with other international development partners. This helped the team to mitigate overlap of activities, exchange valuable information on the implementation of projects, as well as built networks of cooperation.
- In terms of the achieved results, the COPS project implementation has prioritized gender despite the obstacles that the project has faced and the limited gender guidance of the ProDoc. This represented an application of adaptive management to align the implementation of the project with the corporate values as the promotion of gender equality, human rights, and disability concerns are guiding principles for all United Nations entities.



## ANNEX 1. Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

### Evaluators/Consultants

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well-founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners, and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact during the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate, and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings, and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System: Name of Consultant: **Andrei Iovu**

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): **Individual Consultant**

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed in **Chisinau, the Republic of Moldova** on the **13<sup>th</sup> of April 2022**



## **ANNEX 2. Assignment's 14 specific objectives**

- **Objective 1.** Evaluating the status of coordination among international partners such as the Community Policing for Afghanistan CPA project funded by German and UN-Habitat policing program.
- **Objective 2.** Evaluating the status of the training and capacity building of MOIA staff to fully assume responsibilities of the Community Policing Initiatives.
- **Objective 3.** UNDP COPS intervention to the capacity-building demand of MOIA staff, Kabul PHQ, and PDs staff.
- **Objective 4.** Status of training for female MOIA personnel to perform policing functions.
- **Objective 5.** Assess the status of recommendations of CPSS findings.
- **Objective 6.** Supporting Kabul Police District activities implemented by local implementing partners
- **Objective 7.** Assess the project design in terms of its relevance to the overall development situation at the national level, relevance to national strategies, and relevance to beneficiaries
- **Objective 8.** Assess the quality and timeliness of inputs, the reporting, and monitoring system, and the extent to which these have been effective
- **Objective 9.** Assess the cost-efficiency of the project interventions
- **Objective 10.** Assess the relevance and effectiveness of the project's strategy and approaches for the achievement of the project objectives.
- **Objective 11.** Assess the performance of the project in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of producing the expected outputs.
- **Objective 12.** Assess the relevance of the project's management arrangements; identify advantages, bottlenecks and lessons learned concerning the management arrangements.
- **Objective 13.** Analyze underlying factors beyond UNDP control that affect the achievement of the project results.
- **Objective 14.** Provide recommendations to key project stakeholders for future projects/ program development.

### ANNEX 3. Evaluation criteria explanation

In 2019 OECD/DAC revised and further specified their evaluation criteria, published in “Better Criteria for Better Evaluations: Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use”, and added a new criterion, coherence. The revised approach of the above-mentioned benchmarks better reflects the LNOB, gender and takes the lens of the Agenda 2030, as follows:

1. **Relevance:** entails examining the extent to which the COPS project objectives and overall project design responded to beneficiaries’ needs and priorities, as well as alignment with national, global, and partner/institutional policies and priorities. The evaluation of relevance includes the determination of whether the objectives of the COPS project were adequately defined, realistic, and feasible and whether the results are verifiable and aligned with current international standards for development interventions.
2. **Coherence:** represents the new criteria of the OECD/DAC methodology that examines the extent to which other donors’ interventions (particularly policies) supported or undermined the intervention and vice versa. Coherence includes concepts of complementarity, harmonization, coordination, and the extent to which the intervention has added value while avoiding duplication. This is particularly important as in line with Agenda 2030, greater attention must be paid to coherence and the synergies between policy areas and interventions performed by different development actors.
3. **Effectiveness:** represents the standard that looks at the extent to which the intervention achieved its objectives and its results while considering the relative importance of the objectives in the context of the intervention. This is also the main criterion that helps to evaluate the success of the COPS project.
4. **Efficiency:** represents the criterion that indicates the extent to which the COPS project delivered the expected results in an economic and timely way. This is not including only the cost-effective aspects, but also the timely delivery.
5. **Impact:** represents the criterion that helps to explore the extent to which the intervention has generated significant positive or negative, intended, or unintended higher-level effects. Impact addresses the intervention’s ultimate significance and potentially transformative effects – holistic and enduring changes in systems or norms. The impact criterion is exploring whether the intervention created the change that matters to beneficiaries.
6. **Sustainability:** indicates the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue. It encompasses several elements for analysis – financial, economic, social, and environmental and the respective interaction between them.

