

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



United Nations
Peacebuilding

PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT

Country(ies): GHANA	
Project Title: Enhancing social cohesion and social contract, through empowerment of women and youth in three northern regions of Ghana.	
Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):	
PBF project modality: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRF <input type="checkbox"/> PRF	If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts): <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund Name of Recipient Fund:
List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.): UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund).	
List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO): Government: National Peace Council, National Youth Authority, Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation and Rural Development / Regional Coordinating Councils, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MoGCSP). CSOs: WANEP-Ghana, CDD-Ghana, ActionAid Ghana, Youth Harvest Foundation, NORSAAC.	
Project duration in months^{1 2}: 24 Expected project start date: August 2023 Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation: Upper East (Bongo, Bawku West, Garu districts) ³ , Upper West (Wa West, Sissala West districts) ⁴ , and North-East (Yunyoo-Nasuan, Chereponi, Bunkpurugu-Nankpanduri districts). ⁵	
Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below: <input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative ⁶ <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative ⁷ <input type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project	
Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization): UNDP: \$1,999,980 UNFPA \$999,980 Total: \$2,999,960 <i>*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.</i>	

¹ Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 18 months, for PRF projects – 36 months

² The official project start date will be the date of the first project budget transfer by MPTFO to the recipient organization(s), as per the MPTFO Gateway page

³ bordering Burkina Faso, and Togo

⁴ bordering Burkina Faso, and La Cote D'Ivoire

⁵ bordering Togo

⁶ Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

⁷ Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):		
PBF 1st tranche (70%): UNDP: \$1,399,986 UNFPA: \$ 699,986 Total: \$2,099,972	PBF 2nd tranche* (30%): UNDP: \$ 599,994 UNFPA: \$299,994 Total: \$899,988	
Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs): This project seeks to prevent and address the root causes of localized and spillover conflicts and vulnerabilities to violent extremism in Northern Ghana. Specifically, the project will empower local governance institutions, actors and customary governance structures to ensure more inclusive, responsive and accountable governance, economic development and quality service delivery, as a peace dividend in these marginalized regions. It will also enable functional spaces for inclusive dialogues and mediation for conflict prevention and peace building. In particular, the project will enhance the resilience and agency of women and youth for their full and meaningful participation to contribute constructively to local governance decision-making as well as conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. Finally, the project will foster positive collaborations among state and non-state actors and security agencies to facilitate early response to conflict triggers and risks and preparedness to prevent conflict.		
Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups): In the preparation of the concept note and proposal, a number of consultations were held with various stakeholders including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, National and Regional Peace Councils, Northern Development Authority, Ministry of National Security and the National Counter Terrorism and Fusion Center, World Bank Social Cohesion (SOCO) Project, Ministry of Local Government, Decentralization and Rural Development, the Accra Initiative Secretariat, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Ghana, and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) Northern Ghana coordination office, CDD-Ghana, Regional Coordinating Councils in Upper East, Upper West and North East, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MOGCSP), Youth Authority, Youth Advocates Ghana, Youth Harvest Foundation, Youth Bridge Foundation, NORSAAC, UNOWAS, OHCHR Dakar office, University for Development Studies and other PBF funded borderlands initiatives in Togo and Cote d' Ivoire. Additionally, consultations with women and youth representatives in Northern Ghana were held to explore the security issues and threats that impact marginalized groups and propose possible solutions. The scope of this proposal is therefore informed by the lived experiences of potential project beneficiaries.		
Project Gender Marker score⁸: <u>2</u> Specify % and \$ of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment: \$1,992,140 of budget is allocated to GEWE which is 66.41%.		
Briefly explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment ⁹: The project is designed with an inherent integrated approach to address gender equality and women's empowerment, using mainstreaming strategies and a specific project outcome. The project will build the		

⁸Score 3 for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

Score 2 for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE

Score 1 for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

⁹ Please consult the PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding.

gender mainstreaming capacities of local government officials and actors to promote gender responsive planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation at the local level as well as advocate for the full participation of women and youth in local governance, peacebuilding and social cohesion initiatives and strengthening their resilience to secure sustainable livelihoods. Additionally, the project will work with local structures including traditional and religious systems to address negative patriarchal and socio-cultural norms that reinforce women's subordination and disempowerment of the youth.

Recognising the multiple vulnerabilities that expose young people to radicalisation and other effects of violent extremism, coupled by youth and women's underrepresentation in decision making and local governance processes, the project will specifically work with women and youth networks and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to enhance their meaningful participation in local governance processes. The project will build the resilience of women and youth by providing them with the knowledge and skills to advocate for their rights and opportunities to enhance their livelihoods. Thus, the project beneficiaries will receive technical and financial support, including gender responsive and age-appropriate services to strengthen their agency to reduce vulnerabilities. It will provide women and youth the opportunity to engage and dialogue with local government institutions and traditional authorities to address the barriers that hamper women' and youth participation in development and peace building processes.

In all project interventions, the inclusion of women and youth will be prioritized, including in trainings, and mentorships opportunities offered by the project. It will proactively target at least 50 percent representation of women and female youth to enable them to take advantage of the opportunity to lead and be part of governance and peace building processes in their districts and communities.

Project Risk Marker score¹⁰: 1

Is the project piloting new approaches: Yes ☒ No ☐

Does the project design incorporate climate, peace and security related considerations:
Yes ☒ No ☐

Select PBF Focus Areas which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select ONLY one*) ¹¹: (2.3) Conflict prevention/management.

If applicable, SDCF/UNDAF **outcome(s)** to which the project contributes: UNSDCF (United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework) in Ghana (2023-2025)

Outcome 1: Inclusive and sustainable economic growth and transformation: By 2025, people in Ghana, particularly women, children, youth, persons with disabilities and those furthest behind, will enjoy an inclusive and transformed economy that creates decent jobs and sustainable livelihoods reducing inequality.

Outcome 3: Durable Peace and security in Ghana and the subregion: By 2025, people in Ghana will benefit from transparent, accountable, inclusive institutions and systems, including quality integrated digital services delivering a peaceful, cohesive and just society supporting durable peace and security in the subregion.

¹⁰ Risk marker 0 = low risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 1 = medium risk to achieving outcomes

Risk marker 2 = high risk to achieving outcomes

¹¹ PBF Focus Areas are:

(1 1) SSR, (1 2) Rule of Law; (1 3) DDR; (1 4) Political Dialogue

(2 1) National reconciliation; (2 2) Democratic Governance; (2 3) Conflict prevention/management

(3 1) Employment; (3 2) Equitable access to social services

(4 1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4 2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4 3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s) to which the project contributes:

5.5: Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life

10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

16.b: Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

Type of submission:

☒ **New project**

☐ **Project amendment**

If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:

Extension of duration: ☐ Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):

Change of project outcome/ scope: ☐

Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%: ☐











Additional PBF budget: ☐ Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX

Brief justification for amendment:

Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in

TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.

PROJECT SIGNATURES:

<p>Recipient Organization(s)¹²</p> <p>Name of Representative <u>ANGELA LUSIGI</u></p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Name of Agency United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</p> <p>Date & Seal <u>24/08/2023</u> </p>	<p>Representative of National Authorities</p> <p>Name of Government Counterpart <u>Hon. SHIRLEY AYORIKOR BOITWEY</u></p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Title <u>Minister</u></p> <p>Date & Seal <u>25TH August, 2023</u></p> <p></p>
<p>Recipient Organization(s)¹³</p> <p>Name of Representative <u>DR. WILFRED OCHAN</u></p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Name of Agency United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</p> <p>Date & Seal <u>24/08/2023</u> </p>	<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar</p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p>Date & Seal <u>30 August 2023</u></p>
<p>Head of UN Country Team</p> <p>Name of Representative <u>CHARLES ABANI</u></p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Title <u>UN Resident Coordinator</u></p> <p>Date & Seal <u>24/08/2023</u> </p>	<p>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar</p> <p>Signature </p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p>Date & Seal <u>30 August 2023</u></p>

¹² Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

¹³ Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.

I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

- a) A brief summary of gender-responsive **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project.

Ghana remains one of West Africa's most resilient democracies and the country is preparing towards its ninth electoral cycle (a high-stakes presidential and parliamentary elections) in December 2024. The country has been held up as a model of stability in a sub-region beset by political instability and a new wave of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG), primarily through military coups¹⁴ and a surge of violent extremism in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and northern Togo and Benin.¹⁵ Despite being relatively politically stable and peaceful, Ghana is affected by many localised conflicts that continue to put increasing strain on the existing national architecture for peace and security. Indeed, evidence suggests that while none of the 16 administrative regions in the country is resilient from one form of conflict or the other, the Northern parts of the country have recorded the most incidence of protracted violent conflicts.¹⁶ Some of the conflicts in the north include the Dagbon and Nanung chieftaincy disputes, the Mamprusi-Kusasi (Bawku) and Konkomba-Bimoba inter-ethnic conflicts over power, identity and control, intra-ethnic disputes over chieftaincy succession such as the Bolga Chieftaincy; and land disputes and contestations over resources¹⁷ such as the Doba-Kandiga, Dorimon, Junjung-Tibongu/Fiabuni, Kaha-Umboh and Kperisi-Goli among others. Additionally, while intra-religious tensions between the Tijāniyyah and Ahlus-Sunnah in the Northern region and between the Sunni, Shia, and Tijaniyyah in the Upper East region conflicts continue to create insecurities in certain parts of the country, entrenched patriarchal practices which undermine the meaning participation of women and youth in political governance and peace building processes, and persisting divisions and intense contestations between the two dominant political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) have resulted in politically related violence and acts of political vigilantism by political party youth/vigilante wings, particularly in the northern part of the country.¹⁸

Crucially, given the recent increased destabilisation in Ghana's neighbouring countries, porous borders, inadequate security sector capacity, and new possibilities for flaring inter- and intra-religious tensions, Ghana's northern regions are highly exposed as fertile grounds for violent extremist organisations (VEOs) to operate from and attack,¹⁹ although the country has not yet experienced any open attacks.²⁰ An attack near the Ghana-Burkina Faso border at a mining community in January 2022, which led to the death of some non-Ghanaians and abduction of others, is an indication of the increasing threat to Ghana. In 2019, a Burkinabe with a loaded gun was arrested in a church in Ghana's Northwestern border town of Hamile.²¹ The Global Terrorism Index for 2023 indicates that the Sahel region in West and Central Africa is now the epicentre of terrorism. The Sahel accounted for more terrorism related deaths in 2022 than both South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) combined. Deaths in the Sahel constituted 43 per cent of the global total in 2022, compared to just one per cent in 2007. Of particular concern are two countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, which accounted for as high as 73 per cent of terrorism deaths in the Sahel within the period under review. The period also recorded increased terror activities in the northern parts of Togo and Benin, as part of a wider

14 UNDP (2022) SITA report

15 Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and northern Togo and Benin have recorded incidents of violent extremism

16 Kaderi N, Patrick O, Shaibu B, 2021 Chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana are mixed up with politics: what's at risks <https://theconversation.com/chieftaincy-conflicts-in-ghana-are-mixed-up-with-politics-whats-at-risk-166602> accessed 30-04-2023; <https://star-ghana.org/learning-2/publications-and-resources/reports/176-roadmap-for-sustainable-peace-security-and-development-in-northern-ghana/file>

17 Ibid See also Salifu, E S and Longi, F T (2013) 'Conflicts in Northern Ghana: Search for Solutions, Stakeholders and Way Forward', Institute for Continuous Education and Interdisciplinary Studies, University for Development Studies GJDS, Vol 10, No 1 & 2, 2013

18 Attuquayefio, P & Darkwa, L (2016) "Towards Elections 2016: Addressing the Phenomenon of Political Vigilantism" *LECIAD Policy Brief* See also Edu-Afful and Allotey-Pappoe (2016), Op Cit

19 UNDP (2023) Vulnerability to violent Extremism report

20 [Ghana has been a target of terrorist attacks for a very long time - Dominic Nitiwul \(25th May 2022\)](https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-has-been-a-target-of-terrorist-attacks-for-a-very-long-time-Dominic-Nitiwul-1545821) <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-has-been-a-target-of-terrorist-attacks-for-a-very-long-time-Dominic-Nitiwul-1545821>

21 <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/06/hamile-burkinabe-arrested-with-loaded-gun-at-catholic-church/>

southward spread of violent extremism and terrorism from the Sahel to coastal West Africa states. In all, 3172 violent incidents were reported in Northern Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire in 2022.²² And yet, the November 2022 UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs' Regional Monthly Report on the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) countries revealed that the priority risks assessed are deteriorating and having a low regional coping capacity (Regional and global influences, Displacement and Migration, Social cohesion, equality and non-discrimination and internal security), while the underlying cause of risk factors remain constant around economic instability and corruption infused political stability. Regional factors like transnational organised crime and spillovers from foreign countries as well as undue political interference by external actors were cited as external triggers of threats. Hence the need for a borderlands intervention that strengthens the existing governance and peace building structures, fostering improved relations between local communities and security forces and at the same time addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization to violent extremism in Ghana. Currently, as a results of the deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Ghana is already beefing up its military presence in the northern borders with Togo and Burkina Faso, with deployment of a 1,000 strong force. This project complements the efforts of the state through its non-security aspects in the marginalised and most-at-risk communities in northern Ghana.

