UniUnited Nations
PecPeacebuilding

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT
(Length: Max. 12 pages plus cover page and annexes)

Country (ies): Libya

Project Title: Peacebuilding through Community Stabilization in the Southern Libyan Municipalities of Ghat, Sebha & Ubari
Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):

PBF project modality:	**If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):**
X IRF ☐ PRF	☐ Country Trust Fund ☐ Regional Trust Fund **Name of Recipient Fund:**

List all direct project recipient organisations (starting with Convening Agency), followed type of organisation (UN, CSO etc): UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, WFP
List additional implementing partners, Governmental and non-Governmental:
Ministry of Local Government, Municipalities of Ghat, Sebha & Ubari

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Expected project commencement date[1]:
Project duration in months:[2] Maximum 24 months
Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: 3 municipalities of Southern Libya (Ghat, Sebha, and Ubari)

Does the project fall under one of the specific PBF priority windows below:
☐ Gender promotion initiative
☐ Youth promotion initiative
☐ Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions
☐ Cross-border or regional project

Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):
UNDP: $1,774,367 (Convening Agency)
IOM: $ 1,258,692
WFP: $ 1,053,530
UNICEF: $ 1,001,437

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[1] Note: actual commencement date will be the date of first funds transfer.

[2] Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 24 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

Total: $ 5,088,026

The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source): Estimated amount of funding from UN and Government sources is estimated to be USD57 million, of which USD14 million are secured funds from participating UN organisations and USD43 million is the estimated amount of investment for the Government in support of programme objectives in the three project zones. Please note this includes an approved USD40 million investment from the Reconstruction Fund for the South which has yet to be released by the National government. Efforts to further quantify and track the exact investment from all government partners will be made throughout the programme implementation.

Details (including planned in-kind support) can be found in Annex E - Complementary funding for PBF programme

PBF 1st tranche (50%):	PBF 2nd tranche* (50%):	
UNDP: **$ 887,184**	UNDP: **$ 887,184**	
IOM: **$ 629,346**	IOM: **$ 629,346**	
UNICEF: **$ 500,719**	UNICEF: $ **500,719**	
WFP: **$ 526,765**	WFP: **$ 526,765**	
Total: **$ 2,544,013**	Total: **$ 2,544,013**	

Two-three sentences with a brief project description and succinct explanation of how the project is time sensitive, catalytic and risk-tolerant/ innovative:
While there has been a decline in violent conflict and related humanitarian needs since the signing of the UN-facilitated Ceasefire Agreement in October 2020, political uncertainty, instability, criminality, weak governance structures, lack of social cohesion, limited economic opportunities and localized conflicts have continued to challenge sustained peace in southern Libya. This joint programme would provide a pragmatic roadmap for advancing stabilization and recovery programming in the South of Libya. The programme also aims to be catalytic for the expansion of UN programming and presence in the South of Libya thus facilitating the implementation of the recently approved UNSDCF in an important region of the country.

Summarize **the in-country project consultation and endorsement process prior to submission to PBSO, including through any PBF Steering Committee where it exists, including whether civil society and target communities were consulted and how:**

Building on the initial inputs provided by multiple international (including EU, USAID, GIZ and several partner INGOs) and national stakeholders during the development of the concept note, the participating UN agencies decided to arrange a joint coordination workshop with partners from Government, UN, and civil society to jointly review the scope of the programme and agree upon the priority interventions.

To this end, the UN agencies conducted a two-day coordination workshop in Tunis in August 2022 with national and local government counterparts (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Planning, and the Ministry of Local Government attending, as well as a representative from the Municipality of Sebha), as well as civil society actors, to discuss the proposed outcomes of this programme and to

incorporate their valuable feedback in the project document. Detailed notes from these consultations are included in **Annex F.**

In close coordination with the participating UN Agencies, the Ministry of Local Government led in-person consultations in Tripoli and online with all three mayors of the participating municipalities to gain further insights on local alignment of the programme. All three mayors endorsed the programme and offered their full collaboration for implementation, providing specific recommendations on how to tailor programming to the challenges in each municipality. To complement the Government interaction, a series of key informant interviews were carried out with civil society actors in the municipalities of Ubari and Ghat to gain further insights on community peacebuilding priorities.

The participating organizations have also discussed the programme outcome areas with existing private sector partners (both international and national) currently operational in Libya. Based on these informal consultations, common priorities of aligning corporate social responsibility programmes, boosting job creation and employment and supporting entrepreneurship have consistently emerged as outcome areas as well as the need to improve the conditions for business to function and grow in the South. These private sector partners include Toyota, Repsol, KIA (HB Group - National Conglomerate), Libyana (National Telecom) and National Oil Corporation (NOC) + Zallaf (part of NOC umbrella that manages licenses for the international firms such as Total & Shell). Inputs and lessons learned from local businesses and entrepreneurs who have participated in recent large recovery programmes covering the target districts (such as the UNDP Stabilisation Facility for Libya (SFL) project) have also been taken into consideration.

Inputs from all the above consultations have informed the present joint programme document and it is foreseen that a selection of the above-mentioned actors will be invited to form the PBF Steering Committee to ensure continued national (through co-chair of the Ministry of Local Government and other technical ministries) and local ownership (through the participation of local authorities and community stakeholders).

Project Gender Marker score: 2 [3]

Specify % and $ of total project budget allocated to activities in direct pursuit of women's   empowerment: 39% of the total budget, **$ 2,007,369.**
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Project Risk Marker score: 1[4]

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project: (2.3) Conflict prevention/management[5]

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[3] **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)
Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate at least 30% of the total project budget to GEWE
Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)
[4] **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes
Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes
[5] **PBF Focus Areas** are:

If applicable, **UNSDCF outcome(s)** to which the project contributes: Outcomes 1.1, 1.2, and 2.1.
1.1: By 2025, Libyan citizens, particularly youth and women, are better able to
exercise their rights and obligations in an inclusive, stable, democratic, and reconciled society,
underpinned by responsive, transparent, accountable, and unified public institutions.
1.2: By 2025, people in Libya participate in and benefit from a more peaceful, safe,
and secure society, free from armed conflict and underpinned by unified and strengthened
security, justice, rule of law, and human rights institutions that promote and protect human
rights based on the principles of inclusivity, non-discrimination, and equality in accordance with
international norms and standards.
2.1: By 2025, people in Libya, including the most vulnerable and marginalized, benefit from
inclusive, transformative, and sustainable socio-economic opportunities, contributing to reduced
poverty and inequalities.

If applicable, **Sustainable Development Goal** to which the project contributes: SDG 5: Gender
Equality; SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth; SDG10: Reduced Inequalities; SDG 16:
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

If applicable, **National Strategic Goal** to which the project contributes:

The programme aligns with the recently signed UN Sustainable Development Cooperation
Framework (2023-2025) which includes outcomes on peace and governance, strengthening social and
human capital, and sustainable economic development. In addition, the programme align with national
strategies on decentralization and transfer of competencies to municipalities, as well as national
strategies fostering inclusive employment and entrepreneurship.

At the local level, peacebuilding and economic recovery have been highlighted as local priorities in
the Local Development Plan (Ghat) developed with UNDP support in 2020/21.

Type of submission: ☒ **New project** ☐ **Project amendment**	**If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:** **Extension of duration:** ☐ Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date): **Change of project outcome/ scope:** ☐ **Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:** ☐ **Additional PBF budget:** ☐ Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX **Brief justification for amendment:** *Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project*

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;
(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;
(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services
(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3)
Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

	document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.

The final document, including the budget, will be reviewed in advance of the Project Steering Committee

توقيعات الأطراف المعنية بالمشروع

ممثل السلطات الوطنية وزارة الحكم المحلي بدر الدين الصادق التومي التوقيع وزير الحكم المحلي التاريخ والختم	الوزير
المنظمة/المنظمات (6) المستفيدة: البرنامج الإنمائي (برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي) مارك أندري فرانشي التوقيع الممثل المقيم للبرنامج الإنمائي التاريخ والختم	المنظمة المستفيدة: اليونيسيف (صندوق الأمم المتحدة للطفولة) ميشيل سرياني التوقيع الممثل الخاص لليونيسيف التاريخ والختم
المنظمة المستفيدة: المنظمة الدولية للهجرة فيدريكو سودا التوقيع رئيس البعثة التاريخ والختم	المنظمة المستفيدة: برنامج الغذاء العالمي التابع للأمم المتحدة ميساء الغرباوي التوقيع المدير القطري التاريخ والختم
رئيس الفريق القطري للأمم المتحدة السيدة جورجيت جاغنون التوقيع مساعدة الأمين العام والمنسقة المقيمة للشؤون الإنسانية بـليبيا التاريخ والختم	مكتب دعم بناء السلام السيدة البرانيت سيبار التوقيع مساعدة أمين عام المكتب التاريخ والختم

PROJECT SIGNATURES:

Recipient Organization(s) UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) *Mr. Marc-André Franche* *Resident Representative, UNDP* Date & Seal	**Recipient Organization** UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund) *Mr. Michele Servadei* *Special Representative, UNICEF* Date & Seal 7 December 2022
Recipient Organization IOM (International Organization for Migration) *Mr. Federico Soda* *Chief of Mission, IOM* Date & Seal	**Recipient Organization** WFP (The United Nations World Food Programme) *Ms. Maysaa Alghribawy* *Country Director, WFP* Date & Seal 06 Dec 2022
Representative of National Authorities *H.E. Badderdine Al-Toumi* *Minister of Local Government* Date & Seal	
Head of UN Country Team *Ms. Georgette Gagnon* *Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Libya* Date & Seal - 6 December 2022	**Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)** *Ms. Elizabeth Spehar* Assistant Secretary-General, Peacebuilding Support Office Date& Seal 15/12/2022

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I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

a) National Peacebuilding Context

Libya has remained deeply divided since the 2011 revolution. The ensuing lawlessness and political and security vacuum triggered the establishment of local militias which have evolved into influential and competing armed groups interested in short-term economic gains sought through predation and exploitation of illicit sources of revenues. As the country struggles to rebuild, the protracted conflict between factions competing for control has damaged already fragile institutions, resulting in the absence of governance and deteriorated socio-cultural bonds. Since 2011, the south of the country has been under the control of tribal affiliated armed groups (since early 2019 most parts of the south, including strategic infrastructure, came under the control of the Libyan National Army), which have been selectively enforcing law and accountability on those not aligned to them while protecting supporters. Conflict over control of territory amongst different groups, exacerbated by looting and retaliatory violence, have displaced Libyans and migrants, who have fled their homes with limited aspirations to return in fear of retribution. IOM reports 159,996 internally displaced persons (IDPs) countrywide as of September 2022, with over 680,000 people classified as returnees. Libya is also currently hosting 667,440 migrants, 13% currently in the south.

