

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



United Nations  
Peacebuilding

**PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT**

<b>Country(ies):</b> Lake Chad Basin Countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria)	
<b>Project Title:</b> Promoting CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives in the Lake Chad Basin sub-region <b>Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):</b>	
<b>PBF project modality:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IRF <input type="checkbox"/> PRF	<b>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund <b>Name of Recipient Fund:</b>
<b>List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):</b> UNDP Chad (Convening Agency), Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria The UNDP Regional Office Dakar/Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (RS SRR) Secretariat will ensure coordination and lead the activities at regional level. Since the RS SRR Secretariat is based in Chad, like the Lake Chad Basin Commission, UNDP Chad will be the convening agency.	
<b>List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO):</b> Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Regional CSO Platform of the LCBC, CSOs that will apply to be part of the CSOs groups to implement this project in the 4 countries in the 8 territories for which there are Territorial Action Plans (TAPs). Territorial Governors and their offices: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Gouverneur de la Région de l'Extrême Nord, Maroua, CAMEROON</li> <li>2. Gouverneur de la Région du Nord, Garoua, CAMEROON</li> <li>3. Gouverneur de la région du Hadjer-Lamis, CHAD.</li> <li>4. Gouverneur de la Province du Lac-Bol, CHAD.</li> <li>5. Gouverneur de la Région de Diffa, NIGER</li> <li>6. Executive Governor, Government House, Adamawa State, NIGERIA</li> <li>7. Executive Governor of Borno State, Government House, Maiduguri-Borno State, NIGERIA</li> <li>8. Executive Governor, Government House, Yobe State, NIGERIA</li> </ol>	
Ministries: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ministry of Water Resources, Nigeria</li> <li>2. Ministère de l'Economie, de la Planification, et de l'Aménagement du Cameroun</li> <li>3. Ministère de l'Hydraulique du Niger</li> <li>4. Ministère de la prospective économique et des partenariats internationaux du Tchad</li> <li>5. Ministère de l'action sociale et de la famille du Tchad</li> <li>6. Ministry of Budget and Planning, Federal Republic of Nigeria</li> </ol>	

7. Ministry of Economy, Planning and Territorial Development (MINEPAT), Republic of Cameroon		
8. Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix du Niger		
<b>Project duration in months<sup>1 2</sup>:</b> 24 months (For Cameroon the project will end implementation by July 2024)		
<b>Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation:</b> Eight territories of the Lake Chad Basin: North and Far North regions (Cameroon), Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces (Chad), Diffa region (Niger), Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states (Nigeria)		
<b>Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <sup>3</sup> <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <sup>4</sup> <input type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project		
<b>Total PBF approved project budget* (by recipient organization):</b>		
UNDP Chad: \$638,255.00		
UNDP Cameroon: \$286,332.00		
UNDP Niger: \$317,255.00		
UNDP Nigeria: \$818,015.00		
UNDP Regional Office Dakar/RS SRR Secretariat in N'djamena: \$1,440,164 (Chad)		
<b>Total: 3,500,021</b>		
<i>*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed.</i>		
Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source): The are two NORCAP experts (CSO Platform Coordinator and Localisation Advisor) who are deployed to the RS-SRR Secretariat who will support the implementation of this project.		
<b>PBF 1<sup>st</sup> tranche (70%):</b>	<b>PBF 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche* (30%):</b>	<b>PBF 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche* ( _ %):</b>
UNDP Chad: \$446,779	UNDP Chad: \$191,477	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
UNDP Cameroon: \$286,332	UNDP Cameroon: \$	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
(100% in Y1 because implementation is for only one year)	UNDP Niger: \$95,177	XXXX: \$ XXXXXX
UNDP Niger: \$222,079	UNDP Nigeria: \$245,405	Total:
UNDP Nigeria: \$572,611	UNDP Regional Office: (Chad)	
UNDP Regional Office: (Chad)	\$432,049	
\$1,008,115		
Total: \$2,535,915	Total: \$964,107	
<b>Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):</b>		

<sup>1</sup> Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 24 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

<sup>2</sup> The official project start date will be the date of the first project budget transfer by MPTFO to the recipient organization(s), as per the MPTFO Gateway page.

<sup>3</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

<sup>4</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

The main goal of this project is to promote the implementation of local and cross-border CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives in line with the priorities outlined in the Territorial Action Plans<sup>5</sup> (TAPs). The project combines the expertise of local civil society organizations, bringing them together in joint projects, and will support the capacity of these CSOs to design and implement peacebuilding projects based on local assessment and needs, as well as provide seed funding to selected local CSOs for TAPs-based and cross-border projects.

The project directly contributes to four pillars of the Regional Strategy on Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad basin region (RS SSR)<sup>6</sup>: namely: Security and Human Rights (Pillar 2); the DDRRR of persons associated with extremist and violent Boko Haram armed groups (Pillar 3); and/or the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace (Pillar 8), and to pillar on the Empowerment and Inclusion of Women and Youth (Pillar 9), which needs to be mainstreamed in all interventions.

**Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):**

During the development of this proposal, regional, government and non-governmental organizations were consulted, and in particular CSOs representatives in the 4 countries and 8 territories. At least 10 CSO members of the Lake Chad Basin CSO Regional Platform per territory were consulted, taking into account gender and age balance. These consultations were organized by the lead of the LCBC Regional CSO Platform in the four countries, which are ALDEPA (Action Locale pour un Développement Participatif Autogéré) in Cameroon, YOPCODI (Yobe Peace and Community Development Initiative) in Nigeria, ACHDR (Association pour l'Action Humanitaire et le Développement) in Chad and AEC (Alternative Espaces Citoyen) in Niger. These 4 local CSOs are currently leading the RS SSR CSO National Platforms in their respective countries, which feeds the regional Lake Chad Basin CSO Regional Platform. A focus group with youth-led organizations was also organized, with two youth organizations per territory in the four countries. The most active youth-led organizations in the national CSO platforms were selected for this consultation. INGO representatives were also consulted in the target territories in the 4 countries, namely Plan International, Search for Common Ground and Roots and Transition.

The eight Governors' offices were consulted as well as the line ministries of the RS SSR: Ministre de l'Hydraulique (Niger), Minister of Water and Resources (Nigeria), MINEPAT (Cameroon), and Minister of Prospective économique et des partenariats internationaux (Chad).

In terms of regional organizations, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has been key in the development of this proposal, the African Union (AU) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) were also consulted.

At UN level, RCOs, including PDAs and PBF Coordinators, have been involved in the design of this project. UNOWAS and UNOCA were also consulted during the process.

**Project Gender Marker score<sup>7</sup>: 2**

<sup>5</sup> <https://communityconnect.cbilt.org/topic/territorial-action-plan-tap-strategic-summaries>

<sup>6</sup> <https://cbilt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/>

<sup>7</sup> **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

44 % and \$1,551,857.81 of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment:

**Briefly explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment<sup>8</sup>:**

This project contributes to the empowerment of women and youth by promoting the engagement and leadership of women and youth-led organizations in all stages of the project. Furthermore, gender will be mainstreamed during the implementation of all the activities as the mainstream of pillar 9 is compulsory for any intervention. The project focuses on building the capacity of local civil society organizations and will have special considerations for organizations that are led by women and/or youth, as per the call for proposals criteria described below, both for the TAP-based and the cross border/regional interventions. Civil society organizations will implement peacebuilding activities at the community level and will ensure conflict sensitivity and gender lens to address the specific concerns and needs of youth, women and other marginalised groups. There will be targeted leadership skills trainings for women-led and youth-led organizations and gender-balance in recipients of all trainings, workshops, and mentoring activities.

**Project Risk Marker score<sup>9</sup>: 1**

**Select PBF Focus Areas** which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select ONLY one*)<sup>10</sup>: 2.3 (Conflict prevention/management)

If applicable, UNSDCF/UNDAF **outcome(s)** to which the project contributes:

**UNSDCF Chad: Axe 3: Governance** - By the end of 2026, populations, in particular the most vulnerable groups, fully enjoy the rule of law, social cohesion and peace

**UNSDCF Cameroon:** By the end of 2022 and 2023, the project will contribute to the socio-economic recovery of populations affected by the crisis, the restoration of the rule of law, good governance, social cohesion, better use of basic public services and better protection of the environment in all areas affected by the project, including affected populations such as displaced populations and refugees.

**UNSDCF Niger:** The project aligns with the first and second strategic priority in Niger: (i) Strengthen governance, particularly ethics and the pact of trust between elected officials and the

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**Score 2** for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE

**Score 1** for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

<sup>8</sup> Please consult the **PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding**

<sup>9</sup> **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 1** = medium risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 2** = high risk to achieving outcomes

<sup>10</sup> **PBF Focus Areas** are:

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management;

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3)

Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

people, and (ii) Empowerment of women, adolescents and youth as an engine of recovery to reduce inequalities or social, political and economic gaps".

**UNSDCF Nigeria:** By 2027 More inclusive, participatory, transparent and gender-sensitive governance, justice and human rights systems are in place at all levels to promote acceleration in achieving the 2030 Agenda and SDGs for a peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive society.

**UNISS Strategic Objective 1.2:** Support ongoing efforts by the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to successfully implement their Stabilization Strategy and Programme, including the development plan for recharging of the Lake.

**Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s)** to which the project contributes: the project contributes mostly to SDG 16 but also to SDG 5, SDG 10 and SDG 17.

<p><b>Type of submission:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>New project</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Project amendment</b></p>	<p><b>If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:</b></p> <p><b>Extension of duration:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):</p> <p><b>Change of project outcome/ scope:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:</b> <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p><b>Additional PBF budget:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX</p> <p><b>Brief justification for amendment:</b></p> <p><i>Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.</i></p>
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


PROJECT SIGNATURES - CHAD

<p><b>AGENCE RECIPIENDAIRE</b></p> <p><b>Nom :</b> Kamil Kamaluddeen</p> <p>Signature </p> <p><b>Titre :</b> Représentant Résident</p> <p><b>Nom de l'agence :</b> Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement</p> <p><b>Date et visa :</b></p> 	<p><b>Représentant du Gouvernement national</b></p> <p><b>Nom :</b> Moussa Batraki</p> <p>Signature </p> <p><b>Titre :</b> Ministre de la Prospective Economique et des partenariats internationaux</p> <p><b>Date et visa :</b> 11 SEPT 2023</p> 
<p><b>Coordonnateur résident</b></p> <p><b>Nom :</b> Violette Kakyomya</p> <p>Signature </p> <p><b>Titre :</b> Coordinatrice Résidente du Système des Nations Unies au Tchad</p> <p><b>Date et visa :</b> 6/09/23</p> 	<p><b>Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix (PBSO)</b></p> <p><b>Nom :</b> Elizabeth Spehar</p> <p>Signature </p> <p><b>Sous-Secrétaire générale chargée du Bureau d'appui à la consolidation de la paix</b></p> <p><b>Date et visa :</b> 20/10/2023</p>

**PROJECT SIGNATURES - CAMEROON**








<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>12</sup></b></p> <p>Aliou Mamadou Dia</p> <p>DocuSigned by:            7C0DFD55AFE4488...</p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>UNDP Cameroon</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i>          08-Aug-2023</p> 	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p>Ministry of Economy, Planning and Territorial Development (MINEPAT), Republic of Cameroon</p>  <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>Minister</p>  <p><b>Alamine Ousmane Mey</b></p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i>          19 SEPT 2023</p>
<p><b>UN Resident Coordinator (acting)</b></p> <p>Nadine Perrault</p>  <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>Representative, UNICEF Cameroon</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i></p> 	<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar</p>  <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i>          20/10/2023</p>

PROJECT SIGNATURES – NIGER

<p><b>Organisation(s) bénéficiaire(s)<sup>13</sup></b></p> <p>Nicole Flora Kouassi </p> <p>Représentant Résident PNUD Niger</p> <p></p> <p>30 août 2023</p> <p><i>Date et Sceau</i></p>	<p><b>Représentant des autorités nationales</b></p> <p><i>Signature</i></p> <p><i>Date et Sceau</i></p>
<p><b>Coordinateur Resident des Nations Unies</b></p> <p>Louise Aubin </p> <p>Coordinateur Resident, UNRCO Niger</p> <p>30 aug</p> <p></p> <p><i>Date et Sceau</i></p>	<p><b>Bureau de soutien à la consolidation de la paix (PBSO)</b></p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar </p> <p><i>Signature</i> Assistante du Secrétaire général pour la consolidation de la paix</p> <p><i>Date et Sceau</i> 20/10/2023</p>



**PROJECT SIGNATURES – NIGERIA**

<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>14</sup></b></p> <p>Mohamed Yahya </p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>UNDP Nigeria</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 16/10/2023</p>	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p>Ministry of Budget and Planning, Federal Republic of Nigeria</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>Minister</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i> Sept 19, 2023</p>
<p><b>UN Resident Coordinator</b></p> <p>Matthias Schmale </p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>The Resident Coordinator, UNRCO Nigeria</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 12 Oct. 2023</p>	<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar </p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support</p> <p><i>Date &amp; Seal</i> 20/10/2023</p>

## Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)

- a) A brief summary of **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age-responsive.

This summary is based largely on the findings of a regional conflict analysis report and eight territorial conflict analysis reports<sup>11</sup> focusing on the regions, states and provinces most directly impacted by the Boko Haram crisis. These reports are based on primary and secondary data collection and were prepared in 2020, 2021 and the first part of 2022 by partners of the LCBC, such as UNDP, the ISS and IMPACT to inform programming in the Lake Chad Basin region and to provide a baseline of key indicators for the ‘Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Resilience and Recovery of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad basin region’ (Regional Strategy or RS SSR). These reports include sources of information and methodology for reference. Data from 2022 is taken from an ISS presentation to UNDP of November 2022 and the 2022 Annual Report of the UNDP Regional Stabilization Facility for the Lake Chad.

Based on these reports’ findings, this project will aim to address some of the following driving factors of conflict:

- ☐ Lack of social cohesion and trust amongst communities and between communities and State authorities due to the protracted crisis and tensions between local communities and IDPs as well as intra-communal conflicts;
- ☐ Rise of violent extremism, recruitment and association with NSAGs and security responses;
- ☐ Exclusion of women and youth from the majority of the local decision-making processes as well as non-inclusion/consideration of local civil society organizations and their importance and role in development and peace responses;
- ☐ Communities’ feeling of insecurity, persistent human rights violations perpetrated by NSAGs and insufficient mental health and psychosocial support to the communities affected by trauma;
- ☐ Limited state presence in the Lake Chad Basin and trust in State entities as well as lack of accountability from authorities on local and State level, including on human rights violations by security actors;
- ☐ Non-existence or minimal social contract in certain areas of the Lake Chad Basin, translating into insufficient basic and social services for the communities, in some cases provided by external actors;
- ☐ Climate change and population pressures have led to dwindling land and water resources, which have exacerbated inter-community and resource-based conflicts.

