

FINAL REPORT

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PILOT
PROJECT FOR STRENGTHENING MIGRANT INTEGRATION AND
SOCIAL COHESION IN SOUTH AFRICA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation report presents the end-of-programme performance evaluation of the United Nations Joint Programme (Joint Programme) for Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders' Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities and Countering Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa. This final evaluation was conducted to assess the overall performance of the Joint Programme, to assess to what extent intermediate results (outcomes) were achieved, how effective they were, and what level of sustainability can be expected of what has been achieved to date.. The evaluation highlights lessons learned and good practices, and provides recommendations for future programming, based on government and other stakeholder priorities. The Joint Programme was implemented in three provinces in South Africa: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape, from October 2020 to July 2023, by five Participating United Nations Organizations (PUNOs).¹

The Joint Programme was funded to a value of USD 2.5 million, by the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF). Through the Joint Programme, and in the context of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM), the five PUNOs jointly worked to strengthen national and local system capacities to prevent and respond to xenophobia; promote social inclusion and peaceful coexistence among migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, other migrant groups, and host communities. These organizations also sought to strengthen national capacities and systems for understanding the causes and dynamics of xenophobic violence and articulate effective responses. The question of gendered violence was embedded in this capacity-building objective.

The key initiatives stemming from the Joint Programme were:

- a) Support for national initiatives which focused on the provision of livelihood support for communities affected by COVID-19.
- b) Assistance in providing holistic livelihood strategies to host and migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers communities in the context of integration and social cohesion, especially for those made economically vulnerable by the COVID-19 pandemic. This holistic approach included support geared specifically to addressing drivers of xenophobic conflict.

¹ The PUNOs involved in the implementation of the Joint Programme are the IOM, UNHRC, UNDP, OHCHR, and UN Women.

- c) Establish and sustain early warning systems in the efforts to contain and reverse racial discrimination, xenophobia, gender, and other related forms of discrimination.
- d) Finally, during the implementation of the Joint Programme, interventions were also responsive to disasters that affected communities as a result of the July 2021 riots that affected both Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces as well as the devastating floods that negatively affected communities in KwaZulu-Natal. These interventions were responsive adaptations to the original activities of the Joint Programme.

On the Joint Programme's relevance, the key activities implemented by the Joint Programme appear closely aligned with the GCM's overarching objective as outlined in Objective 16 (MPTF Annual Report 2021, 2022: MPTF Project Proposal, 2020).

When the Joint Programme's coherence is considered, there were clear complementarities between the Joint Programme and the ongoing "Global Promotion of Best Practices for Children in Migration Project," an initiative implemented through a partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Turning to efficiency, the evaluation found that the Steering Committee² adopted a policy to use a balance of earmarked and unearmarked funds to support implementation. Doing so provided the Joint Programme with a high level of operational flexibility and kept available financial resource levels reasonably balanced (e.g., the Joint Programme was not faced with too much funding for Implementing Partners (IP) to absorb at once nor specific stretches whereby funding was scarce).

Because the activities implemented under the Joint Programme were so many, it is difficult to track the effectiveness of individual activities and even more difficult to look at the effectiveness against costs. There was consensus among engaged stakeholders that future Joint Programmes should focus on a more realistic and manageable number of activities to ensure achievable results and outcomes. Nonetheless, USD 2.5 million is a small budget, particularly for a project that is seeking to effect change at both community and

² The PMT was a technical day-to-day structure responsible for implementation and facilitating information for the evaluation while the EMC aimed to manage the evaluation process only.

government (institutional) levels. Notwithstanding, at the output level, the Joint Programme met some of its established targets. These include:

- Implementing seven (7) community peace initiatives (6 in KwaZulu-Natal and 1 in Gauteng) against a baseline of two (2) initiatives identified at Joint Programme outset.
- Implementing (6) conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms (two per province) against a target of one (1) mechanism established at Joint Programme outset.
- A recorded 70 percent reduction in the percentage of host community members who claim that xenophobia has declined between 2021 and 2023.
- A recorded 70 percent of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers ³and host community members reported increased social inclusion.

It is also difficult to assess the impact of the Joint Programme over the course of three years of implementation, not least because social cohesion is a qualitative behavioural change and is something that takes considerable time to take root, particularly in communities that have been affected by violence, as many reached by the Joint Programme have been. Most of the Key Informants (KI) deferred impact assessment to the future. Notwithstanding, perspectives from the evaluation's focus groups and community survey do point to the achievement of real results – in terms of a growth in the number of community-level peace initiatives; the number of functioning conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms; around community perceptions indicating a decline in incidences of xenophobia and in modest but notable changes in levels of social cohesion; and in early changes in policy and practice by South African government institutions. Not all of these changes are attributable to the Joint Programme alone. However, there was considerable recognition, particularly at community-level, that the Joint Programme provided opportunities for engagement and dialogue, particularly between migrants and South African host communities that would otherwise not have been possible.

This report determined that the Joint Programme's outcomes and outputs have been developed to reflect GCM principles, in terms of both indicator design and levels of disaggregation. Indeed, the programme's narrative around Outcome 2 (Social Inclusion and Peaceful Co-existence Reinforced between Migrants and Host Communities) makes direct reference to its implementation modality being around the GCM principle

³ See methodology section for details of sample

of adopting a “whole-of-society” and “whole-of-government” approach (MPTF Results Framework, 2022 Update).

Finally, on the Joint Programme’s sustainability, the Joint Programme took many of the steps necessary to begin building sustainability for its activities and achieved results. The Joint Programme targeted development of community and local government-level structures that should, in time, be capable of independently convening stakeholders to address conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Arguably the most prominent example is the multi-stakeholder forums, which have been created to serve as organizing/facilitating entities in many locations, with the mandate to independently design and implement social cohesion activities – including experience and idea exchanges – between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members (MPTF Annual Report, 2021). Other important initiatives which play a critical role in future sustainability of the Joint Programme include OHCHR work with the legacy Foundations, the Little Nana Same Campaign, as well as work on coordination and contingency planning, and UN Women’s partnership with the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation. These partnerships offer an opportunity for continuity and extended impact of the Joint Programme even after the programme’s official end.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AMP	Adonis Musati Project
ANC	African National Congress
CBD	Central Business District
CBO	Community Based Organization
CGE	Commission for Gender Equality
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease of 2019
CRL Rights Commission	Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDP	Democracy Development Programme
DOJ&CD	Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
DSAC	Department of Sport, Arts and Culture
DSD	Department of Social Development
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EMC	Evaluation Management Committee
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCM	Global Compact for Migration
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAP	Interested or Affected People
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration

IP	Implementing Partner
JP	Joint Programme
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
KZN	KwaZulu-Natal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MTSF	Medium-Term Strategic Framework
NAP	National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
NDMC	National Disaster Management Centre
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PUNOs	Participating United Nations Organizations
RC	Regional Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator Office
RMF	Results Management Framework
RSA	The Republic of South Africa
SA	South Africa
SAMP	South African Migration Programme
SAPS	South African Police Service
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SAHRC	South African Human Rights Commission
SOW	Scope of Work
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations

UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UN Women	United Nations Women
USD	United States Dollar
WC	Western Cape
Y4F	Project Youth for Future

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings from an end-of-programme performance evaluation carried-out for the United Nations Joint Programme (JP) for Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders' Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities and Countering Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa. The Joint Programme was implemented in three provinces in South Africa: Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape, from October 2020 to July 2023. Implementation was carried-out by five Participating United Nations Organizations (PUNOs)⁴, marking the Joint Programme as a significant example of cooperation between UN agencies and providing a testing ground for whether these agencies could effectively leverage their comparative advantages and complement each other over the course of implementation. The Joint Programme was funded to a value of USD 2.5 million, by the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF).

The implementation of the Joint Programme was motivated by the fact that in spite of its ongoing history of xenophobic violence, South Africa continues to be the main destination for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the Southern African region. Many migrants, refugees and asylum seekers live in vulnerable circumstances in South Africa, part of which is a consequence of poor integration – socially and/or economically – with host communities. On the whole, migration policies in South Africa lean towards securitization, effectively (if unintentionally) reinforcing *social othering* (Moyo and Zanker, 2020), and therefore undermining social cohesion. Thus, migration-related conflicts have been observed in both urban and informal settlements in the three provinces that are the focus of the Joint Programme (Ibid, 2020).

Effectively, the Joint Programme sought to address this glaring gap in integration through a renewed focus on engaging government, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and host communities (and the organizations/institutions representing them) in activities aimed at promoting community-level peace and socio-economic empowerment. The Joint Programme also aimed to (re)shape the public narrative around migration in South Africa, through promoting tolerance and evidence-based discussions around different facets of migration. Gendered dimensions of migration, as well as community-level support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, served as cross-cutting issues for the Joint Programme.

⁴ The PUNOS involved in the implementation of the Joint Programme are the IOM, UNHRC, UNDP, OHCHR, and UN Women.

The Joint Programme took a three-legged implementation approach, *Prevention, Protection, and Empowerment*, thus drawing on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). GCM Objective 7 (address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration), GCM Objective 16 (empower migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion) and GCM Objective 17 (eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration) were particularly relevant for the Joint Programme. In addition to these objectives, the intervention was guided by three Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Targets; SDG 10.2 (empower and promote the socio, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, economic or any other status); SDG 10.3 (ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequality of outcomes including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and actions in this regard); SDG 16.1 (significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere); SDG 16.B (promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development); and SDG 17.18 (enhance capacity building support to developing countries to increase significantly the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant to national contexts).

Through the Joint Programme, and in the context of the GCM, the five PUNOs were tasked to jointly strengthen national and local system capacities to prevent and respond to xenophobia; promote social inclusion and peaceful coexistence among migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, other groups, and host communities. These organizations also sought to strengthen national capacities and systems for understanding the causes and dynamics of xenophobic violence and articulate effective responses. The question of gendered violence was embedded in this capacity-building objective.

The key initiatives stemming from the Joint Programme were:

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- c) Establish and sustain early warning systems in the efforts to contain and reverse racial discrimination, xenophobia, gender, and other related forms of discrimination.
- d) Finally, during the implementation of the project, interventions were also responsive to disasters that affected communities as a result of the July 2021 riots that affected both Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces as well as the devastating floods that negatively affected communities in Kwa-Zulu Natal. These interventions were responsive adaptations to the original activities of the Joint Programme.

Drawing on the DAC evaluation criteria developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), this evaluation assesses the extent to which the above initiatives were relevant to the social conditions relevant to fanning the flames of xenophobia, the extent to which stakeholders and institutions worked together in a coherent manner, how effective, efficient, and impactful the programme was, as well as how sustainable programme initiatives are likely to be.

In addressing these evaluation objectives, the report is structured as follows.

Part one sketches the socio-political and legislative context of the Joint Programme, and subsequently provides an outline of the purpose and objective of the Joint Programme. This contextual background is followed by the presentation of the methodology employed in the end-of-programme evaluation. The findings emerging from both desktop review and primary data collection are presented thematically using the OECD DAC⁵ criteria in part three. In part four, the report presents the lessons learned, articulates main conclusions on the Joint Programme's performance, and offers recommendations to inform ongoing and future programming by the PUNOs and other stakeholders.

⁵ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Association Committee (OECD DAC).

PART 1: CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

1.1. Socio-Political Context

The United Nations Joint Programme “Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders’ Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities and Countering Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa” (referred to in this report as the “Joint Programme”), was implemented during a time of considerable socio-political and economic upheaval. The COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting economic dislocation⁶ (see Ngarava et al., 2022) already exerted pressure on the population. This was followed by widespread (mainly in KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng) violence in South Africa, which occurred in July 2021 (referred to as July Unrest). Although the July Unrest did not directly target migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, their socio-economic status and the related location in the informal economy made them easy targets for looting and vandalism. These events foregrounded organised (albeit fragmented) groups which pivoted and scapegoated economic hardships to migrants. These organizations, which include “Operation Dudula” and “Put South Africa First,” directly put to the test and indirectly countered the Joint Programme’s stated objectives of strengthening migrant, refugee, and asylum seekers integration and social cohesion.

At the same time, these events also reinforced the relevance of the Joint Programme’s role in supporting and complementing the South African Government’s efforts to implement its 2019 National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP). Brathwaite (2023), writing about United Nations efforts to support South Africa’s efforts to combat xenophobia (in a broader context than just the Joint Programme) emphasized “the undeniable appropriateness of the UN agencies addressing these issues [of xenophobia and anti-migrant violence] at this specific time” (pg. 14), and the implementation and review of the 2012 social cohesion strategy.

The document review highlights the scale of the problem the Joint Programme was mandated to address. Highlighting these issues provides a viewpoint from which to consider whether the types of interventions put in place by the Joint Programme – particularly around community-level social integration and economic

⁶ Real GDP growth in South Africa plummeted by 7.2 per cent in 2020, primarily due to restrictions on economic activity to contain the spread of the virus (See National Treasury, 2020)

development – were fit for purpose in addressing the scale of the problem at hand. The project-specific documentation details what the project did, when, and with what resources committed and outputs achieved. In this sense, the document review is useful as a guide for how the evaluation focused its primary data collection to address notable gaps and to truly capture in-depth reflections on the programme and its actions. At the same time, efforts are made to tie various findings from the document review, focus group discussions and key informant interviews to the OECD DAC evaluation criteria. The findings section of the evaluation report builds on the literature detailed below to provide a more holistic picture of the Joint Programme, its successes, challenges, and resulting recommendations.

The South African Migration Programme's (SAMP) national surveys of South African attitudes towards migrants, refugees, and migration practices all point to the country having a particularly hostile view towards immigration. This conclusion is similar to data sourced from Xenowatch (2019) which reports 529 incidents of xenophobic violence between 1998 and 2018, with 10% of these occurring in 2018 alone. A 2018 study by South African Social Attitude Surveys (SASAS) (See Human Science Research Council, 2018) particularly observed that, from a nationally representative survey which interviewed 3500 adults, 22.2% of the respondents recommended expulsion of migrants from the country (SASAS, 2018). The same survey cites that these anti-migrant views emerge mainly from the fact that about a third of the sampled respondents believe that the main reason why migrants are attacked is due to their own actions, namely, economic 'theft' and other criminal activities.

Dube (2019), reflecting on the findings of past the SAMP and other surveys and situating them in a more current context (albeit before the COVID-19 pandemic) posits that the answers to these questions likely moved in a more intolerant direction during the years of the Zuma presidency, arguing that xenophobia, while officially denounced, was too often a “tool of political convenience” (pg. 119) wielded by political elites incapable of addressing systemic problems (e.g., high unemployment and high crime rates) through public policy.

All in all, the recent literature on xenophobia incidents and anti-migration sentiments in South Africa is extensive (Dube, 2019; Gordon, 2015, 2016, 2017a, and 2017b; Gordon and Maharaj, 2015; and Ruedin, 2019, to name just a few examples). This literature broadly acknowledges that violence by South Africans against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (mainly African but also from South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan) is increasing. This recent literature points clearly to the emergence of anti-migrant

narratives growing, often at the behest of increasingly “populist” political environment. In response, the literature argues in favour of many of the policy and programmatic responses undertaken by the Joint Programme (see Dube, 2019 and Gordon, 2018a, 2018b). These include:

- Close engagement with Government stakeholders, including around sensitization and capacity building on migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers issues.
- Equally close engagement with civil society and the utilization of community organizations as ideal entry points, with established popular credibility, to combat anti-migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker views.
- The importance of addressing underlying economic/livelihoods-based drivers of anti-migrant, refugee and asylum seekers fear and distrust.
- The fundamental need to include women and youth as “peacebuilders” in community-based initiatives around building social cohesion among migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host, considering that women are still a minority in refugee leadership structures and peace building initiatives.

1.2. Legislative Context

Several policy and strategy documents related to the principles of the Joint Programme were analyzed as part of the evaluation’s desk review. Later in the report, reference is made to the content of these policies / strategies, particularly when assessing the *relevance, coherence, and effectiveness* of the Joint Programme’s design and implementation. These policies and strategies exist at two levels. First, at the national level, reflecting the South African Government’s stated desire to combat xenophobia (and racism/discrimination more broadly), and to promote social cohesion between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host communities. Second, at the international level, relating to international conventions developed and championed, in particular, by United Nations entities.

South Africa’s **NAP to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (2019)** is a further response to commitments first made at the United Nations World Conference against Racism, held in Durban in 2001. At this time, states, including South Africa, were urged to “establish and implement without delay national policies and action plans to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, including their gender-based manifestations” (NAP, 2019: 3). The NAP was developed

as part of a consultative process that involved the South African Government, Chapter Nine institutions,⁷ and civil society. While in part, a broad declaration of principles that emphasize the “universality, interdependence, and indivisibility of human rights, participation and inclusion, progressive realisation, accountability, equality, and non-discrimination” (NAP, 2019: 4-5), the NAP also contains several practical “programmatic” measures. These include:

- Calls for the establishment of formal partnerships between government departments and Chapter Nine institutions in implementing anti-racist and anti-discrimination education.
- Requirements that institutions routinely collect data regarding racism and discrimination so that the South African state can better target interventions, prosecute offenders, and offer psychosocial support to victims.
- Identifying legislation that needs to be amended or adopted with a view to improving the protection of victims, generating greater equality, and strengthening democracy and the rule of law.

Clause 78 of the NAP details a declaration of principles around social cohesion, stating the importance of inculcating “a spirit of inclusion that must guide national efforts aimed at building a new society”. At the centre of this is “the promotion of a sense of common belonging and a celebration of diversity among all who live in South Africa” (pg. 27). Following the constitution which guarantees the right to equality, the NAP details South Africa’s supposed rejection of xenophobia by “promoting a spirit of integration through engaging communities where xenophobia is most rampant” (Clause 82, pg. 28).

Abrahams (2017), writing at a time when the NAP was still in development, provides an evaluative overview of NAPs implemented in other countries, arguing that their success demands a level of national self-awareness and willingness to accept and even embrace criticism. While awareness around racial issues is prevalent, historically, the dominant narrative on xenophobia and intolerance towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers categorises as “normal” criminality rather than being something directed purposely towards *others*. There has been positive movement however, particularly concerning the recently approved Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill [B9B-2018]⁸ which legislates on racism,

⁷ South Africa’s Chapter Nine institutions were developed in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution to strengthen democracy. These institutions are the Public Protector; South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC); Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission); Commission for Gender Equality (CGE); Auditor-General; Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); and Independent Authority to Regulate Broadcasting.

⁸ The Bill was sed in Parliament in November 2023 (See <https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/media-release-national-council-provinces-passes-prevention-and-combating-hate-crimes-and-hate-speech->

racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. The Bill was passed by National Assembly On November 15th 2023.

The NAP aligns with a broader policy – **Chapter 15 of the National Development Plan, Vision 2030 (NDP)**. Entitled “Transforming Society and Uniting the Country,” this component of the NDP aims to promote South Africa as a “non-sexist, non-racial, and democratic” society. Nation-building, according to this part of the NDP, is to be done by “implementing redress, promoting economic and social inclusion, social cohesion, active citizenry and broad-based leadership, and the crafting of a social compact” (NDP 2012: 33). Notably, the NDP mentions xenophobia and the “importance of individuals with transnational identities,” leaving the details for implementing agencies or departments. Thus, the NDP is less prescriptive overall than the NAP, a fact which Brathwaite (2023) notes is the product of the NDP’s nature as an aspirational document.

A third policy/strategy document analysed as part of the desktop review is the **Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) (2019-2024)**. The MTSF arguably goes further than the NAP or NDP in acknowledging that xenophobia has clear root causes which are related to people’s perceptions of “not benefitting from democracy, globalisation, and integration” (MTSF, 2019: 117). Like the other policy documents mentioned so far, the MTSF is very focused on the lived realities of South African citizens, not mentioning migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, their particular risks from xenophobia, or the need to combat anti-migrant narratives as a part of promoting social cohesion.

In the context of this evaluation, it is understood that the Joint Programme was undertaken to reflect South Africa’s national priorities as identified in strategies like the NDP, NAP, and MTSF. Indeed, the Joint Programme has the declared aim of helping the South African Government realize key aims outlined in these strategies. However, the analysis above also points to the fact that many of the objectives of the Joint Programme, particularly those focused on supporting migrants as a core group of beneficiaries, actually go beyond what these strategic documents themselves emphasize e.g., acknowledging that xenophobia is an issue but not directly stating who is most directly affected and how root causes can be addressed). When assessing the Joint Programme against the OECD DAC criteria, the evaluation places emphasis on the extent to which there is any evidence of emerging change within the South African Government institutions

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nsideration.)

reached, in terms of a greater willingness to recognize and address xenophobia as a threat that primarily faces migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as a distinct group.