At the political level, state/non-state actors remain extremely fragmented with each endeavouring to consolidate their own power, particularly amongst some tribal leaders. Amidst tribal governance in the project areas, vulnerable populations, such as women, youth, and cultural components (minority groups), remain marginalized with limited civic space and opportunities to participate in governance and decision-making.

Inequitable access to social services foments mistrust and frustration on the part of those populations who perceive they are marginalized, which can culminate in increased tensions and conflict along tribal and ethnic lines. While conflict can be triggered by lack of availability and access to services, it has simultaneously complicated access to services for some groups at risk of being targeted, which also negatively impacts social cohesion.

The fragmented central state polity, porous borders, and increased insecurity has led to the flourishing of an illicit economy comprised of extortion, trafficking, kidnap for ransom, and smuggling of drugs, fuel, weapons, and people with funds flowing to violent extremist groups in addition to militias acting in a context of total impunity. According to the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)[6], from 2004 to 2013, Libya had an annual average of USD 1.2 billion of illegal financial flows (IFFs) and a cumulative of USD 11.8 billion. While IFFs as a percentage of GDP in Libya has remained extremely low since 2008 (2% of the GDP), the lack of data to measure IFFs in the country could account for the relatively low figure.

Lack of women participation across civic and political life in southern Libya continues to be a major concern. While Libyan women have traditionally played an important role in negotiating or mediating conflicts within families, clans and local communities, this legacy is often overlooked (possibly due to lack of written documentation).[7] At the same time despite women being at the forefront of civil society action from 2011 onwards, this has not translated into increased women's participation in political and peace processes. Insecurity as well as diverse

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[6] Illicit Financial Flows and Asset Recovery in Libya, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), 2021, p.33

[7] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-the-exclusion-of-women-has-cost-libya/

but reinforcing patriarchal elements in the country's cultural make-up has limited women's freedom of movement in public and thus their active participation in many public spaces. That said, women continue to facilitate many of the informal peace processes throughout the country and are active organizers for peace. Given that Libyan women are equal stakeholders in sustaining peace and are highly motivated to terminate conflict given the differential effect of war on women, it is essential to work towards higher levels of meaningful women's participation and leadership in formal peace processes.

In terms of the economy, the south of Libya continues to lag the rest of Libya. While many adults (both men and women) receive a public salary[8] and other stipends from the state, residents also hold jobs in the private sector, which has increasingly provided education, transport, catering, and health care, in lieu of the deteriorating public service over the last decade. Thanks to irrigation systems set up years ago, agriculture still represents a meaningful source of jobs in the area, despite the challenges posed by conflict and infrastructure decay. Produce such as vegetables, fruits and fodder can be sold in local markets and while women's labour participation remains low, women mainly work in the agriculture sector in all three municipalities. Private-sector opportunities are neither numerous nor robust, but their addition to the broad subvention provided by state salaries means that economic despair is not the main factor pushing residents in southern Libya who decide to join the illicit economy. Armed groups often provide safety and a source of income to the tribe or local community and may be one of the few opportunities to form bonds amongst peers for young men. However, it should be noted that women retain significant influence over the men of their family and tribe and any efforts to mitigate the push and pull factors of conflict must engage both young men and women. Combined with the governance vacuum, illegally derived revenues have become integral to many legitimate facets of local life in the south.

With almost 60 percent of the world's 828 million hungry people living in areas affected by armed violence, conflict is the single greatest challenge to achieving zero hunger. Awarding the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize to WFP, the Norwegian Nobel Committee described the link between hunger and armed conflict as a vicious circle in which "war and conflict can cause food insecurity and hunger, just as hunger and food insecurity can cause latent conflicts to flare up and trigger the use of violence." The link had previously been acknowledged by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2417 (adopted in May 2018), which also reconfirmed the prohibition on the use of hunger as a weapon of war – whereby armed factions block access to food to force civilian populations to surrender or leave – and recognized that the world will never be able to eliminate hunger unless there is peace.

The link between conflict and food insecurity in Libya cannot be ignored with a National average of 12.04% of moderately food insecure population, with the average in the South being 11.6%. According to the WFP-conducted Food Security Outcome Monitoring (August 2022) among formerly assisted people, the proportion of moderately food insecure population in Ghat is as high as 17.2 % (which is the third highest after Tobruk and Sirte) and reaches 8 % in Sebha and 13% in Ubari. The prevalence of severely food insecure populations has also been reported in both Sebha and Ubari.

Local Peacebuilding Context in Selected Municipalities
As evidenced by recent conflict assessments carried out in the three municipalities of Ghat, Sebha and Ubari, many of the national peacebuilding challenges above are acutely present in

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[8] Government work was by far the largest employer for both women and men. Source: Women in the Libyan Job Market: Reality and Challenges, 2017 (based on 2006 govt. data) p.39 ref - https://docs.euromedwomen.foundation/files/ermwf-documents/7511_4.6.womeninthelibyanjobmarket-realityandchallenges.pdf

each of these municipalities. **Annex G** provides a summary of the findings and analysis of recent conflict assessments, highlighting threats, opportunities, and stakeholders in each municipality. All three selected municipalities have previously been included in UN programming, especially the UNDP Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) project which invested substantial sums in all three target areas in recent years.

Peacebuilding Challenges to be Addressed under this Joint Programme

Following extensive research review, dialogue, and numerous coordination sessions to identify the added value that the UN can bring to build and sustain peace in these municipalities, the participating UN agencies, together with local stakeholders, have decided to focus on the following challenges to peace which are common (while still nuanced) in the three target municipalities and have a causal linkage to many other challenges identified in the analysis.

- **Low levels of social cohesion** (eroded by low trust in the state, inter-communal tensions, low levels of participation by important segments of society in public life & poor/inequitable access to services)
- **Lack of licit economic opportunities**, especially for women and youth (fueled by high dependence on illicit economy & insufficient public sector employment as well as challenges to access basic service such as electricity, water and infrastructure)

Given the continued challenges to uphold the rule of law in the three municipalities and the relative impunity with which the armed groups, smugglers, and human traffickers continue to operate, in addition to the pending roll out of comprehensive government-led demobilization and reintegration programming in the south of Libya, the proposed programme does not directly focus on socioeconomic integration of youth already in armed groups. Rather, the programme looks **to further strengthen and grow inclusive alternative opportunities in the local economy in partnership with the private sector, as well as creating inclusive dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms as legitimate routes to express discontent with the current social, political, and economic landscape.** In this way, it is hoped that there would be an indirect impact on youth joining armed groups in the future. The programme will also take a prevention angle by prioritizing engagement with adolescents via schools and community structures and building adolescent's critical thinking and life skills, as well as

working with parents and teachers to help guide youth and children towards non-violent, self-reliant avenues in the future.

Main stakeholders to be engaged to tackle these peacebuilding challenges

The programme will work with a wide array of local and national stakeholders to ensure inclusive, conflict-sensitive programming. The main actors are noted below:

Local government – Mayors, municipal councils, and local authority officials will be engaged throughout the programme to co-prioritize and co-design training modules promoting their greater roles in peacebuilding and civic engagement initiatives, as well as playing an active role in the implementation of the peacebuilding plans, alongside UN agencies and other actors to provide basic services, economic opportunities, social/cultural activities, to communicate effectively with the local population, and to deliver to the extent possible on their mandate of service provision. The local Mayors and Councils in programme zones have been recently elected and to some degree reflect the community structure in each municipality, thus enjoying a certain degree of legitimacy vis-a-vis the local population while bearing a responsibility to deliver results to their constituents. As highlighted in recent interactions with the MoLG and Mayors of the target municipalities, several departments within the local authorities have been mandated to enhance community planning and civic engagement (namely the Community Development Departments and Citizens Service Units) and they see this Joint Programme as a good entry point to establish and expand these local government services. The priorities of social cohesion and economic opportunities have also been clearly articulated in recent local development/stabilization plans.

Central Government – The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) will be the lead government partner and will support the active engagement of national and local government bodies in the programme. The MoLG will encourage coordination among the three participating municipalities and help to share learnings from this programme across all local authorities. The Ministries of Labour, Education and Planning, will be engaged to ensure localized implementation of national initiatives and to further strengthen technical coordination between local and national government bodies. Based on lessons learned from previous programming in southern Libya, UN agencies will work closely with the national government to strengthen synergies between national programming and local implementation.

Civil society – UN agencies have strong relationships with local civil society organizations in the participating municipalities, including youth and women led CSOs, and will seek to further expand their outreach to smaller, grassroots and sector-focused organizations to involve all local civil society actors.

Existing community peace structures – respecting existing community structures and platforms which bridge government and community engagement, the programme will engage with social councils, Mukhtar Muhalla (a social structure that was established long before the 2011 revolution and reinforced by decentralization law No.59 issued in 2013. The Mukhtar reports to the mayor and is tasked with mediating local disputes, reporting criminal activities and any threats to public security, and providing data and statistics when requested. While almost all Mukhtar Muhalla have been traditionally men, the recent appointment of a women Mukhtar Muhalla in Tripoli provides a precedent that there is potential for more women to take on this role in the future, although considerable advocacy and awareness-raising would be necessary to normalize women holding this traditionally male role), migrants' representatives, tribal representatives, women and youth activists, and any others which might be identified during the consultation stage which will happen at the beginning of the programme. Where possible, the Peacebuilding Committees to be supported under this programme will build on the existing peace structures in place in each municipality including peacebuilding committees functional during the UNDP Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) programme. UNDP has

conducted an initial mapping of peace structures in the target municipalities which will be re-validated under this programme to ensure no-one is left behind. While previous Peacebuilding Committees tended to have more representation of men than women given the social norms at play in target districts, under this programme recipient organizations will reach out to women leaders to understand current limitations to participation from local women and will implement flexible arrangements (such as offering women-only meetings and/or allowing women to provide inputs from home, online or via phone) to encourage more women to form part of more gender inclusive peacebuilding committees.

Excluded community members – to ensure that all segments of society are well represented, even if no formal structures exist, the programme will reach out through local channels to members of excluded communities (such as the Tebu and Tuareg (especially non-documented people) to ensure their active participation in the programme. Gender dynamics within these excluded communities will be further explored during the conflict assessment to better understand the specific challenges faced by women, above and beyond limited access to service provision and employment which has been identified in existing assessments. Local women from various tribes in Sebha have been known to participate in post-conflict dialogues and take on mediation roles to help their communities move forward from the conflict and the programme will seek to build on these successful examples as entry points for enhanced engaged of women in the peacebuilding process.