The Lake Chad region is one of the world’s most protracted conflict and crisis environments. Notwithstanding some positive developments, high levels of violence continue to have a devastating impact on millions of people in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria and basic social services and already limited natural resources are severely strained. Despite Boko Haram being declared as “technically defeated” by the Nigerian President Buhari since 2015, when the Nigerian army recaptured most of the large areas invaded by the group, violent attacks remain frequent. Over the past years the

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<sup>11</sup> ISS - Regional Conflict Analysis Report on the Lake Chad Basin and Territorial Conflict Analyses by IMPACT available at UNDP Stabilization shared point and upon request to the RS SRR Secretariat.

conflict landscape has further diversified, with Boko Haram splintering in 2016, but also the rise of other extremist groups, local militia, organized criminal groups, and intracommunal conflicts. Violent attacks remain mostly focused on Nigeria and the border areas shared by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria<sup>12</sup>. The total number of security incidents in 2022 involving NSAGs, state security, and civilians, including intra- and inter-group, amounted to 1,200 (recorded incidents) in the Lake Chad Basin area, resulting in approximately 3,800 deaths<sup>13</sup>. This is a slight increase of incidents in comparison to 2021, when 1100 incidents were reported, but with 4000 deaths, showing a sustained impact of violence in the sub-region.

After nearly 13 years of conflict, armed groups continue to spread violence and 11 million people need wide-ranging assistance. Some 5.6 million people were expected to be severely food insecure during the 2023 lean season – the highest figure in four years. Furthermore, 2.9 million people are internally displaced (IDPs) across the four countries (2.2 million in Nigeria, 141000 in Niger, 381000 in Chad, and 385000 in Cameroon) and 276,000 people have been forced to take refuge in neighboring countries, particularly in Niger, Chad and Cameroon<sup>14</sup>. Since the crisis started, around 350,000 people have died in attacks, clashes and explosions in Nigeria alone and indirect fatalities are estimated at 35,000 in the entire region, including as a result of conflict impact on diseases and hunger<sup>15</sup>. These figures have continued to grow, aggravated by other negative circumstances such as floods, droughts, and COVID-19.

The death of Abubakar Shekau in May 2021, the long-serving leader of the Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) faction of Boko Haram, set waves of surrenders into motion. Between May 2021 and March 2023, over 90,000 people associated primarily with JAS, but also other violent groups, opted to surrender to the Borno State authorities in cooperation with security forces, creating an opportunity to reinforce efforts to reintegrate ex-JAS combatants and steer the region towards reconciliation and peace<sup>16</sup>. However, if community integration, reconciliation and transitional justice systems fail, mass surrenders pose a risk of enhancing community divides, grievance, relapse, recidivism, and a new conflict cycle. Effective justice mechanisms as well as support models for community-based reintegration and reconciliation are still lacking. Addressing this gap is central to strengthening exit pathways from violent extremist groups, restoring justice and empowering communities to prevent violent extremism and to take an ownership role in the reconciliation and reintegration processes. As the years progress, additional implications for policy will increase in the domain of transitional justice, which would be essential in communities that need healing and reconciliation. For the resurgence of conflict to be avoided and stability to be assured, structures would need to be established to ensure that victims are given a platform to not only express themselves but seek redress. This would also need to be accompanied by truth commissions and accountability mechanisms that hold perpetrators responsible for their actions. The rule of law and criminal justice system has an important role to play, so also the need to promote reconciliation and trust. A regional Community-based Reconciliation and Reintegration of persons formerly associated with Boko Haram (CBRR) policy has been developed by LCBC and is going through the final stages of adoption, which

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<sup>12</sup> ISS Conflict Analysis 2020 -2012

<sup>13</sup> Using ACLED data, there were 1,232 incidents and 3,740 deaths: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>

<sup>14</sup> OCHA (2022). Lake Chad Basin humanitarian snapshot as of December 2022. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/lake-chad-basin-humanitarian-snapshot-08-december-2022>

<sup>15</sup> UNDP Conflict Analysis of the Lake Chad Basin 2020-2021

<sup>16</sup> See <https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/receptivity-and-reintegration-of-ex-boko-haram-associates-in-the-lake-chad-basin-region/>

provides a framework to address these gaps and challenges with reintegration in a consistent manner across the sub-region.

The antecedents of the Boko Haram crisis can largely be traced to the failures of the state to establish trust and presence, as well as its inability to provide access to basic services, including security, in the Lake Chad region, especially in remote communities. Boko Haram factions have gained support and evolved through the exploitation of socioeconomic and political gaps for recruitment into violent extremism. The Boko Haram insurgency is taking place in a context characterized by high unemployment, especially for the youth, perceived corruption of local authorities, under-development of infrastructures, limited provision and access to services, ethnic and religious tensions, structural inequalities, and competition over land, water, mineral and other resources. Many of these factors also feed into other types of conflict (inter-communal, banditry) within the region, thus highlighting how existing conflicts and tensions may sustain each other. The presence or absence of the state in the peripheral areas of Lake Chad has a strong link with the narrative, ideology, and actions of Boko Haram, building its messages on the perceived corruption of the state and its political elite, and the failure of the state to provide basic services, including security, especially in remote communities. Contested state presence in many remote communities has resulted in situations where communities have had to involuntarily foster some sort of social contract with various actors of insecurity, such as Boko Haram, who present themselves as the sole providers of services, such as securing market routes, access to potable water and farmlands, and medical assistance<sup>17</sup>.

Regarding the Lake Chad Basin and the prevalence of NSAGs, one aspect that requires consideration and assessment is the increasing spread of violent extremism since 2015. In 2011, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only six percent of total attacks globally, but by 2021 this proportion had risen to 26 percent. This indicates that after the fall of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) violent extremist groups operations have shifted to sub-Saharan Africa, particularly territorial imprints in the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes, and wider Sahel region<sup>18</sup>.

Youth unemployment, abuses by state security actors and the absence of livelihoods are flagged as a strong motivation for community members to join armed groups or engage in criminal activities. The context of conflict and insecurity has brought about changes in gender norms, with women being often forced into roles as primary providers, heads of mono-parental households and engaging in casual farming labor or trade while continuing to care for the children and household as well as women being elevated to the highest roles of traditional leadership, in few cases. The targeting of school facilities and other key infrastructure by organised armed groups has reportedly contributed to decreased access to education for many young people, restricting their access to livelihood opportunities and skilled labor and increasing the withdrawal of children from school for safety, especially girls. Early marriage of young girls is also cited as a cause preventing them from accessing education services in some areas of the region. Communities, especially women and girls, are also reportedly more exposed to incidents of SGBV and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), with girls being married off at a young age due to the household's inability to financially sustain them and women often taking added responsibilities as heads of households when their husbands are killed or leave their homes for job opportunities in other states. Additionally, social protection is lacking; For example, in Chad, 87% of experts and leaders believe that there is no social protection. Active population does not benefit from social guarantees. Most of the population is employed in the informal sector where social protection does not exist.

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<sup>17</sup> See ISS Conflict analysis 2020-2021.

<sup>18</sup> See "Journey to Extremism in Africa, Pathways to recruitment and disengagement", UNDP, published 2023.

Both qualitative and quantitative findings in the sub-region show that community members feel that decision-making is not inclusive nor responsive to communities' needs and priorities, with peaks of 85% and 93% of individuals surveyed respectively in Borno State (Nigeria) and Lac province (Chad) believing so, and an even higher, respectively of 90% and 98%, when looking at women respondents only<sup>19</sup>. Age and sex (as well as the intersectionality between the two) are commonly reported key factors that may prevent certain groups from participating in decision-making as well as influencing local development policies. Other commonly reported excluded groups are internally displaced persons (IDPs) and persons with disabilities. In Far North region (Cameroon) less than 30% of surveyed individuals were satisfied with government services overall. Only 17% of seats were held by women in local governments according to the governor's office in the Far North region (Cameroon), 15% in Lac province (Chad) and 5% in Borno State (Nigeria)<sup>20</sup>.

In addition to the insurgency, several other conflicts are present in the region this includes inter-community conflicts, such as those between host communities and displaced populations or conflicts between farmers and pastoralists; identity-based conflicts between ethnic or religious groups as well as conflicts between communities and state actors. The insurgency has reportedly exacerbated some of these conflicts, increased SGBV cases and stigmatization of certain groups based on identity.

The conflict context is characterized by social dis-ordering and violence on the margin of states' responses, generally targeted at resolving the conflict but that sometimes amplifies violence. Clashes between the states and communities increase the overall complexity of the conflict and highlight the challenge of lack of social contract between the state and citizens. Traditional leadership structures still manage to maintain their respect and authority, even though traditional figures/leaders reportedly have less influence than in the past and seem to live in constant fear of being targeted by armed groups. Some are even seen as being biased and that influences how they can handle tensions. According to qualitative data from Borno state, community dialogue and awareness as well as orientation programs focused on conflict resolution and peace building have had a positive impact in the reduction and mitigation of local conflicts<sup>21</sup>.

Various intra- and inter-community conflicts are observed in the regions bordering Lake Chad, generally involving semi-nomadic pastoralists living in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin and sedentary farming and fishing communities, living mainly in Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. The areas surrounding the Lake Chad, its shores and islands are fertile lands, pasture and fishery resources that have allowed diverse communities to sustain themselves, both indigenous and non, including IDPs and refugees. The types of activities carried out by these communities lead them to share the same territories and natural resources (arable lands, fishing areas, fish-farming land, pastures) which are often the starting point of conflicts. Although such clashes are not new, the growing use of firearms has been observed which increases casualty rates and signals an access to weapons in the region. Despite states' efforts to collect them, they seem to re-surface during inter-community conflicts that can more frequently degenerate into a full-blown crisis<sup>22</sup>.

The issue of land and water access is key in these semi-desert areas, where watered lands around the lake are at the center of competition for productive activities among riparian communities. In a number of instances, claims to ancestral land rights go hand in hand with claims to chieftaincy. These inter-

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<sup>19</sup> See Conflict Analysis and Territorial Perception Study for Borno and Lac by IMPACT and LCBC (2022) available at <https://communityconnect.cbtl.org>

<sup>20</sup> ISS - Regional Conflict Analysis Report on the Lake Chad Basin and Territorial Conflict Analyses for Far North, Borno and Lac by IMPACT and LCBC.

<sup>21</sup> Conflict Analysis and Territorial Perception Study for Borno by IMPACT and LCBC (2022)

<sup>22</sup> See ISS Regional Conflict Analysis Report.

community and resource-based conflicts are exacerbated by changing power dynamics, climate change and resource scarcity in the region. In the past, these conflicts were settled amicably among the interested parties, with support from the community leaders or referred to the police or judiciary as last resort. Informal dispute resolution mechanisms are therefore mainly led by traditional and religious leaders and in some cases local CSOs or humanitarian organizations. In some instances, the conflict has caused traditional leadership structures to take on more roles, such as sensitizing the community on how to improve social cohesion.

Due to the conflict, most islands in the lake have been abandoned by the population due to insecurity. The insurgency exacerbated farmer-herder conflicts as the pastoralists' transhumance patterns were affected by increasing contact between farmers and herders and traditional trade routes were inaccessible. Regional trade and commercial networks have already been disrupted by the Boko Haram crisis and to ensure survival, many traders have had to resort to other sources of supply and take new routes at higher costs. Key livelihood activities such as agriculture, farming and fishing have been negatively affected by the conflict situation, effects of climate change and environmental degradation. As an example, between 2015 and 2019, fishery and cultivation of bell peppers was banned by the authorities in the Diffa Region (Niger), with the objective to cutting the financial flow of their commercialization towards the group Boko Haram. In 2021 access to certain islands was banned to the population in the Lac province (Chad) for military operations. Insecurity has also caused an influx of NGOs in certain states, increasing demand for new services such as real estate, private security and construction, while other services have been closed or significantly reduced, such as those related to tourism and investments.

Communities are at the center of the ongoing violence and crisis in the region and are sometimes caught in the middle of hostilities with accusations from each party of supporting the other, which leads them to be victimized by various parties. Communities are suffering losses of lives, livelihoods, being forcibly displaced with associated illnesses and hunger, often disproportionately affecting women, children and people with disabilities. Community resilience requires support, in light of the longstanding challenges affecting the region. In other words, even the minimum-to-moderate outcome of trends still necessitates the rebuilding of community resilience. The cumulative damage caused by the Boko Haram crisis, farmer-herder conflicts and other forms of violence and banditry, have all disrupted the local LCB economies. Agricultural activities including fishing, farming and animal husbandry, which constitute the base of the regional economy, have all dwindled in output. Trade and transport networks have equally suffered major setbacks that have induced a rise in the cost of trading, higher prices of agricultural products, and income losses for several communities.

A whole-of-society approach to addressing the complex crisis of the Lake Chad Basin means that efforts of state or government actors are part of a broader framework of endeavors. Involving non-state actors such as local community-based organizations (CBOs), local civil society organizations (CSOs) and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those situated among affected communities, is crucial. Local CBOs and CSOs are a bridge for citizen participation in discussing issues that concern them and are critical voices for accountability and transparency of policy implementation.

### **Stakeholder Analysis**

Main actors present in the areas are the military and police, vigilantes and other community militia, INGOs, CSOs as well as grassroots associations, state officials and agencies, community and religious leaders, trade unions.

**JAS and ISWAP:** Although the group’s violence intensified progressively since 2009, Boko Haram’s origins date back to the 2002 period when its followers were referred to as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’. Beyond this period, followers have more prominently been known as the *Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad* or JAS. In March 2015, Boko Haram declared allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and by August 2016, the group splintered, and its breakaway faction was recognised as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). At the time, JAS and ISWAP disagreed on ideological issues and how civilians should be treated, with JAS’s violence against women gaining the group global notoriety. JAS claimed to conduct its own ‘jihad’ by not attacking Muslims even though, this is not entirely the case. Rapport with communities also reflects some nuance in the positioning of JAS and ISWAP. Both factions are known to engage in extortion of local populations. This entails looting and various forms of taxation aimed at generating and sustaining funds for operations. ISWAP, on the other hand, has adopted a more conciliatory method of engagement and operations in recent years; its objective of winning hearts and minds has become more apparent. The two factions continue to launch attacks on security forces’ locations, raids on communities and mounting checkpoints for looting, robbing and abducting passengers. Despite the leadership spasms of the group, perpetuation of attacks, interaction with (and disruption of) communities, as well as responses from security forces, JAS and ISWAP have retained the ability to adapt and remain resilient<sup>23</sup>. Following the death of the JAS leader, Shekau, the faction was weakened and lost significant territories (as well as some fighters) to ISWAP. However, the group has maintained a presence and in Far North Region, Cameroon, where they were responsible for 80% of the attacks in 2022. ISWAP’s steady expansion in northwestern and central Nigeria (beyond the Lake Chad states) continued in 2022 and the group carried out attacks in several new locations. In July 2022, ISWAP with the aid of Ansuru (An Al Qaida affiliated group active in Nigeria) carried out a major complex attack on Kuje prison, not far from Abuja. In the attack over 800 inmates were freed, and only about half of them have been found. The attack illustrates ISWAP capacity to plan and carry out complex attacks but also a trend of new alliances between different extremist or violent groups. Another example of coordination between former foes was the abduction of over sixty passengers on a train bound for Kaduna in March by JAS in coordination with groups on bandits<sup>24</sup>

**Organised crime actors:** acts of banditry, abduction, highway robbery and cattle rustling have historically been recorded in this region even before the advent of the Boko Haram crisis. There are increasing suggestions that they may be receiving support from violent extremist groups in the region. The support may be motivated by various reasons, including expanding the pool for recruitment, resource mobilization, potential expansion of the scope of their activities and movement of weapons and personnel as well as other forms of logistics.