Two United Nations strategies were also included as part of the desk review. The **UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for South Africa (2020-2025)** outlines the United Nations system's collective commitment to supporting South Africa's development objectives. The UNSDCF's second strategic priority ("Human Capital and Social Transformation") directly addresses issues around xenophobia – noting the importance of United Nations support to the country in "strengthening enjoyment of human rights and protection from violence, discrimination, and violations for the most vulnerable and marginalised populations" (UNSDCF 2020, pg. 9). Mentioning migrants at least nine times by name, it is clear that migrants are included as among "the most vulnerable and marginalized."

Perhaps the most important frameworks to consider, and the one of greatest interest to the evaluation of the Joint Programme, is **the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)**. The GCM comes closest to reflecting what the Joint Programme is aiming to achieve, highlighting in Objective 16 the goal to "empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion". Objective 17 is also key to the Joint Programme, emphasizing the need to "eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration" (GCM 2018: 12). While a global strategy, it is readily apparent how the Joint Programme has been designed to reflect the GCM. At the same time, Crush (2022) warns that a technocratic approach to implementing the GCM (in South Africa or elsewhere) must eventually confront the fact that xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments are political phenomena that are often (although not always) projected during election campaigns.

1.3. Evaluation Purpose, Scope, and Criteria

The performance evaluation assesses the overall performance of the Joint Programme, examines the extent to which intermediate results (outcomes) were achieved, and analyses how effective and sustainable they are. The study highlights lessons learned and good practices, and provides recommendations for future programming, based on government and other stakeholder priorities around social cohesion. In this regard, the evaluation identifies lessons that can be applied to a scaled-up initiative – in South Africa and within the region. With the above details in mind, the evaluation focuses on

addressing questions which align with the OECD's DAC evaluation criteria. The evaluation goes further to also consider the Joint Programme's alignment with cross-cutting issues pertinent to the GCM.

The assessment was undertaken in recognition that some components of the Joint Programme were still being implemented. To accommodate this, Frontline adopted a dual approach to its analysis – performing a summative assessment of those activities and processes that have been completed; while taking more of a formative approach to assessing activities that were ongoing.

In terms of scope, the Joint Programme was implemented in a total of thirty-seven (37) urban areas within the three Provinces (Gauteng-8, KwaZulu-Natal-17, and the Western Cape-12). These sub-localities, which were considered hot spot areas for xenophobia, are detailed below.

Table 1: Sub localities where the Joint Programme activities were implemented.

Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape
Atteridgeville	Berea	Bredasdorp
Johannesburg	Cato Ridge	Cape Town CBD
Katlehong	Durban CBD	Gugulethu
Pretoria	Emolweni	Lutzville
Soweto	Eshowe	Mitchells Plain
Thokoza	Kwamashu	Philippi
Vosloorus	Ladysmith	Stellenbosch
Yeoville	Lamontville	Wynberg
	Mpumalanga	Parow
	Nazareth	Khayelitsha
	Pietermaritzburg	Worcester
	Phoenix	Caledon

Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Western Cape
	Richards Bay	
	Richmond	
	Umgeni	
	Umhlanga	
	Umlazi	
8	17	12

PART 2: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Overview of Methodological Approach

To meet its objectives, this evaluation incorporated a combined focus that included an extensive document review, as well as the collection of primary data through KIIs and FGDs. The document review focused primarily on reviewing and critically analysing relevant project documents provided by the Programme Management Team (PMT). Additional documentation was sourced separately, including documentation that shed light on the policy environment in South Africa pertaining to social cohesion, as well as on the work of civil society organisations in the social cohesion space. Primary data were collected through mixed methods - the use of a quantitative survey administered to Joint Programme beneficiaries and qualitative methods, in the form of KIIs and FGDs with a targeted number of Joint Programme stakeholders. Importantly, the evaluation employed gender mainstreaming through the implementation process, including in relation to data collection and analysis. Details on the gender considerations provided during data collection are provided in section 2.5.2. For its part, the document review also took into account gender issues amongst other cross-cutting issues that are particularly relevant in relation to the GCM.

2.2. Ethical Considerations

The data collection process adhered to the United Nations Evaluation Group's (UNEG) ethical guidelines to protect both participants and the integrity of their data. In this context, Frontline undertook the following. First, all study participants from whom data were collected, were fully informed of the objectives of the evaluation. Second, and following full evaluation study disclosure, the evaluator recited (and recorded) consent notes to all interviewed participants. This, as noted by Denzin & Lincoln (2011), is the cornerstone for ethical research. As a general rule, an informed consent includes clear information to the participant on what the study seeks to obtain from them, how the data will be used and the risks or consequences which might relate to the volunteering of information. Third, the informed consent involved an opt-out opportunity. The photos appended to this report were taken after consent was obtained from the respective stakeholders. Fourth, all analysed data is anonymised, in order to protect the identity of the interviewees.

2.3. Stakeholder Mapping

A detailed stakeholder mapping (which profiled beneficiaries, PUNO agencies and Implementing Partners (IPs) relevant for the evaluation) was done immediately following project inception. The mapping was done in coordination with the PMT and was informed by the initial document review, to ensure that as many relevant stakeholders (i.e., groups or individuals who have been /will be affected by the Joint Programme) as possible were included and engaged.

2.4. Secondary data (Document Review)

Frontline's evaluation team conducted a comprehensive document review, which provided important contextual information relevant to the project. The documents reviewed were both those publicly available on the internet and documentation provided by the PUNOs including, inter alia, programme work plans, monitoring and evaluation reports, activity and narrative reports, financial reports, and meeting minutes. The document review contributed to a better understanding, on the part of the evaluation team, of the Joint Programme's activities, self-identified challenges, and successes, as well as shed light on the contextual factors – socio-economic and political – that may have influenced the performance of the Joint Programme.

2.5. Primary Data Collection (Quantitative and Qualitative)

Quantitative

The evaluation team undertook a telephonic quantitative survey. The objective of the survey was to *comparatively assess* the Joint Programme performance in the sampled provinces and/or sub-localities. Quantitative methods are useful in providing measurable data which can be generalised (Cohen and Morrison, 2011). This method further provides an opportunity for replicability (Lichtman, 2013), which is particularly relevant to the current study. Quantitative methods pose the 'what' question, of which the OECD DAC criteria partly seek to answer. The 'what' gaps identified during the survey were probed further through subsequent qualitative methods, as discussed below.

At inception of the evaluation, the proposed sampling approach was to be determined on the basis of obtaining the database/s of beneficiaries from the PUNOs. While lists of beneficiaries were obtained from various PUNOs, the heterogeneity of the indicators captured by each PUNO, along with incomplete profiles of the beneficiaries, rendered the databases less useful for sampling and survey administration terms

than was expected. Consequently, the evaluation team adapted the survey methodology by reaching out to IPs directly, to supply the databases of beneficiaries. Ultimately, this approach was more effective. It was however not without at least two limitations, namely, missing/incorrectly captured mobile phone numbers; and the IPs were given short turnaround time⁹ to provide the databases. A note should be made here that migrants tend to change their numbers and /or SIM cards often, which could have contributed to limited access to the migrants. These limitations would later influence the sample target, size, and distribution of the survey, and by association limiting the scope to which the survey findings can be applied.


The challenges related to accessing a useable database of beneficiaries required adaptation of the *sampling procedure*. While the original plan was to employ probability sampling procedure in the form of stratified random sampling of beneficiaries reached by the Joint Programme, the fact that it was not possible to obtain – from the PUNOs or from IPs – complete and fully accurate beneficiary lists, means that Frontline resorted to using a non-probability sampling approach based on convenience sampling. Convenience sampling is based on “...practical criteria such as easy accessibility, geographical proximity, availability at a given time, or the willingness to participate” (Dörnyei, 2007). The decision to go with convenience sampling was aimed at achieving not only a reliable sample size, but also reasonable targets on gender and nationality indicators for survey inclusion, with both of these issues being deemed critical during the design and implementation of the Joint Programme.

As already noted, the evaluation utilised the OECD DAC criteria, to assess the impact of Joint Programme. The evaluation matrix which contains the assessment questions is appended as annexure 1.

The survey achieved a total of 100 beneficiaries, distributed unevenly through the three provinces. As illustrated below, Gauteng contributed the lion share (49%) followed by KwaZulu Natal (30%) and then Western Cape (20%)


⁹ The short turnaround time related to the limited timeline of the entire evaluation exercise.

Figure 1: Survey Sample Distribution




Although there were efforts to achieve gender balance, coincidentally, more than three quarters of the respondents were women (84%), even though slightly more than half of these women (55%) lived in male-headed households. Which is to mean, gender dynamics in this data are more complex than linear presentation of gender-based percentages. It is notable that four in every ten beneficiaries lived in female-headed households, and just under half (48%) had not attained tertiary education. These demographics underscore the prevailing social and economic conditions within which the Joint Programme activities were implemented.

Figure 2: Gender Distribution Per Province



Regarding nationality, as illustrated below, about 40% of respondents were South Africans, while another 34% (most of the migrant, refugee, or asylum seeker sample) were from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The rest of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers respondents were from Burundi (7%), Rwanda (4%), Malawi (4%), Nigeria (4%), Zimbabwe (4%), and Somalia (1%). Overall, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers representing seven countries were included in the survey.

Figure 3: Nationalities of the Survey participants



Qualitative

Qualitative data were collected in order to ensure the availability of rich descriptive data regarding the perceptions of those most closely involved in implementing the Joint Programme. The use of qualitative methods allowed for a deeper interrogation of the experiences of the Joint Programme's main stakeholders, allowing them to provide their opinions, recollections, and suggestions for future iterations of social cohesion-focused programming (De Vos, 2002; Leedy and Ormond, 2014). These qualitative methods also addressed the "how" and "why" behind the Joint Programme and were particularly useful at drawing out evaluative findings around migrant integration and perceptions around changes in levels of social cohesion in communities. Indeed, the success (or lack thereof) of the Joint Programme is inevitably connected to how its key stakeholders – whether migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, those in host communities, participating South African Government departments, PUNOs, or Implementing Partners – envisioned and approached the programme's core objectives and whether they fully bought into them. In-depth qualitative data collection allowed for these issues to be fully explored. The qualitative approach utilized key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

(a) Key Informant Interviews (KIs)

The purpose of KIs is to gather insights from people with specialized knowledge on a particular issue or set of issues. (Carter and Beaulieu, 1992; Rowley, 2012). KIs were conducted with a wide range of purposively identified stakeholders, from those involved in the planning and management of Joint Programme implementation; to national and local government actors who were exposed to the Joint Programme's capacity strengthening and sensitization efforts; community leaders; and Non-Government Organizations, Community Based Organizations and Faith Based Organizations (NGO/CBO/FBO)¹⁰ representatives. The KIs sought to achieve in-depth perspectives of the Joint Programme's coherence,

¹⁰ An NGO is a legally established, recognized entity created by private individuals or organizations to further political or social goals. CBO refers to non-profit groups that form at the community or grassroots level, usually to resolve specific problems or provide local representation in village councils or in municipal or regional government while FBOs are groups of individuals who have come together voluntarily around a stated spiritual or belief system that informs and guides their work together.

relevance and strategic fit, programme effectiveness, resource use efficiency. Impact and sustainability were also assessed though to a lesser extent focused on the progress made in this regard.

The KIs were implemented using a semi-structured interview guide, which was developed and then finalised in conjunction with the Evaluation Management Committee (EMC). A total of forty-one (41) KIs were conducted virtually. Of these, the evaluation undertook twenty-two (22) Key Informant Interviews (KIs) with the Implementing Partners listed in annexure 3. In addition, the evaluator undertook a total of sixteen (16) Key Informants drawn from the UN agencies, as listed in annexure 3.

(b) Focus Group Discussions

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are structured discussions among a small group of people with the goal of eliciting information about their perspectives on a specific topic (or set of topics) (Gray, 2014). FGDs aim to generate interactive dynamics that promote "self-disclosure" around shared and unshared attitudes and experiences by offering a safe environment for discussion (Freeman, 2009; Stewart et al., 2007).

During the evaluation, Frontline facilitated seven FGDs between the 12th and 14th of September 2023. These FGDs were spread out in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Western Cape, and Gauteng provinces (See detailed profile of FGDs in annexure 3). The FGDs constituted the targeted beneficiaries of the Joint Programme (migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and South Africans), and were held in locations with high concentration of Joint Programme activities in each of the three provinces. The participants of the FGDs were initially selected purposively, following which a snowballing approach was employed in which participants would recommend to the evaluation team others that they should include. The evaluation team considered representation of gender and nationality, both demographics of which were targeted by the Joint Programme's activities at the onset. The FGDs provided a crucial opportunity to assess the effectiveness – primarily from a knowledge and attitudes perspective – of the Joint Programme's success in boosting support for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers' integration and social cohesion/social protection objectives.

The evaluator separated the host community FGDs from FGDs with migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in order to encourage maximum participation and to minimize the risk of potential conflict or sensitivity arising over contentious issues. There was, however, one mixed FGD carried-out in KwaZulu-Natal, which

specifically aimed to observe and understand how migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host communities interacted and to consider how the social dynamics to them play out in an interactive setting. The decision to go ahead with this single mixed FGD was informed by a recommendation by the evaluation steering committee. KwaZulu Natal was selected as the location for this joint FGD based on the geographical convenience of bringing together several beneficiaries on the basis of close clustering of Joint Programme implementation sites in and around Durban.

Given the number of localities and the significant distance between each, the FGDs were held in central locations that were easily accessible to the participants and FGD facilitators (evaluation project experts). This strategy required that some participants commute to the FGD venue. The evaluator facilitated transport to and from the venue, along with refreshments.

(c) Outcome Harvesting


The evaluation incorporated, to a modest degree, an additional complexity-awareness data collection method in the form of outcome harvesting. Notably, the outcome harvesting approach was conceptualised from the beginning of the project. Outcome harvesting is interested in identifying changes in behaviour among identified “social actors” (those the project is trying – directly or indirectly – to reach and influence through its activities). Outcome harvesting collects (or “harvests”) evidence of what has changed (“outcomes”) and then works backward through a process tracing approach to determine whether and how a project (or a specific part of a project) has contributed to the identified change. In the case of the Joint Programme, the outcomes were not necessarily expected to be linear. The situational intricacy and the complexity of the activities did not lend themselves to simple output-outcome performance tracking, and where narratives/stories were an important part of assessing change delivered by the Joint Programme, outcome harvesting was considered useful for the evaluation.

In its simplest sense, outcome harvesting requires all members of a project team (and other stakeholders, as identified) to generate outcome statements. These statements could be in the form of a few sentences, or they could be in the form of short half-page narratives. Good outcome statements will identify a change (big or small) that has taken place with an identified “social actor” (an individual, group or organization) and will note when, who, where, and what this change relates to.

The outcome statement identifies when the change occurred, who was involved, where the change took place, and what the change in behaviour was. A good outcome statement then ascertains the significance of the identified change such as: - a) Is the change the first outcome of its kind? b) Is this outcome indicative of systemic change? c) Does the outcome contribute to sustainability? (to provide just a few examples). Finally, the outcome statement description concludes with a plausible account of the contributory pathway between a project and the identified outcome. This description should convey what activities were implemented that could have possibly led to the outcome.

Crucially, these outcome statements and the project’s contributory pathway(s) also require some sort of verification. Best practices in outcome harvesting traditionally insist on two sources of verification, often in the form of documentation (e.g., training registers and reports, meeting minutes, policy briefs, research reports, emails, etc.) and KIs with “social actors.” The latter is particularly important in allowing for an external perspective to give weight to the project team’s claims about their initiative’s contribution to change. It is important to note that outcome statements do not have to reflect positive change (change can also be negative) and they should not be confused with success stories. These statements should remain within the realm of the plausible without exaggerating a project’s contribution to identified changes. Figure 3 details the outcome harvesting process.

Figure 4: Visual Representation of the Outcome Harvesting Process



Source: *Outcome Harvesting* (2012) by Ricardo Wilson-Grau and Heather Britt.

The outcome harvesting exercise was conducted as part of the KII and FGD interviews. The consultant first identified the most insightful participant (during KIIs and FGDs). Secondly, the evaluation team followed up with these participants for more in-depth interviews focused on outcome harvesting. Each key informant who was willing to participate in the outcome harvesting exercise was briefed on the approach as part of the interview. The evaluation team provided the key informants with the outcome harvesting template and asked them to complete the draft of one outcome statement. The key informant's engagement in Outcome Harvesting complemented, but did not replace, the interview itself. Indeed, the evaluation team expected that the KII would provide an opportunity to tease out information that the key informant would elaborate on further in their drafting of the outcome statement.

It is important to note that these descriptions referenced broader changes in "behaviour writ large" since the start of the programme, that participants in the evaluation identified as being important.

This outcome-harvesting approach did not replace any of the other data collected for the evaluation, which focused strongly on the outcomes achieved in the Results Framework. However, outcome harvesting served as a complement to these data, allowing for a reflection on how the programme has contributed to behaviour change at a macro level. While outcome harvesting does not provide evidence of attribution of change to project activities, it strengthened the analysis pertaining to the programme's contribution to positive impact.

PART 3: EVALUATION FINDINGS

This section triangulates primary and secondary data collected as part of the evaluation. The report frames the data analysis of triangulated primary and secondary data within OECD DAC evaluation criteria.¹¹ For its part, the desk review drew primarily on the project annual narrative reports from 2021 and 2022, complemented by information contained in the project’s Social Cohesion Strategy (2021) and the NAP Implementation Roundtable (2022). Salient points from the document review are linked with the findings obtained from the primary data in the presentation of findings that follows. The findings are presented on the basis of the evaluation questions.

3.1. General Assessment

Both primary data and the review of project-specific documentation clearly indicate that the Joint Programme was designed to operationalize the actions outlined under Objective 16 of the GCM by “empowering migrants refugees and asylum seekers and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion through different initiatives at both the policy and operational levels” (MPTF Annual Report, 2022). **As outlined below, the key activities implemented by the Joint Programme appear closely aligned with the GCM’s overarching objective as outlined in Objective 16** (MPTF Annual Report 2021; 2022; MPTF Project Proposal, 2020).

- Capacitating community members and civil society organizations to better respond to the occurrence of xenophobic violence – primarily through training in measures to enhance social cohesion.
- Training state and non-state actors on issues pertaining to the human rights of migrants refugees and asylum seekers, as well as on broader issues of non-discrimination and xenophobia.
- Increasing awareness of and access to legal, psychosocial, and administrative support to victims of violence (migrants, refugees & asylum seekers, and non-migrant).
- Awareness-raising around peacebuilding measures at community-level.
- Countering negative narratives around migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers through dedicated outreach to communities and through the design of targeted social media strategies.
- Training of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members on confidence-building and the promotion of traditional conflict resolution methods.
- Capacitating female community leaders on mediation and peacebuilding approaches.
- Making available socio-economic/livelihood opportunities, particularly for vulnerable women and youth.

¹¹ OECD Evaluation Criteria. < <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm> > (accessed 13 August 2023).

- Improving the evidence-base around the causes and dynamics of anti-migrants, refugees and asylum seekers sentiment and violence in South Africa.
- Developing an early response/early warning system on xenophobia and hate speech.
- Capacitating government departments to adjust relevant policies and programmes to implement violence prevention and containment mechanisms.

Each of these 11 key activities are empowerment-focused and are inclusive – aiming to incorporate migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members, women, and youth. The document review and the KIs all indicated that the Joint Programme’s activities were mostly bottom-up in focus and aimed to reach those most likely to be directly affected by violence – as victims or as perpetrators. This bottom-up approach is something that Reyhler and Paffenholz (2001), Sandole (2010), and De Coning (2018) all identify as being essential for successful programming around peacebuilding and social cohesion.

When looking at the extent to which the Joint Programme prioritized the policy objectives of the South African Government, **it is apparent that the focus areas of the Joint Programme’s activities all apply in consideration of the overall objectives of the NDP 2030, the 2019 NAP to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, as well as to the MTSF (2019-2024)** – with some acknowledgment that the broadness of these strategies’ objectives make it relatively simple for many types of social cohesion projects to attain alignment (Brathwaite, 2023). The Joint Programme was co-implemented with relevant government departments, specifically the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD), the Department of Social Development (DSD), and the Department of Sport, Arts, and Culture (DSAC). There is evidence that the Joint Programme aligned with three specific key objectives of the NAP – in terms of fostering formal partnerships between government institutions and Chapter Nine institutions around anti-racism (or anti-xenophobia) education, around the centrality of data collection as an essential component to sustainable social cohesion interventions, and around issues of legislation or broader policy reform. These may be issues that are even more relevant to a potentially scaled-up version of the Joint Programme.