## ANNEX 4. Pool of evaluation questions

The Terms of Reference indicated the list of questions that shall be addressed to the stakeholders in the process of conducting the evaluation. For purposes of improving the accuracy of gathering information as well as mainstreaming LNOB and gender, some of the questions that were indicated in the Terms of Reference were slightly adjusted, by maintaining the intended meaning of the inquiry. Additionally, the evaluator has added some questions specifically to elucidate the LNOB and gender dimensions of the intervention, by applying the gender lens to the evaluation criteria.

The questions to assess the **relevance** of the COPS formulated in the context of the assignment in the ToR were the following:

1. What is the value/relevance of the intervention regarding the national and international partners' policies and priorities?
2. How effective was COPS in garnering national ownership of the activities?
3. Where was the project not able to deliver on enhancing national ownership and why?
4. What were good practices for securing national ownership?
5. How much support did the Government provide to the COPS project's efforts to garner national ownership?

In addition to these questions, the evaluator has put forward the following questions that seek to elucidate the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of COPS's project relevance:

1. Was the COPS project designed in a way that responded to the needs and priorities of all genders? If so, how?
2. To what extent does the intervention's design reflect the rights of persons of all genders and included feedback from a diverse range of local stakeholders including marginalized groups?
3. Does the intervention meet the practical and strategic needs of all genders?

The assessment of **coherence** as an evaluation criterion was not reflected in the ToR of the assignment. In this sense, the evaluator has put forward the following questions:

1. Did the COPS project team regularly participate in the thematic groups and coordination structures in the MOIA?
2. Did COPS closely coordinate with international initiatives that support the transformation of the ANP?

To reflect the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of the COPS's project **coherence**, the following questions were put forward:

1. To what extent are the intervention's design, delivery and results coherent with international law and commitments to gender equality and rights?
2. To what extent does the intervention support national legislation and initiatives that aim to improve gender equality and human rights? What lessons can be learned?

The questions to assess the **effectiveness** of the COPS project formulated in the context of the assignment in the ToR were the following:

1. Has the COPS project successfully delivered the results as identified under each of the project outputs?
2. What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
3. How effective was the governance arrangement of the project?
4. To what extent has there been collaboration and communication among UNDP, donors, and MOIA at the central level?
5. How effective have the capacity development initiatives undertaken by the COPS project been?

6. Have the initiatives been adequate and resulted in sustainable capacity in the target MOIA departments at the central, provincial, and regional offices?
7. How effective has COPS been in addressing the challenges in demand-driven initiatives, and priorities raised by communities?
8. Has the capacity development support of COPS to the ANP-led community-oriented police within MOIA?
9. How effective and efficient were the lines of reporting between UNDP and MOIA, and how clear was the division of responsibilities and accountability of various functions and activities between the government and UNDP?
10. How was the overall project designing process?
11. Was it designed through a consultative process with MOIA counterparts, donors, and other stakeholders?
12. How effective was the international partners' role in COPS funding, implementation of activities, communication, and overall coordination?

To identify the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of the COPS's project **effectiveness**, the following questions were put forward:

1. Did the intervention achieve its objectives and expected results in ways that contributed to gender equality? If so, how?
2. Were there differential results for different people? If so, how and why?
3. Were different approaches necessary to reach people of different genders?
4. Was the intervention adjusted to address any concerns and maximize effectiveness?
5. Was the theory of change and results framework informed by analysis of gender equality, political economy analysis, and human rights? If so, to what extent?

The questions to assess the **efficiency** of the COPS project formulated in the context of the assignment in the ToR were the following:

1. How efficiently were funding, staff, and other resources used to achieve the expected results of the project?
2. Based on cost-benefit analysis what conclusions can be drawn regarding 'value for money' and cost-related efficiencies or inefficiencies in implementing the COPS project?
3. What was the quality and timeliness of the implementation of activities and the responsiveness of the project to adapt and respond to changes and challenges?
4. What were the risks and how effective was expectation management?
5. Were the organizational structures, management, planning, and implementation processes effective and efficient?
6. Did the project use the resources most economically to achieve its objectives?
7. Have the resources invested led to the achievement of the intended results?

To elucidate the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of the COPS's Project **efficiency**, the following questions were put forward:

1. Were different resources allocated in ways that considered gender equality? If so, how were they allocated? Was differential resource allocation appropriate?
2. Do the investment costs per person target the differentiated needs of people of different genders?