**Vigilantes:** the protracted nature of the Boko Haram crisis has led to the proliferation of non-state armed groups (NSAG), that include community militia organized in the form of vigilantes, such as the *Comité de Vigilance* (COVI) in Cameroon and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria. These are mainly self-defense groups and, for the most part, their activities are condoned by the governments and communities.

**NGOs and INGOS:** they are well present in some of the key affected areas of the region and often carry out humanitarian activities that support the government in delivering basic services, like health and child protection. Some tensions are reported that cause duplication of activities, weak collaboration with administrative authorities and frustration regarding the criteria for selection of beneficiaries and participants to certain programs. For example, a local CSO-driven Human Rights Observatory (HRO)

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<sup>23</sup> ISS Conflict Analysis 2020-2021

<sup>24</sup> ISS Presentation, November 2022 available upon request to the RS SRR Secretariat.

in the Far North Region of Cameroon was created in 2020 to monitor and address state violence and human rights violations committed by state personnel as a driver of violent extremism in affected communities. It reported on 181 human rights violations that occurred during counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram, such as torture, summary executions, enforced disappearances and SGBV.

**Local authorities and Governors:** In 2018 the Governor of Borno, invited his colleagues from the other affected territories around the Lake to what was named “the First Governors’ Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development”. This marked the beginning of closer involvement and coordination among the Governors’ Offices on issues of peacebuilding and stabilization in the region. In the RS SRR, the Governors are mandated to develop and oversee the implementation of the Territorial Action Plans; the “operationalization” of the RS SRR. The Governors’ Forum also serves as the primary mechanism for cross-border cooperation as well as domesticating implementation of the Strategy<sup>25</sup>. While the Governors’ have been at the forefront of stabilization and peacebuilding efforts since 2018, there are significant differences between Nigeria and the three other countries. For the latter, the Governors are appointed civil servants that rarely originate from the territory they are set to work in, and frequent changes of Governors are the rule rather than exception. In Nigeria, on the other hand, the Governors are elected for a four-year period and the Office comes with a significant administration and budget.

**Communities:** Communities and their leaders have been caught in the center of the ongoing conflict in the Lake Chad Basin region. Community members have lost lives, property and livelihoods, been displaced (sometimes multiple times), have faced disease and hunger due to the conflict and been separated from their families. Social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals/clinics, markets, etc. have been destroyed resulting in lack of opportunities. They are often caught in the middle of the hostilities between Boko Haram and the security forces and are sometimes accused by each party of supporting the other, sometimes leading to victimization by both sides. Community members have been abducted by Boko Haram and their women and girls have experienced forced marriages and other sexual violations. Apart from being victims of violence as a result of the conflict, community members, including women and youth, play a critical role in stabilization, mediation, and peacebuilding.

**Media:** The Media plays a key role in providing the necessary information as well as being platforms for dialogue to defuse tensions and contribute to building more stable societies. As a result, there are several chances for the media to play a helpful role in conflict transformation.

Despite the tense and constrained operational environment, media in the Lake Chad Basin have continued to provide minimum service to the affected populations through some existing local news outlets. However, the media, like all other stakeholders, has been hampered by a lack of access to a substantial portion of the conflict-affected areas, which means that a wide range of concerns impacting the population may go unreported. Community-led media, such as radio alternatives in Diffa, have formed in the affected communities, giving a first leverage point for sensitization, and reporting from within the affected communities. However, the space for media and their potential contribution to peace remains severely constricted, they require adequate support to develop, improve and begin playing their proper role.

Support for the media in the form of training, security, and financial resources has shown to be a potential strategy to keep the flow of independent information about the ongoing situation in conflict-affected regions.

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<sup>25</sup> See RS SRR <https://cblt.org/regional-strategy-stabilization/>



Even though the media is a key stakeholder in the region and hence considering in this conflict analysis, this project will not target the media as it is solely focused on promoting CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives.

**Other relevant stakeholders/platforms:**

**Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF):** established on 22 May 1964 by the four countries bordering Lake Chad: Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. The Commission's mandate is to manage the Lake Chad and shared water resources of the Basin sustainably and equitably, to preserve the ecosystems of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin and to promote regional integration, peace and security across the Basin. The Commission is located in N'Djamena, Chad. The Executive Secretary of the LCBC is also the Head of the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF). Initially called the Multinational Joint Security Force, the joint Military force was mandated in 1994 to combat organized crime and banditry in the region. In 2015, the deployment of the MNJTF to fight Boko Haram and stabilize the Lake Chad region was authorized by the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council. Following the regionalization of the Boko Haram crisis and the deployment of MNJTF, the LCBC recognized the need to complement military action with developmental interventions. The '**Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region**' (RS SRR) was thus developed by LCBC. The Strategy was adopted by the LCBC Council of Ministers in August 2018 and later the same year endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council.

The RS SRR offers a comprehensive approach to address the challenges of the region and builds on nine pillars, with a strong emphasis put on the New Way of Working and localization. The strategy is operationalized on two levels: the territorial level through the Territorial Action Plans for each of the eight territories, and on a regional level through regional structures and platforms such as the CSO platform, the Governors' Forum and the Regional Task Force.

**LCBC Regional CSO Platform:** The RS SRR identifies CSOs as a key stakeholder and thus the Regional Stabilization Secretariat has been deliberate in working closely with local civil society in the implementation of the Regional Strategy in the territories affected by conflict within the Lake Chad Basin. Localized responses, centering civil society engagement, are critical to enhancing the resilience of communities, while creating a more efficient transition from relief-centered assistance towards lasting, self-sustaining national/community-driven processes that reduce poverty, vulnerability, exclusion, and instability. CSOs usually act as sub-contractors of INGOs or UN agencies and have very little autonomy in programming and agenda/priority setting. As sub-contractors, they never gain the experience of planning and implementation based on their own needs assessment. Additionally, while numerous assessments are being done by international partners across the humanitarian, development, peace nexus, sub-contracting CSOs as enumerators, these are largely not coordinated across the HDP nexus, and result in programs being implemented in silos. These limitations mean local CSOs are not only unable to design and implement their own projects/programs based on their knowledge, but they are also reduced to implement projects dictated by lead agencies, instead of implementing holistic projects which reflect actual needs on the ground, irrespective of silo funding streams and program cycles incentives.

The Regional CSO Platform is a coordination mechanism created in December 2020 to enable the role of civil society in the implementation and monitoring of the RS-SRR. The platform is a decentralized structure of about 240 national and local civil society organizations across the four riparian countries. The platform not only facilitates civil society engagement with the regional strategy, but also serves

as a medium for cross territorial and cross border collaboration between national and local civil society on stabilization, recovery and resilience initiatives. The platform provides for a structured network for CSOs in the Lake Chad region with CSO country leads in the four countries as well as CSO focal points in each of the 8 territories covered by the Regional Strategy in the 4 countries.

Through the Regional CSO Platform, CSOs have participated in the articulation of the TAPs, resulting in their ownership and potential for contributing to their implementation. In addition to this, CSOs have played and continue to play an active role in key policy making and framework definition. CSOs were actively present in key regional political platforms, including the LCB Governors' Forums of 2019 and 2021 as well as the High-Level Forums on the Lake Chad in Oslo, Berlin and Niamey. Through the declaration<sup>26</sup> issued at the 3<sup>rd</sup> LCB high level conference in Niamey, January 2023, CSOs called for more engagement and efforts from stakeholders to build on the gains from the implementation of the RSS-RR to further consolidate peace in the region. They specifically emphasized:

- Increased access to and protection of populations affected by the crisis especially women and children;
- Reconstruction of the Lake Chad Basin region with a priority on social infrastructures;
- Special attention must be focused on climate change;
- Actors to respect the Istanbul Grand Bargain engagements especially on localization of aid;
- Enhanced women and youth participation in decision making.

The proposed initiative will therefore be a key step in the right direction to start addressing the issues highlighted by the local CSOs, including the need for a more localized response through CSO led actions, with a key focus on the protection of women and youth in the conflict affected territories.

**The LCBC CSO Directory and Information Management System (DIMS)<sup>27</sup>:** The CSO Directory and Information Management System was set up by the LCBC to support the overarching CSO engagement framework within the Regional Strategy. It is designed to be the information management system of the LCBC/RSS CSO Platform, reinforcing knowledge sharing and capacity development support through an online directory of civil society actors. The first phase of mapping and assessment of over 900 CSOs in the region was concluded in 2022. A second phase is underway and it is expected that DIMS will enable coalition building (including across territories and across borders), TAP reporting, programmatic engagement and organizational strengthening. Once fully realized, DIMS will serve the following objectives:

1. A comprehensive, offline/online directory of civil society organizations, including their capacities and needs;
2. Promotion of CSO engagement in TAP development and implementation;
3. A vehicle for CSO reporting and information sharing;
4. Facilitation of needs based CSO capacity strengthening;
5. Promotion of partnership, cross border harmonization and coherence across the HDP nexus using an area-based approach.

DIMS is a multi-year initiative launched in April 2021 and is being implemented in two phases. Phase I (completed in 2022) resulted in proposed criteria for membership in DIMS and the CSO Platform, the digital platform architecture (capacity strengthening and information management), and the mapping of


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<sup>26</sup> CSO Declaration issued at the High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Basin in Niamey, January 2023. Available in UNDP SharePoint folder

<sup>27</sup> DIMS available at UNDP Stabilization shared point and LCBC Knowledge Management Platform: <https://communityconnect.cblt.org/>

CSOs across the eight territories which resulted in the creation of four country-based directories. The CSOs mapped are engaged in humanitarian, development and peacebuilding initiatives across the territories with activities aligned with the nine pillars of the Regional Strategy. Of the CSOs mapped (240 in Cameroon, 339 in Nigeria, 98 in Niger, and 239 in Chad), 48% are community-based, 30% are national NGOs while 17% are local NGOs. Additionally, 47% are women-led, 30% are youth-led, while 82% work primarily through volunteers. Annual budgets for the CSOs range from \$80 to over \$8000. Below is a snapshot of the mapped CSOs, which shows that most of the funding is currently allocated to Pillars 4, 6, 7 and 8 on top of the cross-cutting Pillar 9. This highlights, and reinforces the ask from CSOs, the need to enhance funding for Pillars 2 and 3, that will be among the priorities for this initiative based on their expertise.

### Sample CSO directories



Phase II (from 2023-2025) will produce a digital platform, linked to the central LCBC Knowledge Management Platform<sup>28</sup>, with offline and online features: a private interface supporting CSOs’ organizational sustainability and (cross-border) collaboration and a public-facing CSO directory, providing opportunities for partnerships, cross-territorial and cross-border cooperation; ensuring the visibility of CSOs programmatic efforts and needs, as well as an overview of CSOs strengths and organizational challenges allowing for tailor-made external institutional support. To respond to the varying capacities within the region, the capacity development architecture employs a two-track approach where CSOs are differentiated into Track 1 (advanced) and Track 2 (nascent). While the organizational growth support mechanism positions Track 1 CSOs for funding, Track 2 CSOs are supported to move to Track 1. DIMS is therefore set to be a one-stop point for all stakeholders seeking to form partnerships with CSOs in the various territories. Indeed, the proposed DIMS phase 2 envisages an online version that includes key information about CSOs sectors of engagement, experience in the various sectors and geographical areas, current projects, and funding sources.

**LCB Governors’ Forum:** To date four LCB Governors’ Forums have been held; in Maiduguri,

<sup>28</sup> <https://communityconnect.cbilt.org/>

Nigeria, in May 2018, in Niamey, Niger 2019 and in Yaoundé, Cameroon in October 2021. The fourth Forum took place in N’Djamena, Chad on 5- 7 July 2023. The Forum has at different occasions been delayed: in 2020 because of the Covid pandemic and in 2022 due to the domestic political situation in Chad. The Governors’ Forum serves as the primary mechanism for cross-border dialogue, coordination and exchanges under the RS SRR. The Forum brings local and national Government together, alongside regional actors, CSOs and international partners. As such it has over the past years established itself as the main platform for political dialogue in the LCB and enables a shared understanding of the key challenges facing the region as well as offer opportunity to discuss regional and cross-border solutions. Significantly, at the third Governors’ Forum in Yaoundé, the Governors agreed to facilitate the contribution of civil society and the engagement of CSOs in the implementation and monitoring of the TAPs but also to “commit to a set of common regional priorities for stabilization, recovery and sustainable development, including but not limited to the conduct of community based DDRR, cross-border trade, greater investment in socio-economic opportunities; the empowerment of youth and women; good governance; and leveraging on the role of civil society for sustaining peace and development in the Lake Chad Basin region”. As such Governors recognizes, but also further emphasizes, the critical role of CSO in the implementation of the RS SRR and the TAPs on territorial and regional level. The CSO Declaration at the 4<sup>th</sup> Governors Forum further stressed the importance and need for sustained engagement with civil society organizations. Specifically, CSOs asked for sustained, meaningful and equitable partnerships between all actors and CSOs at the territorial, national and regional levels; and donor funding flexibility to increase and enhance funding to CSOs including through a dedicated local CSO fund<sup>29</sup>.

**RS SRR Regional Task Force:** The RS SRR Regional Task Force aims to bring together the regional stakeholders working in the Lake Chad Basin in areas linked to stabilization, recovery and resilience to promote a “New Way of Working”. It is composed of international and national implementing partners of the Strategy. The Regional Task Force is further divided into three “self-governed” thematic clusters, aligned to the 9 RSS pillars of intervention as well as the UN Country Frameworks for Assistance, the AU Sahel Strategy and the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, namely: 1) Governance; 2) Development and Humanitarian; and 3) Security and Protection. Through the Clusters the Regional Task Force contributes to building synergies and coordination amongst partners in the LCB, identifies opportunities of collaboration, facilitate information sharing and also supports with the development and review of documentation, including the RS SRR annual report.

- b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks**<sup>30</sup>, how it ensures **national ownership**. If this project is designed in a PRF country, describe how the main objective advances a relevant strategic objective identified through the Eligibility Process

### **Existing Regional and Governmental Strategic Frameworks**

As mentioned above, this project is aligned and embedded within ‘**Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region**’. The Regional Strategy has 9 pillars, which are split into 40 strategic objectives to address the short-, medium- and long-term needs of the affected areas towards stabilization, recovery and resilience. To aid with the coordination of actors implementing these pillars, the pillars are grouped into three thematic clusters as follows:

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<sup>29</sup> CSO Declaration at 4<sup>th</sup> Governors Forum at UNDP SharePoint

<sup>30</sup> Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc.