Assessing project relevance also involves looking at the extent to which the perspectives of intended beneficiaries are incorporated into project design and implementation. In this regard, there are some discrepancies between how project implementors, particularly from the PUNOs, saw this issue (as expressed through multiple KIs) and the views expressed by beneficiaries themselves. The evidence obtained through the document review and the KIs indicates that there was a broadly **consultative**

approach taken at the community/beneficiary levels as part of project design. Indeed, a consultative process was mandated by each of the PUNOs for their IPs in the development of community-focused activities (MPTF Project Proposal, 2020) and – based on KIs with IPs – this consultative process was broadly followed during the design phase. This consultative process appears, based on these data sources, to have also been well-maintained throughout implementation, with “rights bearers and duty holders being continuously consulted and engaged during the programme implementation” (MPTF Annual Report, 2021: 16). KIs from each of the PUNOs noted that a consistent intent was present to ensure consultation and collect beneficiary feedback, though three of the PUNO KIs also noted that this feedback was not always acted on in a timely manner and the ways in which feedback was acted upon was not always consistently fed back to beneficiaries. As the project faced unexpected challenges, not least the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, the Joint Programme’s approach to adaptive management was informed by consultations with representatives from host communities and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers associations – e.g., around areas where pivoting in terms of programmatic focus would be appropriate in relation to changes in context (and particularly during and immediately after the pandemic). Based on reviewed documentation and KIs with two PUNO representatives and three IPs, the IPs engaged migrants, refugees and asylum seekers associations in particular as co-implementors on a number of programme interventions during the pandemic, further strengthening the project’s assumed relevance to community needs (MPTF Annual Report, 2022).


Given the above findings, there is worth in valuing a type of participation which goes beyond general consultation to also encompass *active engagement* of the beneficiaries, including as project co-creators and co-implementors. This benefit is observed by Masouri and Rao (2004), who posit that community-based development is synonymous with active beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of projects. In fact, for Fukuda-Parr (2003), those targeted by a given project should be considered more than beneficiaries. Rather, they are agents of change, and therefore critical in both the design and the implementation of a given project. To what extent did the Joint Programme represent this level of active beneficiary engagement?

Based on the survey findings with community-level stakeholders, and running contrary to the views expressed by KIs at the both the PUNO and IP-levels, beneficiaries themselves perceived their engagement as inadequate in both design and implementation. Around half of the surveyed beneficiaries were not aware of any engagement or claimed that they were not engaged at all on either the design or implementation

phases of the project. This perception was shared across all demographics, including among respondents in each of the Joint Programme's three geographical areas. Some consideration should be given here to the fact that a) for the reasons cited earlier, the survey was necessarily limited in terms of its reach (those who were engaged by the Joint Programme during design or implementation) may simply not have been included in the survey. At the same time, there is a possibility that beneficiaries did not remember being consulted even if they had been, or chose to report not being consulted in the expectation that the evaluation findings will compel a scaled-up or new iteration of the Joint Programme to provide more benefits to communities as part of any beneficiary engagement processes. Finally, it may simply have been the case that beneficiaries were unaware of what the Joint Programme itself was, even if they were aware of specific sub-projects within the Joint Programme (e.g., the sports-focused interventions, livelihood support activities, etc.). The evaluation team attempted, as much as possible, to gauge beneficiaries' recognition of the Joint Programme by listing its constituent components in the survey, but this did not serve to increase respondent familiarity.

Engagement of beneficiaries on both design and implementation could, based on the survey findings, be viewed as one of the Joint Programme's shortcomings, which should be addressed in future programming. However, since the survey data do conflict somewhat with the information reported by several KIs and from the narratives included in Joint Programme documentation, there is also a need to delve deeper into why this disconnect seems to exist.

Figure 5: Participation by beneficiaries



The evaluation attempted, through its qualitative data collection, to clarify all that the Joint Programme included, but at the survey-level, a lack of clarity on this issue may be relevant. Second, the small beneficiary sample size necessitates some caution in interpretation. Nevertheless, even when the issue was probed during FGDs, concerns were raised around lack of ongoing engagement by IPs in including beneficiary feedback in how different project components were rolled-out. Ensuring that this beneficiary engagement is evident from the start and that there is a clear systematic process in place to continue collecting and acting on this feedback, is the most promising pathway to achieving behavioural change (Pollnac & Pomeroy, 2005), which at its core, the Joint Programme sought to realize.

3.2. Relevance

The evaluation categorises the findings per each evaluation question as follows:

3.2.1. Evaluation Question: Were the project activities and outputs well-designed, valid, and consistent with the intended outcomes and objective?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The project was well-designed and covered relevant areas of intervention that speak to the pressing social cohesion needs in South Africa. Several key informants spoke of the Joint Programme's emphasis on addressing both the "micro" and the "macro" sides of social cohesion. On one hand, working at community-level to raise awareness, facilitate dialogue, and provide capacitation around issues of peacebuilding (among other activities) and on the other hand, working with government departments to strengthen the institutional foundations that govern the country's migration space and which can provide migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers with protection from xenophobic attacks. Each of these activities and resulting outputs are valid in that they each align well with the Joint Programme's overarching – if very broad – objective of *"strengthening migrants refugees & asylum seekers, refugee and asylum seekers' integration and social cohesion among populations in vulnerable situations through targeted engagement and participation of government counterparts, civil society, migrants refugees & asylum seekers, and host communities in community level peace and socio-economic related activities"*.

While noting that the project design was well-aligned with the Joint Programme's overall objective, a majority of key informants pointed to the highly ambitious nature of the Joint Programme's activities and

the considerable number of outputs that were expected to be achieved. Once again, while these activities and outputs were deemed fit for purpose in aligning the Joint Programme with its stated objectives, programmatic ambition was seen as being mismatched to the Joint Programme's modest budget and limited three-year timeline. Thus, under its overriding objective "to contribute to strengthening migrant, refugee, and asylum-seekers' integration, social cohesion, and positive relations with host communities, particularly among populations in vulnerable situations," the Joint Programme aimed to achieve three (3) outcomes, inclusive of eleven (11) outputs and twenty-seven (27) indicators. Three key informants from the PUNOs contended that while these outcomes and outputs were technically well-considered, they were not governed by a consistent use of the Joint Programme's Results Monitoring Framework (also noted in MPTF, 2022). This fact, in turn, was seen as contributing to a lack of coordination around implementation.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were different stakeholders, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and affected communities, engaged in the design and implementation of the programme interventions?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme was designed with some stakeholder input. According to one key informant, however, there was a very quick turnaround time (less than six weeks) between the release of the call for proposals and the submission date. This was backed-up by a review of documentation pertaining to the project proposal co-design process. Consequently, **the design process – while reasonably consultative among the PUNOs – was too quick to incorporate a large amount of stakeholder input beyond the PUNOs.**

"The amount of time available to respond to a call for proposals is so short that it's not really enough time to ground yourself, to have extensive dialogues with partners, or to get a granular idea of what's happening on the ground" (K11).

Once implementation got underway, four KIs noted that co-design of activities was conducted more often by PUNOs with their individual IPs rather than directly with migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers or with host communities. Implementation was also typically informed more by engagement with IPs and with PUNOs placing a great deal of trust and responsibility in IPs to identify beneficiaries to be engaged. By itself, this is not necessarily problematic, particularly when IPs have close deep connections to the communities

they serve. For one key informant, however, this arrangement was problematic to the extent that it was felt that not all IPs had been subjected to full due diligence around their approaches to community engagement. As such, relying solely on the Implementing Partners to identify beneficiaries was seen to come with a risk of them choosing those they wished to work with rather than making an objective assessment of who could stand to benefit most from interventions. This concern was not identified by other KIs or in the Joint Programme's documentation. However, acknowledgment of this finding and the need for deeper reflection on it did emerge from the validation of findings undertaken by the evaluation team following the first-round of data analysis.

Co-design and co-implementation with government agencies was included as an objective of the Joint Programme, but did not happen regularly. According to four of the key informants from PUNOs, this was due to government stakeholders being pressed for time and moving slowly (or not responding at all) to requests for engagement. Rather than being involved in all facets of co-creation, the Joint Programme tended to receive government inputs at the last minute, which sometimes necessitated sudden reversals in approaches. Notably, a lack of consistent engagement from government ministries was something acknowledged by two government-level KIs when the evaluation team sought to triangulate this finding – though there was also a view expressed by these KIs that engagement with government agencies – especially the Department of Justice and Constitutional Department (DOJCD) improved over time. The validation of evaluation findings with PUNO representatives also reflected this view.

Evaluation Question: To what extent did the activities and outputs take into account the policies and priorities of the South African Government and beneficiary groups' needs?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme was designed, at least in part, to serve as a means of operationalizing the commitments made by the South African Government in the NAP. In this sense, and as is described further in the discussion around project "Coherence," the Joint Programme is very much aligned with South Africa's policies and priorities around social cohesion. **Several of the Joint Programme's activities speak directly to Clause 78, Clause 82, and Clause 193 of the NAP.** Indeed, the Joint Programme responded to fourteen of the NAP's nineteen Actions. The Joint Programme's efforts to inculcate social inclusion at community-level are drawn especially from activities falling under the project's Outcome 2 (Social inclusion and peaceful coexistence reinforced between migrants refugees & asylum seekers, other groups, and host communities).

These include the use of socio-cultural activities (e.g., community-level football matches, and cultural diversity programs) to promote migrants, refugees and asylum seekers' integration and social cohesion; the organization of awareness-raising initiatives such as workshops; community social cohesion dialogues (e.g., between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and members of host communities); the Living Ubuntu joint awareness campaign focused on acceptance and community harmony, the implementation of youth empowerment programs; training in income-generating opportunities; media (including social media) campaigns to promote positive narratives around migration and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers; corporate social responsibility schemes; training of community members in conflict resolution; and the strengthening of peer education networks, to name some of the more prominent activity examples.¹²

The Joint Programme also underscores the need to engage those communities “where xenophobia is most rampant” through the work done under its Outcome 1 (National and local systems and capacities improved to prevent and respond to violence and victims of violence) and Outcome 3 (Improved institutional system for understanding the causes and dynamics of crisis and violence, and for articulating responses). Under the former, the Joint Programme's work emphasizes capacity strengthening with local authorities (including Community Policing Forums) and work with local partners such as OHCHR work with the legacy Foundations, the Little Nana Same Campaign, as well as work on coordination and contingency planning, and UN Women's partnership with the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation. Other notable initiatives include investment in the development of early warning systems; the development of standard operating procedures for community leaders around conflict prevention; and improving access to legal and psychosocial support for victims of xenophobic violence. Under Outcome 3, the focus was on undertaking community mapping and research to understand the drivers of xenophobic violence and to formulate community-specific (and community-owned) responses.

“The NAP outlines nineteen recommended actions. I think the project [Joint Programme] responds to at least thirteen or fourteen of these” (KI5).

The NAP aligns with a broader policy – Chapter 15 of the NDP Vision 2030. Entitled “Transforming Society and Uniting the Country,” this component of the NDP aims to promote South Africa as a “non-sexist, non-racial, and democratic” society. Nation-building, according to this part of the NDP, is to be done by

¹² Joint Programme Annual Report, 2022.

“implementing redress, promoting economic and social inclusion, social cohesion, active citizenry and broad-based leadership, and the crafting of a social compact” (NDP, 2012: 33). While lofty (and not always specific) in its objectives, **it is still readily possible to observe alignment between the NDP’s Chapter 15 principles and the Joint Programme’s activities described above.** More to the point for the purposes of this evaluation, it is apparent that South African Government representatives viewed their engagement with the Joint Programme largely through the lens of trying to operationalize these policies, particularly the NAP. This also points to a high level of coherence between the Joint Programme’s design and NAP principles and objectives.

“The Department of Justice [and Constitutional Development] is the steward of the NAP. They’re the ones who are supposed to make its implementation a success. I think the Joint Programme was positively received by this Department because it gave them an avenue to begin putting meat on the bones of the NAP” (KI).

Activities were viewed by beneficiary groups themselves as being highly relevant to their needs. **Foundational research that constitutes something of a beneficiary assessment was conducted at project outset.** However, as noted in the “Coherence” section of the report, it is not apparent that the data for this assessment was utilized – or at least consistently utilized – to inform joint decision-making among the PUNOs (KIs referenced the existence of this foundational research and even acknowledged its quality, but there was no recollection – and no documented evidence in the documentation reviewed by the evaluation – supporting its widespread use). Nor, according to two of the key informants, was any attempt made by the project to actively make use of any meta-analyses of already existing research – including some research done by the PUNOs themselves. Instead, a great deal of beneficiary feedback was transmitted to the PUNOs, both at design and implementation stages, by the PUNOs’ Implementing Partners. This feedback was undoubtedly helpful, but perceptions remained among several key informants that the “more objective data” drawn from the beneficiary assessment, or from existing data sources, should have been utilized more fully.

3.3. Coherence

General Assessment

Any consideration of project coherence needs to consider the extent to which the Joint Programme exists in isolation vs. having synergies with other complementary initiatives (whether implemented by UN agencies or other stakeholders). **There were clear complementarities between the Joint Programme and**

the ongoing “Global Promotion of Best Practices for Children in Migration Project,” an initiative implemented through a partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Referred to as “Children on the Move,” this project takes a particular focus on supporting child migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers with the provision of psychosocial and educational support, as well as support in accessing healthcare services and in accessing documentation they require to obtain legal status in their host countries (UNICEF, 2023). The evaluation obtained mixed perspectives on the degree to which the Joint Programme engaged with this UNICEF-led initiative. It is clear that collaboration was not necessarily close (e.g., on a day-to-day basis), but the MPTF Annual Report (2022) does note that even passing engagement with “Children on the Move” encouraged the Joint Programme to take seriously the potential value of involving children in peacebuilding forums and other social cohesion events; a plan that was not there at project outset.

Outside close coordination and collaboration with UNICEF, evidence suggests that **the Joint Programme demonstrated a less than successful exemplar of a broader “One UN-Approach.”** This should, however, be understood in the context that the MPTF was the first in South Africa, and therefore there were obvious limitations to the programme’s ‘jointness’ Simply because PUNOs lacked the experience of working in tandem and harmonizing their own (often highly specialized) operational processes. The MPTF, under which the Joint Programme sits, has clearly brought together multiple United Nations agencies at country level around the design of a project that is broadly reflective of different agencies’ comparative strengths. However, there was a general consensus among KIs that the PUNOs could have engaged in closer and more effective collaboration particularly around implementation planning, which includes standardisation, coordination of budgets, work plans, and allocating staff time. **The evaluation evidence suggests “limited jointness” among the PUNOs when it came to engaging with South African Government entities, seemingly due to the PUNOs’ separate mandates not being fully reconciled in the context of project management and because the PUNOs had different budgets and resultingly different perceptions around the level of engagement with Government that they were capable of.** Limited jointness here means that the Joint Programme was not fully representative of true multi-agency coordination as it was an example of multiple agencies implementing a single project albeit still largely operating in silos and with clear divisions of responsibilities.

Context to the above finding is important, however. As reported by several KIs, the COVID-19 pandemic made in-person meetings difficult and prevented the type of relationship-building between different PUNO

personnel that would usually accompany a Joint Programme implementation approach. Moreover, in the evaluation's presentation of preliminary findings, it was noted by participants that this siloed approach to implementation did begin to shift, at least for some activities, towards the end of implementation. As noted elsewhere in this report, the impetus for this shift appears to have largely been the influx of new personalities. However, the document review does indicate a more systematic approach to joint planning emerging around the Living Ubuntu campaign and around certain activities – such as those focused on livelihoods strengthening – which necessitated agencies coming together to undertake similar work.

There was evidence on the Joint Programme's strengths (and potential) in encouraging a cohesive “whole-of-government” approach towards migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers-focused social cohesion among South African Government institutions. A prominent example was around the formulation of community conflict prevention plans. The development of these plans was undertaken in consultation with local government entities in the Joint Programme's targeted provinces. Targeted engagements were also conducted with provincial-level stakeholders to ensure that the conflict prevention plans established were linked vertically with province-level early warning systems and with national platforms like the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC). This linkage with the NDMC, in particular, is seen to reflect a strong likelihood of the Joint Programme being able to institutionalize and sustain some of its interventions, not least around advocacy and public awareness of xenophobia against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and in the ongoing training of local government stakeholders – including at community-level – to anticipate and provide support in the aftermath of outbreaks of anti-migrant, refugee and asylum seeker unrest (MPTF Annual Report, 2022). The work done by the Joint Programme to engage and link Community Policing Forums (CPFs) to broader community violence prevention efforts owned by local authorities and communities, is an example of important linkage-building between different levels of government, while OHCHR work with several stakeholders (such as Legacy Foundations, the Little Nana Same Campaign) as well as UN Women's partnership with the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation,- these point to capacity strengthening of non-government organizations.

Assessment on the Basis of Evaluation Questions

- (a) Evaluation Question: To what extent was the intervention consistent with relevant national, regional, and international frameworks, particularly the GCM and Sustainable Development Goals?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme was intentionally designed to reflect – and has reflected in its implementation – the objectives of South Africa’s national frameworks and policies around social cohesion – particularly the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (NAP) and Chapter 15 of the National Development Plan (NDP) Vision 2030. Indeed, the Joint Programme’s engagement with South African line ministries, particularly the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD) was premised on the Joint Programme serving to support the South African government in operationalizing the NAP. The Joint Programme was also developed with the clear intent of reflecting the objectives of select Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 10 (Reduce inequality within and among countries); SDG 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels); and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the goals). Finally, **implementation of the Joint Programme was fully aligned with select GCM objectives**, namely Objective 16 (Empowering migrants refugees & asylum seekers and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion) and Objective 17 (Eliminating all forms of discrimination and promoting evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration).

The NAP is a response to commitments first made by South Africa at the UN World Conference against Racism, held in Durban in 2001. At this time, states, including South Africa, were urged to “establish and implement without delay national policies and action plans to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, including their gender-based manifestations” (NAP, 2019: 3). The NAP was developed as part of a consultative process that involved the South African government, Chapter Nine institutions¹³, and civil society. While in part a broad declaration of principles that emphasize the “universality, interdependence, and indivisibility of human rights, participation and inclusion, progressive realisation, accountability, equality, and non-discrimination” (NAP, 2019: 4-5), the NAP also contains several practical measures. These include:

- Calls for the establishment of formal partnerships between government departments and Chapter Nine institutions in implementing anti-racist and anti-discrimination education.

¹³ South Africa’s Chapter Nine institutions were developed in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution to guard democracy. These institutions are the Public Protector; South African Human Rights Commission (SHRC); Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission); Commission for Gender Equality (CGE); Auditor-General; Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); and Independent Authority to Regulate Broadcasting.

- Requirements that institutions routinely collect data regarding racism and discrimination so that the South African state can better target interventions, prosecute offenders, and offer psychosocial support to victims.
- Identifying legislation that needs to be amended or adopted with a view to improving the protection of victims, generating greater equality, and strengthening democracy and the rule of law.

Clause 78 of the NAP details a declaration of principles around social cohesion, stating that the importance of inculcating “a spirit of inclusion that must guide national efforts aimed at building a new society”. At the centre of this is “the promotion of a sense of common belonging and a celebration of diversity among all who live in South Africa” (NAP, 2019: 27).

Several of the Joint Programme’s activities speak directly to Clause 78 and Clause 82 of the NAP. The Joint Programme’s efforts to inculcate social inclusion at community-level are drawn especially from activities falling under the project’s Outcome 2 (Social inclusion and peaceful coexistence reinforced between migrants refugees & asylum seekers, other groups, and host communities). These include the use of socio-cultural activities (e.g., community-level football exhibitions, cultural diversity programs) to promote migrants refugees & asylum seekers integration and social cohesion; the organization of awareness-raising initiatives such as workshops; community social cohesion dialogues (e.g., between migrants refugees & asylum seekers and members of host communities); the implementation of youth empowerment programs; training in income-generating opportunities; media (including social media) campaigns to promote positive narratives around migration and migrants refugees & asylum seekers; corporate social responsibility schemes; training of community members in conflict resolution; and the strengthening of peer education networks (to name some of the more prominent activity examples).¹⁴

The Joint Programme also speaks to the need to engage those communities “where xenophobia is most rampant” through the work done under its Outcome 1 (National and local systems and capacities improved to prevent and respond to violence and victims of violence) and Outcome 3 (Improved institutional system for understanding the causes and dynamics of crisis and violence, and for articulating responses). Under the

¹⁴ Joint Programme Annual Report, 2022.

former, the Joint Programme’s work emphasizes capacity strengthening with local authorities (including police); investment in the development of early warning systems; the development of Standard Operating Procedures for community leaders around conflict prevention; as well as improving access to legal and psychosocial support for victims of xenophobic violence. Under Outcome 3, the focus is on undertaking community mapping and research to understand the drivers of xenophobic violence and to formulate community-specific (and community-owned) responses.