The questions to assess the **sustainability** of the COPS project formulated in the context of the assignment in the ToR were the following:

1. What is the sustainability of the results achieved, with a focus on capacities built and the ability of the institutions to operate with reduced international technical assistance in the future?
2. How predictably and regularly had resources been supplied to COPS?
3. To what extent were COPS project capacity-building initiatives/training sustainable and what are the longer-term effects?

To assess the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of the COPS's project **sustainability**, the following questions were put forward:

1. Did the intervention contribute to greater gender equality within wider legal, political, economic, and social systems? If so, how and to what extent?
2. Did it result in enduring changes to social norms that are harmful to people of all or some genders? If it did not achieve this, why not?
3. Will the achievements in gender equality persist after the conclusion of the intervention? Have processes contributed to sustaining these benefits?
4. Have mechanisms been set up to support the achievement of gender equality in the longer term?

The questions to assess the **impact** of the COPS formulated in the context of the assignment in the ToR were the following:

1. What were the unintended effects of the COPS project interventions (negative and positive)?
2. What are the results of the intervention in terms of changes in the lives of beneficiaries against set indicators?
3. To what extent has COPS impacted the wider objective of re-building the ANP?
4. What changes, both positive and negative, both intended and unintended, can be attributed to the interventions?
5. What is the estimated impact of the COPS funding on overall security in the country?
6. What were the intended and unintended aspects of the program related to the political, security, and developmental dimensions?

To better determine the *gender* and *human rights* dimension of the COPS's project **impact**, the following questions were put forward:

1. Were there equal impacts for different genders or were there any gender-related differences in engagement, experience, and impacts? If so, why did these differential impacts occur?
2. To what extent did gender-related impacts intersect with other social barriers including race/ethnicity, disability, age, and sexual orientation to contribute to differential experiences and outcomes?
3. How did gendered norms and barriers within the wider political, economic, religious, legislative, and socio-cultural environment impact outcomes?
4. To what extent have impacts contributed to equal power relations between people of different genders and to changing social norms and systems?

From the analysis of the questions that were put forward in the ToR, the main accent was put on elucidating the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the COPS project. Also, the questions in the ToR were complemented by the evaluator with gender-sensitive inquiries.

## **ANNEX 5. List of interviewed people**

Chencho Gyalmo Dorjee, Peace and Governance Adviser, UNDP Afghanistan

Mohammad Haroon Nusrat, former COPS's national project coordinator

Sainey Ceesay, Team Lead, LOTFA Projects Closure

Syed Haroon Ahmadi, RBM Analyst Development Effectiveness Unit, UNDP Afghanistan

## **ANNEX 6. Focus-group questions**

1. What was the relevance of the intervention regarding the national and international partners' policies and priorities?
2. How effective was COPS in garnering national ownership of the activities?
3. Where was the project not able to deliver on enhancing national ownership and why?
4. What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
5. Why then the project did not adjust the work plan and intervention approach? – COVID?
6. How effective was the governance arrangement of the project?
7. To what extent has there been collaboration and communication among UNDP, donors, and MOIA at the central level?
8. What conclusions can be drawn regarding “value for money” and cost-related efficiencies or inefficiencies in implementing the COPS project?
9. What was the quality and timeliness of the implementation of activities?
10. What lessons learned and recommendations could be learned from the:
11. Is there anything you would like to add and do you think some questions were not raised during this interview that could have been important to be discussed?



