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| EVALUATION Report |

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| 28 February 2025 | End-Term Evaluation – Support Political Transition in Somalia Project (SPTSP) |

The evaluation was conducted between October 2024 and January 2025 by

André Kahlmeyer, Conflict Management Consulting (CMC)

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**EVALUATION TEAM**

The Evaluation Team was composed of two consultants **– Andre Kahlmeyer, and Leyla Jeyte.** The Team combined international standards of evaluation expertise, excellent knowledge of governance and gender projects, and the national context in which the *Support to Political Transition in Somalia project* has been implemented.

The team would like to thank all interviewees, especially UN staff and Somali government staff for their support in conducting this evaluation.

**SUBMITTED TO:**

**UNDP SOMALIA**

1. PROJECT AND EVALUATION INFORMATION DETAILS

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PROJECT/OUTCOME INFORMATION** | | | | | |
| **Project/outcome title** | | Support Political Transition in Somalia Project (SPTSP) | | | |
| **Quantum ID** | | 00129480 | | | |
| **Corporate outcome and output** | | The project contributes to the UN Strategic Framework Priorities:   * UNSDCF strategic priority 1. Inclusive politics and reconciliation, particularly output 1.2: Somalis, particularly women and youth, benefit from and participate in functional, inclusive, accountable, and transparent democratic systems across all levels of government and governmental institutions. * UNDP Strategy Plan 2018-2021, outcome 2: Accelerate structural transformations for sustainable development, as highlighted in the UNDP CPD. * SDGs 5, 10, 16 and 17. | | | |
| **Country** | | Somalia | | | |
| **Region** | | Geographic zones for project implementation: Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and five federal member states (Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle) and Banadir. | | | |
| **Date project document signed** | | November, 2021 | | | |
| **Project dates** | | **Start** | **End** | | |
| 1 October 2021 | 17 November 2023  No Cost Extension: till 31st July 2024 | | |
| **Total committed budget** | | USD 2,000,000 | | | |
| **Project expenditure at the time of evaluation** | | USD 1,835,222 | | | |
| **Funding source** | | Peace-building Support Office (PBSO) | | | |
| **Implementing party[[1]](#footnote-2)** | | * UNDP   **Other UN implementing partners**   * The United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM).   **Government Counterparts**   * The Office of the Prime Minister, Federal Government of Somalia (OPM FGS). * Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs (MOIFAR). | | | |
|  | |  | | | |
| **EVALUATION INFORMATION** | | | | |
| **Evaluation type (project/ outcome/thematic/country programme, etc.)** | End-term evaluation | | | |
| **Final/midterm review/ other** | Final | | | |
| **Period under evaluation** | **Start** | | | **End** |
| November 2021 | | | November 2023 |
| **Evaluators** | André Kahlmeyer, Leyla Jeyte | | | |
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| **Evaluation dates** | **Start** | | | **Completion** |
| October 2024 | | | January 2025 |

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1. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AU | African Union |
| CPD | Country Programme Document |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DGCF | Director-General Coordination Forum |
| DIM | Direct Implementation Modality |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FGS | Federal Government of Somalia |
| FMS | Federal Member State |
| GBV | Gender Based Violence |
| GESI | Gender Equality and Social Inclusion |
| HR | Human Resource |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MoIFAR | Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs and Reconciliation |
| NCC | National Consultative Council |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NRF | National Reconciliation Framework |
| NVC | Non-Violent Communication |
| OPM | Office of the Prime Minister |
| PAMG | Political Affairs and Mediation Group |
| PBF | Peacebuilding Fund |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| SPTS | Support Political Transition in Somalia |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNSOM | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia |
| UNSDCF | United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework |
| UNTMIS | UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia |
| WPS | Women, Peace and Security |
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

This evaluation report examines the Somalia Political Transition Support Project (SPTS), focusing on its contributions to political dialogue, federalism, and reconciliation processes. The evaluation follows OECD-DAC criteria, assessing key evaluation questions, including relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability, and inclusivity. The overarching aim is to provide insights into the project’s performance and offer recommendations for future programming.

## Project Background

The SPTS was implemented during a period of political transition marked by federal-state disputes, electoral reforms, and governance challenges. The project supported political stabilization by facilitating dialogue through the National Consultative Council (NCC), working closely with key institutions, including the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR). It aligned with Somalia’s National Development Plan (NDP-9) and the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), with a focus on supporting electoral processes, federalism, and reconciliation.

The project operated within a complex political and security environment shaped by Somalia’s federal transition and peacebuilding efforts. Key stakeholders included the federal government, federal member states (FMS), civil society organizations, and international partners. The project’s success depended on the coordination of these actors, particularly in facilitating inclusive governance dialogues.

## Evaluation Purpose, Scope, and Objectives

The primary objective of this end-term evaluation is to assess the contributions of the Project towards enhancing political stability and transition in Somalia. The evaluation assessed the project’s relevance to national priorities, effectiveness in collaboration among stakeholders, and contributions to peacebuilding and governance. The purpose was to capture lessons and identify areas for improvement to inform the design of future programs. The evaluation covered the project’s key phases and examined its contributions to political negotiations, institutional strengthening, and conflict resolution during implementation between November 2021 to July 2024. The key audience for this evaluation is the project beneficiaries and stakeholders UNDP, UNTMIS, Government of Somalia, including other UN agencies UN Women, and donors PBF.

## Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach, mainly including document reviews, stakeholder consultations, and key informant interviews. Data was collected from Somali national institutions, UNSOM, UNDP and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The methodology was guided by OECD-DAC criteria, to ensure a comprehensive analysis of the project’s achievements and challenges.

For data analysis, the evaluation used qualitative data analysis to analyse the collected data through KIIs, specifically thematic analysis. Only a limited number of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were carried out combined and a survey, initially planned for the evaluation and agreed upon in the inception report, was prepared by the evaluators but not used, at the request of UNDP. Thus, due to limitations and information gap no quantitative data analysis was done. The evaluation ensured as much as possible reliability and validity of findings through triangulating the available data. This was done through cross-verifying available information, identifying areas of convergence and divergence in stakeholder perspectives so that the conclusions drawn were as robust as possible and were supported by available sources of evidence (KIIs and available documents).

## Recommendations

The evaluation’s main **Recommendations** are:

| **STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION** | **SUB-RECOMMENDATIONS** | **IMPLEMENTING PARTIES** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. **Strengthening Inclusive Governance & Political Dialogue** | * Develop a two-tiered engagement strategy that integrates grassroots consultations with high-level dialogues. * Collaborating with government and in alignment with their priorities, establish formal partnerships with CSOs, particularly those representing women, youth, and marginalized groups, to ensure their active participation in governance discussions. * Collaborating with the government ensuring Somali owned and Somali led process, support facilitation of joint workshops between political actors and community representatives to enhance mutual trust and understanding. | UNDP, OPM, MoIFAR, CSOs, Donor, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Enhancing Coordination & Policy Coherence** | * Enhance coordination between UNDP, UNSOM, and other partners, ensuring joint implementation plans, resource-sharing, and clear roles. * Develop structured linkages between national-level political dialogues and local reconciliation programs to ensure grassroots concerns inform high-level processes. | UNDP, UNTMIS, Somali Government |
| 1. **Improve Project Efficiency & Resource Allocation.** | * Develop a clear agreement with the government (e.g., an MoU) outlining allowable expenses for recurring activities, such as NCC meetings, to ensure financial consistency and accountability. * Introduce adaptive resource allocation mechanisms to allow for quick reallocation of funds in response to emerging needs or shifting priorities. | UNDP, UN PBF, Somali Government, Donors, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Enhancing Gender Inclusion & Marginalized Group Participation** | * Develop targeted mentorship and leadership programs for women, youth, and marginalized groups to enhance their participation in political decision-making and advocacy. * Establish robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track and enforce the 30% women’s quota. * Collaborating with government and in alignment with their priorities, strengthen formal partnerships with gender-focused and grassroots CSOs to incorporate community-level perspectives into peacebuilding processes and policy discussions. | UNDP, UN Women, Somali Government, CSOs, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Building Sustainable Institutions & Long-Term Political Stability** | * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to formalize the NCC within Somalia’s political framework to enhance its legitimacy, sustainability, and role in fostering reconciliation and governance reforms. * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to develop transparent grievance resolution mechanisms to address federal-state tensions and community disputes. * Implement comprehensive capacity-building programs for national and regional governance actors to sustain reconciliation and negotiation efforts. | UNDP, UNTMIS, member states, Somali Government, |
| 1. **Ensuring Financial Sustainability & Institutional Resilience** | * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to establish national resource mobilization mechanisms and multi-donor trust funds to reduce dependency on external funding. * Strengthen accountability frameworks and M&E systems to track implementation of governance and reconciliation agreements. * Support the government to develop clear financial transition plans to ensure the sustainability of political dialogue mechanisms like the NCC. | UNDP, UNTMIS member states, Somali Government |

1. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in partnership with The United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM), the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MOIFAR) have implemented the two-year project ***Support Political Transition in Somalia (SPTS),*** funded by the United Nation (UN) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)***.*** Geographically, the project was carried out in Mogadishu, Banadir, and the five federal member states – Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle between 26 November 2021 and 26 November 2023.

This is the end-term evaluation of the project. It will be used by UNDP, the new UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), by UN PBF and by the Government of Somalia, for accountability and for learning and will inform future support to political transition in Somalia.

This report is structured according to UNDP’s guidelines for evaluation reports. After a description of the project and the evaluation methodology, including the evaluation questions, the report will present the evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION

## Project Background

The SPTS project was conceived as a means to implement timely political consensus, deepening and strengthening the Somali-led and Somali-owned reconciliation processes and initiatives in order to contribute to longer-term state-building objectives in Somalia. The main goal of this project was to lay the groundwork for the implementation of the National Consultative Council (NCC) Agreement and ongoing political discussions on state-building priorities that were taking place. The aim was to ensure a peaceful transition of power, reduce risks of the use of violence for political gains, and promote a culture of dialogue to permeate all peacebuilding and state-building efforts. The expected outcome was to have strengthened the capacity of key stakeholders to actively participate in discussions and reach agreement on the implementation of the key state-building priorities, based on the NCC Agreement. As per the Terms of Reference (ToR), the project engaged the following stakeholders and beneficiaries – FGS, FMS government Ministries of Interior, Federal and Reconciliation Affairs of Jubbaland State, Galmudug State, Office of the Presidents of Southwest State and Hirshabelle State, the Ministry of Interior, Federalism and Democratization of Puntland State, OPM, and civil society organizations (CSOs).

## Project Objective & Theory of Change

The core objective of the SPTS Project was to provide an enabling environment, and necessary conditions for high-level political dialogue, informed through engagement with civil society, especially women and youth, in order to agree on the advancement of key state-building priorities to prevent, mitigate and manage future conflicts[[2]](#footnote-3).

The project has one outcome and three outputs to contribute to the objective above:

**Outcome 1:** Spaces for high-level political dialogue enabled and FGS/FMS leaders supported to reach consensus on the implementation of state building priorities

* **Output 1.1**: Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s (SRSG’s) good offices facilitate dialogue between the FGS and the FMS and assist in a peaceful resolution of conflicts to reach political agreements.
* **Output 1.2**: The capacity of the OPM strengthened and support to NCCs provided in a timely manner, thereby enabling agreements on the electoral framework and agreements on state-building priorities.
* **Output 1.3**: Engage, mobilize, and equip civil society and other groups, particularly women and young people, in the state-building processes.

The Theory of Change as illustrated in *Figure 1* below makes the following assumptions:

* **SHORT-TERM IMPACT**: (1) Somali leaders will be incentivized to agree on the realization of the state building priorities and (2) citizens engagement in decision-making would secure the broader ownership required to strengthen state-society linkages
* **LONG-TERM IMPACT**: The risk of the use of violence for political gains will be reduced and a culture of dialogue will permeate peacebuilding and state- building efforts

**UNDP Country Programme Document 2021-2025 Linked Outcomes:**

When it comes to UNDP Country Programme Document the project is linked to programme priority 1: governance, inclusive politics and reconciliation[[3]](#footnote-4). It is further aligned with the key national priorities highlighted in the National Development Plan (NDP) – 9, Pillar 1. Inclusive and accountable politics and reconciliation, National Reconciliation Framework (NRF).

## Project’s Key Partners and Budget

*Table 1* below captures the key partners roles in the project implementation[[4]](#footnote-5):

TABLE 1: KEY PARTNERS ROLES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

| **KEY PARTNER** | **ROLE IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION** |
| --- | --- |
| UNDP Somalia country office in coordination with UNSOM PAMG (under the coordination and direction of the Office of the UNSOM Deputy SRSG) | Has overall responsibility and accountability for management of resources and achievement of results. |
| Project Board | Guide and oversee that the project remains on track vis-à-vis the goals, objectives and results as defined in the project document. The PB approves the project annual work plans (including their revisions) and budgets and provides strategic guidance to the implementation of the project. In practice, the board reaches agreement consensually. In case a consensus cannot be reached, final decision rests with the UNDP. |

The total planned budget for the project was USD 2,000,000, and as per the ToR the total expenditure of the project at the time this evaluation was commissioned was USD 1,835,222.

The following figure was developed to capture the project’s Theory of Change (ToC) based on the project’s overall objective, expected outcome, three outputs captured as phases, and the short-term and long-term impact expected according to project document:

FIGURE 1: THEORY of CHANGE (ToC)

**KEY OBJECTIVE: Provide an enabling environment and necessary conditions for high-level political dialogue (informed through engagement with civil society, especially women and youth) to agree on the advancement of key state-building priorities to prevent, mitigate and manage future conflicts**

**Enable political dialogue for peaceful transition of power**

**Support emerging needs for post transition political dialogue**

**CSO engagement to ensure inclusivity and transparency of the state building processes**

**PHASE ONE**

**PHASE TWO**

**PHASE THREE**

**SHORT-TERM IMPACT: (1) Somali leaders will be incentivized to agree on the realization of the state building priorities and (2) citizens engagement in decision-making would secure the broader ownership required to strengthen state-society linkages**

**LONG-TERM IMPACT: The risk of the use of violence for political gains will be reduced and a culture of dialogue will permeate peacebuilding and state- building efforts**

**OUTCOME**

**Spaces for high-level political dialogue enabled and FGS/FMS leaders supported to reach consensus on the implementation of state building priorities**

**ASSUMPTIONS**

## Project Context

Somalia continues to navigate one of the most complex and protracted conflicts in the world. While there has been measurable progress in governance and state-building over the past decade, the country still faces deep-rooted challenges that affect every aspect of political, social, and economic life. These factors create both risks and opportunities for interventions aimed at peacebuilding and institutional reform. The following sub-section highlight the context the project was operating in, both in design and implementation.

### **Social Context**

Somalia’s social fabric has come to be deeply shaped by clan dynamics, influencing governance, access to resources, and representation in decision-making. These dynamics, while a source of identity and social cohesion, have also been a cause of division, contributing to cycles of conflict and exclusion. Women, in particular, remain largely absent from formal peacebuilding processes, despite the crucial roles they play in conflict resolution at the community level. Structural barriers, such as male-dominated political systems and restrictive social norms, continue to limit their participation in governance and decision-making.[[5]](#footnote-6) That said, Somali communities have consistently demonstrated resilience, with local mediation efforts playing a critical role in preventing wider conflict escalation.[[6]](#footnote-7)

### **Political Context**

Somalia’s political landscape remains fragile, marked by disputes between the FGS and FMS, the absence of an agreed-upon Federal Constitution, and the continued presence of non-state armed actors like Al-Shabaab.[[7]](#footnote-8) The 2021 electoral crisis exacerbated tensions, leading to a political standoff that nearly escalated into armed conflict. On April 25, 2021, security forces split along clan lines, and clashes broke out in northern Mogadishu. However, urgent mediation efforts, as well as community led resilience, prevented a full-scale conflict. This led to the May 2021 NCC Agreement, which allowed the electoral process to move forward and facilitated a peaceful transition of power.[[8]](#footnote-9) Despite these setbacks, governance has seen measurable progress. The May 2021 NCC agreement and the establishment of a new administration in August 2022 marked key milestones. The UN played a significant role in supporting these processes, providing mediation, technical assistance, and institutional strengthening through collaborative efforts involving UNDP, UNSOM, and other UN agencies.[[9]](#footnote-10)

### **Economic Context**

Somalia’s economy remains one of the most fragile in the world, constrained by weak institutions, climate related shocks, and persistent security risks.[[10]](#footnote-11) However, the country has made progress to financial and economic reforms, particularly in public financial management, revenue generation, and stabilization efforts. [[11]](#footnote-12) That said, the biggest challenge remains ensuring that economic growth translates into tangible improvements in people’s lives, especially for marginalised groups such as women and youth, who continue to face barriers to economic participation.

### **Institutional Context**

The absence of a fully functioning judicial system means Somalia continues to rely on political settlements rather than legal mechanisms to resolve disputes.[[12]](#footnote-13) This creates uncertainty and weakens public trust in institutions. Additionally, federal-state tensions have complicated governance and service delivery, making institutional reform a priority for long-term stability. However, Somalia has an opportunity to build stronger institutions through capacity building initiatives and legal reforms. The UN and international partners continue to support these efforts, particularly in constitutional review, security sector reform, and peacebuilding initiatives.[[13]](#footnote-14)

### **Geographical Landscape**

Somalia’s geography presents both logical and security challenges. Certain regions, including major roads and strategic areas, remain under Al-Shabaab control, limiting access for government and humanitarian actors.[[14]](#footnote-15) As a result, most interventions have been concentrated in Mogadishu and other relatively secure areas, restricting broader engagement. However, localized peace initiatives and increasing coordination between federal and regional authorities offer opportunities for more inclusive and sustainable governance.

### **Challenges and Opportunities in the Context of the Project**

**Challenges:**

* Ongoing security threats limited movement and access to key regions.
* Political fragmentation and governance tensions delayed reforms.
* Limited inclusion of women and youth in peacebuilding processes.

**Opportunities:**

* The NCC Agreements and international support provided a foundation for institutional reform and stabilisation.
* Somali communities demonstrated remarkable resilience, which could be leveraged for long-term peacebuilding.
* UNDP and its partners played a key role in supporting political dialogue and institutional strengthening.

In summary, the project operated within a complex and evolving environment shaped by political tensions, security constraints, and institutional challenges. Despite these limitations, opportunities existed in the form of increased international support, community resilience, and ongoing governance reforms. These factors not only influenced the project’s implementation but also provided a critical lens through which the evaluation will assess its effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability in the following sections.

1. EVALUATION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

## Scope of Evaluation

The scope of the evaluation was to cover the outcome and all outputs during the entire project period. The evaluation assessed the criteria of – **relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness,** **impact, sustainability, and equality and inclusivity.** The evaluation was also expected to have a geographical coverage that was representative of the main areas where the project has been implemented within both the FGS and FMS. Specifically, Banadir, and the five federal member states – Puntland, Jubbaland, Southwest State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle were planned to be covered through evaluation interviews and visits. However, no meeting outside Mogadishu took place in the end because the list of stakeholders provided by UNDP did not include individuals or institutions outside of the city. As a result, when interviews were scheduled, all identified stakeholders were located in Mogadishu, making external engagement unfeasible.

Additionally, in accordance with the ToR, the evaluation focused on the project aspects presented in the following *Table 1*, and compiled challenges, lessons learned, and provided actionable recommendations based on evidence collected to guide the design and implementation of future governance and peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia.

TABLE 2: PROJECT ASPECTS TO BE EVALUATED

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **EVALUATION FOCUS** | |
| **PROGRESS AND IMPACT** | * Assess the appropriateness of the Project design and management arrangements for achieving the stated objectives. * An in-depth review of the extent to which the implementation of various programme components and outputs outlined in the programme document and work plan has been achieved to identify the level of achievement as well as an analysis of factors in case the set benchmarks were not fulfilled. * Review assumptions underpinning current programme theory of change for amendment/revision and the expected impact. * Recommend alternative activities or implementation modalities for optimizing intended results and potential impact. * Propose any new pilot/experimental activities and/or phasing out of activities that may no longer be relevant or require amendments. |
| **MANAGEMENT & MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS** | * Conduct an in-depth review of the oversight, reporting and monitoring structures designed to support the Joint Programme implementation. |
| **RISK MANAGEMENT** | * Assess the current and possible risks to the Joint Programme outputs and suggest related mitigation strategies which may be undertaken in future. |
| **PARTNERSHIPS & LOCALIZATION** | * Assess the quality of partnerships, national ownership, and sustainability vis-à-vis the strategy in the Joint Programme document. * Assess partnerships that can be further enhanced for an extended phase of the Joint Programme. * Identify partnerships that need to be undertaken for comprehensive programming, coordination, and programme implementation. |

## Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The end-term evaluation of the SPTS project assessed the contributions the project has made towards enhancing political stability and transition in Somalia. This was done by identifying the success of the project in, as per the ToR, achieving its intended outputs and outcome, particularly in its ability to facilitate high-level political dialogue, strengthen institutional capacities, and promote active societal engagement in state-building efforts. Additionally, the evaluation:

1. Assessed the alignment of project interventions with the strategic needs and priorities of Somalia’s political landscape during the period from November 2021 to November 2023.
2. Analysed how economically resources were utilized to generate value within the project’s scope, examining the management of finances and human resources against the results achieved.
3. Assessed the project’s inclusivity in reaching marginalized groups, including people with disabilities and its impact on gender equality and women's empowerment. This will be done by examining the extent the project has addressed gender-specific needs, promoted women's participation, and ensured their representation in decision-making processes.
4. Assessed the sustainability of the project’s outputs and the impact on political transition in Somalia with regard to ongoing political dialogue, institutional resilience, and civic engagement.
5. Explored how the project’s impact may be maintained or enhanced post-project completion by identifying pathways for continued engagement and institutional strengthening.
6. Compiled key insights and obstacles encountered during the project lifecycle to inform the design and implementation of future governance and peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia
7. Provided actionable recommendations based on evidence collected, aimed at guiding future projects and policy formulation to consolidate peace and political stability in Somalia.
8. Identified bottlenecks and lessons learned to ensure that remaining gaps are addressed during the period until the end of the United Nations Cooperation Framework (UNCF) in December 2025.
9. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS

## Evaluation Approach

The evaluation planned to use a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. This approach was designed to address the complexity of the project operating in the political, institutional, and social landscape in Somalia, ensuring that diverse perspectives are captured. However, the quantitative data collection – an online survey – agreed on in the inception report and prepared by the consultants, was not conducted in the end at the request of UNDP. This was due to UNDP not having the contact information of stakeholders, especially for the participants from the NVC trainings. Only a qualitative approach was applied. Specifically, the evaluation then focused on:

* **Gender-responsiveness,** ensuring that gender equality and inclusivity are central to both the evaluation process and the analysis of project outcomes.
* **A human rights-based approach**, with special attention to marginalized groups such as women, youth, and people with disabilities, ensuring that their experiences are accounted for.
* **A** **utilization-focused evaluation**, ensuring that findings are useful and actionable and applicable to future programming and decision-making for both UNDP and the Government of Somalia.