The NAP aligns with a broader policy – Chapter 15 of the NDP Vision 2030. Entitled “Transforming Society and Uniting the Country,” this component of the NDP aims to promote South Africa as a “non-sexist, non-racial, and democratic” society. Nation-building, according to this part of the NDP, is to be done by “implementing redress, promoting economic and social inclusion, social cohesion, active citizenry and broad-based leadership, and the crafting of a social compact” (NDP, 2012: 33). While lofty (and not always specific) in its objectives, **it is still readily possible to observe alignment between the NDP’s Chapter 15 principles and the Joint Programme’s activities described above.** More to the point for the purposes of this evaluation, it is apparent that the South African government representatives viewed their engagement with the Joint Programme largely through the lens of trying to operationalize these policies, particularly the NAP. This also points to a high level of coherence between the Joint Programme’s design and NAP principles and objectives.

The Joint Programme’s **design and subsequent implementation align with several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**. In particular, the Joint Programme aligns with:

- **SDG #10:** Reduce inequality within and among countries¹⁵ – Target 10.2 (Promote universal social, economic and political inclusion); Target 10.3 (Ensure equal opportunities and end discrimination); Target 10.7 (Responsible and well-managed migration policies).
- **SDG #16:** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels¹⁶

¹⁵ SDG Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries. <<https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal10>> (accessed 10 September 2023).

¹⁶ SDG Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. <<https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16>> (accessed 10 September 2023).

- Target 16.1 (Reduce violence everywhere); Target 16.b (Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies).

- **SDG #17:** Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development¹⁷ – Target 17.18 (Enhance capacity-building support to developing countries to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely, and reliable data).

Discussion of the SDGs does not feature prominently in the Joint Programme documentation reviewed for the evaluation, though each of the above goals and targets are recorded on the information sheets (cover pages) of the project's annual reports. Again, it is relatively straightforward to understand, based on the brief description of Joint Programme activities provided earlier, how the project sought to address SDG-specific targets around promoting inclusion, creating equal opportunities, ending discrimination, improving access to justice, reducing violence, promoting non-discriminatory laws and policies, and generating quality research.

At a national level, the Joint Programme's objectives are also well-aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for South Africa (2020-2025). The UNSDCF outlines the United Nations system's collective commitment to supporting South Africa's development objectives. The UNSDCF's second strategic priority ("Human Capital and Social Transformation") comes closest to directly addressing issues around xenophobia—noting the importance of United Nations support to the country in "strengthening enjoyment of human rights and protection from violence, discrimination, and violations for the most vulnerable and marginalised populations" (UNSDCF 2020: 9). Each of the Joint Programme's three outcome areas, and particularly Outcome 1 (National and local systems and capacities improved to prevent and respond to violence and victims of violence) are aligned with this broad objective.

Finally, in regards to the GCM objectives, it is sufficient to note that the Joint Programme is coherent in relation to:

- **Objective 16:** Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion.

¹⁷ SDG Goal 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/?gclid=Cj0KCCQiw06-oBhC6ARIsAGuzdw3vAdqaNSEyntYGDN2FMNiOgeBT8kiWRdycD3QuW-ALUJt2gb-Z59AaAo0bEALw_wcB> (accessed 10 September 2023).

- **Objective 17:** Eliminate all forms of discrimination and provide evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration.

It is readily apparent that project design – including the nature of specific activities – was developed to align with these two objectives focused around inclusion and non-discrimination.

What the evaluation did find, based on the KIs with PUNO respondents, was a perception that there was a lack of regular reflection on how and to what extent the project was contributing to the specific objectives identified, namely, while this evaluation addresses this gap to some degree, **this finding points to a wider issue with the Joint Programme – the lack of any institutionalized internal reflection and learning processes that can relate the project’s progress back to these overarching conceptual objectives.** This is in spite of the fact that the project proposal did intend to include “stock taking activities” as part of its learning approach (but no evidence was found through the KIs or document review that these became institutionalized).

- (b) Evaluation Question: Do synergies exist with other interventions in South Africa carried out by intervention partners or other actors? If yes, how can these be scaled up in a future follow-up phase?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

Potential synergies clearly exist with other projects being implemented by United Nations agencies in South Africa – such as UN Women’s HeForShe Initiative (with its focus on GBV prevention and HIV/AIDS) and the joint ILO-UNICEF Project Youth for Future (Y4F): Youth Empowerment and Integration in Host Communities project (which focuses on employable skills development for migrant and refugee youth).¹⁸ Other interventions carried-out by intervention partners also stand to be scaled-up in a future follow-up phase. This includes some of the advocacy and research work being done around social cohesion by the Democracy Development Program (DDP), the psychosocial support and GBV prevention work done by the Adonis Musati Project (AMP), and an expanded media campaign – perhaps leveraging the ongoing support of Zoe Life or a likeminded partner – focused on combatting negative narratives around migration

¹⁸ Youth and Future (Y4F), UNDP https://www.ilo.org/africa/technical-cooperation/WCMS_817632/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 18 September 2023).

and migrants refugees & asylum seekers in the lead-up to the 2024 election. Finally, some of the work being undertaken by the SAMP project, implemented by multiple PUNOs (UNHCR, IOM, UNODC, and ILO), focuses on combatting disinformation, could potentially be scaled-up as part of coordinated efforts to combat negative narratives around migration and migrants refugees & asylum seekers. The African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) has already received United Nations funding to support complementary work strengthening the capacity of CPFs to identify and respond to the warning signs of xenophobic violence, and closer coordination with this agency would be worth considering in any scaled-up version of the Joint Programme.

- (c) **Evaluation Question:** How has the programme contributed to an increase in United Nations coherence and jointness in the social cohesion and in general in the implementing United Nations entities' work and Resident Coordinator (RC) leadership in the United Nations in the country?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme has provided a unique opportunity for the testing of a “one-UN approach” to project implementation. There is much that can be built upon for future initiatives in South Africa’s social cohesion space, with important inter-agency relationships having been fostered and improved familiarity having been developed among the PUNOs as to how each other operate and where complementarities – both programmatic and operational – can be identified and actioned to improve the efficiency and quality of implementation.

Available evidence does not indicate that the Joint Programme has created (at least not yet) conditions of improved United Nations coherence or jointness. More often than not, implementation appears to have been done in a fairly siloed manner and where joint work has been undertaken by PUNOs, it has often been driven by personalities rather than by the institutionalization of joint processes. Challenges in delivering truly “joint” efforts were often practical – the lack of truly pooled funds (the document review and KIs indicated that joint budgeting was relatively rare until it was undertaken, for very specific trainings and soccer-related social cohesion activities, late in implementation. Differences in operational procedures (e.g., around payment and procurements), and the fact that not all PUNOs had dedicated staffing budgets that allowed them to hire dedicated points of contact for the Joint Programme, all played a part in preventing an equal commitment to implementation from emerging for all PUNOs.

Clear opportunities to advance coherence and jointness among the PUNOs were missed. KIs cited the failure to establish an overarching Steering Committee, the fact that no dedicated efforts were made towards process standardization, teambuilding at project outset (though they did begin to emerge later on), and the claimed lack of sufficient use of the Joint Programme's Results Management Framework (RMF), which was intended to serve as a foundation for joint planning to achieve common results, are fault lines in implementation that should be addressed to generate coherence and jointness in future initiatives.

In any country context, responsibility for inter-agency coordination of the PUNOs lies primarily with the Resident Coordinator. A review of contextual information,¹⁹ corroborated by two of the evaluation's key informants, indicates that **there was a turnover in the Resident Coordinator position in the period of the Joint Programme's implementation.** While this may not have affected the full scope of project implementation, the Joint Programme did not consistently benefit from having in place a *consistent* advocate for a "one-UN approach" or someone reliably in-country who had overarching authority to mandate coordination between United Nations agencies on the basis of GCM principles.

For any type of joint initiative to be successful, agencies must be willing to contribute to a collective vision and not jealously guard their own mandates. **The evaluation found mixed results on this front.** On one hand, joint planning between the PUNOs was clearly evident at the design stage, with the project proposal serving as a strong reflection of what a One-UN vision for improved social cohesion in South Africa could look like.²⁰ This same level of joint collaboration did not extend to the early stages of project implementation, which was admittedly complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Closer collaboration did emerge more strongly towards the later stages of the project, including in the PUNO's collective humanitarian response to flooding in KwaZulu-Natal in April 2022²¹ and in the rollout of the nationwide #LivingUbuntu campaign in April 2023, which focused on dispelling negative myths around migration and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.²² However, this change in favour of closer collaboration was not

¹⁹ Refers to a review of news bulletins from the website of the Resident Coordinator Office.

²⁰ Project Proposal for the United Nations Pilot Project for Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders' Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities, and Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa (2018).

²¹ News 24. KZN floods: United Nations in SA contributes R21m 'to provide support to affected communities', <<https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/kzn-floods-united-nations-in-sa-contributes-r21m-to-provide-support-to-affected-communities-20220512>> (accessed 16 September 2023).

²² IOM. #Living Ubuntu: A Campaign hoping to promote social cohesion in communities. <<https://southafrica.iom.int/news/livingubuntu-campaign-hoping-promote-social-cohesion-communities>> (accessed 11 September 2023).

uniform and was driven more by an influx of new personalities at the PUNOs rather than by adherence on the part of the PUNOs to any type of institutionalized approaches to collaboration.²³

Joint work planning between the PUNOs was done occasionally and does appear – based on a review of project narrative reports – to have been successful in preventing some duplication of activities. For the most part, however, key informants reflecting on the jointness of project implementation recalled that different PUNOs largely adopted specific components of the Joint Programme to work on and then went off to implement in isolation.

“What we find with our [UN] agencies is that once we all have access to resources, we turn around and implement our own programs. With this program [the Joint Programme], we implemented activities individually and came together to collate the report to say that I [my agency] did that, that, and that” (K16).”

“What you didn’t see [in the Joint Programme] were PUNOs collaborating on how to work together to enrich the same initiatives, for example how to jointly implement a package of community trainings. This does not necessarily mean that the results [of the trainings] were poor, just that there wasn’t any real sense of common purpose [among the PUNOS]” (K17)

“We’d have training of certain government departments. IOM would go and do some training around migration policy. Then perhaps OHCHR [Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights] would see the need for a policy training around human rights. These would end up as two separate trainings but if there had been proper planning and coordination, it would have been clear that the same people [same government representatives] are being targeted for these trainings and they should be done together. The trainings could even have reinforced each other” (K12)

“For much of the project, what were supposed to be joint planning meetings were actually just opportunities for agencies to provide their updates. There really wasn’t any joint planning going on” (K18)

The above quotes should not be taken to suggest that joint work by the PUNOs was entirely non-existent or did not improve as the project went on. Indeed, the aforementioned example of the Living Ubuntu

²³ Based on the perspectives of three KIIs

campaign, joint work between UNHCR, and UNDP to define the scope of livelihood training interventions, are among two examples where joint planning emerged, often successfully. The overarching point remains, however, that this jointness appears to have been the exception rather than the norm and it emerged most significantly as the project was already entering its latter stages.

There were several practical challenges that affected the jointness of Joint Programme implementation by the PUNOs. **The project had in place a lead agency (IOM) and an IOM-based Project Coordinator, as well as a Programme Management Team with overall oversight of the project, along with a Steering Committee to oversee it. Notwithstanding,** the ability of the Results Group to advise to the Joint Programme also depended on the PUNOs actively deciding to include it and to seek its advice – something that two key informants (backed-up by a review of project narrative reports) indicate never happened.²⁴

The jointness of PUNO collaboration on the Joint Programme suffered from the fact that there were no truly pooled funds and not all of the PUNOs had project-specific staffing budgets. While some PUNOs, like IOM and OHCHR, could budget for and hire staff dedicated 100% to the Joint Programme, this was not the case for all of the United Nations agencies. Those agencies with a smaller share of the Joint Programme's budget could not hire dedicated staff, meaning that they had to allocate staff costed to other projects to do "extra work" on the Joint Programme. According to three KIs, these other agency staff did give the Joint Programme attention when they could, but they were often too busy to give it the *exclusive* attention it actually needed. The focal point from UNHCR, for example, was responsible for 10 portfolios in addition to their work on the Joint Programme. This had some effect on both the ability of the UNHCR focal point to regularly participate in joint planning, but most significantly to ensure their availability to take part of joint implementation and review of activities.

With Joint Programme is bringing together multiple agencies, there is usually an initial teambuilding phase to ensure that those from the different agencies become familiar with each other and develop an initial sense of camaraderie. From a review of project documentation, confirmed by two key informants, **no such teambuilding was done prior to the start of the Joint Programme.** The COVID-19 pandemic may have complicated any such in-person gathering at project outset, but dedicated initiatives do not appear to have been instituted even once the worst of the pandemic was over and in-person work had once again become

²⁴ K13 and K15.

the norm. One possible exception was a lunch initiative, instituted by IOM, which was meant to establish team familiarity. This was launched in 2022, however, well-past the initial stage of implementation where teambuilding would have been most valuable in informing joint coordination. The fact that new staff progressively became part of the Joint Programme over the course of its implementation, and did not find much in the way of joint team dynamics in which to operate, was cited by some key informants as a major challenge.²⁵

Ultimately, a lack of dedicated teambuilding at the start of the project also served as a missed opportunity in providing PUNOs with clearer understandings of how their sister agencies work, what Implementing Partners they engage with, and the implementation modalities they work with. Having such understanding clarified from the beginning “would have saved a lot of...I wouldn't say conflict...but uncertainty in how the different agencies were planning to tackle implementation of the Joint Programme” (K17). The instituting of a Program Management Team (PMT) later in the project, once the COVID-19 pandemic had abated, did allow for more in the way of joint coordination. This PMT saw the different PUNOs rotate responsibility for chairing meetings, and did help to establish some common understandings that were not present between the agencies initially. However, the fact that the PMT seldom emerged as a speaking point for key informants, despite considerable probing on issues of project joint administration, speaks to the fact that this mechanism still could not totally make up for the lack of a systematic process for joint meeting being in place from project outset.

IOM, as the lead agency and the one responsible for project deliverables, was put in a difficult position of trying to coordinate project planning, implementation, and review, but struggling to pin down colleagues from the other PUNOs who had a multitude of other responsibilities outside the Joint Programme to attend to. **The sizeable number of activities and outputs implemented through the Joint Programme also made coordination difficult when some agencies lacked fully dedicated project focal points.** Three of the evaluation's KIs noted that the overriding need to simply ensure that activities were completed meant that when scheduling or other challenges made joint planning impossible, individual agencies would go ahead and implement so as not to delay their planned schedule on the Joint Programme.

²⁵ This point was also raised by two other KIs.

Jointness between the PUNOs was also made challenging due to the agencies' differing financial systems and different operational processes (e.g., in relation to procurement). Sometimes debilitating and impractical, these operational differences created circumstances where, for example, several KIs noted that agencies sought to share financial resources (e.g., for one agency to support another in procuring consultant trainers) but were prevented from doing so by the lack of complementarities between payment structures and agency-specific financial/audit compliance rules.²⁶

To its credit, the project seems to have done well to overcome some operational challenges through joint efforts – for instance, with IOM being the executor of the Joint Programme contract, in allowing other agencies to piggy-back on its procurement processes when soliciting quotations for venues, consultants, etc. IOM was also able to draw on UNHCR's roster of Implementing Partners they had previously worked with. While raised as a compliance concern by one key informant, a workaround was found between IOM and UNHCR whereby IOM could choose to work with Implementing Partners previously contracted by UNHCR without having to repeat the (often onerous) due diligence processes that UNHCR had already undertaken with these Implementing Partners when first onboarding them.²⁷ Being able to take advantage of the legwork already done by UNHCR allowed IOM to move forward quickly to partner with Implementing Partners and make up for implementation time lost due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

More worryingly, however, some of the key informants reported that several opportunities for improving intra-agency coherence and jointness between the PUNOs were missed (and even actively neglected) over the course of Joint Programme implementation. For the purposes of this evaluation, two particular issues stand out. First, is the apparent lack of prioritization given to the RMF as a foundational tool for joint planning, implementation, and reflection. The RMF was intentionally designed to serve as a guiding reference for each of the PUNOs. However, according to one KI, and validated by a wider group of PUNO stakeholders in the initial presentation of evaluation findings, the RMF was never used for this purpose:

“At no point was the results matrix really consulted over the course of implementation. This is obviously a problem since your decisions around what to do, what interventions to focus on, should be guided by the results you want to achieve. That didn't really happen with the Joint Programme” (KI)

²⁶ KI6.

²⁷ Mentioned by two KIs –. This issue was not noted in any of the reviewed project documentation, however.

The upshot of planning not being based on a shared understanding of desired results, according to the KIs, was that PUNOs broadly implemented the activities that they wished to, regardless of whether they could be readily linked to the causal change pathways articulated in the RMF. This again speaks to a lack of an overarching Steering Committee that could have institutionalized clear joint planning processes from *project outset*. This does not necessarily imply that the results that were achieved weren't positive, but rather that they weren't necessarily linked to a shared PUNO understanding of what was trying to collectively be achieved.

"In most projects I've worked with, the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the Theory of Change are really important in guiding work plans. For this project, the M&E Framework was a good tool because it really focused on what the project was trying to do holistically. However, I don't remember any conversations being centred around the Framework or talking about the results we wanted to achieve – though I know it was used in the project reporting"

(KI7)

Similarly, the project commissioned contextual research in its initial phase of implementation to help inform joint planning. According to two key informants, this research, which resulted in the production of training guides and standard operating procedures for engaging both government and community-level stakeholders on social cohesion, was largely (and for reasons unknown) disregarded. To be fair, issues may have existed with the utility of the outputs produced, even if this did not come through in the evaluation findings. Regardless, **these resources were intended to foster a common approach to implementation across the PUNOs, but they were seemingly ignored – or at least not actively utilized - in favour of the PUNOs working within their already established (and largely siloed) approaches vis-à-vis stakeholder engagement.** Curiously, reviewed documentation, while noting the commissioning of this research, makes little further reference to it, though one did note that the findings of this preliminary research were used to identify "hot spot" areas where agencies could focus their programming in both KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. According to one of the key informants, the fact that the findings from this initial research were not used created a gap in terms of agency knowledge of how best to engage community stakeholders. According to the key informant, this left some PUNOs overly reliant on their Implementing Partners to provide community-level intelligence and to undertake beneficiary selection.

- (d) Evaluation Question: How well does the programme complement and fit with other ongoing UN and national and provincial government programmes in South Africa?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme is complementary of South Africa's existing national and provincial government programs focused on social cohesion. Particularly at the national level, it should be noted that the Joint Programme has been the main vehicle through which the three ministries most engaged in the social cohesion space – DOJ&CD, DSD, and DSAC – have sought to operationalize their social cohesion objectives. These ministries have also entered into “bilateral” agreements with some of the UN agencies, most notably DSAC with UNDP.²⁸ A number of UN agencies have in place separate projects that speak to aspects of social cohesion and social protection more broadly, which a scaled-up version of the Joint Programme should seek to link with. A number of these projects operate in the GBV prevention space, including UN Women's HeForShe Initiative, which focuses (among an array of issues) on GBV and HIV – issues that could easily find complementarities in a focus on migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. There are also considerable complementarities between the Joint Programme and the Youth for Future (Y4F): Youth Empowerment and Integration in Host Communities project, being implemented jointly by ILO and UNICEF. This project focuses directly on capacitating young migrants, refugees, and youth in host communities to enter into sustainable livelihoods initiatives – and could serve those migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (with more intensive support) that were reached by the livelihoods support work of the Joint Programme.

3.4. Efficiency

(a) General Assessment

According to the MPTF Annual Report (2022), making use of policy for purposes of managing project funds for implementation provided the Joint Programme with a high level of operational flexibility and kept available financial resource levels reasonably balanced. The Joint Programme did not experience an influx of funding for Implementing Partners to absorb at once nor specific stretches whereby funding was scarce. Project documentation (MPTF Joint Programme Proposal, 2020; MPTF Annual Report, 2021; 2022) indicates that 70 percent of total Joint Programme funding was released at project outset. The remaining

²⁸ Partnership for strengthening social cohesion in South Africa. <<https://www.undp.org/south-africa/press-releases/partnership-strengthening-social-cohesion-south-africa>> (accessed 09 September 2023).

amount was tied to the realization of performance targets and was released within the last three months of implementation. This approach impacted on the speed of implementation. In addition, PUNOs raised concerns related to limited funding, the basis of which a second No-Cost Extension was given by the funder. Even then, the No Cost Extension addressed the question of time, and not the resource related limitation.

