

**SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PEACEBUILDING FUND  
PROJECT DOCUMENT TEMPLATE**



United Nations  
Peacebuilding

**PBF PROJECT DOCUMENT**

<b>Country(ies):</b> The Gambia	
<b>Project Title:</b> Sustaining The Gambia's peaceful transition by supporting implementation of the Security Sector Reform Strategy	
<b>Project Number from MPTF-O Gateway (if existing project):</b>	
<b>PBF project modality:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> IRF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRF	<b>If funding is disbursed into a national or regional trust fund (instead of into individual recipient agency accounts):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Country Trust Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional Trust Fund <b>Name of Recipient Fund:</b>
<b>List all direct project recipient organizations (starting with Convening Agency), followed by type of organization (UN, CSO etc.):</b> UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC	
<b>List additional implementing partners, specify the type of organization (Government, INGO, local CSO):</b> <b>Government:</b> Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence; Office of National Security; Office of the Vice President; National Assembly; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare; Ministry of Public Service; National Council for Civic Education National Youth Council. <b>Security Sector Institutions:</b> Gambia Armed Forces (GAF), Gambia Police Force (GPF), Drug Law Enforcement Agency Gambia (DLEAG), Gambia Prison Services (GPS), Gambia Immigration Department (GID). <b>Independent Commissions:</b> National Human Rights Commission (NHRC); Office of Ombudsman. <b>Academic Institutions:</b> University of The Gambia, The Gambia College, Management Development Institute. <b>Civil Society Organisations:</b> CSO Coalition on SSR; The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO); ActionAid International, Activista, Centre for Research & Policy Development, Fact Check Centre, National Youth Parliament, Peace Ambassadors, Peace Hub - The Gambia, Gender Platform; Solo Sandeng Foundation, Women's Association for Victim's Empowerment (WAVE), Yakarr Justice, Beakanyang, Gamworks, the Inter Party Committee (IPC), the Gambia Press Union, Gambian Bar Association, Men for Equality; Peace Network; Gambia Federation of the Disabled (GFD)	
<b>Project duration in months<sup>1 2</sup>:</b> 36 months	
<b>Geographic zones (within the country) for project implementation:</b> Nationwide, with special focus on areas experiencing tensions between civilians and security institutions.	
<b>Does the project fall under one or more of the specific PBF priority windows below:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Gender promotion initiative <sup>3</sup> <input type="checkbox"/> Youth promotion initiative <sup>4</sup> <input type="checkbox"/> Transition from UN or regional peacekeeping or special political missions <input type="checkbox"/> Cross-border or regional project	

<sup>1</sup> Maximum project duration for IRF projects is 24 months, for PRF projects – 36 months.

<sup>2</sup> The official project start date will be the date of the first project budget transfer by MPTFO to the recipient organization(s), as per the MPTFO Gateway page.

<sup>3</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Gender Promotion Initiative

<sup>4</sup> Check this box only if the project was approved under PBF's special call for proposals, the Youth Promotion Initiative

**Total PBF approved project budget\* (by recipient organization):**

UNDP: \$ 1,450,718  
 OHCHR: \$ 827,856  
 UNODC: \$ 721,426  
 TOTAL: \$ 3,000,000.00

*\*The overall approved budget and the release of the second and any subsequent tranche are conditional and subject to PBSO's approval and subject to availability of funds in the PBF account. For payment of second and subsequent tranches the Coordinating agency needs to demonstrate expenditure/commitment of at least 75% of the previous tranche and provision of any PBF reports due in the period elapsed. In addition, considering the shrinking civic space in The Gambia, there will be a joint RCO-DPPA review of progress/challenges ahead of second and third tranche disbursements, to assess the situation before considering each subsequent transfer request.*

Any other existing funding for the project (amount and source):

<b>PBF 1<sup>st</sup> tranche (35%):</b>	<b>PBF 2<sup>nd</sup> tranche* (35%):</b>	<b>PBF 3<sup>rd</sup> tranche* (30%):</b>
UNDP: \$ 507,751	UNDP: \$ 507,751	UNDP: \$ 435,215
OHCHR: \$ 289,749	OHCHR: \$ 289,750	OHCHR: \$ 248,357
UNODC: \$ 252,499	UNODC: \$ 252,499	UNODC: \$ 216,428
<b>Total: \$1,049,999.00</b>	<b>Total: \$ 1,050,000.00</b>	Total: 900,000

**Provide a brief project description (describe the main project goal; do not list outcomes and outputs):**

The overarching goal of the project is to build strong, accountable, and effective security institutions that safeguards the human rights and aspirations of The Gambian people for conflict prevention and sustaining peace in post-transition period. This will be achieved by addressing key challenges related to weak institutional legislations and policies; lack of accountability as a result of weak internal and external oversight institutions; existing gender gaps including lack of women representation in decision making; lack of institutional capacities; and low trust and confidence in security sector by the public.

The Gambia is party to regional and international human rights instruments with provisions pertaining to SSR. Security actors are therefore expected to respect and protect human rights in aligning with both national and international laws. This project uses a human rights-based approach, recognizing people as rights-holders and the State, including core security actors, as duty-bearers in providing security as a service to the people, emphasizing that human rights and security are interconnected. Human rights violations are seen as potential causes, results, or early warnings of conflict.

Consolidating gains from Gambia's peaceful transition through the implementation of Security Sector Strategy (2023-2027), the project will build on past interventions such as the PBF supported *Strategic Advice and support to Security Sector and Governance project (2017-2018)*, *Strengthening Community Access to Justice, Community Policing and Effective SGBV Response (2020-2022)*, among others. The project will take a broader approach that supports the provision ('supply and demand') of security sector reform and improved human security within the

population. In doing so, the approach will contribute to strengthened security legislations, policies, and strategies to align them with international norms, build more accountable, professional and gender responsive security institutions; institutional capacity building to increase SSR knowledge; improve accountability and oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with SSR international standards and legislative provisions in the exercise of their functions; promote gender inclusion to increase women's participation in the security sector particularly in leadership and decision making roles; inclusive participation and improve civilian oversight mechanisms to foster trust between the public and security institutions. As the country heads towards the presidential election in December 2026, the project will strategically position the security sector as a trusted institution with the necessary capacities to accompany the country's democratic processes including the electoral cycle (2026-2028).

The work around legal frameworks, policies and strategies will notably support the passage of the National Security Council Bill, advocacy for retention of progressive SSR provisions in the adoption of the Draft 2020 Constitution<sup>5</sup>, development of a gender policy for all security institutions, review of The Gambia Armed Forces Act, Prisons Act and Strategy. Additionally, the project will focus on strengthening the capacity of the Office of National Security (ONS) to fulfil its coordination mandate on the Security Sector Reform agenda to avoid overlapping and duplication across the sector. Moreover, the project will strengthen the capacity of national security institutions, ensure gender responsive security institutions, as well as enhance civilian oversight bodies and inclusive participation to effectively implement the SSR agenda, while leveraging on data generation through research and assessments to drive evidence-based decision making and interventions.

The project approach is innovative as it will work with the newly established CSO coalition on SSR in an inclusive way that brings CSOs together in an institutionalised organization to strategically strengthen coordination and meaningfully participate in the implementation of SSR while holding the duty bearers accountable. The project also introduces Civil-Security Committees to be piloted in three regions, including the Foni area, where the relationship between the public and security forces is characterised by tensions and mistrust, thereby improving collaboration and trust, and ultimately contribute to peaceful co-existence and stability.

Unlike the CSO coalition on SSR that will bring different CSOs together at the national level to collectively participate in the implementation of SSR and promote civilian oversight and respect for human rights, thereby sustaining the implementation of SSR momentum, the Civil-Security Committees will bring together communities and security institutions to have structured engagements/dialogue sessions aimed at raising awareness among the citizens on SSR, the role of security institutions, existing SSR policies/legal frameworks and security issues that are of concern to the communities. These engagements will enhance community understanding of SSR, promote ownership and accountability, strengthen relationships, trust and confidence of the citizens towards the security sector especially in the regions with low trust and confidence in security sector.

Engaging Men as Gender Equality Champions (GEC) is another innovative model the project will adopt to promote women participation in leadership and advocate for the elimination of all forms of GBV within the security sector. It will involve identifying and selecting men from the target security institutions using the criteria of volunteerism, influence and involvement, leadership, communication skills and no history of violence. Training of trainers (TOT) of selected male gender champions will be conducted to build their capacity, enabling them to continuously educate their fellow men about women's rights, and the importance of their participation and representation in leadership and decisions within the security sector.

**Summarize the in-country project consultation process prior to submission to PBSO, including with the PBF Steering Committee, civil society (including any women and youth organizations) and stakeholder communities (including women, youth and marginalized groups):**

This project is reflective of an inclusive and extensive consultative process with government partners (Ministry of Defence, Office of National Security, Ministry of Public Service, Ministry of Interior, Office of the Vice President, National Assembly, Ministry of Justice), security sector institutions (Gambia Armed Forces, Gambia Police Force, Drug Law Enforcement Agency Gambia (DLEAG), Gambia Immigration Department (GID), Independent Commissions (National Human Rights Commission; National Council for Civic Education; National Agency for Legal Aid); Academic Institutions (University of The Gambia); Civil Society Organizations (The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO), Action Aid, Activista, Beakanyang, Centre for Research & Policy Development (CRPD), Fact Check Centre, National Youth Parliament, Peace Ambassadors, Solo Sandeng Foundation, Women's Association for Victims Empowerment (WAVE), Yakarr Justice). The consultations informed the concept note and the full proposal, on which the above-cited partners have continued to provide inputs.

A series of fora on SSR have also usefully shaped this document: A PBF-supported two-day Consultative Workshop on SSR Institutional Reforms (SSR) took place at UN House from 17-18 April 2023. The workshop included a dedicated session to learning lessons from the previous PBF SSR project. The Gambian government held a four-day "National Consultative Workshop on the Policy Objectives of Security Sector Reform" on 13-16 June 2023; and the PBF-supported Technical Workshop on Peacebuilding Areas Prioritization in November 2023. Both these events included robust but respectful exchanges between civil society and the security personnel that helped shape activities. Helpful exchanges also took place within consultations on the update of the Gambian Conflict and Development Analysis in June and the extended development process of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2024-2028).

Indicating the importance and commitment of the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) to an inclusive SSR process, the National Security Adviser hosted in November 2023, with PBF support, a one-day workshop Consultation on the Peacebuilding Fund Security Sector Reform Project at which the proposed structure and activities of this proposal were presented and discussed. The consultation was convened by the Office of the National Security (ONS), led by the National Security Advisor, with support from the Peacebuilding Team in the office of the UN Resident Coordinator. The purpose of the consultation was to ensure the SSR project document is aligned

with national priorities, reflects the strategic needs of beneficiaries and compliments ongoing support being provided by other partners while avoiding duplication. Participants of this high-level consultation included the Minister of Justice who opened the consultation, three other Ministers (Defence, Interior, and Public Service), the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly (who is also the Chair of the Standing Committee on Defence and Security), the National Security Advisor, and the UNDP RR. Furthermore, representatives of the following entities participated in the consultation: Government: Gambia Armed Forces (including the Chief of Defence Staff); Gambia Police Force; State Intelligence Services; Gambia Revenue Authority; Drug Law Enforcement Agency; Gambia Immigration Department; Gambia Prison Service.

Oversight bodies that participated in the consultation included National Human Rights Commission (NHRC); National Assembly (3 members, including the Chair of the Select Committee on Gender, Ms. Fatoumatta Njie). Partners: EU (Head of Cooperation); Germany (Ambassador) and DCAF. Civil Society: The Association of NGOs (TANGO); Women's Association for Victims' Empowerment (WAVE); Women in Liberation and Leadership (WILL); Peace Ambassadors Gambia; Centre for Research & Policy Development; African Centre for Legal Research & Training. United Nations: UNDP; UNODC; OHCHR; RCO.

In and around these public meetings, two extended bilateral meetings have been held with the NSA and ONS team at which it was clear that the proposed activities reflect GOTG's five core priorities, and that NSA supports the Project's gender priorities, and its work on oversight and accountability. Follow-up consultations were held with DCAF for in-depth discussions on their gender interventions within the security institutions, and following the consultations, the UN project team reviewed the project document to strengthen synergy in some activities and eliminate duplication. Regular consultations with the ONS during the drafting phase of the project document helped to clarify past, current, and anticipated support. This information was necessary to build on previous interventions, pinpoint existing gaps, and guide the development of new strategies for intervention.

**Project Gender Marker score<sup>6</sup>: 2**

Specify 33. % and \$ \$979,866.99 of total project budget allocated to activities in pursuit of gender equality and women's empowerment:

***Briefly explain through which major intervention(s) the project will contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment <sup>7</sup>:***

The project aims to improve gender mainstreaming within the security sector; increase recruitment of women and their participation in decision making and leadership roles, create a safe and conducive environment that encourages security personnel particularly women within the security institutions to report GBV cases as they pertain to sexual exploitation, harassment, or abuse. It proposes to do this by working in the following areas:

<sup>6</sup> **Score 3** for projects that have gender equality as a principal objective and allocate at least 80% of the total project budget to Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE)

**Score 2** for projects that have gender equality as a significant objective and allocate between 30 and 79% of the total project budget to GEWE

**Score 1** for projects that contribute in some way to gender equality, but not significantly (less than 30% of the total budget for GEWE)

<sup>7</sup> Please consult the **PBF Guidance Note on Gender Marker Calculations and Gender-responsive Peacebuilding**

Conduct in-depth needs assessment to identify and address existing barriers hindering women from joining or advancing their career in security sector. These barriers may include socio-cultural norms, gender stereotypes, family responsibilities, limited complaints/reporting mechanisms, among others.

Development of a national gender policy for security sector that promote gender equality and inclusivity within the security sector, including recruitment, retention, training, and career advancement opportunities for women to take up leadership and decision-making roles. Institutional support will be a strategic focus area of support to further gender mainstreaming within the security sector, building on DCAF's previous work through the Office of the National Security (ONS). Additionally, oversight bodies such as the office of Ombudsman, National Assembly, National Human Rights Commission, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare and other relevant government agencies, will be strengthened to fulfil their investigative, legislative and oversight mandate.

Support CSOs and the media to advocate for the passage of key gender focused legislations, implementation of the gender policy, as well as increased women participation and representation in leadership and decision-making roles within the security sector.

**Project Risk Marker score<sup>8</sup>: \_\_\_\_\_ High**

**Is the project piloting new approaches: Yes ☒ No ☐**

**Does the project design incorporate climate, peace and security related considerations: Yes ☐ No ☒**

**Select PBF Focus Areas** which best summarizes the focus of the project (*select ONLY one*)<sup>9</sup>:

If applicable, **SDCF/UNDAF outcome(s)** to which the project contributes:

Outcome 2.1: By 2028, marginalized and vulnerable people in The Gambia, participate in functional, accountable, and transparent institutions for the efficient delivery of public services and good governance.

**Sustainable Development Goal(s) and Target(s)** to which the project contributes:

SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

SDG 5, 5.1: End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere.

SDG 5, 5.5: Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic, and public life.

SDG 5, 5.c: Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.

**Type of submission:**

☒ **New project**

**If it is a project amendment, select all changes that apply and provide a brief justification:**

<sup>8</sup> **Risk marker 0** = low risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 1** = medium risk to achieving outcomes

**Risk marker 2** = high risk to achieving outcomes

<sup>9</sup> **PBF Focus Areas** are:

(1.1) SSR, (1.2) Rule of Law; (1.3) DDR; (1.4) Political Dialogue;

(2.1) National reconciliation; (2.2) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management.

(3.1) Employment; (3.2) Equitable access to social services

(4.1) Strengthening of essential national state capacity; (4.2) extension of state authority/local administration; (4.3) Governance of peacebuilding resources (including PBF Secretariats)

<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Project amendment</b>	<p> <b>Extension of duration:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional duration in months (number of months and new end date):         </p> <p> <b>Change of project outcome/ scope:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> </p> <p> <b>Change of budget allocation between outcomes or budget categories of more than 15%:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> </p> <p> <b>Additional PBF budget:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Additional amount by recipient organization: USD XXXXX         </p> <p> <b>Brief justification for amendment:</b> </p> <p> <i>Note: If this is an amendment, show any changes to the project document in RED colour or in TRACKED CHANGES, ensuring a new result framework and budget tables are included with clearly visible changes. Any parts of the document which are not affected, should remain the same. New project signatures are required.</i> </p>
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## PROJECT SIGNATURES:

<p><b>Recipient Organization(s)<sup>10</sup></b></p> <p>Ms. Mandisa Masholo</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>UN Agency: UNDP Date &amp; Seal</p> 	<p><b>Representative of National Authorities</b></p> <p>Salimatta E. T Touray</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>Title: Secretary General and Head of the Civil Service Date &amp; Seal</p> 
<p><b>Recipient Organization</b></p> <p>Mr. Robert A. Kotchani</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>UN Agency: OHCHR Date &amp; Seal</p> 	
<p><b>Recipient Organization</b></p> <p>Dr. Amado Philip de Andrés</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>UN Agency: UNODC Date &amp; Seal : 26 July 2024</p> 	
<p><b>Head of UN Country Team</b></p> <p>Karl-Frédéric Paul</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>Title: UN Resident Coordinator Date &amp; Seal</p> 	<p><b>Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)</b></p> <p>Elizabeth Spehar</p> <p><i>Signature</i> </p> <p>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Date &amp; Seal</p> <p style="text-align: center;">19 August 2024</p>

<sup>10</sup>Please include a separate signature block for each direct recipient organization under this project.



## **I. Peacebuilding Context and Rationale for PBF support (4 pages max)**

- a) A brief summary of gender-responsive **conflict analysis findings** as they relate to this project, focusing on the driving factors of tensions/conflict that the project aims to address and an analysis of the main actors/ stakeholders that have an impact on or are impacted by the driving factors, which the project will aim to engage. This analysis must be gender- and age-responsive.

More than seven years since The Gambia's peaceful political transition following a 22-year period of authoritarian rule, the country, with support from PBF and other partners, continues to navigate a complex and delicate transition that has seen significant progress in some areas and worrying delays and setbacks in others. Among the country's achievements are a slow but steady recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, a peaceful and credible 2021-2023 cycle of presidential, legislative, and local elections, the completion of the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) process and subsequent launch of the Government's five-year Implementation Plan for the TRRC Recommendations.

Although the constitutional reform process stalled following the failure of its passage by the National Assembly in September 2020, at a February 2024 induction supported by International IDEA and the European Union, National Assembly Members expressed optimism about the completion of the constitutional reform within the Cabinet's recommended deadline of December 2024<sup>10</sup>. Following the induction and consultations with different stakeholders, the 2020 draft constitution was legally cleaned and proposed amendments were submitted in March 2024 to the Cabinet for its consideration, and subsequent submission to the National Assembly. However, in early May 2024, during a meeting between UNOWAS SRSB and the Minister of Justice, the latter informed that all efforts would be made to complete the process including the holding of the constitutional referendum between December 2024 and the first quarter of 2025. The National Consultative Dialogue Forum for political parties and stakeholders, initiated and led by President Adama Barrow, held several sessions in February 2024 to enhance unity in the country and build consensus among the political players on divergent issues, and prioritised constitutional reform in the discussions, with a notable commitment to a new constitution<sup>11</sup>. The constitution review process and relevant legislative reforms will provide a significant forum for negotiations and dialogue between civilians and security sector institutions, improving relationships and trust, thus building momentum for successful implementation of security sector reform.

Security sector reform presents a more nuanced picture. Under the authoritarian rule of former President Yahya Jammeh, the security sector served as a repressive mechanism and blurred the lines between political elites and security sector actors. The security sector was therefore re-oriented to serve the main goal of regime protection instead of providing security to the Gambian people. Challenges presented to SSR are further complicated by perceptions of nepotism and ethnic favouritism that has created disproportionate representation of certain ethnicities in senior ranks, some legacy allegiance to

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<sup>10</sup> <https://www.idea.int/news/national-assembly-members-undergo-training-constitution-building-gambia>

<sup>11</sup> <https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/barrow-presides-over-1st-national-dialogue>

the previous regime, and resentment at the lack of trust the Executive has in the Gambian security sector as represented by the continued ECOMIG presence<sup>12</sup>.

Security Sector Reform is fundamental for the stability and peacebuilding of The Gambia that is undergoing a delicate political transition after decades of authoritarian regime that involved serious human rights violations largely committed by security institutions. For the security sector to effectively play its peacebuilding role, it needs a nationally driven reform agenda to develop security institutions that are accountable, professional, inclusive, representative, accessible and transparent, respecting human rights and the rule of law, and responsive to the needs of all Gambians, including the marginalised groups and rural communities. This view is shared by analyses which make recommendations for specific activities in this area:

**The 2024 PBF re-eligibility conflict analysis, “Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding in The Gambia: 2024-2028,”** also identifies security sector reform (SSR) as both a potential conflict driver and a peace engine due to the complexities of restructuring security institutions in a post-dictatorial context. The “slow or interrupted” progress of SSR raises doubts about the authorities’ commitment to their promises and due SSR process, fostering public distrust and disengagement from the reform agenda. However, successful SSR implementation could be pivotal in reconciling Gambia’s past and present, fostering trust between the security forces and the population, and ensuring a sense of safety and stability crucial for lasting peace. The conflict analysis, notes progress made in SSR, including the elaboration of policy frameworks, capacity building of security sector institutions including on human rights, strengthening of civilian oversight, especially by the National Assembly, civil society, and the media, but it also recommends an urgent need for more significant strides to be made in implementing The Gambia’s SSR Strategy in order to sustain the peaceful nature of the country’s transition, especially in the prevailing regional context in which military coups and coups attempts have become more frequent.<sup>13</sup> While SSR in The Gambia faces challenges that could incite conflict, it also has the potential to lay the foundation for enduring peace if managed inclusively, transparently, and professionally. This dual nature of SSR highlights the delicate balance between dismantling old, repressive systems and building new, democratic, and effective security institutions to sustain peace in a post-transition country.

**The 2019 Conflict and Development Analysis (‘CDA’)** is also explicit on the dual role of SSR as a driver of conflict, as well as a potential peace engine: “Perhaps one of the most important areas of reform for the purposes of conflict prevention and shoring up of social cohesion remains that of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Like other reforms and commissions-as-actors, SSR must be held in view of a dual potential – on the one hand, as a conflict driver, as well as a significant engine to ensure peace and stability, particularly in view of any eventual post-ECOMIG era. Steps taken towards achieving SSR objectives will be a strong sign to the public that the architecture of the former regime is truly being dismantled and competently replaced by professionalised institutions, leadership, and personnel”. All efforts to advance swiftly and competently along the road map that SSR actors have identified, will be key for sustaining peace in The Gambia. On the other hand, disgruntlement on the

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<sup>12</sup> 2019 Conflict and Development Analysis, pp 20;38. Also World Bank Group: ‘Gambia Security Sector Public Expenditure Review: Fiscal Implications and Financial Management in a Season of Transition’, Draft 2019

<sup>13</sup> 2024, Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding in The Gambia: 2024-2028,”

part of the security sector at poor salaries and conditions, and (potentially) the poor management of right-sizing process, for example through the failure of appropriate exit-packages being implemented, lack of transparency in promotion, hiring and firing processes could make junior officers lose trust and respect to those in higher ranks, a pointer to the failure of SSR with instability implications.<sup>14</sup> The CDA has noted that the prolonged presence of ECOMIG has instability implications as it contributed to the frustration and demoralization of the Gambian forces – suggesting SSR stagnation as an important process. As a result, public distrust might prevail and lead to more grievances by citizens who still view the presence of ECOMIG forces as an affront to the country’s sovereignty.