- ② *Humanitarian and Development* - Humanitarian Assistance (Pillar 4); Socio-Economic Recovery and Environment Sustainability (Pillar 6); and Education, Learning and Skills (Pillar 7)
- ② *Governance* - Political Cooperation (Pillar 1); Governance and the Social Contract (Pillar 5)
- ② *Peace and Security* - Security and Human Rights (Pillar 2); DDRRR of Persons Associated with Boko Haram (Pillar 3); and Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace (Pillar 8)
- ② Pillar 9, which focuses on Empowerment and Inclusion of Women and Youth, is a cross-cutting pillar.

This intervention will focus on the operationalization of identified priority Pillars as per the above conflict analysis, also selected based on the local CSOs’ own assessments and project development consultations. These **priority Pillars** of the Strategy will include Pillars 2 – Security and Human Rights; Pillar 3 – DDRRR of Persons associated with extremist and violent Boko Haram armed groups; Pillar 8 – Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace; mainstreaming Pillar 9 – Empowerment and Inclusion of Women and Youth by promoting CSOs work in these thematic areas.


Over the past three years, the LCBC has promoted the participation of local CSOs in the overall implementation of the Regional Strategy through high level political advocacy and engagement with the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). During these engagements at the PBC, participants stressed the need to balance State-military efforts and security approaches to the crisis in the region with triple nexus intervention focusing on the role civil society can play in enhancing the triple nexus approach and facilitating community engagement to strengthen stabilization efforts. Mainly with the creation of the Regional CSO Platform, there are now tools to effectively support local CSOs in implementing local and cross-border peacebuilding initiatives, anchored in Territorial Action and in line with the political efforts of the four riparian states under the Regional Strategy.

The RS SRR is operationalised through the Territorial Action Plans (TAP), which were launched at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Governors’ Forum, Yaoundé, in October 2021. Each TAP was developed building upon already existing local and national development plans, and as such they represent a comprehensive framework of the actions and priorities required to reach each territory’s vision for the future. For ease of implementation, the various interventions are categorized under the same broad clusters as the RS SRR with the addition of “Cross-border Interventions”. Governors’ Offices in each territory are responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the TAPs, while their implementation remains a shared responsibility of the state actors, international donors, local CSOs and other actors operating on the ground. A key component to the success of the TAPs is the continuous ownership of local actors. Here local CSO play a critical role, not only as implementing actors, but for advocacy and accountability. Attached to the project submission is summaries of each of the TAPs<sup>31</sup>.

## **Overview of the Territorial Action Plans and Governors’ Office cross-border proposals <sup>32</sup>**

<sup>31</sup> TAPs Strategic Summaries. Available on the UNDP SharePoint folder and upon request to the RS SRR Secretariat.

<sup>32</sup> RS SRR factsheet <https://cblt.org/download/rss-factsheet/>



TAPs were articulated and elaborated under the leadership of the Governors’ offices and represent the key priorities of each of the eight territories – moving from humanitarian to long-term recovery and resilience of communities. They provide a great opportunity to mobilize CSOs at various levels to support these priorities.

Local CSOs play a key role in implementing the TAPs, in advocating for their effective implementation and for accountability of the key stakeholders. This project would be a pilot to streamline joint CSO engagement in the TAPs, combining expertise of various CSOs/ CBOs operational under RS SRR Pillars, using the Directory (DIMS) to access a pool of pre-qualified organizations, using the Directory’s vetting system.<sup>33</sup> This wide accreditation framework, considered a single-entry point for CSOs to enable coordination among and between CSOs and other actors through a structured channel, aims to not only facilitate better engagement and greater collaboration, but also to streamline CSOs engagement with institutional partners for visibility and direct resource mobilization in the context of the RS SRR.

### National Strategic Frameworks

**Governmental Strategic Frameworks in Chad:** Consultations on the new 2024-2026 cooperation framework between the Government of Chad and the United Nations system took place on March 31, 2023, through a workshop aimed at defining the pillars and priorities of the Government to be included in the new cooperation framework. The Government, through its Minister of Economic Prospective, Mr. Moussa Batraki, emphasized that this cooperation framework, which is proposed for the period

<sup>33</sup> In defining the criteria for the Directory, the accreditation criteria were viewed as large as possible to encompass the whole spectrum of CSOs (excluding INGOs). The criteria were developed based on principles of inclusiveness and simplicity. There are a multitude of definitions of civil society organizations, tailored by institutions as per their objectives and aims. The RS SRR Secretariat in its consultation processes has reached out to a wide range of civil society actors, going beyond “organizations”, and including what it has termed representatives from “woman and youth, traditional and religious leaders, and academics

2024-2026, will have to be aligned with the roadmap for this second phase of the political transition, as well as with the National Development Plan (NDP). The formulation process was initiated on the basis of the evaluation of the current cooperation framework, which ends this year 2023, and the 2030 Agenda. The UNDAF 2017-2021 and the current cooperation framework aims to accompany "Vision 2030, the Chad we want" which corresponds to the image of the future that Chadians want to share. It is based primarily on a united, supportive and peaceful nation in order to make Chad "a peaceful nation, unified in its cultural diversity, resilient through its transformed economy and offering a pleasant living environment for all". The revised roadmap for second phase of the political transition revolves around three pillars, (i) defense and security, peace and social cohesion and national reconciliation, (ii) the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, and (iii) the return to constitutional order and the reconstruction of the state.

**Governmental Strategic Frameworks in Cameroon:** For its economic and social development, Cameroon adopted in 2009 a long-term development Vision, which aims to make Cameroon "an emerging country, democratic and united in its diversity by 2035". Through this Vision, the Government proposes: (i) to achieve close to double-digit economic growth; (ii) to reach the 25% threshold as the share of manufacturing production in GDP; (iii) to significantly reduce poverty by reducing its incidence to less than 10% in 2035; (iv) to consolidate the democratic process and strengthen national unity while respecting the country's diversity. This Vision is now in the second phase of its implementation, under the National Development Strategy 2020-2030 (NDS 2030). The NDS 2030 relies on 4 (four) main pillars, namely: (i) structural transformation of the national economy; (ii) development of human capital and wellbeing; (iii) promotion of employment and economic integration; (iv) governance, decentralization and strategic management of the State. Furthermore, the Government established a Special Reconstruction Plan for the Far North region. The five-year plan, with a three billion USD budget, will focus on i) the reconstruction of public buildings and infrastructure; ii) infrastructure development; iii) socioeconomic development, including income-generating activities at community level; and iv) establishment of governance mechanisms for the Special Plan (steering committee). UNDP is the Government's fiduciary and implementing agency for the Plan.

**Governmental Strategic Frameworks in Nigeria:** The Nigeria National Development Plan 2021-2025 has identified four strategic goals to drive the country's development agenda. The fourth goal seeks to enhance security, peace, and governance by strengthening institutions, promoting justice, and ensuring the safety of all citizens. The goal has four outputs that aim to achieve these objectives. The first output aims to advance the rule of law, access to justice, and respect for human rights through the improved capacity of institutions and right holders. This output aims to support victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to have access to justice, increase the number of SGBV cases reported to the National GBV Data Situation Room (NGDSR) and resolved with survivors compensated, and increase the percentage of police officers expressing positive perceptions and attitudes towards police reform. The second output focuses on increasing the participation and representation of women, youth, and other marginalized groups in governance processes. The third output seeks to strengthen systems, institutions, and capacities, including civil society, for enhancing good governance. Finally, the fourth output aims to strengthen systems, institutions, and capacities for transitioning to development solutions and for inclusive and gender-responsive peacebuilding. This output aims to increase the number of functional infrastructures for peace at the national and sub-national levels and increase the number of gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive development policies, systems, and plans in place to prevent the risk of conflict, including climate security.

**Governmental Strategic Frameworks in Niger:** Niger's 2022-2026 Economic and Social Development Plan (ESDP) has five strategic axes that reflect all the dimensions of sustainable human

development. The overall objective of the ESDP is to build a peaceful, well-governed country with an emerging and sustainable economy in order to improve the well-being of the population. This impact will be measured by a reduction in the incidence of poverty, the gender inequality index and an improvement in the human development index. Under Strategic Area 7 "Governance and modernization of the State"; the security component of the action undertaken will focus, among other things, on "improving collaboration between the defense and security forces and the population". In the area of peacebuilding, ESDP aims to create the conditions for dealing with emergency situations relating to conflict and threats of conflict through the HACP and the Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahelo-Saharan zones of Niger (SDS-Sahel).

### **Existing UN Frameworks**

**UN Strategy for the Sahel:** The project is in alignment with the United Nations Integrated Strategy for Sahel (UNISS) Strategic Objective 1.2: Support ongoing efforts by the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to successfully implement their Stabilization Strategy and Programme, including the development plan for recharging of the Lake.

### **UNSDCFs**

**Chad:** This project falls under the third strategic priority of the new cooperation framework (UNSDCF 2024-2026). Chad recently developed the new United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2024 - 2026, which succeeds the UNDAF 2017 - 2021, to provide joint support for the implementation of the PND 2024 - 2028 (under development), the United Nations 2030 agenda and Chad's 2030 vision, titled "The Chad We Want". The latter thus declared "Chad, a peaceful nation, united in cultural diversity, resilient by its transformed economy and offering a pleasant living environment for the well-being of all". The PND 2024 - 2028 like the previous one is structured in four strategic axes: Axis 1 Strengthening national unity; Axis 2 Strengthening good governance and the rule of law; Axis 3 Structural transformation of the economy through economic diversification; Axis 4 Improvement of the living conditions of the population and reduction of social inequalities. Thus, in the perspective of the United Nations Agenda 2030, joint United Nations support for the implementation of the PND 2024 - 2028 and the 2030 Chad's vision, the UNSDCF will focus on the following four strategic priorities: (i) Access to and use of quality basic social services; (ii) Development of food systems, improvement of food and nutritional security and the living environment; (iii) Governance (rule of law, social cohesion and peace); (iv) Economic growth. This UNSDCF 2024-2026 also draws on regional strategies, including the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNIS) and the country priorities relating to the Global Alliance for the Resilience Initiative (GARI). It takes into account the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which are adapted to national needs and realities, lessons learned from the implementation of the UNS Interim Strategic Frameworks, Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) and the successive MDG evaluation reports.

**Cameroon:** This project aligns with the UNSDCF for Cameroon 2022-2026, which is based on the Government "Vision 2035" which aims to transform Cameroon into an emerging, democratic, and united country in diversity. The Growth and Employment Strategy Paper implemented this vision between 2010 and 2019 through the Strategy Paper for Growth and Employment which marked the first phase of implementation. The 2020–2030 National Development Strategy, which the Government of Cameroon recently adopted, will support implementing the second phase of Vision 2035. Furthermore, the United Nations system and the Government of Cameroon will collaborate towards addressing the gaps and challenges that hinder the populations' equitable, inclusive and sustainable



access to opportunities. In particular, the United Nations system and the Government of Cameroon will target opportunities to improve people's socio-economic well-being, the use of essential social services such as health, nutrition, education and social protection, access to life in a healthy environment, as well as the ability to enjoy their rights fully and build their resilience capacities fully which revolves around 4 pillars: the structural transformation of the economy; the development of human capital and well-being; the promotion of employment and integration; The governance, decentralisation, and strategic management of the State.

**Niger:** The implementation of the UNSDCF in Niger is guided by the following three strategic priorities, which aligns with this project, namely with the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> strategic priority:

(i) Strengthen governance, particularly ethics and the pact of trust between elected officials and the people

(ii) Empowerment of women and youth as actors of peace, reduction of socio-economic inequalities, and political engagement.


(iii) Unleashing Niger's potential in term of natural resources potential.

In the security and peace area, the UNSDCF will contribute to improving the governance of institutions responsible for security, stabilization, social cohesion, and peacebuilding. It will support the implementation of interventions aimed at strengthening the protection of civilians and human rights, consolidating the peace architecture, and contributing to the peace agenda at the national level, with emphasis on the operationalization of the National Action Plan of Resolution 1325 on the participation of women in the peace and security process.

**Nigeria:** The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for Nigeria 2023-2027 comprises four strategic priorities summarized as the 4 Ps: Prosperity, Planet, People, and Peace supported by the fifth P, Partnerships. The strategic vision for Peace of the UNSDCF is for people in Nigeria of all ages, especially the most vulnerable, to benefit from peace and security, and protection from conflict, violence, and crime through strengthened capacity and infrastructure. Strategic Priority Area 4 on Peace for Nigeria focuses on achieving more inclusive, participatory, transparent and gender-sensitive governance, justice and human rights systems to promote the acceleration of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Nigeria. By 2027, the outcomes of this strategic priority area aim to ensure that people in Nigeria, especially the most vulnerable, benefit from peace and security, access to justice, and enhanced gender equality and human rights. To achieve these outcomes, the UNSDCF outlines specific outputs, such as strengthening systems and institutions for transitioning to development solutions, enhancing good governance, and increasing meaningful participation and representation of women, youth, and other marginalized groups in the governance process. The strategic priority area aligns with the objectives of the Nigerian Development Plan (NDP) 2021-2025 and the SDGs 16 and 5, as well as the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063. The UNSDCF also recognizes the need to address discriminatory gender and social norms and harmful practices, including child marriage and female genital mutilation, and to improve the livelihoods of persons with disabilities, especially older persons with disabilities.

**UNDP Regional Stabilization Facility for the Lake Chad:** In 2019 UNDP launched the Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF) for the Lake Chad. The facility has a dual focus; on short term/immediate stabilization and, secondly, to building the preconditions for extended stabilization. UNDP understands Stabilization as a timebound, localized, integrated civilian program of activities with the primary purpose of extending State presence through establishing minimum security conditions, essential infrastructure and services and livelihood opportunities. Those are understood as necessary to re-establish the social contract and lay the foundations for peace. Immediate stabilization is undertaken in close collaboration with local and national authorities, in **Joint Action Plan (JAP)**

**locations;** often a specific community that have been severely impacted by the Boko Haram crisis. Under the RSF in the Lake Chad Basin there are currently 31 ongoing JAP locations (in yellow on the map below) and another 19 planned for 2023 (in red on the map below) across the LCB region. There are also 10 cross-border JAP locations. In most of the JAP locations community committees have been established to promote community security, conflict resolution and social cohesion. The JAPs are critical contributors to the TAPs and UNDP is, through the RSF, also supporting the LCBC’s capacity to coordinate the TAPs and capacity to steer and support RS SSR implementation and governance structures. This support constitutes the “extended stabilization” of the RSF.



In blue: 31 active Joint Action Plan (JAP) locations from inception until end of 2022 with 2,200,000 population active  
 In red: 19 additional JAP locations planned

**Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus**

The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016 underscored the need for the humanitarian and development sectors to align around collective outcomes and work jointly on analysis, data collection, planning and to collaborate at the country level and increase the coherence of aid deployment. UN Reforms put even a stronger emphasis on new ways of working to foster collective outcome and impactful results. The Commitment to Action, signed by eight of the main UN humanitarian and development entities (FAO, OCHA, UNCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO) and IOM, co-signed by former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and endorsed by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, meant the preminent joint UN and World Bank commitment to move forward on

achieving the Agenda for Humanity and transcend humanitarian-development divides. The additional initiative Peace Promise to ensure conflict sensitivity and address drivers of conflict was another step on the operationalization of the triple nexus approach.