The evaluation assessed the project’s relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact on the political transition in Somalia, with specific emphasis on the project’s contribution to gender empowerment, inclusivity, and reconciliation processes.

The **utilization-focused approach** ensured that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations are actionable and directly aligned with the needs of the primary users of this evaluation, mainly **UNDP’s Somalia Country Office**, and **government counterparts.** They will rely on the evaluation to eventually inform future **decision-making processes**, shape **future programming strategies**, and **enhance accountability** regarding political transition initiatives in Somalia.

The evaluation served the following **purposes**:

* *For UNDP and government partners*: the findings can be used to improve future project design and adjust current strategies to enhance their relevance and impact.
* *For CSOs and beneficiaries*: the lessons learned can inform future inclusive practices for marginalized groups, including women, youth, and people with disabilities.
* *For international partners and donors*: the findings can inform strategic priorities for Somalia through identifying effective and sustainable approaches, and future funding priorities.

**Key steps of the utilization-focused approach included:**

1. *Permanent engagement of intended users*: Key stakeholders, including UNDP, and government representatives, were consulted during all steps of the evaluation to ensure their priorities and information needs were met by the evaluation design, implementation and analysis. Civil society partners, originally planned to be included as agreed in the inception report, were ultimately neither consulted nor included in the evaluation, at the request of UNDP.
2. *Focus on actionable findings*: The evaluation aimed to provide practical and evidence-based recommendations. This final evaluation report provides concrete, user-friendly and realistic recommendations structured around thematic areas, such as gender inclusivity, political dialogue, and capacity building to allow for direct application in future programming and policy-making (should recommendations be accepted in the management response).
3. *Iterative feedback*: Preliminary findings were shared with key stakeholders through a debrief session to ensure alignment with their expectations and to incorporate feedback.
4. *Guided by the evaluation questions and objectives*: The evaluation framework had been designed with the specific evaluation objectives and questions in mind, with a focus on relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and equality and inclusivity.

## Evaluation Questions

The evaluation addressed the following key questions, grouped according to the evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, as well as additional considerations for equality and inclusivity (gender and disability). The questions were modified from the assignment ToR after the review of key documents and after discussion with UNDP, in order to respond to all relevant evaluation questions.

**1.** **Relevance**

* How relevant were the objectives and activities implemented by the project in addressing state-building and peacebuilding issues in Somalia?
* Were the project’s goals aligned with the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) and National Development Plan (NDP-9)?
* How did the stakeholders perceive the relevance of the project?
* Were the inputs and strategies identified appropriate and adequate to achieve the project’s results?
* Were the project activities realistic and well-tailored to the needs of Somalia’s political transition?
* To what extent did the project support gender empowerment, participation, and protection?
* How relevant were the project’s interventions in addressing gender-specific needs, particularly those of women and marginalized groups?

**2.** **Coherence**

* How has collaboration between key stakeholders, including UNDP, UNSOM, national/regional counterparts, and civil society, contributed to addressing the needs and priorities of the project?
* Were there synergies with other programs or partners that enhanced the project’s outcomes?
* How well did the project integrate with other UN joint programs and initiatives?
* Were there opportunities for better partnership and coordination across different programs?

**3.** **Efficiency**

* How efficient was the overall project implementation, particularly in terms of staffing, planning, and coordination?
* Were resources (financial, human, and material) used optimally to achieve project outcomes?
* Was project implementation cost-effective, and did it adhere to the planned timeline and budget?
* How effectively were financial resources allocated and managed?
* Were the accounting and financial systems adequate for project management and reporting?
* Were financial reports accurate and timely, and did they contribute to project accountability?
* Did the project have a suitable and tailored monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system and was it used appropriately?

**4. Effectiveness**

* How effective was the project in facilitating high-level political dialogue and supporting Somalia’s political transition?
* Did the project achieve its stated objectives of strengthening institutional capacity and promoting state-building priorities?
* To what extent did the project promote inclusivity in peacebuilding, particularly the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups?
* How effective were the strategies used to engage these groups in the political process?
* What impact did the project have on fostering political and peacebuilding processes that are gender-responsive?
* Were women actively participating in decision-making processes, and did the project address gender-specific barriers?

**5. Impact**

* To what extent did the project generate positive or negative, intended or unintended, effects on Somalia’s peacebuilding and state-building environment?
* How did the project contribute to the larger objectives of political stability and reconciliation?
* What tangible improvements in governance, political participation, or community reconciliation have been observed as a result of the project?
* Can specific examples or case studies of positive impact be identified?

**6. Sustainability**

* Will the changes brought about by the project continue beyond its lifespan?
* What mechanisms are in place to ensure the sustainability of project outcomes, particularly at the national and community levels?
* How has the project strengthened the capacity of local institutions and partners to sustain peacebuilding and state-building efforts?
* Are there adequate motivations or incentives for local partners to continue playing their roles after the project’s completion?
* What are the risks to the sustainability of project outcomes, and how can they be mitigated?
* Are there political, financial, or institutional risks that could undermine the long-term success of the project?

**7. Equality and Inclusivity**

* To what extent did the project address the needs of women and promote their participation in state-building and political processes?
* Was gender-specific barriers identified and addressed in the project’s design and implementation?
* Were marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with disabilities, consulted and meaningfully involved in project activities?
* What challenges did these groups face, and how effectively did the project respond to their needs?
* How successful was the project in promoting gender-responsive approaches and ensuring that women’s voices were included in political decision-making?
* Were there measurable improvements in gender equality outcomes as a result of the project?
* To what extent did the project address the needs of people with disabilities?

## Evaluation Design and Data Collection Methods

Initially, five data collection methods were planned – desk review of documents, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), field visits, and an online survey. In the end, only the first two, Desk Review and KIIs took place, at the request of UNDP.

1. **Desk Review**

The desk review provided the foundational understanding of the project’s design, objectives, and results to date. This involved a systematic analysis of:

* **Project documents**: Including the original project proposal, annual work plans, and periodic progress reports.
* **National policies and strategic frameworks**: Including the National Development Plan (NDP-9) and the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF), which are central to understanding the political context in which the project operated in.
* **Financial Reports and Budget Revisions**: These documents were meant to help assess how financial resources have been allocated and used relative to the project’s stated objectives.
* **Gender and Human Rights Reports**: Reviewed any reports or guidelines that informed gender mainstreaming and human rights considerations within the project.

This desk review was used to help identify key areas of inquiry, gaps in existing documentation, and inform the finalisation of the interview and survey instruments (which are included as a draft in the annex of this report).

1. **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)**

KIIs were conducted with only a small array of stakeholders to gather insights and qualitative data. These interviews included:

* **Government Officials**: Representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR).
* **UNDP Project Staff**: Including the project management team, technical advisors, and other staff involved in project implementation.

**Beneficiary Groups,** including women and youth groups, local community leaders, and civil society advocates, as well as **International Partners**, such as international partners and donors involved in peacebuilding and governance, or UN agencies such as UN Women, agreed upon during the inception phase, were ultimately not included in the evaluation, at the request of UNDP.

These conducted interviews were semi-structured to allow for a balance between standardized data collection and the flexibility to explore specific topics in greater depth. Questionnaires were agreed upon with UNDP during the inception phase. The interviews were designed to:

* Assess the relevance and effectiveness of the project in promoting state-building and reconciliation.
* Evaluate the project’s contribution to enhancing women’s participation in political processes.
* Identify challenges, gaps, and lessons learned from the project’s implementation.

## Gender-Responsive Evaluation Approach

The evaluation aimed to adopt a **gender-responsive approach** to assess the project’s impact on gender equality and inclusivity. However, this approach was primarily intended to be implemented through field visits and focus group discussions (FGDs), which ultimately did not take place due to a request from UNDP. Instead, two interviews were conducted to specifically explore the project’s gender-related activities—one with UNSOM staff and the other with a Somali government gender representative.

## Ethical Considerations

The evaluation was conducted in strict adherence to the UNEG Ethical Guidelines, ensuring that all participants are treated with respect and confidentiality. Key ethical considerations included:

* **Informed Consent**: All participants were fully informed about the purpose of the evaluation and their role in it. Participation will be voluntary, and participants will have the right to withdraw at any time.
* **Confidentiality**: The confidentiality of participants was maintained throughout the evaluation process, and no personal information was disclosed without explicit consent.
* **Cultural Sensitivity**: The evaluation was conducted in a culturally sensitive manner, ensuring that all data collection methods are adapted to the local context and respect cultural norms.

It was planned that the evaluation would pay special attention to ensuring that marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with disabilities, were included in the evaluation in a way that is respectful and inclusive. However, in the end no such interviews were conducted, at the request of UNDP.

## Limitations

The evaluation encountered challenges that impacted its ability to comprehensively assess the project’s outcomes and effectiveness. Key challenges include:

* **Limited amount of data available**: The evaluation faced the challenge limited project documentation, particularly available project reports about activities. The evaluation found that most likely more had been conducted by the project than what is reflected in written documentation, which is partly due to a lack of monitoring and evaluation and a dedicated responsibility for tracking project activities. The limited data availability influenced the depth of analysis for certain evaluation criteria, particularly in assessing broader stakeholder perspectives. That said, the evaluation remains credible as the KIIs provided detailed and context-specific insights into relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, minimizing as much as possible the impact of missing information, with additional measures taken to ensure the depth and validity of the findings through triangulating multiple interviews The evaluation also incorporated secondary data from available documentation to strengthen the credibility of the findings, while not being limited too much by the small sample size. Caution was exercised in generalizing findings, with an emphasis on depth and quality of insights rather than quantity of interviews.
* **Limited number of interviews conducted:** The evaluation was only able to conduct a small number of KIIs, due to limited list of individuals representing the implementor, and key counterparts from UNSOM, OPM, and MoIFAR. UNDP was unable to provide additional stakeholders to expand the number of interviews. The FGDs and the online survey, agreed upon during the inception phase, were not conducted at the request of UNDP. The inception report included FGDs and an online survey as approved methods, UNDP later decided not to proceed with these approaches.. We understand that it may have been due to the limited number of stakeholders directly involved in the project made FGDs and surveys impractical, and thus influencing the decision. As a result, to mitigate the absence of FGD and the survey, data collection was adjusted to focus on in-depth KIIs, triangulate data, finding from KIIs were cross-checked with secondary documentation, available project documents were analysed to fill gaps in primary data.

## Cross-Cutting Issues

The evaluation integrated cross-cutting issues throughout its design, data collection, and analysis. The main cross-cutting issues considered were gender equality and social inclusion, human rights, and conflict sensitivity:

### Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI)

The evaluation reviewed how the project promoted gender equality and addressed the needs of marginalized groups, including women, youth, and people with disabilities. Data collection tools for KIIs, FGDs and the survey were designed to ensure that diverse voices were represented by encouraging active participation from all relevant groups. However, neither FGDs nor the survey were conducted in the end, at the request of UNDP.

### Human Rights and Accountability

The evaluation adopted a human rights-based approach, analysing how the project aligned with national and international human rights standards. Attention was given to the inclusion of marginalized and vulnerable communities.

### Conflict Sensitivity

Given the complex political and security context in Somalia, the evaluation considered the impact of project activities on conflict dynamics, both “do-no-harm” and “do-good”. The evaluation tried to identify any unintended consequences and assessed whether the project promoted peaceful resolution mechanisms and mitigated the risk of exacerbating tensions.

1. DATA ANALYSIS

The evaluation used qualitative data analysis to analyse the collected data through KIIs, specifically thematic analysis exploring the following key themes:

* The project’s effectiveness in fostering political dialogue and state-building.
* The extent to which gender equality and inclusivity were integrated into the project’s design and implementation.
* Challenges faced during project execution.
* Lessons learned that can inform future projects.

As mentioned earlier, a limited number of KIIs were carried out combined with the limited documentation in the project, not all evaluation questions could be fully answered.

Although a survey was initially planned for the evaluation, it was not completed at the request of UNDP. Thus, due to limitations and information gap no quantitative data analysis was done, this included analysing the financial performance as there wasn’t enough documentation to cross-reference and get the narrative for the budget allocation vs. the actual spending. Similarly, due to limited M&E documentation quantitative analysis could not be done for outcome indicators.

The evaluation ensured as much as possible reliability and validity of findings through triangulating the available data. This was done through cross-verifying available information, identifying areas of convergence and divergence in stakeholder perspectives so that the conclusions drawn were as robust as possible and were supported by available sources of evidence (KIIs and available documents).

1. FINDINGS

## Relevance

**Evaluation Question** – *How relevant were the objectives and activities implemented by the project in addressing state-building and peacebuilding issues in Somalia? Were the project’s goals aligned with the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) and National Development Plan (NDP-9)?*

The evaluation finds that the project was relevant. The objectives and activities of the project were relevant to addressing state-building and peacebuilding issues in Somalia. The project objectives were aligned with the United Nations (UN) country framework, reflecting international priorities for Somalia’s stabilization and development. The project goals also aligned with the Government of Somalia’s priorities including aligning with the NRF and NDP-9, linking it to high level decision-making.[[15]](#footnote-16)

POLITICAL VS. DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROJECT

The Support Political Transition in Somalia Project highlights the tension between political imperatives and development objectives in fragile contextst. Politically, the project was viewed as essential for maintaining stability and facilitating high-level dialogue among Somali leaders during critical moments of transition. UN officials with a political mandate and mindset emphasized the project’s role in fostering consensus-building and preventing conflict escalation through the National Consultative Council (NCC), describing it as a cornerstone of peacebuilding efforts.

From a development perspective, however, the project faced notable shortcomings. Stakeholders observed that key development principles—such as promoting gender equality, fostering broad inclusivity, and achieving measurable outcomes—were not consistently met. The lack of robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms also further hindered the ability to track progress and adapt interventions based on lessons learned. Moreover, the project’s top-down approach, primarily focused on elite political actors, which was requested by the government and UNTMIS following the urgency to facilitate political processes to prevent outbreak of the conflict, constrained efforts to engage marginalized groups, particularly women and youth.

This dichotomy, reflected in the interviews conducted for this evaluation, underscores the challenge of balancing political priorities with sustainable development goals in fragile contexts. To address this, future iterations should aimfor a more integrated approach that aligns political stabilization efforts with inclusive development outcomes, ensuring that peacebuilding processes are both legitimate and sustainable.

The project is linked to CPD Outcome governance, inclusive politics and reconciliation under the UNDP Country Programme Document 2021-2025. Additionally, the project aligns with Somalia’s NDP-9 Pillar 1. Inclusive and accountable politics and reconciliation.[[16]](#footnote-17) These linkages demonstrate that the project was designed to align with both national and international development priorities, ensuring coherence and relevance.

The project addressed critical needs during a volatile period when Somalia was at the brink of civil war, elections were delayed, and political leaders were unable to reach consensus.[[17]](#footnote-18) The establishment of NCCs provided a mechanism for dialogue and facilitated a peaceful transition of power, addressing an urgent gap in the governance and peacebuilding framework.[[18]](#footnote-19)

In summary, the project was highly relevant to Somalia’s political and developmental needs, effectively addressing immediate challenges related to state-building and peacebuilding. By aligning with national and international frameworks, the project demonstrated its ability to respond to critical governance gaps during a period of heightened political instability.

**Evaluation Question** – *How did the stakeholders perceive the relevance of the project?*

Stakeholders widely perceived the project as relevant, given its focus on addressing Somalia’s critical challenges of political instability and delays in elections. Interviewees emphasized that the project directly responded to the challenges by fostering dialogue and engagement, which were essential for addressing national priorities and resolving contentious issues mainly around the electoral agreement.[[19]](#footnote-20)

The project’s main focus shifted to support the smooth implementation of elections during a politically fragile period when mechanisms for consensus-building were lacking.[[20]](#footnote-21) Originating from the UN’s recognition of this gap, the project was designed as a vehicle for dialogue, with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) playing a pivotal role as the driving force. The Prime Minister’s active leadership in steering the process further underscored the project’s relevance, demonstrating government ownership and commitment.[[21]](#footnote-22) Stakeholders particularly highlighted the project’s role in facilitating continuous engagement and dialogue between FGS and FMS leaders, contributing to consensus-building on electoral frameworks and other national priorities.[[22]](#footnote-23) The Government of Somalia affirmed the project’s alignment with its state-building objectives, reinforcing its perceived importance.[[23]](#footnote-24)

In summary, stakeholders overwhelmingly acknowledged the project’s relevance to Somalia’s critical state-building and peacebuilding challenges. Its alignment with national priorities and its ability to address immediate political crises through fostering dialogue and consensus-building enhanced its perceived importance. However, future initiatives should consider deepening grassroots involvement to ensure broader inclusivity and sustainability.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were the inputs and strategies identified appropriate and adequate to achieve the project’s results?*

The appropriateness and adequacy of the inputs and strategies identified for the project were shaped by substantial modifications during implementation. Initially broader in scope, the project was redesigned to focus primarily on supporting the NCC and Director-General Coordination Forum (DGCF) meetings, reflecting the evolving priorities of Somalia's state-building and peacebuilding context.[[24]](#footnote-25) Civil society outreach and inclusion was also planned to be a major component of the project when it was designed but was largely reduced during implementation.[[25]](#footnote-26) The decision to reduce the scope and reallocate resources was driven by the increasing demand for NCC meetings, which became a critical platform for facilitating dialogue between the FGS and FMSs[[26]](#footnote-27). This shift ensured that the project addressed the immediate need for consensus-building during a volatile period, but it also meant that other planned activities, such as the survey component, civil society outreach and promotion of gender equality, were deprioritized or removed entirely.[[27]](#footnote-28) A significant portion of program funds was redirected to support the NCC, underlining its strategic importance in achieving the project’s objectives.[[28]](#footnote-29)

In summary, the inputs and strategies of the project were adapted to meet Somalia’s urgent political needs, particularly the facilitation of high-level dialogue through the NCC. While this adaptation enhanced the project’s relevance during a critical period, it limited the scope of planned activities, such as civil society engagement and gender-focused initiatives. Future projects should aim to balance immediate political priorities with broader, long-term goals to ensure inclusivity and sustainability.

**Assessment of Output Design**

The design of the project output was largely responsive to Somalia’s evolving political context. The Project Results Framework outlines key outputs related to facilitating political dialogue through the NCC, supporting constitutional review, promoting women’s political participation. While these outputs effectively addressed immediate state-building needs, their design evolved during implementation, prioritizing high-level political engagement over broader civil society participation. For example, output 1.3 initially included grants to CSOs for political participation but was deprioritized in favour of direct government engagement. the shift in focus ensured relevance but also reduced inclusivity, particularly for women and marginalized groups. Future project design could benefit from ensuring a balance between high-level negotiations and grassroots participation to promote sustainability and inclusivity.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were the project activities realistic and well-tailored to the needs of Somalia’s political transition?*

The project activities were realistic and well-tailored to the needs of Somalia’s political transition. Designed in response to the political realities at the time, the project addressed the critical need for mechanisms that could support dialogue, consensus-building, and collaboration among Somalia’s political leaders.[[29]](#footnote-30) By focusing on facilitating the NCC meetings and other forums for engagement, the activities directly supported the FGS and FMSs in navigating the complexities of the political transition.[[30]](#footnote-31)

Interviewees emphasized that the project was designed to align with the government’s needs and priorities, ensuring its relevance and practicality in the given context.[[31]](#footnote-32)

In summary, the project activities were both realistic and responsive to Somalia’s political transition needs, effectively addressing the immediate priorities of dialogue and consensus-building. By aligning with the government’s objectives, the activities contributed to advancing the transition process. Future projects could expand this tailored approach to include broader engagement with civil society and marginalized groups, ensuring inclusivity alongside practicality.

**Assessment of Indicator Design**

The Project Results Framework includes a structured set of indicators to measure progress. Several indicators are designed to be SMART – Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-bound – particularly those tracking NCC meetings, constitutional amendments, and agreements on state-building priorities. However, the extent to which gender-disaggregated data was consistently collected and analysed remains unclear. While indicators such as # of community reconciliation initiatives addressing women’s interests and # of women engaged in the state-building process aimed to incorporate gender perspectives, the evaluation found limited mechanism for systematically tracking gender impact, although some gender-related activities, facilitated by the OPM, to inform the NCC decision making were organized. Additionally, the indicator on implementing the 30% women’s quota focused on advocacy, rather than concrete mechanisms for enforcement. Future projects should ensure that indicators are not only SMART but also systematically disaggregated by sex, age, and other relevant factors to provide a more nuanced understanding of inclusion and participation.

**Evaluation Question** – *To what extent did the project support gender empowerment, participation, and protection? How relevant were the project’s interventions in addressing gender-specific needs, particularly those of women and marginalized groups?*

The project made some efforts to support gender empowerment, participation, and protection, but its overall impact on addressing gender-specific needs, particularly those of women and marginalized groups, was limited[[32]](#footnote-33). While conversations about gender inclusion were initiated with counterparts at the OPM, these discussions faced significant resistance, highlighting the challenging political and cultural environment.[[33]](#footnote-34) Notable efforts included the nomination of Goodwill Ambassadors by the OPM to advocate for a 30% women’s quota in decision-making spaces. However, the quota was not achieved during the elections, reflecting both the lack of a clear mechanism to enforce it and limited proactive engagement from the government.[[34]](#footnote-35) A training on non-violent communication for a total of 157 women was conducted, however interviewees expressed concerns about how the training was organised and about the lack of monitoring and follow-up.[[35]](#footnote-36)

Despite these challenges, gender-related activities such as supporting women-led field visits led by the late Minister Khadija Mohamed Diriye demonstrated some progress.[[36]](#footnote-37) These visits engaged women’s networks at both the federal and member state levels, fostering dialogue with political leaders and clan elders. However, the project lacked a systematic approach to integrating gender considerations into its broader objectives since NCC meetings were prioritized. The lessons learned from these initial efforts suggest that while the baseline for gender inclusion was not ambitious, sustained and structured mechanisms are critical to achieving meaningful gender-related outcomes in future initiatives.

In summary, the project made initial efforts to support gender empowerment, participation, and protection, particularly through advocacy for a 30% women’s quota and women-led initiatives. However, the lack of systematic approaches, enforcement mechanisms, and follow-up processes limited its impact on addressing gender-specific needs. Future projects should integrate structured and sustained gender-focused strategies into their objectives, ensuring that activities are monitored and resistance is proactively addressed.

## Coherence

**Evaluation Question** – *How has collaboration between key stakeholders, including UNDP, UNSOM, national/regional counterparts, and civil society, contributed to addressing the needs and priorities of the project?*

The collaboration between stakeholders, including UNDP, UNSOM, and the Somali government played an important role in advancing the project, but it also faced important challenges. The partnership between UNDP and OPM was mentioned by several interviewees as essential in convening the NCC and supporting high-level political dialogue.[[37]](#footnote-38) This collaboration ensured that the project aligned with Somalia’s NDP-9 and the NRF, through addressing core political needs related to elections, federalism, and reconciliation.