**The draft 2024 CDA** has noted the advances made in the elaboration of SSR policy framework, provision of training to security sector institutions, including on human rights, and plans for the strengthening of civilian oversight, especially by the National Assembly, civil society, and the media. Some progress has also been made in closing some of the legislative gaps governing the security sector through the elaboration of draft Acts governing the police, the army and the intelligence services, as well in strengthening oversight of the security sector by State and non-State actors, such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the National Assembly, the Ombudsman, the media, and civil society. In addition, with support from the AU, a draft Legal Coordination Framework on SSR has been elaborated, and the gender aspect of SSR has also received attention, including in the form of in-depth studies on the role of women in The Gambia’s security sector. There is ample scope—and urgent need—for more significant strides to be made in implementing The Gambia’s SSR Strategy to sustain the peaceful nature of the country’s political transition and consolidation of democracy, especially in the prevailing regional context where military coups and coups attempts have become more frequent.

The World Bank Public Expenditure Review 2019 (‘WB PER 2019’) highlighted clashes between Jammeh and Barrow supporters in the Foni region, pointing out that “Ethnically driven preferential treatment under the Jammeh regime” had “reportedly created disproportionate representation of certain ethnicities in senior ranks of the army” creating “risks of ethno-political violence”. It noted that current spending on the security sector was sustainable at current levels in the medium term, however “Balancing the country’s security objectives and the availability of resources” would allow capital investment in modernization and training. After balancing public expenditure on the security sector with the country’s security needs, the World Bank’s SSR PER identified three additional governance reforms for the security sector. These included 1) promoting international support for Security sector reform by enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of resources in the sector, 2) strengthening coordination and monitoring and evaluation of the relevant Ministries and departments, and 3) building effective systems for data collection and management.”<sup>15</sup>

Some of the proposed activities under this Project have taken up these recommendations. Activities include working with the ONS to develop a monitoring & evaluation framework, strengthening communication capacity, improving data collection at the ONS and in corresponding security institutions. Training courses leading to professional development and career progression will be conducted in areas such as collaborative leadership, strategic planning, budget management and public

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<sup>14</sup> 2019 Conflict and Development Analysis, pp 48.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank Group: ‘Gambia Security Sector Public Expenditure Review: Fiscal Implications and Financial Management in a Season of Transition’, 2019

administration, among others. The National Assembly, Office of Ombudsman, CSOs and other relevant institutions will be supported to perform their oversight mandate over the security institutions in different areas, ensuring adherence to human rights standards and norms.

**Key recommendations of the joint UN-ECOWAS-AU SSR Technical Assessment Mission** to The Gambia that took place from 12-15 July 2022, are also adopted. While implementation of recommendations by the TAM has been slow due to lack of understanding and ownership of SSR policies and strategies by stakeholders both at the level of the government and population; funding gaps to implement the SSR strategy; inadequate communications capacity to strategically create awareness on the SSR agenda; limited involvement of civilian oversight institutions; weak coordination by international partners supporting SSR; weak civil-security relations; rejection of draft constitution in 2020 that left SSR without a sufficient legal and institutional framework, among others, the proposed project activities build on its preliminary progress. Activities proposed within the Project include work on co-ordination, by building the capacity of the Office of National Security, National Assembly Members, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and strategic engagements with CSOs and academia to deepen their involvement in the SSR process and effectively undertake their civilian oversight functions. The mission also recommended strengthening the communication capacity of national authorities, including development and implementation of a comprehensive communication strategy on SSR to inform the population and security personnel.

### **Regional trends strengthening the necessity to prioritize SSR in The Gambia**

There have been worrying indications of instability both within and outside of The Gambia. Transnational organized crime is not only a potential source of instability, but also stretches further the already limited capacity of the security sector. The West African region is volatile as demonstrated by the high incidences of military coups and attempted coups in Africa, numbering over 20 since 2010 (figure includes the Sahel), accounting for 44% of the African total.<sup>16</sup> The coup d'état in Niger in July 2023 confirms this trend but perhaps most concerning, in view of its similar size and strong historical and linguistic bonds (in a largely francophone region) was the attempted coup in Sierra Leone in November 2023. The Gambia itself has experienced coup attempts: unsuccessfully (1981, 2014), successfully (1994), and in December 2022 the Government claimed to have foiled a coup attempt by members of the Gambian navy, army, military police, and state guards. Seven accused coup plotters were arrested and tried in the courts. On 31 October 2023, the High Court sentenced Lance Corporal Sanna Fadera, identified as the ringleader of the thwarted coup, to a 12-year prison term for treason. The Gambia also shares some of the regional trends with destabilizing effects that have triggered coups in the region, including potential constitutional manipulation by leaders attempting to extend their term limits and enhance their powers, poverty and a high cost of living, youth unemployment, the presence of violent extremism, and widespread corruption.<sup>17</sup>

### **Human rights, SSR and the Gambia's international obligations**

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<sup>16</sup> Why West Africa has had so many coups and how to prevent more (theconversation.com), February 2022

<sup>17</sup> Rising Insecurity in The Sahel Needs More Attention — UNHCR: <https://humanglemedia.com/rising-insecurity-in-the-sahel-needs-more-attention-unhcr/>

The Gambia is party to regional and international human rights instruments with provisions pertaining to SSR. Respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights are part of the role of all security actors; and aligns with the Gambia's human rights obligations under national and international law. Using a human rights-based approach, the implementation of this project will increase the public's confidence and trust in government institutions, which is critical to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In employing human rights approach, the project has been conceived with the understanding of people as rights-holders and the State, including core security actors, as duty-bearers in providing security as a service to the people. Interventions have been developed on the premise that human rights and security and security are closely linked, and that human rights violations can be a cause of conflict, a result of conflict or an early warning of conflict.

Drawing on human rights principles in the Project's design and implementation will help the police, prison officials and the military to understand their role as duty-bearers in providing security as a public service to the people – the rights-holders. This will involve a difficult but important shift in mindset especially in a context where certain security actors paid allegiance to the former regime and operated with limited accountability; and institutions were kept weak and isolated, so the regime leadership could manipulate their work and maintain control.<sup>18</sup>

The Project will support the State to engage with UPR and UN treaty bodies on its implementation of SSR related international law obligations and treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Rights ICCPR), Convention Against Torture (CAT), International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED) and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).– This would ensure that SSR elements are reflected in state reports to relevant treaty bodies, and SSR related concluding observations and recommendations issued by international treaty bodies and mechanisms are implemented by relevant institutions.

The project will also establish or strengthen the capacity of Human Rights Units in targeted Security to institutionalize an organizational culture of reporting, monitoring and addressing human rights violations committed by the security personnel. Specialized training will enhance skills, knowledge, and understanding of human rights principles, laws, and best practices among the personnel of these agencies, contributing to a sustained culture of respect for human rights, accountability, and professionalism within the institutions and the broader society.

In terms of inclusion, the Project has been designed to include an assessment of all the different security needs of the population and proceed to form a strategy to respond to such needs without discrimination. Such an approach would consider the security needs of women and girls, rural populations, youth, people with disabilities.

If the security needs of different segments of the population are overlooked, this potentially reduces the effectiveness of service providers to protect victims particularly women within and beyond the security sector. Although legislations such as the criminal code, Sexual Offences Act, Domestic Violence Act 2013 exist, the security needs of women, such as protection from domestic violence, is

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<sup>18</sup> DAI Global, Security Community—Victim of the Regime, Workshop with the Police Force in the Gambia, 2020, <https://dai-global-developments.com/articles/restoring-trust-toward-a-people-centric-security-sector-in-the-gambia/>

misunderstood as being a private matter. As a result, the SGBV cases are not reported by victims for fear of retaliation and stigmatization.

There is no victim or witness support policy or legislation in place even though provisions of the Sexual Offences Act include sections protecting witnesses and victims of Sexual and Gender Based Violence. The lack of a protection programme, designed to provide a full range of physical protection and psychosocial support to witnesses and victims, means that there is no enabling environment to report cases, yet this is critical in ensuring access to justice, fair trials and combating impunity. The State does not provide psychosocial support services for SGBV victims currently, this is provided by civil society organisations. This context results in less security for affected individuals and reduce their active and positive contribution to peacebuilding and development. The Project's consideration of the needs of marginalised groups will ensure a holistic and participatory approach to the SSR process.

### **Human rights violations and Shrinking Civic Space**

There is a rising trend of human rights abuses and violations in the country and the security forces are still seen as over-aggressive in their response <sup>19</sup> as “the operational stance of the security sector has not changed”<sup>20</sup>. However, security institutions counter that reforms have been happening, including the development of a National Security Policy, National Security Strategy and a Security Sector Reform Strategic document. Additionally, security institutions are implementing these frameworks by re-aligning their activities with specific constitutional mandates, in contrast to the past when they served and protected the regime.

Broader governance reforms encompass the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) which was awarded A status by the Global Network of National Human Rights Institutions on account of its work and set-up in compliance with the UN Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions. The NHRC is currently monitoring the Government's implementation of Post TRRC recommendations, including those related to SSR. The enactment of significant laws such as the Reparations Act, The Ban from Public Office Act, the Anti-Corruption Act and more recently the Special Accountability Mechanism Bill and the Special Prosecutors' Office Bill point to the State's reform agenda.

Despite the above governance reforms, the retention of some security officers accused of human rights violations remains a cause for concern by citizens, particularly the victims. It is a visible indicator suggesting a 'business as usual' attitude. The population is reminded daily of corruption within the security sector while at the same time the security forces lack the institutional capacity such as, but not limited to, inadequate finances, limited communication and training infrastructure to effectively deliver security services to the population.

Human rights violations and shrinking space is further demonstrated by the ongoing incidents of arbitrary arrest of human rights activists and opposition members. For example, in September 2023, the sedition trial of Yankuba Darbo, Chair of Brikama Area Council and an opposition party politician, was resumed after a two-year hiatus. The opening of the trial was marked by a large demonstration of

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<sup>19</sup> Around one-third of citizens say the police routinely use excessive force in dealing with protesters (36%) and criminal suspects (33%), while 20% say they frequently engage in criminal activities.” R9-News-release-Gambians-cite-unprofessional-conduct-by-police\_-Afrobarometer-bh-14june23-1.pdf

<sup>20</sup> Civilian participant in the PBF Strategic Results Framework workshop 21-22 August 2023

opposition party supporters, heavy police presence as well as accusation of police brutality, and inflammatory multimedia statements against the police, which resulted in subsequent arrests for ‘threats to the police’. A few days later, on 12 September 2023, two police officers were killed, and another seriously injured in a shooting incident. Once arrested, the government linked the suspect to both the protests at the sedition trial and with the armed and separatist group known as the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) that has been waging a secession war against the central government in Senegal since 1982.<sup>21</sup> Human rights groups raised concerns over several breaches of judicial guarantees, including failing to allow legal representation and detention at an unknown place.

The June 2024 arrest of opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) executive member, Ebrima Dibba, for uttering seditious words against President Adama Barrow, has further raised concerns about the shrinking civic space and its impact on SSR, undermining public trust towards the security institutions. Human rights activists criticized Dibba’s arrest, maintaining that sedition in country’s laws is not only draconian but a threat to democracy, accountability of public officials and the development of a dynamic civic society. This presents opportunities for the new SSR project to address human rights violations by engaging diverse stakeholders, improving transparency and trust, building capacity, and advocating for legal and policy reforms to protect civic space and human rights.<sup>22</sup>

For SSR to succeed, it is essential to protect and expand civic space, ensuring that civil society organizations, the media, and the public can freely participate in shaping a secure and just society.

### **A delayed process with renewed Governmental commitment to move forward**

The slow pace of security sector reform (SSR) implementation has been an ongoing issue of concern given its potential impact on the stability of the country. The progress of SSR has been affected by the upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and a three-year electoral cycle that ran from December 2021 to April 2023 (especially the December 2021 presidential election). The electoral context made it difficult for the Executive to undertake politically sensitive reforms that could have reduced the chance of the President to be re-elected, such as determining the size, role and affordability of security institutions or performing human rights vetting among the ranks. Notwithstanding this, today, there is an urgent need to address drivers of conflict in and around the Gambian security sector which fuel popular mistrust outside the security sector, and discontent within it, and if left unaddressed will be a cause for instability in the country. Recent tensions over the elections, resumed efforts to adopt a new Constitution and other reforms makes it important to strategically prioritize focus on political stability and the security sector, to restore trust between citizens and the state and continue the positive political transition trajectory.

The Government is committed to accelerate the implementation of SSR, as demonstrated by the President’s action of appointing a new National Security Advisor (NSA) in December 2022 to head the Office of National Security and to coordinate the government’s efforts on SSR. The proactiveness of the NSA, the updating of the Security Sector Reform Strategy (SSRS) which has been renewed for

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<sup>21</sup> <https://standard.gm/the-polices-inadequacy-in-illuminating-the-fatal-shooting-incident/>

<sup>22</sup> <https://voiceoutdigital.com/ebrima-dibba-faces-charges-for-seditious-intention/>

the period 2023-2027, the prioritization of SSR in the new Recovery Focused National Development Plan (RF-NDP 2023-2027) suggest this area is a government priority but there are serious capacity constraints in moving this complex reform process forward. Some constraints include but are not limited to insufficient knowledge and understanding of SSR process by security personnel and the general population, inadequate legislations and resources, and inability by oversight institutions to hold security sector accountable for the implementation of the SSR strategy.

The implementation of the TRRC recommendations provide the most visible and specific indicators and retain substantial public support, particularly the issue of victim's reparations and the continued presence, albeit on administrative leave in some cases, of alleged human rights abusers within the security institutions. The enactment of the Victim's Reparations Act 2023 and the Ban from Public Office 2023 represent important facilitative steps addressing issues to be taken forward under the current PBF-funded Post TRRC project. In June 2022, the government suspended 9 public officials adversely mentioned during the public hearings of the TRRC pending retirement or termination of their contracts.<sup>23</sup> Recently, the government committed to ban 40 more before the end of 2024 following the passage of the Ban from Public Office Act in January 2024. Majority of these officials are from the security sector and were found responsible for human rights violations under the former regime of Yahya Jammeh.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, the passage of Special Accountability Mechanism Act and Special Prosecutors Office Act on 24<sup>th</sup> April 2024 to aid the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cases of serious human rights violations and international and domestic crimes specified in or related to acts and omissions described in the report of the TRRC that have occurred between July 1994 and January 2017, further demonstrates government's commitment to prosecute persons guilty of rights violation.<sup>25</sup> In addition, further steps have been taken by the Ministry of Justice as advisory body to the Ministry of Public Service to initiate the process of removing from office the accused officials on a case by case basis, including forced retirements, dismissals or other forms to be determined by the Ministry of Public Service, as the lead in the implementation of the Public Office Act.<sup>26</sup>

Both the TRRC recommendations and the Government's White Paper highlight the need for restructuring, capacity building, and rightsizing of security sector to ensure respect for and protection of human rights, and for it to become effective, affordable, and sustainable.

### **Critical gaps and challenges disrupting a dynamic implementation of the Security Sector Strategy (SSRS)**

The SSRS (2023-2027) advocates for a radical shift from traditional, regime/State-centric security to human security and to "cultivate an effective, robust professional, apolitical, accountable, transparent and responsive sector in line with international best practices."<sup>27</sup> The Strategy has 5 priority areas: i)

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<sup>23</sup> <https://standard.gm/govt-acts-on-trrc-recommendation-to-suspend-officials/>

<sup>24</sup> <https://standard.gm/40-banned-officials-to-be-removed-from-govt/>

<sup>25</sup> <https://thepoint.gm/africa/gambia/headlines/2-new-bills-out-to-prosecute-persons-guilty-of-rights-violation>

<sup>26</sup> Interview with the legal and transitional justice expert, Ministry of Justice

<sup>27</sup> Security Sector Reform Strategy 2023–2027



Restore public trust and confidence by addressing post-authoritarian legacies; ii) Develop an overarching security governance framework; iii) Reform, empower and strengthen civilian management and oversight bodies such as the National Assembly, Local Councils, National Audit Office, CSOs, etc.; vi) Address cross-cutting perennial challenges; and v) Address specific institutional reform activities. Security sector institutions do face a number of organizational constraints including inadequate human and operational capacities to effectively deliver their mandates in line with the SSR strategy.

The following represent some of the most critical gaps and challenges:

### **Legislations, policies, and strategies**

The absence or inadequate SSR related legislations, policies, and strategies, as outlined in the SSR Strategy, has impeded the transformation of the security sector to deliver services to the citizens. To transform security sector to adopt a human security approach, the project will support the development and revision of key legislations, policies, and strategies for effective service delivery. These will include the National Security Council Bill; Gambia Armed Forces Act; the Prisons Act; Gender policy;<sup>28</sup> prison, and armed forces strategies. To achieve this, the project will collaborate with ONS and DCAF, to strengthen the capacity of National Assembly (Standing Committees on Defence and Security, Finance & Public Accounts, Human Rights and Constitutional matters, and select committee on Gender, Children and Social Welfare); Ministry of Justice; CSOs, media and the Inter-Party Committee for the passage and implementation of legislations, policies, and strategies.

### **Institutional Capacity Gaps**

Lack of capacity in security institutions and other relevant state institutions has hindered timely implementation of the security sector reform strategy.<sup>29</sup> Also, specific capacity gaps the project will address include lack of IT equipment and security communication devices for all (8) security institutions that are needed to enhance intra and inter-agency communication and information sharing;, build communication capacity within security institutions and coordinate outreach activities in the security sector and communities.

Collaborative leadership and strategic planning skills have been identified as key missing capacity gaps in security institutions that the project will aim to address to strengthen leadership within and across the institutions and further enhance strategic planning capacity to accelerate implementation of the SSR strategy. Additionally, the project will enhance the capacity of the security institutions, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice through training, development of curriculum and training manuals, accreditation courses and mechanisms for international treaty obligations for timely and effective implementation of the SSR strategy. Young people have not been involved in SSR processes and by deploying University of The Gambia (UTG) under the UTG Graduate Scheme, their knowledge

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<sup>28</sup> The sexual Harassment Policy is yet to be developed by DCAF, but it is in the pipeline and expected to be developed this year. The implementation of Gender policy for the police is ongoing. The project will leverage on this policy to develop a gender policy for all security institutions.

<sup>29</sup> <sup>29</sup> <https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/security-sector-reform-in-the-gambia-what-is-at-stake>

and experience in SSR will be enhanced while facilitating their participation in SSR processes at institutional and community levels.

### **Lack of data management and Real-time Data for Informed Decisions**

Data generation and management in the security sector remains a key gap that limits evidence-based decision making and programming. The project intends to address the data generation gap by collaborating with ONS, University of The Gambia (UTG) and research institutes to conduct an in-depth assessment on barriers impeding women's participation and representation in decision making and leadership within the security sector. Also, with lack of proper data management in place that includes insufficient documentation; limited access to information; inadequate communication channels and absence of feedback mechanisms within the security sector has hindered effective knowledge sharing and collaboration. The project will support development of digitalized reporting dashboard at ONS to collate real-time data and information such as personnel information, assets, reported cases of malpractices by personnel and crime data and many other. Establish monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) framework at ONS to facilitate learning, knowledge sharing and exchange of best practices within security institutions (GAF, GPF, DLEAG and GPS). The MEL framework aims to enhance security service delivery and public trust by assessing performance of service delivery, optimizing resource use, fostering learning, involving diverse stakeholders, and making evidence-based decisions. The MEL framework will be critical in the ongoing security sector reform efforts in The Gambia as it will enable the sector to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of reform initiatives that enhance human rights and gender-responsive security approaches, civil-security relations, transparency and accountability, with an overall aim to improve security service delivery and public trust. By following a systematic methodology (to be determined in terms of reference for the consultant), it enables stakeholders to make evidence-based decisions in the implementation of the SSR strategy.

### **Limited Gender Responsive Security Sector Reform**

As recognized in the CDA and underlined in the NDP, women can play a key role in peacebuilding if they are well represented and occupy positions of leadership where their voices and contributions are respected. Their under-representation in security institutions, particularly at senior levels, is a missed opportunity for peacebuilding and stability in The Gambia. Such under-representation, as well as the limited gender-responsiveness of the implementation of the SSRS, can be explained by several factors, which have various root causes, as outlined below.

*Gender-based violence within the Security Sector:* Few GBV cases are reported due to a culture of silence, limited knowledge, and availability of GBV response and support services. Additionally, the weak complaints mechanisms for cases of sexual harassment and exploitation have further inhibited reporting of GBV cases within the security sector that is primarily male dominated. To address the gap, the project, in partnership with DCAF will strengthen the capacity of security institutions (GAF, GPF, GPS, DLEAG) to respond to cases of sexual harassment and abuse informed by prioritized recommendations from the in-assessment findings (See activity 1.4.1).

*Weak or lack of Gender Policy Frameworks:* There is no Gender policy for security institutions at the national level. However, DCAF has supported the development and implementation of a gender policy

for the GPF. The project will leverage on support provided by DCAF to develop a national gender policy and action plan of the security sector. This will be done in collaboration with ONS, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare and Ministry of Interior in consultation with security institutions.

*Limited Women in security sector, including participation in decision-making and leadership:* Cultural norms, gender stereotypes, family responsibilities, inadequate policies and unsafe work environment has restricted women from joining and holding executive leadership and decision-making positions. To address this gap, the project will collaborate with ONS to train and provide mentorship programmes to inspire and empower women to join and hold leadership and decision-making positions. Moreover, the project will identify and train male gender champions (He for She) within the security institutions (GAF, GPF, DLEAG, GPS) to advocate for more women to join hold leadership positions and report GBV cases through the implementation of the gender policy for security institutions geared towards reduction of GBV and discrimination within the security sector. The gender champions will continuously and sustainably educate their fellow men about women's rights, and the importance of their participation and representation in leadership and decision within the security sector.

*Gender-unfriendly facilities:* Existing facilities within security sector institutions fail to meet the specific needs of women, and don't guarantee their safety, dignity and comfort. Minor refurbishments and materials/equipment provision, with particular attention to the GAF and GPF, will be supported by the project to meet the safety and comfort needs of women, and make it easier to attract more women to join and stay in the security sector institutions. Refurbishment will entail minor renovation of existing washroom facilities, while provision of materials/equipment for hygiene will include handwashing stations, toilet seats, sanitary bins, and bags to attract more women to join and stay in security institutions.

*Lack of gender-responsive training programmes:* Gender mainstreaming has not been fully incorporated in training curricula of security institutions. The curricula to be developed by the project will fully incorporate gender mainstreaming and a learning culture designed to create awareness about gender inclusivity and prevention of SGBV, including but not limited to, facilitating knowledge sharing and exchange of best practices for representatives of GPF and GAF human rights and gender units in the sub-region.

### **Oversight Institutional Gaps**

The oversight institutions have limited capacity and knowledge of the security sector reform to successfully perform their legislative and oversight mandate.

#### *National Assembly:*

Majority of the National Assembly members are new, elected in April 2022, and have no deeper understanding and knowledge of the Security Sector reform agenda and human rights, making it imperative to conduct training sessions, to enable them to positively play their legislative function at a time when the country is undergoing through series of reforms, including SSR. The project will also focus on building the capacity of the relevant committees of the National Assembly (Standing Committees of Defence and Security; Human Rights and Constitutional Matters and the select committee on Gender, Children and Social Welfare) and the Office of the Clerk to play their oversight

role in implementation of SSR, thereby holding the duty bearers accountable for national commitments made under the wider SSR policy frameworks.