Private Sector – this programme views the private sector (at all levels) as an important engine for change in the three municipalities and will ensure their engagement across the two outcomes of the programme, participating in peacebuilding plans, providing jobs for women and youth, as well as being supported to grow their businesses to foster local economic growth, while promoting conflict-sensitive core business strategies.

While Libya currently lacks a national development plan, following official endorsement of the GNU, the UN, World Bank, and European Union are supporting the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment process which commenced in November 2021 with the aim of formulating a set of agreed strategic priorities which will assist the government in the formulation of a new national development plan envisaged to be completed by mid-2023.

In addition the government recently signed the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2023-2025) which includes outcomes on peace and governance, strengthening social and human capital, and sustainable economic development. The UNSDCF, also serving as an Integrated Strategic Framework, fully reflects UNSMIL's mandated priorities, and is aligned to the Berlin Conference outcomes and Security Council resolutions on Libya, including Resolution 2629 (29 April 2022) extending the mandate of UNSMIL as set out in Resolution 2542 (2020) and paragraph 16 of Resolution 2570 (2021). The present programme is fully aligned with the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment findings as well as the UNSDCF.

Given the current context in Libya and the need to focus on local peacebuilding solutions in parallel to supporting national reconciliation efforts, it is important to build upon existing UN partnerships with the local municipal authorities in the target municipalities and capitalize on this momentum to sustain efforts towards a longer-term peacebuilding approach and support the operationalization of the UNSDCF.

Building on lessons learned from the previous PBF funded project in Libya, the following elements have been considered during the design phase of this programme document:

- More intensive co-design and dialogue to establish common approaches to achieve joint results and effective joint management and coordination structures, including a dedicated Joint Programme coordinator.
- More focus on building local capacities throughout the design, planning, and implementation of the project to promote sustainability
- Prioritization of inclusion throughout the programme design and implementation to ensure all relevant stakeholders feel included and valued
- Ensure all activities are designed based on available conflict assessments and that conflict-sensitivity remains a guiding principle throughout the programme implementation.

a)   A **summary of existing interventions**

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
UNDP (multiple projects including the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL)) 2021-2024	EU, The Netherlands, Japan, Italy USD 23.7 million	Resilience, Peacebuilding, Stabilization to support local peace deals, Prevention of Violent Extremism.	PVE activities add complementarity and wider resilience & stabilization efforts provide space to scale-up this more inclusive approach to local PB to other municipalities as well as increase implementation of PB plans from other donor fundings. Considerable investment in community planning, government planning, infrastructure, service improvement and health/COVID response have taken place in all target municipalities under SFL. This programme invested USD8.3M in Sebah, USD 6.9M in Ubari and USD2.8M from 2016-2021. Full overview in Annex N)
UNICEF (multiple projects, 2022-2025)	EU US 4.5 million	Child Protection, Education, Communication for Development	Strong partnership with the Ministry of Education will facilitate scale up of life-skills training in other schools across the country. Child-friendly spaces and a community center (Baity center) to promote social cohesion.
IOM (multiple projects) 2021-2023	EU, Italy USD 6.9 million	Community stabilization, Infrastructure, basic services, livelihoods, migration (DTM)	DTM provides data on migrant trends in target municipalities. TVET partnership with the Ministry of Labour will support scale-up. Wider stabilization efforts in the target areas will support implementation of PB plan.
WFPs (multiple projects) 2023 - 2025	Germany, France, Private Sector USD 1.6 million	Food Assistance for training, Markets rehabilitation, Hydroponics projects	Wider food security initiatives/value chain support can complement livelihoods support under PB plans.
Fezzan Libyan Organization (Sebha)	Funded by USAID USD60,000	The Energy Issue - Youth and Energy - community discussions on the role of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) around closure of oil fields.	An interesting model on how to navigate community discussions with youth on sensitive issues. Could be replicated under this programme on issues around local governance.
United States Institute for Peace	US USD43,000	Electoral violence	Supports work on the legitimacy of the local authorities under the PBF programme in 2 project zones.

II. **Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**

a) A brief **description of the project content**

This Joint Programme will seek to strengthen the resilience of local stakeholders to prevent violent conflict and sustain peace in three municipalities of Southern Libya, namely Ghat, Sebha and Ubari by enhancing social cohesion and creating resilient and sustainable livelihoods, especially for women and youth. Analysis and experience in the south of Libya demonstrates the need for a multi-pronged resilience-based approach to tackle the underlying drivers of conflict. Given the underutilized capacity of women and youth for peacebuilding in the target municipalities, the programme will work closely to context-specific ways to promote women's empowerment and youth empowerment, drawing heavily on lessons learned from women, peace and security and youth, peace and security practice areas. Effective youth engagement will be ensured across the programme where youth will be given a seat at the decision-making table, youth voices will be heard and their recommendations will be incorporated into the programme activities. Youth capacity building sessions across the programme will also have a strong youth empowerment focus, working with young people and youth-led organizations and bodies (for example student unions) to help youth develop confidence and critical skills and ensuring safe spaces for youth engagement to contribute effectively to the peacebuilding process.

Interventions under **Outcome 1: Strengthening social cohesion**, (Output 1.1: Local peacebuilding capacities) the programme will build on existing conflict assessments to establish an inclusive, common understanding of challenges to peace and potential solutions in each municipality on which to base the capacity development, civic engagement, and peace planning processes. All relevant stakeholders, (especially women and youth CSOs) will be engaged throughout the process to ensure maximum community ownership from the outset, including those Private sector partners engaged under Outcome 2 who will be important stakeholders in the peacebuilding process. The UN agencies will build upon the existing mapping of local peace structures and local planning documents/strategies and determine their legitimacy vis-a-vis the local population to develop the roadmap for the Peace Building Committee in each municipality (UNDP). Capacity building initiatives which speak to the specific capacity gaps in each municipality will be jointly conceived and implemented by UNDP and UNICEF and will include community awareness sessions and referral services (established via the mobile peace kiosks by UNICEF) as well as training and empowerment of women, youth, and adolescents to become active agents of change and assume important roles in the peacebuilding process (Output 1.3). By facilitating this inclusive process of bringing local authorities and communities together to analyze, dialogue, receive training and plan for a peaceful joint future, the programme seeks to improve citizen state relationships by enhancing their common understanding of the challenges that each stakeholder faces in the current scenario as well as their current capacities to respond to these challenges. Based on lessons learned from previous programmes, the programme seeks to reduce existing frustrations caused by lack of common understanding and goals between the local authorities and the local communities. Throughout this process the UN organisations will also be mindful to inform, educate and guide communities towards climate-resilient priorities, bearing in mind the specific climate risks identified in each community. This will also feed into longer-term local conflict prevention by mitigating future conflicts over natural resources.

Once the peacebuilding priorities of each municipality have been established, under Output 1.2 the UN team will work jointly to identify sources of funding to cover their implementation, from the government funds, existing programmes in the area, local private sector, in addition

to funds from this programme. Again, at this stage implementing organziations will be mindful to ensure climate-resilience practices are adhered to during the implementation phase and that priorities identified by women are given special consideration in the selection criteria. IOM and UNDP will lead on the implementation of the priorities identified in the plans (who will do what will be identified based on comparative advantage, capacities and cost effectiveness) and will actively engage communities in the monitoring of these schemes. A conflict-sensitive lens will be applied throughout the programme to ensure that the priority initiatives do not exacerbate any existing tensions and positively contribute to consolidating social cohesion. A strong government/community-led communications strategy will support public awareness of inclusive action.

Building on the successful examples under previous programming (including UNDP SFL programme) the current PBF programme aims to demonstrate that the inclusive process of citizens and local authorities jointly working towards the implementation of shared goals can help further improve the citizen-state relationship as communities perceptions around the efficiency and effectiveness of the local authorities improve while also enabling the local authorities to be more inclusive in its future efforts to provide community services after seeing the value added that inclusive processes can bring to their mandate.

Under **Outcome 2: Resilient and sustainable livelihoods,** the programme seeks to address the lack of licit economic opportunities, which is a common threat to peace across all three municipalities, especially for women. In order to ensure coherence between the two outcomes, outcome 2 will target populations identified as particularly disenfranchised during the peacebuilding analysis and planning process under Outcome 1. UNDP will conduct a human centered design research (as part of the conflict assessment) to better identify which opportunities are best suited to different local population groups, with specific focus on identifying challenges, barriers, capacities and opportunities to enhance women's economic empowerment in the target communities. This will involve the local partner interacting with men, women and local employers to collect stories, group the socio-economic and gender profile and their pull factors and capacities - both in relation to conflict and choice of livelihood alternatives. The research will also consider the potential negative impacts of private sector actions in the target areas, namely the extractive industry and will adhere to UN guidelines on engagement with the extractive industry throughout the programme to mitigate any associated risks. Where possible, the research will aim to identify climate-resilient opportunities for economic growth in each of the target areas, with focus on local food security and the introduction of new knowledge, trades, products and technology to enhance the resilience of the local economy to current and future climate shocks.

Based on these findings, the target population will be matched to a suitable livelihood opportunity, with a focus on prioritizing employment and entrepreneurship opportunities for women. While this activity will support the selection of young men and women for each livelihood activity, agencies will advance in government partnerships/procurement/partner selection while the research is being finalized. Under Output 2,1, specific lifeskills training for adolescents and youth will be offered by UNICEF to enhance employability in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and linked to vocational training done by others. These trainings will also include social cohesion and civic engagement elements, thus feeding into the peacebuilding plans. Targeted training modules will be developed for young women and girls to help address specific issues of concern such as: WFP will provide training opportunities for moderately food-insecure families (with a focus on women) via the Food for Training programme which will provide cash/food to cover the households basic needs during

the interim period between receiving the training and accessing the job market (the final modality for this assistance will be decided based on a market assessment and the capacity and presence of financial service provider in each municipality, where possible cash may be provided to food insecure families instead of food). Training focusing on agriculture and livestock production would be considered given the importance of these sectors in the target municipalities. As the area is also heavily impacted by climate change which affects the food security of the target communities, WFP will ensure the inclusion of climate-resilient practices and tools in the training. IOM will also focus on providing excluded populations with vocational skills and toolkits, considering the specific opportunities available for women to enhance their economic activity. Communication on the economic opportunities which have been offered to these populations will feed into the new peacebuilding narratives of inclusion established under Outcome 1. While this output is training intensive, in all cases the recipient organisations will ensure a strong link to the market and will provide support to trainees to translate their new skills into increased economic income via mentoring, networking, job placement support as well as access to grants and linkages with financing bodies.