## PROJECT LESSONS-LEARNED REPORT

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Support to Payroll Management (SPM) Project</b>
<b>Country:</b>	Afghanistan
<b>Related CPAP Outcome</b>	Outcome 2: Trust in and access to fair, effective, and accountable rule of law services is increased in accordance with applicable international human rights standards and the government's legal obligations.
<b>Project Description and Key Lessons-Learned</b>	
<b>Brief description of context</b>	<p>In April 2015, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), UNDP and the donors supporting the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) received H.E. President Ghani's approval to proceed with the restructuring of LOTFA and the development of a new programme document that included the design of a LOTFA Transition Plan to succeed the LOTFA <i>Akheri</i> beginning 1 July 2015. The LOTFA transition would ensure the full handover of the payroll functions to the GIROA and to develop national capacity for its effective, efficient, and accountable management. They agreed on a three-phased, conditions-based transition period from July 2015 to December 2016, with clear targets and deliverables for each phase. Some twenty-three conditions were agreed in a Donor Conditions document – for all the four parties<sup>1</sup>—which set out the conditions for the transition of payroll management to GIROA (MOIA).</p> <p>Since the end of the three phases—i.e., December 2016, the SPM project had been subjected to series of extensions, as a result of mostly MOIA not meeting most of its twelve donor conditions. The statuses of those conditions were subjected to two separate independent assessments both of which identified the same facts about MOIA's conditions.</p> <p>As part of the US-Taliban peace deal, the US and NATO forces began their withdrawal from Afghanistan from May 2021 which saw a deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan as a consequence. As the Taliban's offensive continued, many districts and provincial capitals started to fall to the Taliban further worsening the security in most parts of the country. On the 15th of August 2021 there came the invasion of Kabul and consequently the overthrow of the Ghani-led government and consequent taking over of the government by the <i>De facto</i> Authority. As the consequence of this, UNDP immediately suspended all LOTFA related projects which was subsequently unanimously approved by LOTFA donors. At the time of this suspension, there was no LOTFA fund in the hands of the former government (Ministry of Finance) since the latest advance request made by the MoF had not been processed. Based on this suspension of project activities, both APPS and WEPS systems were shut down and taken out of service. So far, for 2021, police payrolls were processed for only January to July 2021. At its meeting of 4th November 2021, the LOTFA MPTF Steering Committee decided to close the project effective on 4th December 2021.</p>
<b>Brief description of project</b>	The LOTFA-SPM Project was a dedicated payroll management project with approximately 40, mostly national staff and 3 international staff, working closely together with MOIA staff from the Budget & Finance, HR and ICT departments to ensure timely payment of salaries and incentives to the ANP and GDPDC officers. The expected outcome of the SPM project was to build the Government of

<sup>1</sup> The donor conditions document was meant for the full transition of all payroll management functions to the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOIA) of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). It outlined the consensus reached by the MOIA, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) responsibilities, and donors' expectations to deliver an integrated human resources and payroll system.

	<p>Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)’s capacity to independently manage all <i>non-fiduciary</i> aspects of payroll for the ANP and GDPDC, including producing relevant reports for donors in their specified formats. MOIA should also be able to manage the full range of functions related to payroll, i.e., human resources, accounting, and information and communication technology in a seamless manner.</p> <p>The LOTFA-SPM project was divided into <u>6 outputs</u> as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <u>Output 1</u> entails having in place updated legislative, policy and regulatory framework and business processes, implemented and functional in support of independent MOIA payroll management.</li> <li>○ <u>Output 2</u> entails MOIA personnel (in Payroll, Human Resources (HR), Finance and Budget as appropriate) being able to independently undertake all payroll inputs, processing and validation tasks to agreed and measurable standards, using the reliability, accuracy and timeliness of personnel data and payroll to support improved evidence-based planning, prioritization and decisions.</li> <li>○ <u>Output 3</u> covers MOIA’s payroll systems which should electronically be linked with HR systems, implemented and operational nationwide, and covers all pertinent and validated personnel. Three interconnected activity results are to be achieved for the overall achievement of this Output.</li> <li>○ <u>Output 4</u> covers the provisions of the necessary infrastructures to support the full functionality of MOIA payroll systems during and after the SPM project.</li> <li>○ <u>Output 5</u> is the core function of the SPM project as it entails the transfer of funds, on a timely and regular basis, to MOF for Police Pay.</li> <li>○ <u>Output 6</u> is the SPM Project management component which is to ensure that the rest of the outputs get implemented in accordance with the project document and in a timely, efficient, accountable and effective manner.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Key project successes</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ From the beginning of the project, SPM led and supervised improvements in systems architectures, oversight mechanisms and adjustments to the police payroll system—WEPS—which greatly improved misappropriations, errors, revolutionized reporting, hence improving the integrity of the whole LOTFA payroll funding.</li> <li>○ High level of effectiveness and efficiency across almost all outputs of the SPM Project’s log-frame, which was confirmed in the successive annual audit reports; two independent mid-term evaluations; and various other independent reports, such as the risk assessment report, etc. For example, the 2017 mid-term evaluation report reflected this as follows: <p><i>“Overall, we find the SPM Project achieving or exceeding its benchmarks for the development of MOIA policies and procedures related to the payroll process; strengthening LOTFA governance and oversight mechanisms (such as the Monitoring Agent and Thematic Working Groups); building WEPS systems architecture, data entry, reconciliation and verification via innovations such as the “Digital M16” form and bar code; supporting the expansion of pay distribution modalities such as Electronic Funds Transfer and Mobile Money; and supporting CSTC-A in data for the Afghanistan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).”</i></p> </li> <li>○ As a result of SPM project’s interventions and oversight mechanisms, the MOIA payroll for ANP and GDPDC became more efficient, transparent, timely and accurate. By the end of the project, the percentage of ANP and GDPDC personnel paid by EFT had reached a 95% and 100%, respectively, thanks to the efforts of the SPM project in leveraging mobile banking. The project had also achieved 100% connectivity of all ANP payroll stations via a direct link to MOIA’s intranet, and protected VPN connectivity (via public Internet) to the MOIA servers for all GDPDC payroll stations.</li> <li>○ By the end of the project, the windows of opportunity for “ghost police” and other forms of corruption surrounding the ANP payroll process had closed, as a result of LOTFA-SPM project’s strengthening of internal controls, introduction of the Monitoring Agent and its physical verifications, etc.</li> <li>○ Over the duration of the project, SPM provided trainings to over 2,000 staff of the MOIA, across its various departments—Finance and Budget, Personnel</li> </ul>