(b) Evaluation Question-Based Assessment

Evaluation Question: How well are the resources (funds, expertise, and time) being converted into results?

Because the activities were so many, it was difficult to track the effectiveness of individual activities and even more difficult to look at the effectiveness against costs. An overarching point should be made in relation to this evaluation question – that USD 2.5 million is “a drop in the ocean” (according to one adamant KI), particularly for a project that is seeking to effect change at both community and government (institutional) levels. Indeed, to deliver meaningful change according to the outcomes outlined in the Joint Programme’s RMF, investments would be required from government and exploring partnerships with private sector entities interested in similar initiatives.

Evaluation Question: Were the interventions implemented in the most efficient way (time and funds) and to the planned scope?

The interventions were delayed in the process of planning and aligning the Joint Programme with partner stakeholders. As noted in the “Coherence” section of the report, the funding available to the PUNOs has not always been fit for purpose, particularly in relation to staffing. With some PUNOs being unable to allocate full-time staff to the project, the result has been an over-burdening of staff already allocated to (and budgeted under) different projects. Unsurprisingly, with some implementing staff spread too thin, this has implications in slowing down implementation, including by making joint planning more difficult.

3.5. Effectiveness

(a) General Assessment

A review of the MPTF Results Framework (2022) indicates that at the outcome level, the Joint Programme met its established targets. These include:

- Implementing seven (7) community peace initiatives (6 in KwaZulu-Natal and 1 in Gauteng) against a baseline of two (2) initiatives identified at project outset.
- Implementing (6) functioning conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms (two per province) against a target of one (1) mechanism established at project outset.
- A recorded 70 percent reduction in the percentage of host community members who reported a decrease in perceptions of violence and xenophobia by the population in targeted communities in the past two years.
- A recorded 70 percent of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members reporting increased social inclusion.
- Approval of reform proposals for crisis and violence prevention, including for xenophobic violence, at the national level.

Taken by themselves, these indicators reveal only partial information about the Joint Programme's effectiveness. As the Results Framework itself indicates in several places, more descriptive data — such as gathered by the evaluation team — are required to interrogate what these findings really mean in terms of qualitative change in levels of social cohesion. While the evaluation was not expected to focus too heavily on validating the Joint Programme's Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) data, it provided a sense check and further interpretation of these data (at least at the outcome-level) wherever possible – mainly through the KIIs.

A review of the Joint Programme's annual narrative reports (2021; 2022) does point to some descriptive information that further highlights achievements to date. These include:


- The creation of a customized Human Rights toolbox for South Africa, alongside a training handbook that incorporates migration and issues facing migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
- Substantive efforts to use the above toolbox platform on which to support the South African Government to undertake legislative/policy reviews aimed at improving inclusivity of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
- Awareness raised and positive narratives around migrants, refugees and asylum seekers promoted by PUNOs through a range of socio-cultural approaches, community dialogues, community outreach, and social media campaigns.

- Development of the Community Capacity Enhancement (CCE) manual that DSD is now using as a training resource for their change agents and other community leaders. This manual has also been used to strengthen the capacity of CPFs in collaboration with APCOF.
- The implementation of local peace mediation approaches through community peacebuilding and the training of monitors, traditional leaders, and women to play key roles in taking ownership of these peacebuilding efforts.
- The use of social mixing approaches to bring together migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members to exchange experiences and views. These approaches were implemented to (ideally) foster a “common culture of acceptance.”
- Implementing capacity-building/trainings for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members to identify and access livelihood support and socio-economic opportunities.
- Both South African Government agencies and civil society organizations, including youth and students, equipped with the skills required to monitor online hate speech and other forms of violence like Gender Based Violence (GBV), to develop tools to identify communities at risk and to map the underlying causes of xenophobic violence, as well to map potential solutions.
- Support by the PUNOs to government stakeholders, to review and improve current government plans and strategies on integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and nation building/social cohesion.

Where effectiveness appears to have been diminished, it has largely been the result of 1) the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic; and 2) limitations on inter-agency coordination among South African state actors. According to most of the KIs engaged for the evaluation, the pandemic’s lockdown restrictions prevented the Joint Programme from making initial headway in engaging communities face-to-face. The pandemic also served as an additional driver of anti-migrant, refugee and asylum seeker sentiment and violence, which Brathwaite (2023: 17) calls a “tremendous barrier to any quick wins for South African or international initiatives to combat xenophobia”. Poor inter-governmental coordination, cited by several key informants, on the other hand, has negatively impacted Joint Programme implementation by making it challenging for Implementing Partners to coordinate with different levels of government, or to obtain buy-in (e.g., by provincial authorities for community/local-level initiatives) around how social cohesion initiatives would be incorporated into these institutions’ routine operations (see also White and Coulson, 2023).

There **was reasonably low level of project awareness by beneficiaries**. About half of all beneficiaries (51%) were either not aware at all, or somewhat unaware of the Joint Programme. This evaluation however cautions that the Joint Programme took many cascaded descriptors, in which case it was difficult for the survey to determine which label or descriptor was used in which community. The survey employed variations of descriptors as advised by the Implementing Partners. In other words, while all the Implementing Partners were well aware of the project description as '*the Joint Programme*' this was not necessarily the description of the project on community level. Perhaps the key lesson for any future programming is to determine some standardised project descriptors which would make it easier for communities to refer the Joint Programme by.


Figure 6: Awareness of the Joint Programme by Beneficiaries



The survey made a distinction between awareness and understanding of the Joint Programme. Whereas *awareness* relates to possessing basic information, *understanding* refers to a reasonable grasp of the facts surrounding a phenomenon. Writing about public goods (specifically public health), Trevethan (2017) cautions that differentiating the two words is necessary if interventions are to achieve meaningful impact. This is particularly true for the Joint Programme, considering the misunderstanding of the migration phenomenon, its causes, and links to development; even in the migrants, refugees and asylum seekers' receiving communities. The dominant (and popular) approach is to identify migrants as a monolithic group without internal differences of class, nationality and ethnicity, instead, the general public focus delineates all these sub-categories in a single category, namely, illegal migrants. This evaluation did not find documented evidence that factual information related to numbers (both aggregated and dis-aggregated) of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers was conveyed to beneficiaries in such a way that prevailing (negative) myths around migrants, refugees and asylum seekers would be combatted with factual information. When the survey probed the factual understanding of the Joint Programme (inclusive of its objective), only 38% of survey respondents claimed that they fully or somewhat understood the technical premise of the Joint Programme. A similar number claimed to understand 'only a little' while 24% claimed that they did not understand the Joint Programme at all. This does not suggest they were not aware (and therefore


considered the personal relevance into the Joint Programme), but that they did grapple with the Joint Programme's technical principle.

Figure 7: Understanding of the Joint Programme



Nonetheless, despite insufficient understanding of the Joint Programme activities, the survey concluded that there was a general understanding among beneficiaries that the Joint Programme targeted migrants, refugees, and South Africans. In view of future upscaling and/or joint programming, the satisfactory understanding of the targeted beneficiaries is a valuable entry point to deepening perception of the Joint Programme, noted above.

Figure 8: Who benefited most from the Joint Programme



(c) Assessment on the basis of Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question: Have the activities and outputs been achieved in accordance with the stated plans?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

By and large, most activities appear to have been implemented as intended, even if their realisation has been done in a more siloed manner than was originally expected of the Joint Programme. A common theme among key informants from the PUNOs was around the fact that **the Joint Programme attempted to do too much with too little time**. Delayed start to project implementation – both due to the COVID-19 pandemic and unexpected demands by the DSD for a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Resident Coordinator prior to any implementation – cut the time available for implementation further.

A review of project Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) materials, reinforced by the KIIs, indicates that the Joint Programme did not institute a strong evaluation or learning function that would have been able to point more clearly to results achieved. There is a prevailing view, which this evaluation supports based on the data it has been able to collect, that effectiveness is more apparent at the “micro” (community level) than at the “macro” (government engagement) level. Even here, however, effectiveness tends to be viewed in a very narrow lens – changes in attitudes or sentiments towards migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers on the part of host community members, or more people (migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members) accessing common opportunities (e.g., around income generation).

“When talking about the effectiveness of the Joint Programme, we were probably too ambitious. So many of the issues around social cohesion are big, longstanding problems that are structural and which the UN can’t solve. What did we do well? I think it’s the community dialogues. A dialogue doesn’t solve these problems, but it starts a more constructive conversation about them” (K18)

“The environment in South Africa is so complex. Especially at the policy level and trying to engage with government. The relationship between the government and the UN has its own characteristics too. Are we a drop in the ocean? Maybe. But I think some of the downward linkages that have been built. Communities engaging with each other, local leaders trained to identify and address the drivers of conflict, those are definite positives” (K12)

Interestingly, three key informants noted that when the Joint Programme started, the PUNOs operated with an assumption that they would be mainly addressing the needs of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Instead, it was noted that many South Africans struggle to access the same services (e.g., many lack identity documents that would enable their access to basic services). According to several KIIs, **this realization was reported to have placed an additional burden on the PUNOs in trying to address community-wide needs rather than focusing more narrowly on migrants, refugees and asylum seekers needs, as was expected.** It should be noted here that the perception of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers-specific focus could point to a lack of understanding among some of the PUNOs as to the core emphasis of the project (since project documents routinely – and correctly – refer to the engagement of “host communities” as a necessary precondition for building social cohesion). It may also point to some agencies, whose mandates are usually migrant and/or refugee-focused, recognizing that they must adapt to a Joint Programme that demands an additional host community focus.

Key informants were of the view that while the Joint Programme laid a positive foundation, a realization of true change would be more likely to come after the implementation of a 4-5 year project, with more financial and dedicated human resources. This also involves more jointness in implementation, and with attention being placed on a narrower range of activities that could be the focus of intensive implementation. At the same time, project effectiveness around social cohesion requires “buy-in at the top,” within the political (rather than technocratic) wing of the South African government to champion social cohesion and combat xenophobia.

“I don’t doubt that there are people within government who really want to do good work [around social cohesion]. The NAP is a reflection of this, [the Department of] Justice seems like they’re really interested. But the tone is set from the top and I just wonder how effective any of us [PUNOS] can be if the political messaging is to scapegoat migrants and refugees” (KI7)

Evaluation Question: What were the major factors, internal or external, influencing the delivery of project deliverables?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

Several contextual factors influenced the delivery of project deliverables. The COVID-19 pandemic was still salient in the early stages of project implementation, though neither the key informants nor a review of project documentation suggest that the pandemic was a major barrier to implementation. **Of more**

direct relevance to the Joint Programme, however, were - the unrest that gripped South Africa in July 2021, some of which reflected xenophobic sentiments even if the root causes were broader, and the devastating floods that hit KwaZulu-Natal in April 2022. Notably, these events, while tragic in themselves, served to demonstrate the PUNOs coordination capabilities at their best led by the Resident Coordinator's Office. Particularly in the case of the floods, the PUNOs demonstrated a strong capacity for adaptive management in repurposing their funding and their staff focus to immediate humanitarian relief. The perceived success of this relief effort was a source of pride for many of the key informants and an area of recognition among beneficiaries:

"We didn't foresee these [2021 unrest or 2022 floods], so we had to think quickly during implementation to see how we could respond to them. With the floods, we noticed very quickly that refugee and migrants refugees & asylum seekers households were not receiving assistance from the state [only South African households were]. We sprang into action quickly and extended needed relief. The coordination between the agencies [PUNOs] was at its best at this time" (K12)

"With the floods, as horrible as they were, they did show what could be achieved when you have a relief effort that tries to be inclusive of both migrants and refugees, as well as South African [host community] households. I actually think our emphasis on helping everyone and excluding no one, calmed tensions in some communities at a very difficult time" (K12)

As much as these unexpected events did signify positive examples of adaptive management, they also did affect "regular" project implementation, slowing the rollout of some activities.

Other external factors influencing project delivery – and effectiveness – had to do with government agency inertia. In particular, the Joint Programme's initial government interlocutor – the DSD requested a new MoU from the Resident Coordinator before allowing for project implementation to begin. This demand for a new MoU was unexpected given that the UN's presence in South Africa is already governed by a Cooperative Framework. Once again, this situation did allow the Joint Programme to demonstrate some value in its adaptive management, prompting a shift towards focusing on relationship building with a much more receptive DOJ&CD – but it did come at the expense of delays in project rollout and in allowing for clarity to be established around the optimal modalities for engaging with the government.

“I think there was a little bit of uncertainty around how this project [the Joint Programme] would handle the relationships with the government ministries. At first, it was hard to gain traction and then this whole issue with the MoU [request from DSD] came up. We consulted with DIRCO regarding this matter. Thankfully, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development by virtue of their mandated role as custodian of the NAP embraced the opportunity presented by the Joint Programme. Once we realized that we’d find a more willing partner at [the Department of] Justice, it changed our calculations and the relevant agencies [PUNOs] we able to get moving with some of their priorities” (K11)

By and large, however, the main issues affecting project delivery were *internal*. Many of these issues are covered in depth in the discussion of project “Coherence.” A lack of jointness in many aspects of project implementation, the fact that three of the five PUNOs lacked the ability to allocate full-time (100% dedicated) staff to the Joint Programme - meaning that it was “extra work” for them, the sheer number of activities being implemented, and the fact that coordination between the PUNOs was too often “hit or miss” (with failed efforts to coordinate affecting implementation schedules), also playing a role.

Evaluation Question: To what extent were the relevant stakeholders reached as expected, and are they satisfied with the results of the interventions?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme has reached its target stakeholders. Indeed, the project was initiated with the intent of focusing on including migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, *as well as* members of host communities. In this sense, the reach of the Joint Programme’s community-level work has been significant.

3.6. Impact

(a) General Assessment

Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Joint Programme given its short three-year duration, part of which was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Because social cohesion is a qualitative behavioural change, time and sustained effort are required to generate any kind of positive shift. Most of the key informants engaged by this evaluation deferred any discussion of an impact assessment to the future, recognizing that there are some risks inherent in this deference – e.g., if future political violence leads to loss of gains made to date. Other key informants saw the Joint Programme as a pilot whose primary “impact” will be informing a larger-scale and more intensive social cohesion initiative, with lessons learned

from the pilot informing considerations of what to do (and what to prioritize) and what not to do in programme design and implementation. Notwithstanding, perspectives from FGDs and the survey with community members do point to the achievement of real results – in terms of a growth in the number of community-level peace initiatives; the number of functioning conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms; around community perceptions on incidences of xenophobia and changes in levels of social cohesion; and in early changes in policy and practice by South African government institutions.

The evaluation's use of outcome harvesting, while less informative than hoped in generating evidence of unexpected change (outcome statements, where collected from KIs and willing FGD members, largely reiterated points already established through the KIs or FGDs), is somewhat helpful in gauging impact. Below are two outcome statements from the outcome harvesting that demonstrate at least emerging signs of impact:

Outcome Harvest #1: Migrants, refugees, and host community members engage in regular dialogue around issues of mutual interest or concern (e.g., around housing and other infrastructure, around employment, around transport, etc.).


Outcome Harvest #2: Some, albeit not all, host community members are actively working with local police departments and are advocating for greater protection of their migrant neighbours against the risk of xenophobic violence.

Variations of these outcome statements were identified over the course of the outcome harvesting exercise and were validated in discussions with the PUNOs over the course of the evaluation. Both statements reflect behaviour change on the part of host community members in a direction that is indicative of improved social cohesion. In both cases, process tracing used with several respondents identified clear linkages between the Joint Programs' implementation of community dialogues and early warning systems for xenophobic violence, as drivers of positive change that link directly as a contributor to the outcomes described above.

Notwithstanding the above noted challenge, the survey did come close to assessing the Joint Programme's impact on 'activity input' level. From this point of view, the greatest impact of the project was on talent/skill development, with 63% of the surveyed respondents citing empowerment. These claims are consistent


with the records provided by the PUNOs on the interventions focused on training and capacity building among the beneficiaries. Leadership development was the second area where beneficiaries reported high impact (31%). A total of 21% of beneficiaries also reported high impact on livelihood support unrelated to COVID-19, while 3% reported on the Joint Programme's impact on livelihood support related to COVID-19. Follow up should be made at a later stage, to determine how exactly these interventions went beyond activity input to qualitative change in the lives and behaviours of the beneficiaries. Given that this recommendation requires lapse of a longer period to allow for translation of skills to social and/or economic value, it lies beyond the scope of the current evaluation. The following chart illustrates the perceived impact of the Joint Programme, by beneficiaries. The chart presents by percentage, the beneficiaries who perceived impacts on a given focus area of the Joint Programme.

Figure 9: Assistance received by Beneficiaries.




The evaluation team found that an overwhelming majority of the surveyed beneficiaries (94%) were satisfied with the activities of the Joint Programme. Indeed, the Joint Programme's skills development, leadership development and livelihood support activities are clearly among the highlights of the Joint Programme from the beneficiaries' points of view. These activities could be scaled up in the future, perhaps bundled/tethered on social cohesion and migrants refugees & asylum seekers integration as guiding pillars.

Figure 10: Satisfaction with Joint Programme Activities




Staying on the impact of the Joint Programme on social cohesion in communities where surveyed beneficiaries live, even with the short period of time to effect behavioural change as illustrated below, the Joint Programme was perceived as a positive contributor to social cohesion. In this regard, respondents were asked the state of social cohesion before the Joint Programme was implemented, and after the Joint Programme was implemented. Two in every ten claimed that they did know how the Joint Programme impacted the peaceful co-existence between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host communities. A slightly higher percentage (33%) claimed that peaceful co-existence increased after the Joint Programme was implemented. There was a sizeable percentage, however, who were circumspect in their response, who shared the perspective that the impact of the Joint Programme on social cohesion was yet to be realised. As already noted earlier in this section, this inference should be seen as deriving from the Joint Programme's short project span.

Figure 11: Perception of the Impact of the Joint Programme on Social Cohesion in Beneficiary Communities



Turning to perceptions of the impact of the Joint Programme on various demographics, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, women and girls, and South African women and girls were considered as the cohort which the Joint Programme impacted the most. These findings relate the explicit gendered approach employed by the Joint Programme in both the design and implementation. Other demographics where the Joint Programme was considered as having the greatest impact are the youth, both from migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as well as host communities. The perceived impact of the Joint Programme on people living with disability, - including migrants refugees & asylum seekers and host communities, was relatively low. This demographic should be considered as one of the Joint Programme is targeted areas of improvement in the future.

Figure 12: Impact of the Joint Programme on various categories of beneficiaries



(b) Assessment on the basis of Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question: What significant change(s) does the intervention bring or is expected to bring for South Africa, on GCM implementation, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

As already noted, it is difficult, if not impossible, in the context of a three-year pilot project, to discuss *impact* in the social cohesion space. Notwithstanding, there was a missed opportunity to undertake a baseline survey of the targeted communities, followed by periodic longitudinal surveys (perhaps annual) which assess changing attitudes towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers integration and social cohesion.

Nevertheless, the types of changes that the project has delivered to date are primarily at the community-level and more around adjustments in perceptions and attitudes rather than changes in behaviour or state. The point that the evaluation struggles to address is how lasting even these important, but potentially ephemeral, changes are likely to be.

Given the perceived high risk of xenophobic violence continuing into the future, the one notable gap is the lack of early warning systems. The development of these systems and their acceptance as well as institutionalization into the DOJ&CD, could be concluded as one intervention from the current iteration of the Joint Programme that could have an impact. A promising start may exist in the work that CPFs are doing to develop early warning systems through a tool commissioned by CPF boards to the communities, whose responses will be analyzed and emerging trends shared with relevant authorities for action.

“We need to expect that we’re going to have to mitigate the threat of xenophobic violence in the future. This problem hasn’t been solved” (K11)

One positive unintended impact of the Joint Programme is how it shaped attitudes towards the provision of humanitarian relief in mixed migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker-non-migrant communities. While the evidence is largely anecdotal, communicated by the key informants, the PUNOs’ focus on including migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community households in its humanitarian response during the KwaZulu-Natal floods served to “create a sense of fairness”. This also may have served to diffuse potential tensions that would have possibly arisen if assistance had been provided exclusively to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The value of this dual approach, whereby even migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker-focused organizations (e.g., IOM and UNHCR) provide care and support to the “whole of community” has been reinforced by the Joint Programme and could become further institutionalized as a standard approach in the future.