Additionally, **Outcome 2, Output 2.2** will seek to implement recommendations of recent conflict assessments to further promote the expansion of the licit private sector-led economy in the three municipalities. This will be done by bringing together the collective expertise of all UN agencies to engage with various levels of private sector operating in the area, from microentrepreneurs selling vegetables in market spaces, to start-ups looking to develop new markets, as well as medium and large firms operating in the area. Given the important role of the private sector in the peacebuilding process, these actors will also be represented on the Peace Building Committees in each municipality. Participating agencies will build on previous engagement with the private sector in Libya to identify suitable entry points and incentives to engage, retain and grow private sector interest in building the local economy and promoting economic inclusion. Potential entry points to engage the private sector are the promise of qualified and motivated local human resources as well as advocating the role that local peacebuilding can play in improving the climate for local investment. This engagement will be focused on facilitating sustainable growth of the private sector, as well as providing more licit jobs for women and youth. In particular, and given its importance in the region, In keeping with the conflict-sensitive approach mentioned above, UNDP intends to engage with the extractive industry and companies linked to NOC by focusing on potential entry points throughout the supply chain of the oil and gas sector to promote more transparent hiring practices for inclusive employment. As such it includes field engineering service, service provision for the companies' personnel, catering, HR/accounting, and products used in core daily operations

Important elements of sustainability for local human capital development will be to set up channels for future public-private collaboration, for example establishing TVET services in coordination with the government and the local private sector to bridge the skills gap (led by IOM) and setting up Business Incubation Centers to foster innovation and entrepreneurship in each municipality (led by UNDP). This activity will build on UNDP's support to incubation programmes in Libya which has been in place since 2018 and remains an important component for the next programme cycle (2023-2025). The allocated budget under PBF for this activity will predominantly cover training of trainer initiatives and the provision of small grants through a services provider with whom UNDP has already initiated activities within other municipalities in partnership with the MoLG. UNDP will build on this experience to ensure timely implementation arrangements for the PBF BIC activities. Lastly, under this activity, the programme seeks to establish markets for women to sell local produce in coordination with the local authorities (WFP). Again conflict-sensitive engagement with selected segments of the

private sector will ensure that these economic opportunities support the theory of change by reducing inequalities, strengthening the role of the state in providing economic opportunities, as well as reducing the influence of the conflict economy in target areas.

In case of drastic changes to the political and security environment, the programme will seek to continue engagement with the Peacebuilding Committees as well as the local authorities to decide how to adapt or adjust planned community investments to meet emerging needs of the population while continuing to focus on establishing a baseline for peacebuilding. UN agencies will conduct contingency planning sessions to ensure that they are ready to jointly pivot to respond as required should the situation on the ground change dramatically and will coordinate via the RCO to keep the PBF updated on any possible changes which would require considerable amendment of the planned programme document.

b) Provide a **project-level** '**theory of change'**

Based on the above analysis, the following theory of change has been elaborated:

"**IF** local institutions have the capacity to manage collaborative peacebuilding processes (*which include women, peace and security and youth peace and security perspectives*)

AND IF mechanisms to better manage conflict and promote dialogue are in place

AND IF there is equitable access to basic services

THEN there will be increased social cohesion in target communities **BECAUSE** the root of selected inter-communal frustrations will have been addressed, citizens will have more confidence in the local authorities after seeing examples of effective and inclusive governance and local authorities will be able to better understand and interact with the community to sustain peace."

"**IF** citizens have increased diversification of economic opportunities

AND IF strong interrelations are established with the wider peacebuilding process

**THEN** there will be an increase in the number of people (especially women and youth) with access to resilient and sustainable livelihoods in target communities" **BECAUSE** women and young people in target communities will have the confidence, knowledge, skills, tools, networks and opportunities to access new sustainable opportunities

Taking a resilience-approach to peacebuilding, IF social cohesion is increased *AND* more people have access to resilient and sustainable livelihoods *THEN* the target communities will have increased resilience to prevent violent conflict and contribute to sustained peace

Larger TOC diagrammes can be found in Annex F for reference.

    c) **Project result framework** – Annex B
    d) **Project targeting and sequencing strategy**

The project will be implemented through an area-based approach in Ghat, Sebha and Ubari. Building on recent conflict assessments, the following target beneficiaries have been identified for the programme. Given that the community members under Outcome 1 will include those who benefit from economic opportunities under Outcome 2, the total number of direct

beneficiaries would be 30,000 community members, largely through improved access to services, of which 30% are women and 30% are youth and adolescents.

Outcome 1: Mayors, municipal councils, local authority officials, civil society groups, particularly women and youth groups, service providers, educational institutions, migrants, women, young people, and adolescent boys and girls, private sector, existing peace structures, Peacebuilding Committee (either new structure or revival/extension of an existing one, these committees are normally formed by 8-12 people with women representation but normally more men than women join). An initial mapping of stakeholders is available under the existing conflict assessments and UNDP is currently undertaking a CSO mapping which covers target areas. These documents will inform the initial consultations/invitations in each municipality which will be conducted during the initiation phase. During these consultations, local actors will be asked to help identify any important groups who are underrepresented and should be involved in the consultation. Once a wider stakeholder analysis is available, and based on the peacebuilding plans, specific target groups for the trainings/activities will be decided in coordination with the Peacebuilding Committees in each municipality. Wider community as part of the awareness campaigns and as beneficiaries of the initiatives to be designed and implemented under the peacebuilding plans. Under this component the programme hopes to engage at least **30,000 community members**, largely through improved access to services, of which 30% are women and 30% are youth and adolescents.

Outcome 2: a) disenfranchised populations identified in the conflict assessments/peacebuilding plans (most vulnerable segments including women, youth, adolescents, migrants) in **Outcome 1**. b) different echelons of the private sector operating in the area ranging from microenterprises to start-ups, to medium and large private sector firms, as well as working with certified training providers and educational institutes. In terms of economic opportunities, the programme seeks to provide economic opportunities to an estimated **2,500 people**, of which 30% are women and 70% are adolescents and youth.

In keeping with the central, transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda to "leave no one behind", the programme will reach marginalized individuals, some of whom may be undocumented. Selection of specific beneficiaries will be linked to vulnerability criteria, not to ID registration to allow for maximum inclusion. To further support non-documented individuals in Libya, IOM advocates for access to ID registration, civil registry, and travel documents for migrants and – through complementary projects – assist migrants during their administrative procedures, in particular through consular support. Following a "Do No Harm" approach, the planned interventions are designed and implemented in close consultation with local communities so as not to increase tensions around access to the resources created by the project.

In terms of sequencing of activities, **Annex I** outlines the planned joint approach, but broadly Outcome 1 will follow a sequential pattern of community needs assessment, capacity development, and planning, implementation, and monitoring of key local peacebuilding initiatives. To ensure coherence between the outcomes, Outcome 2 will have two parallel tracks. One track will directly link with the outcome of the Peacebuilding Plans under Outcome 1, whereby the neighbourhoods and beneficiary groups identified in the plans will be invited to join a variety of training and other economic support and thus will take place in tandem with the peacebuilding plan implementation. Given the importance of offering alternative economic opportunities in these municipalities which are heavily impacted by the conflict economy, UN agencies will initiate work from the project initiation with private sector actors in parallel to set up systems and structures to support future economic growth in new industries. Conflict-sensitive programming with the private sector, as well as increased economic opportunities for

the local population, will in turn feed into the successful implementation of the Peacebuilding Plans under Outcome 1.

In terms of establishing the UN Hub, the participating agencies are already moving forward with the preparatory activities along with UNDSS. The RCO is also in discussions with UNSMIL to decide their future participation in the stability of the Hub.

While previous attempts to conduct the security assessments have been delayed, the UNCT hopes that the Security Risk Management process and the Blast Assessment will take place by early 2023, allowing the UNCT to have the necessary information to determine the next steps. Following the assessment and decision on potential site of the hub, the UNCT will decide an agency to administer the hub and a joint project account will be set up to manage the Hub expenses where the PBF Hub allocation of USD 500k will be transferred by the recipient UN organizations without charging GMS to facilitate joint funding of the Hub establishment and operations. Further to this detailed planning will begin with arrangements made for the use of land, blueprints for the Hub drawn up and approved by the UNCT, procurement assessments (to identify local vendors) and plans will be put in place for security, ICT equipment & installation of a radio room, accommodation and office equipment. It is hoped that these plans will be made available to PBF as and when approved.

III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners –
Based on an analysis by the Resident Coordinator's Office of the UN agency's existing presences, capacities, and mandates in promoting peacebuilding in Southern Libya and keeping in mind the agency contributions to the UNSDCF, four UN Agencies resident in Libya were identified to participate in the design of this joint programme: UNDP, IOM, UNICEF and WFP.

Given UNDP's broad mandate of sustainable development along with its extensive USD 34 million portfolio of resilience, stabilization, prevention of violent extremism, and peacebuilding programming across 16 municipalities in Southern Libya, it was decided that UNDP would take on the role of Convening Agency for this Joint Programme. UNDP has an established partnership with the lead government partner, the Ministry of Local Government (who sits on UNDP Resilience Project Boards),) as well as the Ministry of Planning, who plays a key role in linking local development planning to national development processes. Locally, UNDP has ongoing collaboration with all three target municipalities as well as CSOs (including women and youth-led CSOs in Ubari (Azjer), Sebha (Shabab and Atta, Sebha Dialou, Business Women Association, Tanmia 360 and Moomken) and Ghat (I am Libyan, my son is a foreigner), academia (University of Sebha) and private sector.

IOM, with existing sub-offices in Sebha and Qatroun, has been supporting comprehensive programming in the south since 2016. IOM has the largest agency presence across the country, significantly contributing to the humanitarian development peace nexus through integrated programming across all three nexus pillars. IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix & Research Programme provides critical and timely data for informed, conflict-sensitive, and evidence-based programming. Enhancing local capacities for efficient labour migration governance, particularly via the expansion of TVET services, is a top priority where IOM works closely with the Ministry of Labour.

Since 2016, UNICEF together with regional and local government authorities, have been improving living conditions, resilience of local communities and reaching young people in the south via access to life skills and social entrepreneurship training, small grants to support social entrepreneurship initiatives, and the establishment of child-friendly spaces and youth centres. Since 2020, UNICEF also operates a community-serving center (the 'Baity Centre') which continues to provide child protection, non-formal education, life skills trainings, and primary healthcare services to vulnerable Libyan/non-Libyan populations in Sebha with mobile units.

While mainstreaming women's empowerment and the do-no-harm principle of conflict-sensitivity in its programmes, WFP strives to contribute to peace as well as to preventing conflict where ever possible – both to respond to the operational challenges on the ground that endanger the fulfilment of its food security mandate, as well as the institutional commitments such as the Sustaining Peace Agenda and the Peace Promise. As a both humanitarian- and development mandated agency, WFP therefore aims to contribute to improving the prospects for peace, using its large operational footprint in conflict-affected regions and food assistance as well as access to and relationships with local communities as entry points for local engagement, participation and inclusive solutions.