UNSOM’s contributions complemented UNDP’s efforts by providing political expertise and Good Offices, particularly during periods of political stalemate. However, despite established weekly coordination meetings between UNDP and UNTMIS, numerous ad-hoc requests to support political processes sometimes resulted in fragmented support, leading to missed opportunities for more cohesive joint project implementation. This lack of synergy weakened the potential for resource-sharing and policy coherence.[[38]](#footnote-39)

Collaboration with CSOs was an area where the project clearly fell short of its own planning and expectations and of the assumptions made when the project was designed (and amended). While civil society engagement was referenced as a project priority, reports and interview notes highlighted that CSOs were largely sidelined in high-level political discussions. As a result, community-level perspectives, particularly those from marginalized groups such as women, youth and people with disabilities, were not fully reflected in the NCC’s deliberations. This limited the inclusivity and perceived legitimacy of the political dialogue process. A planned survey to include civil society views and perceptions, was not conducted because of Somali government’s resistance to it that UNDP did not challenge.[[39]](#footnote-40)

The Somali government, particularly the OPM and MoIFAR (Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation), demonstrated strong ownership of the project, which was a critical success factor, [[40]](#footnote-41) even if Puntland and Jubbaland left the NCC process after the project’s last NCC activities, due to a lack of grievance mechanisms in the NCC set-up.

In summary, while stakeholder collaboration contributed to key achievements, such as the facilitation of high-level political dialogue, it was hindered by weak inter-agency coordination and insufficient grassroots engagement. Addressing these shortcomings can enhance both the inclusivity and sustainability of future initiatives.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were there synergies with other programs or partners that enhanced the project’s outcomes?*

The project benefited from some synergies with other programs and partners, but these were largely dependent on ad-hoc arrangements rather than formalized partnerships. On the positive side, the close collaboration with UNSOM added significant political value, as UNSOM’s diplomatic support and political advisory roles complemented UNDP’s technical assistance and implementation capabilities. This synergy was particularly effective during NCC meetings, where UNSOM’s mediation efforts helped to resolve political impasses, while UNDP ensured logistical and administrative support.

The project also aligned with broader initiatives, such as the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), reinforcing its contributions to governance and state-building. However, these connections were limited and there was limited evidence of joint programming or integrated monitoring mechanisms to capitalize on the collective impact of multiple UN entities.

Similarly, synergies with civil society programs were limited. While some coordination occurred during dialogue forums, there is no evidence that CSO recommendations have been integrated into NCC planning. This weakened the project’s grassroots outreach and limited its ability to create bottom-up pressure for governance reforms.

A notable synergy gap was between UNDP and other donor-funded reconciliation and governance programs, which could have complemented the project’s high-level political focus. For example, initiatives focusing on local governance and reconciliation could have strengthened community buy-in for the federal-state dialogue supported by the project. But a lack of coordination mechanisms prevented the integration of local-level initiatives into the national political dialogue process.[[41]](#footnote-42)

The evaluation found no explicit documentation detailing how the project coordinated with other UNDP governance and peacebuilding initiatives in terms of joint programming, integrated monitoring, or shared outcomes. However, based on a review of the project framework, it is evident that the project was formally linked to several UNDP interventions, including State-building and Reconciliation Support Program (SRSP), the Joint Parliamentary Support Project (PSP), and the Consolidate Gains in the Constitutional Review Process initiative.

The project was governed through the UNDP Reconciliation and Federalization Support (REFS) project board until mid-2022, after which a new oversight structure was established, including UNDP, UNSOM, PBF, and OPM. Additionally, some of the project’s staffing and activities were cost-shared with other UNDP initiatives, suggesting financial and operational synergies. UNDP and UNSOM also maintained a weekly coordination platform, where progress on joint programs was discussed, providing an avenue for inter-agency collaboration.[[42]](#footnote-43)

Despite these formal arrangements, the evaluation found that ad hoc requests to support political processes sometimes resulted in fragmented support, leading to missed opportunities for more cohesive joint project implementation.

To improve internal coherence, future projects should strengthen documentation of cross-program collaboration and establish clear integration mechanisms between UNDP-led governance and peacebuilding initiatives.

In summary, while the project leveraged synergies with UNSOM and aligned with broader UN frameworks, it was also formally linked to other UNDP-led governance initiatives. However, opportunities to build stronger partnerships with key regional actors and CSOs, and other UNDP programmes were not fully utilized. Strengthening these synergies through formalized collaboration and joint programming could significantly enhance the project’s outcomes and long-term sustainability.

**Evaluation Question** – *How well did the project integrate with other UN joint programs and initiatives?*

The project demonstrated some alignment with broader UN joint programs and initiatives, but the depth of integration was limited in practice. The project’s objectives were consistent with UNSDCF and Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, reflecting its commitment to supporting Somalia’s political transition, peacebuilding, and inclusive governance. However, the lack of structured joint implementation mechanisms meant that the project often operated in silos, with limited operational collaboration across UN agencies.

UNSOM’s involvement provided valuable political expertise and complemented the project’s governance-focused activities. Interviews indicated that coordination between UNDP and UNSOM was impacted by ad hoc request to support political dialogues, which affected cohesive project implementation. As a result, opportunities to leverage UNSOM’s resources and UNSDCF joint outcomes were not fully realized.[[43]](#footnote-44)

Additionally, the project’s engagement with other UN agencies working in Somalia, such as UN Women, was limited, although UNWOMEN and UNDP jointly supported Goodwill Ambassadors and were part of the joint UN coordination mechanism to advocate for the implementation of the 30% quota, chaired by the DSRSG. Although gender inclusion was a core aspect of the project, stakeholders highlighted that stronger collaboration with UN Women could have enhanced efforts to promote women’s political participation. Similarly, integration with other peacebuilding initiatives, such as those led by the UN PBF, was noted as an area for improvement. Interviewees cited examples where projects with overlapping objectives operated independently rather than through a coordinated approach that could have reinforced outcomes.

For coordination with other humanitarian and development action of the UN, though not the purpose or focus of this project, UNDP participated in the inclusive politics donor coordination group and gave regular briefings about the NCC. R. t

In summary, while the project aligned with key UN joint programs on paper, its integration into the broader UN system was limited in practice. Addressing these gaps through joint implementation frameworks and stronger inter-agency partnerships could enhance coherence, resource efficiency, and long-term impact.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were there opportunities for better partnership and coordination across different programs?*

The project presented several opportunities to enhance partnerships and coordination, but these were not fully leveraged. Interviews with UNDP and UNSOM staff highlighted that while collaboration between the two entities occurred on a regular basis and also during key moments—such as NCC meetings— sometimes ad hoc requests to a certain extent impacted the implementation.

Although UNDP was collaborating with UN Women with regards to supporting Goodwill Ambassadors, stronger collaboration with UN Women and other agencies working under the Women, Peace, and Security agenda was necessary. Several interviewees emphasized that integrating UN Women’s expertise could have strengthened gender mainstreaming efforts, particularly around the 30% women’s quota for political representation. H UNDP was part of the joint UN platform led by the DSRSG to advocate for the 30% quota during which tasks for different UN agencies were assigned. Although this platform collected senior representatives of the agencies, it had ultimately only a limited advocacy success. Additionally, closer partnerships with CSOs advocating for women’s political participation could have broadened grassroots engagement and increased the pressure for systemic change.

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Partnerships with donor-funded initiatives in governance and reconciliation, such as the UN PBF supported projects, were either not pursued because of the absence of obvious links to other projects, or were made later during the project, e.g. with the Women, Peace and Protection Programme and the Joint Justice and Correction Programme..

From an internal UN perspective, several stakeholders noted that stronger coordination between political, development, and humanitarian arms of the UN system could have created more comprehensive responses to Somalia’s challenges. For instance, integrating socio-economic recovery programs into political stabilization efforts could have addressed the root causes of conflict, such as economic exclusion and unemployment, particularly among youth.

In summary, while the project achieved notable collaboration at the political level, there were significant opportunities to strengthen partnerships with gender-focused agencies, and CSOs. By formalizing coordination structures and fostering inter-agency synergies, future projects could achieve a more holistic and sustainable approach to governance and peacebuilding.

## Efficiency

**Evaluation Question** – *How efficient was the overall project implementation, particularly in terms of staffing, planning, and coordination? Were resources (financial, human, and material) used optimally to achieve project outcomes?*

The overall efficiency of the project implementation demonstrated strengths in resource allocation and flexibility but faced challenges in planning and coordination, particularly in human resource management.[[44]](#footnote-45) The project was implemented under a direct implementation modality (DIM), with UNDP Somalia as the lead agency in coordination with UNSOM PAMG. Governance was structured around Project Board, responsible for oversight, approvals, and strategic guidance, and a Technical Committee, which prepared work plans, risk assessments, and resource plans. A summary of key roles and responsibilities is provided in Table 1: Key Partners Roles in Project Implementation, in sub-section 6.3 above. This governance structure ensured structured decision-making, although some stakeholders noted challenges in coordination between design and implementation teams.[[45]](#footnote-46) Financially, the project’s $2 million dollar budget was considered sufficient for its two-year duration by interviewees, with resources effectively allocated to priority activities, such as NCC meetings and related gatherings.[[46]](#footnote-47) However, the project lacked a dedicated human resource (HR) plan, as it was designed to operate within a short timeline and focused primarily on activities rather than staffing.[[47]](#footnote-48) However, this is also a requirement because modus operandi of the PBF projects is to rely on existing staff from other projects, not to fund separate HR structure, or else to allocate minimal funds for staffing. This lean HR approach contributed to cost efficiency but created gaps in planning and coordination, especially as the project evolved to address shifting priorities.

UNDP’s operational systems were noted as having room for improvement, particularly in accountability and coherence between the original project design and its implementation.[[48]](#footnote-49) A Some interviewees noted, that there was a disconnect between those who designed the project and those who implemented it, leading to challenges in alignment with the priorities of various stakeholders, including the UN PBF, UN leadership, and Somali counterparts.[[49]](#footnote-50); while UNDP mentioned that UNDP’s Portfolio Manager and REFS project manager drafted the project from UNDP’s side, together with staff from UNTMIS. Despite these challenges, the project’s flexibility was a key strength, enabling it to adapt to Somalia’s rapidly changing political environment.[[50]](#footnote-51) Government representatives highlighted the project’s ability to accommodate ad hoc priorities, coordinate effectively, and adjust timelines as necessary in response to the fragile political landscape.[[51]](#footnote-52)

While the project leveraged its resources effectively to achieve high-level impact, including facilitating key political dialogues, risks and inefficiencies emerged due to mismatched expectations among stakeholders and over-spending primarily on the NCC meetings.[[52]](#footnote-53) The project encountered several high-impact risks, including political instability, financial disbursement delays, and challenges in federal-state coordination. The evolving political landscape let to repeated revisions of project activities, as reflected in the revised project document. While the project adapted to these risks, there is limited documentation confirming a structured Risk Log was maintained. Within the UN, high-level discussions and leadership interventions addressed some of these issues, including concerns raised about the integrity and alignment of spending.[[53]](#footnote-54) Adding a permanent secretary who understood the UN’s challenges improved coordination and accountability.[[54]](#footnote-55)

In summary, the project demonstrated efficiency in resource allocation and flexibility, successfully adapting to Somalia’s dynamic political environment. Key strengths included the effective use of its $2 million budget to prioritize critical activities, such as NCC meetings, and its ability to coordinate and adjust timelines to accommodate evolving priorities. However, the absence of a dedicated HR plan, coupled with mismatched expectations among stakeholders and procedural inefficiencies in UNDP’s operational systems, constrained the project’s overall efficiency. Future initiatives should focus on integrating a robust HR plan, improving alignment between project design and implementation, and streamlining financial and coordination processes to enhance accountability and mitigate risks.

**Evaluation Question** – *Was project implementation cost-effective, and did it adhere to the planned timeline and budget? How effectively were financial resources allocated and managed?*

The project demonstrated cost-effectiveness in certain areas but faced challenges in fully adhering to the planned timeline and budget due to its dynamic and evolving nature.[[55]](#footnote-56) The regular and often short-notice execution of NCC meetings reflected the project’s flexibility and responsiveness to ad hoc government priorities, which contributed to its overall relevance and impact.[[56]](#footnote-57) However, some planned activities, such as engagement with CSOs and the opinion surveys were not implemented.[[57]](#footnote-58) These activities were deprioritized or modified due to time constraints and capacity limitations within the OPM.[[58]](#footnote-59)

According to some interviewees, from an implementation standpoint, managing the project within the constraints of the UNDP posed significant challenges.[[59]](#footnote-60) These constraints were partly due to slow UNDP bureaucratic processes but also reflected necessary accountability measures to ensure adherence to funding rules.[[60]](#footnote-61) The project relied on existing staff, as the program design did not allow for the hiring of additional personnel.[[61]](#footnote-62) This created strain on the team and limited the capacity to address all planned activities effectively.

Budget lines were adjusted multiple times through reprogramming, with each change requiring approval from the UN PBF.[[62]](#footnote-63) While these adjustments ensured adherence to financial protocols, necessary accountability, and alignment with shifting priorities, they added complexity and occasional delays to project management and execution.[[63]](#footnote-64)

The budget execution reflects a reallocation of resources, prioritizing high-level political dialogue over grassroots engagement and gender-focused initiatives. As outlined in *Table 3* below, while Outputs 1.2 and 1.3 were fully expended, some planned activities under these outputs—such as youth- and women-led initiatives, opinion polling, and broader civil society engagement—were deprioritized to accommodate the urgent need for NCC meetings.

* Output 1.1 was under-executed ($635,222 spent out of $800,000), reflecting the partial achievement of its objective to facilitate political agreements. While key agreements were reached, delays in implementation contributed to this variance.
* Output 1.2 was fully executed ($600,000 spent), aligning with the project’s increased focus on NCC meetings. The target of three meetings was exceeded, with six conducted, demonstrating cost-effectiveness in supporting high-level negotiations.
* Output 1.3 was fully executed ($600,000 spent), but key activities such as youth engagement, women-led initiatives, and polling were deprioritized due to the shift in project priorities. While advocacy for the 30% women’s quota took place, representation reached only 21%, with limited follow-up mechanisms.

This reallocation of funds was a strategic decision, ensuring that the project remained responsive to Somalia’s evolving political landscape. However, it also meant that certain planned activities did not receive the expected level of implementation. Future projects should integrate flexible funding mechanisms that allow for adaptability while ensuring that grassroots engagement and inclusivity commitments are not de-prioritized.

TABLE 3: ASSESSMENT OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| PROJECT OUTPUT | EXPENDITURE IN USD | BUDGET IN USD |
| Output 1.1: SRSG’s good offices facilitate dialogue between the FGS and the FMS and assist in a peaceful resolution of conflicts to reach political agreements | 635,222 | 800,000 |
| Output 1.2: The capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister strengthened and support to NCCs provided in a timely manner, thereby enabling agreements on the electoral framework and agreements on state-building priorities. | 600,000 | 600,000 |
| Output 1.3: Engage, mobilize, and equip civil society and other groups, particularly women and young people, in the state-building processes. | 600,000 | 600,000 |
| TOTAL | **1,835,222** | **2,000,000** |

In summary, the project demonstrated cost-effectiveness by prioritizing high-impact activities, such as NCC meetings, and showcasing flexibility in responding to evolving government priorities. However, challenges in adhering to the planned timeline and budget arose due to time constraints, capacity limitations, and procedural delays within the UNDP’s operational framework. The reliance on existing staff without additional recruitment further strained resources, limiting the implementation of some planned activities, such as CSO engagement and opinion surveys. Future initiatives should focus on reducing bureaucratic delays, streamlining reprogramming processes, and incorporating mechanisms to enhance staffing capacity to better meet dynamic project demands.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were the accounting and financial systems adequate for project management and reporting? Were financial reports accurate and timely, and did they contribute to project accountability?*

The adequacy of the accounting and financial systems for project management and reporting was mixed, with notable challenges impacting efficiency and relationships.[[64]](#footnote-65) UNDP's due diligence in payment clearance processes, while ensuring financial accountability, often resulted in delays in expenditures.[[65]](#footnote-66) These delays strained relationships with government counterparts, as payments were sometimes late, creating challenges in clearing bills and justifying expenses.[[66]](#footnote-67) government counterparts occasionally perceived UNDP as unresponsive, which affected the project’s overall implementation dynamics.[[67]](#footnote-68)

The reliance on extensive paperwork for financial management and clearance processes further compounded these challenges.[[68]](#footnote-69) Operating in Somalia's complex and irregular administrative environment required significant effort to ensure proper documentation and compliance. However, the project lacked sufficient personnel dedicated to addressing these financial management issues, leading to delays in handling transactions.[[69]](#footnote-70)

Based on the project documentation provided, it was not clearly deduced whether financial reports were consistently accurate and timely. While accountability measures were prioritized, the observed delays and procedural hurdles suggest that financial systems could be strengthened to improve reporting and operational efficiency.

In addition to financial reports, two annual reports where shared, both containing similar information, Annual Report 2022 and a combined Annual Report 2022 and Semi-Annual Report 2023. However, both reports contained track changes, making them difficult to review, and some of the sections lacked full information.

In summary, while the project’s accounting and financial systems ensured accountability, procedural delays and a lack of dedicated financial management personnel hindered efficiency and strained relationships with government counterparts. Simplifying processes and allocating specialized personnel could improve efficiency and ensure timely, accurate reporting in future initiatives.

**Evaluation Question** – *Did the project have a suitable and tailored M&E system and was it used appropriately?*

As it has been observed in project documents, the project lacked a suitable and tailored M&E system, which limited its ability to systematically track progress and comprehensively document activities and meetings. The absence of a defined M&E approach and also responsibilities within the project team made it challenging to capture the full scope of what was achieved, reducing the availability of detailed evidence to support the findings of this evaluation.

While a substantial amount of work was accomplished, more robust documentation could have further highlighted the project's successes and contributions, strengthening the evaluation process and showcasing lessons learned more effectively.

In summary, the absence of a tailored M&E system significantly limited the project’s ability to track progress, document activities comprehensively, and provide detailed evidence of its achievements. This gap not only hindered the evaluation process but also reduced opportunities to showcase the project's successes and apply lessons learned effectively. Future projects should prioritize the development and implementation of a robust M&E framework, with clearly assigned responsibilities and systematic documentation processes, to enhance accountability, impact measurement, and knowledge sharing.

## Effectiveness

**Evaluation Question** – *How effective was the project in facilitating high-level political dialogue and supporting Somalia’s political transition?*

The project played a critical role in facilitating high-level political dialogue and supporting Somalia’s political transition during key moments of uncertainty. The NCC, supported by the project, became a vital platform for resolving disputes between the federal government and federal member states. This forum enabled leaders to negotiate agreements on electoral processes, constitutional review, and federalism, preventing political deadlock and contributing to a peaceful transfer of power. Many stakeholders viewed the project as essential for maintaining a degree of political stability during Somalia’s tumultuous political landscape.[[70]](#footnote-71)

However, while the NCC meetings served as a valuable tool for crisis management, the project’s overall approach was reactive rather than strategic. Several interviewees noted that NCC sessions were often convened in response to political crises, limiting the council’s ability to serve as a routine platform for long-term planning. This reactive nature also led to rushed preparations and inconsistent follow-up on agreements, which weakened the institutionalization of the dialogue process.

The project was effective in building relationships with high-level political actors, particularly through the OPM. However, the disengagement of key federal member states, such as Puntland first, and then Jubbaland, from the NCC process indicated that the project was not always perceived as impartial.[[71]](#footnote-72)

Efforts to ensure gender inclusivity in high-level dialogues were also limited. While the project supported advocacy efforts for the 30% women’s quota in political representation, stakeholders noted that there was insufficient follow-up to enforce these commitments.[[72]](#footnote-73)

In summary, while the project was effective in facilitating high-level political dialogue during key transitional periods, it faced challenges in supporting the institutionalization of these processes and ensuring broad-based inclusivity. Strengthening the structure of the NCC and fostering more inclusive participation could significantly enhance the project’s long-term impact on Somalia’s political transition. While NCC is a government structure, that ultimately depends on the decisions of Somali leadership decisions, UNDP and the UN system have a clout to influence and lobby for that.

**Assessment of Results Framework Indicators**

The project’s effectiveness in achieving its planned targets is assessed through *Table 4* below, which evaluates progress against each indicator, highlighting final achievements and variances where applicable according to the final report shared by UNDP.

Key findings from the assessment include:

* **NCC Meetings**: The target of three meetings was exceeded, with six NCC meetings conducted. This reflects the project's responsiveness to the political context and its ability to facilitate high-level dialogue.
* **Gender Representation**: Advocacy efforts for the 30% women’s quota resulted in 21% representation in both Houses of the Federal Parliament, falling short of the target due to limited follow-up and engagement with civil society.
* **Community Engagement and Peacebuilding Initiatives**: Several planned activities, including women- and youth-led initiatives and broader community outreach, faced delays due to reallocation of resources toward supporting NCC meetings during critical periods.