Evaluation Question: What evidence exists to show that the project made a contribution to outcome results?

When looking at the outcome-level results included in the Joint Programme’s RMF, the following results needed to be addressed:

- **Outcome 1:** National and local systems and capacities improved to prevent and respond to violence and victims of violence.
- **Outcome 2:** Social inclusion and peaceful coexistence reinforced between migrants, other groups, and host communities.
- **Outcome 3:** Improved institutional systems for understanding the causes and dynamics of crisis and violence, and for articulating responses.

There is no evidence to suggest that the second and the third outcomes have been fully achieved or even contributed to (which is likely the more realistic goal), though this would be expected, particularly given the short timeframe and limited budget available to the Joint Programme. There was notable achievement, however, on outcome 1.

Unfortunately, the project's evidence base is also too scattered to piece together extensive internal proof that could point unambiguously to outcome-level change. This evaluation, while addressing this gap to a degree, is largely collecting perceptions-based data, which are useful but do have limitations when it comes to establishing clear evidence of higher-level change.

In Outcome 3, a gap exists in establishing early warning systems intended to recognize and alert relevant authorities to the threat of xenophobic violence. As noted elsewhere, one of the Joint Programme's key strengths has been to obtain buy-in on the ownership and institutionalization of the project at government-level (nationally and sub-nationally). In particular, within the DOJ&CD, and to an extent the DSAC. Furthermore, the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Community Policing Forums (CPFs) are also important targets. This is an opportunity to develop an integrated early warning system, along with capacitation of national and local systems to prevent and respond to violence.

For Outcome 3, community mapping has been undertaken to identify the drivers of xenophobic violence but KIs with Implementing Partners and PUNOs suggest that the use of this mapping has been patchy to date, and there is little to suggest that it is being employed systematically to inform decision-making around violence prevention and response.

With Outcome 2, achievement of this outcome – or even unambiguous progress towards meeting it – was always likely too ambitious for the Joint Programme given its timeframe and relatively small budget. As noted elsewhere, the foundations for improved social inclusion have been laid down by the Joint Programme – through the community social cohesion dialogues, by efforts to build bridges using sports and media campaigns, and as a result of extending economic/livelihood opportunities to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and non-migrants in target communities. Positive stories can emerge from each of these activities, but they do not – yet – provide a sound indication of fortifying social inclusion and peaceful coexistence that the outcome statement emphasizes.

Regarding Outcome 1, the Joint Programme used multi-stakeholder forums, forged partnerships with implementing partners, and worked with relevant government departments, notwithstanding the limitations experienced in coordinating these government departments. As already noted, some of these multi-stakeholder forums involved government departments, Legacy Foundations, as well as other relevant NGOs. These collaborations played a role in networking the existing structures together.

3.7. GCM Principles

(a) General Assessment

Returning to the Joint Programme's Results Framework, **it is apparent that the project's outcomes and outputs have been developed to reflect GCM principles, in terms of both indicator design and levels of disaggregation.** Indeed, the project's narrative around Outcome 2 ("Social Inclusion and Peaceful Co-existence Reinforced between Migrants refugees & asylum seekers and Host Communities") makes direct reference to its implementation modality being around the GCM principle of adopting a "whole-of-society" and "whole-of-government" approach (MPTF Results Framework, 2022 Update). The Pilot Programme's narrative reports do indicate challenges in realizing these approaches, particularly a "whole-of-government" approach, given low levels of inter-governmental integration among South African ministries and between local, provincial, and national government entities (MPTF Annual Report, 2021).

The evaluation finds that cross-cutting principles around human rights, gender responsiveness, and child-centred approaches were considered during project design and implementation. As noted earlier, the child-centred approach was strengthened once the Pilot Project began to engage more fully with the "Children on the Move" project implemented by the UNHCR and UNICEF. The 2022 MPTF Annual Report does refer to the Pilot Project's administration (potentially a self-administration) of a "Human Rights Marker Self-Assessment Matrix", indicating that the project had adhered to and achieved key human rights outcomes. Similarly, the same report also refers to the administration of a Child Sensitivity Marker Self-Assessment Matrix," for which results are still pending and will be reflected in the final project report due to be submitted in December 2023.

(b) Assessment on the basis of Evaluation Questions

Were the project activities and outputs well designed, valid, and consistent with the GCM principles?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

Based on Key Informants, Most of the GCM guiding principles were incorporated into the design of project activities and outputs – a people-centred approach was adopted for the focus on community-level interventions, such as the social cohesion dialogues, the sports-focused interventions, and on the peacebuilding training. These interventions also took on board the core GCM emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities and human rights violations – or even the prospect of them.

To what extent was the intervention consistent with international frameworks, particularly the GCM?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The intervention was broadly consistent with the GCM. At design phase, as noted elsewhere in this evaluation report, GCM objectives 16 (Empower migrants refugees & asylum seekers and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion) and 17 (Eliminate all forms of discrimination and provide evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration) served as core guiding principles. Project outcomes identified in the RMF were aligned with these principles, with Outcome 1 and Outcome 3 linked to Objective 17 and Outcome 2 linked to Objective 16.

To what extent did the interventions incorporate the GCM principles, and advance the enjoyment of human rights by relevant rights-holders; gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; and children's rights and meeting their needs.

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

In terms of gender, the Joint Programme did take evident steps to ensure that the activities completed were gender considerate. Among beneficiary-focused activities, for example, a review of project activity points to a gender balance, or at least an active consideration towards achieving a gender balance, in terms of participation. An analysis of relevant documentation also points to some effort by the Joint Programme to elevate the voices of women in activities, such as peacebuilding, where they are traditionally underrepresented. Project implementation has sought to ensure that women are given the opportunity to speak at large gatherings; an opportunity they otherwise seldom receive.

To what extent were the GCM principles incorporated into the project cycle (design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting)?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

Project monitoring and reporting was linked to GCM principles solely to the extent that the project monitoring system was centred around collecting and reporting on data for outcomes linked to Objective 16 and Objective 17 of the GCM.

To what extent did the programme management structure reflect and align with these GCM Guiding Principles? Are there lessons learned and/or good practices that can be identified?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The implementation of the Joint Programme was managed by multiple PUNOs with four out of the five PUNOs being represented by women as the project managers. Engagements with the project managers on implementation provided gendered perspectives on the Joint Programme. It should however be noted that there were limited records on the gender representativeness of beneficiaries held by the Implementing Partners. This is an oversight which should be corrected in the future.

Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance advancement of the GCM principles?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

There is scope in a scaled-up Joint Programme to include more targeted activities focused on women's needs – prevention of GBV is an issue that should be included as a priority intervention for any scale-up according to three key informants. Additionally, community-level work around HIV/AIDS prevention (closely tied to efforts to combat GBV) was not a priority focus for the PUNOs in this iteration of the Joint Programme but should be considered for scaled-up activity.

3.8. Sustainability

(a) General Assessment

As has been noted, the Joint Programme took many of the steps necessary to begin building sustainability for its activities. The Joint Programme targeted development of community and local government-level structures that should, in time, be capable of independently convening stakeholders to address conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Arguably the most prominent example, and one highlighted by a large number of KIs, are the multi-stakeholder forums, which have been created to serve as organizing/facilitating entities in many locations (in all the provinces). The stakeholders who constitute these forums have been mandated to independently design and implement social cohesion activities – including experience and idea exchanges – between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members (MPTF Annual Report, 2021). These forums are also mandated by their constituents to continue promoting the traditional methods of conflict resolution for which community members and community leaders in targeted areas were trained by the Joint Programme.

The Joint Programme achieved improved capacity among government departments to address social cohesion issues, particularly as they pertain to migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Brathwaite, 2023; MPTF Annual Report, 2022; Paulson, 2022). Citing a previous Joint Programme evaluation (presumably a mid-line evaluation, to which the evaluators do not yet have full access), the MPTF (2022: 19) Annual Report highlights improved capacity within government departments – locally / provincially and nationally – to “adjust policies and programs to implement violence prevention and containment mechanisms”.

It is also worth noting that the Programme further provided capacity strengthening to Implementing Partners, as well as Legacy Foundations. Examples of these partnerships include work with the legacy Foundations (OHCHR), working with the Little Nana Same Campaign (OHCHR), as well as UN Women’s partnership with the Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation. These partnerships offer an opportunity for continuity and extended impact of the Joint Programme beyond the programme’s official end.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that the Joint Programme demonstrated some expected sustainability challenges. One is the high level of turnover in staff at government departments. Staff shake-ups often happen at short notice. This can affect both institutional memory among the departments affected, as well as make it difficult for a project like the Joint Programme to effectively plan when its key

interlocutors are no longer in place. Also, it should be noted that anti-migrant, refugee and asylum seeker sentiment and outright xenophobia, are systemic issues in many South African communities, with most communities suffering from low levels of social cohesion. The scale of these challenges, while not unexpected by the Joint Programme, are too entrenched for a short-term project to address comprehensively. Instead, it is readily acknowledged that it will be necessary to continue engaging government entities in a consistent manner over an extended period. Further to this, it is essential to continue exposing communities to conflict identification and resolution mechanisms over time, in order for them to become institutionalized. A prominent concern raised in this evaluation report is around the lead-up to South Africa's national elections in 2024, for which it is expected that anti-migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker sentiment may be opportunistically exploited by populist political leaders searching for support (MPTF Annual Report, 2022). A key question is whether the institutional sensitization and strengthening done over the course of the Pilot Programme will provide South African government entities, as well as non-state stakeholders, the means to resist and overcome what could be significant near-term challenges in South Africa's social cohesion space.

(b) Assessment on the basis of Evaluation Questions

Does the Government of South Africa and its departments at national, provincial, and local level have any plans and/or structures to continue making use of the services/products produced?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

At the national level, the South African Government, through the three main ministries engaged in the Joint Programme – DOJ&CD, DSD, and DSAC – is committed to maintaining some of the key gains from the project, according to KI7. The DOJ&CD, as the Ministry charged with executing the NAP, has a vested interest in working to sustain some of the Joint Programme's key outcomes pertaining to community-level protection, access to justice, and capacity-building with the South African Police Service (SAPS). For its part, DSAC is already involved in the Protection Working Group and its mandated leadership of Priority 6 in the MTSF, which makes it an important interlocutor to the PUNOs.

Based on the KIIs and a review of project documentation, there is some ambiguity around the extent to which government departments at the sub-national level are likely to continue making use of what was provided by the Joint Programme. Capacity strengthening and sensitization around migrant, refugee and asylum seeker needs (e.g., in terms of access to basic services, access to business licenses, etc.) was done

with many government entities, but the short timeframe for project implementation, combined with the expected high-level of turnover in government department staff, means that the sustainability of these efforts is debatable.

“Government institutions are tricky, especially at the local level. We do work with them; we strengthen their knowledge and ability to respond [to migrants, refugees & asylum seekers needs] but staff come and go. We trained people, but I’m not sure how much we necessarily institutionalized within these parts of government”

(K17).

It is difficult for the evaluation to address this question without delving into the prevailing political sentiment towards migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in South Africa. For all of the work done in the Joint Programme to engage the South African Government – at national, provincial, and local levels – political sentiment still tends to demonize “foreigners.” “Anti-foreigner” rhetoric is likely to grow in the lead-up to the 2024 national elections, in which Operation Dudula figures to play an influential role. The fact that the discourse around foreigners in South Africa is based on emotion rather than fact (e.g., far fewer migrants, refugees and asylum seekers reside in South Africa than popular opinion suggests), points to an evident tension that the Joint Programme was unable to fully resolve – the programmatic imperative to engage on a technical level with the South African Government on social cohesion versus an (unsurprising) inability to influence the political narrative around migration and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The upshot is that regardless of the technical plans and/or structures that the South African Government has in place to sustain what the Joint Programme started (such as the NAP, Social cohesion strategy, and associated implementation plans, etc.), the credibility of such plans and structures could be easily undermined for reasons of political expediency.

“The project [Joint Programme] did really well to bring us [migrants and refugees] together with South Africans, so we could come to know each other better. The community dialogues mean that we’re starting to be seen by them [South Africans] as human and as partners in this country. But will it last? The next elections could set everything back”

(FGD member, KZN)

“On migration, the political rhetoric is completely the opposite of the facts. But because of politics, we can’t move from evidence to understanding and action. If social cohesion in South Africa works, it will be because of communities and not because of national-level structures” (K11)

To what extent were the participating Departments of the South African Government and other relevant stakeholders engaged in the interventions?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

The Joint Programme successfully engaged three South African line ministries to play reasonably consistent roles in project activities: 1) the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD); 2) the Department of Social Development (DSD); and 3) the Department of Sport, Arts, and Culture (DSAC). One of the more successful examples of the Joint Programme’s adaptive management was the shift to the DOJ&CD, from the DSD as the primary champion.

Indeed, both the KIs and a review of relevant documentation suggests that the Joint Programme only started to gain real traction in its engagements with government once a switch was made to engaging primarily with the DOJ&CD. Interestingly, gaining an ally with the DOJ&CD appears to have been a precursor to the Joint Programme improving its visibility within the DSD. Several key informants noted that by the end of the project, the DSD reported appreciation for the Joint Programme’s community-level trainings and have requested a new joint initiative focused on the training of their change agents.

“They [DOJ&CD] bought-in quickly to what we [the Joint Programme] were trying to do. They saw us as helping them to operationalize the NAP and as assisting them to meet some of their [NAP] targets. From this initial buy-in, we were able to start gaining more traction with the rest of the [South African] government” (K12)

Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance sustainability?

Summary Response to the Evaluation Question

A common sentiment expressed by many of the key informants was around the link between sustainability and the number of activities being implemented. As already noted earlier in the report, **sustainability, it was felt, would have been easier to achieve if the Joint Programme had placed a focus on implementing and looking for ways to actively institutionalize a smaller number of activities.** Instead, a large number of activities were implemented and, for interviewed key informants, doubts were expressed about whether all, or even a majority, of these would be sustained over the long-term. This was especially the case for the community-level activities led by Implementing Partners – such as the community social cohesion dialogues, the soccer or cultural exhibitions, and the capacity-building around income generating activities – which require ongoing donor funding to support at scale. Should further funding be available to support a scale-up, **consideration should be given to focusing on a much more targeted sets of interventions and working to institutionalize these over a longer period of time.** A more targeted approach may mean that a scaled-up project cannot address the full range of needs when it comes to building social cohesion. However, sustainability may be more evident if a focus is placed on doing a smaller number of things really well.

At the same time, several components of the programme were identified by key informants as being worthy of scaling up. At the forefront of these are the community-level football exhibitions. Sports-focused interventions, in particular, were deemed to be of value due to their visibility, their high likelihood of attracting community interest (as compared to, for example, a workshop), and (crucially) the opportunities they provide to engage children and youth. There is sufficient evidence in literature on the role played by sports in advancing social cohesion (see Bradshaw, 2007; Brown, Hoye and Nicholson, 2012; Cubizolles 2013; Jamieson 2014). Brown, Hoye and Nicholson particularly conclude that sport contributes to increased levels of trust, build networks and reciprocity, and ultimately leads to the strengthening of community. The interviewed KIs collaborate this evidence.

“The sports-focused interventions are really good because they provide an opportunity to talk about social cohesion and acceptance with young people. These could be migrants, refugees, or people from host communities. Youth are less likely to be involved, or want to be involved in a workshop, so we miss them if we don’t have something [like the soccer] (KI4)

In addition to scaling-up the sports component of community engagement, two key informants also recommended that similar youth-focused interventions could be launched around the arts (e.g., drama and dance). These would further expand the pool of potential youth participants for engagement around social cohesion. The community social cohesion dialogues were universally acknowledged by key informants – and within the limited literature focused on the intervention – as being important to scale-up and continue. These dialogues were viewed as foundational components of building social cohesion at the community level, not because they necessarily led to anything immediately tangible but rather because they provided a space for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and members of host communities to come together and interact.

“Relations with them [South Africans] are still difficult, but at least we’ve seen and heard each other. These [dialogues] are important. They make people look into each other’s eyes and acknowledge each other and that we’re all here together” (Male FGD participant, Western Cape)

“The dialogues should be scaled-up. I think their impact is not easy to discern, but I think it’s obvious that they play an important role in bringing people together who may never otherwise interact” (K11)

The other key intervention that was seen as a priority if the JP is scaled-up is information sharing platforms, such as WhatsApp platforms that could act to minimise occurrence of xenophobic violence. Key informants, as well as FGD members, expressed the view that the community mapping done to establish early warning systems in particular areas was a measured success of the Joint Programme and something that could readily be expanded, particularly since government partners – including sub-national government and the SAPS – proved to be willing partners to help institutionalize these systems.

“There needs to be some type of system in place in all communities that can serve as a trigger so that the police know when xenophobic violence is likely to happen” (Female FGD participant, Gauteng).

Another point that needs to be considered in relation to sustainability and scale up is the implementation geography. While a sound decision was made to focus the Joint Programme on South Africa’s most populous provinces and in areas with the presumed highest number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, key informants were also of the view that migrants and refugees were often at equal risk of xenophobic attack in communities closer to international borders. As such, Limpopo (with its proximity to Zimbabwe) and Mpumalanga (with its proximity to Mozambique) were singled-out as locations where a scaled-up Joint Programme should seek to work.

PART 4: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. Conclusion

The implementation of the Joint Programme was motivated by the fact that in spite of ongoing history of xenophobic violence, South Africa continues to be the main destination for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the Southern African region. Many migrants, refugees and asylum seekers live in vulnerable circumstances in South Africa, part of which is a consequence of poor integration – socially and/or economically – with host communities. In addition, institutional misalignment along with the accompanying inadequate policy integration presents increases the vulnerability of the migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Broadly, the Joint Programme sought to address gaps in social cohesion and migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers integration through a renewed focus on engaging government, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host communities (and the organizations/institutions representing them) in activities aimed at promoting community-level peace and socio-economic empowerment. In these efforts, gendered dimensions of migration, as well as community-level support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, served as cross-cutting issues for the Joint Programme.

The Joint Programme took a three-pronged implementation approach, *Prevention, Protection, and Empowerment*, thus drawing on the GCM, as discussed earlier in the report. In addition to the objectives, the intervention was guided by at least three SDGs and Targets, also discussed in the introduction of this report.

Through the Joint Programme, and in the context of the GCM, the five PUNOs jointly worked to strengthen national and local system capacities to prevent and respond to xenophobia; promote social inclusion and peaceful coexistence among migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and host communities. These organizations also sought to strengthen national capacities and systems for understanding the causes and dynamics of violence, and articulate effective responses.

Broadly, the evaluation found the following:

First, on relevance, the key activities implemented by the Joint Programme appear closely aligned with the GCM's overarching objective. Second, in terms of coherence, there were clear complementarities between the Joint Programme and the ongoing "Global Promotion of Best Practices for Children in Migration Project," an initiative implemented through a partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Third, with regard to efficiency, the evaluation found that the Steering Committee²⁹ adopted a policy to use a balance of earmarked and unearmarked funds, to support implementation. Doing so provided the Joint Programme with a high level of operational flexibility and kept available financial resource levels reasonably balanced (e.g., the Joint Programme was not faced with too much funding for Implementing Partners (Implementing Partners) to absorb at once nor specific stretches whereby funding was scarce).

Fourth, because the activities were so many, it is difficult to track the effectiveness of individual activities and even more difficult to look at the effectiveness against costs. There was sufficient consensus to suggest that the number of activities in future Joint Programmes should be scaled down to achievable and manageable results and outcomes. Nonetheless, USD 2.5 million is a small budget, particularly for a programme that is seeking to effect change at both community and government (institutional) levels. Notwithstanding, at the output level, the Joint Programme met some of its established targets. These include:

- Implementing seven (7) community peace initiatives (6 in KwaZulu-Natal and 1 in Gauteng) against a baseline of two (2) initiatives identified at project outset.
- Implementing (6) -conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms (two per province) against a target of one (1) mechanism established at project outset.
- A recorded 70 percent reduction in the percentage of host community members who reported a decrease in perceptions of violence and xenophobia by the population in targeted communities between 2021 and 2023.
- A recorded 70 percent of migrants, refugees & asylum seekers (see methodology section for details of sample) and host community members reporting increased social inclusion.

²⁹ The PMT was a technical day- to- day structure responsible for implementation and facilitating information for the evaluation while the EMC aimed to manage the evaluation process only.