The project seeks to operationalize the HDP Nexus (*New Way of Working*) via the work of the CSOs and facilitates the work of local peacebuilding CSOs - as identified by the recent PBSO Thematic Review as key to achieve greater results at community level<sup>34</sup>.

In Cameroon, for example, the project will align with the collective outcome, which states that “By the end of 2026, the most vulnerable populations (internally displaced persons, returned internally displaced persons, refugees, repatriated or economically inserted refugees, host and/or communities of origin) living in areas of convergence in the Far North, North, Adamawa, East, Northwest and Southwest priority regions, or in other regions affected by crises recover indiscriminately their fundamental rights and improve their physical well-being and social welfare”<sup>35</sup>. Cameroon was the first country to volunteer at the World Humanitarian Summit to implement the Nexus approach (previously called The New Way of Working). It became one of the seven priority countries in 2017. Cameroon has a National HDP Nexus Task Force and two Regional Task Forces - one covers the Far-North region and the other the Eastern Front (North, Adamaoua and East regions). The vision of the HDP Nexus in Cameroon is based on a bottom-up approach. It seeks to create synergies between Humanitarian, Development and Peacebuilding interventions in municipalities where conditions allow for the three types of interventions. These municipalities are called Convergence Areas. In the Far-North region, 25 municipalities have been selected as areas of convergence, of which 6 were prioritised to start the implementation in 2022. In the Eastern Front, 21 municipalities have been selected, and 7 were prioritised for 2022<sup>36</sup>.

**UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE):** The UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism recognizes that a sustainable and inclusive approach to the phenomenon requires a balance between security-oriented measures and development interventions. An integrated approach is, indeed, crucial to address the upward trend of violent extremist groups’ attacks and promote disengagement of former fighters. Additionally, the recent (March 2023) remarks of the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council open debate on “Countering Terrorism & Preventing Violent Extremism by strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and mechanisms” highlighted the need of the UN to cooperate with regional entities to address this phenomenon. This intervention aims to support LCBC on that, as one of the focus-pillar of the CSOs responses will be on PVE.

- c) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief **summary of existing interventions** in the proposal’s sector by filling out the table below.

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<sup>34</sup>Source : <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/local-peacebuilding-2022>

<sup>35</sup> The collective outcome is divided into three pillars and collective sub-outcomes:

Pillar 1: *Basic social services*

By the end of 2026, the most vulnerable people living in convergence areas and/or affected by the crisis access sustainable basic social services.

Pillar 2: *Sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities*

By the end of 2026, the most vulnerable people living in convergence areas access sustainable livelihoods and economic opportunities.

Pillar 3: *Protection, social cohesion and local governance*

By the end of 2026, good local governance and the consolidation of Peace protect the fundamental rights of the most vulnerable people living in convergence areas.

<sup>36</sup> <https://response.reliefweb.int/cameroon/humanitarian-development-peace-hdp-nexus-cameroon>

<b>Project name (duration)</b>	<b>Donor and budget</b>	<b>Project focus</b>	<b>Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal</b>
The Civil Society Network on Inclusive Reintegration	This network was conceptualized in 2018 by leading peace and security practitioners from African Civil Society Organizations that were convened by the UNDP and the Elman Peace Centre.	Support to community-based reintegration - <a href="https://peacebyafrica.com/">https://peacebyafrica.com/</a>	Some of the CSOs engaged in this network can apply to be part of this project.
Enhancing multisectoral resilience for vulnerable households in the conflict affected zones of Northeast Nigeria and North Cameroun  October 2022 – September 2026	Caritas Germany 4.5 million euros  Implementing partners: ALDEPA Cameroon Justice and Peace Commission Maiduguri Nigeria Caritas Maroua- Mokolo Diocese	50% food security 25% reconstruction 5% disaster risk management	This project is complementary to the PBF proposed interventions; indeed it is implemented in the same localities where also the PBF will be implemented, and focuses on some aspects that are in a sense enabling factors for communities rehabilitations (food security and livelihoods, infrastructure etc..) in the zones where PBF will be implementing peacebuilding activities.
Supporting CSOs in Northern Cameroun to actively engage in promoting civic participation processes, peace and human rights protection with a particular focus on women and youth	Funded by the EU delegation in Cameroon  425 531 euros  Implementing partner: ALDEPA	Civic participation Promoting transparency and accountability in the decision-making processes Conflict prevention Enhancing citizens competence in peacebuilding, promoting social cohesion, Improved social and economic reintegration for	This project is very much complementary to the proposed PBF project as indeed it addresses some of thematic issues that have also been identified through consultations with various actors

February 2022 – January 2025		youth and women that are members of CSOs in the target regions in North and far North Cameroun	including human rights promotion, enhancing CSOs capacities in peacebuilding. Discussions have been undertaken with actors in the region and the communities to ensure that we build on the foundations laid by this project and most importantly extend to communities that were left out as this project is quite small and only reached a few communities.
Northeast Connection (Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism and Conflict in Northeast Nigeria) 2021 - 2023	USAID/Creative Associates International \$ 2.1 Million	Mitigating the grievances that may erode social cohesion within and across communities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, and ultimately create a stronger foundation against violent extremist threats and other conflicts	The project did not focus on strengthening capacity of CSOs in Peace Building and no cross border or cross territory activities for peace building and stabilization in the LCR.
Support to Early Recovery from Conflict and Resilience building in Yobe state.  2019 - 2023	EU/ International Alert	Build the capacity of state and non-state actors on problem solving (mediation) in relation to the reintegration of survivors (Men, Women, Boys, Girls and Children Associated with Armed Conflict) of Boko Haram related abductions in Yobe state.  Develop a community Action plan for communities and LGAs to facilitate reintegration in the communities, which	Difference: The project was implemented in 3 LGAs of Yobe state and does not consider inter border interventions and learning.  Complementarity: The project targeted at re-integration and stabilization in Boko Haram affected communities.

		will be coalesced into a white paper for Advocacy purposes at the State and National levels.	
Project to prevent the feminization of Boko Haram's modus operandi in Chad (2021-2023)	PBF to UNDP and UNICEF \$1.5M	The project aims to strengthen the knowledge, skills and resilience capacities of women and girls so that they are less attracted to voluntary recruitment into Boko Haram	The project has been implemented in the same zone and included local NGO as its implementing approach as implementing partners.
Gender and peace: Let's mobilize for an inclusive peacebuilding process (2023-2025)	PBF to COOPI \$1.5M	The project aims at contributing to the reduction of conflicts related to economic resources in the Lake Chad region and creating an environment conducive to social cohesion and peaceful coexistence through the inclusion of women, young women and women's organizations in the dialogue on peacebuilding.	Same area of implementation and almost the same approach of including women and community-based women's association in the process of peacebuilding and social cohesion.
Enhancing Women's Meaningful Involvement in DDR Policy Design and Implementation in Cameroon Based on the National DDR Gender Strategy 2021-25: Strengthening Platforms for Women's Associations (2023 – 2025)	PBF to IOM and UNWOMEN \$ 2 million	To empower women's organizations (WO) to contribute meaningfully and sustainably to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and DDR-related processes in Cameroon, with an emphasis on reintegration and reconciliation. WOs will be empowered through supporting the establishment of working relationships with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee (NDDRC) and other organizations working on DDR	This project is complementary to the PBF proposed interventions in Cameroon; it is potentially implemented in the same localities of the Far North region and focuses on CSOs (women-led) implementation and capacity building. The difference or specificity consists in the fact that this project will only cover activities related to the DDR in Cameroon and its gender strategy.

		and DDR-related processes in Cameroon and in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB); strengthening their technical knowledge and institutional capacities; and providing them with financial means to participate in coordination structures and implement specific interventions.	
Peace through Health: peacebuilding and violence reduction in communities in the Far-North, through inclusive health and social interventions  (2 December 2021 to 2 Jun 2023, NCE ongoing)	PBF to WHO and IOM \$ 2,562,043.40	Contribute to strengthening the socio-political and institutional conditions for effective and sustainable peace in Cameroon, by using health interventions as an entry point to support national entities and local communities towards promoting social cohesion, dialogue on security issues, and trust between communities, and towards national authorities in the Far-North region, specifically addressing the negative impacts of armed groups in the Far North.	This project is complementary to the PBF proposed interventions in Cameroon; it is potentially implemented in the same localities of the Far North region and focuses promoting social cohesion, dialogue on security issues, and trust between communities, and towards national authorities in the Far-North region, specifically addressing the negative impacts of armed groups in the Far North.
Support for peaceful cohabitation between the communities of Logone Birni in the Far North of Cameroon  (December 2022 – May 2024)	PBF to IOM, FAO, UNDP, UNHCR \$4,000,000	The project proposes activities that directly address the root causes of inter-community conflict in Logone and Chari in the far north of Cameroon, by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Strengthening early warning, dialogue, prevention and conflict management mechanisms</li> <li>ii. Strengthening access to justice, particularly through</li> </ul>	This project is complementary to the PBF proposed interventions in Cameroon specifically on addressing intercommunal violence root causes; it is potentially implemented in the same localities of the Far North region (Logone Chari).

		<p>the various mechanisms of traditional justice, institutional justice and through participatory dialogues as well as law enforcement and positive communication mechanisms</p> <p>iii. Improving community resilience and livelihoods to a reasonable extent and with explicit peacebuilding/social cohesion linkages to the previous two outcomes</p>	
<p>Strengthening reconciliation and reintegration pathways for persons associated with non-state armed groups, and communities of reintegration, including women and children, in Northeast of Nigeria</p> <p>2022-2024</p>	<p>PBF to UNODC, IOM, UNDP and UNICEF</p> <p>\$2,300,000</p>	<p>The aim of this project is to catalytically support the coordinated interventions of Federal and Borno State Governments at the policy and political level for reconciliation and reintegration pathways in Borno State communities. The ultimate goal of the project is to facilitate long-term reconciliation and reintegration for persons associated with non-state armed groups and affected communities in Borno State. In order to achieve this goal, the project targets Federal and Borno States to ensure they are better coordinated at policy and political level and that communication with the communities is improved.</p>	<p>This project is complementary to the PBF proposed interventions; indeed it is implemented in the same localities where also the PBF will be implemented. Outcome area 2 focuses on Bama LGA in Borno State for Reintegration and Reconciliation activities which CSOs under the LCB project can support with their own initiatives.</p>

**I. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results**



## II. Framework Annex)

- a) A brief **description of the project** focus and approach – describe the project’s overarching goal, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- responsive).

The project promotes local civil society peacebuilding initiatives in the implementation of the Governors’ Territorial Action Plans (TAPs), and streamlines joint CSO engagement in the TAPs, via a CSO group model combining expertise of various CSOs/ CBOs, managed by the UNDP CO in-country and the UNDP regional level. The project’s objective is to promote CSO-led implementation of local and cross-border peacebuilding initiatives in line with the priorities identified by the CSOs in the 4 pillars of the RSS. This is done by building and promoting CSOs capacities to design, plan and form partnerships based on local and cross-border needs they have identified as relevant to them and as per priority activities listed in the TAPs and the priority pillars. CSOs will be accompanied to design effective and quality territorial and cross-border projects and provided micro-grants to implement the designed projects, based on the concept notes they submit.

This project is a timely and catalytic investment in local CSOs engagement across the triple nexus, fostering coalition building, partnerships, and learning across all spectrums of civil society, recognizing the diversity of their contributions in the TAPs and to the JAPs. As direct implementers of multiple humanitarian, peace and development agencies, CSOs and CBOs’ work cuts across the HDP nexus and, as a result, these organizations have a particularly significant role to play in the TAPs implementation and can propose interventions that address the triple nexus.

Cognizant that CSOs and particularly local ones often operate in geographic areas where experienced INGOs do not, within their own communities armed with a deep appreciation, knowledge and understanding of the issues, dynamics, and are better placed therefore to work on the solutions with the communities, the joint CSO interventions will allocate a considerable amount of resources to CBOs and grassroots entities as they remain rooted in the communities where they work, staying behind when international NGOs leave.

The project’s results address the need for CSOs to own an area-based response framework, which allows them to promote sustaining peace/peacebuilding, recovery and reconstruction, by tackling cross-cutting vulnerability dynamics in the LCB region and by facilitating dialogue between CSOs and local/national authorities. It also foresees capacity building and reinforcement of the technical and administrative capacities of the CSOs. Furthermore, and responding to the need to ensure cross border and inter-TAPs work, the project will also foster joint CSOs projects across different TAPs.

Therefore, the project will have two main outcomes:

- 1) Increased collaboration between CSOs in the Lake Chad Basin region to implement effective peacebuilding activities in their countries in line with the eight TAPs.
- 2) Increased regional and cross border collaboration and engagement between CSOs across the 8 territories of the Lake Chad Basin region

Both results will have an element of **programmatic responses** in line with the priority pillars, i.e., the Security and Human Rights (Pillar 2); the DDRRR of persons associated with extremist and violent Boko Haram armed groups (Pillar 3); and/or the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace (Pillar 8) ensuring Pillar 9, the empowerment of women and youth, is mainstreamed, and, secondly,

within the two result areas, a component of **reinforcement of the CSOs' capacities** to deliver quality and impactful peacebuilding programming.

The first outcome will be led by UNDP COs with the support of UNDP regional office. The programmatic element and the monitoring will be done by the COs whereas activities related to training/capacity building will be done by the UNDP regional office by engaging a company or team of international/national consultants to facilitate the multiple capacity building activities. Outcome 2 will be delivered by UNDP regional office. In both outcomes, LCBC / RS SRR Secretariat is involved in the implementation.

Under the second result, the call for proposals will be managed by the UNDP regional office with LCBC and the same criteria of outcome 1 will apply but instead of focusing within one TAP location, it will be for inter-TAP/cross border proposals. The technical committee will be of regional level, counting also with the Governors, CSOs, Regional CSO Platform, LCBC / RS SR Secretariat, and UNDP regional and country offices. Moreover, the second outcome will focus on reinforcing the capacities of the Regional CSO Platform and on organizing at least two regional workshops for sharing of experiences and regional trainings because of the work undertaken under both streams of work.

- b) Provide a **project-level 'theory of change'** – explain the assumptions about why you expect the project interventions to lead to changes in the conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis. What are the assumptions that the theory is based on? Note, this is not a summary statement of your project's outcomes.