In the past two years, the United Nations (UN) has conducted three assessments to analyse conflict and violent extremism in Ghana and its borders. All assessments, including the 2023 UNDP Vulnerability Assessment in the five northern regions, and the 2020 Conflict and Development Analysis have pointed to similar dynamics, vulnerabilities, resiliencies, and recommendations. Recommendations include programming in social cohesion, strengthening local governance, and security sector capacity building among others. Yet, to understand the nature and underlying causes of conflicts and vulnerabilities in Northern Ghana, there is a need to critically examine colonial legacies of state formation in the northern parts of the country²³ and how these underlying dynamics have been compounded by post-independence regime policies and politics,²⁴ which will be detailed in the points below.

1. Colonial legacy, failure of decentralization and absence of effective government

Ghana's colonial and post-colonial state-building strategy and state structures show uneven forms of development, investments and different levels of citizen inclusion in developmental processes. Due to variations in state formation and the associated developmental gaps in the Northern regions, there has been a sense of a state in 'retreat'; lagging in socio-economic development relative to other parts of the country resulting in a historical North-South divide and leading to the creation of particular types of vulnerabilities in the regions of the north. Governments in the post-colonial era identified slow development in the north compared to the other parts of the country and tried to address the gap, however their approach was focused on providing development for the people and not with the people. This gradually created a sense of exclusion and lack of understanding of governance and development processes. Again, the response to the long legacies of underdevelopment in the north has been the creation of parallel structures at the district through NGOs. This has undermined the capacity of local government structures with the mandate to provide services. Based on these lessons, this project seeks to re-focus on the local government structures directly with the aim of capacitating them to be more responsive and inclusive in the implementation of their mandates and engagement with women and youth especially in the target districts. It is also designed to promote inclusion of the people (women and youth in at-risk communities) in governance, development planning, decision-making and peace building processes to address the gaps in development.

²² <https://www.unicef.org/wca/press-releases/10-million-children-extreme-jeopardy-central-sahel-insecurity-seeps-neighbouring>

²³ (cf Mamdani, 1996 Acemoglu et al , 2001, 2002; Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005; Mahoney, 2010)

²⁴ MN 13; Kendie, S B (2010) *Conflict management and peace building for poverty reduction* Tamale: GILLBT Press

One major vulnerability in the northern part of Ghana, compared to the south lies in the largely ineffective and inefficient functioning of state capacity to deliver relevant services and reach the depths of civil society. Resulting from the differential state formation processes, successive post-colonial governments adopted decentralization and local governance as an essential part of taking governance to the grassroots and involving everyone, yet so far, the promise and optimism of decentralization has not yielded many positive dividends for the Northern part of the country. According to Sections 82 to 88 of the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), the District Assembly is the authority vested with the responsibility and authority to plan the development of the district, effectively creating pathways for communities to fully participate in the development of plans. However, a combination of the weak capacity of local government institutions to facilitate inclusive development and engage citizens (including women and youth), and limited reach of the state²⁵ (a symptom of both legacies of colonial state formation as well as the inequitable access to social services/infrastructure/inadequate provision of services based on age and gender analysis) has often undermined accountability, responsiveness and opportunities for communities to effectively participate in governance processes in the northern part of the country in particular. In addition, there are inadequate formal justice systems (and the non-state justice system is not structured) as well as limited social amenities and other symbols of the presence of the state in most communities in the north. Such low advancements in the north have led to distinctive perceptions about the state from individuals and communities. This has found expression in varying levels of loyalty and expectations about what the state can, ought to and is capable of delivering in terms of public services, including security provision and social welfare as a whole.²⁶ The 2023 UNDP Vulnerability to Violent Extremism in Northern Ghana assessment reveals that citizens' perception of the state and its capacities span from mistrust, dismissiveness, and dissatisfaction with its incapability to provide protection and public goods, to limited engagement or withdrawal from national and community-based governance activities. Indeed, while majority of respondents indicated higher levels of mistrust for the national government (75%), local government (75%) and police (65%), compared to traditional authorities (47%) and religious institutions (42%), most indicated a lower sense of identification with their country (47%), region (54%) compared to town/city (78%) and community/neighborhood (92%).

A consequence of the state neglect and or ambivalence, a combination of historical colonial legacies²⁷, failed policies and interventions²⁸ has been identified as contributing to high levels of poverty and inequality in the regions of the north of Ghana. For instance, the policies pursued by the colonial state, including forced labour migration and systematic suppression of agricultural²⁹ and infrastructural development on one hand, and post-colonial pursuance of liberal policies such as elimination of subsidies on farming inputs have "subordinated the interests of northern development to those of southern Ghana".³⁰ To address the legacies of colonial lopsided developmental policies, and post-independence policies that exacerbated poverty and social inequalities in the north in particular, successive governments of Ghana have launched a series of economic initiatives to produce accelerated growth and enhance standards of living. These include compensatory poverty reduction initiatives (targeting human development and the provision of local infrastructure), considerable donor

²⁵ state reach is one of the manifestations of state capacity. The reach of the state pertains to the geographical spread of state institutions within a given territory (vom Hau, 2012). The emerging research on the territorial reach of the state is analogous to Mann's notion of infrastructural power, which explores the extent to which states are able to penetrate society (Mann, 1984). In the SSA context, for instance, Herbst (2000) contends that, in rural areas with a low population density, the establishment of state institutions on the periphery of states is contingent on the ability of the state to collect sufficient taxes. Thus, the ways in which states penetrate their realms remain critical in political performance and outcomes.

²⁶ UNDP (2023) Vulnerability to violent Extremism report

²⁷ Nii-K. Plange, (Dec 1984), The Colonial State in Northern Ghana: The Political Economy of Pacification, *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 31, Capital vs. Labour in West Africa, pp. 29-43

²⁸ Korbla P. Puplampu, K. P., 1999. The state of agricultural policies and food security in Ghana (1983-1994). *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 20 (2): 337-359

²⁹ Yaro and Jan Hesselberg. 2010. *Op. cit.*

³⁰ Ampratwum, E. (2022) Local Party-Political Competition and State Infrastructural Power in the Implementation of Social Protection in Ghana. *The Politics of Distributing Social Transfers*, 121

investments to improve access to roads, electricity among others to tackle spatial inequalities.³¹ Notwithstanding, the northern part of the country remains disadvantaged in the provision of quality health and education services. This has resulted from the significant capacity gaps of governance institutions in the north³², the establishment of parallel systems for CSOs focusing on “service delivery” via NGOs.³³ In addition, poverty and inequality levels in the north compared the south remain high.³⁴ For instance, while poverty incidence in the national capital, the Greater Accra region fell from 13.5% to 2.5% between 2005 and 2016, in the northern region, poverty incidence actually increased from 55.7% to 61.1% over the same period.³⁵ Equally, the northern region witnessed sharp increases in levels of inequality, from 0.406 to 0.453 over the same period³⁶ resulting mainly from the inadequacy of frameworks for accelerated development such as the erstwhile Savannah Accelerated Development Authority, the Northern Rural Growth Programme³⁷ among others, to address the underlying causes of poverty and vulnerability in the region.

Another consequence of the historical colonial legacies, and failed policies and interventions in the north is the limited presence of public services such as educational, health, security, employment opportunities, and poor quality of service delivery.³⁸ The youth, especially young women in rural areas, is characterised by lower secondary school completion rates, higher unemployment rates, and higher rates of time-based underemployment. Available statistics indicate an average 26% upper secondary school completion rate among young people compared to 35% of their southern counterparts. Additionally, the average unemployment rate among youth (15-35 years) in northern Ghana stands at 36%, almost twice the national average of 19.7%.³⁹ Further to the lack of capacity and technical knowledge, the youth face higher barriers to employment and self-employment, stemming from their lack of access to finance, land, social networks, and other factors compared to their older counterparts. This economic and social exclusion of youth in the North creates a sense of frustration, hopelessness, exclusion, and irresponsibility, which affects meaningful citizenship formation, governance and peacebuilding participation. Youth unemployment, as acknowledged by the National Security Strategy, poses significant threat to peace and security of Ghana. The teaming unemployed youth can be exploited to join vigilante groups, extremist groups, illegal mining, and armed robbery in the absence of sustainable jobs to make a living and feel a sense of belonging in society. This is in line with the recent findings from UNDP’s Journey to Extremism in Africa 2.0, where lack of livelihood conditions and unemployment accounted for over 70% of the reason to join the violent extremist groups.⁴⁰ Hence, the need for interventions that leverage partnerships between local government systems (Business Advisory Centers) and local private actors and CSOs to provide flexible financing options and business development support to catalyze investments for existing women and youth led businesses and identified local value chains including micro-saving initiatives (such as village savings and loan associations) and to equip young people with entrepreneurial and livelihood skills to enhance their resilience while at the same time reducing their vulnerability to exploitation and radicalization to violent extremism.

Outside the sphere of the youth and against a backdrop of generalised disenfranchisement, patriarchal customs and practices remain a dominant driver of discrimination against women, particularly young women in northern Ghana. This undermines the capacities of the women to participate meaningfully in local and community governance, own and trade landed properties⁴¹ and contribute to peace building

³¹ Ampratwum, E (2022) Local Party-Political Competition and State Infrastructural Power in the Implementation of Social Protection in Ghana The Politics of Distributing Social Transfers, 121

³² Shepherd et al, 2004; UNDP 2018; World Bank 2018)

³³ (Mohan, 2002, p 140)

³⁴ (Mohan, 2002, p 140)

³⁵ https://www2.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/GLSS7/Poverty%20Profile%20Report_2005%20-%202017.pdf

³⁶ https://www2.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/GLSS7/Poverty%20Profile%20Report_2005%20-%202017.pdf

³⁷ <https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/ghanas-northern-rural-growth-programme-is-transforming-agriculture-17157>

³⁸ UNDP (2023) Vulnerability to violent Extremism report

³⁹ https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/2021%20PHC%20General%20Report%20Vol%203E_Economic%20Activity.pdf

⁴⁰ <https://www.undp.org/prevent-violent-extremism/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement>

⁴¹ <https://banyanglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/USAID-Ghana-Gender-Analysis-Report.pdf>

efforts in their communities. In some ethnic groups, practices like wife inheritance, forced marriages and other forms of violence against women are prevalent.⁴² There are few or no informal and formal support structures at the community and local government levels that help young women to file legal complaint for acts of violence and no protection against their abusers. In particular, the decentralized local governance system, which in principle should be a platform for enhanced women's participation in governance, has not lived up to expectations. For instance, women currently hold only 12% and 14% seats in local government in the northern and upper west regions respectively although the district assemblies are the platforms for discussing "bread and butter issues". Equally, women are usually excluded from peace processes and other decision-making platforms. The number of women in the Regional Peace Councils (which has the objective to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution and building sustainable peace in the country), nationally has increased from 19.2% to 24.4% between 2014 and 2022. Only 2 women are represented on the 20-member Bawku Inter-Ethnic Committee set up to mediate in the Mamprusi-Kusasis conflict in Bawku, and only 14 women (17.5%) are members out of a total 80 members of all the 16 Peace Mediation Committees in hotspot districts/constituencies formed by the National Peace Council. Again, though customary processes and practices acknowledge women chiefs in some societies in northern Ghana, the absence of clearly defined roles of leadership for these women chiefs in the houses of chiefs, for example, clearly undermines their roles in local conflict resolution mechanisms.⁴³ An Affirmative Action Bill, formulated in 2013, was re-submitted to cabinet under the new government in 2018 but has yet to be passed into law. Hence, the focus of this project is on leveraging partnerships with traditional and religious leaders at the community level to tackle discriminatory gender and socio-cultural norms. Again, by enhancing the resilience of women to conflict triggers while promoting meaningful participation in peace building, economic development and local governance, the project would be addressing the root causes of patriarchal relations in northern Ghana.

The COVID-19 pandemic may have further exacerbated vulnerabilities of the youth and women as the prolonged school closures and worsening economic conditions may have weakened the economic capital of women and hence their ability to effectively participate in governance and decision making in their communities. Even worse, government's recent success in obtaining a \$3 billion facility from the International Monetary Fund to address post-COVID economic crisis and manage its debts, with conditionalities to implement structural reforms and austerity measures, has led to a rise in the cost of living and placing additional strain on the social aspects of Ghanaian society, particularly women and youth. As women and youth have immense potential in leadership in social, economic and political spaces, the current gap in their participation in governance, economy and peace building offers an opportunity for their inclusion.

2. Natural resources, land management, and climate change

Inefficient management of natural resources has become a fulcrum around which several conflicts revolve, and recently, these have been compounded by changing climate impacts which are especially felt in Northern Ghana. Climate change vulnerability in the north is the greatest for those who are heavily reliant on land and other natural resources for agricultural purposes, with the lowest capacity to cope with these changes. Particularly, female-headed farming households, are largely susceptible to the impacts of climate change and are hampered in their adaptive capacity due to insufficient access to financial resources, adequate technology, and unfavorable land tenure systems. To cope with these climate-induced vulnerabilities, young male and female smallholder farmers in northern Ghana have resorted to seasonal migration to trading centers and small-scale mining sites in the south, especially

⁴² Domestic Violence in Ghana: Incidence, Attitudes, Determinants and Consequences (2016)

⁴³ NCCE (2011) The Role of Women in Traditional Governance in Ghana

during the long dry seasons. Their counterparts that remain in the north are exposed to increased unpaid care work, especially trekking long distances to fetch water and firewood: further compounding their vulnerability to domestic violence and other forms of rights abuses including gender-based violence.⁴⁴ Thus, partnering and linking with local government institutions, local private sector and CSOs to provide flexible financing options to women and youth local value chains including micro-savings initiatives in climate-insecure communities in northern Ghana could contribute to reducing vulnerability and perceptions of exclusion,

At the same time, climate-induced vulnerabilities have stoked different kinds of conflicts in communities in the north. A case in point are the farmer/herder conflicts which have found rise in some districts in northern Ghana, where the impact of climate change is most extreme influencing the dynamics between these two groups. In Northern Ghana, community leaders are expressing increased concern about the frequency of clashes between farmers and herders, those commonly perceived to be of the Fulbe group. These clashes are mutating into other forms of violent incidents, with the presence of small arms of both local manufacture and industrial-grade weapons, and cattle rustling across international borders to Togo, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Hence, it's important to highlight the need for justice (whether transitional or formal) and redress - especially on land issues, but also on issues related to access to resources, legal redress and dispute transformation mechanisms are key. If they are not in place, trust by communities towards customary or formal authorities is undermined and communal division can be easily exacerbated and instrumentalized.