TABLE 4: RESULTS FRAMEWORK INDICATORS ASSESSMENT

| **Indicator** | **Planned Target** | **Final Achieved Result** | **Assessment** | **Explanation for Variance**  **(if applicable)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 1a: FGS and FMS started implementing state- building priorities Roadmap based on the agreed action plan and sequencing/prioritization of the actions.** | Sequencing action plan agreed by Somali leaders | NCC technical committee established.  ToR was developed for the NCC  A roadmap for the NCC was developed and agreed | Achieved, though implementation  remains ongoing |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 1b: # of agreements reached following the NCC consensus on the state- building priorities roadmap** | Somali leaders agreed on the principles leading to the completion of the constitutional review process and reaching a consensus on the contentious issues | 4 political agreements on the allocation of powers, and federal justice model, fiscal federalism and electoral model were signed by the FGS and FMS leaders. | Partially achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.1: Facilitate continuous engagement between the FGS and the FMS leaders to operationalize a consensus on the state-building priorities.** | Agreed a platform for the continuous engagement of the FGS and the FMS | NCC technical committee was established  ToR for the technical committee was developed  NCC roadmap was developed and endorsed by the leaders | Achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.2: Facilitated process to reach the agreement to secure the implementation of the 30 per cent quota for women in the election process** | Track and advocate that the Somali leaders/signatories secure implementation of the agreement on the 30 percent women representation in the electoral process, including among delegates, polling officers and in the 11th Parliament. | Women Goodwill Ambassadors were appointed  Advocacy meetings for women's quota were held, which resulted in achieving 21% women representation in both Houses of the Federal Parliament | Partially achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.1: Regularity of NCC meetings is ensured through material and technical support** | At least 3 NCC meetings organized | 6 NCC meetings were organized | Achieved | Frequency of NCC meetings increased due to intensified political engagement between FGS and FMS leaders. |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.2: # of recommendations from the dialogues with women and youth and opinion polling included in the NCC discussions** | # of targeted sessions on the role of gender and youth in state building processes organized and recommendations from the sessions included in the NCC agenda | NCC planned in 2023 | Partially achieved, quota advocacy took place but was not enforced | Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.1: # of peacebuilding processes, led by women or youth (or women and youth organizations) initiated** | At least 2 women-and- youth-led initiatives initiated | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Received funds were prioritized to support NCC meetings.  Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.2: # of women and other citizens informed about and engaged in the state-building processes (information disaggregated by sex and age)** | At least 5,000 women, youth and members of the minority communities informed about and engaged in the state-building processes | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Received funds were prioritized for NCC meetings.  Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.3: Reliable data on women and youth’s opinion on state-building priorities collected** | Opinion polling completed | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |

**Evaluation Question** – *Did the project achieve its stated objectives of strengthening institutional capacity and promoting state-building priorities?*

The project made some progress in strengthening institutional capacity and promoting state-building priorities, particularly in supporting the convening of high-level political dialogues through the NCC. By providing financial, logistical, and technical support to key government institutions, particularly the OPM and MoIFAR, the project facilitated the negotiation of agreements on governance, federalism, and elections. These efforts contributed to advancing the state-building process during a critical political transition period.[[73]](#footnote-74)

However, the project’s overall contribution to long-term institutional capacity-building, which remained in the project document also after the major revision to focus on NCC meetings, based on Somali government requests, was limited. Several interviewees noted that while the project provided short-term technical assistance, it lacked a comprehensive strategy for embedding sustainable capacity within Somali institutions. Capacity-building activities, such as workshops and advisory support, were implemented sporadically and often in response to immediate needs rather than as part of a cohesive institutional development plan. This approach limited the project’s ability to foster institutional resilience and institutionalize processes related to governance and political dialogue.

Moreover, while the project succeeded in establishing a platform for federal-state negotiations, it fell short in addressing key state-building priorities at the grassroots level.

Efforts to promote inclusivity in state-building also faced significant challenges. Although the project incorporated gender mainstreaming efforts and supported advocacy for the 30% women’s quota in political representation, these initiatives did not translate into sustained institutional changes. Reports indicated that many institutions lacked the internal capacity and political will to implement gender-sensitive reforms, and there were limited follow-up mechanisms to ensure accountability.

In summary, while the project achieved some of its objectives by supporting high-level negotiations and advancing state-building discussions, it fell short in fostering sustainable institutional capacity and promoting inclusive governance. A more strategic approach to capacity-building and increased engagement with local institutions and marginalized groups could significantly enhance the project’s long-term contributions to state-building in Somalia.

**Evaluation Question** – *To what extent did the project promote inclusivity in peacebuilding, particularly the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups?*

The project incorporated inclusivity as a key priority, particularly through its support for advocacy efforts aimed at increasing the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups in peacebuilding processes. The establishment of the NCC created a high-level platform for federal and state leaders to engage in negotiations on critical governance issues. However, despite this progress, the project’s ability to meaningfully engage underrepresented groups in political dialogues remained limited in practice.[[74]](#footnote-75)

Efforts to promote women’s participation included support for advocacy around the 30% women’s quota for political representation. Goodwill Ambassadors were appointed to raise awareness and champion women’s leadership in governance. While these initiatives demonstrated the project’s commitment to gender inclusivity, their implementation faced significant cultural and institutional barriers. Interviewees highlighted that many women faced systemic challenges in accessing decision-making roles, and the project lacked targeted mentorship and leadership programs to address these barriers. Additionally, despite public commitments to the 30% quota, enforcement mechanisms were weak, leading to inconsistent application across federal and state institutions.[[75]](#footnote-76)

Youth engagement was another area where the project faced challenges. Although youth organizations were occasionally included in consultations, their participation was often symbolic rather than substantive. Several interviewees noted that young people were invited to attend events but had limited influence on the decision-making processes that shaped peacebuilding outcomes. Similarly, representatives of marginalized communities, including minorities and persons with disabilities, were rarely consulted during high-level political dialogues. This lack of comprehensive engagement weakened the inclusivity and perceived legitimacy of the peacebuilding process.

Moreover, the absence of formal partnerships with CSOs that advocate for marginalized groups further limited grassroots representation. CSOs could have played a key role in bridging the gap between national-level dialogues and community-level concerns, but their involvement in the project was minimal and largely informal.[[76]](#footnote-77)

In summary, while the project made notable efforts to promote inclusivity in peacebuilding, these efforts were constrained by systemic barriers and limited follow-through mechanisms. By strengthening partnerships with CSOs, implementing targeted leadership programs, and ensuring accountability for inclusivity goals, the project could significantly enhance the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups in peacebuilding processes.

**Evaluation Question** – *How effective were the strategies used to engage these groups in the political process?*

The project implemented several strategies to engage women, youth, and marginalized groups in Somalia’s political process, but their overall effectiveness was limited by systemic barriers and a lack of sustained follow-up. One key strategy was the promotion of the 30% women’s quota for political representation through advocacy campaigns and the appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors. These efforts increased visibility for women’s political participation and demonstrated a commitment to gender inclusion. However, the project did not include sufficient accountability measures to ensure that government institutions upheld the quota consistently. Interviewees noted that without mechanisms to track progress and enforce the quota, women’s participation remained symbolic in many cases, with limited access to decision-making roles.[[77]](#footnote-78)

The project’s engagement with youth was largely event-based and sporadic, consisting of invitations to national consultations and dialogue forums. While these events provided a platform for youth organizations to voice their concerns, they lacked mechanisms to translate their input into actionable outcomes. Several stakeholders emphasized that youth representatives often felt their participation was tokenistic rather than meaningful. Additionally, there were few structured initiatives aimed at building the capacity of young leaders to navigate political processes and advocate for their communities effectively.[[78]](#footnote-79)

Marginalized groups, including minority clans and persons with disabilities, faced even greater challenges in accessing the political process. The absence of targeted outreach strategies and formal consultation mechanisms for these groups limited their ability to influence peacebuilding discussions. CSOs that work with marginalized communities were consulted infrequently and had minimal formal roles in political dialogues, further weakening the inclusivity of the political process.

Moreover, while the NCC served as a platform for political negotiations, its composition primarily reflected elite political actors, with few representatives from grassroots organizations. This limited the council’s ability to address community-level grievances and foster broader public buy-in for state-building efforts.[[79]](#footnote-80)

In summary, while the project made efforts to engage women, youth, and marginalized groups, its strategies often fell short of fostering meaningful participation. By implementing stronger accountability frameworks, leadership programs, and targeted outreach initiatives, future interventions can better ensure that these groups have a substantive role in the political process.

**Evaluation Question** – *What impact did the project have on fostering political and peacebuilding processes that are gender-responsive?*

The project had a mixed impact on fostering gender-responsive political and peacebuilding processes. On the positive side, the project contributed to raising awareness about the importance of women’s political participation and played a role in advocating for the enforcement of the 30% women’s quota in decision-making bodies. The appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors to champion gender inclusion at the NCC and other political dialogues was a notable achievement, as it amplified calls for greater representation of women in governance. Additionally, the project’s alignment with the WPS agenda reinforced the need for gender-sensitive approaches in peacebuilding.[[80]](#footnote-81)

However, despite these initiatives, the project struggled to translate gender advocacy into sustained institutional changes. Many interviewees noted that although the 30% quota was recognized in principle, its implementation was inconsistent and often viewed as a symbolic target rather than a binding commitment. In key political forums, including NCC negotiations, women were frequently underrepresented, and when present, their roles were often peripheral. The absence of dedicated leadership programs and mentorship initiatives further hindered women’s ability to contribute meaningfully to political decision-making.

Another critical gap was the limited inclusion of CSOs focused on women’s rights and gender equality. While some CSOs were engaged in advocacy events, their participation in high-level dialogues was minimal. This weakened the potential for grassroots-level pressure to ensure that gender-responsive reforms were institutionalized. Reports also indicated that discussions on peacebuilding priorities, such as reconciliation and governance reforms, rarely addressed gender-specific impacts of conflict, leaving key concerns—such as access to justice for survivors of gender-based violence (GBV)—largely unaddressed.

Youth inclusion was similarly underdeveloped. While there were some efforts to involve young women in political dialogues, stakeholders highlighted that these efforts lacked structure and follow-up, limiting their long-term impact. Additionally, marginalized women from minority clans and rural communities were often excluded from consultations, which reduced the inclusivity of the project’s gender-responsive peacebuilding initiatives.[[81]](#footnote-82)

In summary, the project had a positive impact in raising awareness about gender inclusion in political processes, but its efforts fell short in institutionalizing gender-responsive reforms and addressing the intersectional needs of marginalized women. Future initiatives must prioritize accountability, leadership development, and grassroots engagement to create more inclusive and sustainable gender-responsive peacebuilding processes.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were women actively participating in decision-making processes, and did the project address gender-specific barriers?*

Women’s participation in decision-making processes supported by the project was limited, and the project only partially addressed gender-specific barriers to their inclusion. While the project included advocacy efforts to promote the 30% women’s quota in political representation, these efforts often lacked robust follow-through and enforcement mechanisms. Interviewees consistently highlighted that women’s representation in NCC meetings and other high-level political forums was symbolic rather than substantive, with women often relegated to observer roles rather than active contributors to decision-making processes.[[82]](#footnote-83)

The project’s approach to addressing gender-specific barriers focused on increasing visibility for women’s political participation through Goodwill Ambassadors and awareness campaigns. While these initiatives raised public awareness, they did not tackle deeper institutional and cultural barriers that prevented women from taking on leadership roles. For example, there were no sustained mentorship programs or leadership development initiatives to equip women with the skills and support needed to navigate political negotiations effectively. Additionally, many interviewees noted that the project lacked mechanisms to monitor compliance with the 30% quota across different levels of governance, which undermined its credibility and impact.[[83]](#footnote-84)

The project also struggled to engage women from marginalized backgrounds, such as rural communities and minority clans. These women faced compounded barriers due to socio-economic exclusion and discrimination, yet they were often excluded from consultations and dialogues. CSOs working on gender equality were underutilized as partners, which limited the project’s ability to bring community-level gender concerns into national political discussions.

Moreover, the project did not sufficiently address the intersectional impacts of conflict on women, such as the need for justice and support services for survivors of GBV. By focusing primarily on high-level political dialogue, the project missed opportunities to link gender-sensitive governance reforms to broader peacebuilding and recovery efforts that could have addressed the root causes of women’s political marginalization.

In summary, while the project contributed to raising awareness of women’s political representation, it was less effective in ensuring active participation and addressing systemic gender-specific barriers. By implementing leadership programs, stronger accountability measures, and targeted outreach efforts, future initiatives can better support women’s meaningful inclusion in decision-making processes.

## Impact

**Evaluation Question** – *To what extent did the project generate positive or negative, intended or unintended, effects on Somalia’s peacebuilding and state-building environment?*

The project had a mix of intended and unintended effects on Somalia’s peacebuilding and state-building environment, reflecting both its contributions to political stabilization and its limitations in fostering long-term governance reforms.

### Positive Intended Effects

A key achievement of the project was its role in supporting the NCC, which provided a structured forum for federal and state leaders to negotiate contentious issues related to elections, federalism, and security. By facilitating dialogue during periods of political tension, the project helped to avert political violence and fostered consensus on several key state-building milestones, including the establishment of timelines for elections. This contributed to maintaining a degree of political stability during critical transition periods.

The project also reinforced Somali-led processes by supporting the OPM and MoIFAR in leading political negotiations. This strengthened national ownership of the state-building process and enhanced the legitimacy of political dialogues. Additionally, the advocacy for the 30% women’s quota, although inconsistently implemented, signalled the importance of gender inclusivity in governance and laid the groundwork for future reforms.[[84]](#footnote-85)

### Negative Intended and Unintended Effects

However, despite these successes, the project also had some negative effects, both intended and unintended. One of the most significant challenges was the project’s reliance on high-level negotiations without sufficient engagement at the community level. This top-down approach contributed to perceptions that the NCC was an elite forum, disconnected from the needs and grievances of local communities. Several interviewees noted that the exclusion of CSOs and grassroots actors from political dialogues weakened public trust in the peacebuilding process and limited the project’s ability to foster broad-based legitimacy.

An unintended negative effect, which is beyond the project’s influence, was the political disengagement of key federal member states, such as Puntland and Jubbaland, from the NCC process. This disengagement in January 2023 and October 2024 was partially attributed to grievances over representation and perceptions of unequal power dynamics. Instead of fostering unity, the NCC discussions sometimes reinforced federal-state tensions, particularly when agreements reached at the federal level were not perceived as inclusive or transparent.

The project’s focus on high-level political stabilization also diverted attention from institutional capacity-building efforts. This created a gap in sustainable governance reforms, as institutions involved in the peace process lacked the resources and expertise to independently manage political dialogues and implement agreements. Furthermore, the lack of robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms limited the project’s ability to track and mitigate unintended consequences, such as regional disengagement and public disillusionment with the political process.[[85]](#footnote-86)

In summary, the project had a positive impact on high-level political stabilization and reinforced Somali ownership of state-building processes. However, its top-down approach and limited grassroots engagement contributed to federal-state tensions and weakened public trust. Future initiatives should prioritize inclusive, multi-level engagement and implement stronger monitoring frameworks to mitigate unintended negative effects and ensure more sustainable peacebuilding outcomes.

**Evaluation Question** – *How did the project contribute to the larger objectives of political stability and reconciliation?*

The project made significant contributions to political stability and reconciliation in Somalia, particularly through its support for high-level political dialogues and the establishment of the NCC as a platform for negotiations. By facilitating dialogue between the federal government and federal member states, the project helped to prevent political crises and foster agreements on key governance and state-building issues, such as electoral processes and federalism. These efforts were instrumental in maintaining a degree of political cohesion during periods of heightened tension, contributing to broader peacebuilding objectives.[[86]](#footnote-87)

The project’s logistical and financial support to the OPM and MoIFAR strengthened the capacity of these institutions to convene and lead political negotiations. This Somali-led approach enhanced national ownership of the political transition process and reinforced the legitimacy of reconciliation efforts at the federal level. The NCC meetings served as a critical mechanism for fostering dialogue and resolving disputes, thereby reducing the likelihood of political violence.

However, the project’s contributions to reconciliation at the community level were limited. The top-down focus on high-level political actors meant that local grievances, particularly those of marginalized groups and rural communities, were not consistently addressed. Additionally, federal member states such as Puntland and Jubbaland disengaged from the NCC at key points due to grievances over representation and power-sharing dynamics, underscoring the need for more inclusive and transparent negotiation frameworks.

The project also struggled to embed long-term reconciliation mechanisms into governance institutions. While the NCC was effective in resolving immediate political disputes, there was insufficient follow-up to institutionalize reconciliation processes and address deeper drivers of conflict, such as clan-based divisions and resource allocation issues. Moreover, the absence of dedicated programming for youth and women in peacebuilding limited the project’s ability to foster inclusive reconciliation processes that could bridge intergenerational and gender divides.[[87]](#footnote-88)

In summary, the project contributed to political stability by preventing crises and supporting Somali-led dialogue processes. However, its impact on reconciliation was limited by its top-down approach and insufficient grassroots engagement. Strengthening federal-state cooperation, institutionalizing reconciliation mechanisms, and promoting inclusive peacebuilding can enhance the sustainability and legitimacy of future efforts.

**Evaluation Question** – *What tangible improvements in governance, political participation, or community reconciliation have been observed as a result of the project?*

The project led to several tangible improvements in governance and political participation, particularly at the national level. A key achievement was the support provided to the NCC, which enabled federal and state leaders to engage in structured negotiations on critical governance issues. These dialogues helped produce agreements on key milestones, such as timelines for elections and discussions on federalism, contributing to political stability during a volatile period. The establishment of the NCC as a forum for dialogue also strengthened governance by institutionalizing a Somali-led process for conflict resolution and decision-making.

The project’s advocacy for the 30% women’s quota in political representation increased awareness of the importance of gender inclusivity. While the enforcement of the quota was inconsistent, some improvements in women’s political participation were observed. For example, more women were appointed to advisory roles within governance bodies, reflecting incremental progress in gender representation. However, stakeholders noted that these advancements were largely symbolic and that structural barriers to women’s leadership roles remained unaddressed.[[88]](#footnote-89)

In terms of community reconciliation, tangible improvements were less pronounced. The project primarily focused on high-level political negotiations, with limited engagement at the community level. Formal mechanisms to include grassroot stakeholders in the process, which could have helped to foster trust and social cohesion at the local level, did not exist. A survey to capture popular views, planned in project design, was not conducted. However, UNDP organized reconciliation activities through RFES, that were linked to this project, integrating community visions in high level processes.

The absence of formal mechanisms to include grassroots stakeholders in the reconciliation process limited the project’s ability to foster trust and social cohesion at the local level.

Additionally, while the project supported high-level agreements that promoted political stability, the disengagement of some federal member states, such as Puntland and Jubbaland, revealed gaps in inclusive governance. Their withdrawal from the NCC process highlighted the need for more inclusive and transparent negotiation frameworks that address power imbalances and ensure equitable participation.[[89]](#footnote-90)

In summary, while the project contributed to tangible improvements in governance and political stability at the national level, its impact on political participation and community reconciliation was uneven. Strengthening grassroots engagement, enforcing gender commitments, and fostering transparent federal-state negotiations could enhance the inclusivity and sustainability of future governance and reconciliation efforts.

**Evaluation Question** – *Can specific examples or case studies of positive impact be identified?*

The project yielded several positive impacts, particularly in facilitating high-level political agreements and advancing Somali-led dialogue processes. Below are key examples that highlight specific areas where the project made a meaningful contribution:

**1. National Consultative Council (NCC) Agreements on Electoral Timelines and Political Reforms**

One of the most notable successes of the project was its support for the NCC, which played a crucial role in achieving agreements on electoral timelines and processes. During a politically sensitive period, the NCC facilitated negotiations that led to the establishment of a timeline for parliamentary and presidential elections, preventing potential political deadlock. This achievement underscored the project’s role in maintaining political stability and fostering dialogue among federal and state leaders.

The NCC discussions also contributed to agreements on the framework for federalism and the constitutional review process, both critical components of Somalia’s state-building priorities. These outcomes were particularly significant in sustaining political dialogue during moments of heightened tension between the federal government and federal member states.[[90]](#footnote-91)

**2. Advocacy for the 30% Women’s Quota in Political Representation**

The project contributed to increased visibility and advocacy for women’s political participation through its support for the 30% women’s quota. Although the enforcement of the quota was inconsistent, the project’s efforts helped ensure that the issue remained on the national agenda. For example, Goodwill Ambassadors were appointed to champion gender equality in political processes, raising awareness about the importance of women’s representation in governance.

A key milestone was the inclusion of women in political advisory roles and advocacy forums. While these roles were largely symbolic at times, the presence of women in such spaces was a step toward normalizing their involvement in political decision-making. Interviewees noted that these efforts contributed to broader discussions on gender equality and reinforced the importance of implementing WPS agenda in Somalia.

**3. Strengthening Somali-Led Political Processes**

The project’s support for the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation strengthened the capacity of these institutions to lead political negotiations. By providing financial, logistical, and technical support, the project enabled Somali-led dialogue processes that reinforced national ownership of peacebuilding and state-building efforts. This national ownership was viewed by many stakeholders as critical to the legitimacy of the political transition process.

**4. Preventing Conflict Escalation During Federal-State Disputes**

Another example of positive impact was the prevention of political escalation during disputes between the federal government and federal member states. By convening NCC meetings during periods of heightened political tension, the project created a platform for dialogue rather than confrontation. Stakeholders highlighted that without this platform, political disagreements could have led to more serious conflict, particularly during electoral delays.

**5. Increased Institutional Coordination for High-Level Dialogues**

The project facilitated greater coordination between national institutions and international actors, including UNSOM. This coordination contributed to more structured and consistent political negotiations. Although gaps in formalized coordination persisted, the project’s efforts improved the ability of Somali government institutions to convene high-level meetings and manage political consultations.

In summary, the project had several tangible successes, such as facilitating electoral agreements, strengthening national ownership of political processes, and preventing conflict escalation. However, to enhance its long-term impact, future efforts should focus on broadening participation, improving accountability, and addressing federal-state grievances to foster more inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding outcomes.[[91]](#footnote-92)

## Sustainability

**Evaluation Question** – *Will the changes brought about by the project continue beyond its lifespan?*

The sustainability of the changes brought about by the project is uncertain and depends heavily on the institutionalization of political dialogue processes and continued support for governance reforms. On the positive side, the project contributed to strengthening the capacity of key institutions, such as the OPM and MoIFAR, to lead and convene high-level political discussions. The establishment of the NCC as a dialogue platform created a precedent for structured negotiations between the federal government and federal member states, reinforcing national ownership of political processes. This institutional foundation provides a framework that, if maintained, could continue to foster dialogue and prevent political deadlock beyond the project’s lifespan. The project therefore significantly contributed to conflict prevention, implementation of the electoral process as well as the political agreement between all Somali leaders from June 2022 on the key statebuilding priorities, which were integrated in all of Somalia’s policy documents, such as the National Transformation Plan.

However, the long-term sustainability of these achievements is undermined by several challenges. First, the NCC remains dependent on external funding and logistical support, raising concerns about its ability to function independently. Interviewees noted that without continued financial backing from international partners, the frequency and quality of NCC meetings may decline, reducing the platform’s effectiveness as a conflict resolution mechanism.

Second, while the project contributed to short-term stabilization by facilitating high-level agreements, it did not sufficiently address deeper structural issues, such as federal-state mistrust and resource-sharing disputes, which continue to pose risks to political stability. The withdrawal of federal member states like Puntland and Jubbaland from NCC discussions, which were beyond the project’s influence and happened after UNDP’s support to NCCs ended, highlighted the fragility of the political dialogue process and the need for more inclusive and transparent engagement frameworks. Without sustained efforts to address these grievances, there is a risk that political tensions could resurface, undermining the gains made during the project.

The project’s gender-related initiatives also face sustainability challenges. While advocacy for the 30% women’s quota increased awareness of gender inclusivity, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and leadership programs for women raises concerns about the long-term impact of these efforts. Unless gender-sensitive governance reforms are institutionalized, women’s political participation may remain symbolic rather than substantive.

Furthermore, the project’s limited engagement with grassroots stakeholders and CSOs weakened its ability to foster broad-based public support for state-building efforts. Sustained reconciliation and political stability require bottom-up engagement to complement top-down negotiations, but the project’s focus on elite-level dialogues left a gap in community-level ownership of peacebuilding processes.

In summary, while the project made important contributions to political stabilization and governance, its sustainability is uncertain due to ongoing federal-state tensions, financial dependency, and limited grassroots engagement. Strengthening institutional frameworks, fostering inclusivity, and securing long-term national funding and ownership will be critical to ensuring that the project’s achievements endure beyond its lifespan.