In this current programme, WFP is uniquely placed to support the economic empowerment of vulnerable groups having implemented agricultural programmes throughout all southern locations for several years. WFP has staff present in the Fezzan, as well as long-standing local partners with a strong track record of working on economic empowerment (Kafaa Foundation),) social cohesion, and community engagement (Fezzan Libya Organization). WFP has also been working with a peacebuilding partner (United States Institute of Peace) on measuring and making contributions to peace in the Fezzan since 2020.

No implementing partners have been named at the project design stage given that all UN organizations plan to carry out selection processes to engage partners as per their individual programme and operations policies and procedures. More details on planned actions/timelines for selection of implementation partners is included in **Annex J.**

Existing presence/capacity of recipient UN organizations

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
UNDP	USD 45 million	EU, Japan, Germany, Italy, Korea, France, Netherlands, Norway, UK,	Tripoli	105 (5 local staff in the project zones)	International staff specialized in programme management, social cohesion, and economic recovery. National staff local to the implementing areas. Strong operations team with experience of high volumes of delivery in target areas.
UNICEF	USD 25 million	Core funding, public sector donors (ex. EU, France, Germany, United States, Japan)	Tripoli, Benghazi	64 (3 of which in project zones)	UNICEF has international and national staff specialized in Child Protection, Education, and Youth who will support the implementation of the project.
WFP	USD 21 million	International funding (Canada, CERF, Czech Republic, EU Humanitarian Aid, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Swiss,	Tripoli Benghazi No office but WFP staff are present at	65 (2 of which in project zones)	International Head of Programme & Livelihood Officer well versed with Conflict Sensitivity in Libya, National Focal Points for Livelihoods, Climate Changes, Civil Engineer, Agronomist, Monitoring, Vulnerability Assessment, Common Feedback Mechanism, Security,

		USA); Private Sector Partners; World Bank; UN.	Sebha and Sirte		International and National staff who manage the UN hub in Benghazi.
IOM	USD 60,000,000	EUTF, Italy, Austria, USA, The Netherlands	Offices in Tripoli and Benghazi; sub-offices in Sebha,Qatroun, Beni Waleed, Zwara	635 (39 of which are in project zones)	Community Stabilization Programme Manager and Officers experienced in implementing conflict sensitive partnerships Labour Mobility & Social Inclusion Manager and Specialist have developed TVET and youth employment centers in Zwara and Benghazi. Government Liaison Officer in Tripoli.

b) **Project management and coordination**

Based on lessons learned from past joint programming, including the PBF funded joint programme in Sirte, the four participating UN agencies have agreed to create an efficient joint programme management and coordination structure, led by UNDP as Convening Agency. A Joint Programme Coordinator, based in Tripoli, will be hired by UNDP to lead the management of the programme, facilitate and monitor joint results, and lead frequent coordination, knowledge management, and learning exchanges between all programme staff. In addition, UNDP will hire an International UNV M&E Officer who will support the design and implementation of joint monitoring and activities.

Each agency will deploy a technical team based between Tunis and Tripoli to provide expert guidance, technical assistance, and quality assurance to the specific project activities. Most of these positions will be co-funded with other funding sources to ensure value for money and synergy with other similar programmes. The team will coordinate on a bi-weekly basis as the Joint Technical Team, convened by the Joint Programme Coordinator. At least one technical expert from each agency will join this team. Further technical working groups composed of relevant agencies will be established as required, for example a technical working group on social cohesion or livelihoods. Lastly, agencies will make efforts to enhance coordination among field teams based in the target districts and where possible will economize by engaging joint field monitoring teams. Given the constraints on movements in target municipalities, UN agencies will make use of existing third-party arrangements which will allow the experts to work with greater operational flexibility at the local level.

The Resident Coordinator's Office will support coordination by participating in the Joint Technical Team, as well as deploying a Regional Coordinator in Sebha who will support the Joint Programme Coordinator with local level coordination of UN, government, and other partners and stakeholders. One year of the Regional Coordinator's salary (2024) has been charged to the programme budget. **Annex K** shows the proposed organogram for the Project Management team as well as the Coordination structures that will be put in place and the division of responsibilities between the Joint Programme Coordinator and the Regional Coordinator in Sebha.

The UN proposes to establish a United Nations presence in Sebha. The UNCT will draw on its capacity and experience in establishing and managing UN hubs in Libya, particularly the WFP experience in setting up the Benghazi Hub that has been operational since April 2019, to lead the establishment of the UN presence in the South. The UN Security Management Team are working to conduct the necessary security assessments and confirm relevant costs and the recipient organizations will work throughout 2023 to ensure a solid plan is in place for the roll-out of the Hub. It is foreseen that the premise will mainly host national staff, allow regular visits of international staff, and act as a coordination base for stakeholders implementing

projects in the South of Libya, bringing the UN close to the local community. At the same time, the Hub would provide a physical coordination space to support the PBF project coordination.

c) **Risk management**

Based on the risks identified jointly by the participating UN agencies, the team has assessed the level of risk for project success as **Medium**, where all efforts have been taken to identify the major project specific risks in **Annex L,** as well as relevant mitigation measures. While there are considerable risks associated with operating in the target municipalities, the joint team believes that successful implementation of the mitigation measures is sufficient to ensure achievement of the programme targets.

To ensure a risk-informed and conflict sensitive project implementation, the project will continually assess the situation in the country and relate it to the actual project implementation. The project will look at the following critical risks: (1) political context and possible political leverage; (2) the security situation; (3) the project risks (i.e., conflict sensitivity); and (4) the operational risks as well as (5) the reputation and fiduciary risks.

The programme management team proposes to review this risk matrix on a quarterly basis, or following an unexpected event, where the Joint Programme Coordinator will update the risk log and revise the associated mitigation strategies. Should there be any threats that substantially change the level of risk for project success, the joint team would immediately contact the PBF team to discuss further analysis and action. Throughout the envisaged programme activities, a conflict-sensitive approach will be ensured by all participating UN agencies considering the local context and societal dynamics to do no harm.

d) **Monitoring and evaluation**

UN participating agencies will work closely to develop a solid joint M&E strategy and workplan. As a Convening Agency, UNDP will lead a joint baseline study , co-funded by all recipient organizations, to establish baselines for all programme indicators. Based on experience of similar recent data collection exercises in the target zones, it is estimated that the baseline would be complete within 5 months of project initiation (except for a few activity-specific indicators which relate to behaviour change of participants in activities which initiate later in the programme). UNDP will work with all participating organizations to finalize terms of reference and ensure swift on-boarding of the baseline study partner and will monitor progress to ensure that the study is completed within the planned timeline. Details of the baselines for the programme results framework will be included in the request for the second tranche.

UNDP will hire an International UNV M&E Officer who will support the development and implementation of the joint M&E workplan to ensure that all project interventions in target areas are systematically and periodically monitored, analyzed, and reported to guide the project's implementation throughout all stages of the project's implementation. This includes: (i) tracking performance through the collection of appropriate and credible data and other evidence; (ii) analysing evidence to inform management decision-making, improve effectiveness and efficiency, and adjust programming as necessary; and (iii) reporting on performance and lessons to facilitate learning and support accountability. **Annex M** shows the M&E timeline.

Given the current challenges in terms of access to the project locations for all project staff, the M&E strategy will bring together a variety of tools and methodologies in order to ensure efficient and effective monitoring of the programme at multiple levels, involving local

partners, third party contractors, and local volunteers in data collection and analysis, as well as exploring digital monitoring options where feasible. Conflict dynamics and trends will also be monitored throughout the programme and updated analyses will be included in regular reporting. Agency monitoring activities will be complemented with third party reporters/photographers collecting field stories on human impact, supported by pictures (and videos, where relevant) and interviews with beneficiaries and end-users, and media monitoring and analysis contributing to increased transparency and accountability of project interventions.

A common baseline will be established during the initiation phase which will feed into the baseline for numerous programme indicators. A common database will then be established to monitor the key indicators and monitor progress against the activities as per the established timelines. Behavioural insights will be employed to better monitor behaviour change in specific initiatives and surveys will be coordinated to ensure common questions are included and analyzed across programme interventions. Data of beneficiaries will be captured in a common format which will be distributed to all agencies and implementing partners and uploaded to a centralized database to facilitate tracking and regular monitoring of activities by UN staff (via verification phone calls/visits by local staff). UN agencies will ensure a policy is in place to ensure data protection of beneficiary information.

Dashboard reports on programme progress will be prepared ahead of the Project Steering Committee and will be used to inform all stakeholders on the progress, challenges, and next steps, thus ensuring efficient and effective meetings based on evidence. This information will also fuel the joint communication strategy. Simple dashboards will also be established for each of the peacebuilding plans, and data on the progress of each of the sections will be collected from participating agencies and partners to provide at least quarterly updates on progress made, challenges, and next steps to ensure accountability and community ownership of the process. Local authorities and members of the peacebuilding committees will be trained on how to manage these dashboards and extract reports so that this can be a live tool which continues to be used after project closure.

e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability**

The exit strategy is centered on creating and nurturing sustainable structures throughout the programme duration to ensure the sustainability of local peacebuilding efforts beyond 2024 and to be able to present the lessons learned from this experience as a roadmap for other municipalities to follow. UN investment in local capacity development and resilience-building is a clear element of the sustainability strategy, based on the assumption that the local stakeholders engaged in the project implementation are likely to remain influential in the short to medium term (even if they are no longer occupying the same role).

It is hoped that by demonstrating the utility and effectiveness of a citizen-state dialogue for peacebuilding, the community will continue to convene it as and when necessary. It is also envisaged that the Peacebuilding Plan will be a living document which can be updated (by community members who now have the capacity to analyze/prioritize and plan for peace) and used in the future as a common platform to guide local investments. Click or tap here to enter text.Each Peacebuilding Plan will include a section on sustainability of the proposed interventions and these aspects will be included in regular reporting to PBF. The UN agencies will work with the Ministry of Local Government and the municipalities as well as the relevant reconstruction funds and donors to advocate for additional funding of the plans in each municipality based on the needs and gaps. Upon completion of the project, the Peacebuilding Plans will already be endorsed by the government and the community and it is hoped that local

authorities and communities alike will continue to advocate for its implementation. For the specific interventions carried out under the plan by PBF funding, agencies will put in place mechanisms so that maintenance/continuance of services can be sustained by local authorities or civil society depending on the nature of the intervention. The exit strategy for each intervention will be determined ahead of implementation and strong advocacy with the Reconstruction Funds and line departments to ensure continued investment in the priority areas of the peacebuilding plan will continue beyond the programme duration.