*The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC):*

NHRC has limited capacity on SSR. With assistance from the Project, the NHRC will be supported through training of commissioners and staff on SSR to be able to monitor and ensure compliance with national and international human rights standards. Additionally, the NHRC will lead the establishment of a civilian coordination platform, in collaboration with ONS, to coordinate civilian oversight mechanisms/institutions, ensuring they have a clear understanding of SSR and are capable of participating and identifying their roles in the implementation of SSR Strategy while holding the duty bearers accountable. NHRC will collaborate with the platform to monitor cases of harassment and/or arrest of civil society actors while undertaking their duties under the civilian oversight function. Furthermore, NHRC and ONS, in collaboration with research/academic institutions, will commission a study on the inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities in the SSR process.

*The Office of Ombudsman:*

It has the mandate, as outlined by the National SSR policy <sup>30</sup>, to investigate complaints from the public and service members, and to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law. The Ombudsman Act 1997 also empowers the office to investigate complaints of injustice, corruption, abuse of power, maladministration and unfair treatment of any person by a public officer in the exercise of official duties.<sup>31</sup> Whilst they have this mandate, it lacks the capacity to implement its key functions, and the project's interventions will build its capacity, through trainings, to investigate complaints of wrongdoings reported by the public and service members against security institutions. Support will also be extended to the development of a communication strategy and revamping of online reporting platforms (website, social media platforms and corporate email addresses) to improve engagements with citizens and enhance reporting and implementation of wrongdoings committed by security personnel. In addition, it will support public awareness on existing reporting complaints mechanisms to encourage civilians to report any wrongdoing by the security personnel.

*Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), media, religious leaders, political parties:*

The lack of inclusion and participation in SSR by CSOs, CBOs, media, political parties, has limited their involvement in the implementation of SSR. In some instances, media, CSOs and Political Parties have criticized the Government over the slow pace of SSR implementation, especially the failure in right sizing, vetting, passage of legislations, etc. In some cases, critics have been silenced through

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<sup>30</sup> <https://security-legislation.gm/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-Gambia-National-Security-Policy-28-5-19.pdf>;

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[https://www.google.com/search?q=ombudsman+gambia&rlz=1C1CHBD\\_enGM1074GM1074&oq=Ombudsman+Gambia&gs\\_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqDAGAEcMYJxiABBiKBTIMCAAQIXgnGIAEGIoFMgYIARBFGEAyDQgCEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgDEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgEEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgFEAAyHgMYgAQYigWoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8](https://www.google.com/search?q=ombudsman+gambia&rlz=1C1CHBD_enGM1074GM1074&oq=Ombudsman+Gambia&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqDAGAEcMYJxiABBiKBTIMCAAQIXgnGIAEGIoFMgYIARBFGEAyDQgCEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgDEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgEEAAyHgMYgAQYigUyDQgFEAAyHgMYgAQYigWoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)

arrests and detentions, in further impeding their participation in the implementation of security sector reform, awareness raising and accurate reporting, and holding the duty bearers accountable. Factors explaining the absence of civilian oversight institutions in SSR include weak coordination, lack of knowledge/understanding on SSR, lack of advocacy strategies/ plans, limited capacity, and inability to be assertive in the governance reform agenda. To ensure inclusive participation, the project will support the institutions, trainings on SSR and human rights to increase knowledge/understanding of SSR; strategic advocacy for awareness raising of SSR at the national and regional level and enhance accountability; coordination and communication skills, among others.

Ultimately, this will promote inclusive participation, accountability, build public trust and confidence in security institutions, and eventually enhance social cohesion and peace in The Gambia.

The newly established CSO Coalition on SSR provides an opportunity for meaningful participation of CSOs in SSR processes in coordinated way, making implementation of SSR inclusive and participatory. As a new institution, building its capacity (technical and operational) will enhance effective representation and participation of CSOs in SSR and boost its ability to advocate for accountability and transparency. Key training needs of the CSO coalition will include coordination, communication, advocacy, community dialogue skills, monitoring and evaluation, partnerships building and resource mobilization, among others.<sup>32</sup>

Potential risk that is likely to emerge and affect CSOs participation in SSR is intimidation and retaliation by the duty bearers in situations where their advocacy for accountability and transparency is not well received. Currently, there are no legal frameworks to protect CSOs from intimidation and retaliation, but noting this as risk to the project implementation, some mitigation measures will be undertaken during the project implementation phase including raising awareness and building staff capacity on reprisal risk, high level advocacy and engagements by UN with relevant government officials, and strengthening collaboration between CSOs and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to continuously monitor conditions for civil society and protect them against intimidation and retaliation through media engagements, reports on human rights violations and UPR reporting mechanisms.

Marginalized groups of Women, Youth and Persons with Disability (PWDs) will be key partners in implementation of the project to ensure inclusive participation and no one is left behind. Collaboration with the Women and youth led CSOs will be deliberately targeted while partnership with the Gambia Federation of the Disabled (GFD) will bring on board PWDs as strategic partners in the implementation of SSR. The proposed Civil-Security Committees will be inclusive with participation of all groups from the communities, an approach that will further strength inclusivity and accountability.

## **Fragile Civil- Security Sector Relations**

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<sup>32</sup> See CSOs Engagement Strategy on the Implementation of Security Sector Reform in The Gambia. The strategy identifies the role of CSOs in SSR, how the CSOs Coalition could contribute and accelerate implementation of SSR. See also <https://foroyaa.net/office-of-national-security-discuss-policy-objective-of-security-sector-reform/> and <https://standard.gm/ecomigs-continuous-presence-is-purely-senegals-interest/>

Civil-security sector relations is an issue of concern in The Gambia's security sector. The legacy of the former autocratic regime weakened citizens' trust and confidence towards the security sector largely because of human rights violations. Instances of law enforcement abuse have contributed to declining enthusiasm among the Gambian population<sup>33</sup>. Although some progress has been made<sup>34</sup> since President Adama Barrow came to power in 2017, civil-security collaboration remains fragile with potential to deteriorate if the implementation of security sector reform is not accelerated as the country heads towards the next electoral cycle in 2026.

Largely affected are the rural regions, where the reach of the Gambian state apparatus is low. The state's central administrative apparatuses, such as law enforcement are more robust in the Greater Banjul Area and are less effective in the more rural areas, due to factors such as cost and availability of transport, frequent power outages and a concentration of human capital in the Greater Banjul Area<sup>35</sup>. Establishing Civil-Security committees will therefore enhance engagements between communities and security sector and not only increase awareness of the SSR, but also enhance ownership and accountability. The composition of the committees will include the regional Governor, two representatives from the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), Village Development Committee (VDCs), Ward Development Committee (WDCs), Women, Youth and Persons with Disability Groups; local Government and Security Institutions (GAF, GPF, GPS, DLEAG), with oversight function provided by ONS. The total number of committee members will be a maximum of 25. A term of reference will be developed to define the mandate and responsibilities of the committee as well as its members.

The SSR Strategy has prioritized strengthening civil-security sector relations to address post-authoritarian legacy of politicization and misuse of security institutions to violate human rights.<sup>36</sup> To enhance relationships, trust and confidence of the citizens, the project will leverage best practices from Cote d'Ivoire to support engagement sessions and activities through piloted civil-security committees in the regions with low trust and confidence levels (Greater Banjul area, URR and LRR).<sup>37</sup> Engagement sessions will include raising awareness among the citizens on SSR, the role of security institutions, and existing SSR policies/legal frameworks, while activities will include, but not limited to, dialogue sessions and gender inclusive sports such as football matches and athletics.

## **Linkage to other similar interventions**

### *Previous PBF support in SSR:*

The *Strategic Advice and Support to the Security Sector Reform in The Gambia* was a two-year project that commenced in July 2017 and ended in April 2020 with a budget of \$1,400,000. Substantial funds were spent on advisers embedded in the ONS and in different security institutions. By its nature such investments are challenging to demonstrate long-term impacts. A similar challenge is presented with other activities such as study visits and exchanges, although arguably the well-received

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<sup>33</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GMB>

<sup>34</sup> [https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab\\_r7\\_dispatchno317\\_gambians\\_trust\\_army\\_but\\_divided\\_over\\_economig.pdf](https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r7_dispatchno317_gambians_trust_army_but_divided_over_economig.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GMB>

<sup>36</sup> Security Sector Reform strategy 2023–2027.

<sup>37</sup> [https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab\\_r7\\_dispatchno317\\_gambians\\_trust\\_army\\_but\\_divided\\_over\\_economig.pdf](https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ab_r7_dispatchno317_gambians_trust_army_but_divided_over_economig.pdf)



communications activities are part of the reason why civil society is relatively well-informed and vocal about the need for SSR.

Several achievements were made, notably policies and strategies that included the National Security Policy, SSR strategy and the National Security strategy as well as Institutional Policies for Police and Immigration. In a relatively short period, it is difficult to both develop nationally owned policies and to track their application. An SSR resource mobilization strategy was dependent on other documents being developed and had not been finalized, for example. However, the SSR Assessment is regularly cited in government documentation. One area of activity that has not been sustained is the coordination mechanisms, in particular donor coordination remains a problem, though not one that should be laid at the feet of the PBF SSR program solely. The project ensured that gender issues were given consideration in SSR processes and Gender, and children welfare units were established at GPF and GAF, in line with the ECOWAS standards.

The project evaluation made recommendations, a number of which are taken forward and reflected in this document. These include capacity building in the education and marketability of skills of service personnel; the importance of civilian oversight bodies with recommendation for continuous engagements to enhance oversight. The project evaluation also identified several challenges and stressed the importance of a strong monitoring framework and recommended strengthening gender capacities and policies to address barriers inhibiting women from participating and holding positions of decision making and leadership in the security sector. Related recommendation is conducting assessments on such barriers to guide reforms at operational and strategic levels. Other challenges included ineffective donor coordination, insufficient budgetary allocation by the government and weak awareness of SSR by the communities across the country.

Other related issues that were recommended by the evaluation included enhancing coordination of oversight bodies to appreciate their needs and responsibilities, and to ensure regular monitoring of the activities of the SSR process; strengthened communication capacity at ONS to regularly inform the local populations on status of implementation of the reforms; mobilisation of the citizenry and CSOs to participate, own and support the SSR to be able to promote accountability and transparency; sensitise Security forces on SSR reforms; capacity needs assessment and subsequent continuous capacity building programme in key institutions (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of interior, Presidency, National Assembly Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare) to enhance national ownership of SSR; establish forums for community and members of security forces to share views on security and development issues to enhance trust and national ownership; among others.<sup>38</sup>

The previous PBF SSR intervention supported capacity building for the ONS, but all staff were on secondment from various institutions and have since returned to their original positions. Significant staffing changes have occurred, including a new Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor (NSA), and Deputy NSA, with all current staff now on permanent contracts. Additionally, the IT equipment procured in 2018 was for administrative purpose. The ONS is expanding by establishing regional offices. Therefore, the new project aims to offer both refresher and new capacity-building programs, support with IT equipment to enhance inter-agency communication, implement the newly developed communication strategy and related outreach activities targeting communities and other stakeholders. This will also improve the ONS's capacity for timely communication, data collection, monitoring, and

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<sup>38</sup> Terminal evaluation of the UNDP Security Sector Reform (SSR) project, May 2020:  
<https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/GMB/Gambia%20SSR%20Terminal%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report%2010th%20June%202020.pdf>

evaluation, enabling it to effectively coordinate and implement the SSR strategy. The capacity-building programmes will be “institutionalized”, in a way that they can be delivered anytime new staff members join, thanks to the integration of the programmes in new staff induction.

- b) A brief description of how the project aligns with/ supports **existing** Governmental and UN **strategic frameworks**<sup>39</sup>, how it ensures **national ownership**. If this project is designed in a PRF country, describe how the main objective advances a relevant strategic objective identified through the Eligibility Process. Elaborate on the catalytic nature of the project and how national ownership, including but not limited to, national and subnational entities are built in.

The project will support the government to implement key elements of its Security Sector Reform Strategy (2023-2027) ,to implement relevant parts of The Gambia’s new, recovery-focused, National Development Plan (NDP II 2023-2027); and will dovetail with activities under the Implementation Plan for the Government’s White Paper on the TRRC Report, and the constitutional reform process. Aspects of the constitutional reform initiative relevant to the SSR include strengthening the National Security Council (NSC) by including the Minister of Justice who is also the chair of National SSR Steering Committee as a member. The draft constitution also proposed the National Security Advisor to represent the Office of National Security on the NSC and Gambia’s failure to adopt the Draft Constitution raised questions on the mandate of the NSA and Office of the National Security. The Ministry of Defence was also proposed for the membership of the NSA. The 1997 Constitution doesn’t contain provisions for the NSC’s oversight role over security policies and SSR, a role that was proposed in the draft constitution.<sup>40</sup> The continued validity of the 1997 Constitution means the NSC will continue to function within a limited mandate.

The Gambia’s SSR Strategy advocates for a radical shift from traditional, regime/State-centric security to human security and to “cultivate an effective, robust professional, apolitical, accountable, transparent and responsive sector in line with international best practices.”<sup>41</sup> The Strategy has 5 priority areas:

- I. Restore public trust and confidence by addressing post-authoritarian legacies.
- II. Develop an overarching security governance framework.
- III. Reform, empower and strengthen civilian management and oversight bodies such as the National Assembly, Local Councils, National Audit Office, CSOs, etc.
- IV. Address cross-cutting perennial challenges.
- V. Address specific institutional reform activities.

The project will contribute to the following priority areas of SSRS and their objectives:

**Priority Area 1:** Addressing Post-Authoritarian Legacies. The key objective will be strengthening civil-security sector relations to re-build trust and confidence on security sector among the citizens.

**Priority Area 2:** Developing Overarching Security Governance Legal and Policy frameworks: The key objectives will be to establish, review and operationalize institutional legal frameworks and policies, promote security policy and strategy coherence and synergise policies and strategies of the security sector.

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<sup>39</sup> Including national gender and youth strategies and commitments, such as a National Action Plan on 1325, a National Youth Policy etc.

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<sup>41</sup> Gambia SSR Strategy (2023-2027), p. 1.



**Priority Area 3:** Reform activities to enable Civil Management and Oversight: Key objectives will include enhancing civil management and oversight bodies with requisite technical and operational competence and strengthening the coordination capacity of the Office of National Security (ONS).

**Priority Area 4:** Reform Imperatives to Address Cross Cutting Perennial Challenges with the key objective being to have in place a security sector that is responsive to the needs of all persons irrespective of gender, age and vulnerability and achieve equitable representation and participation of gender in the security sector.

**Priority Area 5:** Specific Reform Activities Relating to Respective Security Institutions to reform the security institutions by reviewing obsolete regulatory frameworks and developing new ones, supporting institutional capacities, and ensuring a capable and professional security sector.

1. Additionally, this project will align with several national priorities regarding the involvement and participation of women in peace and security institutions and processes. The need for gender mainstreaming in the security sector is highlighted in the Gambia National Defence Policy (2023), the National Security Policy -NSP (2019) and the Outcome 3.5 of the National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2021-2025). The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, which has played an important role in policy development and implementation around this theme, will be key in coordinating gender mainstreaming actions in the security services.
2. Supporting the government to implement relevant parts of The Gambia's new, Recovery-Focused, National Development Plan (NDP), specifically Outcome 2.7 which has a clear focus on a reformed security sector with adequately capacitated security institutions.
3. The project will dovetail with activities under the Implementation Plan for the Government White Paper on the TRRC recommendations, which proposes to review the Gambia Armed Forces (GAF) training curricula with a view to including topics on human rights, current constitutional draft law (with anticipation this will be passed latest by the first quarter of 2025) and rule of law.<sup>42</sup> The Implementation Plan for the Post-TRRC Recommendations, developed by the Ministry of Justice includes accreditation of training courses for the Army, review of the military regulations to set minimum training requirements in relevant accredited courses as a condition for promotion and developing training manuals on Civil-Security relations with a view to changing mind-sets of serving members of the Armed Forces for the respect of established rules.<sup>43</sup>
4. The project will contribute to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), which calls on States to increase women's participation in conflict resolution, as well as Sustainable Development Goals 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls) and 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. The Gambia has developed a National Action Plan that has three overarching goals: to ensure greater respect for women's right to participation in the decision-making processes on equal footing with men;

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<sup>42</sup> Implementation Plan for government White Paper on TRRC Report, 2.2.1

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., Implementation Plan, 2.2.2 – 2.2.4

- c) A brief explanation of how the project fills any strategic gaps and complements any other relevant interventions, PBF funded or otherwise. Also provide a brief **summary of existing interventions** in the proposal's sector by filling out the table below.

<b>Project name (duration)</b>	<b>Donor and budget</b>	<b>Project focus</b>	<b>Difference from/ complementarity to current proposal</b>
SSR-UNDP (2017-2020)	USD 1,400,000	Supporting a comprehensive, nationally led SSR process	This Project provided strategic advice and support to the designing and launching of a nationally led, inclusive and participatory Security Sector Reform process. The Project complements the current project because it laid a foundation for the implementation of Security Sector Reform in The Gambia by providing strategic and technical support to conduct an assessment and develop frameworks of the security sector. It also coordinated the support of the international community to the security sector reform process.
TJ-UNDP-OHCHR 2017-2022	PBF USD 4,699.999		The Project supported the TRRC Commission proffer specific recommendations on the security sector following witness statements during its truth telling process. Those recommendations identified specific areas of reform which informed and continue

			to shape SSR initiatives.
Post-TRRC UNDP-OHCHR 2022 - 2024	PBF USD 3,494,150.27		The Post TRRC Project aims to assist the government adopt effective measures to implement the TRRC recommendations, including on SSR, in line with international human rights standards and in response to victims and survivors needs. The Project will enhance the justice sector's capacity to prosecute cases emanating from the TRRC recommendations and support the National Human Rights Commission and CSOs monitor implementation of TRRC recommendations.
Rule of Law: Strengthening Community Access to Justice, Community Policing and Effective SGBV Response in The Gambia UNDP/UNICEF/UN	PBF 1.5million USD	Supporting to build the capacity of the criminal justice sector and increasing access to justice. This includes critical support to police (Community Policing, training, data and evidence-based planning) and the Prisons reforms process	Complements SSR process through use of comparative advantages to build institutional capacity, ensure rule of law standards and promote access to quality justice services for all.
UNODC: "Support the criminal justice and prison reform process in The Gambia and strengthen law	Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) - USD 1.5 Million	Support to criminal justice system, prison reform and anti-money laundry in The Gambia.	Aims to improve and enhance the capacities of different sectors of the criminal justice system of the country

enforcement and judicial mechanisms for the prevention of serious crimes and money laundering” (2018 - 2021)			
(EU) Support to Security Sector Reform in the Gambia: (2019-2020)	EU, 1.5M Euros	Support to Security Sector Reform	Focused on strengthening governance institutions and support capacity for security institutions (Army, Police etc) complements the current project and ensures there are no duplications on the issues of vetting of security personnel.
Strategic Support of the National SSR Process in the Gambia towards an Effective, Responsive and Accountable Security Sector (2019-2023)	UNDP ` Funded. USD 1.2M	Support to Security Sector Reform	The project supports reform of security institutions, enhanced implementation of the rule of law that guarantees respect for human rights, gender equality and access to basic security services. The Project supports the implementation of some basic recommendations in the SSR strategy approved by the Gambia in 2021 with a strategic goal of supporting the structural reform of the defence and security architecture, addressing existing dysfunctions within the security sector, including institutional frameworks and architecture (inappropriate doctrine, poor guidance, ill-training, as well as performance orientation

			and accountability deficits).
UNODC: Organised Crime: West African Response to trafficking (OCWAR-T)	EU Funded Regional Project Total project Amount 3,769,000 EURO	Crime Prevention Border Management Prevent and management of conflicts and security threats in the ECOWAS region	The project had a comprehensive and holistic approach in the fight against TOC structures by combining the different themes of trafficking and included linking the three P dimensions of crime control: prosecution, protection, and prevention. It followed a human rights- based approach and strengthened the cooperation between national security forces in the aim to increase their ability to uphold human security, enforce a legitimate state monopoly on violence, and protect human rights.
UNODC/ OHCHR: PROMIS Project	Governments of Italy and Netherlands	Supporting states' responses to smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.	This is a UNODC/ OHCHR joint initiative which aims to strengthen the capacities of West African states to develop a human rights-based response to smuggling of migrants and to effectively respond to human rights violations related to irregular migration.
UNODC: XAW /K36 - (2019)	Funded by the Federal Republic of Germany  50,000USD	Enhancement of Forensic Science Services in West Africa	This project aimed at strengthening the institutional and human capacities of law enforcement officers, enhancing legal and policy frameworks, strengthening data collection and research, and creating regional

			coordination mechanisms. UNODC has developed various technical assistance tools that aim to support States to implement international legal instruments.
UNODC: XAMU50 Project 2021-2022	Funded by the Federal Republic of Germany  200,000USD	Assistance to the ECOWAS and to Member States in West Africa for the Development and Implementation of Drug Control and Crime Prevention Strategies	This project ensures the consolidation of achievements from 2019 and the broadening of the scope of its previous intervention. It supported the availability and use of quality forensic science services, data and information as an essential element for effective and fair criminal justice systems, and evidence-based policymaking.
American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI) and Freedom House Promoting Rights and Justice in the Gambia (2021 – 2026)	USAID 7,800,000 USD	Rule of law sector	Promoting Rights and Justice in the Gambia, implemented by ABA and Freedom House, is a 5-year project that seeks to strengthen the efficiency of the justice system in The Gambia and to empower civil society organisations to increase accountability and public participation. This Project will work closely with the American Bar Association team in The Gambia to ensure non-duplication of activities and the creation of synergies.

UNDP 2023-2027	European Union: 9,000,0000 million euros	Support constitutional and law reforms, enhance transitional justice, human rights and rule of law processes. Strengthen local governance structures.	The EU-UNDP GREAT Initiative is a European Union funded initiative which is being implemented by UNDP in partnership with the Ministry of Justice from 2023 - 2027. It aims to promote consensus on constitutional and legislative reforms, enhance transitional justice and human rights processes, rule of law and human rights, and strengthen local governance structures. The Project will engage with the GREAT initiative to ensure activities are complementary.
Government of Turkey - 2023	US\$ 600,000	Military hardware	This support took the form of a donation of military hardware; The non-lethal military items included high-frequency (HF) radios, mine detectors, uniforms, winter jackets, raincoats, combat boots, and more.
Royal Gibraltar (RG) Regiment, British Army 2023	UK Funded	Training of trainers for GAF	The initiative aimed to develop the GAF's capabilities to support training of their own soldiers to undertake UN missions.
The German Police Support Team in The Gambia, 2018 -	Funded by the German Police	Bilateral development aid capacity-building project	The project is aimed at capacity building and professionalisation of the Gambia Police Force.