*(Note: Change may happen through various and diverse approaches, i.e. social cohesion may be fostered through dialogue or employment opportunities or joint management of infrastructure. The selection of which approach should depend on context-specific factors. What basic assumptions about how change will occur have driven your choice of programming approach?)*

**If** civil society organizations have the means, technical capacities and skills to design CSO-led peacebuilding project proposals and implement them,

**If** civil society organizations are encouraged to work together, instead of competing for resources, on promoting Security and Human Rights, DDRRR of Persons associated with extremist and violent Boko Haram armed groups, and on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Building Peace while considering the empowerment and inclusion of Women and Youth,

**If** community-based organizations and grassroots organizations, as well as youth- and women-led organizations, are directly involved and at the driving seat of CSO-led initiatives,

**If** other organizations' interventions are complemented and reinforced by CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives in a whole-of-society approach,

**If** the LCBC CSO Regional Platform is supported in terms of capacities and to play its role of regional convener and facilitator of sharing of experiences and lessons learnt,

**Then** the CSOs can be at the driving seat of defining their own priorities in support of TAPs implementation and contribute to the achievement of TAPs' results and, consequently, to enhanced stabilization, recovery and resilience, in line with the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience for the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region;

*Then* we will have more localized, context-specific and sustained peacebuilding activities;

*Because* civil society and CBOs – including women- and youth-led organizations – will play a leading role in the implementation of the LCBC RS SRR and of the TAPs through context appropriate, endogenous and localized responses that contribute to enhancing the resilience of communities as they create a more efficient transition at community/local level from relief-centered assistance towards lasting, self-sustaining community-driven processes that reduce poverty, vulnerability, exclusion, and instability.

This Theory of Change is based on the **assumptions** that when CSOs feel more empowered and are able to develop and implement triple-nexus approaches and the civic space enables effective CSO actions their contribution to the TAPs and the LCBC RS SRR is enhanced and increasingly recognize by other actors as efficient and effective, and more sustainable as these CSOs and CBOs will remain in these areas and engaged in their communities despite the duration of the project.

- c) **Provide a narrative description of key project components (outcomes and outputs)**, ensuring sufficient attention to gender, age and other key differences that should influence the project approach. In describing the project elements, be sure to indicate important considerations related to sequencing of activities.

**Outcome 1: Increased collaboration between CSOs in the Lake Chad Basin region to implement effective peacebuilding activities in their countries in line with the eight TAPs.**

**Output 1.1: CSOs, under a CSO group, jointly implement CSO-designed peacebuilding priorities in line with the TAPs in the LCB region, and have increased capacities and skills to implement peacebuilding activities**

This output will be implemented separately in the 4 countries, under the coordination and streamline of the UNDP regional office and aims to empower local CSOs and ensure their contribution to the implementation of the TAPs. Each of the 4 UNDP COs will launch a call for proposals to CSOs to be part of this project, using the below criteria, defined per the project consultations with the different stakeholders, including CSOs, i.e., each UNDP CO will launch its call for proposals but the criteria will be the same, cognizant that each country has its own specificities and priorities to be aligned to as per the TAPs in each country.

Interested CSOs (who must all be registered in DIMS) will be required to partner in groups of 2 or 3 CSOs to submit one joint concept note. The concept notes will detail their motivation to be part of this process and project and an initial idea of a project they would like to jointly implement, in at least one of the 3 priority pillars, with pillar 9 mainstreamed – the youth and gender one. This joint CSO group approach will promote collaboration, networking and experience-sharing between CSOs and lessen the harmful impact of resource competition in the CSO ecosystem. There will be no lead CSO and all selected CSOs will receive funds. The criteria to apply for the call will be, inter alia:

- 1) CSOs must be registered on DIMS;
- 2) CSOs must be operating in the TAPs but proposals can include more than 1 TAP if they are in the same country;
- 3) The proposed intervention touches on - at least - one of the 3 above mentioned pillars of the RSS and states clearly alignment with the TAP;

- 4) The proposed intervention mainstreams the engagement and empowerment of women and youth – pillar 9;
- 5) It is an intervention that works across the triple nexus;
- 6) Preference will be given to applications that include youth- and/or women-led CSOs;
- 7) Preference will also be given to groups of CSOs proposing interventions in the JAPs within the TAPs and explaining clearly how the project will contribute to the implementation of the TAPs to ensure synergies and monitoring by UNDP Country Offices;
- 8) Preference will be given to groups that work/provide funds via sub-grants to local/community CSOs to ensure support to local peacebuilder organizations.

CSOs will also be encouraged to design applications that aim to tackle issues under the pillars mentioned above understanding how it can – at the same time - contribute to socio-economic empowerment of target groups, including women and youth.

The National Technical Committee will review and select the most qualified concept notes, according to the selection criteria. Successful groups of CSOs will undergo a series of capacity building and workshops to improve their skills and knowledge in terms of the thematic areas related to the priority pillars, project cycle management, advocacy and organizational capacities. During this process, via a mentoring scheme, CSOs will have the opportunity to expand their initial project ideas into a project document to be funded and implemented. Projects will include support to the organizational capacities of the CSOs. Considering the specific disadvantages women- and youth-led organizations face in accessing funding the selection will aim to ensure these types of CSOs can participate and benefit from the project.

By bringing several local CSOs together, this will also foster the sharing of experiences, exchange of ideas regarding this work under the priority areas but also overall in the TAPs. Considering that this is a catalytic funding, it may only involve about 10 CSOs, i.e., 3 to 4 proposals per country. Each CSO can then appoint a maximum of three participants for the capacity building initiatives, taking into consideration gender, age and other relevant inclusion criteria. Considering the nature of the process and that this CSOs will be engaged jointly in a long period of time, it will also facilitate longer-term peer-to-peer exchange, not only with the CSOs part of the group and with the ones that grassroots level that will be working with the main 2-3 CSOs. The rationale here is that while smaller, front-line organisations typically do not qualify for this type of intervention, this project’s approach allows them to still be included, through a context driven methodology.

**Activity 1.1.1:** Launch a joint CSO «call for interest» using the DIMS accreditation framework as a single-entry point for CSOs to engage in the project<sup>37</sup> and in line with the above-stated criteria.

There will be a call launched per country via the DIMS database and each country office under the coordination and streamline of the Regional Office, based on the set general criteria, will define the rules and requirements, as well as timeline and budget limits for the proposals. The concept notes will have to respect the above-set criteria, detailing which CSOs are part of it and an initial brief description of what the CSOs propose to do, in a genuinely owned CSO-led process, and their motivation. To ensure all CSOs have the right information and can ask questions about the process, an online information session will be held in each country as part of the call.

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<sup>37</sup> Pre-qualification to join the project’s pool of CSOs will be done using the Directory vetting criteria (Relevance, Legitimacy, Basic Accountability). Using the DIMS capacity assessment tiered approach, only CSOs certified as tier 1 and 2 can join the pool of CSOs qualified to be part of the process and receive funds.

The COs national staff allocated 50% to the project will be charged here.

**Activity 1.1.2:** Based on the analysis of the concept notes, select the groups of CSOs that will be part of the project

Groups of CSOs (minimum 2 and maximum 3 CSOs) will be selected, based on the quality of their application, by the National Technical Committee, which will be composed of UNDP, LCBC, Governors' Offices and CSOs. The selected group of CSOs will be the ones receiving funding for programmatic interventions and benefiting from activities 1.1.3 to 1.1.6.

The funding allocation for programmatic interventions is based on the number of TAPs that exist per country. USD\$ 225,000 will be allocated per TAP for programmatic activities. Therefore, it will be:

- USD \$ 675,000 for Nigeria
- USD\$ 450,000 for Chad
- USD\$ 225,000 for Niger, and
- USD\$ 225,000 for Cameroon (the allocation to Cameroon is less than to the other countries had the country will only stay in the project for a year due to the request of the Government of analyzing the PBF portfolio in the country).

Projects proposed by the CSO groups can range up to USD\$ 55,000. Each TAP aim to cover 4 group of CSO proposals. All Groups of CSOs that are selected to be part of the project will be receiving funds.

**Activity 1.1.3:** Organize a planning and design workshop and ongoing peer-to-peer mentorship to support improvement of the initial joint CSO proposals

This workshop is a learning workshop, and the objective is to guide the selected groups of CSOs to improve upon and develop their initial project ideas into quality project proposal documents that meet the requirements of donors, i.e., it is during this period that concept notes will be converted into project documents. The selected CSOs can participate in the process and all training activities with up to 3-4 participants.

**Activity 1.1.4:** Organize a “project defense presentation” workshop, disburse funds to the CSO group projects and monitor implementation

The groups of CSOs will be asked to have a project defense presentation as part of a skill that is useful for CSOs when applying to other development partners' funding. Following the project defense workshop, UNDP CO will transfer the funds to CSOs to implement their joint projects, as per the detail information under 1.1.2. The projects will include funds not only for programmatic implementation but also to support core organizational needs.

During the projects' implementation, UNDP will monitor the development of the activities. This monitoring will be jointly done with the CSOs that were selected during the call for proposals as well as the Regional CSO Platform.

Funds for the groups of CSOs will be disbursed under this activity. The monitoring costs are budgeted under additional operational costs – M&E.

**Activity 1.1.5:** Thematic workshops for the CSOs focusing on the 3 priority pillars and on women's and youth's empowerment (pillar 9)

The project will have a component on the delivery of a sequenced curriculum tailored for peacebuilding initiatives in the LCB context. Systems and tools will be developed and applied to all the groups of CSOs through trainings, participatory workshops, mentoring/coaching, as well as peer exchange. In each CSO group, identification, and inclusion of women- and youth-led organisations in the capacity development agenda will be prioritized. Where the capacity exists, the workshops will promote experience-sharing between CSOs.

**Activity 1.1.6:** Design and implement capacity building trainings to strengthen organizations institutional capacity

The project's organizational capacity strengthening goal is to support CSOs in delivering quality and impactful peacebuilding programming at scale as envisioned in the RS-SRR strategy.

The capacity strengthening could focus on the following areas: (1) project cycle management and advocacy (including initiation, planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation and reporting, and closure); (2) leadership and management skills; (3) critical organizational systems and processes (4) HR functions; (5) CSO finance needs including trainings in the essentials of finance management, providing advice on accounting software, training staff, reviewing policies and procedures and bring in trained auditors to review internal control systems; (6) active coaching and support to CSOs on fund modalities. The cocktail of capacity building each CSO will receive will be based on the needs identified and prioritized during the participatory organizational capacity needs assessment.

Capacity strengthening efforts can focus on all topics which were identified during the capacity needs assessment conducted during the DIMS vetting process<sup>38</sup> and based on the consultations during the design of this project, with a focus on peacebuilding approaches: project cycle management and advocacy, leadership and governance, funding, human resources, strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, coordination, and communication. Additionally, and for increased focus, following the selection of CSO groups, a questionnaire will be used to prioritize capacity strengthening needs, so that CSOs receive capacity strengthening that meet their most urgent needs. Capacity strengthening will be provided parallel to the delivery of other activities in this outcome.

This project, by providing targeted institutional and thematic capacity strengthening along program implementation, differentiates itself from other initiatives. Each programmatic intervention will have a monitoring framework and exit and sustainably strategies to ensure progress continues after the project life. Furthermore, demonstrated progress will support CSOs fundraising efforts for core, un-earmarked funding from other development partners, being this PBF funds catalytic.

**Outcome 2: Increased regional and cross border collaboration and engagement between CSOs across the 8 territories of the Lake Chad Basin region**

**Output 2.1 CSOs-led regional and crossborder peacebuilding projects are developed and funded**

**Activity 2.1.1:** Launch a CSO regional call for regional/crossborder/inter-TAP projects

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<sup>38</sup> DIMS CSO Capacity Assessments

This single regional call will be launched and managed by UNDP Regional Office. CSOs, registered in DIMS, will be asked to submit joint CSO proposals that include proposed interventions in, at least 2 of the 8 TAPs across different countries.

Additionally, the criteria of the national call for proposals will apply:

- 1) CSOs must be registered on DIMS
- 2) CSOs must be operating in the TAPs proposed for the crossborder/regional projects
- 3) The proposed intervention touches on - at least - one of the 3 above mentioned pillars of the RSS and states clearly alignment with the TAPs;
- 4) The proposed intervention mainstreams the empowerment of women and youth;
- 5) It is an intervention that works across the triple nexus;
- 6) Preference will be given to applications that include youth and women-led CSOs;
- 7) Preference will also be given to the CSOs proposing interventions in the JAPs within the TAPs and explaining clearly how the project will contribute to the implementation of the TAPs to ensure synergies and monitoring by UNDP Country Offices.
- 8) Preference will be given to group/consortium that work/provide funds via sub-grants to local/community CSOs to ensure support to local peacebuilder organizations.

**Activity 2.1.2:** Organise a “project defense” session to choose projects to be funded and disburse funds to the selected ones

The joint CSO projects will be evaluated by the Regional Technical Committee, which will comprise UNDP regional and COs, the Governors of the four countries, LCBC and CSOs, at the “project defense” session, to which only the best proposals will be called upon for funding. The selection process will take into consideration the proposals received at national/TAP level to ensure synergies between both processes and diversity of selected CSOs.

USD\$ 250,000 will be disbursed for programmatic activities, with a maximum of USD\$ 50,000 for 5 projects.

**Activity 2.1.3:** Organise active coaching and support sessions to CSOs who received funds for cross-border and regional interventions

**Output 2.2 The Regional CSO Platform is reinforced to play its role of regional CSO convener and for enhanced facilitation of CSOs peer-to-peer learning**

**Activity 2.2.1:** Organisation of two regional workshops bringing together the CSOs who were selected for funding in the context of the regional and the national calls (outcomes 1 and 2) for sharing of experiences regarding project implementation, its contribution to TAP delivery and future funding opportunities

These workshops will be convened by the Regional CSO Platform and LCBC to promote experience sharing and learning between all the CSOs implementing cross-border/regional and national projects.

**Activity 2.2.2:** Develop a policy brief on localized peacebuilding in the LCB building on the experiences of this project

**Activity 2.2.3:** Undertake joint monitoring/learning visits and joint review workshops as a means to enhance dialogue and mutual accountability in the funded peacebuilding initiatives.

The joint monitoring/ learning activities will take place every six months in one of the countries where cross border activities will be implemented, and will be attended by CSOs members, government officials and other stakeholders that are involved in implementation of activities in the various countries.

**Activity 2.2.4:** DIMS presentations to stakeholders in the 8 territories to encourage continuous CSO enrollment into the platform and the directory in the 4 countries and its use by CSOs and development partners

**Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.**

- d) **Project targeting** – provide a justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, expected number and type of stakeholders/beneficiaries (must be disaggregated by sex and age). Indicate whether stakeholders have been consulted in the design of this proposal. Do not repeat all outputs and activities from the Results Framework.

The proposed geographic zones cover 8 territories of the Lake Chad Basin: North and Far North regions (Cameroon), Lac and Hadjer-Lamis provinces (Chad), Diffa region (Niger), Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states (Nigeria).

CSOs will define spatial areas of intervention based on the Territorial Action Plans and other pre-defined thematic and geographic parameters. The direct project beneficiaries are CSOs active in the RS SRR territories, working on peacebuilding programming at large and in particular on the three priority pillars. CSOs will be identified for this project via DIMS, as mentioned above, and based on their expression of intention.

Noting the marginalisation of women and youth, and the disproportionate impact of crises on women and girls, the project will specifically target interventions to support women’s and youth-led organisations, and support gender mainstreaming.

In particular, the selection of the beneficiary CSOs will be done via expression of interest. The intra-TAP and inter-TAP CSO-led interventions will be done via a call for proposals, to which CSOs registered in the DIMS, and fulfilling the required criteria as per the below, will be able to apply. The application process should include an initial project idea and submitted jointly by two to three other CSOs. The CSOs will as such form a “mini consortium”. The best initial projects ideas will be selected and the CSOs submitting them will be invited to be part of the group/consortium of CSOs.