The land question has equally become one of the key drivers of conflict in Ghana, with a land tenure system that is a fusion of customary/communal rules and recent statutory overlays. The allocation of land for commercial agriculture and non-agricultural use, including public and commercial building plots, is handled by the respective customary trustees. In recent years, the system has come under increased pressure, as competition for land use has become more intense. This is due to population growth, economic reasons such as commercial farming and mining, and climate change among others. Another potential for conflict lies in the land acquisition process, which is regulated by customary practices and statutes. However, due to the absence of transparent evidentiary proof of ownership systems, the acquisition of lands for public and private projects sometimes degenerates into conflicts or prolonged litigations. Essentially, whereas climate shocks and risks over the years are accelerating conditions for inter and intra-communal contestations over resources (at a time of increased failure of customary arrangements to regulate use of shared resources), it has become the responsibility of largely incapable local government systems to provide the necessary response and mitigation mechanisms, resulting sometimes in increased vulnerabilities of communities and individuals. Therefore, this project would seek to enhance the resilience of women through strengthening capacities of traditional and customary leaders' vis-a-vis local government authorities to tackle women's inadequate access to productive resources including land.

3. Localized forms of contestations between traditional versus formal power structures (inter and intra-ethnic, chieftaincy, and power related conflicts).

To understand the nature and causes of conflicts in Northern Ghana, there is a need to critically assess the interactions between precolonial social organisations such as traditional authorities, structures created by colonial administrators/policies to facilitate indirect rule, especially in territories without a history of hierarchical authority, local governance structures and how post-independence contemporary politics have exacerbated these underlying dynamics.⁴⁵ The creation of a 'foreign and

⁴⁴ https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/condemned_without_trial_women_and_witchcraft_in_ghana_report_september_2012.pdf

⁴⁵ (see Berry, 2001; MacLean, 2002; Boone, 2003; Lund, 2006).

intrusive' chieftaincy structure to facilitate indirect colonial governance impeded the two main systems (hierarchical and acephalous) of the traditional rule and social organizations in northern Ghana, which subsequently contributed to undermining the emergence of strong state institutions, political representation⁴⁶ and impacted the land tenure systems.⁴⁷ This partially underpins the persistent inter-ethnic, chieftaincy, power and identity struggles, and related land/ boundary conflicts, which are intimately connected with social and political status as well as economic opportunities in the country's northern part.

The dichotomy between chiefly and non-chiefly groups, and the governance arrangements that were made to regulate relations among such groups have often led to misunderstandings and have often resulted in conflictual outcomes leading to the loss of lives and destruction of property. Among the several facets of chieftaincy that engender confusion, tensions, and violence, the most critical issues include: struggles for paramountcy and autonomy; overlap of traditional chiefly authority and local government institutions; ownership and control of land; struggles for recognition of ethnic identities and respect, and perception of discrimination and marginalization by some ethnic groups leading to rivalries, in which chiefs hold bargaining power, for and on behalf of their groups. In contemporary times, traditional authorities in northern Ghana often fill the gaps in areas where state capacity is weak.⁴⁸ Frequently, traditional authorities take an active role in mobilising communities both civilly and politically. However, eminent citizens with diverse professional backgrounds also play a critical role in conflict management and resolution. For instance, the Eminent Citizens of Upper East Region led by a retired Supreme Court Judge have been very instrumental in the ongoing mediation process of Doba-Kandiga conflict; though these groups are dominated by men. A constant feature of Ghana's competitive politics is the attempt by political parties and politicians to rally voters by tapping into the legitimacy of chiefs to canvass and win political power or gain control of the central state in its various forms, although the latter is prohibited.⁴⁹ Indeed, Article 276 (1) of Ghana's constitution prohibits chiefs from taking part in active politics. At the same time, traditional authorities in jurisdictions with a history of contestations have sought to boost their legitimacy through alignment with ruling ⁵⁰[~~OB~~]. The recent strong alignment of chieftaincy and politico-religious issues in northern Ghana, as found in the Dagbon conflict, has further exacerbated the forms of vulnerabilities and fragilities to conflict.

It is worth stating that though women played some leadership roles in the past and still play roles in traditional political systems in their respective traditional places, chieftaincy institutions in Northern Ghana are male-dominant institutions. The negative perceptions of the traditional roles of women in the Northern part of Ghana have made very few of the female chiefs to be seen as chiefs. For a woman to be appointed a chief she needs to satisfy some requirements to allow her to be enskinned/installed just like the men. Female chiefs do not seem to be as recognized as their male counterparts despite the various efforts being made by NGOs (Non-governmental organisations), and the public sector to facilitate their involvement.⁵¹ Hence, in the adjudication of cases and resolution of disputes using traditional structures of the society in northern Ghana, the voices of women, even those in leadership, remain largely marginalised. This project will work with the Department of Gender, traditional councils, local government actors and women-led CSOs to build leadership, participation,

46 The paramount chieftaincy as a prerequisite for a seat in the Northern and National Houses of Chiefs significantly impacts the political representation and hence the contestations to attain paramountcy status and increased attempts by previously acephalous systems to be recognized as autonomous polities.

47 Jönsson, J. (2007). *The overwhelming minority: traditional leadership and ethnic conflict in Ghana's northern region*. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.

Osei-Kufuor, P., Kendie, S. B., & Boakye, K. A. (2016). Conflict, peace and development: A spatio-thematic analysis of violent conflicts in Northern Ghana between 2007 and 2013. *Conflict & Communication*, 15(2).

48 (Ray, 2003; Owusu-Sarpong, 2003)

49 (Crook, 2005; Crook & Addo-Fening, 2005)

50 (Bofo-Arthur, 2003; Jonah, 2003; Crook, 2005; Lentz, 2006)

51 Yakubu Mohammed, Eliasu Alhassan, Mahama Seth Sayibu (2022) Female Chiefs in Dagbon Traditional Area: Role and Challenges in the Northern Region of Ghana, *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Research*, Vol 8, No 2 pp 57-81

peacebuilding and advocacy capacities of existing women and youth groups/networks, champions and models for peace to facilitate inclusion in local governance and peace building processes.

4. Electoral related and exacerbated conflicts, inter-generational tensions and political vigilantism.

The persisting divisions between the two dominant political parties (the NPP and NDC) have generated politically related violence and have created a dangerous phenomenon characterized as political vigilantism⁵² since the early 2000s. With regards to political vigilantism, there appears to be a positive correlation between youth, local forms of vigilantism, and context-specific ingrained culture of violence in the Northern region.⁵³ Local vigilantes in most of the northern regions require further investigations to appreciate their complexity and roles. During the prolonged dry season, worsened by the semblances of desertification triggered by climate change in recent years, many youths are inactive and are easy to be exploited to join vigilante groups, as many are out of school and with limited opportunities for socialization. With time, these vigilante groups, either transmute to become, join, or form criminal gangs that go into kidnapping, robbery, or illegal mining activities. These vigilante groups are often more pronounced during the election season⁵⁴, as youth, especially the unemployed, are utilized by political parties and politicians to inflict violence, spearhead hate campaigns, and propagate hate speeches with the promise of job provision. These youth vigilante groups often engage in aggressive political activities, including vandalization of public property, seizing and controlling public goods, forming militias/vigilantism, leading hate campaigns and social media trolls and mobilizing for electoral violence.⁵⁵

Additionally, during election season, some sections of the youth often engage in electoral malpractices, including the removal and defacing of posters and snatching of ballot boxes. Furthermore, the youth are also involved in post-election violence⁵⁶, such as the seizure of public facilities⁵⁷ or kicking out public officials that they perceive as belonging to the opposition party from public offices. The government has adopted the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act to curb the menace of vigilantes. The Act seeks to disband vigilante groups; including political party vigilante and land guards; to proscribe acts of vigilantism in the country and to provide for related matters.⁵⁸ Thus, combined with ill-formed political consciousness or limited political awareness, in a context of a gradual erosion of intergenerational bonds and pluralization of information sources, the youth have become willing and available cannon fodder ‘used by politicians and political parties to distort political processes for small payments.’⁵⁹ This project will work with the National Youth Authority and the National Peace Council as well as youth led CSOs that focus on peace and security to mobilise, engage and prevent the involvement of vulnerable youth in election related violence.

The growing intensity of electoral competition and the associated electoral polarization and sense of political mistrust in the age of digitalization has resulted sometimes in increasing cases of mis/disinformation and a resort to hate campaigns and hate speech, especially through social media. Although traditional sources including radio and television remain the dominant daily news source used by Ghanaians, daily news consumption through the internet and the mobile phone has tripled since 2012 (from 6 to 19%), and the usage of social media as a news source nearly doubled since 2014 (from 12 to 22%). With the growing tech-savvy population, and the increasing percentage of active

52 Dumenu, M Y, & Adzraku, M E (2020) Electoral Violence and Political Vigilantism in Ghana: Evidence from Selected Hotspots

53 UNDP (2023)

54 <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/political-vigilantism-threatens-stability-in-ghana>

55 Dumenu, M Y, & Adzraku, M E (2020) Electoral Violence and Political Vigilantism in Ghana: Evidence from Selected Hotspots

56 <https://citifmonline.com/2017/10/18-incidents-of-vigilante-violence-recorded-since-npps-victory/>

57 <https://www.modernghana.com/news/213479/ndc-chairman-pays-irate-ashaiman-ndc-youth.html>

58 https://www.peacecouncil.gov.gh/storage/2019/09/ACT-999-VIGILANTISM-AND-RELATED-OFFENCES-ACT-2019-1_2.pdf

59 MN 5, 11 12 22

social media users to source information, the use of hate speech, mis/ and dis information are now threats to social cohesion and peace, particularly during elections. Currently, the dissemination of false information in Ghana is a criminal offense that is punishable by a fine and imprisonment based on Section 76 of Ghana's Electronic Communications Act (2008). Yet the trend of false information remains prominent in the media landscape, especially during elections. The National Peace Council and the National Media Commission recently launched a guideline for media on hate speech, this requires support to sensitise the general public and perpetrators punished to serve as deterrence. There is need to sustain education and sensitization on misinformation and disinformation while developing mechanisms to empower both traditional and social media as well as civil society to report and address hate speech and design simple mechanisms to verify information around elections and protracted conflicts.

Importantly, abuses by state and security forces⁶⁰ of youth suspected to be involved in various shades of crime and violations have also gained notoriety in the last few years, especially in some of the counter terrorism operations in northern Ghana, undermining trust between communities and state agencies. According to data from Statista, Ghana in 2020 recorded a high incidence of security-civilian brutalities which further threatens confidence and trust in security especially police to protect them and efforts to collaborate for early warning and response to prevent conflicts. Fostering dialogues between youth and security agencies in communities along the borders in the north of Ghana and also promoting dialogues between local authorities, security agencies and youth in areas with protracted conflicts and on the frontlines of violent extremism could mitigate vulnerabilities and improve youth perception of the state. Critically, enhancing capacities of security agencies and other relevant actors to respect human rights and adopting human rights-based approaches for conflict management would be key to sustaining social cohesion.

5. Three additional time-specific conflict triggers:

Upcoming Elections: In the fourth quarter of 2023, Ghana will be holding its district level elections and in December 2024 its general elections. As highlighted in the 5-year Northern Development Authority Plan (2022-2025), for instance, conflicts have assumed complex traits often embodying a toxic mix of partisan politics and chieftaincy. This has increased political skirmishes in the zone, especially in the lead up to general elections. The situation however creates the opportunity to start to groom the youth, particularly young women to participate as voters and educators and engage the local governance system via the youth parliaments and other youth platforms.

Displacement of populations across the borders and within the conflict prone communities: The recent violent extremist (VE) attacks in Burkinabe and Togolese towns closer to Ghana's northern borders have displaced and left thousands of Burkinabes and Togolese in need of shelter, food, healthcare and education for their children. Available information shows that over 8000 from Burkina Faso and 1500 from Togo fled into neighbouring Ghanaian communities such as Sapeliga, Widnaba, Komaka, Kasoogo and Agatuse in the Bawku West District and Bansi in the Binduri District.⁶¹ Due to this development, tensions between asylum seekers and host communities have begun to emerge, more so as other groups of displaced persons (DPs) such as the Fulbe (who are mainly transhumance), have entered Ghana with large numbers of livestock. This has created tensions on grazing land, depreciation of livestock market value and destruction of crops for host communities due to the nomadic nature of livestock grazing by such groups. At the same time, the current development on the influx of DPs offer

⁶⁰ <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Year-In-Review-5-times-the-police-were-accused-of-using-deadly-force-on-civilians-in-2022-1685435>

⁶¹ <https://www.theghanareport.com/weve-registered-over-3200-refugees-from-burkina-faso-ghana-refugees-board/>

opportunities for community-level sensitisation on preventing violent extremism across all the border towns and big markets in the areas receiving displaced persons. It is also important to engage host communities and displaced persons to strengthen cohesion among them to ensure peaceful co-existence and prevent stigmatisation, xenophobia and discrimination that can result in violence. Community watchdog committees who could be active in community sensitisation could also be targeted for training to improve their knowledge in the subject area.