GIZ The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	GIZ Funded	Institutional strengthening and capacity building.	GIZ supports the Gambia Police Force to enhance its administrative and management skills in HR affairs; equipment and training measures to support the Gambian police develop and use a computerised HR database.
African Union 2023		Technical support	In 2023, the African Union supported the Gambia Government to establish a National SSR Coordination mechanism.
African Union Technical Support Mission to the Gambia 2019 - 2020		Technical support on defence and governance reforms.	Six senior army officers from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda were embedded in GAF, Ministry of Defence, and ONS. The team also comprised a Human Rights Expert who supported the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, and a Rule of Law Expert attached to the Ministry of Interior.
DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance - 2018		Security sector reforms	Assist the government launch, steer, and implement an effective and inclusive SSR process. The support is to ensure that security institutions in the Gambia are more



			effective at ensuring human security at the individual and community levels, with due regard to human rights standards, including gender equality.
Infrastructure for Peace Project. UNDP, UNESCO, ITC	PBF - US\$ 2.5 million	The government of The Gambia will be supported to create a peaceful environment (base) at national and community levels. This will be done by strengthening social cohesion, early warning, and conflict prevention through the establishment of the national infrastructure for peace to support the implementation of the post TRRC recommendations.	The Project's overarching goal is to strengthen inter and intra community relationships in The Gambia through strong coordination by the National Infrastructure for Peace (I4P), and through building the capacities of national peacebuilding and conflict prevention institutions.
The International Development Law Organisation 2023 -		Transitional Justice	The International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) through its Project " <i>Improving Access to Justice in The Gambia</i> ," will partner with local training institutions to develop and provide specialised training curricula for judges, magistrates, and prosecutors. IDLO will also work with civil society to help sensitize individuals in local communities to their rights and explain how

			<p>the judiciary can protect these rights. This new initiative will be primarily focused outside the greater Banjul area and include work with the lower magistrate courts operating in the rural divisions of West Coast (Brikama), North Bank (Kerewan, Farfenni), and Upper River (Basse Sante Su).</p>
Democracy International 2023 - 2025	US Department of State	Transitional Justice	<p>The Project will support the establishment and socialisation of a Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) and hybrid court. The initiative t aims to enhance capability and support for transitional justice that reflects the vision of the Government of The Gambia as defined in its Implementation Plan to ensure accountability of crimes, institute reparations, strengthen civil society, and build national capacity and expertise.</p>

The project will support the UN's political engagement in the country by:

1. Contributing to the implementation of the UN's new Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2024 -2028) with the government, specifically Outcome 2.1—By 2028, marginalized and vulnerable people in The Gambia, participate in functional, accountable and transparent institutions for the efficient delivery of public services and good governance—and Output 2.1.1—"Rights of people are protected by ongoing implementation of improved legal, regulatory and policy frameworks especially related to constitutional, security sector, transitional justice, anti-corruption and land reforms."

Implementing key recommendations of the joint UN-ECOWAS-AU SSR Technical Assessment Mission to the Gambia that took place from 12-15 July 2022, specifically the recommendation that the UN, ECOWAS, and the AU should re-engage in supporting the implementation of the SSR Strategy they helped to elaborate, including reactivating the SSR Steering Committee based on clear Terms of

Reference, capacity building of the SSR Steering Committee, the Office of National Security, National Assembly Members, the NHRC, CSOs, and academia. The implementation of the TAM recommendations has been slow but preliminary progress is notable, including discussions and development of this concept note for SSR; a new SSR strategy with budget; and strategic engagements with CSOs to deepen their involvement in the SSR process, including elaboration of CSOs strategy for implementation of SSR.

## **II. Project content, strategic justification and implementation strategy (4 pages max Plus Results Framework Annex)**

- a) A brief **description of the project** focus and approach – describe the project’s overarching goal, the implementation strategy, and how it addresses the conflict causes or factors outlined in Section I (must be gender- and age- responsive).

The project aims at strengthening the capacity of the Office of the National Security (ONS) to fulfil its coordination mandate on the security sector reform agenda; support the building of an inclusive and effective security sector through the development and review of key and strategic legislation, policies and strategies; reforming and building the capacity of the security sector institutions to engage with and implement SSR; the Project will also ensure increased awareness of the SSR processes and institutions among communities, working closely with national authorities and encouraging the use of empirical data to guide decision making, ownership and leadership. Monitoring and evaluation systems will be put in place and training in GEWE, human rights and other relevant courses conducted to ensure sustainability of the Project. Civilian oversight institutions will be strengthened with knowledge of SSR to enable them to participate effectively in the implementation of SSR, hold the duty bearers accountable and raise SSR awareness among the target communities. Civil-Security Sector Committees will be established to create space for engagements and rebuild trust and confidence in security sector by the citizens.

The project seeks to address the existing dysfunctions of the security institutions, weak policy and legal frameworks, disengaged oversight institutions and communities, while ensuring integration of human rights norms and standards. Specifically, the project will review Gambia Armed Forces Act and Gambia Prisons Act and their strategies as recommended by the SSR strategy. The strategy identifies the Acts as obsolete and in need of review to transform the security institutions, making them more effective, professional, apolitical, accountable, and responsive to security needs of the citizens in line with international best practices. Some of the amendments will focus on recruitment and career development to eventually address an over-bloated security sector due to the post-authoritarian legacy of non-adherence to procedures for recruitment and promotion. Regulating career progression of the military and prisons staff through capacity enhancement opportunities that are inclusive of the marginalized groups is important in creating a professional army and the GAF Act will be amended in this regard. Through stakeholders’ consultations supported by the project, other areas needing amendments will be identified to inform the review of the Acts and strategies. To strengthen the capacity of security institutions to effectively drive the SSR agenda, the project will support the development of a comprehensive training curriculum, accreditation of training courses and training manuals for all 8 security institutions to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law in line with TRRC Recommendations. The project will also support continuous professional development of personnel from GPF, GAF and GPS working on the SSR agenda on collaborative leadership and strategic planning skills. The targeted security personnel will be those in middle and senior leadership positions.

Human Rights Units in some security institutions do not exist and where they exist, their human rights capacity is weak. The project will assist in establishing or building the capacity of Human Rights Units in targeted security institutions. Each HRs unit will be composed of at least 4 security personnel, two female and two male, headed by an officer at the level of commissioner. The mandate of HR units will be to receive complaints about human rights abuses by security personnel and, as training of trainers, to regularly train officials and senior management on human rights best practices and monitor and evaluate, on a regular basis, the effectiveness of human rights training programmes gauge the level of understanding among personnel and identify areas that require additional focus or improvement.

There is limited mainstreaming of gender norms across the core functions of Security Sector and this remains problematic. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) remains rife in The Gambia and within the security sector system because of unequal power relations between men and women, mainly due to the patriarchal nature of society. The Project will therefore foster a sustainable culture of recruitment of women within the security sector system, create reporting mechanisms to address and respond to SGBV cases and support minor refurbishment of facilities for women to get fully integrated into the security sector. As per Activity 1.4.1, capacity support for preventing and addressing sexual harassment will be prioritized based on findings from thorough assessments. Building on this, our literature review suggests several potential support avenues. These include establishing confidential reporting mechanisms like hotlines or dedicated email addresses within each security institution, facilitating victim reporting without fear of retaliation. Additionally, organizing awareness training for security personnel to understand the impacts of sexual harassment and the necessity of prevention and response is crucial. Furthermore, developing monitoring and evaluation frameworks to gauge the effectiveness of interventions is essential. A carefully targeted SSR human rights compliant and gender-responsive consideration will be adopted using findings and recommendations of the assessment Report, the UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) Report of 2019 and the DCAF Report 2020.

The project will identify and support male gender champions in target security institutions who will actively contribute to promoting gender equality and enhancing the overall work environment. The champions will undergo training and supported to enhance their knowledge and skills in promoting gender equality. Training will focus on gender policy for security institutions and other legal frameworks; gender basic concepts of gender, gender identity, and gender roles; importance of gender equality and its benefits to institutions and society; how gender norms and stereotypes affect behavior and decision; advocacy, communication, and mediation skills, among others. By effectively advocating for gender equality, male gender champions in security institutions will help create a more inclusive, fair, and effective workplace, benefiting not only their female colleagues but the institution and society as a whole.

Promoting the inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities, and rural communities in security sector processes is crucial for ensuring diverse perspectives, equitable representation, and effective outcomes. To achieve this goal, the project will commission a study on the inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities in the SSR process. Once the study is complete, targeted recommendations inclusion of marginalized groups and rural communities in SSR will be implemented. By strategically implementing the recommendations, the security sector processes could become more inclusive, responsive, and representative of the diverse needs and perspectives of all members of society.

- b) Provide a **project-level ‘theory of change’** – explain the assumptions about why you expect the project interventions to lead to changes in the conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis. What are the assumptions that the theory is based on? Note, this is not a summary statement of your project’s outcomes.

*(Note: Change may happen through various and diverse approaches, i.e. social cohesion may be fostered through dialogue or employment opportunities or joint management of infrastructure. The selection of which approach should depend on context-specific factors. What basic assumptions about how change will occur have driven your choice of programming approach?)*

### Summary of the Theory of Change

**IF** there is political will at the leadership level, and there is timely and effective implementation of responsive SSR legal & policy framework and the security sector institutions show leadership and ownership in implementing reforms,

**IF** the capacity of the Office of National Security (ONS) and security institutions are reinforced to drive forward a nationally owned security sector reform agenda and the SSR Strategy by strengthening its strategic planning, coordination, guidance, and project management capabilities,

**IF** gender mainstreaming efforts and increased women's participation and representation are prioritised within security institutions,

**IF** civilian and institutional oversight mechanisms are strengthened and members of communities, including marginalised groups, have increased knowledge of SSR and are engaged to support the SSR process, and community trust level towards security sector is increased,

**THEN**, the security sector will institutionalize effective oversight and compliance mechanisms, ensuring adherence to rule of law, human rights where transparent and accountable security practice will be maintained; Gender-responsive service delivery and inclusivity within the security sector will be fostered by integrating gender perspectives into policies, operations, and decision-making processes; Fostering public trust and confidence, promoting dialogue, and incorporating community feedback improving social cohesion. The theory of change adopts adequacy of political will at the highest level, commitment, national ownership to effectively implement the SSR reform process.

#	Results	Assumptions
1	Development and repeal of legislations and policies to further strengthen the security sector reform agenda as recommended by the TRRC recommendation and SSR Strategy.	Enacted, repealed and enforcement of legal frameworks and policies will lead to successful implementation of security sector reform.
2	Enhanced transparency and accountability in the management of resources in the security sector by improving internal financial oversight, strengthening legislative provisions for effective audit oversight, establishing clear policies and procedures for the management of assets including asset registers, open procurement processes etc.	Improving internal financial mechanisms, oversight, strengthening and establishment of policies and procedures for the management of assets and open procurement processes will lead to transparency and accountability in the management of resources in the security

		sector.
3	<p>Training of security institutions on human rights, existing international reporting mechanisms such as UPR, human security to reduce cases of rights violations and enhance independence of security sector, Additionally, community engagements will increase the knowledge of SSR and promote collaboration between public and security sector. Furthermore, interventions related to monitoring human rights violations and cases reported and responded to will demonstrate security institutions follow the law, do not use excessive force and justice is applied if violations take place, Ultimately, these interventions will improve public trust towards the security sector.</p>	<p>Conducting training to enhance capacity of security personnel on human rights and existing international reporting mechanisms to ensure understanding of obligations to respect human rights, transparency, accountability and ultimately effectiveness in service delivery.</p> <p>Conducting community engagements to increase knowledge of SSR will lead to a better collaboration, improved public trust towards security sector institutions, and enhanced security in the communities.</p> <p>Monitoring human rights violations, reporting cases and justice being served will increase public trust towards security institutions.</p>
4	<p>Training of key security sector staff on collaborative leadership, project management, monitoring and evaluation, existing laws, and policies on SSR and proposed reform agenda in TRRC recommendations and draft constitution.</p>	<p>Enhanced leadership capacity, project management, monitoring and evaluation, existing laws and policies, etc, of security sector staff will impact positively on implementation of SSR and staff turnover ratio will remain low.</p>
5	<p>Gender responsiveness of security actors is reinforced by developing gender policy/strategy to increase women's participation in the security sector, particularly in decision-making positions.</p>	<p>Ownership and implementation of the gender policy/strategy by security sector institutions to attract and retain more women in the sector.</p>
6	<p>Enhance the capacity of the Gambian security sector institutions to prevent and respond to cases of sexual harassment within the security sector; and reporting and management of SGBV and sexual exploitation of women and girls to security forces by supporting effective gender sensitive and confidential reporting mechanisms, training, and sensitization campaigns</p>	<p>Capacity development to prevent, respond and report S/GBV cases will lead to efficient reporting and prevention of cases in security sector institutions.</p>
7	<p>Enhanced capacity of civilian oversight mechanisms and support their implementation of tailored SSR initiatives.</p>	<p>Improved capacity of civilian oversight institutions will increase their participation in SSR, scrutinize and hold the government to account for the implementation of the</p>

		SSR reform agenda.
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- c) **Provide a narrative description of key project components** (outcomes and outputs), ensuring sufficient attention to gender, age and other key differences that should influence the project approach. In describing the project elements, be sure to indicate important considerations related to sequencing of activities. Ensure that where relevant UN's [Community Engagement Guidelines](#) are adhered to.

The first outcome aims at supporting the development and strengthening of legal frameworks, policies, and strategies to accelerate implementation of SSR strategy and its targeted reforms, notably the passage of the National Security Council Bill, the Gambia Armed Forces Act, Gender Policy for Security Sector and the prison strategy. The second part of the outcome will enhance the capacity of security intuitions, specifically the coordination capacity of the Office of National Security (ONS) to strategically drive the reform agenda, effectively implement key reforms outlined in the five strategic areas of the SSR strategy and communicate the reform agenda to the public, support gender mainstreaming in security institutions and related interventions, in compliance with rule of law and human right principles in The Gambia. This will include increasing the capacity to coordinate SSR processes. The outcome will also foster partnership with civil society organizations in scaling up advocacy for passage of legislation and policies, including gender mainstreaming in the security sector, in addition to strengthening data and knowledge management for real-time and evidence-based decision making within the security sector.

The second outcome focuses on stronger compliance, accountability, and civilian oversight mechanisms on SSR implementation. The capacity of the National Assembly, the National Human Rights Commission and civil society organizations, including those representing marginalized groups and rural communities will be strengthened to oversee SSR processes effectively. Project stakeholders will undertake and build on existing initiatives to foster trust between the sector and communities in selected areas while baselines and research activities will be carried out at the beginning of the project to inform and shape interventions and results.

Drawing from principles of inclusivity, equality, and non-discrimination the Project will support activities to strengthen the implementation of gender and sexual harassment policies in GAF and GPF and engage with CSOs representing women, youth, and persons with disabilities and rural communities. Confidence and trust building work will be carried out to improve community and security sector relationships in selected regions outside the Greater Banjul Area including in selected rural communities. A participatory approach in tune with public views and values would improve responsiveness, build trust, and potentially enhance accountability. These considerations will influence the implementation of activities across the country throughout the Project's lifecycle.

Activities linked to on-going projects will be carried out to complement and not duplicate partner efforts. In this regard, the Project will regularly engage with development partners and entities working on the Project's thematic priorities to share information and streamline coordination efforts. The Development Partners Group (DPG) in The Gambia has a Governance thematic working group that meets regularly. Project activities, results, and emerging risks will be presented at these meetings at least quarterly. A key development partner, preferably a PBF donor supporting SSR interventions in the country, will be invited to join the Project Steering Committee (PSC), which will hold at least two meetings annually. This will promote collaboration and information sharing, and assess project impact and effectiveness collaboratively. Additionally, key development partners will be invited to attend

project-related events and participate in joint monitoring and evaluation missions to assess project impact and effectiveness collaboratively.

Human rights-based approach will be employed in the outcomes interventions, with a clear understanding that human rights and security are closely linked, and that human rights violations can be a cause of conflict, a result of conflict or an early warning of conflict.

Activities under the two outcomes will entail:

**Outcome 1: Strengthened security institutions to promote implementation of gender responsive Security Sector Reform, ensuring adherence to the rule of law and human rights in The Gambia.**

Summary of the Outcome:

This outcome is aligned to SSR strategy and TRRC recommendations. Using a human rights-based and gender responsive approaches, it envisions support to the government, security institutions and other relevant stakeholders to advocate for the review of SSR related legislations and institutional policies and strategies including the *National Security Council Bill*, *Gambia Armed Forces Act*, *prison Act*, *Ministries of Defense and Interior Strategies*, whilst supporting advocacy for the retention and enactment of progressive constitutional provisions related to SSR through dialogues, outreach activities with CSOs and stakeholders. A *Gender Policy* for security institutions will be developed together with its monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

The outcome will also strengthen the coordination capacity of ONS and enhance capacity of security institutions to drive the reform agenda through effective implementation of the SSR strategy, ensuring gender mainstreaming, effective communication, data, and knowledge management. The project will leverage on existing research and data, as well as conduct assessments where gaps exist, to understand the actual security needs of citizens, address the barriers inhibiting women's recruitment, retention and representation in decision making and leadership roles within the security sector and establish human rights violations level in the country using HRDDP risk assessment criteria. OHCHR will conduct the HRDDP assessment at the beginning of the project. Recommendations and findings from the research/assessments will be documented and shared with stakeholders for incorporation into policies, practices, and programming. A comprehensive national survey on the actual security needs of the citizens is a foundational element for effective Security Sector Reform. It will ensure that reforms are data-driven, context-specific, and responsive to the actual needs of the population, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness, legitimacy, and sustainability of the SSR project.

Through the UTG Graduate Scheme, graduates will be supported to gain knowledge and experience in SSR by being deployed to the relevant institutions and advance the SSR agenda at institutional and community levels. Support will be provided to Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and relevant security sector institutions to fulfil relevant international treaty reporting obligations pertaining to the Security Sector during the Project cycle. Some of the SSR related treaties will include the International Covenant on Civil and Rights (ICCPR), Convention Against Torture (CAT), International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED) and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

This outcome interventions are linked to Peacebuilding Fund strategic result framework for The Gambia (2024-2028): "Passage of key legislation emanating from TRRC recommendations that includes but not limited to National Security Bill and other SSR related key legislations;" "Inclusion



of gender-responsive provisions in all new legal frameworks related to the TRRC recommendations". This will be measured using the project *Outcome indicator 1.1.1a "Legislations, gender responsive security sector policies and strategies adopted"*.

**Output 1.1: Strengthened legal frameworks, policies, and strategies to effectively support the implementation of Security Sector Strategy in The Gambia**

**Activity 1.1.1:** Support the review of the Gambia Armed Forces Act, Prison Act and Strategies (Ministry of Defense & Ministry of Interior), and develop a Gender Policy for Security Sector to transform security sector into a more professional, accountable and responsive to security needs of the citizens in line with international best practices and human rights standards.

**Activity 1.1.2:** Conduct advocacy among the relevant institutions including the National Assembly, CSOs, IPC, Media, National Human Rights Commission and policy makers on passage of National Security Council Bill, draft constitution, and key legislations through lobbying, consultations, town hall meetings, and training sessions.

**Activity 1.1.3:** In collaboration with ONS, support the simplification, translation into local languages and dissemination of the SSR strategy and gender policy for security institutions.

**Activity 1.1.4:** Support outreach activities at national and grassroots levels to increase awareness of the SSR strategy and the gender policy for inclusive participation and ownership.

**Output 1.2: Enhanced Capacity of the Office of National Security and relevant state institutions to effectively coordinate implementation of the SSR Strategy.**

**Activity 1.2.1:** Equip ONS management centre as required to ensure functionality, including information and communication equipment to enhance intra and inter-agency communication and information sharing. (*This will involve procuring IT equipment and databases for the ONS as well as security communication devices for the 8 LEAs that are part of the coordination mechanisms*).

**Activity 1.2.2:** Assign a National UNV within the ONS to assist implementation of the communication strategy, build communication capacity of security institutions and coordinate outreach activities within the security sector and the communities.

**Activity 1.2.3:** Support the development and review of training curricula, accreditation of training courses, training manuals to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law in line with TRRC Recommendations

**Activity 1.2.4:** Support continuous professional development of personnel working on the SSR agenda in collaborative leadership and strategic planning skills.

**Activity 1.2.5:** Support Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and relevant security sector institutions to fulfil relevant international treaty reporting obligations pertaining to the Security Sector during the Project cycle.

**Activity 1.2.6:** Support security sector engagement with MOJ and the National Mechanism for Reporting and Follow-up on the implementation of concluding observations and recommendations from international treaty reporting obligations pertaining to SSR such as the International Covenant on Civil and Peoples Rights (ICCPR), Convention Against Torture (CAT), International Convention

on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICED) and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

**Activity 1.2.7:** Support graduates through the UTG Graduate Scheme to gain knowledge and experience in SSR to advance the SSR agenda at institutional and community levels. *(Young UTG graduates posted to Security Institutions will have the opportunity to participate effectively in the SSR processes and engage young people at national and grassroots levels on SSR)*

**Activity 1.2.8:** Develop and implement a Senior Managers course in the for all security sector institutions to improve capacity in public administration, planning and implementation and budget management.

**Activity 1.2.9:** Support ONS in undertaking dedicated advocacy with the security sector institutions to increase their own accountability and responsiveness in the monitoring of arrests and intimidation actions of their personnel.

### **Output 1.3: Strengthened data and knowledge management for real-time and evidence-based decision making within the security sector.**

**Activity 1.3.1:** In collaboration with ONS, conduct a comprehensive national survey on security needs and concerns to understand security challenges faced by the population and the perception of young Gambians on the security forces with the view to strengthen community-security engagements, ownership and data-driven interventions for sustainability.

**Activity 1.3.2:** Conduct in-depth assessment and evidence generation on barriers impeding recruitment, retention, and career advancement with particular attention to women in security institutions and disseminate to the national and local stakeholders.

**Activity 1.3.3:** Establish a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Framework at ONS to track progress in the implementation of the SSR Strategy and other legislations and policy instruments/ MEL to be linked to the integrated data and reporting dashboard. *“The dashboard is a component of the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) system. We have separated these components to recruit two specialized consultants: one with technical expertise in IT to develop the dashboard, and another with strong M&E expertise to develop MEL guidelines for the security sector. The MEL system will focus on strengthening monitoring and evaluation in the security sector, encompassing data collection, analysis, reporting, dissemination, and utilization. The dashboard will serve as a data visualization, monitoring, and dissemination tool. It will visualize various types of data collected by security institutions, including administrative data (e.g., assets, personnel, offices), crime data, and public feedback gathered through the MEL system.”*

**Activity 1.3.4:** Revamp the integrated security sector data/reporting dashboard at ONS. *(This is to collate real-time data and information within the security institutions and share with the public and stakeholders By following a systematic data management strategy and implementation methodology - to be determined in Terms of Reference of the consultant- which will outline the data sets to be collected, collection frequency, data storage and verification mechanisms, it enables stakeholders to make evidence-based decisions in the implementation of the SSR strategy).* *“The dashboard is a component of the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) system. We have separated these components to recruit two specialized consultants: one with technical expertise in IT to develop the dashboard, and another with strong M&E expertise to develop MEL guidelines for the security sector. The MEL system will focus on strengthening monitoring and evaluation in the security sector, encompassing data collection, analysis, reporting, dissemination, and utilization. The dashboard will serve as a data visualization, monitoring, and dissemination tool. It will visualize various types of data collected by security institutions, including administrative data (e.g., assets, personnel, offices), crime data, and public feedback gathered through the MEL system.”*

**Activity 1.3.5:** Support ONS’s and individual security institutions’ personnel (GAF, GPF, GPS, DLEAG) capacity on data and knowledge management and integrated system. *(This is to effectively coordinate, collate and report data at central level in real time for evidence-based decision making).*

**Activity 1.3.6:** Facilitate knowledge sharing and exchange of best practices for representatives of GPF, GPS, DLEAG and GAF human rights and gender units in the sub-region.