The safe spaces/peace kiosks from where relevant capacity-building, community awareness sessions, and referral services will be provided or facilitated will be established at the neighborhood level, these will be set up in existing communal spaces (community centers or recreational parks run by municipal council, local branches of the Ministry of Social Affairs(MOSA)), or included in the peacebuilding plan and will be services by a mobile teams of youth champions/community volunteers and local MOSA social workers. Based on the training these teams receive during the project, it is hoped that this training/awareness will be continued under MOSA leadership in coordination with the municipality. UNICEF will work with MOSA at the National level to strengthen its social service workforce and to support legislation to reactivate social support centers that can continue the work of the peace kiosks.

As the private sector is frequently identified as a potential engine for change in Southern Libya, fostering partnerships between the Government, the private sector, and the local community is also of strategic importance for the sustainability of programme results. Investing in structures with strong local ownership and sustainability strategies (like markets, business incubation centers, and TVET services) will support the continued extension of economic opportunities for locals, while investments in training and upskilling of individuals will lead to greater opportunities for these individuals and their families in the future. Upon project completion markets will be handed over to the municipal government and committees formed of local vendors to help manage daily operations. BICs will be handed over to the University of Sebha and its partners for them to continue to run these centers based on sustainability plans that will be prepared during the project to support this transition. The Ministry of Education and participating school management and teachers will be encouraged to take over the content of the life skills curriculum to continue to include this in future courses and expand to other schools.

The programme also prioritizes linkages between local peacebuilding activities to the national authorities via the partnership with the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Affairs among others, feeding into larger national reconciliation efforts. Efforts to empower women and girls throughout this programme will be well analyzed and documented to inform future women's empowerment initiatives in this region.

Lastly coordination, linkages, and knowledge sharing with other projects implemented by the participating UN agencies in these municipalities and those implemented by other UN organizations under the UNSDCF, as well as with the wider donor community via bilateral coordination and the planned donor coordination group for stabilization and peacebuilding efforts, will help to ensure that the peacebuilding gains achieved via the implementation of this programme can be sustained in the long term.

IV. Project budget

Annex D has been completed by all UN recipient organizations based on implementation experience to date and paying particular attention to the PBF Value for Money principles. Where possible, existing staff will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the programme, while cost-sharing of project staff between multiple funding sources has also been prioritized to reduce the personnel costs charged to PBF. Considering current restrictions in place for UN staff travel in the project areas, several agencies will use third-party contractors (Human Resource firms who are already on LTAs and can quickly hire local staff) to support project implementation. Budgeting has been based on considerable UN experience of implementing similar activities in project zones and efforts have been made to prioritize the most efficient manner of achieving the desired results within the established timeline.

38% of funds have been allocated for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment activities, thus achieving the status of Gender Marker 2 while 5% of the budget is dedicated to monitoring activities. Funds for an independent evaluation have been included in the budget.

As proposed in **Annex D**, it is recommended to transfer the funds in two tranches to the participating UN Agencies, with. With a first tranche of 50% upon project approval followed by a second tranche of 50% (to be released following commitment of 75% of the first tranche and submission of all due reports to PBF during this period and under the condition of availability of all indicators' baselines and clear update on the status of the establishment of the Sebha Hub). UNDP, as Convening Agency, will be responsible to demonstrate these conditions upon request of the second tranche of funding.

While the assessments for the UN Hub are ongoing, an amount of USD500,000 has been earmarked under the budget for this PBF programme to contribute towards the initial set-up of the Hub. Tentative budget lines, based on the experience of the UN Hub in Benghazi have been used at this initial stage. Given the fluctuating security environment, if the establishment of the UN Hub in the South were delayed for any reason and would not incur planned expenditures within the programme timeline, the implementing agencies will use these funds to further achieve the existing programme outcomes. No significant change (above 15% as per guidelines) of budget per outcome or per overall budget lines is expected in Plan B, thus avoiding the need for a formal project revision. Nevertheless, written communication to PBF will be required to confirm which option the UNCT recommends and written formal approval by PBSO will be required in case funds are not utilized for the set-up of the Hub. If the UNCT decides to move forward with the Hub utilizing PBF funds, then regular updates on its sustainability must also be provided.

<u>**Annex A.1**</u>: **Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds" (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

● Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;

● Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;

● Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations' headquarters);

● Disburse funds to any RUNO for any costs extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist

Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report **Q4 expenses** (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to been refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and *Administrative* Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (http://unpbf.org) and the Administrative Agent's website (http://mptf.undp.org)

Annex B: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated data)

See Annex B in excel

Annex C: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline		x	While key Government stakeholders have bee identified, implementing partners will be duly identified following UN Agency programme ar operations policies
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Plz attach to the submission	X		TORs attached
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		Project municipal locations have been identifie and local governments have their commitmen to supporting the project implementation. Specific neighborhoods and locations for activities will be decided based on the results the participatory community planning exercise develop the peacebuilding plans.
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		Consultations with national stakeholders, Ministry of Local Government, as well as key local stakeholders from the civil society have been consulted. Notes from these meetings a attached.
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		Several conflict assessments exist as well as mapping of UN activities in Southern Libya ar a selection of lessons learned documents fro previous joint programmes and agency led stabilization programming in Southern Libya h been consulted and discussed internally.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	X		Beneficiary criteria for overall participation in t programme as well as tentative selection crite for certain livelihood activities has been

			identified based on lessons learned. It will be finalized based on the results of the conflict assessment and the peacebuilding plans.
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	X		Agreement has been made with the Ministry Local Government to be the lead Government coordination partner and to support coordination with the participating municipalities
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		UN recipient organizations have had multiple technical sessions to identify the common project implementation approach, sequencing activities and synergies
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?	N/A		

Annex D: Detailed and UNDG budgets (attached Excel sheet)

Annex E: Complementary Funding for PBF programme

Partner	Estimated amount LYD	Estimated Amount USD	Any in-kind support	Details
Ministry of Local Govt.	**14,075,215**	**2,815,043**	**Dedicated staff to support implementation of the programme, including linkages between local and national authorities and inter-municipal knowledge management and collaboration**	**Training to strengthen capacity of local authorities in 3 municipalities, training for new citizen engagement units**
Ministry of Education	**231,412**	**46,282**	**Use of selected local schools for training of youth, support to further incorporate life skills into the curriculum**	**Maintenance of schools**
Ministry of Labour			**Participation in site selection/curriculum/training of trainers/maintenance of the programme.**	

Reconstruction Fund of Murzuq and cities affected by conflict in the south (approved by PMO)	**500,000,000**	**40,000,000**	**Ongoing challenges to access/implement these funds. The Committee to manage the funds has yet to be nominated.**	**Infrastructure/Basic services/economic recovery (this segment covers Sebha and Ubari)**
Municipalities		**-**	**Use of offices for community meetings, staff dedicated to support and lead components of programme implementation**	
UNDP		**4,200,000**		**Investment in capacity building infrastructure, basic services and economic recovery specifically in the 3 target municipalities**
WFP		**1,600,000**		**Food for training/Markets for target districts**

UNICEF		**3,877,659**		**EU funding programme supporting peace kiosks and lifeskills in these and more districts in the South**
IOM		**5,000,000**		**Labour migration governance, employment mapping for youth, CSO capacity development, build capacities of local implementers for basic services**
RCO		**65,000**		**1 year of regional coordinators salary (2023)**

Total Complementary Funding		**57,603,984**		
UN sub-total		**14,742,659**		
Govt. sub-total		**42,861,325**		

Annex F: Summary of notes from the Consultations with Government of Libya and Civil Society Organizations

PBF Coordination Workshop, Tunis, Tunisia, 29-30th August, 2022

<u>**Government participants:**</u> **Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Planning, Municipality of Sebha.** *Municipalities of Ubari and Ghat were unable to attend.*

Key observations:

· Selection of 3 municipalities must be well-justified

· Project title should mention specific municipalities, do not refer to wider Fezzan

· Ensure local level discussions are held to plan context-specific activities

· Must build upon existing UN work in the project zones

· Must limit operational costs and ensure progress is seen on the ground

· UN agencies should adapt innovative approaches to peacebuilding

· Close collaboration with the local authorities is necessary during the implementation phase

· Ministry of Local Government offered to lead coordination and consultation process with participating municipalities (which was subsequently held, notes below).

CSO participants: Fezzan Libya Organization (Sebha based - https://fezzanlibya.com/)

Key observations/recommendations for the programme:

· Local councils in Sebha are prevented from taking simple decisions inside the municipality, thus sustaining tensions. Enhancing the capacity of the local authorities can help to increase citizen-state trust.

· The lack of liquid assets in Sebha has contributed to an increase in intercommunal tensions specific to the control of resources and influence over the distribution of public services. Improved equitable access to social services would help to mitigate these tensions.

· Social cohesion activities and reconciliation programmes should connect to service provision. International support would be required to address this challenge.

Meeting led by Ministry of Local Government, 7th September 2022

Government participants: Ministry of Local Government, Mayors of the municipalities of Sebha, Ubari and Ghat

Key observations/recommendations for the programme:

· Strong recommendation to contextualize the programme in each municipality

· Request to indicate clear timeline/milestones to be able to monitor the programme

· The programme should reinforce the local authority structures, especially the Community Development Department and Citizens Service Unit (recently established by MoLG) to ensure sustainability of the programme

· Drivers of conflict affect the overall service provision of the municipalities and as such any peacebuilding tools developed under the programme should take into account a strong do no harm approach

· Need to focus on areas that have recently suffered conflict/wars, especially where IDPs are still without solution (ex. Ubari).

· The challenge of community members without ID should also be supported by the programme.

· It is important to support the role of the reconciliation committees

· It is important to coordinate with the local planning office as well as the Mukhtar Mahala

· Providing services is key to strengthening peace and stabilization; for example, lighting the city's main street reduces criminal activities.

· One of the leading peace drivers is the role that plays by Mukhtar Mahala which they fill the gap between the communities and local authorities.

· Establishing friendly spaces for women and children and families that support and enhance the social cohesion, sport also is a key to reach this.

· The programme should be well documented to support scale-up in other areas

· Focus on innovation and creativity should be strong as should a focus on sustainability

· Cultural differences between the local populations should be noted and incorporated into the programme design.

Consultation with CSOs from Ubari, 10th September 2022

Participants: local CSOs including the   **Commission of Civil Society in Ubari.**

Key observations/recommendations:

· Need to develop a peacebuilding process that attracts youth and communities.