Global economic risks/ effects: The recent shifts in the Global economic arena, resulting partly from the aftereffects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukraine War have had serious implications for household food security in Ghana. Available evidence suggests that households that depend on agriculture as their source of household income are more likely to be food insecure. Most of these households are in the northern part of the country with Upper East (48.7%); Northeast (33%); and Northern (30.7%) regions representing the highest prevalence respectively. That said, the recent food price hikes in northern Ghana resulting from low inputs linked to the unavailability/unaffordability of fertilisers, increased local competition for control over the limited arable land and water sources⁶², coupled with increased political instability in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (where Ghana imports large amounts of cereals, tomatoes and onions), could exacerbate vulnerabilities of women and youth in northern Ghana. Hence, addressing underlying drivers of conflict and factors predisposing the youth and women vulnerabilities in the context of fast changing global economic arena remains critical.

- b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks**⁶³, how it ensures **national ownership**.

(i) Alignment to national priorities

This project contributes to the Government of Ghana's overall strategies towards ensuring human security in relation to the youth and women and strengthening the capacity of local peace and security architecture to respond and adapt adequately to changing situations of the possible youth involvement in and vulnerabilities to conflict in the north of the country. The project first takes inspiration from the government of Ghana's Coordinated Programme for Economic and Social Policies (CPESDP 2017 – 2024) which has 'sustainable safety, peace, and security' as one of its priority intervention areas, focused on addressing "...current threats to peace and security in Ghana including violent crimes such as armed robbery, tribal and chieftaincy conflicts, terrorism, vigilantism and electoral violence...". The CPESDP also seeks to modernize and transform agriculture, promote industrial diversification, and accelerate youth employment with deliberate national strategies to localize and achieve the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) leaving no one behind. Secondly, the project draws insights from the National Security Strategy, which was launched in June 2021 and creates a great window of opportunity for violence reduction, conflict prevention complements and setting up national and subregional conflict and counterterrorism mechanisms in Ghana. Thirdly, the project is in line with several other Government initiatives such as the YouStart Programme which seeks to expand opportunities for young men and women in entrepreneurship through skill training, promotion of access to finance, markets and business development services and the recent youth employment programmes which have provided temporal employment for youth over their period of implementation. Also, the program supports the national youth policies provision on the engagement and participation of youth in peace building, conflict resolution and sustainable development. However, as short-term measures which do not address entrepreneurial and employable skills, they

⁶² https://statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/fileUpload/pressrelease/MultidimensionalPovertyGhana_Report.pdf

⁶³ Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc

have not been sustainable in addressing youth unemployment due to their dependence on government resources to finance them. Though Ghana does not have a national action plan on UNSCR 2250 on youth, peace and security, the project will ensure the full and meaningful participation of the youth in peace processes. Finally, this project is in line with the aspirations of the National Gender Policy, to promote gender equality, equal protection and enjoyment of rights by all citizens including the youth. Furthermore, it is in line with the Ghana National Action Plan 2 on UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 1325 (GHANAP 11) which serves as a reference document to the development of this concept to ensure the full participation of women in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It also aligns to the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) CPF (Country Partnership Framework) especially on intervention areas focused on early warning, women, peace and security, youth empowerment and peace education (culture of peace). With focus on the northern part of Ghana the proposal is aligned to the Northern Development Authorities Medium-Term Development Strategy for the 2023–2027 which will prioritise jobs and livelihoods, tackle issues on gender and social inclusion, and embrace actions to enhance climate justice and build resilience.

(ii) Alignment to existing Development Partner (DP) and UN initiatives

This project aligns to UN and other Development Partners programmes and initiatives focusing on strengthening behavioural, livelihoods, human rights and conflict-sensitive approaches to preventing conflicts, addressing the root causes of conflict and marginalization and fostering peaceful coexistence. Specifically, this project aligns with the new UN Cooperation Framework (2023-2025), backed by the UN’s programming vision for the North of Ghana and will be complementary in preventing conflicts and strengthening community cohesion in the target areas with dialogue processes and capacitating youth and women for productive activities. The UNSD Cooperation Framework Outcome 3 – Peace and Security analysis identifies that by 2025, the people of Ghana can experience a peaceful, cohesive and just society, if they could benefit from transparent, accountable, inclusive institutions and systems including quality integrated digital service delivery. Also, the project fully aligns with the Northern Development Authority’s mid-term development strategy which was supported by the UN system. This is part of the UN’s role in ensuring that development interventions in Ghana especially the north are coordinated for complementary and efficient use of limited resources. UN agencies, including UNDP and UNFPA, have over the years provided support to the Government of Ghana and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), to strengthen the capacity of women and youth in livelihood development and conflict prevention/ resilience. Some of these interventions are highlighted in the table below:

Initiative	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal	Key Lessons Learned
Building Resilience of Youth and Women-led MSMEs in Ghana (ended in 2022)	Focuses on Innovation and Digitalization for the green and inclusive recovery programme, which seeks to reinforce the youth and women-led MSME (Micro Small, and Medium Enterprise) sector to flourish in a green, inclusive, and equitable manner.	Contributes to addressing structural vulnerabilities of youth and women, unemployment and their exclusion from decision making.

UNDP Domestic Revenue Mobilisation-Tax for SDGs in Ghana (ongoing)	Strengthening local government capacities for revenue mobilization, partnerships, and local investment opportunities. Only two districts in the north are covered by this project.	The lessons learnt will inform districts plan on revenue mobilization and ways of harnessing partnerships with private sector in revenue mobilization and local investment opportunities for improved service delivery
Preventing Violent Extremism, Radicalisation, and Small Arms Proliferation in the Sahel and adjoining Coastal Countries in West Africa (ongoing)	Targets the reinforcement of skills and capacities for security personnel and CSO actors to better prevent and respond to violent extremism, radicalisation and small arms proliferation in Ghana, Benin, Togo, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast.	Efforts to capacitate security personnel must be complemented with training of border control officials. In addition, the training must be completed with strategic interventions to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as explosives.
Building capacity for the development of PVE action plans in Benin, Ghana and Togo (ended in 2020)	The project provided the required resources and expertise to initiate and develop PVE strategies and national actions plans in Benin, Togo and in Ghana the implementation of its framework. It contributed towards enhancing awareness creation and popularizing the strategies, establishing collaboration among key stakeholders and identifying early warning signs to prevent violent extremism and conflicts. The project enabled to facilitate analysis on common processes, drivers and enablers that operate at individual, group, national, and regional levels.	Experience gained has strengthened the knowledge base as to when, why and how diverse domestic and regional constellations converge to produce protracted conflicts and violent extremism. Lessons points to relevance of strengthening social contract between states and citizens and reinvigorating state legitimacy through improved governance performance and accountability: both ex-recruits and the reference groups reported low levels of trust in formal institutions as well as security sector actors. Another lesson was the need to collaborate with

		CSOs and other stakeholders.
--	--	------------------------------

In addition to the country specific alignment, the project will also work closely and leverage on the operations of the UNOWAS Good Offices in West Africa and the Sahel which is currently operating with a “political mission” mandate. With the fast-evolving conflict and political dynamics in the West Africa sub-region, Ghana remains a priority country for UNOWAS’ prevention strategy. Consequently, the project will engage and partner the UNOWAS Good Offices to bring security issues of Ghana at the fore by engaging in coordinated political advocacy as it relates to the governance and political issues and the conflict situation in Northern Ghana. For example, with political engagements with national stakeholders planned in the period leading up to the 2024 elections, the project will work with UNOWAS in conceptualising such dialogues, including the provision of vital preparatory information. The project will also piggyback on SRS UNOWAS reporting mechanism to raise areas of concern on the peace and security agenda for Ghana.

Outside the UN, the project aligns with and serves as a ‘soft’ component to the Accra Initiative⁶⁴ (an African-led and executed collaborative security mechanism to contain the spill over of violent extremism from the Sahel) and the implementation of the ECOWAS regional counter-terrorism strategy and the ECOWAS Action Plan for 2020-2024. The Accra Initiative has set up a hub in Northern Ghana for their field operations with funding from Germany. There is a growing focus on CIMIC (Civilian-Military Coordination) activities, and this will take them to software like basic services and infrastructure. The recently begun conversations with UNCTs in member states should help their mapping process of who is working where on the fragility/CVE drivers and how to collaborate with the UN in member states. The AI Executive Secretariat is working to develop non-kinetic aspects of their strategy. The project will facilitate the linkages with activities of other development partners in the targeted areas, building on the mapping previously done in the locations. This PBF project complements the Accra Initiative by building on UNDP’s longstanding engagement in strengthening Ghana’s infrastructures for peace and the implementation of the National Framework for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) and National Security Strategy.

Moreover, this PBF project complements the ongoing USAID Trust to Peace project which focuses on transforming relationships across potential conflicting groups and to build social trust and cohesion with the aim of preventing violent extremism. In addition to selecting communities not covered in the USAID project, the PBF investment will strengthen the capacity of the local government systems to provide more inclusive and accountable services which is not the focus of the USAID Trust to Peace project. Importantly, while building on the successes of the USAID Trust to Peace, the PBF project will complement the upcoming US government’s Global Fragility Act implementation in Ghana which seeks to invest over \$10 million over a period of five years to address conflict and vulnerability in northern Ghana as well investing in the prevention of violent extremism. This PBF project will take off ahead of the GFA project and hence, UNDP and UNFPA would seek partnership with the USAID West Africa mission currently designing the project.⁶⁵ UNDP and UNFPA will thus continuously

⁶⁴ The Normative framework to develop a national programme that supports the Ghana government to bring into action a concrete cooperative and collaborative mechanism to control the possession, trafficking and proliferation of illicit arms and ammunitions and other materials with the potential of promoting violent extremist activities. The Accra Initiative is part of the peace building process to respond to changing security dynamics in the Gulf of Guinea countries and Sahel. Set up in 2017 by 5 coastal countries (Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso), the membership was later extended to include Mali and Niger. Nigeria currently has observer status.

⁶⁵ On June 12, USAID West Africa mission designing the GFA reached out and had lengthy discussions with UNDP to seek guidance and access relevant information on the work on peace building in northern Ghana especially. The two teams have agreed a road map on regular check-in meeting to exchange ideas and track progress.

engage with USAID, including sharing the current project specific contents such as the results chain and target communities to avoid duplication. A detailed mapping of the project indicators will be available for USAID project team reference to facilitate information sharing on the project. In addition, Joint monitoring will also be undertaken with USAID teams working in communities in the project target districts/regions. Importantly, a representative of the USAID project would be invited to join the project steering committee as an observer to ensure that there are no duplications.

Equally, this proposed PBF intervention will complement the Ghana-leg of the World Bank's Gulf of Guinea Social Cohesion project (SOCO) worth \$450 Million (of which Ghana will access a grant of \$150 Million) which lays emphasis on social infrastructures like health centres, schools and farm-to-market roads. The forty-eight beneficiary Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in the six regions targeted for the project, have markedly lower agglomeration economies, and market access. This PBF project would complement the infrastructural focus of the SOCO project in northern Ghana by enhancing the capacity of citizens, particularly women and youth to demand accountability and responsiveness from the local government structures and systems. It would catalyse the capacity of local government institutions to foster partnerships with private sector and traditional authorities to strengthen resilience and incomes of women and youth farmers. Again, the project would capacitate women and create dialogue platforms to enhance their participation in governance and peacebuilding processes. This would strengthen the resilience of youth and women as co-actors at the local level in promoting social cohesion and addressing the drivers of vulnerabilities. Importantly, this project fills the gaps in the SOCO initiative by building partnerships with traditional and religious authorities and enhancing both the informal and formal mechanisms in conflict prevention and peace building in the selected regions and districts. The target districts were selected based on discussions with WB and Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development who are leading the implementation of the SOCO project. This was to ensure that the districts selected benefit from the two projects for increased impact (while SOCO provide the infrastructure/hardware, the UN through the PBF will provide the software by enhancing capacity of the local government structures and citizens in the target districts). Besides planned periodic bilateral engagements with the WB and other partners we also intend to leverage existing platforms for collaboration such as DP's working on PVE platform and DP's working in northern Ghana which SOCO has expressed interest in co-chairing with the UN, so we coordinate implementation strategies in the three regions beyond the project districts. Again, the steering committee that will be constituted to oversee project implementation will comprise all relevant stakeholders including a representative of the World Bank SOCO project (as observers) and its partners to ensure that there are no duplications. A detailed mapping of the project indicators will be available for partners reference to facilitate information sharing on the project. Joint monitoring will also be undertaken.

Partnering with the National Peace Council (NPC), this project would complement the recently completed Conflict Prevention and Peace Building project which was funded by DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency) and implemented by the NPC. The project focused on promoting advocacy against political vigilantism, and capacity building using soft approaches in addressing conflict targeting political parties, students and public leadership. It also leverages the strong connections the NPC is building with various security sector actors in the ongoing project on Preventing Violent Extremism through Social Accountability (PoVETSA) project in partnership with the Catholic Relief Services which strategically builds consensus to improve civilian-security agency relationship and build trust towards preventing violent extremism, targeting security agencies in the 5 Northern Regions of Ghana with funding from Netherlands Embassy. This project will operate in some of the NPC districts and deepen the burgeoning security-civilian relations, especially along the borders of Ghana with Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire and ensure sustainability of earlier initiatives.