**Activity 1.3.7:** Conduct a Human Rights Due Diligence Risk Assessment of security forces included in the project to identify areas of risk and possible subsequent mitigation measures (*the HRDDP RA include analysis of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; accountability records; preventions mechanisms; existing legislations and frameworks, mitigation measures among others*).

**Output 1.4: Enhanced gender responsive security sector through increased women's participation and representation in decision making roles.**

**Activity 1.4.1:** Support the capacity of security institutions (GAF, GPF, GPS and DLEAG) to prevent and respond to cases of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse, in partnership with DCAF. (*The intervention will prioritize capacity building activities based on recommendations of the findings of in-depth assessment- Activity 1.3.2. The activity will also conduct survey to measure the change in women's satisfaction regarding strengthened technical capacity to prevent and respond to SGBV-related issues*). .).

**Activity 1.4.2:** In collaboration with ONS and DCAF, develop and support implementation of gender action plan for all security institutions to address challenges experienced by women in the security sector and promote women's meaningful participation in the peace and security agenda. (*The gender policy will be implemented through the action plan*).

**Activity 1.4.3:** Support national and regional peer-to-peer mentorship programmes within the security sector to increase women's participation in decision making and leadership positions. (*The mentorship programme will entail holding a networking conference (both in-person and online) that will lead to the establishment of regional and national mentorship networking platforms. The regional platform will bring together women in high ranks within the security sector from targeted regional country/es to regularly share experiences and best practices. The national platform will mentor women, especially new recruits and middle ranks, and discuss issues/challenges facing women in security on regular basis*).

**Activity 1.4.4:** Identify and train male gender champions (GAF; GPF; DLEAG; GPS) to promote women's participation in leadership and advocate for the elimination of all forms of GBV within the security sector.

**Activity 1.4.5:** Minor refurbishment of facilities within security sector institutions, using a phased approach and based on recommendations of in-depth assessment to meet the specific needs of women, ensuring their safety, dignity and comfort. (*This will include the minor renovation of existing washroom facilities; provision of materials/equipment for hygiene such as handwashing stations, toilet seats, sanitary bins, and bags to attract more women to join and stay in security institutions. The activity will also measure the proportion of female officers reporting satisfaction with the refurbished gender-responsive facilities*).

**Activity 1.4.6:** Develop and disseminate simplified pocketbooks on Gender, Sexual Harassment, and abuse to enhance knowledge, raise awareness, and provide practical guidance on fostering a respectful and gender-inclusive environment.

## **Outcome 2: Strengthened civilian oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency in the implementation of security sector reform.**

### Summary of the outcome:

This outcome will build capacities of key national stakeholders, specifically civilian bodies that provide oversight to the security sector and hold it accountable. These key institutions include the National Assembly, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), Office of Ombudsman, CSOs coalition on SSR, community-based structures, media and the Inter-Party Committee (IPC). Identified institutions will be supported to increase knowledge on SSR and human rights, implement tailored initiatives and generate research to inform the Project. To participate effectively in the SSR process, the CSOs coalition on SSR will be supported to develop a code of conduct/guideline that will lay down a set of standard and core values for CSOs engaged with SSR. The coalition will also be supported with capacity building to strengthen their understanding of SSR. To strengthen collaboration between CSOs and the government, a platform will be established to bring together the ONS and CSOs working on SSR. This platform will serve as a space to foster collaboration, enhance communication, and build partnerships. It will enable regular discussions and address emerging SSR issues through a unified approach.

Furthermore, community and security sector dialogue will be organized to strengthen trust and collaboration for increased reporting of security concerns and sustainable peacebuilding. Strengthened civilian-security collaboration will improve civilian and institutional oversight and accountability, and build relationships, trust, and confidence through initiatives such as advocacy, dialogue sessions, training on role of security institutions and existing SSR policies/legal frameworks.

.Learning best practices from the region on role played by parliaments in providing oversight over the security sector is vital in strengthening SSR. Selected National Assembly Members from 5 committees, the Speaker of the National Assembly and a representative from the National Youth Parliament will be supported to engage the Network of African Parliamentarians Members of Défense and Security Committees (REPAM- CDS) and get first-hand knowledge on how different parliaments in the regional countries contribute successfully to the implementation of SSR, challenges met and available opportunities. Parliamentarians play a critical role in overseeing the security sector to ensure accountability, transparency, and adherence to democratic principles. By participating in regional networks, they can exchange best practices, strategies, and information on effective oversight mechanisms, thus enhancing their capacity to fulfil this vital role. They will also be able to forge collaboration among parliamentarians from different regional countries facing similar security challenges and facilitate information sharing on emerging security threats, trends, and challenges. It is expected the 7 selected individuals, upon return, will transfer knowledge acquired to other members of the National Assembly.

This Outcome interventions are linked to Peacebuilding Fund strategic result framework for The Gambia (2024-2028); " Establishment and use of inclusive mechanisms enabling citizen monitoring of public action". This will be measured at project **Outcome Indicator 2b:** "*Percentage of population who express confidence in the security sector (disaggregated by gender and age)*".

### **Output 2.1 Capacity of the National Assembly to engage and support the SSR processes is enhanced**

**Activity 2.1.1:** Conduct a needs assessment of the role of the National Assembly in the SSR process during and after the Jammeh era. (*The assessment will inform the development of a handbook on the role of the National Assembly in SSR*).

**Activity 2.1.2:** Develop handbook on the role of National Assembly and the Office of the Clerk in SSR processes. *(The book will enable continuous referencing and awareness creation within the institution and sustain awareness of their role in SSR especially for all NAMs. This will also strengthen institutional memory at the Office of the Clerk. The handbook will draw on good practices on parliaments and SSR reforms in the sub-region).*

**Activity 2.1.3:** Organize training sessions for members of the National Assembly and office of the clerk on SSR, human rights and democratic governance *(The training, guided by the developed handbook will focus on the NA, Office of the Clerk, Standing Committees on Defence and Security, Finance & Public Accounts Committee, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Gender Committee, and National Youth Parliament. The intervention will enhance their engagement and ownership of the SSR, including supporting the SSR agenda and relevant legislative reform processes).*

**Activity 2.1. 4:** Support participation of National Assembly members from the relevant committees including the speaker of the National Assembly to participate in regional networks of parliamentarians with oversight of security sector. *(To visit the Network of African Parliamentarians Members of Défense and Security Committees (REPAM-CDS)). Participating NAMs will be from Standing Committees on Defence and Security, Finance & Public Accounts Committee, Standing Committee on Human Rights, Gender Committee, and National Youth Parliament)*

**Output 2.2: Capacity of the National Human Rights Commission to carry out its oversight functions, coordinate stakeholders and contribute to SSR enhanced.**

**Activity 2.2.1:** Build capacity of NHRC commissioners and staff on SSR to carry out their oversight function effectively in the SSR process. *(This will ensure NHRC Commissioners and staff will acquire the relevant skills, so the reform process is compliant with national and international human rights standards).*

**Activity 2.2.2:** Facilitate the NHRC's creation of a Civilian Coordination Platform. *(This will coordinate civilian oversight mechanisms to ensure all oversight institutions have a clear understanding of their role, identify specific areas of engagement during the course of the project, support quarterly engagement of all civilian oversight mechanisms to facilitate communication and coordinate monitoring of cases of harassment and/or arrest of civil society actors while undertaking their duties. The NHRC will coordinate this platform to facilitate collaborative initiatives among participating entities.)*

**Activity 2.2.3:** Support NHRC and ONS, in collaboration with research/academic institutions, commission a study on the inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities in the SSR process and disseminate findings. *(The study is to determine the current level of inclusion of the targeted groups, as well as to provide recommendations for the greater/enhanced inclusion of the targeted groups to advance a more inclusive and effective SSR process)*

**Activity 2.2.4:** Support the NHRC and ONS implement targeted activities to support the inclusion of marginalized groups and communities (women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities) in SSR based on the recommendations of the study.

**Activity 2.2.5:** Support the NHRC to collaborate with ONS to disseminate and advise law enforcement agencies to implement SSR recommendations from the UN Human Rights Council and relevant treaty bodies. *(The advice on recommendations to prioritize and implement would be based on recommendations issued by the Human Rights Council and treaty bodies after considering Universal Periodic Review report and state reports and after consideration of the Gambia's periodic reports).*

**Activity 2.2.6:** Support the NHRC build capacity of the National Assembly Members and security sector institutions based on recommendations issued by the UN Human Rights Council, UN, AU treaty bodies and special mechanism. *(The project will focus on GPS, GAF, GPF, DLEA and the relevant National Assembly committees to ensure they have acquired knowledge to implement the recommendations)*

**Activity 2.2.7:** Support NHRC's initiative to develop training manuals and strengthen the capacities of human rights units of GPF, GPS, DLEAG and the GAF.

**Output 2.3 Civil society and Office of the Ombudsman are capable to participate effectively and engage in meaningful oversight and accountability of the SSR process.**

**Activity 2.3.1:** Build the capacity of the Coalition of CSOs on SSR and other advocacy groups to actively participate in the oversight, communication, and implementation of SSR processes. *(This entails supporting CSOs to develop and implement, a code of conduct/guideline and innovative approaches to ensure inclusive participation of women, youth and PWDs at regional levels in the SSR processes and holding the duty bearers accountable.)*

**Activity 2.3.2:** Support the capacity of the Office of Ombudsman to investigate complaints of wrongdoings reported by the public and service members against security institutions. *(The training will ensure investigations takes a victim, gender and human rights centered approach to encourage the public as well as service members to report complaints)*

**Activity 2.3.3:** Support the Office of Ombudsman develop a communication strategy and revamp online reporting platforms (website, social media platforms and corporate email addresses) to improve engagements with citizens and enhance reporting and address wrongdoings committed by security personnel.

**Activity 2.3.4:** In collaboration with the ONS and GPU, develop a training manual to train media outlets across the country on professional coverage of SSR issues, and embed the training manual at curriculum of UTG school of journalism.

**Activity 2.3.5:** Build the capacity of Inter Party Committee (IPC) on SSR, support outreach activities to raise awareness on SSR strategy and gender policy among its regional branches and promote participation in national platforms on SSR as envisaged by the SSR strategy.

**Activity 2.3.6:** In collaboration with the Office for National Security (ONS), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), conduct nationwide outreach activities using media outlets to raise awareness about Security sector reform strategy and gender policy.

**Activity 2.3.7:** Activity 2.3.7: Support the establishment of CSOs and security sector platform<sup>44</sup> to promote collaborative engagements and dialogue on emerging issues in the implementation of SSR.

**Output 2.4: Strengthened Civil-Security relations to improve trust and confidence in the Security sector.**

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<sup>44</sup> This is a non-online platform that will constitute the ONS and CSOs working on SSR in The Gambia. It will be coordinated by ONS as a space to strengthen collaboration between CSOs and the government and serve as a space to foster collaboration, enhance communication, and build partnerships. It will enable regular discussions and address emerging SSR issues through a unified approach.

**Activity 2.4.1:** Establish Civil-Security Committees to be piloted in three regions (Greater Banjul, URR and LRR) to build trust and confidence between civilians and security institutions. *(The committees will achieve this through social activities such as sports (e.g. football matches), dialogue sessions, etc. The composition of the committees will include regional Governor, Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), Village Development Committee (VDCs), Ward Development Committee (WDCs), Women, Youth and Persons with Disability Groups; Local Government and Security Institutions with oversight functions by ONS).*

**Activity 2.4.2:** Support capacity building of community radio personnel on SSR to effectively communicate and facilitate awareness sessions at community levels using community radio. *(The capacity will include building their knowledge on the SSR strategy, RF-NDP SSR components, legislations, policies, and processes involved targeting a wider audience)*

**Activity 2.4.3:** Raise awareness using community radio stations to reach a wider audience on the SSR processes. *(The approach will be to bring security personnel and community members together to have joint engagement panel on SSR. During the sessions, the public will be allowed to engage through call-in to the station during discussions)*

**Activity 2.4.4:** Build the capacity of Community Based structures on SSR to lead dialogue and communication between community members and the security actors. *(The capacity will include building their knowledge on the SSR strategy, RF-NDP SSR components, legislations, policies as well as their communication and facilitation skills. The target beneficiaries will be the Village development Committees, The Gambia Federation of the Disabled, religious leaders, Women, and youth groups)*

**Activity 2.4.5:** Raise public awareness on mechanisms of reporting complaints by civilians and security personnel. *(These mechanisms include the Office of Ombudsman, CSOs platform, the existing toll-free lines to promote accountability thereby influencing trust and confident of the public. The awareness strategy will include town hall meetings, Bantaba engagements and community radios)*

**Use Annex C to list all outcomes, outputs, and indicators.**

- d) **Project targeting** – provide a justification for geographic zones, criteria for beneficiary selection, expected number and type of stakeholders/beneficiaries (must be disaggregated by sex and age). Indicate whether stakeholders have been consulted in the design of this proposal. Do not repeat all outputs and activities from the Results Framework.

The geographical scope will be Nationwide, with special focus on areas experiencing tensions between civilians and security institutions.

The main key stakeholders will include the Government, specifically the Office of National Security; Ministry of Public Service; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare; National Assembly and its relevant committees ( Standing Committees Defence and Security; Human Rights and Constitutional Matters; Select committees on Gender, Children and Social Welfare) and the office of the clerk; National Youth Council and the National Council for Civic Education (NCCE). These stakeholders will be supported with the aim to effectively implement the SSR strategy, including capacity to support strengthening security sector related legislations and policies and engage different stakeholders on SSR. Specifically, the project

will work with ONS in collaboration with the MoGCSW to develop Gender policy for security institutions and review of GAF and GPF Acts. ONS will also be supported in simplification, translation into local languages and dissemination of SSR legislations, policies and strategies, accompanied by outreach activities to create awareness and ownership by communities.

All 58 members of the National Assembly will be engaged to support passage of legislations such as the National Security Council Bill in addition to supporting constitutional making process through constitutional dialogue and review sessions, outreach activities with CSOs and stakeholders to ensure civic engagements including during the referendum process. All engagements with the National Assembly on the SSR provisions will be done in consultation and close engagement with International IDEA which has led and supported the constitutional review efforts, in support of the government, and with UNDP which is partnering with IDEA on the public sensitisation efforts ahead of the referendum. The draft constitution contains progressive provisions related to SSR and engagement with the National Assembly will be limited to these provisions. Sustaining SSR capacity at the National Assembly is important due to high turnover of the National Assembly Members after every election, and that is why the project will include the office of the clerk in all capacity building interventions targeting the National Assembly. Given the important role of the youth in implementation of SSR, the National Youth Council will be engaged and supported to mainstream Youth issues in SSR while the NCCE will be supported to carry out outreach interventions targeting the communities across the country.

Four Security Sector Institutions will be supported with different capacities to undertake reforms in conformity with SSR strategy and will include the Gambia Armed Forces, Gambia Police Force, Drug Law Enforcement Agency Gambia (DLEAG). However, some reforms such as the Gender policy will be overarching and will therefore target all security institutions. Human Rights Units in target security institutions (GAF, GPF, GPS and DLEAG) will be strengthened with human rights capacity through specialized training to enhance skills, knowledge, and understanding of human rights principles, laws, and best practices among the personnel of these units. The mandate of HR units will be to receive and respond to complaints about human rights abuses by security personnel and, as training of trainers, to regularly train officials and senior management on human rights best practices and monitor and evaluate, on a regular basis, the effectiveness of human rights training programmes gauge the level of understanding among personnel and identify areas that require additional focus or improvement. Response to human rights violations will be complemented by the National Human Rights Commission and other relevant stakeholders at national and local levels.

The project aims to secure full buy-in from the main security institutions by actively involving their leadership and key technical staff immediately after project approval. This includes engaging in open discussions to understand their perspectives, concerns, and suggestions, and maintaining clear communication throughout the planning and implementation stages. Emphasizing their value in collaborating in monitoring progress and addressing any resistance that may arise to ensure that the security institutions take ownership of the SSR implementation and commit to its sustainability beyond the project's duration.

Independent Commissions will include the National Human Rights Commission and Office of Ombudsman, to play coordination and oversight roles in implementation of SSR. The office of Ombudsman will be supported to develop an integrated mechanism to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, while NHRC staff will be trained on SSR to enable the institution to implement its



mandate of human rights capacity building and coordinating monitoring of abuses within the security sector.

Academic Institutions will play a critical role in data production and management, undertaking research and assessments and supporting fellowship programmes to enhance SSR awareness among the youth/students. These will include University of The Gambia, The Gambia College, Management Development Institute. Specifically, the project will support UTG to conduct an in-depth research study and evidence generation on barriers impeding recruitment, retention and career advancement of women into the security forces, including recommendations for action, to be disseminated to the national and local stakeholders.

Civil Society Organisations will be key in providing oversight to promote accountability and transparency in SSR, hold the duty bearers accountable for the implementation of SSR strategy and support in raising awareness among the communities. The project will support the CSO Coalition on SSR to build its capacity on SSR and participate effectively in SSR oversight mechanisms. The project will work with the media through Gambia Press Union (GPU) to ensure professional coverage of SSR issues at national and local levels while IPC capacity on SSR will be enhanced and outreach activities among its regional branches supported. The participation of IPC in national platforms on SSR as envisaged by the SSR strategy. The following CSOs partners will also be considered for the project implementation across different outcomes and outputs. ActionAid International, Activista, Centre for Research & Policy Development, Fact Check Centre, National Youth Parliament, Peace Ambassadors, Peace Hub - The Gambia, Gender Platform; Solo Sandeng Foundation, Women's Association for Victim's Empowerment (WAVE), Yakarr Justice, Beakanyang, Gamworks, the Inter Party Committee (IPC), the Gambia Press Union, The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO).

Marginalized groups will be engaged during the entire project phase to promote inclusivity in the implementation of SSR. This will encourage more ownership and accountability in the implementation of SSRs. Targeted Women and Youth led groups/organizations at the community level will be central to project interventions, ensuring their knowledge on SSR is enhanced, while their participation in Civil-Security Committees will be guaranteed to enhance SSR knowledge and improve relations with security institutions at the community level. These groups will be selected based on their mandate and proven interventions in governance work at the community level at least 60% of them will be women and youth led organizations. The Gambia Federation for the Disabled (GFD) will be continuously engaged to bring on board PWDs as strategic stakeholders in the implementation of SSR. The proposed Civil-Security Committees will be inclusive, with participation of diverse community groups, an approach that will further strength inclusivity, accountability and improve relations and trust between the duty bearers and rights holders

The targeted communities within the regions will be selected consultatively with key stakeholders including the government based on prioritization of needs and relevance to the project, while all the activities directly related to awareness of gender issues in SSR will be discussed with the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, ONS and the local governance structures within the community, while ensuring that the marginalized groups should constitute at least 40% of direct beneficiaries of the project who will include women, youth and PWDs. Conflict sensitive and human rights principles will underpin the above selection criteria.

Gender responsive capacity building interventions, with partners disaggregated by gender and age, will be conducted using conflict sensitive and human rights compliant approaches under different project outputs as follows:

- ✓ 7 outreach activities will be conducted at national and grassroots levels, targeting the general population, to increase awareness of the SSR strategy and the gender policy. The grassroots outreach will foster community engagement and ownership of SSR initiatives. When communities are involved in discussions about security sector reform and gender policies, they are more likely to understand the importance of these initiatives and actively participate in their implementation, leading to a sense of ownership, empowering communities to hold authorities accountable for the effective implementation of SSR strategies and gender policies. Additionally, outreach activities will help build trust and confidence between security institutions and the general population. This trust is essential for fostering cooperation between security institutions and the communities they serve, leading to more effective security sector reform. The outreach activities will also serve as a feedback mechanism, allowing duty bearers to gather input from the general population on SSR strategies and gender policies. By actively involving the general population in discussions, these outreach efforts will contribute to a more inclusive and effective security sector reform initiatives.

In selecting participants, the project will apply specific conflict sensitive mechanisms such as prioritizing marginalized groups/communities, community leaders, women and youth led community organizations, local CSOs, influencers, Persons with Disabilities (PwDs), among others. In all engagements with communities, the project will mainstream conflict sensitive and human rights principles.

- ✓ Support will be provided for continuous professional development of 50 middle and senior level security personnel working on the SSR agenda: women will be prioritized, human rights violators will be excluded, particularly those adversely mentioned in the TRRC reports and other ad hoc investigations. The security landscape is dynamic, with new threats emerging regularly. Continuous professional development ensures that security personnel stay abreast of these changes, enabling them to adapt strategies and tactics accordingly. Collaborative leadership and strategic planning skills allow security personnel to anticipate and respond effectively to evolving security challenges, foster teamwork, communication, and coordination among diverse stakeholders involved in SSR efforts in addition to promoting a culture of accountability and transparency within security institutions. By enhancing their capabilities, accountability, and responsiveness, the training will contribute to the transformation of the security institutions into a more professional, accountable, and effective institutions that serve the needs of the public and promote national stability. The training will mainstream conflict-sensitive and human rights principles.
- ✓ Support at least 12 graduates through the UTG graduate scheme to gain knowledge and experience in SSR and advance the SSR agenda at institutional and community levels. Graduates selected for the UTG scheme will be provided with opportunities to gain practical knowledge and experience in SSR. This hands-on experience is invaluable for understanding the complexities of security sector governance, including its policies, procedures, and challenges. By placing graduates in various security institutions, the scheme actively contributes to advancing the SSR agenda. The graduates bring fresh perspectives, innovative ideas, and a commitment to reforming security structures to ensure they are efficient, accountable, and responsive to the needs of the community. Involving youth in SSR initiatives enhances their understanding of the importance of security sector governance in promoting peace, stability, and development. As they gain firsthand experience, they become more knowledgeable advocates for SSR, thereby fostering greater trust between security institutions

and the communities they serve. The project will collaborate with UTG in selecting the graduates, ensuring proactive application of conflict sensitive principles, prioritizing young women, persons with disability (PWDs) and those from disadvantaged communities.

- ✓ Facilitate knowledge sharing and exchange within the sub-region, of best practices for at least 500 participants from GPF, GPS, DLEAG and GAF.. This approach will have several advantages, including bringing together representatives from different organizations to foster better coordination and collaboration in addressing human rights and gender issues. Knowledge sharing workshops and exchanges will provide opportunities for participants to learn from each other's experiences and expertise. This will promote adoption of best practices across the region and lead to more effective implementation of programmes and policies. The regional knowledge sharing events will also provide valuable networking opportunities for the selected participants with counterparts from other security institutions that could lead to future collaborations on joint projects, resource and information sharing, and advocacy efforts in the security sector. The project will ensure the application of similar conflict sensitive and human rights principles in selecting the targeted participants, including prioritizing women, PWDs, excluding adversely mentioned human rights violators.
- ✓ Identify and train at least 12 male gender champions from GAF, GPF, DLEAG and GPS to promote women's participation in leadership and advocate for the elimination of all forms of GBV within the security sector. Male gender champions, often occupying influential positions within security institutions, have the power to shape organizational culture and policies. By training them to promote women's participation in leadership, they can actively advocate for the recruitment, retention, and advancement of women within the sector, challenge existing gender stereotypes by advocating for the recognition of women's capabilities and competencies in all areas of security, including leadership roles. By promoting gender equality in security sector, male gender champions will ensure that gender considerations are integrated into decision-making processes at all levels. In line with conflict sensitive and human rights principles, the male gender champions will be selected using the criteria of volunteerism, active promotion of gender equality and women's rights, implementation of gender-sensitive policies or practices, participation in gender training or advocacy events, demonstrated support for female colleagues and with no history of violence especially against women. Importantly, conversations with women in the target security institutions will be held to assist in identification of the champions (peer nominations) and get feedback on the men who will self-nominate. Interviews will be conducted with the nominees to assess their understanding of gender issues and their vision for promoting gender equality within the institutions.
- ✓ Organize training sessions for 62 members of the National Assembly and office of the clerk on SSR, human rights and democratic governance. Many members of the National Assembly and staff may not have a deep understanding of SSR, human rights principles, and democratic governance. Training sessions provide an opportunity to enhance their understanding of these concepts, including their importance, principles, and implications for governance. The training will help build their capacity to effectively engage with issues related to SSR, human rights, and democratic governance. This includes developing skills in legislation drafting, oversight, and implementation of policies and practices that uphold human rights and democratic principles within the security sector. Importantly, the training sessions will enable NAMs and staff to understand their roles in holding security institutions accountable to the rule of law, human rights standards, and democratic principles.