Fifth, it is also difficult to assess the **impact** of the Joint Programme in the three years, not least because social cohesion is a qualitative behavioural change. Most of the key informants deferred impact assessment to the future. Notwithstanding, perspectives from Focus Groups and the survey point to the achievement of real results – in terms of a growth in the number of community level peace initiatives; the number of functioning conflict and crisis resolution mechanisms; around community perceptions on incidences of xenophobia and changes in levels of social cohesion; and in early changes in policy and practice by South African government institutions.

Sixth, the Joint Programme's outcomes and outputs have been developed to reflect **GCM principles**, in terms of both indicator design and levels of disaggregation. Indeed, the project's narrative around Outcome 2 (Social Inclusion and Peaceful Co-existence Reinforced between Migrants and Host Communities) makes direct reference to its implementation modality being around the GCM principle of adopting a “whole-of-society” and “whole-of-government” approach (MPTF Results Framework, 2022 Update).

Finally, on the Joint Programme's **sustainability**, the Joint Programme took many of the steps necessary to begin building sustainability for its activities. The Joint Programme targeted development of community and local government-level structures that should, in time, be capable of independently convening stakeholders to address conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Arguably the most prominent example is the multi-stakeholder forums, which have been created to serve as organizing/ facilitating entities in many locations, with the mandate to independently design and implement social cohesion activities – including experience and idea exchanges – between migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and host community members.

4.2. Recommendations

- 4.2.1. Considering the established working relationship between PUNOs and various government departments and Implementing Partners, the initiatives started under the Joint Programme should be strengthened particularly towards improving on the already established **early warning systems which provide trigger alerts to Community Policing Forums, government departments, Implementing Partners and even PUNOs**. More effective and coordinated early warning systems will go a long way in minimising the explosion of xenophobic violence in volatile communities. To the extent possible, and based on available resources, strengthening

of these systems should be prioritised more so in the run up to the upcoming 2024 general elections.

- 4.2.2. **PUNOs should consider the merits of a more targeted programme that takes the time to do a smaller number of activities.** A theory of change based on this model will need to be developed for such initiative. These targeted projects should be situated at community-level, where “quick wins” – or at least active beneficiary engagement and buy-in – are simpler to obtain.
- 4.2.3. Whether or not South African line departments take ownership of the objectives and outcomes of the Joint Programme depends largely on the degree to which the department in question has internalized the NAP as a guide to its policies and practices. From the available evidence, it is clear that the NAP is an effective partner for the DOJ&CD but does not yet play this role for other partner departments (though it is more relevant to the DSD than to an entity like the Department of Home Affairs, where it seems to have achieved little traction to date). For the PUNOs looking to sustain and scale up what the Joint Programme has achieved, **it is recommended that a focus be placed on maximizing gains that can be achieved through close participation with a “champion” department (DOJ&CD) rather than efforts being spread too thinly to partner with a wide range of departments with more limited buy-in.** In other words, although it is necessary to work with relevant departments, one champion department should be identified for greater effectiveness. Alternatively, a phased approach, whereby engagement with different departments is introduced as a project evolves, could provide an avenue for building momentum with specific “champion” departments and then using this momentum to establish working relationships with other entities such as the Department of Home Affairs over time.
- 4.2.4. Speaking to the larger points around joint implementation, **any follow up to the Joint Programme should develop a more robust Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system, inclusive of a strong learning and reflection component,** that allows for the PUNOs to better understand the level and types of change that are being delivered – both at community-level and at a macro institutional-level. While M&E systems did exist within the JP (through the various committees and the RMF), and among individual United Nations agencies and within

their Implementing Partners, the evaluation found no evidence that effectiveness-focused data were being systematically collected. A robust PMT is required, which should (at a minimum) have responsibility for monitoring the quality of jointness (working together) between the PUNOs, coordinate joint work planning (including standardization of implementation content and process), and provide the Project Coordinator with institutional back-up in matters of day-to-day inter-agency coordination.

- 4.2.5. A project like the Joint Programme is bound to be faced with unexpected events. The Joint Programme adapted well to repurpose funds to provide an effective humanitarian response to the 2022 and 2023 floods in KwaZulu-Natal and July protests. For operational ease, **it is recommended that a scaled up Joint Programme should maintain the same approach of earmarked and unearmarked pool of funds**, jointly held by the PUNOs. The unearmarked funds can be used flexibly and on-demand to address unexpected contingencies.
- 4.2.6. As part of any future project learning agenda, or through the use of methods like outcome mapping or outcome harvesting, **efforts should be made to more closely assess direct project contributions to the realization of NAP, NDP, UNSDCF, SDGs and GCM objectives**. The Joint Programme, in its current form, is clearly coherent with the national-level and (in the case of the GCM) international principles contained in these policies. However, more could be done to include metrics that demonstrate how the project actively champions and serves to operationalize these policies.
- 4.2.7. **In any future Joint Programme, all of the PUNOs should be required – and have the budget available – to hire staff dedicated fully to the project**. The number of staff should be determined by the size of the JP in budgetary terms, but also in terms of geographic coverage. One of the possible approaches that could be used to hire staff is a geographical model, thus X number of staff for the JP operations in a certain province, etc. Ideally, a Joint Programme should have a joint budget from which all agencies can draw to properly staff and implement their activities. Supposing internal management flexibility, the lead agency should maintain the evaluation budget, be the custodian and coordinator of the joint results framework, and have

M&E that serves the project as a whole etc, while participating agencies get a portion of monitoring budget instead.

- 4.2.8. Having focal points from each agency who can dedicate the full-time required to joint work planning, joint implementation, and Joint Programme reviews, is more likely to foster a consistent culture of cross-agency collaboration than is an arrangement where some agencies dedicate full-time committed staff to the Joint Programme while other agencies do not or cannot (for budget reasons) do so. Connected to this, and perhaps a longer-term objective, but **some thought should be given as to what steps would need be necessary to develop a truly Joint Programme budget – tied to jointly developed work plans and shared objectives/indicators – and joint operational as well as evaluation systems** that would facilitate ease of inter-agency collaboration. This targeted and yet flexible funding model has also been recommended in the 2022 UN Women report on “Programming lessons for strengthening movements and solidarity for an end to violence against women and girls in east and Southern Africa”.
- 4.2.9. **For any type of Joint Programme, activities and associated work plans need to be structured in ways that minimize opportunities for siloed implementation.** Notwithstanding the siloed nature of budgets, expenditure accounting and procurement procedures, to the extent possible, Joint Programme activities need to be designed so that their implementation necessitates collaboration between the participating PUNOs. If work plans are developed so that specific PUNOs can simply ringfence parts of it as being exclusively “theirs” and then go away to implement without collaboration with other agencies, then duplication and inefficiencies become almost inevitable.
- 4.2.10. **Future Joint Programmes should undertake active teambuilding from project outset.** This may largely involve familiarization exercises, but should also include a degree of co-creation of guiding project resources, such as a common project Theory of Change and/or RMF. Teambuilding is likely easier if each PUNO has its own 100% dedicated project staff who could then form more of a natural team.
- 4.2.11. There is little evidence in the documentation, or obtained from the KIIs, that the Joint Programme invested heavily in learning and reflection. **The scheduling of regular pause and**

reflect sessions, instituted by the Project Coordinator from the lead agency, but also with active support from the Resident Coordinator, should be introduced for future joint initiatives. Rather than serving as planning sessions, these pause and reflect sessions would obligate PUNOs to be in the same room purely to reflect on shared learning questions of interest to all of the agencies – including on the quality of collaboration and opportunities for improvement. In a project with a longer timeframe, with fewer activities to implement, coordinating the scheduling of pause and reflect sessions may be more feasible.

- 4.2.12. **A beneficiary baseline assessment should be completed and a data management plan developed.** When this is not possible, such as when there is a short gap between a call for proposals and the submission deadline, meta-analyses drawing on existing data should serve as an alternative. Using these resources will ensure an objective reading of the situational context – and one that is not informed by a reliance on Implementing Partners that may have vested interest in seeking funding from a PUNO.

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ANNEXURES

Annexure 1: Evaluation Matrix

Table 2: DAC Criteria based Evaluation Matrix

DAC Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Relevance – Is the intervention doing the right things?	Were the project activities and outputs well-designed, valid, and consistent with the intended outcomes and objective?
	To what extent were different stakeholders, particularly migrants, refugees & asylum seekers and affected communities, engaged in the design and implementation of the programme interventions?
	To what extent did the activities and outputs take into account the policies and priorities of the South African Government and beneficiary groups' needs?
Coherence – How well does the intervention fit?	To what extent was the intervention consistent with relevant national, regional, and international frameworks, particularly the GCM and Sustainable Development Goals?
	Do synergies exist with other interventions in South Africa carried out by intervention partners or other actors? If yes, how can these be scaled up in a future follow-up phase?
	How has the programme contributed to an increase in UN coherence and jointness in the social cohesion and in general in the implementing UN agencies' work and RC leadership in the UN in the country?
	How well does the programme complement and fit with other ongoing UN and national and provincial government programmes in South Africa?
Effectiveness – Is the intervention achieving its objectives?	Have the activities and outputs been achieved in accordance with the stated plans?
	What were the major factors, internal or external, influencing the delivery of project deliverables?
	To what extent were the relevant stakeholders reached as expected, and are they satisfied with the results of the interventions?
Efficiency – How well are resources being used?	How well are the resources (funds, expertise, and time) being converted into results?
	Were the interventions implemented in the most efficient way (time and funds) and to the planned scope?
Sustainability – Will the benefits last?	Does the Government of South Africa and its departments at national, provincial, and local level have any plans and/or structures to continue making use of the services/products produced?
	To what extent were the participating Departments of the South African Government and other relevant stakeholders engaged in the interventions?

	Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance sustainability?
Impact – What difference does the intervention make?	What significant change(s) does the intervention bring or is expected to bring for South Africa, on GCM implementation, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended?
	What evidence exists to show that the project made a contribution to outcome results?
GCM Principles – Human Rights, Gender Responsive, Child Sensitive, Whole of Government, Whole of Society, People-Centred)	Were the project activities and outputs well designed, valid, and consistent with the GCM principles?
	To what extent was the intervention consistent with international frameworks, particularly the GCM?
	To what extent did the interventions incorporate the GCM principles and advance the enjoyment of human rights by relevant rights-holders; gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; and children’s rights and meeting their needs.
	To what extent were the GCM principles incorporated into the project cycle (design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting)?
	To what extent did the programme management structure reflect and align with these GCM Guiding Principles? Are there lessons learned and/or good practices that can be identified?
	Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance advancement of the GCM principles?

Annexure 2.1: Survey Questionnaire

Good day. My name is _____ representing The Frontline Group, an independent research company which is not affiliated in any way with government or any political party. On behalf of Several UN Agencies, -namely, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCR and UNHCR, we are conducting an end of project evaluation of the Joint Programme (Joint Programme) which was co-implemented by all these agencies between 2020 and 2023. Funded by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Joint Programme aimed at Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion, implemented in South Africa.

The broad objectives of the Joint Programme sought to:

- (a) Address migration management gaps through engaging government, migrants refugees & asylum seekers, and host communities (and the organizations/institutions representing them) in activities aimed at promoting community-level peace and socio-economic empowerment.
- (b) Re-shape the public narrative around migration in South Africa, through promoting tolerance and evidence-based discussions around different facets of migration.
- (c) Establish Early Warning Systems in the efforts to contain and reverse racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other related forms of discrimination.
- (d) Attend to gendered dimensions of migration, as well as community-level support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The evaluation seeks to the degree to which the programme was relevant, coherent, effective, efficient, sustainable, and impactful, in the context of the aforementioned objectives.

With your permission, the interviews will be recorded, and notes will be taken during the interview. Your participation is voluntary, and you have the right to end the interview at any time. Your anonymity will be maintained; in which case your name or identity will not be used in the report. We would like to hear your thoughts, experiences, and opinions on the performance of the Joint Programme. Please be assured that there are no right or wrong answers.

Would you like to proceed with the interview?

Yes	Proceed with interview
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No	Thank respondent. Close interview
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DEMOGRAPHIC SECTION

D1. Name and Surname:

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D2. Contacts

Mobile Number									

D3. Email

Email address

D4. Name of the Implementing Partner through which the programme reached the respondent

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D5. Province of residence

		Please tick here
1.	KwaZulu Natal	
2.	Gauteng	
3.	Western Cape	

D6. Gender

		Please tick here
1.	Male	
2.	Female	

3	Other (Specify)	
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D7. Sub Locality

KwaZulu-Natal		Please tick here	Western Cape		Please tick here	Gauteng		Please tick here
1	Berea		18	Bredasdorp		28	Atteridgeville	
2	Cato Ridge		19	Cape Town CBD		29	Johannesburg	
3	Durban CBD		20	Cape Town Metropolitan area		30	Katlehong	
4	Emolweni		21	Gugulethu		31	Pretoria	
5	Eshowe		22	Lutzville		32	Soweto	
6	Kwamashu		23	Mitchells Plain		33	Thokoza	
7	Ladysmith		24	Philippi		34	Vosloorus	
8	Lamontville		25	Salt River		35	Yeoville	
9	Mpumalanga		26	Stellenbosch				
10	Nazareth		27	Wynberg				
11	Pietermaritzburg							
12	Phoenix							
13	Richards Bay							
14	Richmond							
15	Umgeni							
16	Umhlanga							
17	Umlazi							

D8. How long have you lived in the place of your usual residence?

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D9. Age

		Please tick here
1 ·	19-24	
2 ·	25-34	
3 ·	35-44	
4 ·	45-54	
5 ·	55-64	
6 ·	Over 64	

D10. Highest education level

		Please tick here
1 ·	Postgraduate degree	
2 ·	Bachelor(1 st degree)	
3 ·	Diploma	
4 ·	Post-secondary Certificate	
5 ·	Completed Secondary education	

6 .	Some secondary education	
7 .	Completed primary education	
8 .	Some primary education	
9 .	No formal schooling	

D11. What is the name of the country where you were born? your current nationality?

		Please tick here
1 .	South Africa	
2	Zimbabwe	
3 .	Nigeria	
4 .	Malawi	
5 .	Mozambique	
6 .	Somalia	
7 .	Other (Specify)	

D12. Have you acquired nationality in any other country other than your country of birth?

Yes	
No	

D13. [If you have acquired a different nationality from the country of birth], which is your current nationality? [Possibility exists for two nationalities]

	Please tick here

1	South Africa	
2	Zimbabwe	
3	Nigeria	
4	Malawi	
5	Mozambique	
6	Somalia	
7	Other (Specify)	

D14. Which of the following best describes your status in SA?

1	South African citizen	
2	Permanent resident of SA	
3	Refugee	
4	Asylum seeker	
5	Migrant with a work Visa	
6	Migrant with a student visa	
7	Undocumented migrant	
8	Other(specify)	

D15. Concerning Household Head, my household is:

1	Female headed	
2	Male headed	
3	Child headed	
4	Other (Specify)	

GENERAL QUESTIONS

G1: How aware are YOU of the Joint Programme implemented by the UN?

Very aware	
Somewhat aware	
Somewhat unaware	
Not aware at all	

G2: How well would you say you understand the Joint Programme?

Very well	
Somewhat well	
Only a little	
I do not understand it at all	

G3: From what you know, what was the main objective of the Joint Programme?

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G4. Who was/is being targeted as part of Joint Programme activities? [MULTIPLE RESPONSE]

South African host communities	
Migrants	
Refugees	
Businesspeople	
Covid-19 victims	

G5 What specific assistance did you receive from the Joint Programme?

Leadership development	
Talent/Skill development	
Livelihood support related to Covid-19	
Livelihood support NOT related to Covid-19	
Print media outreach	
Social media campaigns	
Other (Specify)	

G6. You were selected to participate in this survey because you received some benefits from the Joint Programme implemented locally by (name of IP). How satisfied are you with the assistance you've received so far from the Joint Programme?

Very Satisfied	
Somewhat Satisfied	
Somewhat Satisfied	
Very dissatisfied	

G7. Which aspects of the Joint Programme were you most satisfied with?

Leadership development	
Talent/Skill development	
Livelihood support related to Covid-19	
Livelihood support NOT related to Covid-19	
Print media outreach	
Social media campaigns	
Other (Specify)	

G8: Who do you think the Joint Programme benefited most, in the community where you live? [MULTIPLE RESPONSE POSSIBLE]

Migrants excluding refugees	
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Refugees	
South Africans	
Other (Specify)	

G9. How were you or your community involved during the DESIGN of the Joint Programme?

Informed and participated in decision making process	
Informed but not part of decision-making processes	
Not informed and not part of decision-making process	
Not aware or engaged.	

G10. How Involved were you/your community during the IMPLEMENTATION of the Joint Programme?

Informed and participated in decision making process	
Informed but not part of decision-making processes	
Not informed and not part of decision-making process	
Not aware or engaged.	

G11: Considering the period BEFORE the Joint Programme was implemented (Before 2020), how would you describe the state of co-existence between migrants and host communities, in the area where you live?

Always hostile	
Peaceful sometimes, but mostly hostile	
Rarely hostile	
peaceful	
Don't Know	

G12: Considering the period AFTER the Joint Programme was implemented (after 2020), how would you describe the current state of co-existence between migrants refugees & asylum seekers (including refugees) and host communities, in the area where you live?

Always hostile	
----------------	--

Peaceful sometimes, but mostly hostile	
Rarely hostile	
peaceful	
Don't Know	

G13. What is your OVERALL level of satisfaction with the project's interventions to promote peaceful co-existence in your communities?

Very satisfied	
Somewhat satisfied	
Somewhat satisfied	
Very dissatisfied	
No comment	

G14. How aware would you say YOUR LOCAL COMMUNITY is, of the Joint programme?

Very aware	
Somewhat aware	
Somewhat unaware	
Not aware at all	

G15: To what extent would you say that the objective of the Joint Programme is understood in the community where you live

Very well understood	
Somewhat understood	
Not very well understood	
Not understood at all	

G16. How can you contact or provide feedback on the work of the Joint Programme in your community.

Through a local NGO	
Through municipalities	
I do not know	
Other (Specify)	

G17. Thinking of empowerment for peaceful coexistence between migrants refugees & asylum seekers and your host community, what impact would you say the Joint Programme made on the following groups?

	Very Positive	Somewhat positive	Neither positive nor negative
South African Women			
South African Girls			
South African Youth			
People with Disability who are South Africans			
Migrants refugees & asylum seekers Women			
Migrants refugees & asylum seekers Girls			
Migrants refugees & asylum seekers Youth			
People with disability who are migrants refugees & asylum seekers			

G18. What components of the Joint Programme would you like to see continued/expanded, if there was an opportunity to do so?

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G19. To what degree would you approve of future implementation of similar project by several stakeholders (UN agencies, government, and local NGOs) working together?

Fully approve	
Somewhat approve	
Somewhat disapprove	
Fully disapprove	
I didn't know the project was implemented by several stakeholders	

G20. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent did government departments work with each other while implementing the Joint Programme in the area where you leave?

They fully worked together	
They somewhat worked together	
They did not work together	

G21. To what degree would you approve of future implementation of similar project by several government departments?

Fully approve	
Somewhat approve	
Somewhat disapprove	
Fully disapprove	

G22. Any other comment?

--

THANK RESPONDENT AND CLOSE

Annexure 2.2: Key Informant Interview Guide

Good day. My name is _____ representing The Frontline Group, an independent research company which is not affiliated in any way with government or any political party. On behalf of Several UN Agencies, -namely, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCR and UNHCR, we are conducting an end of project evaluation of the Joint Programme (Joint Programme) which was co-implemented by all these agencies between 2020 and 2023. Funded by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Joint Programme aimed at Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion, implemented in South Africa.

The broad objectives of the Joint Programme sought to:

- (e) address migration management gaps through engaging government, migrants refugees & asylum seekers, and host communities (and the organizations/institutions representing them) in activities aimed at promoting community-level peace and socio-economic empowerment.
- (f) Re-shape the public narrative around migration in South Africa, through promoting tolerance and evidence-based discussions around different facets of migration.
- (g) Establish and sustain Early Warning Systems in the efforts to contain and reverse racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other related forms of discrimination.
- (h) Attend to gendered dimensions of migration, as well as community-level support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The evaluation seeks to the degree to which the programme was relevant, coherent, effective, efficient, sustainable, and impactful, in the context of the aforementioned objectives. With your permission, the interviews will be recorded, and notes will be taken during the interview. Your participation is voluntary, and you have the right to end the interview at any time. Your anonymity will be maintained; in which case your name or identity will not be used in the report. We would like to hear your thoughts, experiences, and opinions on the performance of the Joint Programme. Please be assured that there are no right or wrong answers.

Would you like to proceed with the interview?