- c) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief **summary of existing interventions** in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below.

Project name (duration)	Donor and budget	Project focus	Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal
Preventing Violent Extremism, Radicalisation and Small Arms Proliferation in the Sahel and adjoining Coastal Countries in West Africa 1 year.	Japan USD 491,940	It targets the reinforcement of skills and capacities for 90 personnel of national border agencies and CSO's to better prevent and respond where necessary especially in the northern border areas in partnership with the Accra Initiative.	It complements the PBF by building capacity of state security and civil society in preventing violent extremism and managing small arms proliferation which will help to reduce violence/ conflicts perpetuated with arms.
Domestic Revenue Mobilisation- Tax for SDGs. Duration: 2022-2024	NORAD USD 300,000	This project is aimed at strengthening capacities of selected MMDAs to generate adequate internal revenues to fund their development plans and the SDGs at the sub-national levels.	The project currently supports only two districts (Kassena Nankana West and Sagnarigu) in the Upper East and Northern regions respectively of Ghana. The lessons learnt will inform the PBF focused districts plan on revenue mobilization for service delivery.
Preventing Violent Extremism through Social Accountability (PoVETSA) project. Duration:2022-2023 Implemented by National Peace Council and Catholic Relief Service.	Netherlands Embassy \$263,000	The main objective of the project is to strategically build consensus to improve civilian-security agency relationship and build trust towards preventing violent extremism in Ghana.	The project targets security agencies in the 5 Northern Regions of Ghana and Two Communities and the PBF security-civilian activity will build on the initial engages through the joint awareness programs.
Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Duration: 2020 –2022 National Peace Council.-	DANIDA \$306,155.59	Consolidate the Peace of Ghana Beyond 2020.	Advocacy against political vigilantism, and Capacity Building in using soft approaches in addressing conflict targeting political parties, students and public leadership.
Enhancing Community Resilience and Social	USD 300,000	The overall goal of the programme is to	The programme is implemented in three border

<p>Cohesion amongst Select Border Communities in Northern Ghana</p> <p>Duration: From 2021 to 2023 (18 months)</p> <p>Implemented by IOM (International Organization of Migration), UNFPA, National Peace Council, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development</p>		<p>contribute to an enhanced community resilience and social cohesion amongst selected border communities in northern Ghana by proactively addressing the interconnected root causes of vulnerability to Violent Extremism (VE) which are often caused by governance cleavages between national and local authorities and the corresponding affected communities.</p>	<p>communities in the Upper East region (Namoo, Pulimakom and Missiga, Pusiga), and has produced a Security Perception/ Vulnerability Assessment/Report which will support context information for the PBF project.</p>
<p>Empowering Adolescent Girls Through Improved Access to Reproductive Health Education and Rights Based Quality SRH (Sexual and Reproductive Health) Services in Ghana.</p> <p>Duration: 2020 –2023</p> <p>Regional Coordinating Councils (GHS (Ghana Health Service), DoG (Department of Gender), NYA (National Youth Authority), DOVVSU (Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit)).</p>	<p>USD\$19,730,092</p>	<p>The programme seeks to empower adolescent girls in Ghana especially the most vulnerable through the provision of, and access to, gender-responsive and age-appropriate comprehensive sexuality education, including meaningful youth participation in service delivery processes for informed decision-making.</p>	<p>The modules developed and lessons learnt from the programme will be adapted for use in the PBF project.</p>

II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)

a) A brief **description of the project** focus and approach

To address the multifaceted underlying drivers of conflict outlined in Section 1, the overall goal of this project is to empower women and youth to be resilient and actively engage in peace building and conflict prevention from spillover of violent extremism and promote social cohesion in northern Ghana. This would be done through improving effectiveness of local governance systems to be accountable, inclusive and responsive on one hand, and deepening trust between state actors (local

government actors, security agencies, justice sector actors among others) and non-state actors (religious and traditional authorities, women and youth groups, civil society) to engender participation in development and governance processes on the other. For instance, the project aims to facilitate the establishment of innovative platforms such as the “District Development Actors Forum (DDAF)” between local government actors and community stakeholders to ensure accountability and participatory processes using existing decentralized operational processes and procedures such as the interactive district fora.

In addition, to bolster the economic capabilities of communities and individuals, especially the youth, the project would establish strategic collaborations with local government systems, women and youth led organisations, and private sector actors in the respective regions, with a focus on building the assets of women and young people including those with disabilities to enhance their economic and livelihood skills.

It would also foster collaboration between local governments and traditional authorities to improve the economic resilience and productive capacities of women. The issues with women’s access to and use of arable land will be addressed through advocacy and engagement with local chiefs and clan heads/Tendanas who are the custodians of lands in Northern Regions; celebrating those who contribute to this cause to encourage others to do same. To expand the resilience of women and youth, the project will build strategic partnerships with local government authorities on strategies for the identification and attraction of investment opportunities to improve their resource mobilization and sources of income generation. The project will also collaborate with the Ghana Investment Promotion Center, the Ghana Enterprise Agency and Northern Development Authority to identify private sector partners who are interested in investing in northern Ghana, as well as those that are already operating from the selected regions that are interested in supporting women and youth-led businesses to enhance economic activities for the most vulnerable. UNDP is currently working with some private sector organizations such as ABSA bank, EMPRETEC Ghana, MasterCard Foundation, Coca Cola, Global Shea Alliance and mobile networks who are supporting some initiatives in northern Ghana and have indicated interest in working in some of the target districts. For example, Absa Bank is partnering with UNDP to train youth and women in small and medium enterprises in financial inclusion in the Sagnerigu and Kassena Nankana West districts currently. We will leverage to expand the support of some of these private sector entities for the project districts. In the past, UNDP has used the private sectors obligations to support the SDGs to invest in development in the country.

To enhance the conflict capacities and address gaps in the participation of youth and women in governance and peace-building efforts, the project will strengthen the capacities of local governance structures through training, development and use of gender-sensitive tools and resources to ensure the equal participation of women and youth in decision-making processes and tailoring development plans to meet the needs of local communities for improved trust and accountability. For sustainable local action to enhance the respect for human rights, traditional and religious leaders will also be exposed to the concept of HRBA using existing platforms such as the meetings of the House of Chiefs to galvanize their support. Subsequently, these actors will be supported to use the information to influence community behaviors and traditional norms and practices. The project also presents an opportunity to support the youth, particularly young women, through offering them mentorship opportunities with political party leaders and local government officials to facilitate their full and meaningful participation in political and peacebuilding processes. Existing platforms of engagement such as women’s religious groups and associations/networks, market women’s associations, youth keep fit groups, and youth in political parties’ platforms will be strengthened to facilitate their effective engagement with local government and actors to amplify their voices.

The project will also enhance the capacities of the local governance system and local security actors in the use of human rights-based approach, conflict prevention and mediation efforts, particularly in conflict hotspots, to ensure peaceful and inclusive development in Ghana. Efforts will be advanced through joint campaigns to strengthen the citizens and security agencies relationship for mutual benefit. All these approaches will be informed by context specific findings which will emanate from studies/research on relevant thematic areas in collaboration with identified academic institutions.

The project will also build partnerships with health and social justice institutions within the local governance structures to actively engage women and young people and various stakeholders (traditional authorities, religious leaders etc.) to address vulnerabilities to sexual exploitation, gender-based violence, reproductive injustice and enhance access to SRHR (Sexual and Reproductive Health Right) and GBV response services including improved referral pathways to minimize abuse and violence which are precursors to family and communal conflict. Feedback mechanisms will be created at the local government level where necessary to highlight social accountability and ensure participation of citizens/community members in development processes.

However, considering the changing nature of conflicts and the localised dimensions of the underlying drivers of conflict and vulnerabilities in northern Ghana as outlined above, the project will take on a *phased* and *targeted* approach, beginning with an inception phase. Specifically, the inception phase will focus on undertaking relevant mapping and assessments to inform the implementation plan and approaches and the geographic scope, with interest to focus on borderland areas, although not limited to those areas. Equally, within this phase, the project will focus on joint identification of at-risk communities, women and youth groups in the target districts, the development of district-specific approaches and mapping of existing mechanisms for early warning and response to conflicts.

b) Provide a **project-level ‘theory of change’**

Building on the approach outlined above, this project conveys the following theory of change:

If spaces for gender-responsive and youth-friendly dialogues and mediation are functional to prevent conflict and build peace in the Northern part of Ghana,

If women and youth are trained to fully and meaningfully engaged and participate in local governance decision making and conflict prevention and peace building processes,


If community leaders (traditional authorities and religious leaders) are engaged on platforms for dialogues and advocacy at local level to transform negative discriminatory gender and socio-cultural norms and practices,

If local governance institutions, actors, and structures are more inclusive, responsive, committed and accountable to deliver on their mandate for quality services for women and youth and put in closer contact with the private sector to foster partnerships,

If security agencies respect human rights and positively collaborate with state and non-state actors to facilitate early response and preparedness to prevent conflict,

THEN

Localized, emerging and spillover conflicts, and vulnerabilities to violent extremism in Northern Ghana reduced for sustainable peace, with the active participation of women and youth.



c) **Provide a narrative description of key project components (outcomes and outputs).**

The overall goal of the project is to prevent and address the root causes of localized and spillover conflicts and vulnerabilities to violent extremism in Northern Ghana. Specifically, the project will empower local governance institutions, actors and customary governance structures to ensure inclusive governance, economic development and quality service delivery. It will also enable functional spaces for dialogues and mediation for conflict prevention and peace building. The project will enhance the resilience and agency of women and youth for their full and meaningful participation to contribute constructively to local governance decision making and conflict prevention and peace building processes. Finally, the project will foster positive collaborations among state and non-state actors and security agencies to facilitate early response and preparedness to prevent conflict. Thus, the project will transform relationships across potentially conflicting groups, enhance the resilience of women, youth and other marginalised groups, strengthen social cohesion and reinforce the social contract between the state and citizens.

Outcome 1: Local governance institutions, actors, and customary governance structures are more inclusive, responsive, committed and accountable to deliver on their mandate for quality services.

Output 1.1: Capacity of local governance actors and traditional/religious leaders enhanced in gender-responsive participatory planning, local economic development and conflict management.

Activities:

1.1.1 Train local governance actors on gender-responsive participatory planning.

- 1.1.2 Train traditional and religious leaders at the community level on conflict resolution, negotiation and confidence building skills for effective conflict management.
- 1.1.3 Train Local government authorities on strategies for the identification and attraction of investment opportunities (business intelligence, developing investment cases and partnerships building) to improve their resource mobilization and sources of income generation.
- 1.1.4 Train traditional and religious authorities at the community level to tackle discriminatory gender and socio-cultural norms and women's inadequate access to productive resources including land.

Output 1.2: Systems and processes for dialogue enabled to foster collaboration among local government institutions, customary governance structures and community representatives for inclusive decision-making.

Activities:

- 1.2.1 Train and facilitate the functional operation of the local infrastructures for peace in conflict resolution and mediation.
- 1.2.2 Facilitate engagements and dialogues of youth and women groups with stakeholders including political parties, local political leaders, security agencies, religious leaders, traditional and community leaders using training courses and radio programs to address political vigilantism, electoral violence and reduce inter-generational tensions.
- 1.2.3 Facilitate awareness raising amongst the youth on hate speech, disinformation and misinformation around elections, religious intolerance and protracted conflicts.
- 1.2.4 Organise community fora between traditional and religious authorities and local government actors to address human rights violations, negative gender norms and stereotypes and farmer-herder conflicts.

Output 1.3: Accountability mechanisms developed/enhanced for local authorities' increased transparency in delivering inclusive and equitable public services.

Activities:

- 1.3.1 Provide support to women and youth groups to implement social accountability initiatives and promote transparency and accountability of local government systems.
- 1.3.2 Build on existing initiatives such as local accountability boards to increase access to information on available public services to ensure more people are aware and can access it.
- 1.3.3 Revitalize existing complaints mechanisms for public services delivery at the local level, capacitate local government officials to provide prompt feedback on response and capacitate citizens (including women and youth) to track responses to the complaints using a monitoring dashboard and citizens scorecards.

- 1.3.4 Support accountability fora such as town hall meetings using community structures for local government authorities to share and receive feedback on development planning and implementation.

Outcome 2: Women and youth are more resilient to conflict triggers and fully and meaningfully participate in peace building, local governance and economic development processes.

Output 2.1: Capacity of women and youth enhanced to participate and engage in critical development issues, decision-making and peace building processes.

Activities:

- 2.1.1 Conduct an assessment on the forms and levels of women and youth participation in local decision making and peace building processes, including their perceptions regarding their roles to inform policy and action.
- 2.1.2 Develop knowledge and advocacy materials targeting duty bearers and community members on gender equality, women's empowerment and peace building issues.
- 2.1.3 Train existing women and youth groups/networks, to enhance their leadership and advocacy capacity to be champions and models for peace and to advocate for their participation and inclusion in local governance and peace building processes.
- 2.1.4 Provide women and youth's access to mentorship opportunities with political party leaders and local government officials to address exclusion and strengthen their capacity for full and meaningful participation in governance as a means of reducing political violence and vigilantism.
- 2.1.5 Support women and youth political aspirants to participate in local governance and electoral processes

Output 2.2: Women and youth groups/networks enabled to access livelihood skills, employment and entrepreneurial opportunities.⁶⁶

Activities:

- 2.2.1 Map and assess the types of vocational and entrepreneurial skills of interest to the youth and women and train them in partnership with local government and private sector.
- 2.2.2 Partner and link local government institutions (Business Advisory Centers) with the private sector and CSOs to provide flexible financing options and business development support to catalyze investments for existing women and youth led businesses and identified local value chains including micro-saving initiatives (such as village savings and loan associations) to reduce vulnerability and exclusion.