	<p>directorate, provincial finance and HR officers, civilian deputy commanders, etc., all with the objective to ensure that MOIA built capacity to undertake all non-fiduciary aspects of payroll management.</p>
<b>Project shortcomings and solutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Limitation of Project scope: From its inception in July 2015, SPM project was limited to a narrow scope—limited to supporting MOIA in payroll management—while leaving out other complementary scope, such as human rights and gender. Following the completion of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) risk assessment, Donors and UNDP recommended for SPM project to include Human Rights and Gender activities in its 2021 Annual Work Plan. These two activities could have been integrated/mainstreamed in the project's AWP and tied to payroll, which could help to encourage the implementing partner, MOIA, to adhere to the international standards and principles to promote human rights, gender equality and the full realization of women's rights and freedoms.</li> <li>o Funding challenge of sustaining police payroll: While the project enjoyed stable funding throughout its nascent years—2015 to 2019, it started facing financial difficulty in meeting cash disbursements on a timely manner towards the end of its life—from 2020. For example, from 2018, the number of contributing donors reduced, with some leaving the Fund altogether and others earmarking funds away from payroll (SPM project) towards the non-payroll Thematic Windows. In 2021, projected cash shortfall for police payroll was estimated at US\$95m. Through the joint efforts of TFMU, donors, MOIA, and UNDP, the matter was well managed, and becoming moot following the change of government and the subsequent suspension of project activities.</li> </ul>
<b>Lessons learned</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o While not a typical development project for UNDP—as a development organization—the LOTFA-SPM Project proves that UNDP as an organization is able to operate effectively (rendering both fiduciary services and development implementation) within a conflict-country context such as Afghanistan—in partnership with a national implementing partner, the MOIA— and alongside a U.N. political mission and international partners.</li> <li>o Coordination: For a project the size of SPM project, effective coordination requires investments of time, funding and commitment and transactions costs, particularly in the establishment of oversight and enforcing systems of controls and protecting the reputation of UNDP and its partners.</li> <li>o Sustainability: It is critical to ensure that exit and sustainability strategies are built into projects from the design stage, to guarantee the sustainability of interventions after donor funding ceases and project closure. The SPM project became some sort of a 'perpetual' undertaking in the hands of UNDP and for the donors, the funding reached an unsustainable level, one which GIROA could not sustain.</li> </ul>
<b>Follow-up Actions</b>	<p>Based on the nature of the SPM project and its abrupt closure, resulting from the take-over of government by Taliban, the only recommended follow up necessary here is to take the above-mentioned lessons into future planning for other similar projects.</p>

Project Information	
<b>Award ID:</b>	SPM (95495, 95840, 95844, 95849, 95846, 95848)
<b>CO Focal Points:</b>	Ms. Chenchu Dorjee; Ms. Surayo Buzurukova
<b>Partners:</b>	MOIA, LOTFA Donors
<b>Project resources:</b>	SPM Project Final Review <a href="#">Report</a>
<b>Report prepared by:</b>	Mr. Sainey Ceesay, Project Manager
<b>Date:</b>	25 July 2022