· Sustainability of the programme needs to be prioritized and mechanisms to follow-up on PBF funded initiatives should be in place

· Establishing trust between communities and between the community and the government must be an important part of the programme

· There should be a clear and fair distribution of support under the programme across the different communities

· Following peacebuilding training, it would be useful to engage communities in pilot projects to convert that knowledge into practical, visible benefits. An example of how volunteers rehabilitated a roundabout and engaged youth in this was given.

· The mother's council established in the municipality could be integrated into the programming planning as a useful women-led platform.

· Lack of understanding of the role of the municipal council fuels tension and hate speech

· Need for the community to put pressure on the municipal government to deliver services, even with a lack of budget, and to build partnerships with international support.

· Reconciliation training must be linked to tangible outcomes

· Addressing the economic situation at the local level is a challenging, but necessary of reconciliation

· Suggestion to link the work with the newly established departments in the municipalities to engage citizens

· Need to think beyond small grants in Ubari case, especially in the agriculture sector these grants sometimes have limited impact

· There is a need to improve the coordination between the local, national, and international plans implemented in Ubari.

· The most vulnerable group are the youth and community with ID issues.

· Creating safe and friendly community spaces that support social cohesion and peace in the community should be incorporated

· The municipality can be the leading partner to stimulate economic opportunities, especially with the transfer of competencies to the municipality to support economic growth

PBF Focus Group Discussion with Ghat CSO representatives: 8th Sep 2022

Local CSO participants

Key observations/recommendations:

- One of the main issues in addressing the challenges is to have a capable and flexible team who can work with the communities to address the challenges.

- Women should play a role in addressing these challenges.

- The programme should enhance the expertise of the existing team working within the Ghat municipality on the Local Development Plan by adding social cohesion and peacebuilding experts. The current plan lacks a peacebuilding lens.

- Good planning with activities focusing extensively on integrating the communities, especially the returnees, IDPs, and the people without national IDs.

- Design and Implement activities that consider all spectrums of the community.

- Focus on social cohesion and shared spaces for host communities and IDPs, returnees and migrants

- Competition over essential services is a critical element that affects the community's social cohesion.

- There is a need to have extensive local consultations to develop the activities that support peacebuilding and social cohesion.

- The main driver for the tension between the host communities and other groups such as IDPs, Migrants, and returnees in Ghat is the pressure they put on the basic services.

- This pressure on the basic services makes the host community angry and a place to refuse any initiatives to integrate them although they are from the same tribes, such as people displaced from Ubari.

- For example, one of the districts in Ghat has a school named Alhurria school; after 2012, the school considered dilapidated and faced an increased number of students from other communities like IDPs and returnees; some of the host community families pushed to change the school for their kids to another district to avoid the unhealthy crowded environment in the school, the situation increased the tension between the host communities and others.

- Strong outreach campaigns to promote peace would be necessary.

- Sport can also be a tool to promote social cohesion.

- Local data seems to suggest that returnees and IDPs are the leading groups engaging in the illicit economy, with host communities less engaged.

- Ghat is considered one of the main smuggling routes, especially fuel, drugs, and goods.

- The booming illicit economy complicates the relationship between the host community and the others, raising the tension, which may lead to a conflict.

- It is essential to support the formal economy through the support of vocational training and provide grants to the youth and to set up objective indicators to evaluate the SME's initiatives.

- Intensive support for SMEs and creative economic ideas such as support for establishing new farms that can increase job opportunities will lead to more people engaging in the formal economy.

PBF Focus Group Interview: Sep 2022

Civil Society participant: Youth Activist and member of Student Union at Sebha University.

Key observations/recommendations:

- The most important groups to engage in a reconciliation process are social councils and tribal representatives

- Tribalisation caused increasing rivalry. This Tribalism pattern ultimately helped undermine the trust of local Institutions and increase provocations by exclusionary practices of those in power.

- Hate speech also challenges the peace process, resisting smooth re-integration of the communities conflicted due to the lack of awareness. For example, in the university hate speech discourages some students (male and female) from resuming classes to avoid any risks.

- The municipality has two newly established departments (community development department) that can be used to fill the gap between the communities and the local authorities.

- The upgrading of the development plans to cover the youth is essential, especially those newly graduated; engaging the students to tailor their life plans is crucial for long-term peace, and these plans will be their roadmap after graduation.

- The municipality can be the leading partner to stimulate economic opportunities, especially with the transfer of competencies to it

- The most vulnerable group is the youth and women, and people lack economic opportunities.

- People with lack of ID are also vulnerable.

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Annex G: Local Peacebuilding Challenges Matrix

Municipality	Threats	Opportunities	Stakeholders
Ghat Population 24,000, Southwest on border with Algeria	**Conflict among Tuareg** families to control resources in the area	Cultural/social similarities between Tuareg (85%) and Ahali tribes.	Tribal councils, 4 social councils, tribal representatives, Muktar Muhalla, Municipal council, Ministry of Local Government. Local private sector, chambers of commerce, private sector associations. Local authorities. Ministry of Education/Labour. Some examples of CSOs (including women-led CSOs) who have participated in UN consultations on social cohesion, resilience and peace: Ghat Women's Union, Al Rahma Association, Youth of Change, Rabsa Group, Faugal Association, Albrkt Youth Association, Sardlis media, Youth Council, No discrimination Movement
	Division of Ghat municipality into 4 in January 2022, there are some concerns about how this will affect control of resources/provision of services	Existing Local Development Plan for Ghat, but must now be revisited to support new administrative divisions.	
	Low level of trust in public services and low level of engagement. Lack of infrastructure & electricity,	New administrative divisions are intended to bring the municipal councils closer to the population to help enhance trust and efficiency.	
	Low levels of women participation in formal decision-making processes despite playing an active role in informal family, cultural and tribal dynamics.	Build on the skills, capacities and willingness of women to play a more active role in public-decision-making processes. Women-led CSOs can be a good entry point to identify women leaders.	
	High cost of living. Majority of residents report spending most of their salaries on food. High cost of fuel. Lack of liquidity.	Creation of new value chains that support renewable energy/logistics. Reduce costs by increasing local food production. Support local	

	Moderately food insecure population is 17%.	agriculture/livestock sector. Enhance home gardening.	(Tawareg), Akakus Association CSO
	Threats to physical security of women lead to reduction in mobility for women and girls resulting in reduced employment opportunities.	Safe spaces, travel arrangements and negotiations with families and local authorities required to allow and proactively encourage women to actively participate in the programme.	
	Lack of licit employment opportunities for youth and women. Traditionally reliant on public sector employment. Commercial border with Algeria closed which has limited role as a trade centre. Smuggling/human trafficking are common.	UNESCO World Heritage Site offers potential for tourism if security and logistics can be improved. Cottage industries remain such as brass ware, leather goods, copper, ceramics, palm weaving products. Abundant underground water supply can support agriculture, including for cultivation of wheat, barley, vegetables, and dates.	

Sebha Population 130,000 Southwest Oasis City in Sahara Desert	**Complex social fabric**. More than 30 tribes with high presence of IDPs and migrants. Complex living environment reinforces group identities. Tuareg and Teba face identity issues.	Inclusive approach to local peacebuilding. Introduce activities to promote social cohesion.	Reconciliation Committee, social councils, tribal representatives, Muktar Muhalla, Municipal council, Ministry of Local Government. Local private sector, chambers of commerce, private sector associations. Local authorities. Ministry of Education/Labour, LNA
	Municipal council controlled by the Awlad Suleiman tribe while Tuareg and Tebu are excluded	Ensure voice of excluded populations in local planning and implementation	
	Exclusion from National development agenda feeds perception that local authorities have limited scope to deliver	Link local plans with national government.	Some CSOs (including women led CSOs) who have participated in past UN consultations on social cohesion, resilience and peace: Fezzan Libya Organization, Sebha Student Union, Do Centre for Training, Al Shararh Youth Center, Al Ateer, Al Daleel Center for Training, Nogoush Fezzan, South of Libya Women's Union, Bait Althurat, Hawah Training Centre for Women, Vision
	Negative influence of National actors who compete for administrative/military control over Sebha.	Link local plans with national government.	
	Lack of rule of law to regulate illicit activities. High level of criminal activity with varying affiliations to political/security actors. Social/economic impact via taxes on local businesses. Competition between armed	Engage with wider UN rule of law efforts	

	groups often leads to violent conflict.		
	Lack of licit employment opportunities for youth and women. Traditionally reliant on public sector employment and agriculture. Challenges to access water, electricity and fuel have limited growth of new economic opportunities.	Build on new value chains, interest from University of Sebha to establish business incubation centers, build on women-led companies by establishing markets/supporting wider value chains	
	Growing social discontent about the lack of opportunities. High cost of living. Moderately food insecure population is 8%.	Engage youth proactively in the peacebuilding process. UN experience with youth-led CSOs. Engagement with Min, Education. Support local agriculture/livestock production.	
	Threats to physical security of women lead to reduction in mobility for women and girls resulting in reduced employment opportunities.	Safe spaces, travel arrangements and negotiations with families and local authorities required to allow and proactively encourage women to actively participate in the programme.	

	Low levels of women participation in formal decision-making processes despite playing an active role in informal family, cultural and tribal dynamics.	Build on the skills, capacities and willingness of women to play a more active role in public-decision-making processes. Women-led CSOs can be a good entry point to identify women leaders.	
Ubari Population 43,000 Southwest medium-sized Oasis town	**Racial and social discrimination** especially towards Tuareg populations who don't have Libyan citizenship.	Whole of society approach to service provision and social cohesion	Reconciliation Committee, social councils, tribal representatives, Muktar Muhalla, Municipal council, Ministry of Local Government. Local private sector, chambers of commerce, private sector associations. Local authorities. Ministry of Education/Labour.

Some CSOs (including women led CSOs) who have participated in past UN consultations on social cohesion, resilience and peace: Commission of Civil Society in Ubari, I am |
	Lack of documentation for Tuareg populations limits their access to services and creates inequality. Persistent source of tension for the community.	Advocacy with relevant authorities	
	Lack of trust in the local authorities, despite the council having Tuareg and Tebu representation since 2019.	Enhance local planning and implementation as well as dialogue spaces with the community	
	Tuareg, Ahali, Tebu co-exist in negative peace since 2015/6 conflict.	Draw on progress made since the end of the war to inform future PB strategies	

		Volunteer Association, Elders Council, Homat Al Diyar Association, Al Etelaf Association, Desert Ship, Free Libya, Al Haroug, Al Gallah Sport Club, Tamazat, Peace Wings
Threats to physical security of women lead to reduction in mobility for women and girls resulting in reduced employment opportunities.	Safe spaces, travel arrangements and negotiations with families and local authorities required to allow and proactively encourage women to actively participate in the programme.	
Low levels of women participation in formal decision-making processes despite playing an active role in informal family, cultural and tribal dynamics.	Build on the skills, capacities and willingness of women to play a more active role in public-decision-making processes. Women-led CSOs can be a good entry point to identify women leaders.	
Food insecurity - Moderately food insecure population is 13%.	Explore mechanisms to enhance local food production via agriculture/livestock support.	