⁶⁶ business management financial literacy, marketing and business innovations

Outcome 3: State actors and non-state actors positively collaborate through the use of early warning systems to prevent conflict

Output 3.1: Security agencies and other relevant actors⁶⁷ have enhanced capacities⁶⁸ to respect human rights and foster peace and social cohesion.

Activities:

- 3.1.1 Build the conflict preparedness and protection capacities of border security agencies and communities, including rights-based conflict sensitivity training and conflict prevention, mediation and resolutions skills.
- 3.1.2 Train security agencies on social dialogue, human rights-based approaches for conflict management and sustaining social cohesion

Output 3.2: Platforms for dialogues between relevant security agencies, justice sector actors and non-state actors (religious and traditional authorities, women and youth groups, media and civil society) enabled and facilitated for early response, peace and social cohesion.

Activities

- 3.2.1 Conduct Civilian-Security joint campaigns to build trust, reinforce and enhance dialogue to address underlying drivers of community conflicts and promote social cohesion.

Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.

d) Project targeting

The **geographical coverage** of the project will include three out of the 5 regions of northern Ghana. The target regions are Upper East, Upper West, and North-East regions. The three regions were selected due to their previous experience with varying forms of community conflicts and proximity to Ghana's border to Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Togo.⁶⁹ In addition, these regions experience high rates of women and youth unemployment, poor public service delivery, exposure to abuse and gender-based violence, lack of quality and inclusive SRH services and other forms of marginalisation, including in decision making and peacebuilding among other drivers of conflicts are having negative impacts, exposing them to exploitation. Project districts namely Bongo, Bawku West and Garu in Upper East region, Chereponi, Yunyoo and Bunkpurugu-Nankpanduri districts in North-East regions and the Wa West, Sissala West districts in the Upper West regions were selected based on consultations with various stakeholders including the regional peace councils, WANEP-Ghana and local government officials working on the design of the World Bank SOCO project in northern Ghana. The districts were also selected based on the presence of various forms of conflicts including land, farmer-herder, chieftaincy and also their proximity to areas that have experienced violent extremist attacks and are receiving asylum seekers/persons of concern from Burkina Faso and Togo.

The **direct beneficiaries** which comprise mainly vulnerable women and marginalised youth of approximately **7500 (females 4000, youth 3500)** will be selected using a mix of approaches to ensure

⁶⁷civil society, religious and traditional authorities, as well as women and youth-led advocacy groups

⁶⁸civil society, religious and traditional authorities, as well as women and youth-led advocacy groups

⁶⁹ These three countries bordering Ghana in the regions of the north have all experienced attacks from extremists recently

we reach those furthest behind first, guided by the “Do no harm” principles. For identification of individuals, tools such as vulnerability assessment tools, gender inequality and discrimination assessment tools, youth unemployment rates per district/community, youth, gender and age markers and needs assessments of the target districts would be used in consultations with community leaders, and local officials to ensure women and youth who are most vulnerable and likely to be left behind are adequately represented. Already, the assessment from the World Bank SOCO project constituted the basis for the selection of the target districts. These approaches will help the project team target the right beneficiaries within the districts. In addition, the project will collaborate with the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development (which has the mandate for registration of formal and informal groups and associations) in the target districts to identify existing women’s rights networks and youth groups in the selected communities to ensure that the project does not contribute to perpetuating existing perceptions and inequalities and discrimination.

At the **institutional level**, the project will target relevant service providers (social services such as gender, health, youth, and disability among others) at the district level including local government authorities (Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies), women’s rights networks and youth groups, platforms for traditional and religious authorities and other civic actors such as the Business Resource Centers and local private sector actors already partnering the local government authorities, National Youth Authority, Department of Gender, Regional Peace Councils, selected security agencies (after a human rights due diligence assessment), relevant CSOs academia, and media operating in the target regions and districts.

The project will target and work with CSOs such as WANEP-Ghana, CDD-Ghana, ActionAid-Ghana, Youth Harvest Foundation, NORSAAC, Capacity Enhancement and Community Support CAPECS who have proven track record with working with women and youth and have extensive community presence in the project districts in the Upper West Upper East and North East regions. Further considerations would be made to ensure that the CSOs have strong partnerships with the local government, traditional authorities and in the project localities to ensure effective implementation and oversight of the project. CSOs will be identified using the call for concepts and proposals in the targeted areas. The terms of reference will determine scope of work and CSOs will be assessed based on the criteria to ensure that they can deliver and are in good standing. CSOs will also be selected based on comparative advantage especially for activities where there are only one or two that have the specialised skills.

III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

a) Recipient organizations and implementing partners

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
Convening Organization: UNDP	10M USD	Japan, GCF (Green	Accra		Head of Accountable Governance

<p>Implementing partners:</p> <p>National/Regional Peace Councils</p> <p>University for Development Studies</p> <p>National Fusion Centre</p> <p>WANEP-Ghana (CSO)</p> <p>CDD-Ghana (CSO)</p>		<p>Climate Fund),</p> <p>GEF (Global Environment Facility),</p> <p>UNDP Core resources</p>			<p>Programme Analyst –Peace & Governance</p> <p>Gender Analyst & M&E (Monitoring & Evaluation) focal person</p>
<p>Recipient Organization: UNFPA</p>	7.8M USD	<p>UNFPA Core Resources (FPA90)</p> <p>Canada</p> <p>Norway (CSE/BRAS A</p> <p>Child Marriage</p> <p>Global Donors</p>	Accra		<p>Programme Specialist (SRHR/Gender)</p> <p>Programme Analyst-Gender</p> <p>Programme Analyst- AYD</p> <p>Programme Analyst-M&E</p> <p>Finance Focal Person</p>
<p>Implementing partners:</p> <p>5 Regional Coordinating Councils (DoG, National Youth Authority)</p> <p>Youth Bridge Foundation</p> <p>Youth Harvest Foundation</p> <p>NORSAAC</p>					
<p>Recipient Organization: UNDP</p>	\$400,000	<p>Government of Ghana, UN System, UNDP, DANIDA</p>	Accra and all 16 Regions of Ghana	<p>18 in total the Regional Peace Council Offices in Upper East, Upper West, Savannah, North-East, and</p>	<p>The Executive Secretary</p> <p>Director – Capacity Development and Outreach</p> <p>Deputy Director – Conflict</p>
<p>Implementing partners:</p> <p>National Peace Council</p>					

				Northern Region	Management & Resolution
--	--	--	--	--------------------	----------------------------

b) **Project management and coordination**

The Ghana PBF project will have three oversight and coordination structures; a Project Steering Committee (PSC), a Technical Working Group (TWG), both with governments and lead line ministry level, as well as a project implementation team. Jointly chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the Ministry of Local Government, Decentralisation and Rural Development, the **project steering committee** will be constituted of key stakeholders, including UN agencies in charge of this project – UNDP and UNFPA, key Government offices, Northern Development Authority, civil society organisations, the Government of Ghana SOCO project supported by the World Bank and key development partners such as USAID as observers. This Committee will meet every six months to review project outcome progress, assess the continuing relevance of project strategy and theory of change, and decide on any significant deviations and approval of annual work plans and reports. Thus, the PSC will provide strategic guidance and oversight over the project and request for amendments from the PBSO if necessary.

A **project technical working group** will include personnel designated as Project Managers in UNDP and UNFPA (the UNDP and UNFPA Focal Points in both Accra and Northern Ghana) who will work with the RCO to ensure that all information including reports are shared with the PBF Office in New York. The Project technical group will meet quarterly or when necessary to review project implementation and progress. The Project technical working team will work closely with other national technical experts, as well as the RCO during the project implementation and monitoring processes to support coordination. These quarterly meetings will provide a platform for technical-level updates relating to the progress, challenges, risk response and agile solutions in the implementation of the project. The technical working group will provide all needed information to the Steering Committee as and when required.

The project will also have an **implementation team** which will comprise of governance & peacebuilding, gender and youth programming experts in both Accra and Northern Ghana from the two participating agencies to enable constant infusion of gender, youth and conflict sensitive perspectives at all stages of the project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

For enhanced project delivery, the project will utilise the existing UNFPA and UNDP decentralized offices in the Northern Region (Tamale) as activity implementation coordination base. In addition, full time staff recruited for the project such as M&E staff will be based in the Northern Region to assist in real time activity implementation tracking for the achievement of results as well through as local partners. In partnership with the decentralised offices of the peace councils in the Upper West, Upper East and North-East regions, who already have oversight roles in the districts to ensure enhanced presence in the project districts. Importantly, UNDP, in partnership with the UNV office would recruit and appoint a national UNV as a project assistant responsible for implementation and reporting. The Project implementation will use a combination of direct implementation and national execution modalities, which will depend on partnerships with government and administrative counterparts including the National Peace Councils in the target regions as listed above, as well as NGO implementation modalities to ensure project linkages with other stakeholders.

SN	POSITION	RUNOs	STATUS	PERCENTAGE
1	Peace & Governance Analyst (UNDP lead and overall project coordinator)- NOB	UNDP	Existing staff	40%
2	Gender Analyst and M&E focal point - NOB	UNDP	Existing staff	30%
3	Project Assistant (finance and admin) national volunteer position- UNV	UNDP	To be recruited under PBF	100%
4	Head of Inclusive Growth and Accountable Governance - NOC	UNDP	Existing staff	20%
5	Programme Specialist (SRHR/Gender) - NOC	UNFPA	Existing staff	20%
6	Programme Analyst-Gender - NOB	UNFPA	Existing staff	30%
7	Programme Analyst-Adolescent & Youth Development-NOB	UNFPA	Existing staff	30%
8	M&E Consultant- NPSA	UNFPA	To be recruited under PBF	100%
9	Finance Focal Person- G5	UNFPA	Existing staff	10%

c) Risk management.

Project specific risk	Risk level (low, medium, high)	Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)
Risk of exclusion and stigma of some groups such as women, youth based on ethnic, religious, disability or localities.	Medium	Continuous engagement and monitoring to ensure the involvement of all at all levels. A community entry strategy focused on a DO NO HARM approach ⁷⁰ to explain the scope and expected target of the project through community meetings, radio etc.
Escalation of conflicts/violence in conflicting areas.	Medium	Partners will continue to support the government to sensitize and create awareness on the need for dialogue for peace. The project through the national and regional peace councils will engage stakeholders to create opportunities to deescalate tensions, violence and promote peace.
Ghana's 2024 general elections will create a challenge in	Medium	The project partners will ensure activities are responsive to changing

⁷⁰ Do not harm principles require consideration of the following 1 the rights of beneficiaries 2 Community functioning and actor relations 3 the local economy and livelihoods 4 the natural environment before introduction of any humanitarian intervention

sustaining interest, availability, and readiness of key political and electoral actors to actively participate means as well as the politicization of platforms.		dynamics and emerging election-related priorities/plans. Project development, planning and implementation will be inclusive and consultative to seek buy-in and ownership of all stakeholders. As part of project inception, it will be made clear to not associate project activities with any political party or event.
Given the politically sensitive issues to be addressed, there may be low political will and institutional commitment from government agencies to actively participate and political manipulation of the youth.	Low	The COs (Country Offices) and partners will continue monitoring and consulting closely with government partners to address any reservations and agree on the way forward. Government partners will be part of monitoring visits and activities to give them firsthand experience on how project is contributing to government programs.
Delays in implementation of activities and achievement of results.	Medium	Regular reviewers and monitoring to take corrective actions with government, civil society and other key stakeholders. Remote and inaccessible places especially during the rainy season will be engaged during the dry seasons. Implementing partners capacity will be accessed and short trainings provided on specific areas.
Deep rooted gender inequalities and cultural norms may pose challenges to the availability and meaningful participation of women and young people.	Medium	Continuous engagement with community leaders and identified gatekeepers of patriarchy for mindset change. Identify and work with male gender champions to engage. Continuous capacity building and training of women and youth on human right based approaches.
Private sector focusing on their interest instead of the project's expected aim	Low	A private sector due diligence will be conducted for each private sector engaged to ensure that their interests match that of the project.

d) Monitoring and evaluation

During the first two months of the Project, the Project team in consultation with project partners will develop a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan with dedicated support from M&E officers and focal points from UNDP and UNFPA. The M&E plan will have clear division of responsibilities and a timeframe. It will also capture baselines, targets, robust, gender sensitive and SMART indicators which are indicated in the Project Results Framework in Annex C to track progress. The Result

Framework will be further refined by the project M&E experts, in consultation with PBSO, within the first three months of the project commencement. The Project Steering Committee (PSC) will oversee the successful implementation of the M&E Plan by holding bi-annual meetings to discuss the status of project implementation, and to ensure efficient resource utilization, accountability and transparency.

The PSC will monitor project implementation and provide recommendations to address bottlenecks based on regular field visits of project sites. Data collection on project implementation will be coordinated with Project Partners and through technical working group meetings. Pre and Post test results of trainings will be analysed to assess changes in knowledge and skills attitudes of participants. Non-structured interviews and surveys of stakeholders and other beneficiaries will be planned with other partners working on similar interventions such as the USAID and deployed with the support of expert consultants to assess changes in attitudes, perceptions and behaviours. This will be conducted using interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) as the main survey methodologies to be used

The designated Project Managers in UNDP and UNFPA (the UNDP and UNFPA Focal Points) will work with the RCO to ensure that all formation including reports are shared with the PBF team in NY.