**Evaluation Question** – *What mechanisms are in place to ensure the sustainability of project outcomes, particularly at the national and community levels?*

The project put in place several mechanisms aimed at ensuring the sustainability of its outcomes, particularly in terms of fostering high-level political dialogue and strengthening governance institutions. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms varied between the national and community levels, and significant gaps remain that could jeopardize long-term sustainability.

**1. National Level Mechanisms**

At the national level, one of the key sustainability mechanisms was the establishment of the NCC as a formalized platform for federal-state negotiations. The NCC served as a structured forum where contentious governance issues—such as elections, federalism, and constitutional reforms—were addressed. By institutionalizing a Somali-led approach to political dialogue, the project reinforced national ownership of the state-building process. Additionally, the support provided to key government institutions, such as the OPM and MoIFAR, enhanced their capacity to lead and convene political negotiations.

However, these mechanisms remain vulnerable due to financial and technical dependencies. The NCC’s continued operation relies heavily on external funding and logistical support, raising concerns about whether it can be sustained without international assistance. Furthermore, while the project provided technical training and advisory support to key government offices, this support was often short-term and not integrated into a long-term institutional capacity-building plan. As a result, government institutions may struggle to independently sustain the dialogue and negotiation processes facilitated by the project.

To address some of these challenges, the project advocated for integrating the NCC and other key dialogue mechanisms into Somalia’s governance framework through national funding allocations. However, progress in this area has been slow due to competing political priorities and resource constraints.

**2. Community Level Mechanisms**

At the community level, the project’s sustainability mechanisms were weaker, as its focus was predominantly on high-level political actors. Community engagement mechanisms, such as consultations with CSOs, were implemented inconsistently and often on an ad hoc basis. While some dialogue sessions included input from CSOs advocating for women’s rights and youth participation, grassroots stakeholders were largely excluded from decision-making processes. This limited the project’s ability to foster broad-based public support for peacebuilding and reconciliation, which is essential for sustaining long-term governance reforms.

Additionally, the absence of formal partnerships with local governance structures and traditional authorities reduced the impact of reconciliation efforts at the community level. Mechanisms for addressing local grievances, such as land disputes and resource allocation conflicts, were not integrated into the project’s peacebuilding strategy, weakening its contribution to social cohesion at the grassroots level.

In summary, while the project supported important mechanisms at the national level, especially the NCCs, to ensure the sustainability of political dialogue, its focus on high-level actors limited its ability to create lasting community-level impacts. Reconciliation activities were pursued through other UNDP programmes through and were not a specific objective of this project. . Strengthening national funding mechanisms and institutionalizing capacity-building efforts are essential steps to ensure that the project’s outcomes are sustained beyond its lifespan.

**Evaluation Question** – *How has the project strengthened the capacity of local institutions and partners to sustain* peacebuilding and state-building efforts?

The project aimed to strengthen the capacity of local institutions and partners to lead and sustain peacebuilding and state-building efforts, with varying levels of success. At the national level, the project made significant contributions by supporting the OPM and MoIFAR, and the NCC. These contributions included financial and logistical support for convening key dialogues and technical assistance to improve the institutions’ ability to lead and coordinate political processes. By enhancing their ability to facilitate high-level negotiations, the project reinforced national ownership of political dialogue and improved coordination between federal and state actors.

However, this support was largely focused on elite-level institutions, mainly NCC meetings as the high-level conflict resolution mechanism, with limited emphasis on strengthening local governance structures and grassroots partners, especially after the project amendment requested by the Somali government. Several interviewees noted that although some CSOs were consulted during dialogues, their contributions were often tokenistic and did not translate into formal partnerships or decision-making roles.

The project’s approach to capacity-building primarily consisted of ad hoc training sessions and advisory support, which, while helpful in the short term, did not result in long-term institutional strengthening. There was a lack of structured mentorship programs and comprehensive capacity-building plans tailored to the needs of local institutions. Additionally, the absence of monitoring and follow-up mechanisms meant that the effectiveness of the training sessions was not adequately assessed, making it difficult to measure improvements in institutional capacity.

Moreover, efforts to strengthen the participation of marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and minorities, in governance and peacebuilding processes were inconsistent. Although the project supported advocacy for the 30% women’s quota in political representation, there were no sustained initiatives to build the capacity of women leaders or youth organizations to actively participate in governance. This reduced the potential for local ownership of peacebuilding initiatives and limited the project’s ability to foster inclusive governance.

In summary, the project strengthened the capacity of national institutions to lead political dialogues and negotiations, contributing to state-building and peacebuilding at the federal level. However, its limited engagement with local governance structures and grassroots partners reduced its impact at the community level. Expanding capacity-building efforts to regional and district actors, fostering formal partnerships with CSOs, and implementing leadership programs for marginalized groups are essential steps for ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are inclusive, sustainable, and locally owned.

**Evaluation Question** – *Are there adequate motivations or incentives for local partners to continue playing their roles after the project’s completion?*

The motivations and incentives for local partners, including national institutions, CSOs, and community actors, to sustain their roles in peacebuilding and state-building after the project’s completion are varied and influenced by both political dynamics and resource availability.

On the positive side, national institutions such as the OPM and MoIFAR have a strong political incentive to sustain their leadership roles, as continued engagement in political dialogue strengthens their legitimacy and consolidates their influence in governance. The NCC platform, which was supported by the project, provides a critical mechanism for these institutions to remain central actors in federal-state negotiations, which could motivate them to sustain the dialogue process. Additionally, the project’s emphasis on Somali-led political processes reinforced national ownership, which is an important motivational factor for local partners seeking to assert their autonomy and credibility.

However, these motivations are weakened by resource constraints and institutional limitations. The NCC and related dialogue processes remain heavily dependent on external funding and logistical support, raising concerns about whether these initiatives can be sustained without continued international assistance. Interviews indicated that while national actors are committed to leading political negotiations, their ability to do so independently is limited by insufficient financial and technical resources. Without a clear strategy for national funding and resource mobilization, there is a risk that the momentum generated by the project will wane after its completion.

For CSOs and grassroots actors, the incentive to remain engaged in peacebuilding efforts is linked to their role as advocates for community-level concerns and marginalized groups. However, these organizations face significant barriers, including limited access to funding and exclusion from formal political processes. Moreover, the absence of formal partnerships and follow-up mechanisms meant that many CSOs lacked the institutional support needed to maintain their activities independently.

Efforts to promote the participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups also faced sustainability challenges. While advocacy for the 30% women’s quota raised awareness of gender inclusion in governance, the lack of mentorship programs and leadership initiatives reduced the long-term impact of these efforts. As interviewees shared, women and youth representatives often felt that their contributions were not taken seriously in political dialogues, which diminished their motivation to remain actively engaged in governance processes.

In summary, while national institutions have political incentives to sustain their roles in peacebuilding and governance, their efforts are constrained by resource dependency and limited institutional capacity. CSOs and marginalized groups face even greater challenges due to exclusion from formal processes and a lack of financial support. Strengthening national resource mobilization, formalizing support for CSOs, and implementing leadership programs are key to ensuring that local partners remain motivated and capable of sustaining their roles after the project’s completion.

**Evaluation Question** – *What are the risks to the sustainability of project outcomes, and how can they be mitigated?*

The sustainability of the project’s outcomes is subject to several risks at both the national and community levels. These risks stem from institutional, financial, and political challenges, as well as limited grassroots engagement. Below is table 2, a critical evaluation of the key risks and proposed mitigation strategies to address them.

TABLE 5: RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES TO SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT OUTCOMES

| **KEY RISKS** | **MITIGATION STRATEGIES** |
| --- | --- |
| **Financial Dependency** | * *National Resource Mobilization*: Develop a national funding strategy to allocate domestic resources for key governance and peacebuilding initiatives. * *Diversified Donor Engagement*: Establish multi-donor trust funds to reduce dependency on single funding streams and ensure consistent financial support. |
| **Institutional Capacity Gaps** | * *Long-Term Capacity-Building Programs*: Implement structured and ongoing training programs focused on leadership, negotiation, and policy implementation. * *Mentorship Initiatives*: Pair senior leaders with junior staff to ensure knowledge transfer and institutional continuity. |
| **Political Instability and Federal-State Tensions** | * *Inclusive Negotiation Frameworks*: Establish transparent and inclusive negotiation processes that address federal member states’ grievances over representation and power-sharing. * *Grievance Resolution Mechanisms*: Create formal mechanisms for resolving disputes between the federal government and federal member states to prevent political stalemates. |
| **Limited Grassroots Engagement** | * *Community-Based Dialogue Platforms*: Continue to support local reconciliation forums to ensure that community-level concerns are integrated into national political processes (e.g. through other UNDP projects such as REFS and SRSP). * *Partnerships with CSOs*: Strengthen partnerships with CSOs to facilitate grassroots participation and build public trust in peacebuilding initiatives. |
| **Weak Accountability and Monitoring Mechanisms** | * *Strengthen M&E Frameworks*: Implement comprehensive M&E frameworks with clear indicators to track the implementation of political agreements and governance reforms. * *Public Reporting*: Increase transparency by publishing regular progress reports to foster accountability and build public confidence in the process. |
| **Gender-Specific Barriers** | * *Leadership Development for Women*: Implement mentorship and training programs to build the capacity of women leaders and support their long-term participation in governance. * *Accountability for Gender Inclusion*: Introduce mechanisms to monitor compliance with the 30% quota and hold institutions accountable for meeting gender-related commitments. |

In summary, the sustainability of the project’s outcomes is at risk due to financial dependency, institutional capacity gaps, political instability, limited grassroots engagement, and weak accountability frameworks. To mitigate these risks, future efforts should focus on resource mobilization, long-term capacity-building, inclusive negotiation frameworks, and stronger grassroots participation. By addressing these challenges, the gains made by the project can be institutionalized and sustained, contributing to long-term peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia.

**Evaluation Question** – *Are there political, financial, or institutional risks that could undermine the long-term success of the project?*

The long-term success of the project is contingent upon mitigating a range of political, financial, and institutional risks. These risks have the potential to undermine the sustainability of project outcomes, particularly if they are not addressed through strategic planning and capacity-building initiatives. Below is a table analysis of the key risks across these three areas and recommendations for mitigation.

TABLE 6: POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF PROJECT

| **RISK CATEGORY** | **DESCRIPTION** | **POTENTIAL IMPACTS** | **MITIGATION STRATEGIES** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Political Risks** | Political instability and federal-state tensions pose significant threats to the sustainability of the project’s achievements. Somalia’s political environment remains highly volatile, with frequent disputes over power-sharing, resource allocation, and electoral processes. The disengagement of federal member states, such as Puntland and Jubbaland, highlighted the fragility of federal-state relations. | * Erosion of trust between federal and state actors, weakening the legitimacy of dialogue processes. * Delays or derailment of key governance reforms, such as the constitutional review and federalism framework. | * *Inclusive Dialogue Frameworks*: Strengthen the NCC by formalizing transparent and inclusive processes that address federal member states’ concerns and foster trust. * *Grievance Resolution Mechanisms*: Develop formal mechanisms for mediating disputes to prevent political deadlocks. * *Strengthened Mediation Capacity*: Enhance national institutions’ capacity for negotiations with support from neutral facilitators. |
| **Financial Risks** | The project’s dependence on external funding and international donor support presents a significant financial risk. While international assistance has been crucial, reliance on external resources raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of key platforms, such as the NCC. A reduction or withdrawal of donor funding could undermine the continuity of political processes. | * Disruption of political dialogue processes due to lack of funding for convening meetings and technical support. * Reduced institutional capacity to implement governance and reconciliation initiatives independently. | * *National Resource Mobilization*: Establish national budget allocations for political dialogue and governance initiatives. * *Diversified Donor Engagement*: Strengthen partnerships with multiple donors to create pooled funding mechanisms. * *Private Sector and Diaspora Engagement*: Explore contributions from private sector and Somali diaspora to support peacebuilding efforts. |
| **Institutional Risks** | Institutional capacity constraints at both the national and local levels present a significant risk to the long-term success of the project. Capacity-building initiatives were often short-term and lacked structured follow-up, limiting institutions’ ability to manage negotiations and implement governance reforms. Additionally, weak M&E frameworks hindered institutional accountability and progress tracking. | * Inability to sustain key dialogue and reconciliation processes due to limited institutional capacity. * Weak accountability mechanisms, leading to delays or failures in implementing agreements and reforms. | * *Comprehensive Capacity-Building Programs*: Implement long-term training and mentorship programs to enhance governance processes. * *Monitoring and Accountability Mechanisms*: Develop robust M&E frameworks with clear indicators to track agreements and ensure accountability. * *Institutional Partnerships*: Foster partnerships between national institutions and international experts to support technical expertise. |

In summary, political instability, financial dependency, and institutional capacity gaps are key risks that could undermine the long-term success of the project. These risks can be mitigated by formalizing inclusive dialogue mechanisms, strengthening national resource mobilization, and implementing comprehensive capacity-building and accountability measures. By addressing these vulnerabilities, the project’s outcomes can be sustained, contributing to lasting political stability and state-building efforts in Somalia.

## Equality and Inclusivity

**Evaluation Question** – *To what extent did the project address the needs of women and promote their participation in state-building and political processes? Was gender-specific barriers identified and addressed in the project’s design and implementation?*

The project made efforts to address the needs of women and promote their participation in state-building, political processes, and the elections, though challenges and limitations remained.[[92]](#footnote-93) The project planned to allocated 30% of its funds, approximately $600,000, to gender-related activities, however most of it was spent on the NCC meetings, with some of the funds supporting field visits by the Goodwill Ambassadors.[[93]](#footnote-94) These visits, led by the late Minister of Women and Human Rights Development, provided opportunities for women leaders and civil society representatives to meet with FMS leaders. The discussions centred on ensuring women’s participation in NCC meetings and advocating for the 30% quota for women’s political representation in parliament during the election.[[94]](#footnote-95) UNDP also explained that the lessons learnt process of UN Women on the 30% quota was linked to this project.

The project also supported the appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors by the OPM, who organized meetings and conducted community outreach to promote the women’s quota and integrate gender-related issues into the political agenda.[[95]](#footnote-96) These efforts were significant in promoting women’s participation in high-level political processes. However, the project operated during a period of political crisis, where immediate priorities focused on averting national instability.[[96]](#footnote-97) This limited the scope for broader gender-related discussions and activities beyond the core objectives. Additionally, while gender-specific barriers were addressed through these targeted efforts, stakeholders, including the OPM, noted a need for expanded support to enhance the project’s impact on gender equality and women’s empowerment.[[97]](#footnote-98)

In summary, the project made meaningful contributions to promoting women’s participation in political processes through initiatives such as the appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors and advocacy for the 30% women’s quota. However, its overall impact was constrained by competing priorities during a period of political crisis and the limited scope of gender-specific activities. Future efforts should focus on institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure sustained gender inclusion and addressing systemic barriers to women’s political participation.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with disabilities, consulted and meaningfully involved in project activities? What challenges did these groups face, and how effectively did the project respond to their needs?*

The project made some efforts to ensure the inclusion of marginalized groups, including women, youth, and people with disabilities, Government representatives highlighted the collaborative approach between the Somali government and UNDP to promote inclusivity, with both parties reportedly working together to include marginalized groups in project activities wherever possible.[[98]](#footnote-99) UNDP also played an active role in reminding government counterparts of the importance of involving these groups in processes and activities.[[99]](#footnote-100)

However, evidence of meaningful consultation and involvement remains limited. For instance, while there were some discussions around inclusivity in principle, specific actions to address the needs of marginalized groups, such as people with disabilities, were notably absent. Similarly, structural barriers, such as the lack of representation in leadership and decision-making roles, further constrained the meaningful participation of women and youth.[[100]](#footnote-101)

Efforts to include women faced significant challenges, as key decision-making bodies remained predominantly male. This lack of representation not only limited their influence but also perpetuated systemic barriers to their involvement in leadership roles.[[101]](#footnote-102) Marginalized groups were less included during the planning and implementation phases than initially planned, making the project and the NCC less inclusive, [[102]](#footnote-103) especially also because already limited resources were needed for the high level conflict resolution mechanisms and decision making.

In summary, while the project emphasized inclusivity in principle and made some efforts to involve marginalized groups, its implementation was inconsistent and lacked specific measures to address systemic barriers. The absence of targeted initiatives for people with disabilities highlights a critical gap in the project’s approach to inclusivity. Future projects should prioritize structured and measurable strategies to engage marginalized groups meaningfully and address their unique needs.

**Evaluation Question** – *How successful was the project in promoting gender-responsive approaches and ensuring that women’s voices were included in political decision-making?*

The project made notable efforts to promote gender-responsive approaches and include women’s voices in political decision-making, with some successes and limitations.[[103]](#footnote-104) One of the key activities supported by the project was the organization of non-violent communication (NVC) training workshops[[104]](#footnote-105) in November and December 2023, which engaged 106 women across five sessions.[[105]](#footnote-106) These workshops aimed to equip women with essential communication skills for political participation. However, the absence of participant lists and follow-up data limited the ability to assess the full impact of these trainings on advancing women’s roles in decision-making processes.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) played a critical advocacy role, consistently promoting the 30% women’s quota for political participation during high-level engagements.[[106]](#footnote-107) Additionally, Goodwill Ambassadors documented their efforts to advocate for the quota, further emphasizing the project’s commitment to gender-responsive approaches.[[107]](#footnote-108) While these initiatives demonstrated the project’s intent to amplify women’s voices, structural challenges, such as the lack of enforcement mechanisms to achieve the quota, constrained their overall effectiveness.

In summary, the project demonstrated a commitment to gender-responsive approaches by advocating for the 30% women’s quota and providing training to empower women’s political participation. However, the absence of enforcement mechanisms, follow-up measures, and robust data collection limited the sustainability and impact of these efforts. Future initiatives should focus on institutionalizing gender quotas, implementing leadership development programs, and strengthening monitoring frameworks to ensure that women’s voices are consistently included in political decision-making.

**Evaluation Question** – *Were there measurable improvements in gender equality outcomes as a result of the project?*

The evaluation found no evidence that there was measurable improvements in gender equality outcomes as a result of the project, reflecting the challenges of working within Somalia's conservative societal context. Efforts to address gender equality included a 30% budget allocation for gender-related activities, initiatives to involve women in political processes, and the integration of gender elements into NVC training workshops. These activities aimed to promote women’s participation and address gender dynamics in state-building and political processes. However, gender components were introduced later in the project’s lifecycle, limiting their potential impact.[[108]](#footnote-109)

The societal and cultural constraints in Somalia, combined with a lack of early and systematic engagement with civil society, further hindered progress on gender equality outcomes.[[109]](#footnote-110) While closed-door discussions on gender inclusion occurred, the project faced significant barriers in translating these efforts into visible and measurable outcomes. The absence of mechanisms to track progress and assess the impact of gender-related activities also limited the ability to document improvements in gender equality.[[110]](#footnote-111)

In summary, while the project included gender-focused activities, these efforts were constrained by cultural barriers, late-stage implementation, and the absence of robust tracking mechanisms. Addressing these gaps in future projects through early engagement with civil society, clear accountability frameworks, and consistent monitoring systems could enhance the effectiveness of gender equality initiatives and ensure measurable outcomes.

**Evaluation Question** – *To what extent did the project address the needs of people with disabilities?*

The project’s ability to address the needs of people with disabilities was limited, with no specific efforts observed to engage this group during its implementation. While inclusivity was a stated objective, the lack of targeted activities or mechanisms to ensure the participation of people with disabilities hindered the project’s ability to make measurable progress in this area.[[111]](#footnote-112)

Furthermore, the absence of an M&E system meant that the project's effects on equality and inclusivity, particularly for people with disabilities, were not systematically captured or documented. As a result, the extent to which the project met the needs of this marginalized group remains unclear.

In summary**,** while the project aimed to promote inclusivity, it did not adequately address the needs of people with disabilities, nor did it implement mechanisms to assess its impact on this group. To ensure future initiatives are inclusive and equitable, specific strategies, targeted outreach, and robust M&E systems must be incorporated to address the unique barriers faced by people with disabilities.

1. CONCLUSIONS

## Relevance

***Key Conclusion****: The project was very relevant in addressing high-level governance priorities and facilitating critical political dialogue through the NCC, which was key to solving the electoral stand-off and for the prevention of an outbreak of war. But its top-down approach also limited the inclusion of grassroots dynamics, particularly the engagement of civil society organizations, women, youth, and marginalized groups, which remained also relevant after the project amendment.*

The evaluation concludes that the project demonstrated strong relevance by aligning with national priorities, including the NDP-9 and NRF. By addressing key governance issues such as federalism, elections, and reconciliation, the project supported Somalia’s transition goals and facilitated high-level political dialogue through the NCC. This focus on federal-state consensus-building underscored the project’s role in promoting stability and fostering national ownership of political processes.

However, the project’s top-down approach limited its ability to address community-level dynamics, such as grassroots reconciliation, inclusivity, and engagement with civil society organizations representing women, youth, and marginalized groups. Although resources were allocated for gender activities, including advocacy for a 30% women’s quota, significant barriers in implementation reduced the impact of these efforts. Lessons learned from the project suggest that sustained and structured mechanisms are critical for achieving meaningful gender-related outcomes.

In summary, while the project was highly relevant to Somalia’s state-building and peacebuilding priorities, future iterations should adopt a more integrated approach that balances high-level political stabilization with grassroots engagement, ensuring that the needs of all stakeholders are addressed comprehensively.

## Coherence

***Key Conclusion****: The project demonstrated coherence through its alignment with broader UN frameworks, such as the UNSDCF and UN PBF-supported programs, and Somalia’s National Development Plan (NDP-9., it*

The evaluation concludes that the project’s coherence was evident in its alignment with broader UN frameworks and its coordination with national institutions. The project was designed to complement initiatives such as the UNSDCF and the UN PBF supported programs. At the national level, the project aligned with Somalia’s National Development Plan and key governance priorities related to federalism, reconciliation, and elections. This strategic alignment reinforced the legitimacy and relevance of the project within the state-building agenda.

But the evaluation also found challenges in achieving inter-agency coordination, particularly between UNDP, UNSOM, and other partners. While the political expertise provided by UNSOM complemented UNDP’s technical support, coordination efforts were often informal and lacked structured joint programming frameworks. This limited the potential for a more cohesive approach to governance and peacebuilding. Additionally, the project’s limited collaboration with CSOs and grassroots actors constrained its ability to integrate local perspectives and community-level concerns into high-level dialogues.

In summary, while the project demonstrated coherence by aligning with key frameworks and national priorities, the lack of formalized inter-agency coordination and limited engagement with grassroots stakeholders weakened its overall impact. Strengthening partnerships with CSOs and formalizing coordination mechanisms could enhance the coherence and effectiveness of future initiatives.