Yes	Proceed with interview
No	Thank respondent. Close interview

DEMOGRAPHICS

Name of KII		
Gender		
Nationality		
Agency/Organization category	Agency/Organization	List name of organization
	UN Agency (Proceed to Section A Only)	
	National and Sub-National Government Stakeholders (Proceed to Section B Only)	
	Private Sector & Civil Society Implementing Partners (Proceed to Section C only)	
Position in the organization		
Role the organization played in the Joint Programme		
Number of years worked in current position		
Email address		
Date of interview		
Start time		
End time		
Name of Interviewer		

SECTION A: UN AGENCIES (IMPLEMENTORS OF THE Joint Programme)

DAC1: RELEVANCE – IS THE Joint Programme DOING THE RIGHT THINGS?

UN 1: To what extent would you say the project activities and outputs were well-designed, valid, and consistent with the intended outcomes and objectives of the Joint Programme?

UN 2: To what extent were different stakeholders, particularly migrants, refugees & asylum seekers and affected communities, engaged in the design and implementation of the Joint Programme interventions? Did it inform project decision making?

UN 3: To what extent did the activities and outputs of the Joint Programme take into account the policies and priorities of the South African Government and beneficiary groups' needs?

UN 4: What is the degree to which the Joint Programme activities and outputs took into account your organization's priorities and policies as well as those of the MPTF?

UN5: How has the project identified changes to the external environment and incorporated them into the project strategy?

DAC 2: COHERENCE – HOW WELL DOES THE Joint Programme FIT?

UN6: To what extent was the intervention consistent with relevant national, regional, and international frameworks, particularly the GCM and Sustainable Development Goals?

UN7: Do synergies exist with other interventions in South Africa carried out by other UN agencies? If yes, how can these be scaled up in a future follow-up phase?

UN8: How has the programme contributed to an increase in UN coherence? To what extent were the objectives of the Joint Programme harmonised and/or shared by all Participating UN Organizations (PUNOs)?

UN9: How has the programme contributed to jointness in migrants, refugees & asylum seekers integration and social cohesion general?

DAC 3. EFFECTIVENESS – IS THE Joint Programme ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES?

UN10: How has the implementation of the Joint Programme activities contributed to delivery of change? Please explain.

UN11: What were the major factors, internal or external, driving or hindering the delivery of the Joint Programme?

UN12: To what extent were the relevant stakeholders reached as expected, and are they satisfied with the results of the Joint Programme?

UN13: To what extent were there regular reviews of the work plan to ensure that the project was on track to achieve the desired results, and to inform course corrections if needed?

DAC 4: EFFICIENCY – HOW WELL ARE RESOURCES BEING USED?

UN14: How well were/are the resources (funds, expertise, and time) committed to the Joint Programme being converted /already converted into results?

UN15: To what extent were the interventions implemented in the most efficient way (time and funds) and to the planned scope?

DAC 5: SUSTAINABILITY – WILL THE Joint Programme BENEFITS LAST?

UN16: Does the Government of South Africa and its departments at national, provincial, and local level have any plans and/or structures to continue making use of the Joint Programme?

UN17: To what extent were the participating Departments of the South African Government and other relevant stakeholders engaged in the interventions?

UN18: How sustainable is the programme in your assessment?

UN19: Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance sustainability?

DAC 6: IMPACT – WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE Joint Programme MAKE?

UN20: What significant change(s) does the Joint Programme bring or is expected to bring for South Africa, on GCM implementation, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended?

UN21: What evidence exists to show that the project made a contribution to outcome results?

DAC 7: GCM PRINCIPLES – HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER RESPONSIVE, CHILD SENSITIVE, WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, WHOLE OF SOCIETY, PEOPLE-CENTRED)

UN 22: Were the Joint Programme activities and outputs well-designed, valid, and consistent with the GCM principles?

UN 23: To what extent was the Joint Programme consistent with international frameworks, particularly the GCM?

UN24: To what extent did the Joint Programme incorporate the GCM principles, and advance the enjoyment of human rights by relevant rights-holders; gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; and children's rights and meeting their needs.

UN25: To what extent were the GCM principles incorporated into the Joint Programme cycle (design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting)?

UN26: To what extent did the programme management structure reflect and align with these GCM Guiding Principles? Are there lessons learned and/or good practices that can be identified?

UN 27: Which components of the Joint Programme should be scaled up to enhance advancement of the GCM principles?

SECTION B: NATIONAL & SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS

DAC 1: RELEVANCE – IS THE Joint Programme DOING THE RIGHT THINGS?

G1: To what extent would you say the project activities and outputs were well-designed? How did these activities relate with pressing issues of social cohesion and migrants refugees & asylum seekers integration? Would you say these activities were consistent with the intended outcomes and objective?

G2: To what extent were different stakeholders, particularly migrants, refugees & asylum seekers and affected communities, engaged in the design and implementation of the programme interventions?

G3: To what extent did the activities and outputs of the Joint Programme take into account the policies and priorities of the South African Government? What about the needs of beneficiary groups?

G4: What is the degree to which the Joint Programme activities and outputs took into account your organization's priorities and policies?

G5. And what to what extent did the Joint Programme consider different needs based on gender, disability or other marginalizations?

DAC 2: COHERENCE – HOW WELL DOES THE Joint Programme FIT?

G6: To what extent was the intervention consistent with relevant national, regional, and international frameworks, particularly the GCM and Sustainable Development Goals?

G7: Do synergies exist between the Joint Programme and other migration integration and social cohesion interventions in South Africa?

G8: How has the programme contributed to an increase in inter-government coherence and jointness in migrants, refugees & asylum seekers integration and social cohesion?

G9: How well does the programme complement and fit with other ongoing national and provincial government programmes in South Africa?

G10: To what extent were the objectives of the Joint Programme harmonised and/or shared by all participating government agencies?

G11: In your assessment, how well did the UN agencies work together, in coordinating all stakeholders and implementing the Joint Programme?

DAC 3: EFFECTIVENESS – IS THE Joint Programme ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES?

G12: How has the implementation of the Joint Programme activities contributed to delivery of change? Please explain.

G13: What were the major factors, internal or external, driving or hindering the delivery of the Joint Programme?

G14: To what extent were the government stakeholders reached as expected, and are they satisfied with the results of the Joint Programme? And what about the other relevant stakeholders (Implementing agencies and beneficiaries)?

DAC 4: EFFICIENCY – HOW WELL ARE RESOURCES BEING USED?

G15: How well are /were the resources (funds, expertise, and time) committed to the Joint Programme being converted /converted into results?

G16: Were the interventions implemented in the most efficient way (time and funds) and to the planned scope?

DAC 5: SUSTAINABILITY – WILL THE Joint Programme BENEFITS LAST?

G17: Does the Government of South Africa and its departments at national, provincial, and local level have any plans and/or structures to continue making use of the Joint Programme?

G18: To what extent were the participating departments of the South African Government engaged in the Joint Programme? What about the other relevant stakeholders (Implementing agencies and beneficiaries)

G19: Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance sustainability?

DAC 6: IMPACT – WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE Joint Programme MAKE?

G20: What significant change(s) does the Joint Programme bring or is expected to bring for South Africa, on migrants refugees & asylum seekers integration and social cohesion, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended?

G21: What evidence exists to show that the project made a contribution to outcome results?

DAC 7. GCM PRINCIPLES – HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER-RESPONSIVE, CHILD SENSITIVE, WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, WHOLE OF SOCIETY, PEOPLE-CENTRED)

G22: To what extent did the Joint Programme advance the enjoyment of human rights by relevant rights-holders; gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; and children's rights and meeting their needs.

G23: To what extent were the gender and children's rights incorporated into the Joint Programme cycle (design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting)?

G24: To what extent did the programme management structure reflect and align with gender and child sensitive Principles? Are there lessons learned and/or good practices that can be identified?

G25: Which components of the Joint Programme should be scaled up to enhance advancement of gender and child sensitive principles?

SECTION C: PRIVATE SECTOR & CIVIL SOCIETY IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

DAC 1: RELEVANCE – IS THE Joint Programme DOING THE RIGHT THINGS?

CSO1: To what extent would you say the project activities and outputs were well-designed, valid, and consistent with the intended outcomes and objective?

CSO2: To what extent were different stakeholders, particularly migrants, refugees & asylum seekers and affected communities, engaged in the design and implementation of the programme interventions?

CSO3: To what extent did the activities and outputs of the Joint Programme take into account the policies and priorities of your organization and beneficiary groups' needs?

CSO4: What is the degree to which the Joint Programme activities and outputs took into account civil society goals, as well as your (specific) organization's priorities and policies?

DAC 2: COHERENCE – HOW WELL DOES THE Joint Programme FIT?

CSO 5: To what extent was the intervention consistent with relevant national, regional, and international frameworks, particularly the GCM and Sustainable Development Goals?

CSO6: Do synergies exist with other interventions by civil society in South Africa?

CSO7: How has the programme contributed to an increase in coherence and jointness in general between civil society and government in the implementation of migration integration and social cohesion?

CSO8: How well does the programme complement and fit with other ongoing programmes in your organization and in the broader South Africa?

CSO9: To what extent were the objectives of the Joint Programme harmonised and/or shared by all participating stakeholders?

DAC 3: EFFECTIVENESS – IS THE Joint Programme ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES?

CSO10: How has the implementation of the Joint Programme activities contributed to delivery of change? Please explain.

CSO11: What were the major factors, internal or external, driving or hindering the delivery of the Joint Programme?

CSO12: To what extent were the CSOs involved in the Joint Programme reached as expected? What about your specific organization? Are CSOs/your organization satisfied with the results of the Joint Programme?

DAC 4: EFFICIENCY – HOW WELL ARE RESOURCES BEING USED?

CSO13: How well were/are the resources (funds, expertise, and time) committed to the Joint Programme being converted /converted into results?

CSO14: Were the interventions implemented in the most efficient way (time and funds) and to the planned scope?

DAC 5: SUSTAINABILITY – WILL THE Joint Programme BENEFITS LAST?

CSO15: Does your organization have any plans and/or structures to continue making use of the Joint Programme?

CSO16: To what extent were the civil society /private sector engaged in the interventions?

CSO17: Which components of the programme should be scaled up to enhance sustainability?

DAC 6: IMPACT – WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE Joint Programme MAKE?

CSO18: What significant change(s) does the Joint Programme bring or is expected to bring for South Africa, on social migrants refugees & asylum seekers integration and social cohesion, whether positive or negative, intended or unintended?

CSO19: What evidence exists to show that the Joint Programme made a contribution to outcome results?

GCM PRINCIPLES – HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER RESPONSIVE, CHILD SENSITIVE, WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, WHOLE OF SOCIETY, PEOPLE-CENTRED)

CSO20: To what extent did the Joint Programme advance the enjoyment of human rights by relevant rights-holders; gender equality and empowerment of women and girls; and children's rights and meeting their needs.

CSO21: To what extent were gender and children's rights incorporated into the Joint Programme cycle (design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting)?

CSO22: To what extent did the programme management structure reflect and align with gender and child sensitive principles? Are there lessons learned and/or good practices that can be identified?

CSO23: Which components of the Joint Programme should be scaled up to enhance advancement of gender and child sensitive principles?

Annexure 2.3: Focus Group Guide

Good day. My name is _____ representing The Frontline Group, an independent research company which is not affiliated in any way with government or any political party. On behalf of Several UN Agencies, -namely, IOM, UNDP, UN Women, OHCHR and UNHCR, first, we would like to appreciate your participation in the Joint Programme. Secondly, we are conducting an end of project evaluation of the Joint Programme (Joint Programme) which was co-implemented by all these agencies between 2020 and 2023. Funded by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Joint Programme aimed at Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion, implemented in South Africa.

The broad objectives of the Joint Programme sought to:

- (i) Address migration management gaps through engaging government, migrants refugees & asylum seekers, and host communities (and the organizations/institutions representing them) in activities aimed at promoting community-level peace and socio-economic empowerment.
- (j) Re-shape the public narrative around migration in South Africa, through promoting tolerance and evidence-based discussions around different facets of migration.
- (k) Establish and sustain Early Warning Systems in the efforts to contain and reverse racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other related forms of discrimination.
- (l) Attend to gendered dimensions of migration, as well as community-level support in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The evaluation seeks to the degree to which the programme was relevant, coherent, effective, efficient, sustainable, and impactful, in the context of the aforementioned objectives.

With your permission, the Focus Group Discussions will be recorded, and notes will be taken during the discussion. Your participation is voluntary, and you have the right to end the interview at any time. Your anonymity will be maintained; in which case your name or identity will not be used in the report. We would like to hear your thoughts, experiences, and opinions on the performance of the Joint Programme. Please be assured that there are no right or wrong answers.

Would you like to proceed with the discussion?

Yes	Proceed with Focus Group Discussion
No	Excuse participant

DEMOGRAPHICS

Name	
No. of male participants	
No. of female participants	
Participant nationalities	
Province	
Sub locality	

A. CONTEXT/AWARENESS QUESTIONS

1. What activities have been implemented in your communities to strengthen the peaceful co-existence between migrants, asylum seekers & refugees and host communities?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- Who has implemented these activities?
- For how long have they been implemented?

2. How would you describe the current state of peaceful co-existence between migrants refugees & asylum seekers and host communities, in the area where you live? Have these conditions changed in the past three years? If so, how?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- Positive conditions/changes
- Negative conditions/changes

- Key contextual factors influencing social integration at community-level (e.g, COVID-19 pandemic, socio-economic conditions, etc.).

3. What do you think the challenges were that you and your communities encountered in terms of co-existence?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- Xenophobia
- Looting of migrants refugees & asylum seekers owned shops
- Clashes between local communities and migrants refugees & asylum seekers
- Services delivery
- Etc

B. PROJECT-FOCUSED QUESTIONS

4. To what extent, and in what ways, do you feel the Joint Programme (need to know what the programme is called on a local level) has contributed to change (positive or negative) in the level of peaceful co-existence, between migrants, asylum seekers & refugees and host communities, in your communities?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- If positive co-existence has improved, probe for examples that demonstrate that improvement and how did the project contribute to this change?
- If positive co-existence has not improved/become worse, why do you feel the project did not contribute to any improvements?
- Probe around the contributions made by different project components (For the communities Frontline will talk to, we should know (or at least have broad awareness of) the specific package of interventions that has been carried-out by the Joint Programme).
 - Building the capacity of local leaders/community focal points/community members on violence prevention, mediation, and conflict resolution.
 - Community dialogues around social cohesion.
 - Provision of legal and social services to victims of violence – including psycho-social support, GBV awareness and referrals, telephonic and home visits by counsellors.

- Awareness-raising activities focused on peacebuilding and combatting anti-migrants refugees & asylum seekers narratives (e.g., socio-cultural activities, media outreach, social media campaigns, workshops).
- Corporate social responsibility schemes.
- Provision of socio-economic responsibilities (e.g., support for the establishment of social enterprises, facilitating access to capital for entrepreneurs).
- Other...

5. In what ways, if any, has the project contributed to positive outcomes for women and girls? For children? For youth? (or negatively)

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- To what extent do you feel the Joint Programme has prioritized the interests of women and girls/children/youth? Explain.

6. To what extent, and in what ways, did the project engage migrants refugees & asylum seekers and host communities to participate in the design and implementation of activities focused on strengthening social cohesion in your communities?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- Do you feel that this level of involvement was sufficient? Why or why not?
- What activities were you most heavily involved with designing? With implementing?
- What factors, if any, constrained the involvement of migrants, refugees & asylum seekers like yourselves in contributing to the project's design and/or implementation of social cohesion activities? Were these constraints addressed over the course of the project? Why or why not?
- How could the project have engaged migrants, refugees & asylum seekers like yourselves more effectively in the design/implementation of social cohesion activities in your communities?
- To what extent, and in what ways, were women and youth involved in the design and implementation of project activities?

7. Were the peaceful co-existence activities that the project designed and implemented in your communities relevant to addressing the challenges your communities face? Why or why not?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- What activities were most relevant to addressing the challenges you face? Least relevant? Why?

8. What is your overall level of satisfaction with the project's interventions to promote peaceful co-existence in your communities?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- If satisfied, why are you satisfied?
- If not satisfied, why are you not satisfied?

9. Which of the peaceful co-existence activities implemented by the project in your communities would you like to see continued or expanded?

Sub-Questions/Prompts:

- Why would you like to see these activities be continued or expanded?

Annexure 3: List of Evaluation Participants Engaged During Primary Data Collection

Table 3: Key Informant Interviews: List of Implementing Partners Interviewed

Date	Organisation	UN Agencies which IPs Worked With.	Province
Monday, August 21, 2023	Foundation For Human Rights	IOM and UNDP	Gauteng
Tuesday, August 22, 2023	Bredasdorp CPF	IOM	WC
Wednesday, August 23, 2023	DSAC	UNDP	Gauteng
Thursday, August 24, 2023	AFRISOC	IOM; OHCHR	KZN
Friday, August 25, 2023	GALA Queer Archive	OHCHR	Gauteng
Monday, August 28, 2023	Lawyers For Human Rights	IOM, UNHCR, OHCHR	KZN, Gauteng and WC
Tuesday, August 29, 2023	Grounded Media	IOM, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNDP, UN Women	Gauteng
Wednesday, August 30, 2023	Fade to Black	IOM, OHCHR	WC
Thursday, August 31, 2023	Flow SA	IOM	Gauteng and WC
Friday, September 01, 2023	Refugee Pastoral Care	IOM, OHCHR	KZN
Monday, September 04, 2023	APCOF	IOM	WC
Monday, September 04, 2023	Institute For Security Studies	IOM, OHCHR	Gauteng
Tuesday, September 05, 2023	Africa Unite	IOM	Gauteng, KZN and WC
Tuesday, September 05, 2023	Social Cohesion Advocate	IOM	Gauteng
Wednesday, September 06, 2023	University of Pretoria	IOM, OHCHR	Gauteng
Wednesday, September 06, 2023	Khula Consulting	UNHCR	KZN
Thursday, September 07, 2023	ACMS, Wits University, Gauteng	OHCHR	Gauteng

Thursday, September 07, 2023	CEO, Desmond & Leah Tutu Foundation	OHCHR	WC
Friday, September 08, 2023	LM Skills	UNDP	Gauteng
Friday, September 08, 2023	Institute For Justice and Reconciliation	UN Women	WC
Thursday, September 14, 2023	Adonis Musati	IOM	WC

The evaluator undertook a total of sixteen (16) Key Informants drawn from the UN agencies, as recorded below.

Table 4: Key Informant Interviews: Interviews conducted with UN Agencies and Government Departments

Date of Interview	UN Agency
Friday, September 08, 2023	IOM
Thursday, September 14, 2023	UNCHR
Wednesday, September 13, 2023	UNCHR
Monday, September 18, 2023	UN Resident Office
Tuesday, September 12, 2023	IOM
Friday, September 15, 2023	IOM
Thursday, September 14, 2023	ILO
Friday, September 15, 2023	OHCHR
Thursday, September 21, 2023	UNDP
Friday, September 22, 2023	RO
Friday, September 22, 2023	UN Women
Monday, September 25, 2023	UNICEF
Wednesday, September 27, 2023	DSD
Monday, October 02, 2023	DSD
Monday, October 02, 2023	DoJ&CD
Monday, October 02, 2023	DoJ&CD

Table 5: Focus Group Discussions: Breakdown and distribution of Focus Groups Conducted during the evaluation.

Province	Sub locality where FG was held	Date	No. of participants	Location	Gender		Nationality
					Male	Female	
KwaZulu Natal	Eshowe	Tuesday 12 th September	10	Eshowe Community Church	6	4	Rwanda (5), Malawi (2) Mozambique (2) Burundi (1)
	Eshowe	Tuesday 12 th September	9	Eshowe Community Church	5	4	South Africa (9)
	Durban CBD	Tuesday 12 th September	11	Phumla Guest House, Glenwood	4	7	DRC (3) Kenya (1) Zimbabwe (1) Burundi (1) South Africa (5)
Western Cape	Cape Town CBD	13 th September 2023	5	Africa Unite Boardroom on Spin Street	2	3	South Africa (5)
	Cape Town CBD	13 th September 2023	5	Africa Unite Boardroom on Spin Street	3	2	DRC (2) Burundi (1) Nigeria and South African (Dual citizen) (1) Mozambique (1)
Gauteng	Katlehong Township.	14 th September 2023	8	Department of social development building	4	2	South Africa (6)

	Katlehong Township.	14 th September 2023	8	Department of social development building	0	8 ³⁰	Mozambique (8)
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³⁰ The area has reasonably dense population of Mozambican migrants