- ✓ Build capacity of 5 NHRC commissioners and 40 staff on SSR to carry out their oversight function effectively in the SSR process. NHRC members and staff need a comprehensive understanding of SSR concepts, principles, and processes. This includes knowledge about the security sector's role, structure, and functions, as well as understanding the linkages between security, human rights, and governance. This understanding enables them to effectively analyze and assess the impact of security sector policies and practices on human rights. Capacity-building equips NHRC members and staff with the necessary skills to conduct effective oversight of security sector institutions and activities. They can monitor compliance with human rights standards, identify gaps or violations, and make recommendations for reforms to ensure that security institutions operate in accordance with international human rights norms and principles. By strengthening their capacity, NHRC members and staff are better positioned to hold security sector institutions accountable for their actions

### III. Project management and coordination (4 pages max)

- a) **Recipient organizations and implementing partners** – list all direct recipient organizations and their implementing partners (international and local), specifying the Convening Organization, which will coordinate the project, and providing a brief justification for the choices, based on mandate, experience, local knowledge and existing capacity.

Agency	Total budget in previous calendar year	Key sources of budget (which donors etc.)	Location of in-country offices	No. of existing staff, of which in project zones	Highlight any existing expert staff of relevance to project
Convening Organization: UNDP	12M	PBF UNDP Core Resources Government of The Gambia GEF	UN House, Cape Point, Banjul	58	Gender Specialist; Programme specialist/ Head of Governance
Implementing partners: Office of National Security, Ministry of Gender; Ministry of Public Service, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, National Assembly; UTG; NHRC; NCCE; Coalition of CSOs on SSR; Centre for Research & Policy Development; Action Aid					

<p>Recipient Organization: UNDOC</p> <p>Implementing partners: Office of National Security, Ministry of Gender; Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, National Assembly; NHRC; Coalition of CSOs on SSR; Centre for Research &amp; Policy Development; TANGO; Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and Technology, Ministry of Youth and Sports.</p>	\$1.2M	Italy EU Netherlands Germany	UN Project Office, The Gambia	5 in the Programme office and a pool of experts from the regional office based in Dakar, Senegal	Senior Law enforcement Advisor; Programme Coordinator; Program Officer; Program Specialist; Gender specialist
<p>Recipient Organization: OHCHR</p> <p>Implementing partners: Office of the National Security, Ministry of Gender, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice, National Assembly, UTG, National Human Rights Commission, National Youth Council, CSO SSR Coalition, TANGO, Gambia Federation of the Disabled, CRPD,</p>	\$ 1M		OHCHR Projects Office, The Gambia	5 in Banjul including thematic experts in the Dakar regional office.	Senior Human Rights Adviser, Human Rights Officer, National Human Rights Officers.

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- b) **Project management and coordination** – Indicate the project implementation team, including positions and roles and explanation of which positions are to be funded by the project (to which percentage). Explicitly indicate how the project implementation team will ensure sufficient gender or youth expertise. Explain project coordination and oversight arrangements and ensure link with PBF Secretariat if it exists. Fill out project implementation readiness checklist in **Annex A.1** and attach key staff TORs.

The project will set up a steering committee, which comprises Heads of Agencies from the three implementing agencies, PBF Secretariat, representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior Office of the National Security, Ministry of Justice, representatives from civil society organizations and the National Human Rights Commission. This steering committee members will meet at least twice a year to review project implementation, progress, and provide strategic direction for the implementation of the project. The project steering committee will work closely with other national technical experts in the country during the project implementation and monitoring processes. This committee will also review project outcome, progress, and make decisions on any significant deviations as well as approval of annual work plans. A project technical committee will be set up comprising project team members from the three UN Agencies and implementing partners to meet at least once every quarter to collectively discuss and review status of project implementation, identify and address emerging needs and challenges, undertake joint monitoring/field visits and report to the steering committee as required. Project staff from the three agencies will have an indirect reporting line to the overall project manager of the lead agency, in this case UNDP, and meet at least once a month to ensure implementation of project activities are in a coordinated and complementary approach, discuss progress, challenges and corrective actions as needs arises.

The project will have the full complement of staff across the three agencies that will ensure quality programme implementation, monitoring, visibility, and reporting. The personnel on the project will provide specific skills in ensuring quality implementation irrespective of the agencies contributing the staff. The budget contribution to the staff will be within the 20% allocated to human resources from the total budget across the various agencies. The Project team will work closely with the PBF Secretariat, sister UN agencies and national technical experts to ensure that the project remains on track in line with planned results. The Project team will ensure there is collaboration at all times in implementation of project activities to eliminate potential duplication and maximize impact.

Programme Specialists from the 3 respective agencies will work closely together to ensure smooth and effective implementation of project activities and quality assurance. To ensure that gender is adequately mainstreamed at all levels of project implementation, gender specialists from all 3 agencies will form part of the Project management team. In case of potential delay in recruitment of project staff, core programme specialists from three agencies will initiate implementation of project activities in interim. UNDP, the lead agency for the SSR project, will utilize 20% of its total budget to recruit three staff at a cost of 100%. The Project Manager will be recruited utilizing NOC/NPSA modality, level 11 and will be responsible for the overall project management, monitoring, and reporting. He/She will have the overall responsibility to engage stakeholders and facilitate partnerships with other on-going programmes of complementary nature. This staff will

be embedded within the UNDP programme staff to ensure full concentration on project activities in liaison with relevant staff of partner organizations.

The national Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst, under NPSA modality level 9, will be recruited to support development and implementation of M&E plans, provide technical advice to the project manager and other project staff on M&E, lead the monitoring and evaluation of project activities, monitor outcomes and indicators, among others. A Project Associate, under NPSA modality level 6, will be recruited to provide administrative/operational and financial support, including procurement, human resource functions, audit requirements, among other functions.

UNDP Governance Programme Specialist (now recruited), who is the programme lead at technical level, will be responsible for Project Quality Assurance to ensure the project is implemented as per agreed programme documents and deviations are reported to the steering committee and approval sought with PBSO. He/She will provide independent project oversight and monitoring functions as well as facilitate Project Support for project administration, management and technical support to the Project Manager as required by the needs of the project. The UNDP Gender Specialist will provide support at all stages of project implementation to ensure gender issues are well mainstreamed and participate in the project technical committee meetings and joint monitoring field visits. The UNDP gender specialist will support interventions by all three agencies. However, OHCHR and UNODC will tap into their gender experts at the Country and regional level for support when needed.

UNODC Programme Coordinator – P3 (30%) (already recruited) will be responsible for the overall management and implementation of the UNODC component of the project, working closely with the UN sister agencies. UNODC will proceed with the recruitment of a program officer NOA (100%) and a driver (50%) SB2. The Programme Office will provide its vehicle for a smooth implementation of the project activities nationwide.

OHCHR will bring strategic expertise and provide guidance on substantive SSR issues, human rights including gender expertise, and international law to enable the Government and key stakeholders implement effective and long-lasting reforms. OHCHR's work will be overseen by staff in the Gambia, with experts from the regional offices and headquarters contributing when there is a need. OHCHR will recruit a National Project Officer NOB (100% cost) and a National Human Rights Officer NOA (100% cost) who would also double as the technical lead. Both would work closely with implementing agencies and partners to implement impactful interventions.

Programme Specialists from the 3 respective agencies will work closely together to ensure smooth and effective implementation of project activities and quality assurance. To ensure that gender is adequately mainstreamed at all levels of project implementation, gender specialists from all 3 agencies will form part of the Project management team. In case of potential delay in recruitment of project staff, core programme specialists from three agencies will initiate implementation of project activities in interim.

- c) **Risk management** – Identify project-specific risks and how they will be managed, including the approach to updating risks and making project adjustments. Include a Do No Harm approach and risk mitigation strategy.

The overall risk level for the project is assessed as high . Key concerns include lack of political will, disillusionment among citizens due to slow progress in Security Sector Reform (SSR) implementation, lack of transparency and accountability within the security sector, security risks faced by women and stakeholders supporting Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE), and potential delays in passage and enforcement of SSR-related legislation, as well as the Constitution by the National Assembly and Government, respectfully. These risks, if not effectively mitigated in a timely manner, pose significant threats to project implementation and its overarching objective of establishing robust, accountable, and effective security institutions that safeguard the rights and aspirations of the Gambian people.

1. Managing these risks necessitates a comprehensive approach that integrates proactive and innovative measures, strategic planning, and continuous monitoring. The project's technical team will collaborate with various partners to ensure timely communication of emerging issues and threats, facilitate meaningful consultations with all stakeholders, and closely monitor the implementation of project activities to identify risks promptly and take appropriate remedial actions. In addition, considering the shrinking civic space in The Gambia, there will be a joint RCO-DPPA review of progress/challenges ahead of second and third tranche disbursements, to assess the situation before considering each subsequent transfer request.

Risks to the achievement of desired Outcomes	Likelihood of occurrence (high, medium, low)	Severity of impact (high, medium, low)	Mitigating strategy (and agency (UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC)/person/Unit responsible)
Reputational Risk – Gambian security personnel might commit serious/gross human rights abuses that cause reputational damage to UN by association	High	High	Conduct human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP) assessment at start of project implementation to establish HR human rights violations level based on HRDDP risk assessment criteria such as analysis of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; accountability records; preventions mechanisms; existing legislations and frameworks, among others. <sup>45</sup> This will involve the target security institutions supported by the project (GAF; GPF; GPS; DLEAG). The targeted security personnel will be disaggregated by gender

<sup>45</sup> Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) Guidance Note - P.18:  
<https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/Inter-Agency-HRDDP-Guidance-Note-2015.pdf>



			<p>Support establishment of mechanisms to hold security personnel accountable for wrongdoings including the NHRC led coordination mechanisms for civilian oversight institutions and CSOs coalition on SSR.</p> <p>Use gender-responsive approach to raise awareness to the public by explaining objectives of SSR project and the role of UN.</p> <p>Project team to maintain up to date communication / briefing material for immediate response by all stakeholders.</p> <p>Rapid Response Team consisting of the UN project team, UN human rights advisor in RCO and Heads of the three UN implementing agencies to be established and tasked to respond immediately to any reported allegations of violations. The team will notify the Project Steering Committee, relevant government authorities, PBSO, international partners, and other stakeholders about the allegations of violations. Prompt notification will ensure that all key stakeholders are aware of the situation and can participate in guiding the discussions and decisions on the appropriate next steps. By maintaining open and timely communication, the team will facilitate a unified and effective response, thereby reinforcing the commitment to uphold human rights standards and mitigate any adverse impacts on the SSR project.</p> <p>Immediate Investigation, Documentation, and Suspensions. The Office of National Security (ONS), led by the National Security Advisor and in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), will undertake a series of critical actions to address any allegations of human rights violations promptly and effectively. This will entail:</p>
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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Engagement with the relevant security institutions to obtain comprehensive details regarding the alleged human rights violations committed by their personnel. This step ensures that accurate and thorough information is gathered from the onset.</li> <li>- Immediate suspension of security personnel implicated in the alleged violations pending the outcome of the investigation to prevent interference with the investigation and to act as a deterrent to potential violators.</li> <li>- Issue public statements to inform the public about the incidents and the measures being taken, ensuring clear and transparent communication to prevent misinformation and maintain public trust in the accountability processes.</li> <li>- Conduct a thorough and impartial investigation, gathering of evidence and testimonies from witnesses.</li> <li>- Based on the preliminary findings from the investigation, implement immediate corrective actions such as revising protocols, conducting additional human rights training for security personnel, and increasing oversight of security sector operations. These steps aim to address the root causes of the violations and prevent their recurrence.</li> </ul> <p>Regular Monitoring and Reporting. Strengthen collaboration between CSOs and the NHRC to continuously monitor violations and intimidations against civil society organizations, to ensure alleged violations are promptly responded to through media engagements, reports, UPR mechanisms and ensure alleged violations are promptly addressed based on investigation recommendations.</p>
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			<p>Provide support to the victims. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), in collaboration with the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Welfare and local NGOs will be supported by the project to ensure that victims receive appropriate support, including medical care, psychosocial counseling, and legal aid as well as provide protection to the victims and witnesses.</p>
Reputational Risk – Public become disillusioned with perceived lack of progress in SSR process	High	High	<p>Successful communications approach with regular updates to the public and engagement with CSOs and media, including the regular communication of progress made in implementation of SSR through success stories.</p> <p>Government to prioritize implementation of TRRC Recommendations on SSR and mobilize support from different partners.</p>
Delivery Risk – Lack of GOTG political leadership and will mean the SSR project initiatives fail to progress	Medium	Medium	<p>ONS and relevant Security Sector management will be members of the Project Steering Committee that will be composed of at least 30% female.</p> <p>Ensure RCO / DPG/UNDP RR/, UNODC and OHCHR Heads of Offices are kept up to date and emphasize the importance of the process with GOTG (see: ‘maintain up to date briefing material’ above)</p> <p>Close monitoring of results and risk, reporting semi-annually and annually by the project team to PSC and DPPA/PBSO+WAD for timely decision making and remedial measures.</p> <p>Identify clear trigger point(s) to swivel the project and share with GOTG, RC, Heads of Agencies and PSC.</p> <p>Ensure project is able to adapt, re-directing activities away from specific/collectively GOTG partners with the approval of Project Steering Committee and PBSO.</p>

Delivery Risk – National partners are unable to deliver on activities, delaying progress, funds not spent.	High	High	<p>Gender responsive capacity building of partners forms a significant component of the project.</p> <p>Early work on M&amp;E by the project team to provide data and common framework of reference for tracking progress, with clear gender targets.</p> <p>UN agencies to develop a clear workplan for national partners with sequential steps and cut-off points.</p> <p>Routine meetings between project management team and ONS to review project implementation against planned results.</p> <p>Project staff to ensure the project is able to adapt to re-direct funds in case of poor delivery through the approval of PSC and PBSO.</p>
Delivery Risk - Oversight / accountability have little effect on security institution activities due to limited capacity and/or security institution resistance	High	Low	<p>Gender responsive capacity building of oversight institutions (NHRC; National Assembly; Office of Ombudsman; CSOs' Media; IPC, etc) to effectively execute their mandate.</p> <p>Develop clear gender sensitive indicators for improved oversight &amp; accountability (eg provision of reports, financial information by security institutions; recommendations of Janneh Commission etc.)</p>
Operational Risk - Delays in procurement related activities e.g., recruitment, outsourcing, contracting cause delay to delivery	High	High	<p>Recruitment, budget set-up to be prioritized at early stage of Project by project staff. The TORs of each position, across the agencies, finalized and published within 1 month after receiving the first tranche. The draft TORs and draft Recruitment Strategies, across the agencies and positions have been submitted to PBSOs.</p> <p>Project staff to clearly define and establish procurement procedures ahead of time to expedite processes, access rosters, employ rapid deployment facilities/rosters where applicable.</p>

			Regular updates to the Project Steering Committee by project staff on emerging issues of concern needing immediate attention and solution.
Operational Risk – Poor co-ordination between UN Agencies undermines cohesive approach	High	Low	<p>Project staff to develop and share workplans, establish regular meetings of project team (at least once every month) with risk assessment (delivery / operational risks) included as standing agenda.</p> <p>Project staff to ensure timely planning of activities to prevent delays by one agency cascading across the project.</p>
Delays in the design / adoption / revision of legislations in a hung National Assembly.	High	High	<p>Continued dialogue by UN heads of agencies with the National Assembly to advocate for the passage of bills/amendments.</p> <p>Support the Inter-party Committee (IPC) in strengthening dialogue among political party leaders through quarterly breakfast meetings. Additionally, assist the IPC in engaging lawmakers to facilitate the passage of key bills.</p> <p>Enhance the capacity of CSOs to advocate effectively for gender-responsive legislation in the National Assembly. This includes supporting CSOs in their efforts to design, revise, and promote the adoption of laws that address gender equality and women's rights.</p>

Security risks for stakeholders involved in the oversight and accountability activities, including vulnerable groups such as CSOs and women	Medium	Medium	<p>The project in collaboration with security sector to set up early warning mechanisms as a mitigating measure.</p> <p>Project staff to undertake regular risk assessments, facilitate awareness programs and training of partners staff on reprisal risks.</p> <p>Development of robust compliance monitoring mechanisms and maintaining open communication channels among stakeholders.</p> <p>Implementing partners to foster a culture of security awareness, and staying informed about emerging threats, including best practices essential for effectively managing security risks in oversight activities.</p> <p>High level advocacy and engagements by most senior UN officials in the country with relevant government officials.</p> <p>Strengthening collaboration between CSOs and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to continuously monitor conditions for civil society, particularly vulnerable groups (women, PWDs and CSOs), to protect them against intimidation and retaliation through media engagements, reports on human rights violations and UPR reporting mechanisms.</p> <p>Continuous engagement with CSOs parent organization, TANGO and Ministry of gender, to create awareness among vulnerable groups (CSOs, women and PWDs), about existing mechanisms they can report cases of harassment and intimidation by security personnel.</p>
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Security risks for the women involved and all stakeholders supporting GEWE in this project (such risks need to be unpacked and outlined);	High	Medium	<p>ONS to conduct public awareness sessions using community radios and the social media with focused messaging on prevention of violence against women and all gender activists.</p> <p>ONS in partnership with the project team to sensitize the public on protection mechanism by popularizing the GBV helpline 199, in addition to the one-stop-centers which offer a range of services including psychosocial support for survivors across the country and the GBV Shelter.</p> <p>Providing gender sensitive training on safety measures, advocating for legal protections, and fostering supportive networks and partnerships within communities and among stakeholders.</p> <p>Ongoing risk assessments and mitigation strategies to be integral components of GEWE project planning and implementation by project team.</p>
Limited enforcement of new/revised legislation;	High	Medium	The project to support advocacy groups/ CSOs in their efforts to advocate and lobby for gender-responsive enforcement of new/revised legislations.
The continued retention of some security officers accused of human rights violations which can lead to protests or have other consequences that can affect the project implementation	High	Medium	<p>Strengthen advocacy capacity of CSOs to demand implementation of TRRC recommendation for the removal from public office of security personnel responsible for human rights violations under the former regime.</p> <p>Support engagements with communities, human rights organizations, and civil society groups to understand their concerns and perspectives.</p> <p>Government to communicate openly and transparently with the public about the steps being taken to remove from public office security officers who committed human rights violence under President Yahya Jammeh in alignment with TRRC recommendations.</p>

Delays ahead of, during, and after the 2026 electoral period can affect project implementation.	Low	Medium	<p>PSC to organize high level engagements between the UN, development partners and the government to update and mitigate potential delays during the electoral period.</p> <p>Proactive engagements by project team and PSC with the Independent Electoral Commission to provide updates on electoral preparedness and timelines for informed decisions and risk mitigation.</p> <p>The project team will be on alert and engage the PBF in case of any eventuality.</p> <p>Project team in collaboration with PSC to develop a contingency plan to prioritize project activities that can be safely carried out during elections period, with minimized risks and disruptions.</p>
Allegations and /or violations involving security sector personnel within the security sector and/or towards civilians that can hamper the overall project objective.	Medium	Medium	<p>The project will establish accountability mechanisms within each security institution to properly address, document and report allegations and/or violations, including ensuring the protection of whistle blowers within security institutions.</p> <p>The project will foster collaboration with external stakeholders such as regulatory bodies, human rights organizations, and CSOs to gain insights into best practices, receive feedback on the conduct of security personnel, and address concerns raised.</p> <p>Regular engagements with ONS to ensure allegations and violations are addressed.</p>

- d) **Monitoring and evaluation** – Describe the M&E approach for the project, including M&E expertise in the project team and main means and timing of collecting data? Include: a budget break-down for both monitoring and evaluation activities, including collection of baseline and end line data and an independent evaluation, and an approximate M&E timeline. To ensure alignment, as relevant, indicators from existing Strategic Results Frameworks or UN Cooperation Frameworks should be included. Fund recipients are obligated to reserve at least 5-7% of the project budget for M&E activities, including sufficient funds for a quality, independent evaluation. Projects are recommended to invest in community-feedback loops (including with women), Community-based monitoring systems or output and/or outcome data collection mechanisms.



Monitoring and Evaluation of the Project will be conducted in compliance with the approved result framework. The project M&E Analyst in collaboration with colleagues from UNODC, OHCHR, and PBFS M&E Officer as well as partners will facilitate needs assessments at the start of the project on the capacity of security institutions, Civil Society Organization (CSOs) to inform on priority areas of support. The needs assessment will also facilitate identification of baselines that will be updated before the time of the second tranche transfer request.

The Project Steering Committee (PSC) will be in charge of overall project oversight. The PSC will hold at least two meetings annually to discuss the project implementation, assess its progress and address challenges. On a quarterly basis the Project technical committee will hold a meeting to recommend actions in case of any deviation from the project objectives and monitor progress achieved. The Results Matrix incorporated in this document will be the benchmark for performance monitoring and reporting. The Project team in close collaboration with the Project Steering Committee and PBF Secretariat, will be responsible for setting up the necessary M&E mechanisms (see further below) in order to ensure continuous M&E of the project's results and impact, as well as to ensure efficient resource utilization, accountability, transparency and integrity.

#### *M&E Plan*

A specific M&E Plan will be developed based on the project Results Framework in alignment with the PBF Strategic Results Framework. As part of the M&E framework and systems results based monitoring including long-term impact, involve the security sector, and all relevant stakeholders will be involved in the M&E process to ensure their perspectives and feedback are considered to measure the results of the intervention. This will entail collaboration with the focal points from the implementing institutions, PBFS and relevant stakeholders to develop SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Timebound) indicators to monitor progress thereof. Regular review and update of the risk logframe. Support will ensure the highest standards of accountability and proper use of funds; encourage knowledge sharing within the Support team and other organizations and to factor in lessons learned from ongoing initiatives into future programming/allocation decisions to increase the positive impacts of the Support on gender responsive implementation of security sector reform strengthening national security in compliance with rule of rule and human rights principles.

The M&E Plan will identify how the various indicators will be tracked, clearly highlighting roles and responsibilities on what, when and how data is to be collected by means of verification. The project M&E Analyst in collaboration with PBFC M&E Officer and the project team will also carry out field missions and spot checks, prepare regular M&E reports that summarises progress, challenges, and achievements and recommendations towards the project overall goal, linked to the peacebuilding fund strategic results framework, national priorities and UNSDCF outcome. Also, periodic joint monitoring of the support will be carried out with implementing partners as well as community-based monitoring to ensure the tracking of implementation and milestones of initiatives in line with the result framework. The overall M&E budget will be 6% of the total budget. The monitoring budget is 6% (\$105,450) of the total M&E budget of \$ 177,032

Tracking the achievement of planned results for each activity within the annual work plan and reporting progress to the Project Steering Committee and giving feedback to the implementing partners will be the responsibility of the Project Manager in close collaboration with the project M&E analyst and PBFS M&E Officer in line with the M&E Plan.