## Efficiency

***Key Conclusion****:* *The project demonstrated efficiency in providing logistical support for high-level political dialogues and effectively allocating resources to priority activities, such as NCC meetings. However, its overall efficiency was weakened by insufficient staff resources, and a lack of robust monitoring and evaluation systems. Addressing these issues could significantly enhance the efficiency and adaptability of future initiatives*.

The evaluation concludes that the project’s efficiency was reflected in its ability to coordinate logistical support and ensure the timely facilitation of key political dialogues despite operational challenges. The support provided to the NCC meetings, including venue arrangements, technical support, and documentation, contributed to maintaining momentum during critical political negotiations. Additionally, the allocation of financial and human resources for technical advisory roles strengthened the capacity of key institutions, such as OPM and MoIFAR.

But the evaluation also found several areas where efficiency could have been improved, for example, through having a clear agreement (such as a MoU) with the Somali government about what and how NCC meetings can be funded, instead of engaging in budget discussions before each NCC meeting.

Furthermore, the lack of robust M&E systems meant that lessons learned were not systematically captured and applied to improve resource allocation and project planning. Stakeholders also noted that more cost-effective approaches, such as virtual meetings or decentralizing support to regional offices, could have enhanced the project’s operational efficiency.

In summary, while the project demonstrated efficiency in providing logistical and technical support for high-level political dialogues, shortages in human resources and lack of M&E weakened its overall efficiency. Implementing adaptive resource allocation mechanisms and improving M&E processes could enhance the efficiency of future initiatives.

## Effectiveness

***Key Conclusion****: The project effectively facilitated high-level political dialogue through the NCC, contributing to political stabilization and agreements on governance reforms, federalism, and electoral processes. However, its overall effectiveness was constrained by NCC’s dynamics, limited engagement with civil society and marginalized groups, insufficient institutional capacity-building efforts, and weak mechanisms for promoting gender inclusivity. Addressing these gaps through strategic planning, and more robust M&E systems could enhance the long-term impact and inclusivity of future initiatives.*

The evaluation concludes that the project was partially effective in achieving its intended objectives related to political stabilization, governance reforms, and reconciliation. Key successes included the facilitation of NCC meetings, which provided a platform for high-level political negotiations and agreements on crucial issues such as electoral processes and federal-state relations. The project also strengthened the capacity of national institutions, particularly the OPM and MoIFAR, to lead political dialogues.

But the evaluation also found significant gaps in implementation. The NCC meetings, while essential for political dialogue, were often reactive and convened during moments of political crisis rather than as part of a long-term strategy for sustained engagement. The limited inclusion of CSOs and marginalized groups in decision-making processes further constrained the project’s effectiveness.

In terms of gender inclusion, the project supported advocacy for the 30% women’s quota in political representation, but enforcement mechanisms were weak, and efforts to support women’s leadership roles were insufficient. M&E frameworks also lacked robustness, making it difficult to measure progress and adapt interventions effectively.

In summary, while the project was effective in convening high-level political dialogues and preventing political impasses, it was less successful in promoting inclusive governance and addressing long-term federal-state relations. Strengthening M&E systems, formalizing civil society engagement, and implementing long-term capacity-building programs for women and marginalized groups could enhance the project’s overall effectiveness.

## Impact

***Key Conclusion****: The project significantly contributed to high-level political stabilization in Somalia by facilitating critical agreements through the NCC and strengthening national institutions like the OPM and MoIFAR through their leadership in the process. However, its narrow focus on leadership engagement as conflict management tool, especially after the project amendment, limited promotion of grassroots engagement, failed to address federal-state tensions fully, and provided insufficient mechanisms to tackle socio-economic conflict drivers. Enhancing inclusivity, fostering multi-level engagement, and addressing systemic barriers to peacebuilding could improve the sustainability and impact of future initiatives.*

The evaluation concludes that the project contributed significantly to high-level political stabilization and to peacebuilding and conflict-prevention processes. A key achievement was the facilitation of the NCC, which enabled federal and state leaders to negotiate agreements on electoral timelines and governance frameworks. This helped prevent political crises and strengthened national ownership of state-building efforts. The project also enhanced the capacity of institutions like the OPM and MoIFAR to lead political dialogues, reinforcing their leadership roles in the transition process.

But the project’s impact on inclusivity was less visible and tangible. Interviews and reports indicated that while elite-level negotiations made progress, marginalized communities, including women, youth, and minority clans, saw limited benefits. Advocacy for the 30% women’s quota increased awareness of the need for gender equality in political representation, but the absence of robust enforcement mechanisms hindered meaningful progress. Additionally, federal-state tensions persisted, with some federal member states, such as Puntland and Jubbaland, disengaging from the dialogue process, though this is beyond the project’s influence and happened after the project’s support to NCCs ended.

At the community and grassroots level, the absence of mechanisms to address local grievances and strengthen community-led peacebuilding efforts reduced the project’s ability to foster social cohesion and broad-based reconciliation. Reports also noted that the project did not sufficiently address the socio-economic drivers of conflict, such as unemployment and access to resources, which are critical for sustainable peace.

In summary, the project made important contributions to political stabilization and strengthened national institutions’ leadership in peacebuilding processes. However, its limited grassroots engagement, unresolved federal-state tensions, and insufficient focus on socio-economic conflict drivers reduced its overall impact. To enhance future initiatives, there is a need for stronger mechanisms to engage marginalized groups, address federal-state grievances, and support community-level peacebuilding efforts.

## Sustainability

***Key Conclusion:*** *The sustainability of the project’s outcomes remains uncertain, primarily due to financial dependencies, unresolved federal-state tensions, and limited grassroots engagement. While the project successfully reinforced national ownership by supporting Somali-led dialogue processes through the NCC and strengthening key institutions like the OPM and MoIFAR, its reliance on external donor funding and insufficient institutional capacity pose significant risks. Furthermore, the exclusion of CSOs and marginalized groups from peacebuilding efforts has diminished community-level impact and broad-based public support. Addressing these challenges through domestic funding mechanisms, strengthened federal-state relations, and inclusive grassroots participation is essential for ensuring the long-term viability of the project’s achievements*

The evaluation concludes that the sustainability of the project’s outcomes is uncertain, largely due to financial dependencies, institutional capacity gaps, and the fragility of political dynamics in Somalia. The project contributed to building national ownership by supporting Somali-led dialogue processes through the NCC and strengthening the roles of the OPM and MoIFAR. However, the long-term viability of these efforts is dependent on continued financial and technical support, as national institutions currently lack sufficient resources to independently sustain these initiatives.

The reliance on external donor funding for logistical and financial support raises concerns about the ability of key institutions to continue convening high-level political dialogues after the project’s conclusion. Additionally, while the project helped institutionalize political negotiation platforms, federal-state tensions remain unresolved, and without robust grievance resolution mechanisms, there is a risk of political fragmentation undermining the sustainability of governance reforms.

At the community level, the limited engagement of CSOs and marginalized groups in peacebuilding efforts weakened the project’s grassroots impact. This reduced the likelihood of broad-based public support for governance initiatives. The absence of formalized partnerships with local governance structures and the lack of community-driven reconciliation mechanisms further diminished the sustainability of reconciliation outcomes.

In summary, while the project made strides in reinforcing national ownership of peacebuilding processes, its outcomes are at risk due to financial dependency, unresolved federal-state disputes, and insufficient grassroots engagement. To enhance sustainability, future efforts should focus on securing domestic funding streams, strengthening federal-state relations, and institutionalizing partnerships with CSOs and local governance actors.

## Equality and Inclusivity

***Key Conclusion****:* *The project demonstrated a commitment to promoting equality and inclusivity, particularly through its advocacy for the 30% women’s quota and support for women’s participation in governance processes. However, systemic barriers, such as entrenched cultural norms, weak enforcement mechanisms, and limited engagement with youth, minority groups, and persons with disabilities, hindered its overall impact. While gender-related advocacy achieved visibility and incremental progress, the lack of formal consultation mechanisms and structured engagement with marginalized groups reduced the project’s ability to foster broad-based inclusivity and address community-level grievances effectively. Strengthening mechanisms for meaningful participation and building the capacity of underrepresented groups will be essential for achieving sustained equality and inclusivity in future initiatives.*

The evaluation concludes that the project demonstrated a commitment to equality and inclusivity through its advocacy for the 30% women’s quota in political representation and its support for women’s participation in governance processes. The appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors and the inclusion of women in dialogue forums were notable achievements in promoting gender equality. However, the project’s impact on inclusivity was inconsistent, as systemic barriers—such as entrenched cultural norms and weak enforcement mechanisms—limited the substantive participation of women in decision-making processes. Reports indicated that women’s roles in political dialogues were often symbolic, with limited influence over key policy outcomes.

Youth and marginalized communities, including minority clans and persons with disabilities, were similarly underrepresented. While youth organizations were occasionally invited to participate in national consultations, their contributions were often viewed as tokenistic rather than integral to the peacebuilding process. The absence of formal consultation mechanisms for marginalized groups further weakened the inclusivity of the project, reducing its ability to address community-level grievances and foster broad-based social cohesion.

CSOs advocating for gender equality and minority rights were consulted sporadically, but their involvement was informal and lacked the structure needed to translate advocacy into sustained policy reforms. This reduced the potential for community-driven peacebuilding and limited the project’s grassroots impact.

In summary, the project made important strides in promoting equality and inclusivity, particularly through gender-related advocacy. However, systemic barriers and limited engagement with youth, minority groups, and CSOs reduced the effectiveness of these efforts. Strengthening formal consultation mechanisms, expanding partnerships with CSOs, and implementing capacity-building programs for marginalized groups could enhance the project’s impact on equality and inclusivity.

1. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations outlined in the table below are informed by the evaluation’s findings and key conclusions, aiming to address challenges and gaps identified during the project’s implementation. These recommendations are designed to enhance the strategic impact, operational efficiency and inclusivity of future initiatives. By integrating lessons learned and adopting targeted strategies, future projects can build on the strengths of this intervention while ensuring sustainability and adaptability in Somalia’s governance and peacebuilding efforts. Each recommendation corresponds to specific key conclusions and provides actionable steps to guide UNDP, government counterparts, and other stakeholders in planning and implementation.

| **STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION** | **SUB-RECOMMENDATIONS** | **IMPLEMENTING PARTIES** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. **Strengthening Inclusive Governance & Political Dialogue** | * Develop a two-tiered engagement strategy that integrates grassroots consultations with high-level dialogues. * Collaborating with government and in alignment with their priorities, establish formal partnerships with CSOs, particularly those representing women, youth, and marginalized groups, to ensure their active participation in governance discussions. * Collaborating with the government ensuring Somali owned and Somali led process, support facilitation of joint workshops between political actors and community representatives to enhance mutual trust and understanding. | UNDP, OPM, MoIFAR, CSOs, Donor, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Enhancing Coordination & Policy Coherence** | * Enhance coordination between UNDP, UNSOM, and other partners, ensuring joint implementation plans, resource-sharing, and clear roles. * Develop structured linkages between national-level political dialogues and local reconciliation programs to ensure grassroots concerns inform high-level processes. | UNDP, UNTMIS, Somali Government |
| 1. **Improve Project Efficiency & Resource Allocation.** | * Develop a clear agreement with the government (e.g., an MoU) outlining allowable expenses for recurring activities, such as NCC meetings, to ensure financial consistency and accountability. * Introduce adaptive resource allocation mechanisms to allow for quick reallocation of funds in response to emerging needs or shifting priorities. | UNDP, UN PBF, Somali Government, Donors, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Enhancing Gender Inclusion & Marginalized Group Participation** | * Develop targeted mentorship and leadership programs for women, youth, and marginalized groups to enhance their participation in political decision-making and advocacy. * Establish robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track and enforce the 30% women’s quota. * Collaborating with government and in alignment with their priorities, strengthen formal partnerships with gender-focused and grassroots CSOs to incorporate community-level perspectives into peacebuilding processes and policy discussions. | UNDP, UN Women, Somali Government, CSOs, UNTMIS |
| 1. **Building Sustainable Institutions & Long-Term Political Stability** | * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to formalize the NCC within Somalia’s political framework to enhance its legitimacy, sustainability, and role in fostering reconciliation and governance reforms. * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to develop transparent grievance resolution mechanisms to address federal-state tensions and community disputes. * Implement comprehensive capacity-building programs for national and regional governance actors to sustain reconciliation and negotiation efforts. | UNDP, UNTMIS, member states, Somali Government |
| 1. **Ensuring Financial Sustainability & Institutional Resilience** | * Jointly with UNTMIS and international partners advocate with the government to establish national resource mobilization mechanisms and multi-donor trust funds to reduce dependency on external funding. * Strengthen accountability frameworks and M&E systems to track implementation of governance and reconciliation agreements. * Support the government to develop clear financial transition plans to ensure the sustainability of political dialogue mechanisms like the NCC. | UNDP, UNTMIS member states, Somali Government |

1. LESSONS LEARNED

The evaluation revealed several key lessons learned from the implementation of the project, reflecting insights from government and implementing partners, as well as observations from the evaluation process. These lessons are valuable for informing the design and execution of similar projects in the future, particularly in fragile political contexts like Somalia.

#### ****1.**** Importance of Continuous Dialogue and Flexibility

* Continuous dialogue was identified as a critical component for achieving lasting peace and stability. Supporting ad hoc government activities and maintaining flexibility in project design and implementation were essential to navigating the fluid and often unpredictable political landscape.
* Stakeholders emphasized the need for community-level advocacy and awareness efforts to complement high-level political dialogues, particularly in the areas of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and inclusivity.

#### ****2. Catalytic Impact of Time-Bound Projects****

* The project demonstrated the potential of catalytic, time-bound initiatives to lay the foundation for larger, longer-term programs. For example, successes achieved in this project informed and contributed to the design of subsequent programs, such as the $27 million State Building and Reconciliation Support Programme.

#### ****3. The Need for Strategic Alignment and Coordination****

* A lack of strategic alignment and coordination among UN agencies and stakeholders was highlighted as a challenge. Early-stage, collective planning sessions involving all relevant parties could help establish a unified vision and strategy.
* Internal discussions and clearer frameworks at the project design stage—such as setting funding ceilings and logistical agreements for NCC meetings—could prevent inefficiencies and improve project delivery.

#### ****4. Gender Inclusion Requires Structured Mechanisms****

* While gender inclusion was a component of the project, the baseline for gender-focused activities was not ambitious, and meaningful outcomes were limited. Sustained and structured mechanisms are necessary to ensure that gender equality objectives are effectively integrated and achieved in future projects.

#### ****5. Tailoring Activities to Context and Realistic Goals****

* Project activities and support should be designed to align with what is reasonably achievable within the given political and operational constraints. Unrealistic goals can lead to inefficiencies and unmet expectations.

#### ****6. Moving Beyond Transactional Activities****

* A recurring theme among interviewees was the perception that the project relied too heavily on financing high-level meetings and workshops, without sufficient focus on achieving transformative change. Future projects should delve deeper into the root causes of conflict and work toward connecting political leadership with on-the-ground realities to foster meaningful and lasting impact.

#### ****7. Inclusivity in Partner Engagement****

* Expanding the range of implementing partners beyond central government entities, such as the OPM, to include community-level organizations and diverse stakeholders can enhance the inclusivity and effectiveness of project outcomes.

#### ****8. Lessons for Monitoring and Evaluation****

* The absence of robust M&E mechanisms hindered the ability to systematically track progress, document successes, and adapt interventions. Future projects must prioritize comprehensive M&E frameworks to ensure evidence-based decision-making.
* Evaluators noted inconsistencies in project documentation and stakeholder engagement, including individuals identified as participants who reported no involvement. These gaps highlight the need for improved documentation and clearer communication regarding roles and responsibilities.

#### ****9. High-Level Political Processes in Fragile Contexts****

* The evaluation underscored the limitations of attempting to fit high-level political processes into rigid project templates. Flexible, context-sensitive approaches are necessary to effectively support political transitions in fragile states.

1. PROJECT FINANCING

The total planned budget for the project was USD 2,000,000, and as per the ToR the total expenditure of the project at the time this evaluation was commissioned was USD 1,835,222. See *Table 2* below for a breakdown the budget expenditure according to the three project outputs.

TABLE 7: BUDGET EXPENDITURE

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| PROJECT OUTPUT | TOTAL AMOUNT USD | % OVER TOTAL |
| Output 1.1: SRSG’s good offices facilitate dialogue between the FGS and the FMS and assist in a peaceful resolution of conflicts to reach political agreements | 635,222 |  |
| Output 1.2: The capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister strengthened and support to NCCs provided in a timely manner, thereby enabling agreements on the electoral framework and agreements on state-building priorities. | 600,000 |  |
| Output 1.3: Engage, mobilize, and equip civil society and other groups, particularly women and young people, in the state-building processes. | 600,000 |  |
| TOTAL | **1,835,222** |  |

1. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES AND WORK PLAN

The evaluation team will produce the following key deliverables:

TABLE 8: EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

| **#** | **DELIVERABLE** | **CONTENT** | **TIMING** | **RESPONSIBILITIES** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Evaluation Inception Report** | Evaluation team clarifies objectives, methodology and timing of the evaluation | **October 7, 2024** | Evaluation team submits Inception Report to the ERG and Commissioner |
|  | **Presentation** | Initial Findings | **December 12, 2024** | Evaluation team presents to the ERG and Commissioner |
|  | **Draft Evaluation Report** | Full draft report (using guidelines on report content) with annexes | **January 13, 2025** | Evaluation team submits to the evaluation manager and the ERG; reviewed by Regional Technical Advisor (RTA). |
|  | **Final Evaluation Report + Audit Trail** | Revised final report and Evaluation Audit trail in which the Evaluator details how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final Evaluation report (as per guidelines on report content) | **February 28, 2025** | UNDP, ERG, stakeholder, and evaluation team |

# ANNEX 1: EVALUATION RATING SCALE

| **SCORE** | | **DEFINITION** | **CATEGORY** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **6** | Highly satisfactory | Level of achievement clearly exceeds expectations and there is no shortcoming. | **SATISFACTORY** |
| **5** | Satisfactory | Level of achievement meets expectations (indicatively, over 80-95 per cent) and there is no or minor shortcoming. |
| **4** | Moderately satisfactory | Level of achievement more or less meets expectations (indicatively, 60 to 80 per cent) and there are some shortcomings. |
| **3** | Moderately unsatisfactory | Level of achievement is somewhat lower than expected (indicatively, less than 60 per cent) and there are significant shortcomings. | **UNSATISFACTORY** |
| **2** | Unsatisfactory | Level of achievement is substantially lower than expected and there are major shortcomings. |
| **1** | Highly unsatisfactory | Level of achievement is negligible and there are severe shortcomings. |

# ANNEX 2: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Roadmap
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Terms of Reference (ToR)
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique, June 2022
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique, September 2022
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique on allocation of powers, December 2022
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique on justice model system, December 2022
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique political agreements on elections, May 2023
* Federal Government of Somalia, NCC Communique on fiscal federalism and security architecture, March 2023
* UN Peacebuilding Fund, Project Document, 2021.
* UN Peacebuilding Fund, PBF Progress Report, October 2022
* UN Peacebuilding Fund, PBF Progress Report, May 2023
* UNDP Somalia, Project M&E Plan (2023)
* UNDP, contact details of project staff and key project stakeholders including Project Board members and other partners (national counterparts and donors).
* United Nations Country programme document for Somalia (2021-2025)

# ANNEX 3: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INCLUDED IN EVALUATION

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Stakeholder Type** | **City** | **Gender** | **Institution** | |
| 1 | Implementing Partner | Mogadishu | F | UNSOM/ROLSIG |
| 2 | Implementing Partner | Mogadishu | F | UNSOM/ROLSIG |
| 3 | Implementing Partner | Mogadishu | F | UNSOM/PAMG |
| 4 | Donor | Mogadishu | M | PBF |
| 5 | Implementer | Mogadishu | M | UNDP |
| 6 | Implementer | Mogadishu | M | UNDP |
| 7 | Implementer | Mogadishu | M | UNDP |
| 8 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | F | OPM of the Federal Government of Somalia |
| 9 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | M | OPM of the Federal Government of Somalia |
| 10 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | M | OPM of the Federal Government of Somalia |
| 11 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | F | Minister of Interior, Reconciliation and Federalism |
| 12 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | M | Minister of Interior, Reconciliation and Federalism |
| 13 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | M | Minister of Interior, Reconciliation and Federalism |
| 14 | Government Partner | Mogadishu | M | Minister of Interior, Reconciliation and Federalism |

# ANNEX 4: RESULTS FRAMEWORK INDICATORS ASSESSMENT

| **Indicator** | **Planned Target** | **Final Achieved Result** | **Assessment** | **Explanation for Variance**  **(if applicable)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome Indicator 1a: FGS and FMS started implementing state- building priorities Roadmap based on the agreed action plan and sequencing/prioritization of the actions.** | Sequencing action plan agreed by Somali leaders | NCC technical committee established.  ToR was developed for the NCC  A roadmap for the NCC was developed and agreed | Achieved, though implementation  remains ongoing |  |
| **Outcome Indicator 1b: # of agreements reached following the NCC consensus on the state- building priorities roadmap** | Somali leaders agreed on the principles leading to the completion of the constitutional review process and reaching a consensus on the contentious issues | 4 political agreements on the allocation of powers, and federal justice model, fiscal federalism and electoral model were signed by the FGS and FMS leaders. | Partially achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.1: Facilitate continuous engagement between the FGS and the FMS leaders to operationalize a consensus on the state-building priorities.** | Agreed a platform for the continuous engagement of the FGS and the FMS | NCC technical committee was established  ToR for the technical committee was developed  NCC roadmap was developed and endorsed by the leaders | Achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.1.2: Facilitated process to reach the agreement to secure the implementation of the 30 per cent quota for women in the election process** | Track and advocate that the Somali leaders/signatories secure implementation of the agreement on the 30 percent women representation in the electoral process, including among delegates, polling officers and in the 11th Parliament. | Women Goodwill Ambassadors were appointed  Advocacy meetings for women's quota were held, which resulted in achieving 21% women representation in both Houses of the Federal Parliament | Partially achieved |  |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.1: Regularity of NCC meetings is ensured through material and technical support** | At least 3 NCC meetings organized | 6 NCC meetings were organized | Achieved | Frequency of NCC meetings increased due to intensified political engagement between FGS and FMS leaders. |
| **Output Indicator 1.2.2: # of recommendations from the dialogues with women and youth and opinion polling included in the NCC discussions** | # of targeted sessions on the role of gender and youth in state building processes organized and recommendations from the sessions included in the NCC agenda | NCC planned in 2023 | Partially achieved, quota advocacy took place but was not enforced | Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.1: # of peacebuilding processes, led by women or youth (or women and youth organizations) initiated** | At least 2 women-and- youth-led initiatives initiated | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Received funds were prioritized to support NCC meetings.   Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.2: # of women and other citizens informed about and engaged in the state-building processes (information disaggregated by sex and age)** | At least 5,000 women, youth and members of the minority communities informed about and engaged in the state-building processes | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Received funds were prioritized for NCC meetings.  Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |
| **Output Indicator 1.3.3: Reliable data on women and youth’s opinion on state-building priorities collected** | Opinion polling completed | Planned in 2023 | Not achieved | Prolonged project revision delayed implementation, activities rephased to Q3 and Q4 |

# undplogo2ANNEX 5: TERMS OF REFERENCE

**Terms of Reference (ToR)**

**Individual Contractor (International)**

**Team Leader, don-Term Evaluation of Support Political Transition in Somalia Project**

1. **BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT**

Emerging from a complex and protracted conflict, Somalia faces significant challenges in its peacebuilding and state-building process. Despite cautious progress, structural deficiencies persist, including the absence of an agreed revised Federal Constitution and an established judicial system. Recent political developments have hindered progress on critical national priorities, such as constitutional review, justice, and security sector reform.