The project team will define a maximum number of proposals/ CSOs selected based on the quality of the ideas presented. All CSOs selected will then benefit from tailored capacity building and skills development training, during which they will advance the ideas submitted into more full-fledged project documents. At the end, a technical committee, formed of the Governors’ offices, CSOs, UNDP (CO and regional) and LCBC will decide which joint projects will receive funding. Funds will be disbursed directly by UNDP COs to the lead CSO of the selected projects who will be in charge of monitoring implementation.



As detailed above in the requirements for the call for proposals under outcome 1 and outcome 2, the niche of this projects is that:

- 1) joint interventions CSO work/projects, which will contribute to empowering civil society by having CSOs working together, developing projects and implementing them, and therefore increasing the likelihood of future funding with other international partners;
- 2) the proposed intervention touches on - at least -one of the 3 above mentioned pillars of the RSS and states clearly alignment with the TAP;
- 3) the proposed intervention mainstreams the empowerment of women and youth
- 4) it is an intervention works across the triple nexus;
- 5) CSOs to apply for the call need to be registered in DIMS;
- 6) preference will be given to joint expression of interest that include youth and women-led CSOs;
- 7) The proposed intervention must contribute to the TAPs. Preference will also be given to the CSOs proposing interventions in the UNDP JAPs locations to ensure alignment and sustainability of already ongoing Stabilization efforts by UNDP.
- 8) preference will be given to group of CSOs that work/provide funds via sub-grants to local/community CSOs to ensure support to local peacebuilder organizations.

Additionally, smaller CSO which often have nascent systems can deliver impactful initiatives. These types of organisations are usually led by excluded and/or marginalised groups such as women and young people and are often critically under resourced. As much as possible, this project will also prioritise funding for these types of organisations.

This project will reach an estimated 335 CSO staff broken down as follows:

	Estimated total beneficiaries to be reached through trainings and meetings	Estimated number of women to be reached through trainings and meetings	Estimated number of youth to be reached through trainings and meetings
Chad (2 territories)	80	32	16
Cameroon (2 territories, but 1 year of implementation)	50	20	10
Niger (1 territory)	40	16	8
Nigeria (3 territories)	120	48	24
Regional (territories dependent on the selected CSOs/regional projects)	45	18	9

In addition to the direct beneficiaries, the selected CSOs will reach community members through the implementation of their peacebuilding projects as per the selected interventions of both the regional and national/TAPs proposals. These numbers will be determined by the selected CSOs; however it is expected that each project, both under outcome 1 and outcome 2, will reach a minimum of 100 community members of which 30% will be women and youth.

### III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

- a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list all direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local knowledge and existing capacity.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year - 2022	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
<b>Convening Organization: UNDP Chad</b>	61, 970, 746	PBF/PBSO,  European Union, UK, Pays Bas,  Fonds Mondial, Japan,  Allemagne,	N'Djaména  Bol Massakory  Laï Mongo Abéché Moundou	N'Djamena 160  Bol: 10 Massakory: 7	Experts Résilience et Relèvement,  Head of stabilization, Coordonnateur de Zone  Expert en Renforcement institutionnel, Juristes
Implementing partners:					
<b>Recipient Organization: UNDP Niger</b>	3 163 651	PBF/PBSO	Niamey Diffa Dosso, Maradi	Diffa 6	Head of Stabilization  Conflict Analyst  Stabilization Specialist  Community Liaison Associate  Operational functions (Procurement, Finance, HR, Engineering, M&E, Communication)
Implementing partners:					
<b>Recipient Organization: UNDP Nigeria</b>	87,959,091.91	EUROPEAN COMMISSION  GEF & Montreal Protocol  Japan  DUTCH  UK	Abuja  Lagos  Maiduguri.  Sokoto  Anambra  Kaduna  Katsina	93  7  50  3  2  2  1	Head of stabilization,  Human Right specialist,  Institutional relations specialist,  Community security specialist,
Implementing partners:					

		Government Cost sharing			Prevention of violent extremism specialist
		Germany			
<b>Recipient Organization:</b> <b>UNDP Cameroon</b>	<b>29,733.670</b>	Germany, Japan, EU, UK, Netherlands, PBF, UNODA, UNTFHS, SABC, GIMC, and BADEA	Maroua Bamenda National office North west south west office	19 15 15 2	Head of stabilization, Human Right specialist, Institutional relations specialist, Community security specialist, Prevention of violent extremism specialist, Social cohesion experts, Gender Specialist, Procurement specialist
Implementing partners:					
<b>Recipient Organization:</b> <b>UNDP Regional Office</b>	<b>\$ 4 281 820,00 (2022)</b>	Child Fund Italy GOV UN Office for Project Services BID Islamic Bank Danmark GOV	Dakar, Senegal, West and Central Africa region	24	Head of the Dakar Regional Hub, Hub Specialists (Com, Programs, OPS,) Deputy Head of Stabilization, Stabilization Specialists (HR, Procurement, program,
Implementing partners:					

- b) **Project management and coordination** – Indicate the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explicitly indicate how the project implementation team will ensure sufficient gender or youth expertise. Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements and ensure link with PBF Secretariat if it exists. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex A.1** and attach key staff TORs.

UNDP Chad, engaging closely with the Regional Stabilization team in the UNDP Regional Office in Dakar, will serve as the managing and convening agency for the project and will ensure coherence and partnership in activity implementation jointly with UNDP Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria as well as with the LCBC- RS RSS Secretariat based in Chad.

The Project Management and implementation team will provide strategic direction for the overall project implementation across the four countries and at regional level (outcome 1 and outcome 2). It consists of an international Project Manager (FTA – P3) for the full project period, who manages, oversees and supervises the project and an International UNV in charge of overall M&E, reporting and communications on the project. The PM and IUNV will be based at UNDP Chad, working closely with the LCBC / SR RSS Secretariat. They will have two reporting lines: to the Head of Stabilization in Chad (or other senior program staff) at national level and on a regional level to the Director of the Regional Stabilization Facility (or other senior program staff) in the Regional Office in Dakar.

The PM will coordinate and manage the overall intervention and will have responsibility on project implementation, including the full implementation of the training components of outcome 1 and

the full outcome 2, providing technical guidance on substantive aspects, ensuring effective coordination among the RUNOs and implementing partners. He/She will coordinate with the COs in the four countries, who will have a project officer charged 50% to the PBF project. At CO level, the project officer will be responsible for managing the Call for Proposals within the country/intra-TAPs and for elaboration the Responsible Parties Agreements/Low value grants with the selected CSOs for programmatic activities (outcome 1) as well as responsible for ensuring monitoring of the programmatic interventions with the other members of the National Technical Committee. International and national consultants will be hired to deliver the capacity building workshops and trainings.

Additionally, the project will count, at CO and sub-office level, with the overall supervision by the four UNDP Senior Management/Heads of Stabilization, as well as operational and technical support from a programme associate and other relevant in-country staff, which will be in-kind contribution to the project. At regional level, communications support will be provided by the regional office in kind as well as engagement of Localization and CSO advisors at the RS SRR Secretariat. UNDP Senior Management, either at CO and/or regional level, will also contribute to the project when needed, and no charges will be made to the PBF project.

The two above-mentioned Staff at the regional level will have to be hired. The staff in the COs are already on board, as per the table below and will be charged 50% to the project (budgeted under output 1):

Country	Staff title/function	Location	Total cost and 50% charged to the project
Chad	Programme Specialist	Bol	NPSA 9 – 29874 USD for two years
Cameroon	Human Rights Specialist	Far North	NPSA 9 – 16698 USD for one year
Niger	Programme Specialist	Diffa	NPSA 9 – 23753 USD for two years
Nigeria	Programme Specialist	Maiduguri	NPSA 9 – 42585 USD for two years

The staff that will be covered by the PBF project is 21% of the budget, which is 1% above the limit of PBF. However, considering this is a project that spans across four countries with both national and regional components, this additional 1% can be justified. Measures have been taken to keep salaries as low as possible: 50% allocation for only one national staff/country and an IUNV for M&E and reporting at a regional level. The project manager has been budgeted at a P3 level and this is the minimum requirement to manage a regional project of this nature. In addition, additional human resources will be provided by the NORCAP deployees to the Secretariat at no additional cost to the project: RSS CSO Platform Coordinator and RSS Localization Advisor

### **PROJECT BOARD (PB)**

The Project Board will be responsible for the overall strategic guidance to the project and make policy decisions regarding the project and the areas agreed in the project document. It will review and assess the targets set in the annual work plan and oversee performance to ensure that the project meets its

critical milestones and that impediments, if any, can be addressed. The Project Board will be at regional level with the participation of the 4 countries. It will be co-chaired by the LCBC and the UN Resident Coordinator in Chad. UNDP Regional Office Coordinator Dakar, UNDP Resident Representatives in Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger along with the 4 relevant ministers will also participate as well as the 4 CSOs who lead the Regional CSO Platform. The African Union may serve as an observer. The Project Board will convene at regional level once a year. Should there be an urgent requirement for a Project Board decision, it may be convened as and when necessary, on an *ad hoc* basis including virtually. Sub-committees may be established by the PB as needed, to further additional coordination and communication around key issues. The relevant joint PBF governance structure will be invited to participate as observers.

#### **TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (TC):**

The project will have one regional and four national technical committees. The Regional Technical Committee (RTC) will be chaired by the UNDP Regional Office Dakar and LCBC and the National Technical Committee (NTC) by UNDP Country Office and the LCBC.

The **Regional Technical Committee (RTC)** will serve as platform for coordination and exchange of information, and to oversee technical aspects of project implementation, including joint field missions for programmatic visits and assurance of project overall quality and reporting. At the regional level, the RTC is chaired by the UNDP Regional Office (with the support of the project manager) and LCBC / RS SRR Secretariat, and will consist of the 4 UNDP COs, the eight governors' offices or their representatives and representatives of the Regional CSO Platform (including women-led CSOs). Coordinators of joint PBF governance structures at technical level are invited to participate and provide advisory and technical support. Other regional technical experts from the contributing partner organisations and direct beneficiaries can also be invited. Considering all technical and procedural aspects of the project, the RTC will meet online twice a year or more frequently, if required. The RTC will provide input to the agenda for the Project Board meetings, as well as provide expert input in the PB discussions. It will be the RTC who will evaluate the regional/crossborder call for proposals.

A **National Technical Committee (NTC)** will be established in the 4 countries and it will serve as platform for coordination and exchange of information, and to oversee technical aspects of project implementation, including field missions for programmatic visits, assurance of project overall quality and reporting, and technical backstopping for all issues related to national/sub-national level project implementation, in particular outcome 1 but also under the relevant regional/crossborder programmatic interventions, if in the country/associated TAPs. The NTC shall meet quarterly or when needed. It will be the NTC who will evaluate the national call for proposal/expression of interest. At the national level, the NTC is chaired by the UNDP CO (with the support of the project manager) and LCBC / RS SRR Secretariat, consists of relevant Governors' Offices and includes local CSO (including women-led CSOs) and the project management team. The coordinators of the joint PBF governance structures at technical level or PDAs can also be invited to provide advisory and technical support, as needed. The composition of the NTC can be expanded to include other relevant structures based on the country contexts.

The **project team**, made of UNDP, regional and at CO level, and LCBC staff, will meet regularly to ensure timely and efficient implementation of the project.

- c) **Risk management** – Identify project-specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include a Do No Harm approach and risk mitigation strategy.

<b>Project specific risk</b>	<b>Risk level (low, medium, high)</b>	<b>Mitigation strategy (including Do No Harm considerations)</b>
Insecurity in the areas of intervention could restrict mobility and access by UNDP and the CSOs	High	Link CSOs with security information management/monitoring structures to enable CSOs have information about the changing security landscape Adapt project implementation to suit changes in the security situation
Risk of CSOs being attacked by armed extremist groups	Medium	Link CSOs with security information management/monitoring structures to enable CSOs have information about the changing security landscape; Adapt project implementation to suit changes in the security situation
Risk of corruption and fraud leading to loss of funds / mismanagement and failure to deliver project outcomes	Low	Due diligence assessment will be carried out prior to final selection of CSOs Training CSOs on donor compliance requirements, anti-corruption and fraud prevention policies Capacity building to strengthen CSOs' internal controls
Lack of interest of the CSOs to participate in the project/ Limited number of CSOs applying to be part of the group/consortium	Low	Consultation with CSOs during project proposal development to ensure to ensure alignment with CSO and community needs Project launch workshop
CSOs activities may not be conflict sensitive	Medium	Strengthen capacity of CSOs on conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm principles and ensure that Human Rights experts at COs and Human Rights experts where they

		exist at the RCO will be engaged
Risk of parallel implementation of Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 and weak coordination and coherence among the 4 Country Offices and the regional level/LCBC	Medium	The project will have only one PM responsible for the coordination and overall implementation of the project who will liaise with the four COs and LCBC/RS SRR Secretariat. Frequent coordination meetings between the COs, CSO, and the project management team to ensure alignment and consistency of approach and implementation across all countries and all levels
Risk that under the call for proposals only the bigger CSOs will be selected	Medium	Project teams, at regional and national level, will take this aspect into consideration and ensure that this project does support local CSOs, as long as registered in the DIMs.

- d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – Describe the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include: a budget break-down for both monitoring and evaluation activities, including collection of baseline and end line data and an independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. Fund recipients are obligated to reserve at least 5-7% of the project budget for M&E activities, including sufficient funds for a quality, independent evaluation.

Monitoring and evaluation will be conducted at different stages and with different methodologies. The project will have annual workplans (AWP) and an M&E plan, which will be prepared and approved by the project team, the technical committee at national and regional level, and shared with PBF once the project implementation starts. The M&E plan will have three objectives: 1) monitor program performance and effectiveness through the collection and analysis of relevant and timely monitoring data but also; 2) support program management and eventually, if necessary, readjustment of project planning; evaluate project impact and document lessons learnt to support scale-up of the pilot project and/or model.

The M&E plan will stipulate frequently monitoring activities to support reporting requirements and data collection activities, based on the adjacent Results Framework, both under outcome 1 and outcome 2. As per the Results Framework below, the monitoring and, therefore the reporting, will vary from specific country/TAP activities and regional ones. In terms of the training/capacity building, to monitor achievement of results in terms of learning, an initial and final questionnaire will be applied to all participant CSOs to compare results and impact of the training and peer-to-peer learning activities. Some indicators require collection of baselines, namely the perception surveys, which will be done at the inception of the project or in the timeline mentioned in the Results Framework.

It is also expected that this project will reach community members indirectly through the CSO's peacebuilding projects. Once the CSOs are selected, a set of suitable indicators and targets will be identified to measure the impact of the microgrants, using a portfolio approach reporting directly to the results framework of this project. The M&E and Reporting Officer will work with the selected CSOs to track and measure these indicators. The indicators will be reported as an addendum to the results framework during reporting to PBF.

The project team will be responsible for ensuring data collection and reporting, based on information provided also from partners/CSOs from project activities. The M&E and Reporting Officer, sitting at the regional level, will contribute to ensure appropriate M&E of the project, ensuring at the same time that results achieved feed into the TAPs and the RSS.