The specific mechanisms/methodologies that will be used to monitor the achievement of results, in collaboration with PBF Secretariat, will include:

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- Establish clear objectives and smart indicators aligned to the results framework.
- Conduct needs assessment and develop an M&E plan with appropriate tools and engage stakeholders through community –based monitoring, joint monitoring visits with implementing partners
- Collect and analyze data, manage risks and adapt based on the monitoring findings
- 
- Semi-annual progress and financial reports, prepared by the Project Management team for review by the PBF/PBF; a PBF standard reporting format will be used;
- Semi-annual and annual progress reports, technical and financial reports prepared by the UN lead agency (UNDP) in collaboration with OHCHR and UNODC implementing agency at the end of six months and at the end of the year
- At Mid-Term Assessment will be undertaken after 18 months of project implementation, which will include lessons learned exercise and documenting good practices; this report will be presented to the Project Board for consideration and action.
- Semi-annual meetings of the Project Steering Committee will be convened to review progress reports and to ensure the Project results are achieved and where necessary, recommend a change in implementation strategy. The Co-Chairs of Project Steering Committee will report to the Resident Coordinator post each semi-annual meeting.
- A final report will be prepared by UNDP, which includes lessons learned and good practices, within 3 months after the project evaluation report is validated and submitted for review and consideration by the Project Review Board.
- Communicate findings effectively, promote a culture of learning and continuously improve the monitoring approach to ensure the SSR project achieves the intended outcomes.
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The project will be subjected to an independent evaluation at the end of the project to establish the achievements of the results. The terminal evaluation will be led by the lead agency and a budget of US 60,000 will be set aside for the exercise.

A structured approach will ensure comprehensive monitoring and timely adjustments, enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of the SSR project in The Gambia.

### Summary Timeline

Activity	Timeline
Needs Assessment	Months 1-2 into the start of the project
Regular Progress Reports	Semi-annual; annual

Activity	Timeline
KPI Monitoring	Ongoing, Monthly/Quarterly Review
Stakeholder Feedback	Quarterly
Field Visits and Observations	Bi-Monthly/Quarterly
Project Steering Committee (PSC)	Semi-annual
Project technical committee	Quarterly
Mid-Term Assessment	18 months
Terminal Evaluation	End of the project
Final reporting	After validation of terminal evaluation report

- e) **Project exit strategy/ sustainability** – Briefly explain the project’s exit strategy to ensure that the project can be wrapped up at the end of the project duration, either through sustainability measures, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the project will do concretely and pro-actively to try to ensure this support from the start. Consider possible partnerships with other donors or IFIs.

Security Sector Reform is NOT easy to implement nor is it a one-off event, especially in countries like The Gambia that have experienced fragile political transitions. Ensuring sustainability of interventions with positive transformation beyond the lifespan of the project is therefore a priority that requires close attention by the project teams and affiliated leadership structures. The exit strategy of this project will develop a sustainability strategy in which the beneficiaries would build on the experiences gained and forge a national leadership and ownership of the process to fulfil implementation of the SSR Strategy (2023-2027). This approach will leverage on SSR interventions by other development partners to enhance coordination continuity for the long term.

The model for sustainability is hinged on strengthening the capacity of different stakeholders and at different levels, from national to community-based structures. To ensure sustainability of some capacity support beyond the timespan of the project, the Office of the National Security will be supported with coordination capacity to effectively coordinate and lead the implementation of SSR strategy. This entails trainings on monitoring and evaluation, deploying a full time national UNV communication officer to strengthen communication capacity and coordinate information reach to the public and stakeholders. Establishing a monitoring and evaluation framework at ONS will lead timely monitoring of the implementation of the agreed benchmarks to ensure the success of the exit strategy. Additionally, the project will enhance the capacity of the security institutions, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice through training, development of curriculum and training manuals, accreditation courses and mechanisms for international treaty obligations for sustainable implementation of the SSR strategy.

As part of the sustainability and exit strategy, the development or review of legal frameworks, policies and strategies will form a strong sustainability mechanism in preserving the results achieved by the project. Key to this is the development of a gender policy for all security institutions that will guide gender mainstreaming in the security sector beyond the life of the project. Furthermore, the project will capitalize on the capacity of actors built during the project implementation in various focus areas to keep the knowledge and skills within the institutions and communities after the exit of the project.

The different training and mentoring programmes for National Assembly, NHRC, CSOs, community and religious leaders, and political parties of the project are designed to ensure the implementing partners and non-state actors continue efficient engagement even at the end of the project cycle. A human-rights based approach in the development or review of legal frameworks, policies and strategies, and capacity building training manuals/materials will promote institutional culture that will always respects human rights across the sector. This will be complemented by collaboration and partnership with the National Human Rights Council that will continue to support security institutions with capacity building, monitoring of human rights practices and violations, investigations and reporting mechanisms. By implementing these measures, Gambia can ensure that human rights practices within its security institutions are maintained and strengthened long after the SSR project concludes.

Partnership with government, development partners, and oversight institutions such as National Assembly, National Human Rights Commission, CSOs, media and political parties will foster partners' efforts to align their plans and budgets to project priorities to ensure continuity at the end of the project. The project will involve stakeholders' participation through targeted assessments/research, strategic knowledge management, dissemination of results, informed consultations, workshops, and research publications. The project will utilize its vast network of CSOs and local organizations to ensure that the beneficiaries own the initiative through community participation. Advocacy sessions on SSR with communities and local leaders will promote ownership, participation, and retention of knowledge among the community members, ultimately increasing their trust levels of the security sector and its human security approach.

The project will identify and train male gender champions (He or She) within the target security institutions (GAF, GPF, DLEAG, GPS) to advocate for more women to join, hold leadership positions and elimination of all forms of GBV within the sector. The gender champions will continuously and sustainably advocate for gender equality while educating their fellow men about women's rights, and the importance of their participation and representation in leadership and decision making within the security sector. Human Rights Units in the four target security institutions will be supported by strengthening their human rights capacity. The HRs units are important and have the mandate of receiving complaints about human rights abuses by security personnel, regularly train officials and senior management on human rights best practices and monitor and evaluate, on a regular basis the effectiveness of human rights training programmes to gauge the level of understanding among personnel and identify areas that require additional focus or improvement. Sustainability of these interventions will be achieved through capacity-building sessions guided by training manuals and trainers' approach tailored to each institution's specific needs. The Training programmes will focus on enhancing skills, knowledge, and understanding of human rights principles, laws, and best practices among the personnel of these agencies. By investing in training and related tools, the institutions can develop internal expertise and mechanisms to sustain their human rights efforts, enabling all recruits receive foundational knowledge on human rights principles from the outset of their careers. This integration helps embed human rights awareness into the organizational culture. Additionally, the project will support developing terms of reference for each unit while collaboration with the National Human Rights Commission will help institutionalize respect for human rights in daily operations of target security institutions.

The establishment of MEL framework will enhance security service delivery and public trust by assessing performance, optimizing resource use, fostering learning, involving diverse stakeholders, and making evidence-based decisions. To sustain continued monitoring and learning, the framework will be integrated in existing institutional strategies, annual plans and monitoring systems. By aligning

with these systems, the framework becomes part of the routine operations, increasing the likelihood of sustained use. Additionally, and using the training of trainers approach, the consultant to develop the MEL framework will be tasked to build capacity of relevant selected security personnel through training sessions to ensure they have the necessary skills and knowledge to continue MEL activities independently. Ultimately, this will ensure sustainable evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of reform initiatives that enhance human rights and gender-responsive security approaches.

Sustaining engagements between the citizens and security sector is vital to continuously address a legacy of negative image and perceptions the public hold against the security institutions. The establishment of Civil-Security Committees in the pilot regions of WCR, URR and LRR will promote sustainability of these engagements through raising awareness on SSR. Educating communities about their human rights and the role of security institutions in protecting these rights will enhance and sustain human rights practices in the security sector while ensuring rights holders have ability to hold duty bearers accountable. The Committees will be located in the offices of Regional Governors, and it is expected that beyond the project's timeline, a strengthened ONS will continue supporting the Civil-Security Committees, including provision of annual budget lines, in collaboration with the Regional Governor's offices. Bringing on board development partners who are currently supporting the SSR could provide continued support and upscaling of the committees. The project will build partnerships with key partners such as DCAF, ECOWAS and AU who could align their plans and budgets to project priorities to ensure continuity at the end of the project.

#### **IV. Project budget**

Provide brief additional information on projects costs, highlighting any specific choices that have underpinned the budget preparation, especially for personnel, travel or other indirect project support, to demonstrate value for money for the project. Proposed budget for all projects must include sufficient funds for an independent evaluation. Proposed budget for projects involving non-UN direct recipients must include funds for independent audit. Fill out **Annex A.2** on project value for money.

The costing of activities for this project is based on estimation of previous expenditure from similar activities. The project will benefit from existing partnerships and initiatives to ensure cost effectiveness and efficiency in utilization of all resources. Sufficient funds have been budgeted for independent evaluation of the project. The allocation of funds for human resources will consider competence and competitiveness in the selection of candidates. Most of the human resources for this project will consider a combination of International and National Staff, while meeting the PBF threshold of 20% budget allocation for salaries.

Please note that in nearly all cases, the Peacebuilding Fund transfers project funds in a series of performance-based tranches. PBF's standard approach is to transfer project funds in two tranches for UN recipients and three tranches for non-UN recipients, releasing second and third tranches upon demonstration that performance benchmarks have been met. All projects include the following two standard performance benchmarks: 1) at least 75% of funds from the first tranche have been committed, and 2) all project reporting obligations have been met. In addition to these standard benchmarks and depending on the risk rating or other context-specific factors, additional benchmarks may be indicated for the release of second and third tranches.

Please specify below any context-specific factors that may be relevant for the release of second and third tranches. These may include the successful conduct of elections, passage of key legislation, the

standing up of key counterpart units or offices, or other performance indicators that are necessary before project implementation may advance. Within your response, please reflect how performance-based tranches affect project sequencing considerations.

Fill out two tables in the Excel budget **Annex D**.

In the first Excel budget table in Annex D, please include the percentage towards Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) for every activity. Also provide a clear justification for every GEWE allocation (e.g. training will have a session on gender equality, specific efforts will be made to ensure equal representation of women etc.).

### Annex A.1: Checklist of project implementation readiness

Question	Yes	No	Comment
Planning			
1. Have all implementing partners been identified? If not, what steps remain and proposed timeline	X		
2. Have TORs for key project staff been finalized and ready to advertise? Please attach to the submission	X		
3. Have project sites been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline	X		
4. Have local communities and government offices been consulted/ sensitized on the existence of the project? Please state when this was done or when it will be done.	X		
5. Has any preliminary analysis/ identification of lessons learned/ existing activities been done? If not, what analysis remains to be done to enable implementation and proposed timeline?	X		
6. Have beneficiary criteria been identified? If not, what will be the process and timeline.	X		
7. Have any agreements been made with the relevant Government counterparts relating to project implementation sites, approaches, Government contribution?		X	Initial discussions with national counterparts have commenced and final agreements will be completed before the start of the project.
8. Have clear arrangements been made on project implementing approach between project recipient organizations?	X		
9. What other preparatory activities need to be undertaken before actual project implementation can begin and how long will this take?	N/A		
Gender			
10. Did UN gender expertise inform the design of the project (e.g. has a gender adviser/expert/focal point or UN Women colleague provided input)?	X		
11. Did consultations with women and/or youth organizations inform the design of the project?	X		
12. Are the indicators and targets in the results framework disaggregated by sex and age?	X		
13. Does the budget annex include allocations towards GEWE for all activities and clear justifications for GEWE allocations?	X		

## Annex A.2: Checklist for project value for money

Question	Yes	No	Project Comment
1. Does the project have a budget narrative justification, which provides additional project specific information on any major budget choices or higher than usual staffing, operational or travel costs, so as to explain how the project ensures value for money?	X		
2. Are unit costs (e.g. for travel, consultancies, procurement of materials etc) comparable with those used in similar interventions (either in similar country contexts, within regions, or in past interventions in the same country context)? If not, this needs to be explained in the budget narrative section.	X		
3. Is the proposed budget proportionate to the expected project outcomes and to the scope of the project (e.g. number, size and remoteness of geographic zones and number of proposed direct and indirect beneficiaries)? Provide any comments.	X		
4. Is the percentage of staffing and operational costs by the Receiving UN Agency and by any implementing partners clearly visible and reasonable for the context (i.e. no more than 20% for staffing, reasonable operational costs, including travel and direct operational costs) unless well justified in narrative section?	X		
5. Are staff costs proportionate to the amount of work required for the activity? And is the project using local rather than international staff/expertise wherever possible? What is the justification for use of international staff, if applicable?	X		
6. Does the project propose purchase of materials, equipment and infrastructure for more than 15% of the budget? If yes, please state what measures are being taken to ensure value for money in the procurement process and their maintenance/ sustainable use for peacebuilding after the project end.		X	
7. Does the project propose purchase of a vehicle(s) for the project? If yes, please provide justification as to why existing vehicles/ hire vehicles cannot be used.		X	
8. Do the implementing agencies or the UN Mission bring any additional non-PBF source of funding/ in-kind support to the project? Please explain what is provided. And if not, why not.	X		Staff from the 3 implementing agencies funded by other sources will support implementation of the Project. The Project will also be complemented by existing interventions being implemented by the



			respective agencies using funding from non PBF sources to ensure maximum effectiveness and impa
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## **Annex B.1: Project Administrative arrangements for UN Recipient Organizations**

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

The UNDP MPTF Office serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF and is responsible for the receipt of donor contributions, the transfer of funds to Recipient UN Organizations, the consolidation of narrative and financial reports and the submission of these to the PBSO and the PBF donors. As the Administrative Agent of the PBF, MPTF Office transfers funds to RUNOS on the basis of the signed Memorandum of Understanding between each RUNO and the MPTF Office.

### **AA Functions**

On behalf of the Recipient Organizations, and in accordance with the UNDG-approved “Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN funds” (2008), the MPTF Office as the AA of the PBF will:

- Disburse funds to each of the RUNO in accordance with instructions from the PBSO. The AA will normally make each disbursement within three (3) to five (5) business days after having received instructions from the PBSO along with the relevant Submission form and Project document signed by all participants concerned;
- Consolidate the financial statements (Annual and Final), based on submissions provided to the AA by RUNOS and provide the PBF annual consolidated progress reports to the donors and the PBSO;
- Proceed with the operational and financial closure of the project in the MPTF Office system once the completion is completed by the RUNO. A project will be considered as operationally closed upon submission of a joint final narrative report. In order for the MPTF Office to financially closed a project, each RUNO must refund unspent balance of over 250 USD, indirect cost (GMS) should not exceed 7% and submission of a certified final financial statement by the recipient organizations’ headquarters);
- Disburse funds to any RUNO for any cost extension that the PBSO may decide in accordance with the PBF rules & regulations.

### **Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient United Nations Organizations**

Recipient United Nations Organizations will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

Each RUNO shall establish a separate ledger account for the receipt and administration of the funds disbursed to it by the Administrative Agent from the PBF account. This separate ledger account shall be administered by each RUNO in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures, including those relating to interest. The separate ledger account shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules, directives and procedures applicable to the RUNO.

Each RUNO will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
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Semi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.

#### Financial reporting and timeline

Timeline	Event
<b>30 April</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b><i>Certified final financial report to be provided by 30 June of the calendar year after project closure</i></b>	

UNEX also opens for voluntary financial reporting for UN recipient organizations the following dates

<b>31 July</b>	Voluntary Q2 expenses (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Voluntary Q3 expenses (January to September)

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250, at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the MPTF Office, no later than six months (30 June) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Ownership of equipment, supplies and other property financed from the PBF shall vest in the RUNO undertaking the activities. Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the RUNO shall be determined in accordance with its own applicable policies and procedures.

## Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website ([www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund](http://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund)) and the Administrative Agent's website ([www.mptf.undp.org](http://www.mptf.undp.org)).

## Annex B.2: Project Administrative arrangements for Non-UN Recipient Organizations

*(This section uses standard wording – please do not remove)*

### Accountability, transparency and reporting of the Recipient Non-United Nations Organization:

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will assume full programmatic and financial accountability for the funds disbursed to them by the Administrative Agent. Such funds will be administered by each recipient in accordance with its own regulations, rules, directives and procedures.

The Recipient Non-United Nations Organization will have full responsibility for ensuring that the Activity is implemented in accordance with the signed Project Document;

In the event of a financial review, audit or evaluation recommended by PBSO, the cost of such activity should be included in the project budget;

Ensure professional management of the Activity, including performance monitoring and reporting activities in accordance with PBSO guidelines.

Ensure compliance with the Financing Agreement and relevant applicable clauses in the Fund MOU.

### Reporting:

Each Receipt will provide the Administrative Agent and the PBSO (for narrative reports only) with:

Type of report	Due when	Submitted by
Bi-annual project progress report	15 June	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
Annual project progress report	15 November	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist
End of project report covering entire project duration	Within three months from the operational project closure (it can be submitted instead of an annual report if timing coincides)	Convening Agency on behalf of all implementing organizations and in consultation with/ quality assurance by PBF Secretariats, where they exist

Annual strategic peacebuilding and PBF progress report (for PRF allocations only), which may contain a request for additional PBF allocation if the context requires it	1 December	PBF Secretariat on behalf of the PBF Steering Committee, where it exists or Head of UN Country Team where it does not.
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#### Financial reports and timeline

Timeline	Event
<b>28 February</b>	Annual reporting – Report <b>Q4 expenses</b> (Jan. to Dec. of previous year)
<b>30 April</b>	Report <b>Q1 expenses</b> (January to March)
<b>31 July</b>	Report <b>Q2 expenses</b> (January to June)
<b>31 October</b>	Report <b>Q3 expenses</b> (January to September)
<i><b>Certified final financial report to be provided at the quarter following the project financial closure</b></i>	

Unspent Balance exceeding USD 250 at the closure of the project would have to be refunded and a notification sent to the Administrative Agent, no later than three months (31 March) of the year following the completion of the activities.

#### Ownership of Equipment, Supplies and Other Property

Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by the Recipient Non-UN Recipient Organization will be determined in accordance with applicable policies and procedures defined by the PBSO.

#### Public Disclosure

The PBSO and Administrative Agent will ensure that operations of the PBF are publicly disclosed on the PBF website ([www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund](http://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund)) and the Administrative Agent website ([www.mptf.undp.org](http://www.mptf.undp.org)).

#### Final Project Audit for non-UN recipient organization projects

An independent project audit will be requested by the end of the project. The audit report needs to be attached to the final narrative project report. The cost of such activity must be included in the project budget.

#### Special Provisions regarding Financing of Terrorism

Consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions relating to terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999) and related resolutions, the Participants are firmly committed to the international fight against terrorism, and in particular, against the financing of terrorism. Similarly, all Recipient Organizations recognize their obligation to comply with any applicable sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Each of the Recipient Organizations will use all reasonable efforts to ensure that the funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement are not used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime. If, during the term of this agreement, a

Recipient Organization determines that there are credible allegations that funds transferred to it in accordance with this agreement have been used to provide support or assistance to individuals or entities associated with terrorism as designated by any UN Security Council sanctions regime it will as soon as it becomes aware of it inform the head of PBSO, the Administrative Agent and the donor(s) and, in consultation with the donors as appropriate, determine an appropriate response.

#### **Non-UN recipient organization (NUNO) eligibility:**

In order to be declared eligible to receive PBF funds directly, NUNOs must be assessed as technically, financially and legally sound by the PBF and its agent, the Multi Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO). Prior to submitting a finalized project document, it is the responsibility of each NUNO to liaise with PBSO and MPTFO and provide all the necessary documents (see below) to demonstrate that all the criteria have been fulfilled and to be declared as eligible for direct PBF funds.

The NUNO must provide (in a timely fashion, ensuring PBSO and MPTFO have sufficient time to review the package) the documentation demonstrating that the NUNO:

- Has previously received funding from the UN, the PBF, or any of the contributors to the PBF, in the country of project implementation.
- Has a current valid registration as a non-profit, tax exempt organization with a social based mission in both the country where headquarter is located and in country of project implementation for the duration of the proposed grant. (**NOTE:** If registration is done on an annual basis in the country, the organization must have the current registration and obtain renewals for the duration of the project, in order to receive subsequent funding tranches).
- Produces an annual report that includes the proposed country for the grant.
- Commissions audited financial statements, available for the last two years, including the auditor opinion letter. The financial statements should include the legal organization that will sign the agreement (and oversee the country of implementation, if applicable) as well as the activities of the country of implementation. (**NOTE:** If these are not available for the country of proposed project implementation, the CSO will also need to provide the latest two audit reports for a program or project-based audit in country.) The letter from the auditor should also state whether the auditor firm is part of the nationally qualified audit firms.
- Demonstrates an annual budget in the country of proposed project implementation for the previous two calendar years, which is at least twice the annualized budget sought from PBF for the project.<sup>46</sup>
- Demonstrates at least 3 years of experience in the country where grant is sought.
- Provides a clear explanation of the CSO's legal structure, including the specific entity which will enter into the legal agreement with the MPTF-O for the PBF grant.

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<sup>46</sup> Annualized PBF project budget is obtained by dividing the PBF project budget by the number of project duration months and multiplying by 12.