A baseline assessment will be conducted in the first quarter of the project year, to set the basis for tracking progress on indicators throughout the project cycle. A final independent evaluation will be conducted to assess achievements, document lessons learned and good practices to strengthen operational learning and replicability.

Monitoring Plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the project results framework will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly,	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.	UNDP, UNFPA	
	A baseline will be conducted at start of the project.	Last Quarter 2023			50,000
	Annual surveys will be undertaken to measure project indicator progress	Annually			80,000
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may	Quarterly	Risks are identified by	UNDP, UNFPA, RCO	60,000

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
	threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log.		project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.		
	Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Financial audit will be conducted as and when threshold is reached			20,000
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.	UNDP, UNFPA, CSOs and government counterparts	10,000
Annual Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.	UNDP, UNFPA	0
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making.	At least annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project Steering	PSC, UNDP, UNFPA	0

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
			Committee and used to make course corrections.		
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Steering Committee and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk long with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	15 June, 15 November every year and at end of project as per PBF rules	Collate project reports from all activity reports, results of surveys and community motoring reports and finalise for dissemination to relevant stakeholders	UNDP, UNFPA	0
Project Review	The project's steering committee (PSC) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Annual Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the PSC shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to	Annual	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress would be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.	PSC, UNDP, UNFPA	5,000

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action	Partners (if joint)	Cost (if any)
	socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant stakeholders.				
End of project Evaluation	Hire consultants to undertake the end of project evaluation	2025	Project evaluation	UNDP.UNFPA, CSOs, government	50,000

e. Project exit strategy/ sustainability

The project has sustainability and exit plans incorporated into its implementation at outcome, output and activity levels, by strengthening human resource capital and institutional capacities of local government and the communities to promote sustainability of the achieved results after the project.

Consultations for the development of the project with national and local institutions is part of the strategy for sustainability and exit. Beneficiaries of the project, communities, local government will be part of the planning process and implementation to ensure that their capacities are improved to take forward the results after the PBF support.

Local ownership will be sought at each stage of the project development and implementation and will ensure that the results and impact of the proposed intervention will continue and be strengthened through partnerships with key stakeholders, local authorities and even after the completion of the initiative.

The Project will strengthen the capacity of critical stakeholders and train active members of local communities, including community leaders, women, youth and government officials at the national and sub-national levels in various areas to ensure sustainability of the achieved results. The dialogue sessions with security agencies and community members to improve collaboration will sustain the relationship after the project duration. Awareness creation programs would whip up public interest in the local governance system, increasing social accountability to monitor and strengthen the system to deliver on its mandates.

The proposed action has been designed to achieve long lasting institutional change. This means the essence of the intervention strategy itself has been built towards and around the concept of sustainability. By focusing on relational approaches and trust building, the project aim to set the basis for durable change by providing key institutions with the incentives needed to prevent conflict, transform potentially conflicting relationships, enhance resilience and participation of women and youth and foster collaboration with security agencies. The project will work in close collaboration with government agencies, local authorities, and key ministries on a high-level advocacy campaign aimed at increasing awareness regarding the importance of government investments in the northern region and to actively shape and fine-tune policies that encourage investments in this area.

As a first step, the project is collaborating with the Government of Ghana initiative to boost investments in northern Ghana via the World Bank SOCO project to ensure alignment and also complementarity of interventions. The project will collaborate with the Ministry of Local Government

and the Northern Development Authority on the need to increase the allocation of resources and incentives that are conducive to drawing both public and private sector investments. In addition, a comprehensive budget analysis will be conducted to enhance the accountability of the central government to the overall development of the northern zone. This will include trends and comparative breakdowns and costed recommendations for specific socio-economic areas that require support. This will be used for evidence based national and regional level advocacy for enhanced investment in the north.

Furthermore, it will identify and establish partnerships with private sector entities interested in investing in northern Ghana, with a specific focus on those willing to provide support to businesses led by women and youth. To maximize its impact, the project will tap into existing initiatives within the private sector that are already operational in the region. By doing so, it aims to amplify economic activities and foster sustainable empowerment for vulnerable groups.

Work-with the regional coordinating councils and district assemblies to facilitate the integration of best practices and lessons learnt from the project into the regional and district planning and budgeting processes. In addition, the engagement of the women and youth groups will build their capacities as pressure groups and advocates to demand for their continuous participation and accountability. Conscious efforts will be made to use existing platforms for proposed interventions. New platforms and tools that will be developed will also be integrated into the decentralized operational processes and procedures such as the interactive district fora to contribute to sustainability.

A crucial component that enhances the sustainability of effort is the enhancement, and continuous strategic engagement with partners and stakeholders. The project will foster collaboration and partnership with traditional partners including local government, development partners, NGOs/CSOs, and local community members as well as forge new partnerships to facilitate effective and efficient implementation. Such a process will help bring the complementary skills and capacities that are required for efficient and effective implementation of activities that would help promote complementarity, synergy, and harmonization of efforts. It will also ensure partners and beneficiaries understand the priorities and expectations thus forming a stronger basis for the complementarity of efforts and mitigating duplication and wastage of resources.

This project would also benefit from the existence of new mechanisms for coordinating and tracking development in northern Ghana. These include the Northern Development Authority (NDA) and the DPs working group on northern Ghana. The Northern Development Authority (a government entity) developed a 5-year strategic Plan (2022-2025) working with the UN and other Development Partners. The outcome of this project is consistent with all 5 key strategic goals of the plan: Governance, capacity development of chiefs and opinion leaders on land and conflict management, peace, security and emergency response, gender mainstreaming and youth development and, access to critical services through digitalization. The NDA, identified as a key partner in this project, would also serve on the project steering committee to ensure ownership and continuity. Under the auspices of the northern Development Authority and in coordination with the UN and DP working group on the north, co-chaired by the UNRCO, the working group has held two successful summits on northern Ghana in the past 2 years. The working group, made up of the World BANK, EU, UK's FCDO, the UNCT among others has established a mechanism for coordinating interventions at the ministerial and regional levels in the 5 regions of northern Ghana to ensure MMDAs are engaged effectively. This project would engage the working group during its quarterly meetings to communicate progress of implementation and also seek input on the progress with the implementation of the workplan.

Ultimately, the project will hold an end of project closure workshop that delineates specific tasks for implementing partners and stakeholders to agree to undertake after the project closure.

Communication

UNDP and UNFPA, working with various implementing partners such as NPC, and WANEP-Ghana, will ensure visibility of the key activities being implemented as part of the project. Communication approaches will include the following.

- a. Maintain close contact at the technical level with the PBSO to provide regular updates on the project
- b. Brand and communicate about the PBF support in project implementation activities such as training workshops, coordination meetings, media briefings/interviews, dialogues with the government where necessary, donor briefings, and field trips among others.
- c. The project will promote the branding of project partners on all project's communications materials such as banners, flyers, TV and Radio advertisements, reports, agenda, T-shirts etc.
- d. On social media, hashtag or mention will be made of the handles of the PBF for visibility on project's activities.
- e. The project will communicate with government through its representatives of the various ministries, agencies and departments.

Regular monitoring will be done to ensure communications activities reach the target audience and activity reports will be produced with media analytics on a quarterly basis. An end of project communications impact report will also be produced to gauge success per the communications objectives and outcomes.

IV. Project budget

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. The proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. The proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every GEWE allocation (e.g., training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question			Comment
Planning			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline			
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	✓		There are existing staff who will be working on the project, UNDP will hire national volunteer(s) whose TORs will be developed.
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	✓		3 regions out of 5 northern regions of Ghana.
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	✓		Key partners have been consulted since 2022.
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	✓		Analysis was done based on existing research and consultations with CSOs, government, academia and other relevant stakeholders.
Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline?		This will be done during the initial stages of the project and as part of assessments.	
6. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	✓		National Peace Council and Department of Gender as well as the Ministry of Local

			Government, Decentralization and Rural Development.
7. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?		This will be discussed during the project inception meeting with all partners.	
8. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?	N/A		Have staff in place, workplans in place
Gender			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g., has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	✓		Gender Specialist and Gender Analyst from UNFPA and UNDP respectively
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?	✓		
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	✓		
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	✓		Yes captured

Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question			Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	✓		
2. Are unit costs (e.g., for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	✓		Budget is within threshold and major changes will be communicated
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g., number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	✓		
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e., no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	✓		Within threshold
5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for the use of international staff, if applicable?	✓		Project is using national expertise
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project ends.		✓	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		✓	Existing vehicles will be used and where necessary hired vehicles
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not?	✓		The UN will support part of direct project cost such as staff time, internet, telephone, rent etc.

Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

AA Functions

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
----------------	----------	--------------

Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
30 April	Annual reporting – Report Q4 expenses (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

31 July	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent's website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Annex B.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)

Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or

may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it		Head of UN Country Team where it does not.
--	--	--

Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
28 February	Annual reporting – Report Q4 expenses (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
30 April	Report Q1 expenses (January to March)
31 July	Report Q2 expenses (January to June)
31 October	Report Q3 expenses (January to September)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure</i>	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website (www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund) and the Administrative Agent website (www.mptf.undp.org).

Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such an activity must be included in the project budget.

Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will

as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

- Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation.
- Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax-exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE:** If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches).
- Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant.
- Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE:** If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
- Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project.⁷¹
- Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought.
- Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

⁷¹ Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated targets)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
<p>Outcome 1: Local governance institutions, actors, and customary governance structures are inclusive, responsive and deliver quality services.</p> <p>SDG Target 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.</p> <p>16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.</p> <p>16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 1: The level of public confidence in the delivery of quality basic services in the target districts disaggregated by sex and age.</p> <p>Baseline: TBC Target: 3</p> <p>Scale:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not confident 2. Moderately confident 3. Confident 4. Very Confident 	Perception Survey Report (Annual) / Community Monitoring report (Quarterly)	<p>1st Perception Survey by end of 2024</p> <p>2nd Perception Survey by end of 2025</p> <p>4 Community Monitoring Reports per year</p>
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1b: Percentage of community members (m/f) in the targeted districts expressing improvements in local government accountability, and responsiveness.</p> <p>Baseline: M:TBC; FTBC Target: M;50%; F;50%</p>	Baseline and End of Project Evaluation report/ Onetime	<p>Baseline – 1st Quarter of Project</p> <p>End of Project Evaluation Report: Last Quarter of Project</p>

(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)	<p>Output 1.1: Capacity of local governance actors and traditional/religious leaders enhanced in gender-responsive participatory planning, local economic development and conflict management.</p> <p>Activities:</p> <p>1.1.1 Train local governance actors on gender-responsive participatory planning.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1: Extent to which local government actors and customary governance structures demonstrate improved knowledge and skills on participatory planning and responsive governance.</p> <p>Baseline: TBC Target: 4</p> <p>Scale:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not at all 2. Very little 3. Somewhat 4. Great extent 	Document Analysis and Interview report/Annual	Last Quarter of project first year
	<p>1.1.2 Train traditional and religious leaders at the community level on conflict resolution, negotiation and confidence building skills for effective conflict management.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.2:</p> <p>Number of partnership mechanisms in place for investment in targeted local communities including any direct collaboration with WB and USAID projects. Baseline: TBC Target: 16 (At least 2 per district)</p>	Annual Project Report	One per year
	<p>1.1.3 Train local government authorities on economic strategies for the identification and attraction of investment</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.3: Number of Traditional Authorities (TA) and Religious Leaders (RL) implementing gender-transformative</p>	Baseline Survey Report / Onetime & Community	Baseline – 1st Quarter of Project

	<p>opportunities (business intelligence, developing investment cases and partnerships building) to improve their resource mobilization and sources of income generation.</p> <p>1.1.4 Train traditional and religious authorities at the community level to tackle discriminatory gender and socio-cultural norms and women's inadequate access to productive resources including land.</p>	<p>initiatives in their communities to eliminate discriminatory gender and socio-cultural norms.</p> <p>Baseline: TBC after Baseline Target: 180 (TA, 50, RL, 130)</p>	Monitoring Report/Quarterly	
	<p>Output 1.2: Systems and processes for dialogue enabled to foster collaboration among local government institutions, customary governance structures and community representatives for inclusive decision-making.</p> <p>Activities</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.2.1: Number of interparty dialogue committees engaging stakeholders to address political vigilantism, electoral violence and reduce inter-generational tensions.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: At least 2 committees per district</p>	Community Monitoring Report / Quarterly	At least 2 engagement per districts per year
		<p>Output Indicator 1.2.2: Number of community radio stations, and religious entities that disallow the</p>	Hate Speech Monitoring Report / Quarterly	Once every Quarter

	1.2.1 Facilitate the functional operation of the local infrastructures for peace in conflict resolution and mediation.	use of hate speech and other inciteful ideas and messages on their networks Baseline: TBC Target: 10		
	1.2.2 Facilitate engagements and dialogues of youth and women groups with stakeholders including political parties, local political leaders, security agencies, religious leaders, traditional and community leaders using training courses and radio programs to address political vigilantism, electoral violence and reduce inter-generational tensions. 1.2.3 Facilitate awareness raising amongst the youth on hate speech, disinformation and misinformation around elections, religious	Output Indicator 1.2.3: Number of incidents of political violence reported and addressed in communities. Baseline: Reported; Addressed (TBC after baseline survey) Target: Reported; Addressed (TBC after baseline survey)	Community Monitoring Report / Annual	Annual (2024; 2025)