By building on the agreement of 27 May 2021 signed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) leaders, the Project was conceived as a vehicle for timely implementation of the political consensus, deepening and strengthening the Somali-led and Somali-owned reconciliation processes and initiatives contributing to longer-term state-building objectives in Somalia. The core objective of the project was to facilitate peaceful transition of power in line with political consensus on electoral arrangement reached through National Consultative Council (NCC).

The UN has played a key supporting role in facilitating the organization of NCC meetings. It was envisaged that the UN will continue to support the implementation of the agreement towards the holding of elections and a renewed focus on the state-building priorities, which will contribute to avoiding the types of challenges that Somalia has faced in the past two years. The primary goal of this Project was to lay the groundwork for the implementation of the NCC Agreement and ongoing political discussions on state-building priorities, notably constitutionalism, parliamentarism, federalism, reconciliation, and power sharing. This would further lead to a peaceful transition of power, reducing risks of the use of violence for political gains and promoting a culture of dialogue to permeate all peacebuilding and state-building efforts. At the same time, the project sought to initiate activities leading to creation of the necessary conditions for both state and nonstate actors to respond and mitigate the multiple and interconnected sources of violent conflicts in Somalia- political as well as communal. Hence, the project’s expected outcome was aimed to have strengthened the capacity of key stakeholders to actively participate in the discussions and reach agreement on the implementation of the key state-building priorities, based on the NCC Agreement.

As per the agreement with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to ensure, in the short term, a peaceful election process and, over the long term, implementation of the state-building roadmap annexed to the 27 May Agreement, the Project was expected to deliver the following three outputs that contribute to achieving the above outcome:

* Output 1.1: SRSG’s good offices facilitate dialogue between the FGS and the FMS and assist in a peaceful resolution of conflicts to reach political agreements.
* Output 1.2: The capacity of the Office of the Prime Minister strengthened and support to NCCs provided in a timely manner, thereby enabling agreements on the electoral framework and agreements on state-building priorities.
* Output 1.3: Engage, mobilize, and equip civil society and other groups, particularly women and young people, in the state-building processes.

The Project aligns with UN and UNDP policy documents, contributes to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and emphasizes gender mainstreaming. Additionally, it aligns with key national priorities outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP), specifically Pillar 1: Inclusive and accountable politics and reconciliation, the national reconciliation framework/plan, and the mutual accountability framework for Somalia. project beneficiaries include the FGS, FMS government Ministries of Interior, Federal and Reconciliation Affairs of Jubaland State, Galmudug State, Office of the Presidents of Southwest State and Hirshabelle State, the Ministry of Interior, Federalism and Democratization of Puntland State, OPM and civil society organizations.

Within this context, UNDP under the auspices of the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project seeks to engage an independent evaluator to conduct an end-term evaluation of the Project in consultation with all the key stakeholders. The evaluation will assess the sustainability of the project’s outputs and the impact on political transition in Somalia, identify best practices and challenges, and provide recommendations that will inform potential extensions or modifications of the project for future programming. This will ensure that the project continues to effectively address the evolving needs related to political stability and governance in Somalia.

**Project Summary Table**

| **PROJECT/OUTCOME INFORMATION** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Project/outcome title** | Support Political Transition in Somalia | |
| **Quantum ID** | 00129480 | |
| **Corporate outcome and output** | The project contributes to the UN Strategic Framework Priorities:   * UNSDCF strategic priority 1. Inclusive politics and reconciliation, particularly output 1.2: Somalis, particularly women and youth, benefit from and participate in functional, inclusive, accountable, and transparent democratic systems across all levels of government and governmental institutions. * UNDP Strategy Plan 2018-2021, outcome 2: Accelerate structural transformations for sustainable development, as highlighted in the UNDP CPD. * SDGs 5, 10, 16 and 17. | |
| **Country** | Somalia | |
| **Region** | * Project duration in months :18 months (with no cost extension of six months). * Geographic zones for project implementation: Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and five federal member states (Puntland, Jubaland, Southwest State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle) and Banadir. | |
| **Date project document signed** | November 2021 | |
| **Project dates** | **Start:** 1st October 2021 | **End:** 17th November 2023 |
| No Cost Extension: till 31st July 2024 |
| **Project budget** | USD 2,000,000 | |
| **Project expenditure at the time of evaluation** | USD 1,835,222 | |
| **Funding source** | Peace-building Support Office (PBSO) | |
| **Implementing party[[112]](#footnote-113)** | UNDP  **Other UN implementing partners**  The United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM).  **Government Counterparts**   * The Office of the Prime Minister, Federal Government of Somalia (OPM FGS). * Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs (MOIFAR). | |

1. **EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES**

**Purpose and Objectives**

The primary objective of this end-term valuation is to assess the contributions of the Project towards enhancing political stability and transition in Somalia. The evaluation will measure the success of the Project in achieving its intended outputs and outcomes, particularly in its ability to facilitate high-level political dialogue, strengthen institutional capacities, and promote active societal engagement in state-building efforts. The evaluation will assess the alignment of the Project interventions with the strategic needs and priorities of Somalia’s political landscape during the period from November 2021 to November 2023. Additionally, the evaluation will analyze how economically resources were utilized to generate value within the Project’s scope, examining the management of finances and human resources against the results achieved. It will identify the sustainability of the Project’s outputs and the impacts with regard to ongoing political dialogue, institutional resilience, and civic engagement, and explore how these may be maintained or enhanced post-Project completion. Moreover, the evaluation will specifically assess the Project’s inclusivity in reaching marginalized groups, including people with disabilities and its impact on gender equality and women's empowerment by examining the extent to which the Project has addressed gender-specific needs, promoted women's participation, and ensured their representation in decision-making processes. The evaluation will also compile key insights and obstacles encountered during the Project lifecycle to inform the design and implementation of future governance and peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia. Finally, it will provide actionable recommendations based on evidence collected to guide future projects and policy formulation aimed at consolidating peace and political stability in Somalia. The evaluation is expected to identify relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, bottlenecks and lessons that can be applied in the programme outcomes to ensure that the remaining gaps are addressed in the period until the end of the United Nations Cooperation Framework- UNCF (December 2025).

**Scope of the Evaluation**

The scope of the end-term evaluation is aligned with the ninth National Development Plan (NDP-9 and UNCF 2025 whose objective among others is to advance gender equality, women’s protection, and empowerment. The evaluation will cover the whole Project period and all outputs and outcomes.

* **Geographical coverage**: this evaluation will cover the areas where the Project has been implemented within both the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS).
* **Target groups and stakeholders:** The evaluation will engage all stakeholders - benefitting communities/institutions, Ministries, funding partners, UN agencies and partnering civil society organisations (CSOs).
* **Target Audience:** the Project beneficiaries and stakeholders including other UN agencies, donors, and other relevant users of the report.

The evaluation will cover the following:

**Progress and Impact**

* Assess the appropriateness of the Project design and management arrangements for achieving the stated objectives.
* An in-depth review of the extent to which the implementation of various programme components and outputs outlined in the programme document and work plan has been achieved to identify the level of achievement as well as an analysis of factors in case the set benchmarks were not fulfilled.
* Review assumptions underpinning current programme theory of change for amendment /revision and the expected impact.
* Recommend alternative activities or implementation modalities for optimizing intended results and potential impact.
* Propose any new pilot/experimental activities and/or phasing out of activities that may no longer be relevant or require amendments.

**Management & Monitoring Arrangements**

* Conduct an in-depth review of the oversight, reporting and monitoring structures designed to support the Joint Programme implementation.

**Risk Management**

* Assess the current and possible risks to the Joint Programme outputs and suggest related mitigation strategies which may be undertaken in future.

**Partnerships and localization**

* Assess the quality of partnerships, national ownership, and sustainability vis-à-vis the strategy in the Joint Programme document.
* Assess partnerships that can be further enhanced for an extended phase of the Joint Programme.
* Identify partnerships that need to be undertaken for comprehensive programming, coordination, and programme implementation.

1. **EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY GUIDING QUESTIONS**[[113]](#footnote-114)

Gender, and human rights-based approaches will form the basis for the evaluation.

**Relevance**

* How relevant were the objectives and activities, implemented by the project, in addressing issues related to state building and peacebuilding such as National Reconciliation Framework (NRF, National Development Plan (NDP) in Somalia and UNCF?
* How do the stakeholders perceive the relevance of the project and how have the activities implemented improved the participation of women in peacebuilding?
* Were the inputs and strategies identified appropriate and adequate to achieve the results? Were they realistic? Was the project relevant in terms of addressing identified needs?
* Evaluate the logic and unity of the process, as well as the relevance of the chain of results of each programme’s component, for supporting gender empowerment, participation and protection and providing subsequent capacity-building programmes to improve overall women’s protection.

**Coherence**

* How has the collaboration between UNSOM PAMG/UNDP/PBF, national/regional counterparts, local partners, CSOs and line ministries contributed to appropriate response of specific needs and priorities of the stakeholders?
* Identify how the other UN joint programmes can be interlinked with the Joint Programme explore if the partnership can be enhanced.
* Assess the internal coherence.

**Efficiency**

* How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project and external partners?
* How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach?
* Evaluate the efficiency of the programme implementation delivered results, the quality of the results achieved and the time/political constraints during the implementation period.
* Were the accounting and financial systems in place adequate for project management and producing accurate timely financial information?
* Was project implementation as cost effective as originally proposed (planned vs. actual)
* Were financial resources utilized effectively? Could financial resources have been used more efficiently?

**Effectiveness**

* Identify and assess the effectiveness of the peacebuilding strategies adopted during the implementation of the project.
* Assess how assumptions have affected programme achievements and the subsequent management decisions vis-à-vis the stakeholder satisfaction, programme reach, and the extent to which the programme outcome has been effectively achieved.
* How effective has the project been in contributing to development results that are gender-responsive?
* To what extent has the project contributed to creating political and peacebuilding processes that are inclusively designed, with women participating in them have capacities to engage effectively and taking leadership roles?
* How has the project adapted to any changes in the political and security contexts in Somalia during the intervention period?
* How effective has the project been in contributing to an environment that promotes better protection and meaningful participation of women?
* How effective has the project been in building gender equality capacity and accountability frameworks?
* Was UNDP successful in promoting innovative development practices? How can these practices be institutionalized?

**Impact**

* Evaluate the extent to which the project generated positive or negative, intended, and unintended effects on its wider peacebuilding and state building environment and its contribution towards the wider objectives outlined in the programme’s document.

**Sustainability**

* Will the changes caused by the joint program continue beyond the life of the project?
* What, mechanisms have, been put in place to sustain the key project Outputs and Outcomes?
* How has the program worked with local partners to increase their capacity in a sustainable way?
* What motivations /mechanisms exist for partners to continue playing these roles?
* What are the risks facing sustainability of project Outputs and Outcomes?
* How well have the project’s benefits been institutionalized within the government?
* Assess the extent to which the results are likely to continue with a specific focus on national capacity and ownership over the process.

**Persons with Disability:**

* Were persons with disabilities consulted and meaningfully involved in project planning and implementation?
* What barriers did persons with disabilities face?

1. **METHODOLOGY**

The Evaluators will conduct a desk review of all existing relevant documentation, including project documents, periodic reports, terms of references of project structures, project budget revisions, national strategic and legal documents including NDP-9, and other relevant documents. The evaluation will use both qualitative and quantitative research mixed methods and instruments in data collection and analysis, conduct extensive interviews and focus group discussions with national authorities, UN personnel, strategic partners, relevant national and international organizations, donors, and individuals. Digital surveys will be employed to account for the potential limitations in stakeholders' ability to physically participate in the exercise(sampling approach needs to be detailed in the inception report).The focus group discussions and interviews (with men and women) will be conducted with a diverse group of stakeholders, including key government officials and project teams, representatives from the OPM, MOIFAR and Office of Presidents of the FGS and FMS, Ministry of Women, representatives from CSOs advocating for women and youth, international partners and UN agencies involved in the project implementation. Subject to the security situation field missions are planned to strategic locations across Somalia including Puntland, Galmudug, Hir-Shabelle, Southwest, Jubaland and Banadir. Evidence obtained and used to assess the results of the support should be triangulated from a variety of sources citation to evidence is required in the reports and in alignment to the UNEG ethical guidelines, findings should be specific and sufficiently elaborated to answer the evaluation questions, address the evaluation objective and supported by information that is reliable and valid. The chosen methodologies, stakeholders’ analysis, sampling approach, planned interviews, and field visits, data analysis approach and tools should be detailed in the inception report explaining how the approach will answer the evaluation questions and address the evaluation objective, ensuring alignment and agreement with UNDP and project stakeholders. The final evaluation report will describe the approach taken, including the rationale for selected methods.

**Gender responsive methodology**

The evaluation will be gender-responsive meaning that both the data collection process and analysis apply the key principles of a human rights-based approach. It will analyze the underlying structural barriers and socio-cultural norms that impede the realization of women’s rights. The evaluation design will apply good practices in gender-responsive evaluations and a suitable approach to assess the type, effectiveness, and the quality of gender-transformative results achieved. Data collection methods should be gender responsive. Cultural aspects that could impact the collection of data should be analysed and integrated into data collection methods and tools. Evaluators are expected to include adequate time for testing data collection tools. Data should be systematically disaggregated by sex and age and, to the extent possible, by geographical region, ethnicity, disability, and migratory status. Specific guidelines should be observed. (namely the UNEG guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations (2014) and UN Disability Inclusion Strategy Evaluation Accountability (2019).

1. **EVALUATION PRODUCTS (DELIVERABLES)**

* A 10-page evaluation inception report. The report should be based on preliminary discussions with the ERG and OPM after the desk review and should be produced before the evaluation starts (before any formal evaluation interviews, survey distribution, or field missions) and before the Country mission in the case of the team leader.
* Evaluation debriefings immediately after the field mission.
* Draft evaluation report: a 40 to 50-page report including executive summary and annexes and should contain all the key evaluation criteria which are detailed above.
* Evaluation report audit trail. Comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report should be retained by the evaluator to show how they have addressed comments.
* Final evaluation report.
* Presentations to stakeholders.
* Evaluation brief and other knowledge products or participation in knowledge-sharing and dissemination. dissemination.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| # | **Deliverable** | **Description** | **Timing** | **Responsibilities** |
| 1 | Evaluation Inception Report | Evaluation team clarifies objectives, methodology and timing of the evaluation | Within two weeks of Contract execution | Evaluation team submits Inception Report to the ERG and Commissioner |
| 2 | Presentation | Initial Findings | Within four weeks of Contract Execution | Evaluation team presents to the ERG and Commissioner |
| 3 | Draft Evaluation Report | Full draft report **(using guidelines on report content)** with annexes | Within three weeks of completion of the field mission | Evaluation team submits to the evaluation manager and the ERG; reviewed by Regional Technical Advisor (RTA). |
| 4 | Final Evaluation Report + Audit Trail | Revised final report and Evaluation Audit trail in which the Evaluator details how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final Evaluation report **(as per guidelines on report content)** | Within one week of final debriefing | UNDP, ERG, stakeholder, and evaluation team |

**Feedback on Deliverables**

* All deliverables are subject to UNDP's approval before considered final. Feedback will be provided within ten working days of submission, and the Consultants are expected to consider comments and submit revised versions promptly.
* Standard templates that need to be followed are provided in the Annexes section. It is expected that the evaluator will follow the UNDP evaluation guidelines and UNEG quality check list and ensure all the quality criteria are met in the evaluation report.  It is recommended that the evaluator quality assures his draft evaluation report against the [quality check list](https://erc.undp.org/pdf/evaluation-guideline-section/section-6.pdf) as part of quality assurance before submitting the draft to UNDP. Please note that all evaluation reports commissioned by UNDP go through a Meta-evaluation quality assessment process by [UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)](http://web.undp.org/evaluation/) through a pool of expert quality assessment reviewers after the finalization and submission of the final report. This is important for the organization to ensure the quality and utility of the final evaluation product. Details of the IEO’s quality assessment of decentralized evaluations can be found in Section 6 of the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines.[[114]](#footnote-115)

1. **EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIRED COMPETENCIES**

A team of two independent individual contractors (evaluators) will conduct the end-term evaluation. One team leader with exposure to project evaluations at global level and one Somali national expert. The team selection seeks to maximize overall “team” qualities in the area of evaluation of gender and governance projects preferably in conflict/post-conflict contexts. The team leader shall coordinate the entire evaluation process and will be responsible for the design and writing of the evaluation report. The national evaluator will be the focal point for coordination with stakeholders at federal and federal member states levels in collaboration with the team leader and local expertise to navigate the Somali context. The person will also lead field data collection including interviews and focus group discussions and work with the project team in developing the field mission itinerary. Should international travel be restricted, the evaluation team with support from UNDP will use remote tools such as Zoom, Teams, Skype and mobile questionnaires for data collection and interviews augmented by field visits by the national evaluator.

**Team Leader**

The team leader shall specifically.

* Coordinate the entire evaluation process, ensuring timelines are met, and all evaluation activities proceed smoothly.
* Develop the framework for data collection, analysis, and reporting.
* Draft the final evaluation report based on findings from field data and analysis.
* Liaise with stakeholders, including the national consultant, to ensure clarity and alignment throughout the evaluation process.
* Write and finalize the evaluation report.

Qualifications of the Team Leader

**Education**

At least a master’s degree or equivalent in political science, social science or in a related field.

**Experience**

* At least three years’ progressive experience in conducting results-based monitoring and evaluation, with specific expertise in the evaluation of gender and governance projects at national and global levels, public administration, conflict management and peacebuilding.
* Conceptual and programmatic grounding in gender, human rights, adaptive management and strong expertise in political processes.
* Familiarity with UN joint programming and experience with UN programmes funded by multi-donor trust funds preferably in conflict/post-conflict contexts.
* Familiarity with the Somali context and understanding of political dynamics in Somalia are assets.

**Competencies**

**Corporate Competencies**

* Demonstrates integrity and fairness, by modelling the UN/UNDP’s values and ethical standards.
* Promotes the vision, mission and strategic goals of the UN and UNDP.
* Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability.
* Treats all people fairly.
* Fulfils all obligations to gender sensitivity and zero tolerance for sexual harassment.

**Functional Competencies:**

* Skilled in research methodologies including frameworks, tools, and best practices.
* Excellent analytical and organizational skills with ability to analyse and synthesise information from different sources and to draw key themes and issues from the information.
* Strong communication skills including ability to formulate concise reports/edit texts and to articulate ideas in a clear concise style to cross-cultural audiences.
* Strong interpersonal skills including ability to interact with national and international actors at all levels of organisation with tact and diplomacy.
* Ability to manage complexities and to work collaboratively as part of a team.
* Possesses the ability to convey difficult issues and positions to senior officials and counterparts.
* Knowledge and effective use of computer software, especially MS Word and MS Excel.

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**Languages**

Fluent in spoken and written English language. Knowledge of any other UN official language is an asset.

1. **EVALUATION ETHICS**

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation.[[115]](#footnote-116) The evaluators must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees, and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners. The evaluation team will be held to the highest ethical standards and is required to sign the ‘Pledge of Ethical Conduct in Evaluation of the United Nations system’.[[116]](#footnote-117)

* Explicit statement of evaluator’s independence from any organizations that have been involved in designing, executing, or advising any aspect of the intervention that is the subject of the evaluation.
* Evaluators should not have a conflict of interest with the Project’s related activities. Evaluators will recuse themselves from evaluating: (a) any project, program, or activity that they worked on or had line responsibility for the work including project formulation and/or implementation (including writing of the project document), appraisal, administration, and completion reporting, or that they had a personal influence or financial stake in, in a previous capacity; or (b) an entity that they had a significant decision making, financial management or approval responsibility for or personal influence or financial stake in, or in which their future employment is a significant possibility.[[117]](#footnote-118)
* Evaluators will similarly recuse themselves when there is such involvement in a project, program, activity, or entity on the part of immediate family members. They should inform the Country Office (CO) management of any such potential conflict of interest, or potential perception of conflict of interest, before evaluator assignments are finalized.
* If a former staff member or consultant is being considered for a consulting assignment in a CO evaluation, particular care will be exercised by the concerned professional staff to ensure that the concerned person was not involved, directly or indirectly, in the subject of the evaluation during his/her past term as staff or consultant of the CO.

1. **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**
2. **Reporting**
3. **Reporting Lines**

* The principal responsibility for managing the end-term evaluation resides with the Commissioning Unit, i.e., UNDP Somalia which will assign the evaluation manager. The UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist will act as the evaluation manager and will be responsible for the oversight of the whole evaluation process ensuring independence of the evaluation process and, that policy is followed. The evaluator will report directly to the evaluation manager and will work closely with the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) composted of UNDP and UNSOM/PAMG and MoIFAR and OPM. However, the ERG will not participate in the meetings between the evaluators and evaluands.
* Any dispute between parties shall be brought to the attention of UNDP immediately. Changes to the Contract shall be formalized in writing through a Contract Amendment prior to implementation of the change. The UNDP shall not be liable for cost overruns arising from informal agreements.

1. **Progress Reporting**

* The evaluators shall begin the evaluation after submission and acceptance of the inception report and shall report to the evaluation manager on a weekly basis.
* The evaluator shall present the inception report and the draft evaluation report to the ERG and the evaluation manager. The ERG and Government partners shall review the reports and will provide an amalgamated set of comments to the evaluators within the agreed timeframe. The evaluators shall retain changes made in response to comments made by UNDP on the reports to show how the evaluator has addressed the comments. The evaluators must respond to all revisions requested by the ERG irrespective of number of revisions requested. The final report will be approved by the evaluation Commissioner.
* All reports shall be written/presented in the English language and shall be high quality. The length of the draft and final reports shall not exceed 50 pages plus annexes with an executive summary not exceeding two pages. The draft and final reports must be analytical in nature (both quantitative and qualitative) and structured around issues and related findings/lessons learnt. They must also include conclusions and recommendations.