Annex C: Project Results Framework (MUST include sex- and age disaggregated targets)

Outcomes	Outputs	Indicators	Means of Verification/ frequency of collection	Indicator milestones
<b>Outcome 1: Strengthened security institutions to promote implementation of gender responsive Security Sector Reform, ensuring adherence to the rule of law and human rights in The Gambia.</b>		<b>Outcome Indicator 1.1.1a:</b> Percentage increase of security institutions implementing gender-responsive service delivery according to the newly adopted legislation, gender policy, and strategies.  Baseline: 25% (2-GPF and GAF- out of 8 security institutions) Target: 50%	Field monitoring report, ,mid-term assessment and evaluation reports	
		<b>Outcome Indicator 1.1.1b:</b> Level of public awareness and satisfaction with the security sector reform process Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Afrobarometer	
		<b>Outcome Indicator 1.1.1 c:</b> Increase in the proportion of women in the decision-making and leadership roles in the security sector.  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Security sector recruitment strategy, HR reports,  UNDP supported SSR gender research report	

	<p><b>Output 1.1:</b> Strengthened legal frameworks, policies, and strategies to effectively support the implementation of Security Sector Strategy in The Gambia</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.1:</b> Support the review of the Gambia Armed Forces Act, Prison Act and Strategies (Ministry of Defense &amp; Ministry of Interior) and develop a Gender Policy for Security Sector to transform security sector into a more professional, accountable and responsive to security needs of the citizens in line with international best practices and human rights standards.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.2:</b> Conduct advocacy among the relevant institutions including the National Assembly, CSOs, IPC, and Media, National Human Rights Commission and policy makers on passage of National Security Council Bill, draft constitution, and key legislations through lobbying, consultations, town hall meetings, and training sessions.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.3:</b> In collaboration with ONS, support the simplification, translation into local languages and dissemination of SSR strategy and gender policy for security institutions.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.1.4:</b> Support outreach activities at national and grassroots levels to increase awareness of the SSR strategy and the gender policy for inclusive participation and ownership.</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.1:</b> Number of legislations, policies, strategies related to security sector reform developed/reviewed adopted and integrated into the operational practices and guidelines.</p> <p>Baseline: 3(SSR policy, SSR strategy &amp; security strategy) Target: 6 (adoption of the Security Council bill, amendment of the GAF and Prison acts, the design and adoption of the strategies related Ministry of Defense &amp; Ministry of Interior, and the design and adoption of the gender policy)</p>	Official government gazettes, Press releases by Government, Newspaper articles, social media reports, ONS updates	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.2:</b> Number of institutions with increased knowledge to advocate for the passage of security legislations.</p> <p>Baseline: 4 (Judiciary, National Assembly Standing Committee on Defense and Security, Ombudsman, TANGO) Target: 6 (National Assembly; CSOs Coalition on SSR; IPC; GPU; media, National Human Rights Commission)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.3:</b> Number of SSR strategy and gender policy simplified, translated into local languages, and disseminated.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 2</p>	Attendance registers, Meeting minutes, reports	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.3:</b> Number of people with access and increased knowledge through the simplified and translated SSR strategy and gender policy desegregated by gender and age.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1000</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.1.3:</b> Number of institutions with acquired skills to advocate for the passage of security legislations.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5 (institutions)</p>	Advocacy report, meeting minutes, and attendance registers and training report	



		<b>Output Indicator 1.1.4:</b> Proportion of population with knowledge of SSR disaggregated by region, gender and age Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Consultations minutes Inception and validation reports Assessment report	
	<b>Output 1.2:</b> Enhanced capacity of the Office of National Security and relevant state institutions to effectively coordinate the implementation of the SSR strategy.	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.1:</b> Number of Coordination Management Centers equipped to functionality status.  Baseline: 1 Target: 2 Coordination Management Centers	Procurement reports	
	<b>Activity 1.2.1:</b> Equip ONS management centre as required to ensure functionality, including information and communication equipment to enhance intra and inter-agency communication and information sharing.	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.3:</b> Number of curriculum and training manual developed and implemented within the security sector.  Baseline: 1 (Police) Target: 2 (Comprehensive curriculum and manual at national level for all 8 security institutions)	Meeting minutes and agendas, Consultation reports, Training manual	
	<b>Activity 1.2.2:</b> Assign a National UNV within the ONS to assist implementation of the communication strategy, build communication capacity of security institutions and coordinate outreach activities within the security sector and the communities.	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.4:</b> Number of security personnel with acquired increased knowledge on leadership and strategic planning skills on SSR, disaggregated by gender and age.  Baseline: 0 Target:50	Reports on the upgrades, IT department records, Training reports, attendance registers,	
	<b>Activity 1.2.3:</b> Support the development and review of training curricula, accreditation of raining courses, training manuals to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law in line with TRRC Recommendations.	<b>Output indicator 1.2.5:</b> Number of security institutions reporting on the fulfilment of international treaty reporting obligations.  Baseline: 2 Target:3 (GPF, GAF, GPS)	Official reports Training reports, attendance registers, training materials/guides.	
	<b>Activity 1.2.4:</b> Support continuous professional development of personnel working on the SSR agenda in collaborative leadership and strategic planning skills.  <b>Activity 1.2.5:</b> Support Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and relevant security sector institutions to fulfil relevant international treaty reporting	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.6:</b> Number of recommendations implemented by the security institutions from the international treaty report  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Activity reports; Consultation report	

	obligations pertaining to the Security Sector during the Project cycle.	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.7:</b> Number of UTG graduates on secondment with knowledge and experience on SSR through the graduate scheme, disaggregated by gender. Baseline: 0 Target: 12	Internship programme report at institutional levels; monitoring, feedback and mid-term assessment reports reports;	
	<b>Activity 1.2.6:</b> Support security sector engagement with MOJ and the National Mechanism for Follow-up on the implementation of concluding observations and recommendations from international treaty reporting obligations.			
	<b>Activity 1.2.7:</b> Support graduates and through the UTG graduate scheme to gain knowledge and experience in SSR to advance the SSR agenda at institutional and community levels.	<b>Output Indicator 1.2.8a:</b> Senior management course for all security institutions developed and implemented.  Baseline: 0 Target: 1 <b>Output Indicator 1.2.8b:</b> Number of senior managers with acquired knowledge of public administration, planning, and budget management desegregated by gender and age  Baseline: 0 Target: 40 personnel (GAF,GPF, GPS,DLEAG)  <b>Output Indicator 1.2.9:</b> Number of reported cases of arrest and intimidation by security personnel documented.  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Consultation, inception and validation reports	
	<b>Activity 1.2.8</b> Develop and implement a Senior Managers course for all security institutions to improve capacity in public administration, planning and implementation and budget management.			
	<b>Activity 1.2.9:</b> Support ONS to under take advocacy within the security institutions to increase accountability and responsiveness in the monitoring of arrests and intimidation actions of security personnel.			
	<b>Output 1.3:</b> Strengthened accountability, data and knowledge management for real-time and evidence-based decision making within the security sector.	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.1:</b> National survey on security needs and concerns of the population, including perceptions of the youth, conducted and validated.  Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Inception, validation and final reports	
	<b>Activity 1.3.1:</b> In collaboration with ONS, conduct a comprehensive national survey on security needs and concerns to understand security challenges faced by the population and the perception of young Gambians on the security forces with the view to strengthen community-security engagements,	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.2:</b> Research study on barriers impeding recruitment, retention, and career advancement with particular attention to women conducted and validated.  Baseline: 0	Inception, validation and final reports	

	ownership and data-driven interventions for sustainability.	Target: 1		
	<b>Activity 1.3.2:</b> Conduct in-depth research study and evidence generation on barriers impeding recruitment, retention, and career advancement with particular attention to women in security institutions and disseminate to the national and local stakeholders.	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.3:</b> Existence of a functional MEL system (frameworks, guidelines, etc.) in place within the security sector  Baseline 0 Target 1	Consultation reports Activity report	
	<b>Activity 1.3.3:</b> Establish a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Framework to track progress in the implementation of the SSR Strategy and other legislations and policy instruments. MEL to linked to the integrated data and reporting dashboard.	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.4:</b> Operationalization of national security data reporting and knowledge management dashboard  Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Activity reports, Monitoring report	
	<b>Activity 1.3.4:</b> Revamp the integrated security sector data/reporting dashboard at ONS to collate and share real-time information with the public and stakeholders.	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.5:</b> Number of ONS staff and security personnel (GAF, GPF, GPS DLEAG) with acquired skills on data and knowledge management to effectively operationalise the dashboard. Disaggregated by gender and age.  Baseline: 0 Target: 200	Training reports, Attendance register, Monitoring report	
	<b>Activity 1.3.5:</b> Support ONS's and individual security institutions personnel (GAF, GPF, GPS DLEAG) capacity on data reporting and knowledge management and the / integrated system to effectively coordinate and report data at central level in real time for evidence-based decision making.  <b>Activity 1.3.6:</b> Facilitate knowledge sharing and exchange of best practices for representatives of security personnel of GPF, GPS, DLEAG and GAF human rights and gender units in the sub-region  <b>Activity 1.3.7:</b> Conduct a Human Rights Due Diligence Review within the security sector to establish HR human rights violations level based on HRDDP risk assessment criteria. <i>(the criteria include analysis of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law; accountability records; preventions mechanisms; existing legislations and frameworks, among others).</i>	<b>Output Indicator 1.3.6:</b> Number of security personnel with the relevant knowledge based on the exchange sessions on implementing a gender and human rights security reform.  Baseline: 0 Target: 500  <b>Output Indicator 1.3.7:</b> Availability of a Human Rights Due Diligence Review Assessment report within the security sector Baseline: 0 Target:1	Peer-peer exchange and review reports Peer-peer exchange reports  Assessment report; validation report; activity report	

	<p><b>Output 1.4:</b> Enhanced gender responsive security sector through increased women's participation and representation in decision making roles.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.4.1:</b> Support the capacity of security institutions (GAF, GPF, GPS and DLEA) to prevent and respond to cases of sexual harassment in partnership with DCAF.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.4.2:</b> In collaboration with ONS and DCAF, develop and support the implementation of gender action plan for all security institutions to address challenges experienced by women in the security sector and promote women's meaningful participation in peace and security agenda. (The gender policy will be implemented through the action plan)</p> <p><b>Activity 1.4.3:</b> Support national and regional peer to peer mentorship programs within the security sector to increase women participation in decision making and leadership positions.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.4.4:</b> Identify and train male gender champions. (GAF, GPF, DLEAG, GPS) to promote women's participation in leadership and advocate for the elimination of all forms of GBV within the security sector.</p> <p><b>Activity 1.4.5:</b> Minor refurbishment of facilities within security sector institutions using a phased approach with particular attention to the GAF and GPF to meet the specific needs of women, ensuring their safety and comfort. (This will include the provision of equipment for hygiene, kitchen, sports facilities etc to attract more women to join and stay in security institutions).</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.1a:</b> Number of security personnel with technical knowledge on GBV to prevent and respond to SGBV related issues.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.1b:</b> Number of security institutions that have institutionalized the gender policy, training manual, case management SOP to effectively prevent and respond to SGBV related issues.</p> <p>Baseline: 1 (Police gender policy) Target: 4 (GPF, GAF, GPS &amp; DLEAG)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.1c:</b> Number of female security personnel, disaggregated by age, reporting satisfaction with prevention and response measures for SGBV within the security sector.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p>	<p>Policy documents, Ministry of Justice reports/ National Gazette</p> <p>Training report, attendance register</p> <p>Monitoring and midterm assessment reports</p>	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.2:</b> Gender action plan developed and prioritized recommendations implemented.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p>	<p>Consultation meeting minutes, report and attendance, Gender plan</p>	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.3a:</b> Proportion of women in the security sector with acquired knowledge through the peer to peer exchange taking up leadership role by desegregated regions</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.3b:</b> Number of networking platforms formulated and operationalised.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 12</p>	<p>Attendance registers or participant lists, events invitation, report from security institutions. Monitoring report</p> <p>Consultation, validation and Monitoring reports,</p>	

	<p><b>Activity 1.4.6:</b> Develop and disseminate simplified pocketbooks on Gender, Sexual Harassment and abuse to enhance knowledge, raise awareness, and provide practical guidance on fostering a respectful and gender-inclusive environment.</p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.4:</b> Number of male gender champions with technical expertise advocating for women participation in leadership positions and the elimination of all forms of GBV within the security sector. Disaggregated by gender and regions.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 20</p>	<p>Consultation, Training reports List of gender champions</p>	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.5a:</b> Number of gender-sensitive hygiene facilities within the security sector institutions refurbished.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 5 (GPS, GPF, GPF, DLEAG &amp; Immigration \)</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.5b:</b> Proportion of female officers reporting satisfaction with the refurbished gender-responsive facilities.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p>	<p>Activity report Monitoring and mid-term assessment report</p>	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 1.4.68:</b> Number of pocketbooks on gender, sexual harassment and abuse developed and disseminated.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1000</p>	<p>Consultation, validation, and activity reports. Printed copy of the handbook</p>	
<p><b>Outcome 2: Strengthened oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency in the implementation of security sector.</b></p>		<p><b>Outcome Indicator 2ai:</b> Percentage of reported complaints of malpractices against security sector actors through formal processes disaggregated by institutions and regions.</p> <p>Baseline: TBD Target: TBD</p>	<p>Administrative records of the given security sector institutions</p>	
		<p><b>Outcome Indicator 2aii:</b> Percentage of complaints malpractices against security sector actors investigated through formal processes desegregated by institutions and regions.</p>	<p>Administrative records of the given security sector institutions</p>	

		Baseline: TBD Target: TBD		
		Outcome Indicator 2a: Percentage of complaints of malpractices against security sector actors satisfactorily addressed through formal processes disaggregated by institutions and regions.  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Administrative records of the given security sector institutions	
		Outcome Indicator 2b: Percentage of population who express confidence in the security sector (disaggregated by gender).  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Afrobarometer, Public perception survey (national or local) to be conducted by the project. The survey needs to be implemented at least twice: at the beginning and end of project implementation.	
		Outcome Indicator 2c: Proportion of the public expressing confidence in the oversight institutions and their effectiveness in ensuring accountability within the security sector. Disaggregated by gender  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Afrobarometer	
	Output 2.1 Capacity of the National Assembly to engage and support the SSR processes is enhanced.  Activity 2.1.1: Conduct a needs assessment on the role of the National Assembly in the SSR process during and after the Jammeh era.  Activity 2.1.2: Develop handbook on the role of National Assembly and the Office of the Clerk in SSR processes.  Activity 2.1.3: Organize training sessions for members of the National Assembly and office of the clerk on SSR, human rights and democratic governance.	Output Indicator 2.1.1: Needs assessment on National Assembly role in the SSR processes conducted and validated.  Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Inception, Consultation, and validation reports	
		Output Indicator 2.1.2: Number of handbooks developed and in use by the national assembly members and clerks to effectively implement the SSR.  Baseline: 0 Target: 100	Inception and validation reports Published handbook	
		Output indicator 2.1.3: Number of National Assembly members with acquired knowledge to effectively contribute	Training reports, attendance registers, NA oversight reports,	

	<b>Activity 2.1.4:</b> Support participation of National Assembly members from the relevant committees including the speaker of the National Assembly to participate in regional networks of parliamentarians with oversight of security sector.	and perform oversight function to the SSR process. Disaggregated by gender.  Baseline: 0 Target: 58	published handbook, Research report.	
		<b>Output Indicator 2.1.4:</b> Number of National Assembly members with technical knowledge from peer-to-peer dialogue on SSR process.  Baseline: 0 Target: 58	Training reports, attendance registers,	
	<b>Output 2.2:</b> Capacity of the National Human Rights Commission to carry out its oversight functions, coordinate stakeholders and contribute to SSR is enhanced.	<b>Output Indicator 2.2.1:</b> Number of NHRC commissioners and staff with acquired knowledge on SSR to perform oversight function. Disaggregated by gender and age.  Baseline: 0 Target: 45	Activity report, training register, monitoring report	
	<b>Activity 2.2.1:</b> Build capacity of NHRC commissioners and staff on SSR to carry out their oversight function effectively in the SSR process.	<b>Output Indicator 2.2.2a:</b> Existence of an operationalized coordination mechanism between the NHRC and ONS to effectively monitor the implementation of SSR.  Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Publication of joint reports, Media reports, Meeting minutes	
	<b>Activity 2.2.2:</b> Facilitate the NHRC's creation of a coordination platform. (This will coordinate civilian oversight mechanisms to ensure all oversight institutions have a clear understanding of their role)	<b>Output Indicator: 2.2.2b:</b> Number of CSO actors harassed and arrested by security actors for playing an oversight role in SSR.  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Quarterly or annual reports NHRC  NHRC, media and human Rights Watch reports	
	<b>Activity 2.2.3:</b> Support NHRC and ONS, in collaboration with research/academic institutions, commission a study on the inclusion of women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities in the SSR process.	<b>Output Indicator 2.2.3:</b> Existence of a validated study on inclusion of marginalized groups and communities in SSR Baseline: 0 Target: 1	Inception, validation and final report	
	<b>Activity 2.2.4:</b> Support the NHRC and ONS implement targeted activities to support the inclusion of marginalized groups and communities (women, youth, persons with disabilities and rural communities) in SSR based on the recommendations of the study.	<b>Output Indicator 2.2.4:</b> Number of recommendations from the study implemented.  Baseline: TBD	Training reports, attendance registers, social media  Publication of joint reports, Media reports, Meeting minutes Activity report, monitoring report.	

	<p><b>Activity 2.2. 5:</b> Support the NHRC to collaborate with ONS to disseminate and advise law enforcement agencies to implement SSR recommendations from the UN Human Rights Council and relevant treaty bodies.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.2.6:</b> Support the NHRC build capacity of the National Assembly Members and security sector institutions based on recommendations issued by Human Rights Council UN, AU treaty bodies and special mechanism.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.2.7:</b> Support NHRC's initiative to develop training manuals and strengthen the capacities of human rights units of GPF, GPS, DLEAG and the GAF.</p>	<p><b>Target:</b> TBD</p>		
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.5:</b> Number of SSR recommendations from treaty bodies and human rights council disseminated and implemented by security institutions.</p> <p>Baseline: 3 Target: 12</p>		
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.6:</b> Number of National Assembly members capacitated on the recommendations from human right council, AU, treaty bodies and special mechanism to effectively perform oversight roles. Disaggregated by region.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 58</p>	Activity report, attendance registers, monitoring report	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.2.7:</b> Number of operationalized human rights units established/strengthened.</p> <p>Baseline:4 Target: 4 (GPF, GPS, DLEAG, GAF)</p>	Activity report, review report, training register and monitoring report	
	<p><b>Output 2.3:</b> Civil society and Office of the Ombudsman Office of Ombudsman is better able to participate effectively and engage in meaningful oversight and accountability of the SSR process.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.3.1:</b> Build the capacity of the Coalition of CSOs on SSR to actively participate in the oversight, communication, and implementation of SRR processes. <i>(This entails supporting CSOs to develop and implement a code of conduct/guideline and innovative approaches to ensure inclusive participation of women, youth and PWDs at regional levels in the SSR processes and holding the duty bearers accountable.)</i></p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.1a:</b> Number of CSOs within the SSR coalition SSR that are utilising acquired knowledge to actively participate in the oversight and implementation of SSR processes.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 23 (CSOs Coalition on SSR),</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.1b:</b> Code of conduct developed integrated, and implemented by CSOs.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1</p>	CSO activities, policy briefs, progress reports, press,	
		<p><b>Output indicator 2.3.2:</b> Number of Ombudsman personnel with relevant knowledge to investigate and respond to</p>	Training reports, attendance registers, media reports, Op-Eds, articles.	



	<p><b>Activity 2.3.2:</b> Support the capacity of the Office of Ombudsman to investigate complaints of wrongdoings reported by the public and service members against security institutions.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.3.3:</b> Support the Office of Ombudsman develop a communication strategy and revamp online reporting platforms (website, social media platforms and corporate email addresses) to improve engagements with citizens and enhance reporting and implementation of wrongdoings committed by security personnel. an integrated mechanism to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including immigration and human rights law.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.3.4:</b> In collaboration with the ONS and GPU develop a training manual on reporting of SSR and train media outlets across the country on professional coverage of SSR issues.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.3.5:</b> Build the capacity of Inter Party Committee (IPC) on SSR, support outreach activities to raise awareness on SSR strategy and gender policy among its regional branches, and promote participation in national platforms on SSR as envisaged by the SSR strategy.</p>	<p>wrong doings by security personnel. Disaggregated by gender and age</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 15</p>		
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.3:</b> Number of complaints received and addressed through the online reporting platforms.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 50</p>	Media reports, social media, Activity reports, Consultation report	
		<p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.4:</b> Number of media personnel demonstrating improved knowledge and skills in accurately and frequently reporting on SSR issues</p> <p>Baseline:0 Target: 50</p>	Training report, Media reports, social media  Midterm assessment and monitoring reports	
		<p><b>Output indicator 2.3.5:</b> Number of IPC members with knowledge on SSR to support outreach programs. Disaggregated by gender, age and regions.</p> <p>Baseline:0 Target: 150</p>		
	<p><b>Activity 2.3.6:</b> In collaboration with the Office for National Security (ONS), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), conduct nationwide outreach activities using media outlets to raise awareness about Security sector reform strategy and gender policy.</p> <p><b>Activity 2.3.7:</b> Support the establishment of CSOs and security sector platform to promote collaborative engagements and dialogue on emerging issues in the implementation of SSR. <i>(this is to foster collaboration, improve communication and partnership to effectively</i></p>	<p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.6:</b> Number of participants in the outreach initiatives reporting increased understanding of the SSR process. Disaggregated by gender, age, and region.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 250</p> <p><b>Output Indicator 2.3.7:</b> Existence of an operationalized CSOs-Security sector platform</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 1 (at national level)</p>	<p>Activity, monitoring and midterm assessment reports</p> <p>TORs of the platform; attendance lists; minutes; activity report.</p>	

	handle emerging SSR challenges through a unified platform).			
	<b>Output 2.4:</b> Strengthened Civil-Security relations to improve trust and confidence in the Security sector.	<b>Output Indicator 2.4.1:</b> Existence of functional civil security committees disaggregated by gender, age and regions.  Baseline:0 Target: 3	Dialogue minutes, media reports, attendance registers, Activity report, TORs for the committees, meeting minutes reports.	
	<b>Activity 2.4.1:</b> Establish Civil-Security Committees to be piloted in three regions (Greater Banjul area, URR and LRR) to build trust and confidence between civilians and security institutions. (The committees will achieve this through social activities such as sports (e.g. football matches), dialogue sessions, etc. The composition of the committees will include regional Governor, Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), Village Development Committee (VDCs), Ward Development Committee (WDCs), Women, Youth and Persons with Disability Groups; Local Government and Security Institutions with oversight functions by ONS).  <b>Activity 2.4.2:</b> Support capacity building of community radio personnel on SSR to effectively communicate and facilitate awareness sessions at community levels using community radio.  <b>Activity 2.4.3:</b> Raise awareness using community radio stations to reach a wider audience on the SSR strategy.  <b>Activity 2.4.4:</b> Build the capacity of Community Based structures on SSR to lead dialogue and communication between community members and the security actors. (The capacity will include building their knowledge on the SSR strategy, RF-NDP SSR components, legislations, policies as well as their communication and facilitation skills. The target beneficiaries will be the Village development Committees, regional Governor, Technical Advisory, Local Government and Security Institutions with oversight functions by	<b>Output indicator 2.4.2</b> Number of community radio personnel with the relevant knowledge on the SSR strategy to engage the community through radio programs. Disaggregated by gender.  Baseline: 0 Target: 20	Activity report, monitoring report, attendance registers	
		<b>Output indicator 2.4.3:</b> Number of people reached through community radio stations on SSR. Disaggregated by gender.  Baseline: 0 Target: 10,000	Radio reports; Activity reports	
		<b>Output indicator 2.4.4:</b> Number of community personnel within the community based structures with knowledge on SSR.  Baseline: TBD Target: TBD	Activity report, monitoring report, attendance registers	
		<b>Output indicator 2.4.5:</b> Number of people with knowledge of reporting mechanisms for reporting complaints.  Baseline: 0 Target: 3500		

	ONS, The Gambia Federation of the Disabled, religious leaders, Women, and youth groups)			
	<b>Activity 2.4.5:</b> Raise public awareness on mechanisms of reporting complaints by civilians and security personnel			

Totals				
	Recipient Organization 1 UNDP	Recipient Organization 2 UNODC	Recipient Organization 3 OHCHR	Totals
1. Staff and other personnel	\$ 283,209	\$ 146,000	\$ 170,000	\$ 599,209
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	\$ 115,200	\$ 30,230	\$ 10,000	\$ 155,430
3. Equipment, Vehicles, and Furniture (including Depreciation)	\$ 140,000	\$ 130,000	\$ 10,000	\$ 280,000
4. Contractual services	\$ 367,402	\$ 145,000	\$ 331,000	\$ 843,402
5. Travel	\$ 195,000	\$ 173,300	\$ 157,041	\$ 525,341
6. Transfers and Grants to Counterparts	\$ 210,000	\$ 39,700	\$ 95,656	\$ 345,356
7. General Operating and other Costs	\$ 45,000	\$ 10,000	\$ -	\$ 55,000
Subtotal	\$ 1,355,811	\$ 674,230	\$ 773,697	\$ 2,803,738
7% Indirect Costs	\$ 94,907	\$ 47,196	\$ 54,159	\$ 196,262
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$ 1,450,718</b>	<b>\$ 721,426</b>	<b>\$ 827,856</b>	<b>\$ 3,000,000</b>