	<p>intolerance and protracted conflicts.</p> <p>1.2.4 Organise community fora between traditional and religious authorities and local government actors to address human rights violations, negative gender norms and stereotypes and farmer-herder conflicts.</p>			
	<p>Output 1.3: Accountability mechanisms developed/enhanced for local authorities' increased transparency in delivering inclusive and equitable public services.</p> <p>Activities: 1.3.1 Provide support to women and youth groups to implement social accountability initiatives and promote transparency and</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.3.1: Level of community members' (m/f) awareness and use of complaint mechanisms put in place in beneficiary districts for improved public service delivery.</p> <p>Baseline: 1 Target: 3</p> <p>Scale: 1. Low – (Not aware) 2. Moderate – (Aware, but not using it) 3. High – (Aware and using it)</p>	<p>Survey Report (Annual) /Document Analysis Report; Community Monitoring report (Quarterly)</p>	<p>1st Survey by end of 2024</p> <p>2nd Survey by end of 2025</p> <p>4 Community Monitoring Reports per year</p>

	<p>accountability of local government systems.</p> <p>1.3.2 Build on existing initiatives such as local accountability boards to increase access to information on available public services to ensure more people are aware and can access it.</p> <p>1.3.3 Revitalize existing complaints mechanisms for public services delivery at the local level, capacitate local government officials to provide prompt feedback on response and capacitate citizens (including women and youth) to track responses to the complaints using a monitoring dashboard and citizens scorecards.</p> <p>1.3.4 Support accountability fora such as town hall meetings using community</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.3.2: Number of women and youth who are able to access information on available public services.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p>	<p>Baseline and end of Project Evaluation survey report/ /Community Monitoring Report</p>	<p>Baseline – 1st Quarter of Project</p> <p>End of Project: Evaluation - Last Quarter of Project</p>
--	---	---	---	--

	structures for local government authorities to share and receive feedback on development planning and implementation.			
<p>Outcome 2: Women and youth are more resilient to conflict triggers and fully and meaningfully participate in peace building, local governance and economic development processes.</p> <p>SDG Target: 5.5: Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life</p> <p>10.2: By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic, and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status</p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2a: Percentage of women and youth (m/f) as a proportion of the total number of people participating in local development planning.</p> <p>Baseline: W (TBC); Y {M (0TBC; F (TBC)}</p> <p>Target: W (30%); Y {M (20%); F (20%)}</p>	District Monitoring Report/ Biennial	Per Year
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2b: Percentage of women and youth who feel included in decision making and peacebuilding processes disaggregated by sex and district.</p> <p>Baseline: W (TBC); Y {M (TBC); F (TBC)}</p> <p>Target: W (50%); Y {M (30%); F (20%)}</p>	Perception Survey Report	One per year
	Output 2.1: Capacity of women and youth enhanced to participate	Output Indicator 2.1.1: Number of women and youth groups and CSOs leading community initiatives on	Community Monitoring Report / Quarterly	15 Groups per year

(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)	and engage in critical development issues, decision-making and peace building processes.	peace and social cohesion disaggregated by sex. Baseline: Women Groups (0); Youth Groups (0) Target: Women Groups (15); Youth Groups (15)		
	Activities: 2.1.1 Conduct an assessment on the forms and levels of women and youth participation in local decision making and peace building processes, including their perceptions regarding their roles to inform policy and action.	Output Indicator 2.1.2: Number of women and youth meaningfully participating in political and decision-making processes in their districts disaggregated by sex. Baseline: W (0); Y {M (0); F (0)} Target: W (80); Y {M (80); F (40)}	Community Monitoring Report / Quarterly	50% per year
	2.1.2 Develop knowledge and advocacy materials targeting duty bearers and community members on gender equality, women's empowerment and peace building issues. 2.1.3 Train existing women and youth groups/networks, to enhance their leadership and advocacy capacity to	Output Indicator 2.1.3: Proportion of women and youth candidates contesting for political leadership and other decision-making positions in their communities/ districts with UN support. Baseline: TBD Target: TBD:	Community Monitoring Report / Annual/ List of contesting candidates from the election	

	<p>be champions and models for peace in and to advocate for their participation and inclusion in local governance and peace building processes.</p> <p>2.1.4 Provide women and youth's access to mentorship opportunities with political party leaders and local government officials to address exclusion and strengthen their capacity for full and meaningful participation in governance as a means of reducing political violence and Vigilantism.</p> <p>2.1.5 Support women and youth political aspirants to participate in local governance and electoral processes</p>			
	Output 2.2: Women and youth groups/networks	Output Indicator 2.2.1: Number of private sector organizations engaged	Project Annual Report / Annual	At least 1 per year

	<p>enabled/ to access livelihood skills, employment and entrepreneurial opportunities.⁷²</p> <p>Activities:</p> <p>2.2.1 Map and assess the types of vocational and entrepreneurial skills of interest to the youth and women and train them in partnership with local government and private sector.</p> <p>2.2.2 Partner and link local government institutions (Business Advisory Centers) with the private sector and CSOs to provide flexible financing options and business development support to catalyze investments for existing women and youth led businesses and identified</p>	<p>and providing financing options and business development support to youth and women led businesses.</p> <p>Baseline: 1 Target: 4</p>		
		<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2: Number of women and youth accessing job and livelihood opportunities as a result of this project's intervention</p> <p>Baseline: M (0); F (0) Target: M (150); F (150)</p>	Annual Project Report / Annual	<p>200 year 1</p> <p>100-year 2</p>

⁷² business management financial literacy, marketing and business innovations

	local value chains including micro-saving initiatives (such as village savings and loan associations) to reduce vulnerability and exclusion.			
Outcome 3: State actors and non-state actors positively collaborate through the use of early warning systems to prevent conflict		Outcome Indicator 3a: Proportion of early action measures adopted to manage current and emerging conflicts. Baseline: TBC Target: At least 50% adopted	Document Analysis & Interview report / Annual	One per year
SDG Target 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels 16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.		Outcome Indicator 3b: Level of satisfaction of community members (m/f) in the targeted communities on the effectiveness of early warning and response mechanisms. Baseline: M:TBC; F:TBC Target: M:TBC; F:TBC Scale: 1 – Not at all satisfied 2 – slightly satisfied 3 – Neutral 4 - Satisfied	Survey Report / Annual	One per year

(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)	Output 3.1: Security agencies and other relevant actors ⁷³ have enhanced capacities ⁷⁴ to respect human rights and foster peace and social cohesion Activities: 3.1.1 Build the conflict preparedness and protection capacities of border security agencies and communities, including rights-based conflict sensitivity training and conflict prevention, mediation and resolutions skills 3.1.2 Train security agencies on social dialogue, human rights-based approaches for conflict management and	5 - Very satisfied Output Indicator 3.1.1: Number of reported peaceful engagements between security agencies and targeted communities Baseline: TBC Targets: TBC	Document Analysis, Interviews, FGD Reports	One per year
--	--	---	--	--------------

⁷³civil society, religious and traditional authorities, as well as women and youth-led advocacy groups

⁷⁴civil society, religious and traditional authorities, as well as women and youth-led advocacy groups

	sustaining social cohesion.			
	<p>Output 3.2 Platforms for dialogues between relevant security agencies, justice sector actors and non-state actors (religious and traditional authorities, women and youth groups, media and civil society) enabled and facilitated for early response, peace and social cohesion</p> <p>Activities: 3.2.1 Conduct Civilian-Security joint campaigns to build trust, reinforce and enhance dialogue to address underlying drivers of community conflicts and promote social cohesion.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 3.2.1: Percentage implementation of early warning action plans for conflict prevention per target community.</p> <p>Baseline: 0% Target: At least 80% implementation rate</p> <p>Output Indicator 3.2.2: Number of joint initiatives in the targeted districts between youth organizations and security agencies per year to promote social cohesion</p> <p>Baseline: TBC Target: 2 initiatives in each of the 16 communities</p>	Community Monitoring Reports	At least 40% implementation rate per year

Annex D - PBF Project Budget

Table 2 - Output breakdown by UN budget categories

	UNDP	UNFPA	Recipient Organizati on 3	Total
OUTCOME 1				
Output 1.1				
Output Total from Table 1	\$ 162,000.00	\$ 187,214.33	\$ -	\$ 349,214.33
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 5,000.00			\$ 5,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)				\$ -
4. Contractual services	\$ 17,000.00	\$ 6,000.00		\$ 23,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 15,000.00	\$ 6,363.64		\$ 21,363.64
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 120,000.00	\$ 168,487.05		\$ 288,487.05
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 5,000.00	\$ 6,363.64		\$ 11,363.64
Total	\$ 162,000.00	\$ 187,214.33	\$ -	\$ 349,214.33

Output 1.2				
Output Total from Table 1	\$ 235,000.00	\$ 144,287.00	\$ -	\$ 379,287.00
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 10,000.00			\$ 10,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)				\$ -
4. Contractual services	\$ 15,000.00			\$ 15,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 12,000.00	\$ 6,000.00		\$ 18,000.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 190,000.00	\$ 138,287.00		\$ 328,287.00
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 8,000.00			\$ 8,000.00
Total	\$ 235,000.00	\$ 144,287.00	\$ -	\$ 379,287.00
Output 1.3				
Output Total from Table 1	\$ 188,000.00	\$ 169,723.50	\$ -	\$ 357,723.50
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 10,000.00	\$ 24,723.50		\$ 34,723.50
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$ 10,000.00			\$ 10,000.00
4. Contractual services	\$ 20,000.00	\$ 105,000.00		\$ 125,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 18,000.00	\$ 5,000.00		\$ 23,000.00

6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 110,000.00	\$ 35,000.00		\$ 145,000.00
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 20,000.00			\$ 20,000.00
Total	\$ 188,000.00	\$ 169,723.50	\$ -	\$ 357,723.50

OUTCOME 2

Output 2.1

Output Total from Table 1	\$ 280,000.00	\$ 127,606.50	\$ -	\$ 407,606.50
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 25,000.00	\$ 45,000.00		\$ 70,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)				\$ -
4. Contractual services	\$ 40,000.00	\$ 50,000.00		\$ 90,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 30,000.00	\$ 6,000.00		\$ 36,000.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 172,000.00	\$ 26,606.50		\$ 198,606.50
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 13,000.00			\$ 13,000.00
Total	\$ 280,000.00	\$ 127,606.50	\$ -	\$ 407,606.50

Output 2.2

Output Total from Table 1	\$ 275,000.00	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 275,000.00
----------------------------------	----------------------	-------------	-------------	----------------------

1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 8,000.00			\$ 8,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$ 5,000.00			\$ 5,000.00
4. Contractual services	\$ 40,000.00			\$ 40,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 10,000.00			\$ 10,000.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 200,000.00			\$ 200,000.00
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 12,000.00			\$ 12,000.00
Total	\$ 275,000.00	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 275,000.00

OUTCOME 3				
Output 3.1				
Output Total from Table 1	\$ 99,060.00	\$ 72,486.50	\$ -	\$ 171,546.50
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials		9000		\$ 9,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)				\$ -
4. Contractual services	\$ 10,000.00	15000		\$ 25,000.00
5. Travel	\$ 10,000.00			\$ 10,000.00

6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 73,060.00	48486.5		\$ 121,546.50
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 6,000.00			\$ 6,000.00
Total	\$ 99,060.00	\$ 72,486.50	\$ -	\$ 171,546.50

Output 3.2

Output Total from Table 1	\$ 40,000.00	\$ 51,223.50	\$ -	\$ 91,223.50
1. Staff and other personnel				\$ -
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials		\$ 5,500.00		\$ 5,500.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)				\$ -
4. Contractual services				\$ -
5. Travel	\$ 4,000.00	\$ 4,000.00		\$ 8,000.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 33,000.00	\$ 33,323.50		\$ 66,323.50
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 3,000.00	\$ 8,400.00		\$ 11,400.00
Total	\$ 40,000.00	\$ 51,223.50	\$ -	\$ 91,223.50

Additional Costs

Additional Cost Totals from Table 1	\$ 590,080.00	\$ 182,020.00	\$ -	\$ 772,100.00
1. Staff and other personnel	\$ 250,000.00	\$ 122,000.00		\$ 372,000.00

2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 50,000.00			\$ 50,000.00
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$ 40,000.00			\$ 40,000.00
4. Contractual services	\$ 50,000.00	\$ 25,020.00		\$ 75,020.00
5. Travel	\$ 100,080.00	\$ 35,000.00		\$ 135,080.00
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 51,000.00			\$ 51,000.00
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 49,000.00			\$ 49,000.00
Total	\$ 590,080.00	\$ 182,020.00	\$ -	\$ 772,100.00

Totals				
	UNDP	UNFPA	Recipient Organization 3	Totals
1. Staff and other personnel	\$ 250,000.00	\$ 122,000.00	\$ -	\$ 372,000.00
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 108,000.00	\$ 84,223.50	\$ -	\$ 192,223.50
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$ 55,000.00	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 55,000.00
4. Contractual services	\$ 192,000.00	\$ 201,020.00	\$ -	\$ 393,020.00

5. Travel	\$ 199,080.00	\$ 62,363.64	\$ -	\$ 261,443.64
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 949,060.00	\$ 450,190.55	\$ -	\$ 1,399,250.55
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 116,000.00	\$ 14,763.64	\$ -	\$ 130,763.64
Subtotal	\$ 1,869,140.00	\$ 934,561.33	\$ -	\$ 2,803,701.33
7% Indirect Costs	\$ 130,839.80	\$ 65,419.29	\$ -	\$ 196,259.09
TOTAL	\$ 1,999,979.80	\$ 999,980.62	\$ -	\$ 2,999,960.42