1. **Administrative and Logistical Support**

* When in Somalia, the team leader will work under UNDP ‘duty of care’ and will comply with all UNDP security regulations. SSAFE pre-deployment certification is required for Somalia travel and if not already in possession of, it will be facilitated and paid for by UNDP. The number of days spent in SSAFE training shall not be considered as working days.
* When on duty travel to Somalia, UNDP shall provide full-board accommodation in Mogadishu and, a living allowance not to exceed the UN Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) applicable rate when on duty travel elsewhere in Somalia.
* The UNDP shall reimburse the evaluator the cost of a maximum of one round trip economy class air ticket (travel to join duty station/repatriation) on the most direct route travelled from the evaluators home country, visa, and terminal expenses. The reimbursement of air ticket shall not exceed quotation from UNDPs approved travel agent. Travel expenses will be reimbursed upon submission of a travel claim form (F-10) and required supporting documents. Should the evaluator choose to upgrade his/her travel to business or first class, he/she will do so at his/her own expense. The UNDP will arrange and bear cost of local travel in Somalia consistent with UNDPs travel policy for Individual Contractors and prevailing UN/UNDP security guidelines.
* The ERG shall provide all relevant documents required to facilitate the Evaluation, set up stakeholders’ meetings, interviews, arrange field visits and coordinate with implementing partners including MoIFAR and the OPM of the FGS. Effort will be made for the interviews to be as comprehensive as possible.
* The evaluator shall be required to submit to the UNDP Somalia Procurement Unit a completed and signed Individual Contractor Statement of Health together with proof of medical, medical evacuation and travel insurance cover for Somalia prior to travel to Somalia.
* The evaluator is required to have a personal laptop computer. The UNDP will provide office space and facilities such as internet connectivity and access to office printers in UNDP offices subject to availability.

1. **TIME FRAME FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS**

The total duration of the Evaluation will be 40 working days over a two-month period. The evaluation timeframe is as follows:

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **ACTIVITY** | **ESTIMATED # OF DAYS** | **DATE OF COMPLETION** | **PLACE** | **RESPONSIBLE PARTY** |
| **Phase One: Desk review and inception report** | | | | |
| Meeting briefing with UNDP (programme managers and project staff as needed) | - | Immediately after Contract execution | UNDP or remote | Evaluation manager and commissioner |
| Sharing of the relevant documentation with the evaluation team | - | Immediately after Contract execution | Via email | Evaluation manager and commissioner |
| Desk review, Evaluation design, methodology and updated workplan including the list of stakeholders to be interviewed | 7 days | Within two weeks of Contract execution. | Home- based | Evaluation Team |
| Submission of the inception report  (15 pages maximum) | - | Within two weeks of Contract execution. |  | Evaluation team |
| Comments and approval of inception report | - | Within one week of submission of the inception report | UNDP | Evaluation manager |
| **Phase Two: Data-collection mission** | | | | |
| Consultations and field visits, in-depth interviews, and focus groups | 20 days | Within four weeks of contract execution. | In country  With field visits | UNDP to organize with local project partners, project staff, local authorities, NGOs, etc. |
| Debriefing to UNDP and key stakeholders | 1 day | Immediately after completion of field mission. | In country | Evaluation team |
| **Phase Three: Evaluation report writing** | | | | |
| Preparation of draft evaluation report (50 pages maximum excluding annexes), executive summary (4-5 pages) | 7 days | Within three weeks of the completion of the field mission | Home- based | Evaluation team |
| Draft report submission | - | Same day of completion of report. |  | Evaluation team |
| Consolidated UNDP and stakeholder comments to the draft report | - | Within two weeks of submission of the draft evaluation report | UNDP | Evaluation manager and ERG |
| Debriefing with UNDP | 1 day | Within one week of receipt of comments from the ERG | Remotely UNDP | UNDP, ERG, stakeholder, and evaluation team |
| Finalization of the evaluation report incorporating additions and comments provided by project staff and UNDP country office | 4 days | Within one week of final debriefing | Home- based | Evaluation team |
| Submission of the final evaluation report to UNDP country office (50 pages maximum excluding executive summary and annexes) | - | Within one week of final debriefing  11 September 2018 | Home- based | Evaluation team |
| **Estimated total days for the evaluation** | **40** |  |  |  |

1. **APPLICATION SUBMISSION PROCESS AND CRITERIA FOR SELECTION**

Ranking of CV received from the GPN/ExpRes Roster.

1. **SCOPE OF PRICE AND SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS**

The total professional fee shall be converted into a fixed output-based contract payable in three instalments of 30%, 20% and 50% respectively regardless of extension of the herein specified duration.

Criteria for issuing the final payment of 50%.

* The final evaluation report includes all requirements outlined in the TOR and is in accordance with the evaluation guidance and responsive to all quality criteria listed in the UNDP evaluation quality checklist.
* The final evaluation report is clearly written, logically organized, and is specific for this project (i.e., the text has not been cut and pasted from other evaluation reports).
* The Audit Trail includes responses to and justification for each comment listed.

1. **TOR ANNEXES**

All relevant documentation and literature will be given to the consultants in soft copy once the evaluation begins, including the following:

**Project Documents**

* Project Document for Support to Political transition in Somalia
* Progress reports
* Annual work plans
* UNDP Evaluation Guidelines
* Report of HACT (Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer) Financial Audit.

**List of stakeholders and relevant institutions**

* United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
* Nations Assistance Mission Somalia (UNSOM) / Pollical Affairs and Mediation Group (PAMG)
* Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation of the Federal Government of Somalia (MoIFAR-FGS)
* Office of the Prime Minster of the Federal Government of Somalia (OPM-FGS)
* Office of the Presidents of the Federal member states

**Documents produced by donors and counterparts**

* Federal Government of Somalia:
* The National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) and National Reconciliation Process (NRP)
* Somalia National Development Plan (2020 – 2024)
* The May 27 political agreement
* UN System:
* UNDP Country Programme Document
* United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF)

**Evaluation matrix**

Please see sample evaluation matrix at the following link <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aT3WRirpBi84LQCLhVfT0d3CQnDof2A7/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=116822776256872262113&rtpof=true&sd=true>

# ANNEX 6: DRAFT ONLINE SURVEY

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Question #** | **Question** | **Responses** |
| **Section 1: Respondent information** | | | |
| 1 | What is your role in the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project? (Select one) | * Government official * UNDP project staff * Civil society representative * Project beneficiary * International partner * Other (please specify) |
| 2 | Which region are you based in? (Select one) | * Banadir * Puntland * Galmudug * Hir-Shabelle * Southwest * Jubaland * Other (please specify) |
| 3 | What is your gender? (Select one) | * Male * Female * Prefer not to say |
| 4 | Are you a part of any marginalized group? (Select one) | * Yes (please specify women, youth, people with disabilities, etc.) * No |
| **Section 2: Relevance and Coherence** | | | |
| 5 | How relevant do you think the project’s objectives are in addressing political transition and state-building in Somalia? | * Very relevant * Somewhat relevant * Not relevant * Don’t know |
| 6 | In your opinion, to what extent has the project aligned with Somalia’s National Development Plan (NDP-9) and the National Reconciliation Framework (NRF)? | * Fully aligned * Partially aligned * Not aligned * Don’t know |
| 7 | Do you think the strategies used by the project were appropriate to achieve its goals? | * Very appropriate * Somewhat appropriate * Not appropriate * Don’t know |
| **Section 3: Effectiveness** | | | |
| 8 | To what extent has the project helped to facilitate political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS)? | * Very effective * Somewhat effective * Not effective * Don’t know |
| 9 | In your opinion, how effective was the project in supporting the participation of marginalized groups (women, youth, people with disabilities) in the state-building process? | * Very effective * Somewhat effective * Not effective * Don’t know |
| 10 | What challenges, if any, have you observed in achieving the project’s objectives? | * (Open-ended) |
| **Section 4: Efficiency** | | | |
| 11 | How would you rate the overall efficiency of project implementation (in terms of coordination, resource use, and time management)? | * Highly efficient * Moderately efficient * Inefficient * Don’t know |
| 12 | Do you believe the project made the best use of available financial resources? | * Yes * No * Don’t know |
| 13 | What could have been done to improve the efficiency of the project’s implementation? | * (Open-ended) |
| **Section 5: Impact** | | | |
| 14 | What impact has the project had on improving political stability and state-building in your region? | * Significant positive impact * Moderate impact * Little to no impact * Don’t know |
| 15 | How has the project influenced the participation of women and youth in peacebuilding efforts? | * Significantly increased * Somewhat increased * No noticeable change * Don’t know |
| 16 | Can you provide examples of positive outcomes or changes brought about by the project in your community? | * (Open-ended) |
| **Section 6: Sustainability** | | | |
| 17 | Do you believe the changes initiated by the project will continue after its completion? | * Yes * No * Don’t know |
| 18 | What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the results of the project will be sustained? | * (Open-ended) |
| 19 | In your opinion, what are the biggest risks to the sustainability of the project’s outcomes? | * Lack of financial resources * Political instability * Insufficient capacity at local institutions * Other (please specify) |
| **Section 7: Inclusivity and Gender Equality** | | | |
| 20 | To what extent has the project addressed gender-specific needs and promoted women’s participation in the political process? | * Very effectively * Somewhat effectively * Not effectively * Don’t know |
| 21 | How could the project improve its approach to gender equality and inclusivity? | * (Open-ended) |
| **Section 8: General Feedback** | | | |
| 22 | Overall, how satisfied are you with the project’s performance in achieving its stated objectives? | * Very satisfied * Satisfied * Dissatisfied * Don’t know |
| 23 | What recommendations would you make to improve future projects of a similar nature? | * (Open-ended) |

# ANNEX 7: KII AND FGD QUESTIONNAIRES

## KII with UNDP staff

**Introduction:**

Thank you for participating in this interview. We are conducting an evaluation of the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project. Your insights as UNDP staff are crucial to understanding the project’s performance. The interview will focus on project design, implementation, efficiency, and lessons learned.

**A. Project Design and Relevance**

* Can you describe your role in the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project?
* How well do you think the project’s design and objectives aligned with Somalia’s broader political transition and state-building goals?
* Were there any gaps in the project’s design that affected its implementation or outcomes?

**B. Project Implementation**

* How did the project team address the political and security challenges during the implementation phase?
* Were there specific adjustments or strategies used to navigate changes in Somalia’s political landscape during the project?
* What coordination mechanisms were in place to ensure smooth implementation across different regions and stakeholders?

**C. Efficiency**

* How efficiently do you think resources (financial and human) were managed throughout the project?
* Were there any delays or challenges in the implementation? If so, what were the reasons, and how were they addressed?
* In hindsight, what could have been done to improve the efficiency of the project?

**D. Impact and Outcomes**

* What impact do you think the project has had in terms of fostering political dialogue and state-building?
* In what ways has the project contributed to gender equality and inclusivity in Somalia’s political processes?
* Can you share any success stories or examples of positive outcomes from the project?

**E. Sustainability**

* Are there mechanisms in place to ensure that the project’s benefits will continue after its completion?
* What do you see as the biggest risks to the sustainability of the project’s outcomes?

**F. Lessons Learned**

* Looking back, what are the key lessons learned from the implementation of this project?
* Based on your experience, what recommendations would you make for similar projects in the future?

## KII for Government Officials

**Introduction:**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. As a key government official involved in the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project, we would like to hear your insights on the project’s relevance, effectiveness, and impact on Somalia’s political transition.

**A: Relevance and Alignment with National Priorities**

* How relevant do you think the project’s objectives were to Somalia’s political transition and state-building priorities?
* In what ways did the project support the priorities outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP-9) and the National Reconciliation Framework?
* Were there any areas where the project could have better aligned with the needs of the government and the people?

**B: Political Dialogue and State-building**

* How effective was the project in facilitating political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS)?
* What impact do you think the project had on fostering state-building and reconciliation efforts across Somalia?
* Were there any specific challenges in engaging different political actors, and how were they addressed?

**C: Inclusivity and Participation**

* To what extent do you believe the project successfully engaged marginalized groups, including women and youth, in political processes?
* Were there any challenges in promoting inclusivity in the political dialogue? If so, how were these addressed?

**D: Efficiency**

* How would you assess the project’s efficiency in terms of resource allocation, coordination with government institutions, and timeliness?
* What factors contributed to any delays or challenges in implementation?

**E: Sustainability**

* In your opinion, what mechanisms are in place to ensure that the outcomes of the project will be sustained after its completion?
* What are the biggest risks to ensuring that the project’s outcomes continue to have a positive impact?

**F: Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

* What are the key lessons learned from this project, particularly in terms of its engagement with the Somali government?
* What recommendations would you make for improving future projects aimed at political transition and state-building in Somalia?

## KII for Civil Society

**Introduction:**

We appreciate your time today. We’re conducting an evaluation of the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project and would like to understand how civil society was involved and impacted by the project, particularly regarding inclusivity, gender, and youth participation.

**A. Role of Civil Society in the Project**

* Can you explain your organization’s involvement in the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project?
* How well do you think the project engaged civil society in the state-building and reconciliation processes?

**B. Inclusivity and Gender Equality**

* How effectively did the project promote gender equality and the participation of women in political processes?
* In your experience, what challenges, if any, did the project face in promoting inclusivity, particularly for marginalized groups such as women, youth, and people with disabilities?
* Can you provide examples of how civil society organizations have contributed to making the political dialogue more inclusive?

**C. Impact on Communities**

* What impact has the project had on the communities you work with, particularly in terms of political engagement and reconciliation?
* Have you noticed any changes in the attitudes or behaviours of community members towards peacebuilding and state-building since the project began?

**D. Coordination with Stakeholders**

* How well did the project coordinate with civil society organizations? Were there any gaps in communication or collaboration?
* What improvements would you suggest to enhance the engagement between civil society and the project team?

**E. Sustainability**

* Do you believe that the project’s outcomes will continue to benefit communities after its completion? Why or why not?
* What should be done to ensure that civil society remains actively engaged in political transition and state-building efforts?

**F. Lessons Learned**

* What lessons can be learned from the project in terms of engaging civil society effectively?
* What recommendations would you make for future projects that aim to involve civil society in political transition and reconciliation efforts?

## KII for International Partners

**Introduction:**

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. As an international partner of the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project, we would like to gather your views on the project’s effectiveness, collaboration, and impact on Somalia’s political transition.

**A. Role and Contribution of International Partners**

* Can you describe your organization’s role in supporting the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project?
* How effectively do you think international partners collaborated with UNDP and other local stakeholders in implementing this project?

**B. Relevance and Effectiveness**

* In your opinion, how well did the project’s objectives align with Somalia’s state-building and reconciliation needs?
* How effective was the project in fostering political dialogue and building institutional capacity for governance in Somalia?
* What impact have you observed on the ground, particularly in terms of peacebuilding and political stability?

**C. Coordination and Partnerships**

* How well did the project facilitate coordination among different international actors, including UN agencies and donor organizations?
* Were there any challenges in coordinating efforts, and how could they be addressed in future projects?

**D. Inclusivity and Gender**

* How successful was the project in promoting the participation of marginalized groups, including women and youth, in the political transition process?
* How could international partners further contribute to gender-responsive approaches in future political transition projects?

**E. Sustainability**

* From your perspective, are there mechanisms in place to ensure the sustainability of the project’s outcomes?
* What do you see as the biggest risks to the sustainability of the political transition and peacebuilding efforts in Somalia?

**F. Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

* What key lessons have international partners learned from this project?
* What recommendations would you make for improving future collaboration between international actors and local stakeholders in Somalia?

## FGD with Beneficiaries

**Introduction:**

Thank you all for participating in this focus group discussion. We are conducting an evaluation of the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project, and your experiences and insights as beneficiaries are vital. We will discuss how the project has impacted you and your community, especially in terms of political participation, gender equality, and peacebuilding.

**Section 1: General Understanding of the Project**

* How did you first become involved in the Support Political Transition in Somalia Project?
  + Probe: Were you informed about the project goals and how it would benefit you or your community?
* What specific activities or events of the project did you participate in?
  + Probe: Capacity-building workshops, reconciliation dialogues, civic engagement programs, etc.
* How well do you think the project addressed your needs and the needs of your community?
  + Probe: Were there areas where the project could have done more to support your community?

**Section 2: Political Participation and Impact on Communities**

* How has the project impacted your understanding of political processes in Somalia?
  + Probe: Have you learned more about governance, reconciliation, or the role of civil society?
* Have you or members of your community become more involved in political discussions or state-building efforts because of this project?
  + Probe: Can you provide examples of how this involvement took place?
* What changes have you seen in your community as a result of the project’s activities?
  + Probe: Positive changes in political dialogue, increased participation in reconciliation efforts, more community-led initiatives.
* What challenges or barriers have you faced in participating in the project’s activities?
  + Probe: Were there cultural, logistical, or security-related challenges that prevented greater participation?

**Section 3: Inclusivity and Gender Equality**

* How has the project promoted the participation of women and youth in political processes?
  + Probe: Can you give examples of how women and youth were empowered to take on leadership roles or participate in decision-making?
* In what ways has the project addressed the specific needs of marginalized groups (women, youth, people with disabilities) in your community?
  + Probe: Have there been special initiatives, training, or support focused on these groups?
* What challenges, if any, did the project face in ensuring inclusivity in your community?
  + Probe: Were there any groups left out or underrepresented in the project’s activities?

**Section 4: Peacebuilding and Reconciliation**

* How has the project contributed to peacebuilding or reconciliation in your community?
  + Probe: Have there been community dialogues or conflict resolution efforts supported by the project? Can you share examples?
* Do you feel that the project has helped reduce tensions or foster better relationships between different groups in your community?
  + Probe: In what ways did the project help promote understanding or resolve conflicts?

**Section 5: Sustainability and Long-Term Impact**

* What lasting changes do you think the project has brought to your community?
  + Probe: Are these changes likely to continue after the project ends? Why or why not?
* What could be done to ensure that the positive effects of the project continue in the future?
  + Probe: What kinds of support, training, or follow-up would help?

**Section 6: Overall Feedback and Recommendations**

* Overall, how satisfied are you with the project and its outcomes in your community?
  + Probe: What did you like the most? What could have been done better?
* What recommendations would you make for future projects like this one?
  + Probe: How can similar projects better address the needs of beneficiaries like you?

**Closing**

Thank you very much for your valuable insights and your participation in this FGD!

# ANNEX 8A: MEETING SCHEDULE

**See Attached Document:**

# ANNEX 8B: FINAL WORKPLAN

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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|  | **Workplan** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **End-Term Evaluation - Support Political Transition in Somalia Project** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | **Activity** | **# of Days/40** | **September** | | | | | **October** | | | | | | | | | **November** | | | | | | | | | | | **December** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | **Submission Dates** | |
|  | Week | | | | | Week | | | | | | | | | Week | | | | | | | | | | | Week | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | 3 | 4 | | 5 | | 1 | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 | | 5 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | 3 | | | 4 | | | 5 | | | |  |
|  | **Phase One: Desk Review and Inception Report** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Meeting briefing with UNDP | 0.5 | x | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Document review | 3 |  | |  | | x |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Develop inception report & submit for approval | 3.5 |  | |  | |  | x | | x | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | **October 7, 2024** | |
|  | **Phase Two: Data-Collection Mission** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Finalize with UNDP list of key stakeholders for evaluation | 1 |  | |  | |  |  | | x | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Schedule KII meetings after introduction email by UNDP | 6 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | | x | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Carry out data collection (Mogadishu, Baidoa, & Barawe) | 10 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | | x | | x | | x | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Prepare preliminary findings | 3 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | x | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Debrief UNDP and key stakeholders | 1 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | x | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | **December 12, 2024** | |
|  | **Phase Three: Evaluation Report Writing** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Data analysis and draft evaluation report | 6.5 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | x | | x | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Submit draft report | 0.5 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | x | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | | **January 13, 2025** | |
|  | Debrief with UNDP | 1 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | | x | | |  | | |  | | |  | | |  | |  | |
|  | Finalize evaluation report and submit for final approval | 4 |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | | | x | | |  | | |  | | **February 4, 2025** | |

# ANNEX 9: UNEG CODE OF CONDUCT FOR EVALUATORS

**Evaluators/Consultants:**

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people’s right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people’s right to provide information in confidence and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders’ dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.
8. Must ensure that independence of judgement is maintained, and that evaluation findings and recommendations are independently presented.
9. Must confirm that they have not been involved in designing, executing or advising on the project being evaluated and did not carry out the project’s Interim Evaluation.

**Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form**

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Evaluator: André Kahlmeyer

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): Conflict Management Consulting (CMC

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at Vienna on 04 February 2025

Signature:

![A close-up of a signature

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incorrect.](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**Evaluators/Consultants:**

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people’s right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people’s right to provide information in confidence and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders’ dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.
8. Must ensure that independence of judgement is maintained, and that evaluation findings and recommendations are independently presented.
9. Must confirm that they have not been involved in designing, executing or advising on the project being evaluated and did not carry out the project’s Interim Evaluation.

**Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form**


Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Evaluator: Leyla Jeyte

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): Independent

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at Mogadishu (Place) on February 4, 2025 (Date)



Signature: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

1. This is the entity that has overall responsibility for implementation of the project (award), effective use of resources and delivery of outputs in the signed project document and workplan. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. PBF Project Document Revised 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. UNDP Somalia CPD 2021-2025 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. PBF Project Document Revised 2023. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. UNDP Somalia CPD 2021-2025 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. PBF Project Document Revised 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. UNDP Somalia CPD 2021-2025 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. PBF Project Document Revised 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. PBF Project Document Revised 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. KII with Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. KII with Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. KIIs with UNDP and Government Counterparts [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. KIIs with UNDP and UNSOM. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Document review; KIIs with UNDP and UN PBF. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. KIIs with Government Counterparts. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. PBF Project Document Revised 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF Partner and Government [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. KII with Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. Document review; KIIs with Government Counterparts. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. On this point, UNDP commented in a draft version of the report: „However, it needs to be noted that those claims may be contested because UN established a weekly platform chaired by DSRSG to coordinate and follow up on the quota related activities, assigning tasks to different agencies, which were reporting them during the follow up meetings.”. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. Document review; KIIs with Government Counterparts and UN PBF. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. Document review; KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM, Government Counterparts and UN PBF. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. KII with Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF and Government Counterpart [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF 2025 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. OPM Gender Marker Project - NVC Training Report, December 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. KIIs with UNDP, UNSOM and UN PBF [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. This is the entity that has overall responsibility for implementation of the project (award), effective use of resources and delivery of outputs in the signed project document and workplan. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. Standard and Norms for evaluation as set by the UN Evaluation Group: http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/1914 [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. Access at: <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/section-6.shtml> [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. UNEG, ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’, 2020. Access at: <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/2866> [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/2866#:~:text=The%20UNEG%20Ethical%20Guidelines%20for%20Evaluation%20were%20first%20published%20in%202008.&text=This%20document%20aims%20to%20support,day%20to%20day%20evaluation%20practice. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. For this reason, UNDP staff members based in other country offices, regional centres and headquarters units should not be part of the evaluation team. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)