COs will have the lead on monitoring under outcome 1, namely the programmatic interventions of the CSOs, the remaining M&E will be led by the regional level thanks to the IUNV to hired as M&E officer for this project. The M&E officer will provide key support to the 4 COs on outcome 1 in liaising with the M&E staff of the 4 COs.

National joint PBF Governance structures can also carry-out monitoring missions in the areas of project implementation in their respective countries and/or internationally, once agreed upon with the relevant stakeholders.

As the project conveying RUNO, UNDP Chad will be ultimately responsible for complying with all narrative and financial reporting requirements established by the PBF, collecting inputs from the other there UNDP COs and with the main support of the PM and M&E staff.

6.04 per cent of the budget (USD\$ 211,325) has been allocated for monitoring and communications activities, as per the budget breakdown. This will include funds to allow the project team to be present during the capacity building sessions and/or workshops, when needed, conduct field visits to the different CSO project locations and any required communication materials for the projects. Each UNDP CO as well as the regional level will have a budget for M&E. Monitoring project progress and the achievement of the targets set in the logical framework, will inform the semiannual and annual activity reports, preparation of periodic progress reports as well as documentation of good and innovative practices.

An Independent Evaluation of the Project will be commissioned at the end of the project to be carried out jointly in all 4 countries. A total of 70,000 USD has been set aside for that purpose and UNDP Chad together with the PM and M&E staff will be responsible for developing the Terms of Reference, launching it and, in close coordination with the project team and the NTC and the RTC, monitor and the work of the consultant. An external final evaluation will verify the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence, impact and sustainability of the project, as well as its catalytic effect, time-sensitivity and risk tolerance and innovation.

- e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project's exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do concretely and pro-actively to try to ensure this support from the start. Consider possible partnerships with other donors or IFIs.



This PBF project would be the pilot to streamline CSO engagement in the TAPs, via a group of CSOs model combining expertise of various CSOs/ CBOs operational under RS SRR Pillars, using the Directory (DIMS) to access a pool of pre-qualified organizations based on the Directory's vetting tool of the LCBC Regional CSO Platform. This wide accreditation framework, considered a single-entry point for CSOs to enable coordination among and between CSOs and other actors through a structured channel, aims to not only facilitate better engagement and greater collaboration, but also to streamline CSOs engagement with institutional partners for visibility and direct resource mobilization in the context of the RS SRR.

Moreover, the establishment of a Special Multiparter Delivery Facility for financial support to the overall implementation of the RS SRR is currently being designed with support from the International Support Group (ISG), in particular Germany and the UK. If this pilot is successful, the Facility can be used to ensure sustained funding for CSO-led initiatives within the region. The ISG is a group of international partners (composed of donors and non-donors), co-chaired by Germany and UK, who provide support, guidance and are working towards improved coordination and alignment with the RS-SRR. The ISG and other stakeholders will receive regular debriefs on the implementation of this project through the existing governance mechanism of this project and the RSF.

Lastly, this project seeks to empower CSOs through the promotion of joint CSO work and capacity strengthening to deliver CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives, despite their short duration. The sustainability of the intervention lies in the long-term effects of the several trainings and associated reinforcement of skills and knowledge. The resultant impact of this project will contribute to organizational sustainability and will increase the ability of participant CSOs to apply to other funding opportunities but other development partners, which in turn will further support CSO activities and their role in the TAPs implementation. By also requiring the selected CSOs to collaborate with community-based organizations and grassroots associations, we are also empowering local peacebuilders who will remain in the area, contributing to the sustainability of their work.

Anchoring the interventions at regional and national priorities, with a strong national ownership and buy-in for the project, in particular of the civil society, in a whole-of-society approach is also a sustainable and exit strategy for the project.

#### **IV. Project budget**

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel, or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

For this initiative, the availability of baselines for each indicator in the Results Framework will be an additional condition for the disbursement of the second tranche.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

<b>Budget Summary</b>						
	<b>UNDP Chad</b>	<b>UNDP Niger</b>	<b>UNDP Nigeria</b>	<b>UNDP Cameroon</b>	<b>UNDP Regional Office (Chad)</b>	<b>Totals</b>
<b>1. Staff and other personnel</b>	30000	25000	43000	17000	637448	<b>752448</b>
<b>2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials</b>	11500	11500	11500	6000	40000	<b>80500</b>
<b>3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)</b>	3000	3000	3000	2600	0	<b>11600</b>
<b>4. Contractual services</b>	71000	1000	1000	500	258000	<b>331500</b>
<b>5. Travel</b>	21000	21000	21000	11500	150500	<b>225000</b>
<b>6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts</b>	450000	225000	675000	225000	250000	<b>1825000</b>
<b>7. General Operating and other Costs</b>	10000	10000	10000	5000	10000	<b>45000</b>
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>596500</b>	<b>296500</b>	<b>764500</b>	<b>267600</b>	<b>1345948</b>	<b>3271048</b>
<b>7% Indirect Costs</b>	41755	20755	53515	18732	94216	<b>228973</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>638255</b>	<b>317255</b>	<b>818015</b>	<b>286332</b>	<b>1440164</b>	<b>3500021</b>

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every

GEWE allocation (e.g. training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

The budget can be found in annex D.

## Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
<b>Planning</b>			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	Yes		Implementing partners will be identified from the pre-vetted CSC in the DIMS.
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	Yes		ToRs for the two to be recruited positions are attached.
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	Yes		The project will be implemented in the sites of the TAPs (and preferably in the JAPS)
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	Yes		Consultations were held with CSOs and the representatives of the Governors' Offices
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	Yes		Analysis was done of activities that aim to directly support CSOs in the TAPs location.
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	Yes		Described above
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?	Yes		UNDP COs have agreements with the relevant government counterparts and the criteria have been discussed with them.
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	Yes		
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?		N/A	
<b>Gender</b>			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	Yes		UNDP gender experts contributed to the document.
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?	Yes		Women-led organizations were part of the CSO consultations. A separate consultation was held for youth-led organizations

12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregate by sex and age?		No	The direct beneficiaries of this project are CSOs. However, measures have been put in place to ensure the project reaches women and youth led organizations
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	Yes		

## Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	Yes		The project will be implemented with support from the UNDP COs and RSS Secretariat, so staff and other operational costs are reduced
2. Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc.) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	Yes		
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	Yes		The funding allocated to the different countries are based on the number of territories and the duration of implementation (Cameroon and Cameroonian CSOs will only participate in the first year of implementation)
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?		No	Salaries are currently at 21%. This is because it is a regional project which requires more staffing support. However, measures have been taken to keep salaries as low as possible: 50% allocation for only one national staff/country and an IUNV for M&E and reporting at a regional level. The project manager has been budgeted at a P3 level and this is the minimum requirements to manage a regional project of this nature. In addition, additional human resources will be provided by the NORCAP deployees to the Secretariat at no additional cost to the project: RSS CSO Platform Coordinator and RSS Localization Advisor

5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	Yes		The project will source local consultants or internal capacities for capacity building activities namely by the RSS CSO Platform Coordinator and the RSS Localization Advisor.
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		No	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		No	
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	Yes		UNDP COs and the regional office will contribute with their office, logistics and staff to the implementation of the project, with in-kind support. Only one staff per CO will be covered by the project (at 50%) despite all the operational costs the work will entail.

## **Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- ☐ Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- ☐ Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- ☐ Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- ☐ Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
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Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

<b>Timeline</b>	<b>Event</b>
<b>30 April</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<i><b>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</b></i>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

<b>31 July</b>	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

## Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website ([www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund](http://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund)) and the Administrative Agent's website ([www.mptf.undp.org](http://www.mptf.undp.org)).

## Annex B.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

### Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

### Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist

Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.
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#### Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
<b>28 February</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b>30 April</b>	Report <b>Q1 expenses</b> (January to March)
<b>31 July</b>	Report <b>Q2 expenses</b> (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Report <b>Q3 expenses</b> (January to September)
<i>Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure</i>	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### **Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property**

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

#### **Public Disclosure**

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website ([www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund](http://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund)) and the Administrative Agent website ([www.mptf.undp.org](http://www.mptf.undp.org)).

#### **Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects**

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

#### **Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism**

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a Recipient

Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

**Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:**

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

- ☐ Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation.
- ☐ Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE:** If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches).
- ☐ Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant.
- ☐ Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE:** If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
- ☐ Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project.<sup>39</sup>
- ☐ Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought.
- ☐ Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

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<sup>39</sup> Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

**Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated targets)**

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
<p><b>Outcome 1: Increased collaboration between CSOs in the Lake Chad Basin region to implement effective peacebuilding activities in their countries in line with the 8 TAPs.</b></p> <p>(Any SDG Target that this Outcome contributes to)</p> <p>(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)</p>		<p>-</p> <p>-</p> <p>Outcome Indicator 1a Additional resources mobilized by civil society to implement TAPs interventions by type and source</p> <p>Baseline: to be determined at start of project</p> <p>Target: 40% improvement per territory (of which 10% are women- and 10% are youth-led organizations)</p>	<p>Baseline, end line survey</p>	
		<p>Outcome Indicator 1b</p>	<p>Baseline and end line survey</p>	

		<p>Community members' perception of the CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives and its contributions to sustained peace in their communities</p> <p>Baseline: to be determined at start of the project disaggregated by gender/age/territory</p> <p>Target: to be determined (disaggregated by age and gender)</p>	<p>conducted in project locations</p>	
	<p>Output 1.1</p> <p><b>CSOs, under a CSO group, jointly implement CSO-designed peacebuilding priorities in line with the TAPS in the LCB region, and have increased capacities and skills to implement peacebuilding activities</b></p> <p>List of activities under this output</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.1</p> <p>Number of collaborative CSO-led peacebuilding projects contributing to the TAPS that are funded by the project</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: To be defined</p>	<p>Project reports from the 4 UNDP COs</p>	

	<p><b>Activity 1.1.1:</b> Launch a joint CSO «call for interest» using the DIMS accreditation framework as a single-entry point for CSOs to engage in the project and in line with the above-stated criteria.</p>	(Disaggregated by women and youth-led projects)		
	<p><b>Activity 1.1.2:</b> Based on the analysis of the concept notes, select the groups of CSOs that will be part of the project</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.3:</b> Organize a planning and design workshop and ongoing peer-to-peer mentorship to support improvement of the initial joint CSO proposals</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.4:</b> Organize a “project defense presentation” workshop, disburse funds to the CSO group projects and joint monitor implementation</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.5:</b> Thematic workshops for the CSOs focusing on the 3 priorities and on women’s and youth’s empowerment</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.2</p> <p>Number of CSO groups that are formed to contribute to TAPs implementation.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: to be determined (Disaggregated by women and youth-led projects)</p>	<p>Survey conducted at the beginning and at the end of the training process to the CSOs involved in the project</p>	
	<p><b>Activity 1.1.6:</b> Design and implement capacity building trainings to strengthen organizations institutional capacity.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 1.1.3</p> <p>% of CSOs in the project who report improved confidence in their ability to design and implement projects that meet community needs and minimum</p>	<p>Survey conducted at the beginning and at the end of the training process to the CSOs involved in the project</p>	

		<p>donor funding requirements</p> <p>Baseline: to be determined at start of project</p> <p>Target: 40% increase ((Disaggregated by women and youth-led projects) , and of which 10% are women- and 10% are youth-led organizations)</p>		
<p><b>Outcome 2: Increased regional and cross border collaboration and engagement between CSOs across the 8 territories of the Lake Chad Basin region</b></p>		<p>Outcome Indicator 2a</p> <p>% of CSOs supported by the project who report improved regional collaboration between CSOs in the Lake Chad Basin region</p>	<p>Baseline and end line survey</p>	



<p>(Any SDG Target that this Outcome contributes to)</p> <p>(Any Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights (UPR) recommendation that this Outcome helps to implement and if so, year of UPR)</p>		<p>Baseline: to be determined at start of project</p> <p>Target: 40% improvement (of which at least 10% are women- and 10% are youth-led organizations)</p>		
		<p>Outcome Indicator 2b</p> <p>Perception of local authorities (Governors Offices and local/community authorities such LGA or Prefect/sub-Prefect) on the contribution of CSO-led peacebuilding activities to the TAPs</p> <p>Baseline: to be defined</p> <p>Target: to be defined</p>	<p>Baseline and end line perception survey conducted with the 8 local Governors offices and LCBC</p>	
	<p><b>Output 2.1 CSOs-led regional and crossborder peacebuilding projects are developed and funded</b></p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.1.1</p> <p>Number of collaborative regional CSO-led peacebuilding</p>	<p>Project report</p>	

	<p>List of activities under this output</p> <p><b>Activity 2.1.1:</b> Launch a CSO regional call for regional/crossborder/inter-TAP projects</p> <p><b>Activity 2.1.2:</b> Organise a “project defense” session to choose projects to be funded and disburse funds to the selected ones</p>	<p>projects funded that contribute to the priority pillars of the TAPs that are funded</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5 (Disaggregated by women and youth-led projects)</p>		
	<p><b>Activity 2.1.3:</b> Organise active coaching and support sessions to CSOs who will receive funds for crossborder and regional interventions</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.1.2</p> <p>Number of CSOs who report improved confidence to design and implement regional projects that respond to community needs in line with the priority pillars of TAPs</p> <p>Baseline: to be defined at the inception of the project</p> <p>Target: to be defined at the inception of the project (of which 10% are women- and 10%</p>	Baseline and end line survey	

		are youth-led organizations)		
		-		
	<p><b>Output 2.2: The Regional CSO Platform is reinforced to play its role of regional CSO convener and for enhanced facilitation of CSOs peer-to-peer learning</b></p> <p><b>Activity 2.2.1:</b> Organization of two regional workshops bringing together the CSOs who were selected for funding in the context of the regional (outcome 2) and the national calls (outcome 1) for sharing of experiences regarding project implementation, its contribution to TAP delivery and future funding opportunities</p> <p><b>Activity 2.2.2</b> Develop a policy brief on localized peacebuilding in the LCB building on the experiences of this project</p> <p><b>Activity 2.2.3</b> - Undertake joint monitoring/learning visits and joint review workshops as a means to enhance dialogue and mutual accountability in the funded peacebuilding initiatives.</p>	<p>Output Indicator 2.2.1</p> <p>Number of joint monitoring/learning visits and joint review workshops and regional workshops supported and/or convened by the Regional CSO Platform</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 3 visits (participants disaggregated by age and gender)</p>	Project reports	
	<p>Output Indicator 2.2.2</p> <p>CSOs' perception of the value-add of the Regional CSO Platform's activities and its contribution to their capacity to engage in</p>	Perception survey conducted at the beginning and at end of the two regional workshops		

	<p><b>Activity 2.2.4</b> DIMS presentations to stakeholders in the 8 territories to encourage continuous CSO enrollment into the platform and the directory in the 4 countries and its use by CSOs and development partners</p>	<p>TAPs implementation and promote peer-to-peer learning</p> <p>Baseline: to be defined disaggregated by gender/age/territory</p> <p>Target: to be defined disaggregated by gender/age/territory</p>		
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