	Lack of licit economic opportunities for young people	More opportunities since re-opening of the power plant. 2 recent events held to enhance private sector investment - Libya International Conference for Investment and Trade, and the Libya Exhibition for Small Projects, South Edition	
	Presence of Salafist 1st Battalion - clashes have arisen with the community on unlawful arrests and their extremist Salafist views	Engage with wider UN rule of law efforts	

Annex H: Theory of Change slides (attached in PPT)

Annex I: Activity Sequencing chart (attached in excel)

Annex J: Procurement strategy

Agency	Partnership Strategy	Estimated Timeline

WFP	WFP Libya currently has agreements with 3 local NGOs (Cooperating Partners) on projects such as Food for Training, Market rehabilitation and School Feeding. If more partners are required, WFP partnerships division may need up to 2 months to issue Request for Proposals (RFPs), do the risk assessment of the partners and sign the Field Level agreements with the selected partners. WFP Libya now uploads RFPs and call of expression of interest to the UN Partners Portal as a step to foster harmonization between UN agencies and to reduce management costs. Regarding the procurement part, WFP supply chain may need between 2 or 3 months, depending on the complexity of the projects, to sign contracts with suppliers. On procurement coordination, WFP works and coordinates with other UN agencies on some logistical matters, like shipment, warehousing, storage, and customs clearance, and in some cases joint procurement. This can be extended to other procurement activities where applicable and feasible.	2- 3 months
IOM	While IOM has existing partnerships, once funds from PBF are received IOM will have to do a new process to hire implementing partners to implement peacebuilding initiatives and for vocational and TVET services. The process is estimated to take between 4-6 months.	4-6 months

UNDP	UNDP is conducting a mapping of local CSOs for peacebuilding and resilience work. This should be finalized by early November and CSO capacity assessments are planned. UNDP would be able to share this mapping with all participating to guide partner selection. There is a relatively small group of capable CSOs in the project zones and thus with common preparation of tors/experience and task requirements, it would be possible to ensure a coordinated implementation approach in target municipalities. Where possible UNDP will seek to do cost-extensions of existing agreements to bridge initial procurement time. UNDP partnership arrangements would take from 2-4 months to finalize agreements.	2-4 months
UNICEF	UNICEF will be building upon existing partnerships in Sebha, with the partner currently implementing the Baity center (community center). However, as this is an INGO partner, UNICEF will be utilizing the PBF funding to apply nationalization/localization strategy and to have local CSOs empowered by the INGO who will serve as an umbrella NGO. Local CSO mapping will be done also in coordination with UNDP to select the relevant CSOs (youth and women NGOs). As for the peace kiosks, local CSOs would be best positioned in identifying the potential peace kiosks, work with the local municipality, tribal councils, informal networks as well as identifying potential youth/adolescent boys and girls champions. UNICEF will coordinate with other agencies on the mapping of	3 months

	local CSOs for the INGOs to become the umbrella NGO. Hence the partnership arrangements will take max 3 months.	

Annex K: Programme Management Organogram

Annex L: Risk Matrix

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
Risk of escalated political instability in the region.	Medium to High	The political situation is continuously monitored. Programme activities have been identified considering the current political situation and anticipated developments. Mitigation measures have been designed to apply if the security situation deteriorates. Democratic structures and principles are firmly supported in the framework of the UN's political dialogue with the host country.

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
Access issues related to security and infrastructure, including deteriorating security situation on roads, leading to some populations being cut-off; related inability to identify locations deemed appropriate for intervention. Suspension in implementing activities in the event that access is not possible.	Medium to High	The participating UN agencies continue to coordinate with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), partners and authorities regarding security and presence to ensure a trustful relationship between stakeholders. Third-party contracting will be utilized where possible and appropriate. UN Agencies anticipate the need for flexibility in dates and locations for field activities, allowing for completion of activities to remain on schedule. Activities may be delayed until the security situation in the target area is sound and there is no potential for harm to beneficiaries or project staff; training sites may be moved pending security assessments.
Restrictive measures related to COVID-19 such as movement restrictions, curfews, closing of all borders, etc. can hamper programme activities	Low	During the peak months of the COVID-19 pandemic, UN Agencies developed and implemented specific safeguards for project implementation to ensure the safety of participants and project teams alike. In some cases, agencies received approvals from local COVID-19 committees to continue small group activities. Similar measures would be taken if COVID-19 or other health concerns arise in future. If required, the UN will advocate with the government for access to project areas, including exemptions to enable activities during curfew hours, lifting of movement restrictions for humanitarian supplies and personnel, etc. to ensure key project activities are implemented on schedule.
Establishment of UN Hub in the South is delayed beyond programme timeline	Medium	If the establishment of the UN Hub in the South were delayed for any reason and would not incur planned expenditures within the programme timeline, the implementing agencies will use these funds to further achieve the existing programme outcomes. No significant change (above 15% as per guidelines) of budget per outcome or per overall budget lines is expected in Plan B, thus avoiding the need for a formal project revision.

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
		To mitigate this risk, the UN Hub budget has been allocated for spending in the second tranche of funding and tranches will be 50/50. This will provide the recipient agencies sufficient time to complete all necessary security, administrative and logistic assessments to determine the feasibility of the Hub. These will be complete and a final decision by the UNCT will be taken by October 2023 on whether the Hub will go ahead under PBF programme, at which point a detailed roll-out plan/budget will be shared for review. The UNCT will only approve the Hub set-up if there are sufficient funds from UN entities in Libya who are able to sustain the structure for at least several years. Agencies like WFP & UNDP who have multiple large projects in the South would intend to use this as a permanent base for staff operating in the South as this would be much easier than managing multiple smaller project offices and would have many added benefits for missions. RCO is also in discussions with UNSMIL to understand how they might contribute to the Hub in the future.
Beneficiaries cannot engage due to fear, insecurity, inability or lack of access; unhappiness based on misconceptions about services or assistance not being equally provided.	Low	Messages to the project beneficiaries will be communicated through government authorities and/or local/community leaders to effectively reach target beneficiaries. Specific care will be taken to reach out via women's organizations/teachers and other trusted sources to ensure effective outreach and engagement of women and girls. Where necessary mobility arrangements will be made to facilitate women's physical presence when required. Consistent, open and honest partner communication and engagement continues to be based on mutual trust and respect for beneficiaries.
Loss of resources (funds, goods, assets) due to looting, vandalism and fraud.	Low	Putting in place security measures and effective internal control to mitigate potential loss of resources, reinforcing third party monitoring. Ensuring ownership and buy-in from the local communities from the start of the project, ensuring expectations are clear and response is based on need. Additionally, each agency has strict requirements in place to mitigate risk of financial fraud and misuse of resources. All project activities will be implemented within the parameters of civil military guidelines.

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
Impact of the declining economic environment on the cost of operations and related local capacity, as well as issues in financial liquidity	Medium	Continuous monitoring of the changing context in Libya and anticipated effects on the economic outlook, financial liquidity, and cash availability. Where possible, UN agencies will opt for the direct provision of supplies and transfers to service providers and will continue to allow partners to use their bank accounts in Tunis or other countries, in line with HACT policies and procedures, and will continue to explore possibilities of supporting the partners to receive LBY in Libya
Substantial exchange rate fluctuations (EUR-US$, US$-LYD)) over the three years could negatively affect the budget of the action, by reducing the funds available for implementation	Medium	UN agencies will closely monitor the budget execution and exchange rates, informing the donor of any impact these fluctuations (positive or negative) might have on achievement of programme objectives and targets. The UN Libya Country Team is working to address any impact changes in the US$-LYD exchange rate may have on programming and operations.
Coordination between national and local partners	Medium	Based on lessons learned from past programming, UN agencies ensure effective coordination and communication with relevant national and local authorities to strengthen synergies and support the implementation of national development goals in the target areas.
Change of interlocutors at the local level after the local elections in Libya (expected this year)	Medium to High	Continuous monitoring of the development and political evolution. Prioritization to be conducted in consultations with wider and representative groups from the community – to ensure that activities are identified inclusively and supported by the communities.
Human rights violations increase in target municipalities.	Medium	The joint programme is driven by a rights'-based approach and the conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed in all the activities.

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
Limited presence of local CSOs and limited access of international CSO to the targeted locations	Medium	UN agencies will utilize contractors for the implementation of activities; third-party monitoring will be reinforced and implemented regularly to ensure effective activity implementation.
Weak coordination and synergies of development partners working in the same target areas	Low	Donor coordination is at a nascent information sharing stage. The project will seek to engage actively in the upcoming Donor Coordination Group to ensure synergies.
Delay in visible results at the local level	Medium	The project will ensure wide community visibility of the peacebuilding process and capacity development activities and will initiate some of the economic activities from the offset of the programme to deliver quick visible wins.
Low levels of participation from women, young women and girls		The programme will develop specific outreach strategies to ensure that women, young women and girls targeted for programme interventions are aware of the opportunities to participate across the different components and feel comfortable throughout their participation. In terms of low interest in women's participation in local governance mechanisms and economic opportunities, the project will hold specific localized women outreach activities, led by local trusted women, with local organizations, women's organizations, schools, health clinics, markets and other community hubs frequented by women to increase awareness on the process, explain clearly what it entails, answer any questions, highlight how women have successfully participated in these kinds of processes before and what the benefits were to them and their communities and provide clear guidance to women who would like to join in. These outreach sessions will also serve to inform any changes that need to be made to any planned activities (such as duration, location, timings, frequency, content) in order to increase women's participation (and changes to further accommodate women will be made periodically throughout the programme to enhance participation rates.

RISKS	Level of risk (High/Medium/Low)	Mitigating measures
		Implementing partners will also be provided with targets for women's participation and will be encouraged to have regular consultations with women participants to gain feedback and insights and thus ensure their continued participation.

Annex M: Monitoring Timeline

Monitoring Activity	Frequency	Expected Action
Track results progress	Monthly, or in the frequency required for each indicator.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.
Monitor and Manage Risk	Quarterly	Risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.

Annual Project Quality Assurance	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.
Review and Make Course Corrections	Bi-annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.
Project Report	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)	
Project Review (Project Steering Committee)	At least annually	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.
Project evaluation	At end of project	Review actual results against intended results and identify any lessons learned for future programming.